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
AND

BIBLICAL REPOSITORY.

EDWARDS A. PARK AND SAMUEL H. TAYLOR, EDITORS

VOL. XVII.

ANDOVER:
WARREN F. DRAPER.
LONDON:
TRÜBNER & CO., PATERNOSTER ROW.
1860.



Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1860,
BY WARREN F. DRAPER,
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts.

ANDOVER:
CLUB
PRESS:

ANDOVER:
PRINTED BY WARREN F. DRAPER.

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THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA,
No. LXV.
AND
BIBLICAL REPOSITORY
No. CXVII.

JANUARY, 1860.

ARTICLE I.

THE RELIGIOUS LIFE AND OPINIONS OF JOHN MILTON.

(Concluded from Vol. XVI., pp. 557—603.)

BY REV. A. D. BARBER, WILLISTON, VT.

Comparison of the "Christian Doctrine" with Milton's other Works.

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE assumes the entire credibility of revelation, and the absolute authority of the word of God; also personal and individual responsibility in all matters of faith and practice. No one is known to hold these doctrines with a firmer grasp than John Milton. He relied upon reason and faith as fully competent, when enlightened by the word and the Spirit of God, to ascertain everything man needs to believe and practise, or know and do. Reason he makes submit to faith; and faith stand upon the word of God. In other words, Milton would have belief limited and practice determined by a manly exercise of the understanding and the reason upon the scriptures, as the "common rule and touchstone," or "the only sufficient and infallible guide."

"*The Christian Doctrine*," he says, in the opening of the treatise, "is that *Divine Revelation*, disclosed in various ages by *Christ* (though He was
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not known under that name in the beginning), concerning the nature and worship of the *Deity*, for the promotion of the glory of God and the salvation of mankind. This doctrine, therefore, is to be obtained, not from the schools of the philosophers, nor from the laws of man, but from the holy scriptures alone, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit." (*Prose Works*, Vol. IV. pp. 10, 11. Bohn's Edit. Lond. 1853.) "The rule and canon of faith is Scripture alone." "Scripture is the sole judge of controversies." "Every man is to decide for himself, through its aid, under the guidance of the Spirit of God. The Scriptures, partly by reason of their own simplicity, and partly through the Divine illumination, are plain and perspicuous in all things necessary to salvation, and adapted to the instruction even of the most unlearned, through the medium of diligent and constant reading." "It is not, therefore, within the province of any visible church, much less of the civil magistrate, to impose their own interpretations on us as laws, or as binding on the conscience; in other words, as matters of implicit faith." (*Id.* pp. 440, 444, 445.)

Throughout all his works, Milton places the same reliance on the authority of the scriptures. He appeals to them for the settlement of the question. In the last work he published, he uses words stronger, if possible, than those already quoted.

"True religion," he says, "is the true worship and service of God, learned and believed from the word of God only. No man or angel can know how God would be worshipped and served, unless God reveal it. He hath revealed and taught it us in the Holy Scriptures by inspired ministers, and in the Gospel by His own Son and His apostles, with strictest command to reject all other traditions or additions whatsoever; according to that of St. Paul: 'Though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other Gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be anathema, or accursed.' And Deut. 4: 2, 'Ye shall not add to the word which I command you, neither shall you diminish aught from it.' Rev. 22: 18, 19, 'If any man shall add,' etc. — *Id.* Vol. II. p. 509.

Milton, as Dr. Sumner well remarks, "has shown a partiality in all his works, even on subjects not immediately connected with religion, for supporting his argument by scripture."

Divisions of The Christian Doctrine.

Milton, after Wollebius, comprehends the Christian Doctrine under two divisions: *Faith, or the Knowledge of God, and Love, or the Worship of God.*

Faith here, as he says, "does not mean the habit of believing, but the things to be habitually believed." Love, also, signifies the whole "knot of Christian graces," or "practical religion, comprehending all the fruits of the Spirit flowing from, and founded upon, vital faith." Milton often, afterwards, uses the word in this sense. (See *Tetrachordon*, *Prose Works*, III. 323. *Treatise of Civil Power*, etc. ii. 534. *Parad. Lost*. xii. 583.)

Of God.

The first subject under the division is "*Of God.*" Like his great contemporaries, Cudworth and Locke, Milton denies that there can be any such thing as real atheism.

"Though there be not a few," he says, "who deny the existence of God, for, 'the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God' (Ps. 14 : 1), yet the Deity has imprinted upon the human mind so many unquestionable tokens of Himself, and so many traces of Him are apparent throughout the whole of nature, that no one in his senses can remain ignorant of the truth."—*Prose Works*, Vol. IV. p. 16.

Besides these tokens and traces of the Divine existence on the soul, and throughout creation, Milton holds that there are direct proofs *in* the soul, in

"that feeling, whether we term it conscience or right reason, which, in the worst of characters, is not altogether extinguished. Conscience, or right reason does, from time to time, convince every one, however unwilling, of the existence of God, the Lord and ruler of all things, to whom, sooner or later, each must give an account of his own actions, whether good or bad."—*Id.* p. 15.

While Milton holds, as a fact, that reason and conscience bear witness to the existence of God, he holds as firmly to the necessity of revelation to unfold to us the character of God, and teach us how we ought to think and feel towards Him. No one can have right thoughts of God," are his words, "with nature or reason alone for his guide, independent of the word or message of God."—*Id.* pp. 13—16.

Concerning this whole subject—the being and character of the one only God—Milton is not known to have held

anything different from the scripture doctrine as understood by the great body of the Christian church. He embraces, heartily, all that the scriptures teach on this fundamental doctrine.

Some, indeed, think he inclines too much to conceive of the Infinite Spirit under the forms of matter and the affections of human nature.

"When we speak of knowing God," he says, "it must be understood with reference to the imperfect comprehension of man; for, to know God as He really is, far transcends the powers of man's thoughts, much more of his perception." . . . Our safest way is to form in our minds such a conception of God as shall correspond with his own delineation and presentation of Himself in the sacred writings. . . . We may be sure that sufficient care has been taken that the Holy Scriptures should contain nothing unsuitable to the character or dignity of God, and that God should say nothing of Himself which could derogate from His own majesty. It is better, therefore, to contemplate the Deity, and to conceive of Him, not with reference to human passions, that is, after the manner of men who are never weary of forming subtle imaginations respecting Him; but after the manner of Scripture, that is, in the way wherein God has offered Himself to our contemplation; nor should we think he would say, or direct anything to be written of Himself which is inconsistent with the opinion He wishes us to entertain of His character. Let us require no better authority than God himself for determining what is worthy or unworthy of Him. If 'it repented Jehovah that He had made man' (Gen. 6 : 6), and 'because of their groanings' (Judg. 3 : 18), let us believe it did repent Him, only taking care to remember, that what is called repentance, when applied to God, does not arise from inadvertency, as in man; for so He has Himself cautioned us, Numb. 23 : 19, 'God is not a man, that He should lie; neither the son of man, that He should repent. . . . (See the whole passage.) If God be said to have made man in His own image, after His likeness (Gen. 1 : 26), and that, too, not only as to his soul, but also as to his outward form (unless the same words have different significations here and in ch. 5 : 3, 'Adam begat a son in his own likeness, after his image);' and if God habitually assign to Himself the members and form of man, why should we be afraid of attributing to Him what He attributes to Himself, so long as what is imperfection and weakness when viewed in reference to ourselves, be considered as most complete and excellent when imputed to God? . . . Let us be convinced that those have acquired the truest apprehension of the nature of God, who submit their understandings to His word; considering that He has accommodated His word to their understandings, and has shewn what He wishes their notions of the Deity should be." . . .

"In arguing thus, we do not say that God is in fashion like unto man, in

all His parts and members ; but that, as far as we are concerned to know, He is of that form which He attributes to Himself in the sacred writings. — *Id.* pp. 16—20.

In all this, we do not discover any unpardonable heresy. And we are the less inclined to look for heresy here, when he adds, as he does immediately after : “ It is impossible to comprehend accurately, under any form or definition, the Divine nature.” Milton, as it seems to us, makes no more than duly prominent an important truth, viz. that the language of sacred affection which God uses to accommodate Himself to our senses, is to be understood “ not in a sense lowered and vague as compared with that which it bears in its ordinary acceptation, but in a sense of incalculably greater intensity and depth.”

Decrees of God.

GENERAL DECREES.

From the existence and attributes of God, Milton passes to the decrees of God. These he divides, with Wollebius, into general and special.

“ God’s General Decree,” he says, “ is that whereby God has decreed from all eternity, of His own most free will and wise and holy purpose, whatsoever He Himself willed, or was about to do.”—*Id.* p. 30.

Milton holds it absurd to separate decrees from the foreknowledge and counsel or wisdom of God. He makes foreknowledge and wisdom underlie decrees, and be logically before them, or before them in the order of nature, if not in the order of time. This he evidently rests on the postulate, that *a thing must be seen to be possible, before it can be determined that it shall be actual.* The Creator must see, too, that what is possible, will be best, if it become actual, before He will determine that it shall become actual.

“ Properly speaking,” he says, “ the Divine counsel can be said to depend on nothing but on the wisdom of God Himself, whereby He perfectly foreknew in his own mind, from the beginning, what would be the nature and

event of every future occurrence when its appointed season should arrive."
— *Id.* p. 36.

"It is absurd to separate the decrees or will of the Deity from his eternal counsel and foreknowledge, or to give them priority of order. For the foreknowledge of God is nothing but the wisdom of God under another name, or that idea of everything which He had in His mind, to use the language of men, before He decreed anything."— *Id.* p. 30.

Milton also rejects absolute decrees in reference to things that appear to us contingent; such as the actions of free, responsible beings.

"God decreed nothing absolutely," he says, "which He left in the power of free agents."— *Id.* p. 31. "Those who contend that the liberty of actions is subject to an absolute decree, erroneously conclude the decree of God is the cause of His foreknowledge, and antecedent in order of time. If we must apply to God a phraseology borrowed from our own habits and understanding, to consider His decrees as consequent upon His foreknowledge seems more agreeable to reason as well as Scripture, and to the nature of the Deity Himself; who, as has just been proved, decreed everything according to His infinite wisdom by virtue of His foreknowledge."

"That the will of God is the first cause of all things, is not intended to be denied; but His prescience and wisdom must not be separated from His will, much less considered as subsequent to the latter in point of time. The will of God, in fine, is not less the universal first cause, because He has Himself decreed that some things should be left to our free will, than if each particular event had been decreed necessarily."— *Id.* p. 39.

In respect to the fulfilment of a decree, Milton makes the distinction much in vogue of late, between the necessity of its fulfilment and the certainty of the same.

"I allow," are his words, "that future events which God has foreseen, will happen certainly, but not necessarily, because prescience cannot be deceived; but they will not happen necessarily, because prescience can have no influence on the object of foreknowledge, inasmuch as it is only an intransitive action. What, therefore, is to happen according to contingency and the free will of man, is not the effect of God's prescience, but is produced by the free agency of its own natural causes, the future spontaneous inclination of which is perfectly known to God. Thus God foreknew that Adam would fall of his own free will; his fall was therefore certain, but not necessary; since it proceeded from his own free will, which is incompatible with necessity."— *Id.* p. 41.

"If it be asked how events, which are uncertain, inasmuch as they depend on the human will, can harmonize with the decrees of God, which are

immutably fixed? for, it is written, Ps. 33 : 11, 'The counsel of Jehovah standeth forever; Heb. 6 : 17, 'the immutability of His counsel,' it may be answered: First, that to God the issue of events is not uncertain, but fore-known with the utmost certainty, though they be not decreed necessarily.—Secondly, in all the passages referred to the Divine counsel, it is said to stand against all human power and counsel; but not against liberty of will in things which God Himself has placed at man's disposal, and had determined so to place from all eternity. For, otherwise, one of God's decrees would be in direct opposition to another."—*Id.* p. 36.

SPECIAL DECREES.

"Of God's special decrees," Milton says: "The first and most important is that which regards His Son, and from which He primarily derives His name of *Father*." Having quoted several passages of scripture, in which the names and relations of the Father and the Son are the principal ones, he concludes: "From all these it appears that the Son of God was begotten by the decree of the Father."—*Id.* 42. But more of this hereafter.

Of Predestination.

The principal *special decree* of God relating to man, Milton terms *predestination*. This word our author uses as equivalent to election. He maintains that this is the scripture use of the word, and that it does not include, but rather excludes, reprobation; that is, when God is said to have predestinated or elected any to eternal life, it must not be inferred that, in so doing, He predestinated to eternal death, or reprobated those whom He passed by and did not elect. See pp. 43, 44, and 45.

On the doctrine of predestination and election, Milton is obnoxious to the charge of making the cause or reason of the divine predestination of some to eternal life lie in the creature rather than in the Creator—in those that are predestinated, and not in Him who predestinates. This, to us, is no predestination at all, but simply a permission that they be saved who choose to be saved; a permission, too, granted

on foresight of what their conduct and condition would be. In other words, it is nothing more than a silent foreboding, if the word be allowed, and acquiescence in what the creature of himself does.

Milton makes the root of election what the scriptures plainly make its fruit. He makes repentance and faith the antecedent conditions, when they are the subsequent results. This he does in his definition :

"Predestination," he says, *"is that whereby God, in pity to mankind, though foreseeing that they would fall of their own accord, predestinated to eternal salvation, before the foundation of the world, those who should believe and continue in the faith; for a manifestation of the glory of his mercy, grace, and wisdom, according to His purpose in Christ."* — *Id.* p. 43.

In other passages Milton expressly says: "the principle of predestination depends upon a condition;" this condition is "faith in Christ." "No one believes because God foresees his belief;" but God foresees his belief, because he was about to believe." — pp. 52, 53—57.

What act or agency there is in predestination, thus defined and limited, that in any way influences and secures the belief and continuance in faith of those that are finally saved, we are unable to see. Consequently, we are unable to see how it can be "for the manifestation of the glory of God's mercy and grace." We cannot see how these are manifested by simply permitting the creature to do as it is foreseen he will do. Mercy and grace imply something more than this simple looking on and refraining from action, and letting the sinner work out his own salvation. There is no mercy and grace manifested until something positive is done; some causative agency exerted more than justice demands, or misery can expect; some agency, too, that shall help secure salvation, and be fully competent to secure it.

If there be errors in Milton's presentation of the subject of decrees, as there evidently is, they arise from failure to grasp the whole subject, and make the decree of the Infinite cover the whole ground, and predetermine even the free actions of all moral beings. The conception is both possible and required of a wisdom and power in the Creator, to form a de-

tree extensive enough, and of such a nature, that it shall cause to be everything that ever will be, from first to last, and leave not one single thing contingent, and yet so arrange the universe, or so arrange influences and causes, that moral beings will of themselves freely choose and do everything that is foreseen and predetermined or decreed concerning them. Or, in the words of inspired disciples, citing a particular case, viz. the murderous putting to death of the Son of God, and the connection of Herod, Pilate, the Gentiles, and the people of Israel therewith, "do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined, before, to be done." Acts 4: 28. Milton himself, several times in the discussion of decrees, seems to have come near grasping this great subject. See, especially, the passage beginning — "That the will of God is the first cause of all things." p. 39.

Of Predestination in "The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce," "Paradise Lost," etc.

The opinions on predestination, election, and reprobation, above given, are those that Milton holds in *The Christian Doctrine*. His other great works contain admissions and advocate opinions on these subjects directly at war with these in *The Christian Doctrine*.

"*The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*," published in 1644, certainly admits the truth, if it does not directly advocate, the doctrine of predestination as we understand it to be taught in the scriptures, and explained by Augustine, Calvin, and Edwards.

"The Jesuits, and that sect among us which is named of Arminius," he says, "are wont to charge us of making God the author of sin, in two degrees especially, not to speak of His permission: 1st, Because we hold that He hath decreed some to damnation, and consequently to sin, say they; next, Because those means, which are of saving knowledge to others, He makes, to them, an occasion of greater sin. Yet, considering the perfection wherein man was created, and might have stood, no degree necessitating his free will, but subsequent, though not in time, yet in order to causes, which were in his own power; they might, methinks, be persuaded to absolve both God and us."—*Prose Works*, Vol. III. p. 223. Bohn's Ed.

In addition to these plain words, Milton continues, through two pages, to show how needless and absurd it is for Jesuits and Arminians to bring these objections to the doctrine under consideration. Even the heathen knew better.

"Plato and Chrysippus, and their followers, the Academics and Stoics," he says, "though they taught of virtue and vice to be, both, the gift of divine destiny, yet could they give reasons not invalid, to justify the counsels of God and fate from the insulsiety of mortal tongues: that man's own free will, self-corrupted, is the adequate and sufficient cause of his disobedience besides fate; as Homer also wanted not to express, both in his *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. And Manilius the poet, although in his fourth book he tells of some "created both to sin and punishment;" yet without murmuring, and with an industrious cheerfulness, he acquits the Deity. They were not ignorant, in their heathen lore, that it is most godlike to punish those who, of His creatures became His enemies, with the greatest punishment; and they could attain, also, to think that the greatest, when God Himself throws a man furthest from Him; which then they held he did, when He blinded, hardened, and stirred up his offenders, to finish and pile up their desperate work, since they had undertaken it. To banish forever into a local hell, whether in the air or in the centre, or in that uttermost and bottomless gulf of chaos, deeper from holy bliss than the world's diameter multiplied; they thought not a punishing so proper and proportionate for God to inflict, as to punish sin with sin. Thus were the common sort of Gentiles wont to think, without any wry thoughts cast upon divine governance. And therefore Cicero, not in his Tusculan or Campanian retirement among the learned wits of that age, but even in the Senate to a mixed auditory (though he were sparing otherwise to broach his philosophy among statists and lawyers), yet as to this point, both in his Oration against Piso, and in that which is about the Answers of the Soothsayers against Clodius, he declares it publicly as no paradox to common ears, that God cannot punish man more, nor make him more miserable, than still by making him more sinful. Thus we see how, in this controversy, the justice of God stood upright even among the heathen disputers." — *Id.* pp. 223—225.

Milton's editors and biographers maintain that this is proof Milton now (1644) held the doctrine of predestination. In a note referring to the passage above given, J. A. St. John says:

"Milton appears to have afterwards altogether abjured the doctrine of predestination, which is so repugnant to common sense, and to all our most exalted ideas of the Divinity, that to hold it and believe, at the same time, in the goodness of God, is impossible. When Milton wrote as he does in the text, he was comparatively young, and was hurried into imperfect views by

his own vehement passions. He came, afterwards, to think more calmly and correctly; though, on many points, he always reasons more like an orator than a philosopher." — *Id.* p. 223.

Mr. Keightley also says of the same passage :

"He [Milton], at this time, held the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, but in the sublapsarian form; for he thus writes." — *Keightley's Life etc. of Milton*, p. 157.

It must be remembered that both St. John and Keightley concur in the opinion of Dr. Sumner, that The Christian Doctrine was composed after "The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce," and during Milton's declining years. In The Christian Doctrine, then, they find the abjuration and those more calm and correct thoughts St. John speaks of. Keightley, also, finds the same in *Paradise Lost* and in "Of True Religion, Heresy," etc., published in 1673, but with how much justice a slight examination will show.

Milton, in *Paradise Lost*, makes no unfrequent or doubtful mention of the doctrines of grace. Nearly every book has something characteristic and distinctive on this subject — the third, perhaps, more than any other. Here the fall and the recovery of man, with what led to the first, and is necessary to the last, is most positively and clearly laid down.

"The particular beauty of the speeches in the third book," are Addison's words, "consists in that shortness and perspicuity of style, in which the poet has couched the greatest mysteries of Christianity, and drawn together, in a regular scheme, the whole dispensation of Providence with respect to man. He has represented all the abstruse doctrines of predestination, free will, and grace, as also the great points of incarnation and redemption (which naturally grow up in a poem that treats of the fall of man), with great energy of expression, and in a clearer and stronger light than ever I met with them in any other writer." — *Spectator*, No. 315.

In this book Milton does, in the most unequivocal manner, assert the freedom of man, and his guilt for his sin and his fall. He had entire liberty and full strength to stand. No foreknowledge of God, nor decree, necessitated nor influenced, in any way, his sin or fall. Thus the Father discourses to the Son, in that passage in which He foretells the

success of Satan, who has now gone to tempt the newly-created and blessed pair.

“ Man will hearken to his glozing lies,
 And easily transgress the sole command,
 Sole pledge of his obedience : so will fall,
 He and his faithless progeny. Whose fault ?
 Whose but his own ? Ingrate, he had of me
 All he could have : I made him just and right,
 Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall.
 Such I created all the ethereal powers
 And spirits, both them who stood and them who fail'd :
 Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell.
 Not free, what proof could they have given sincere
 Of true allegiance, constant faith, or love ?
 When only, what they needs must do, appeared,
 Not what they would : what praise could they receive ?
 What pleasure I from such obedience paid ?
 When will and reason (reason also is choice)
 Useless and vain, of freedom both despoiled,
 Made passive both, had served necessity,
 Not me. They therefore, as to right belong'd,¹
 So were created, nor can justly accuse
 Their Maker, or their making, or their fate ;
 As if predestination over-ru'd
 Their will, disposed by absolute decree,
 Or high foreknowledge : they themselves decreed
 Their own revolt, not I ; if I foreknew,
 Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault,
 Which had no less proved certain unforeknown.
 So without least impulse or shadow of fate,
 Or aught by me immutably foreseen,
 They trespass, authors to themselves in all,
 Both what they judge and what they choose ; for so
 I form'd them free, and free they must remain,
 Till they enthrall themselves ; I else must change
 Their nature, and revoke the high decree
 Unchangeable, eternal, which ordain'd
 Their freedom : they themselves ordain'd their fall.
 The first sort by their own suggestion fell,
 Self-tempted, self-depraved : man falls deceived
 By the other first : man, therefore, shall find grace ;
 The other, none ; in mercy and justice both,
 Through heaven and earth, so shall my glory excel ;
 But mercy, first and last, shall brightest shine.”

For similar passages, see V. 235 and 520—540. VIII. 635. IX. 344—354. X. 9—12 and 43—48.

While Milton thus clears the Most High from all complicity with man's sin and loss, and makes man's *fault* turn wholly on the exercise of his own free, yet misdirected will, he does, on the other hand, no less definitely and plainly attribute his recovery and salvation to the election of God's grace; to which election God was not moved by anything that was about to be in man, or anything He foresaw in him, but by what was in Himself. The willing, or the repentance and faith in which the sinner turns to holiness and God, are not the causes or conditions of his election, but the fruits of it. Such is the doctrine of the following passage :

“ O Son, in whom my soul hath chief delight, . . .

All hast thou spoken as my thoughts are, all

As my eternal purpose hath decreed :

Man shall not quite be lost, but saved who will ;

Yet not of will in him, but grace in me

Freely vouchsafed ; once more I will renew

His lapsed powers, though forfeit and enthrall'd

By sin to foul exorbitant desires :

Upheld by me, yet once more he shall stand

On even ground against his mortal foe,

By me upheld ; that he may know how frail

His fallen condition is, and to me owe

All his deliverance, and to none but me.

Some I have chosen of peculiar grace,

Elect above the rest ; so is my will :

The rest shall hear me call, and oft be warned

Their sinful state, and to appease betimes

The incensed Deity, while offered grace

Invites ; for I will clear their senses dark,

What may suffice, and soften stony hearts

To pray, repent, and bring obedience due.

To prayer, repentance, and obedience due,

Though but endeavored with sincere intent,

Mine ear shall not be slow, mine eye not shut :

And I will place within them as a guide

My umpire Conscience, whom if they will hear,

Light after light, well used, they shall attain ;

And to the end persisting, safe arrive.

This, my long sufferance and my day of grace,

They who neglect and scorn shall never taste ;
 But hard be harden'd, blind be blinded more,
 That they may stumble on and deeper fall ;
 And none but such from mercy I exclude." III. 168—202.

For passages in harmony with this, see also III. 227—233. 290—294. VII. 79 and 173. X. 817. XII. 405—410.

All these, and especially that quoted at length, are in harmony with The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, and in direct opposition to Christian Doctrine, which declares :

"There is no particular predestination or election, but only general ; or, in other words, the privilege belongs to all who heartily believe and continue in their belief." "Of what consequence is it to us, to know whether the prescience of God foresees who will, or will not, subsequently believe ? for no one believes because God has foreseen his belief ; but God foresees his belief, because he was about to believe."

That is, man believes of himself ; God, in no way, influences him thereto ; only, simply foresees what he will do. Again :

"Those who hold the doctrine that man believes because he is ordained to eternal life, not that he is ordained to eternal life because he will believe, cannot avoid attributing to God the character of a respecter of persons." — *Prose Works*, Vol. IV. p. 57.

Milton does indeed, in *Paradise Lost* as in Christian Doctrine, hold that man's freedom is not lost, or intrenched upon, in passing from death unto life ; salvation, in some sense, turns upon his willing or choice.

"Man shall not quite be lost, *but saved who will.*"

Yet, lest he should be understood to deny that man is moved to this willing, and hold that he moves himself, or is self-moved to it ; consequently his will, or he himself rather than anything outside of himself, is the primary and efficient cause of his willing, and his salvation, he adds :

"Yet not of will in him, but grace in me,
 Freely vouchsafed."

Milton goes even further, and defines more carefully the character of this grace, and the condition on which it is given. It is not given because man merits it, or seeks it, but because God wills it. It

“ Comes *unprevented, unimplored, unsought*;
Happy for man, so coming; he her aid
Can never seek, once dead in sins and lost.”

III. 230—233.

Those that receive it “are chosen of peculiar grace,”

“ Elect above the rest.”

Is not this, in other but plain words, the doctrine of Christ in John 1 : 12, 13? “As many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on His name; which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God.” Also of Paul, Rom. 11 : 5—8? “Even so then at this present time, also, there is a remnant according to the election of grace. And if by grace, then it is no more of works; otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then it is no more grace: otherwise work is no more work. What then? Israel hath not obtained that which he seeketh for; but the election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded.”

On the passage above quoted from *Paradise Lost*, Bk. III. l. 163—202, besides the remark of Addison, already given, there are two characteristic notes, remarkable from the fact that they agree as to the doctrine of the passage, though one is the concession of a friend, and the other of an enemy of this doctrine.

“Our author,” says Newton, pointing to the line — ‘Some I have chosen,’ “did not hold the doctrine of rigid predestination: he was of the sentiments of the more moderate Calvinists; and thought that some, indeed, were elected of peculiar grace; the rest might be saved, complying with the terms and conditions of the Gospel.”

“It is a great pity,” says Thyer, pointing to that part of the passage that begins — ‘This, my long sufferance, and my day of grace,’ that our author should have thus debased the dignity of the Deity by putting in his mouth this horrid doctrine of a day of grace, after which it is not possible for a man

to repent; and there can be no sort of excuse for him, except the candid reader will make some allowance for the prejudices which he might possibly receive from the gloomy divinity of that enthusiastic age in which he lived." — *Quoted from Brydges.*

The evidence is full and positive that Milton did hold what are called Calvinistic doctrines. The only questions are — When? How long? There is but little evidence that he had any special affection for them in his youth, though he was educated in Puritan principles. His earliest tutor, Young, has been called a "rigid and zealous Puritan." Notwithstanding his early education —

"There are many traits in his early taste and early poems," says Sir E. Brydges, "which make us hesitate as to his boyish attachment to this sect." "There is evidence that, at this time," says Prof. Masson, "he had not given so much attention, on his own personal account, to matters of religious doctrine, as he afterwards bestowed." . . . His seriousness was rather a constitutional seriousness, ratified and nourished by rational reflection than the assumed temper of a sect." — *Essays on English Poets*, p. 38. Camb. 1856. "It does not seem to me," to quote again from Brydges, "that there are any traces of these Calvinistic prejudices at the time he visited Italy, unless his friendship to Charles Diodati be a sign of it, which I think (looking at the poetical address) is not." — *Brydges' Life of Milton*, p. 11. Bost. 1855.

There is the same progress and coming into the light, on these doctrines, as on that of the Son of God and the Spirit of God. If he denied them in youth and early manhood, he came to hold them and embrace them, in later years, as is seen in "The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce," in 1644, in *Paradise Lost*, and, as might be shown by an appeal to "True Religion, Heresy, etc.," in 1673, the year before his death.

Of the Son of God in The Christian Doctrine.

The next subject, in the order of Christian doctrine, is "*The Son of God.*" In entering upon the discussion of this fundamental doctrine, Milton gives warning beforehand, that he is about to maintain opinions obnoxious to the church generally. He also shows not a little anxiety to conciliate favor and get a fair hearing. He likewise shows much

manliness in facing the opprobrium which he knows he shall draw upon himself in advocating his views of the Son of God.

"I cannot enter," he says, "upon subjects of so much difficulty as the Son of God and the Holy Spirit, without again premising a few introductory remarks. If indeed I were a member of the church of Rome, which requires implicit obedience to its creed, on all points of faith, I should have acquiesced, from education or habit, in its simple decree and authority, even though it denies that the doctrine of the Trinity, as now received, is capable of being proved from any passage of Scripture. But since I enrol myself among the number of those who acknowledge the Word of God alone as the rule of faith, and freely advance what appears to me much more clearly deduced from the Holy Scriptures than the commonly received opinion, I see no reason why any one who belongs to the same Protestant or Reformed Church, and professes to acknowledge the same rule of faith as myself, should take offence at my freedom, particularly as I impose my authority on no one, but merely propose what I think more worthy of belief than the creed in general acceptance." — *Prose Works*, IV. 78.

Having thus premised, Milton devotes the largest and most elaborate chapter of *Christian Doctrine* to his views of the character and offices of the Son of God. Outright he rejects the supreme divinity of the Son, and maintains that He is a dependent, created being — created within the limits of time, not by any necessity, but by the will and decree of the Father. He is endued, by the Father, with the divine nature and substance, but distinct from the Father and inferior, yet one with Him in affection and will. He further maintains that the Son existed in the beginning, and was the first of the whole creation. By power delegated from the Father, He created the heavens, and the earth, and all things. With these views, Milton of course denies the eternal generation of the Son, His self-existence, coequality, and coessentiality with the Father. But we must not leave the subject with this synopsis. We must show the manner in which these opinions are supported.

In the chapter on decrees, Milton divides the efficiency of God into *internal* and *external*. Internal efficiency is independent of all extraneous agency. "Such," he says, "are His decrees." External efficiency shows itself in the execution of the divine decrees. It is that —

"Whereby He carries into effect, by external agency, whatever decrees He hath purposed within Himself. It may be comprised under the heads of *Generation, Creation, and the Government of the Universe.*"

"First, *Generation*, whereby God, in pursuance of His decree, has begotten His only Son, whence He chiefly derives His appellation of Father." — *Id.* 30. 79.

Milton now, to establish what he has laid down, argues like a schoolman, for several pages. He argues to show that the Son was not eternally begotten, but begotten within the limits of time. He admits the truth of the holy scriptures :

"Whatever some of the moderns allege to the contrary, that the Son existed in the beginning, under the name of the Logos or Word, and was the first of the whole creation ; by whom, afterwards, all other things were made, both in heaven and earth."

Having quoted John 1 : 1—3, "In the beginning," etc. ; 17 : 5, "And now, O Father, glorify Me with thine own self, with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was ;" and many other passages, in which not only existence before the world, but even the creation of the world, is ascribed to the Son, he says :

"All these passages prove the existence of the Son before the world was made, but they conclude nothing respecting His generation from all eternity.

Upon the 3d Psalm and those kindred passages that speak of the Son as begotten, we must give a specimen of Milton's argumentation.

"It is evident," he says, "upon a careful comparison and examination of all these passages, that however the generation of the Son may have taken place, it arose from no natural necessity, as is generally contended, but was no less owing to the decree and will of the Father than His priesthood or kingly power, or His resurrection from the dead. Nor is it any objection to this, that He bears the title of Begotten, in whatever sense that expression is to be understood ; or of *God's own Son*, Rom. 8 : 32. For He is called the own Son of God merely because He had no other Father besides God ; whence He Himself said, that God was His Father. (John 5 : 18.) For to Adam God stood less in the relation of Father than of Creator, having only formed him from the dust of the earth ; whereas He was properly the Father of the Son, made of His own substance. Yet it does not follow from

hence that the Son is coessential with the Father; for then the title of Son would be least of all applicable to Him, since He who is properly the Son is not coeval with the Father, much less of the same numerical essence, otherwise the Father and the Son would be one person; nor did the Father beget Him from any natural necessity, but of His own free will, a mode more agreeable to the paternal dignity. . . For questionless it was in God's power, consistently with the perfection of His own essence, not to have begotten the Son, inasmuch as generation does not pertain to the nature of the Deity, Who stands in no need of propagation; but whatever does not pertain to His own essence or nature, He does not affect, like a natural agent, from any physical necessity. If the generation of the Son proceeded from a physical necessity, the Father impaired Himself by physically begetting a co-equal; which God could no more do than He could deny Himself; therefore the generation of the Son cannot have proceeded otherwise than from a decree, and of the Father's own free will. Thus the Son was begotten of the Father in consequence of His decree, and therefore within the limits of time; for the decree itself must have been anterior to the execution of the decree." — *Id.* p. 82.

Again :

"When the Son is said to be the first born of every creature, and the beginning of the creation of God, nothing can be more evident than that God of His own will created, or generated, or produced the Son before all things, endued with the Divine nature, as in the fulness of time, He miraculously begat Him in His human nature, of the virgin Mary. The generation of the Divine nature is described by no one with more sublimity and copiousness than by the apostle to the Hebrews, 1 : 2, 3, Whom He hath appointed heir of all things; by Whom, also, He made the worlds; Who, being the brightness of His glory, and the express image of His person, etc. It must be understood from this, that God imparted to the Son as much as He pleased of the Divine nature, nay of the Divine substance itself, care being taken not to confound the substance with the whole essence, which would imply that the Father had given to the Son what He retained, numerically, the same Himself; which would be a contradiction of terms, instead of a mode of generation." — *Id.* p. 85.

Having reasoned in this style through many pages, Milton lays down the following propositions, to be proved from the scriptures :

"1st. That the name, attributes, and works of God are attributed, in the Scriptures, only to one God, the Father, as well by the Son Himself as by his apostles. 2d. That whenever they are attributed to the Son, it is in such a manner that they are easily understood to be attributable, in their original, proper sense, to the Father alone; and that the Son acknowledges

Himself to possess whatever share of Deity is assigned to Him, by virtue of the peculiar gift and kindness of the Father; as the apostles also testify. And, Lastly, that the Son Himself, and His apostles, acknowledge throughout the whole of their discourses and writings, that the Father is greater than the Son, in all things." — *Id.* p. 96.

Milton admits that the Son is God; but denies that He is supreme God, or equal with the Father.

"He ascribes to the Son as high a share of Divinity," says Dr. Sumner, "as was compatible with the denial of His self-existence and eternal generation. Had he avoided the calling Christ a creature, he might have been ranked with that class of semi-Arians who were denominated Hoemiousians, among whom Dr. Samuel Clarke must be reckoned. On the whole, his chapter on the Son of God may be considered as more nearly coincident with the opinions of Whitby, in his *Last Thoughts*, than of any other modern divine. Both acknowledge Christ to be *Verus Deus*, though not *Summus Deus*; both admit His true dominion and His Godhead, though not original, independent, and underived; both assert His right to honor and worship, in virtue of the Father's gift; both deny His sameness of individual essence with the Father; and both maintain that He derives all His excellences and power from the Father, and consequently is inferior to the Father." — *Id.* p. xxix.

This is, as must be confessed, according to Dr. Channing, "strong reasoning against the supreme Divinity of Jesus Christ." To it, however, bishop Bull has made the only fitting reply. "The Unitarians," he says, "own Christ to be God, but a made God, such as is a mere creature, such as had no existence before his birth of the virgin. *O great God!*" — *Bull's Works*.

Milton closes the discussion of this subject by declaring "Such was the faith of the saints respecting the Son of God; such is the tenor of the celebrated confession of that faith; such is the doctrine which, alone, is taught in scripture, which is acceptable to God, and has the promise of eternal salvation. Finally, this is the faith proposed to us in the Apostle's Creed, the most ancient and universally received compendium of belief in the possession of the church." — *Id.* pp. 149, 150.

Of the Spirit of God.

The discussion of the character and offices of the Holy Spirit is much shorter and less elaborate than that of the Son of God. Milton's opinion on this point may be gathered from the following passage, found at the close of the chapter on the Holy Spirit.

"Lest, however, we should be altogether ignorant who or what the Holy Spirit is, although Scripture nowhere teaches us, in express terms, it may be collected from the passages quoted above, that the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as He is a minister of God, and therefore a creature, was created or produced of the substance of God, not by a natural necessity, but by the free will of the Agent, probably before the foundations of the world were laid, but later than the Son, and far inferior to Him." — *Id.* p. 169.

Christian Doctrine denies that prayer is to be offered to the Holy Spirit. Having quoted the apostolic benediction : "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ," etc. (2 Cor. 13:14), which is usually regarded as a prayer offered to the Spirit as well as to the Father and the Son, there follows :

"This, however, is not so much an invocation as a benediction ; in which the Spirit is not addressed as a person, but sought as a gift, from Him who, alone, is there called God, namely the Father, from whom Christ himself directs us to seek the communication of the Spirit, Luke 11 : 13. If the Spirit were ever to be invoked personally, it would be then especially, when we pray for Him ; yet we are commanded not to ask Him of Himself, but only of the Father. Why do we not call upon the Spirit Himself, if He be God, to give Himself to us ? He who is sought from the Father, and given by Him, not by Himself, can neither be God, nor an object of invocation." — *Id.* p. 165.

Milton says nothing of the Trinity ; nor could he, consistently. Having denied the proper Divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit, there is no ground for the Trinity. In the chapter on the existence and attributes of God, he maintains that there is "numerically one God and one Spirit in the common acceptation of numerical unity." His denial of the Trinity, while it is thus indirect, is positive and clear.

These are the opinions that Milton holds, of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, in Christian Doctrine.

That he held different opinions, and those directly contradictory to these, at other times in his life, is as plain as that his words are the true expressions of his thoughts and opinions. He held to both the supreme Divinity of the Son and the Spirit, and the reality of the Trinity.

Of the Son of God and the Spirit of God, in The Works of 1641 and following.

The Works of 1641 are Milton's theologico-controversial works. Here, if anywhere, we should expect he would be careful of his doctrinal admissions and statements. He was now thirty-three years of age. "Of Reformation in England" was the first of these works, and the first of Milton's prose works that he published. Here he maintains the Divinity of the Son by condemning the Arians, whose peculiarity it is, as is well known, to deny this doctrine. But he shall speak for himself. He had just said that willingness to die, or martyrdom, for a doctrine, did not, in all cases, prove one a true Christian, nor prove the doctrine true for which death was suffered. To use his own words :

"He is not, therefore, above all possibility of erring, because he burns for some points of truth. Witness the Arians and Pelagians, which were slain, by the heathen, for Christ's sake; yet we take both these for no true friends of Christ." — *Prose Works*, vol. ii. p. 371.

And this, he says, as he shows in another place more distinctly, not because of their life, but because of their doctrine.

Other passages of this work are more marked in their condemnation of Arianism, and their assertion of the true doctrine of the Son of God, particularly that one in which Milton dwells at length upon the character of the early Christian Fathers, and notes their errors in faith and practice; and especially among them those of the emperor Constantine —

"How he slew his nephew Commodus, a worthy man, his noble and eldest son Crispus, his wife Fausta, besides numbers of his friends: then his cruel exactions, *his unsoundness in religion*, favoring the Arians that had been con-

demned in a council, of which himself sat as it were president ; his hard measure and banishment of the faithful and invincible Athanasius ; his living unbaptized almost to his dying day : these blurs are too apparent in his life. But since he must needs be the load-star of reformation, as some men clatter, it will be good to see, further, his knowledge of religion, what it was ; as by that we may likewise guess at the sincerity of his times in those that were not heretical, it being likely that he would converse with the famousst prelates (for so he had made them) that were to be found for learning.

“ Of his Arianism we heard ; and for the rest, a pretty scantling of his knowledge may be taken by his deferring to be baptized so many years ; a thing not usual, and repugnant to the tenor of Scripture ; Philip knowing nothing that should hinder the eunuch to be baptized after profession of his belief. Next, by the excessive devotion, that I may not say superstition, both of him and his mother Helena, to find out the cross on which Christ suffered, that had long lain under the rubbish of old ruins ; — a thing which the disciples and kindred of our Saviour might, with more ease have done, if they had thought it a pious duty ; — some of the nails whereof he put in to his helmet, to bear off blows in battle ; others he fastened among the studs of his bridle, to fulfil (as he thought, or his court bishops persuaded him) the prophecy of Zechariah : “ And it shall be, that which is in the bridle shall be holy to the Lord.” Part of the cross, in which he thought such virtue to reside as would prove a kind of palladium, to save the city wherever it remained, he caused to be laid up in a pillar of porphyry by his statue. How he or his teachers could trifle thus, with half an eye open upon St. Paul’s principles, I know not how to imagine.”

Having gone on, at some length, adding to these errors of Constantine, the passage concludes :

“ Thus flourished the church with Constantine’s wealth, and thereafter were the effects that followed : his son Constantius proved a *flat Arian*, and his nephew Julian an apostate, and then his race ended ; the church that, before, by insensible degrees, welked and impaired, now, with large steps, went down hill decaying. . . . Thus you see, sir, what Constantine’s doings in the church brought forth, either in his own or in his son’s reign.” — *Id.* pp. 381—383.

Milton here puts down Constantine’s Arianism as one of his chief errors. Besides calling him unsound in religion, for this very thing, he ranks it with his ambition, his superstition, injustice, and cruelty. As if, too, to show his opinion of Athanasius, the well-known and illustrious defender of the doctrine of the Trinity against the Arians, he calls him the

"*faithful and invincible Athanasius,*" strongly approbating both the man and his doctrine.

If anything more be needed from this work, it is found near its close, in a prayer addressed, be it noted, to the Spirit and the Son, equally with the Father—one of the most lofty and sublime prayers ever heard from human lips; and one, too, avowing the doctrine of Trinity, in a way that every Trinitarian receives it, as a true expression of the scripture doctrine.

"Thou, therefore, that sittest in light and glory unapproachable, Parent of angels and men! Next Thee I implore, Omnipotent King, Redeemer of that lost remnant whose nature Thou didst assume, Ineffable and Everlasting Love! And Thou, the third subsistence of Divine Infinitude, illumining Spirit, the joy and solace of created things! One Tri-personal Godhead! Look upon this Thy poor and almost spent and expiring church."—*Id.* p. 417.

"Of Prelatical Episcopacy" is the next of Milton's works. It was published a little later than "Of Reformation in England," in the same year (1641). This work is equally positive in condemning Arianism; or rather, in avowing the equality of the Father and the Son as a scripture doctrine. Milton is aiming to show the equality of bishops and presbyters, in the apostolic church. He cites Tertullian, who, as it seems, had denied this equality.

"But," he says, "suppose Tertullian had made an imparity where none was originally; should he move us, that goes about to prove an imparity between God the Father and God the Son, as these words import in his book against Praxeas?—'The Father is the whole substance, but the Son a derivation and portion of the whole, as He himself professes: Because the Father is greater than me.' Believe him now, for a faithful relator of tradition, whom you see such an unfaithful expounder of the Scripture."—*Id.* p. 433.

In Christian Doctrine Milton maintains that imparity between the Father and the Son is taught in scripture; here, that it is denied, and their equality plainly taught; so plainly, that Tertullian shows himself incompetent to be a faithful relator of tradition even, because he does not see it. Contradiction cannot be more positive and complete.

"Animadversions upon Remonstrant's Defence" follows.

This also was published in 1641. In this work Milton avows his belief in the eternal generation of the Son; a doctrine pointedly denied in *Christian Doctrine*; for he thus prays to the Son: "O Thou, the *Ever-begotten Light* and perfect Image of the Father! intercede." This prayer proceeds, throughout, upon the supposition that its author held the Son to be not only *verus Deus*, but *summus Deus*. Besides the passage already quoted, it contains these declarations: "Thou art a God." "Thy nature is perfection."—*Prose Works*, Vol. III. pp. 71, 72. In the same work, too, the author strongly reprobates the Arians and Pelagians, as "infecting the people by their hymns and forms of prayer."—*Id.* p. 57.

There is one more work of this year—"The Reason of Church Government," etc. In this work, too, as in "*Of Reformation in England*," he who had maintained, in *Christian Doctrine*, that the Spirit is an "inferior creature," and "not an object of invocation," speaks most devoutly of prayer to the Eternal Spirit. Some works he was then meditating, he says, could "not be raised from the heat of youth, or the vapors of wine," . . . "but by devout prayer to that Eternal Spirit, who can enrich with all utterance and knowledge."—*Prose Works*, Vol. II. p. 481.

In a note on that passage, in *Christian Doctrine*, which expressly states that the Spirit can be neither God, nor an object of invocation, Dr. Sumner refers to the passage just cited from "*The Reason of Church Government*," to show that—

"On this subject (the doctrine of the Spirit) Milton is again at variance with himself." "It should be remembered, however," continues Dr. S., "that this treatise was written as early as 1642, when Milton was not more than thirty-four."¹—*Prose Works*, IV. 165.

To understand this note, it must be remembered that Dr. S. holds *Christian Doctrine* to have been later than "*The Rea-*

¹ "*The Reason of Church Government*," etc., was first published, as I have before stated, in 1641. See Hollis Catalogue, with original dates of the works therein contained. Hollis Memoirs, Vol. II. p. 583.

son of Church Government," and the change with Milton to have been from the holding of the Divinity of the Spirit, in "The Reason of Church Government," to the denial of the same in Christian Doctrine; whereas, the change was the other way.

From the passages now brought forward, and the whole of the works from which they are taken, there is no doubt that, at this period, Milton shrank from all denial of the essential and supreme Divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and held the tri-unity of the Godhead. Indeed, the evidence is so full and positive, that not only Dr. Sumner, but the last editor of the prose works, J. A. St. John, says:

"It appears from this and other passages (passages already brought forward from 'Reformation in England'), that the author, in his younger years, was orthodox, as it is called; but he afterwards altered his sentiments, as it is plain from his tract on 'True Religion, Heresy, Schism,' etc., which was the last work he published." — *Prose Works*, II. 371.

To the doctrine of this tract we shall attend in the proper place.

"Eikonoclastes," of 1649, is in harmony with the works of 1641. Here Milton, according to scripture, represents the Holy Ghost as He who dictates and inspires prayer. Hypocrisy and irreverence in prayer are sins against Him as against God. He also classes Arianism with Pelagianism, and characterizes them as "infectious heresies." — *Prose Works*, I. 327, 433.

Of the Son and the Holy Spirit, in The Works of 1659.

The works of this year, to be noticed, are "A Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes," "Likeliest Way to Remove Hirelings out of the Church," and "The Ready and Easy Way," etc. All of these works, especially in their frequent reference to the Holy Spirit, are in harmony with the works of 1641. See *Prose Works*, II. 133, 523, 524, and especially 537. Also, III. 5, 23, 25, 27, 36, 39.

In "The Ready and Easy Way," etc., Milton apostrophizes

the Deity, and prays in a way that certainly implies that he then held a plurality of coëqual persons in the Godhead.

"What I have spoken," he says, "is the language of that which is not called amiss, 'The Good Old Cause.' . . . Thus much I should, perhaps, have said, though I was sure I should have spoken only to trees and stones; and had none to cry to, but with the prophet: O earth, earth, earth! to tell the very soil itself, what her perverse inhabitants are deaf to. Nay, though what I have spoke should happen (which Thou suffer not, who didst create mankind free! nor Thou, next, who didst redeem us from being servants of men!) to be the last words of our expiring liberty." — *Id.* II. 138.

Dr. Sumner, though in the end he finds Milton denying the coëquality of the Father and the Son, quotes this passage to show that "so late even as the year 1660, he admitted their coëquality." — *Prose Works*, IV. p. xxx. Keightley, also, refers to this passage, for the same purpose. *Keightley's Life of Milton*, p. 157, note. Several other passages of "The Ready and Easy Way," etc., go even more strongly to support this opinion. See *Prose Works*, II., 103, 133, and especially 127.¹

In "The Likeliest Way," etc. (1659), there is a passage which Drs. Sumner and Todd both understand as referring to Christian Doctrine. The passage seems to relate to a work then in existence. Milton is speaking of what is necessary to give a people the knowledge of Christianity. Having alluded to the preaching of the word, he goes on:

"To these I might add other helps, which we enjoy now, to make more easy the attainment of Christian religion by the meanest: the entire Scripture translated into English, with plenty of notes; and *somewhere or other*, I trust, may be found some wholesome body of divinity, as they call it, without school-terms and metaphysical notions, which have obscured rather than explained our religion, and made it seem difficult without cause." — *Prose Works*, III. 26. See, also, Dr. Sumner and Todd's reference to this passage, IV. 441. — *Todd's Life*, p. 302.

¹ Dr. Sumner, Sir E. Brydges, St. John, and Mr. Keightley give 1660 as the date of "The Ready and Easy Way," etc. St. John says it was "first published" in this year. Hollis Catalogue gives 1659. Dr. Johnson and Mr. Mitford agree with Hollis.

Of the Doctrine of the Son and the Holy Spirit, in Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained.

Paradise Lost was begun, according to Philips, in 1655 ; completed and published, in 1666. In the very beginning of the great epic we have a passage that must have no little weight in helping us understand all that comes after it. Here, as is well known, Milton invokes that Eternal Spirit, whose aid fourteen years before, when meditating upon his immortal work, he had declared so necessary.

“ And chiefly Thou, O Spirit, that dost prefer
Before all temples the upright heart and pure,
Instruct me, for Thou know’st. Thou, from the first,
Wast present, and with mighty wings outspread,
Dove-like sat’st brooding on the vast abyss,
And mad’st it pregnant : what in me is dark
Illumine ; what is low, raise and support ;
That to the height of this great argument
I may assert eternal Providence
And justify the ways of God to man.”

Bk. I. l. 17—26.

It is not at all doubtful what Being and Person the poet addresses. Milton himself, as if guarding against all misunderstanding, definitely informs us. It is He who, at creation, “ moved upon the face of the waters.” Gen. 1 : 2. He also, who inspired Moses to write the Genesis of Creation, and tuned the harp of David to sing, and touched the lips of prophets to speak of a new creation, fairer than the first ; who prefers

“ Above all temples the upright heart and pure.”

Poets indeed are wont, at the beginning of their effusions, without much seriousness or meaning, to court the aid of the muse. But the Spirit of God that moved upon the face of the waters at creation, that inspired prophets and apostles, and sanctifies the heart, was not of the Nine. His is too sacred a name, and John Milton too devout and reverential a person, to use so hallowed a name in so irreverent a manner. It does violence to his whole character to suppose that

he would here so solemnly invoke the illumination of the Spirit for the mere purpose of ornament; and much more that he would ascribe to an "empty dream," as he calls the muse, in the beginning of the seventh book of *Paradise Lost*, attributes and acts that belong to God only.

Lest however there should be, after all, any doubt whose aid Milton invokes, even after he has designated the Holy Spirit by such significant words and attributes; or, lest it should be forgotten as his great work unfolds, and any should at length come to say, as some now do, he only conformed to ordinary poetic usage, and courted the presence of some fabled heathen divinity—in the beginning of the seventh book he specifies again, and denies any such imputation.

Milton does indeed, even here, begin :

"Descend from heaven, Urania ;"

but, in the lines following, he denies that the Divine Voice he had followed was thus rightly named.

"The meaning, not the name I call ; for Thou,
Nor of the muses Nine, nor on the top
Of old Olympus dwell'st ; but heavenly born,
Before the hills appear'd, or fountain flow'd,
Thou with Eternal Wisdom didst converse,
Wisdom thy sister, and with her didst play
In presence of the Almighty Father pleased,
With thy celestial song." — l. 1—12.

Can it be that John Milton, "magnum et venerabile nomen," here ascribes the really Divine attribute of eternity to a fabled heathen goddess, and represents her whom, a little further on, he calls an "empty dream," as a companion, fit and coëqual of the Almighty Father? Nay, nay ; he hastens, as we have already said, to forbid such an unjust imputation.

"For Thou,
Nor of the muses Nine, nor on the top
Of old Olympus dwell'st, but heavenly-born,
Before the hills appeared, or fountain flow'd,
Thou with Eternal Wisdom didst converse."

The poet in this passage, had in mind, without doubt, the Divine description of Wisdom in Prov. 8: 22—32, where, as Newton says, “the phrase of Wisdom always ‘rejoicing before God,’ is ‘playing,’ according to the Vulgate Latin: *ludens coram eo omni tempore.*” And so Milton quotes it also in his *Tetrachordon*, written nearly a quarter of a century before: “I was, saith the Eternal Wisdom, daily his delight, playing always before Him.” — *Newton in Todd*, Vol. III. p. 6.

Milton felt, in his inmost soul, the awfulness of his subject, and the greatness of his work. He felt too, equally, the need of illumination and aid, as he was about to adventure so high a flight; and, with childlike confidence and meek humility, he bowed down before the Spirit of all grace, that Eternal Spirit of whom he had spoken before, when meditating this work, and whose aid he had then declared necessary, then, when there is no doubt that he held the essential Divinity of the Spirit, and His coëquality with the Father and Son. Then, as now, he calls Him the “Illumining Spirit.” This prayer, then, is incontrovertible evidence that now, as then — now, as well as a quarter of a century before, John Milton shrunk from all denial of the essential Divinity of the Holy Spirit, and held to an equality of persons in the Godhead. This prayer, note too, is in direct contradiction to Milton’s views of the Holy Spirit in Christian Doctrine.

Paradise Regained, published in 1671, is in harmony with *Paradise Lost*. In the beginning of this work, too, Milton invokes the Spirit, not now in any other than His own proper name and person, the Spirit that led Jesus into the wilderness.

“Against the spiritual foe, and brought’st Him thence,
By proof the undoubted Son of God” —

the same note, too, that was “wont to inspire his prompted song.” This prayer, more than the former, if possible, forbids us to suppose that Milton’s invocations of the Divine Spirit are merely “*exordia pro forma.*” In short, such are

the scripture allusions he makes, and the scripture history he adopts as the basis of both *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained*, and even the scripture phrases and attributes he ascribes to the One he invokes; for it is evident that, at the beginning of *Paradise Lost*, and at the opening of the seventh book, as well as here at the beginning of *Paradise Regained*, he refers to Moses, prophets, and evangelists, and applies to the Person whose aid he implores, the very phrases and agencies they attribute to the Spirit of God, agencies and attributes that can be possessed only by the Infinite Spirit—so evident is this, we say, that to suppose that the poet meant to address any other than the Holy Spirit, is to make the venerable and severe Milton a profane and contemptuous trifler, not only with the Spirit of God, but with the word of God, and even with the understanding of men. Such a supposition cannot be, for a moment, entertained. Milton's invocations are devout supplications to the "Third Subsistence of Divine Infinitude, the Illumining Spirit," for both illumination and strength to—

"Assert eternal Providence,
And justify the ways of God to man."

We have now, as we think, gained high vantage ground, from which to ascertain what Milton holds of the Son of God, in *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained*. If, as we have shown, he holds the Holy Spirit to be truly divine, this is, to say the least, strong presumptive evidence that he holds the Son to be so too; for it is generally acknowledged that the person and character of the Spirit are less fully and clearly defined, even in the word of God, than those of the Son. Milton himself notices this fact. (See *Christian Doctrine*, Vol. IV. of *Prose Works*, pp. 151, 169.) If, then, he makes the Spirit of God truly divine, much more would he the Son of God.

Concerning the character Milton gives the Son of God, in *Paradise Lost*, space does not allow long discussion; nor does the subject need it. In numerous passages of the great epic, Milton ascribes to the Son of God the names and char-

acters of the Supreme Being, and clothes him with powers and prerogatives that none but Jehovah can possess. He calls Him "God," "Almighty," "Omnipotent," and "Jehovah," without any qualification. He ascribes to Him omniscience, omnipresence, existence from eternity, absolute, independent, or self existence. The passages in which these names and attributes of the one only God are ascribed to the Son of God, are so numerous that they hardly need be referred to. They are found throughout the seventh book, frequent in the third and eighth, and not unfrequent in other parts of the sublime epic. See bk. vii. l. 243, 261, 339, 589, 590, 602 ; bk. viii. l. 398, 405—408, 415.

Besides these names and attributes, Milton makes the Son Himself say to Adam :

"What think'st thou, then, of Me, and this My state ?
Seem I to thee sufficiently possess'd
Of happiness, or not, *Who am alone*
From all eternity ? for none I know
Second to Me, or like, equal much less."

Adam replies :

"Supreme of things !
Thou in Thyself art perfect, and in Thee
Is no deficiency found."
No need that Thou
Should'st propagate, *already infinite,*
And through all numbers absolute, though One."
Bk. viii. l. 408—421.

Numerous passages, also, as definitely and unequivocally ascribing supreme Divinity to the Son, are found in the third book. See l. 138—143, 168—173, 305—415.

That Milton follows, very closely, the word of God in speaking of the Son of God, adhering for the most part to the very phrases and figures of Inspiration, is so plain and patent that all his critics have remarked it; nor does it escape the observation of the ordinary reader. Like the word of God, he hesitates not to represent the Son or the Father as existing in finite forms, forms that strike the sense,

and acting in finite modes and agencies ; in deliberating, counselling, and decreeing ; as changing place in space and time ; as affected with sentiments and emotions such as we feel. Milton does this, seeming to be assured, all the time, that he does not degrade or lower the Godhead in thus applying to him words and images that Inspiration has sanctioned. He seems to feel, as he says, "that the holy scriptures contain nothing unsuitable to the Divine character and dignity ; and that God has not, in the guide He has given to His creatures, ascribed to Himself any attribute He would not willingly have them ascribe to Him." *Prose Works*, IV. p. 17.

While Milton, at one time, ascribes to the Son modes of being and action that are finite, or at least less than infinite, and at another the existence, the powers, and prerogatives that belong to Jehovah only, does he contradict himself, or make the character of the Son mixed, and make it impossible for us to ascertain what he holds Him to be ? By no means. These passages are to be understood, and the character of the Son therein determined, not by restricting it to the lower, but by reference to the higher attributes in them. The infinite does not exclude the finite, but consists with it, while the finite does exclude the infinite. In other words, the Infinite Being can possess modes and act through agencies that are less than infinite — that are finite ; but no merely finite being can either possess really divine attributes, or exercise infinite prerogatives. These are, like God's nature, incommunicable. The Creator may act the creature, and, in the mystery of godliness, become the creature ; but the creature cannot become the Creator. Milton's ascription of finite powers and agencies to the Son of God, then, does not prove that he did not hold Him to be infinite, and no more than finite. His ascription of divine attributes and infinite prerogatives to Him, does prove that he held Him to be *something* more than finite — to be infinite — *verus Deus* and *summus Deus*.

Besides the characters given to the Son and the Spirit separately, in *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained*, there

are passages that are best understood as adopting the unity of these Persons in the Godhead, or the Trinity. Such is that in the seventh book of *Paradise Lost*, where the poet represents —

“The King of Glory, in his powerful word
And Spirit, coming to create new worlds.” — l. 204-.

This seems another full endorsement of the tripersonal Godhead “Of Reformation in England,” in 1641. *Thus we have a continuous and unbroken testimony that Milton held the supreme Divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and the reality of the Trinity, beginning in 1641 and then so full and positive as to admit of no doubt, and reaching down to 1671, but three years before Milton’s death.*

Of “*The Letters of State.*”

Additional strength, if it be needed, can be given to this chain of testimony from Milton’s *Letters of State*. These cover a period of ten years, from 1649 to 1659. They show, throughout, how strongly attached was their author to the “evangelic” or “orthodox faith,” for this latter is the phrase he most frequently uses in these *Letters*, especially when addressed to those that are known to be the exponents of this faith, or its practical advocates and defenders. In his *Letters*, for example, to “The States of the United Provinces,” in 1655, concerning the efforts of the duke of Savoy to persecute and destroy the Piedmontois, he says :

“We make no question but that you have already been informed of the Duke of Savoy’s Edict, set forth against his subjects inhabiting the valleys at the feet of the Alps, *ancient professors of the orthodox faith*; by which edict they are commanded to abandon their native habitations, stripped of all their fortunes, unless, within twenty days, they embrace the Roman faith; and with what cruelty the authority of this edict has raged against a needy and harmless people, many being slain by the soldiers; the rest, plundered and driven from their houses, together with their wives and children, to combat cold and hunger among desert mountains and perpetual snow. These things with what commotion of mind you heard related, what a fellow-feeling of the calamities of brethren pierced your breasts, we readily conjectured from the depth of our own sorrow, which certainly is most heavy

and afflictive. For, being engaged together by the same tie of religion, no wonder we should be so deeply moved with the same afflictions upon the dreadful and undeserved sufferings of our brethren. Besides, that your conspicuous piety and charity towards the *orthodox*, wherever overborne and oppressed, has been frequently experienced in the most urging straits and calamities of the churches. For my own part, unless my thoughts deceive me, there is nothing wherein I should desire more willingly to be overcome, than in good will and charity toward *brethren* of the same religion, afflicted and wronged in their quiet enjoyments; as being one that would be accounted always ready to prefer the peace and safety of the churches before my particular interests."

After expressing the hope that what the States of the United Provinces had done, together with what Great Britain had done, would lead the duke of Savoy to "restore his subjects to their habitations and estates, and grant them their pristine freedom in the exercise of their religion," he continues :

"But if he still persist in the same obstinate resolutions of reducing to utmost extremity those people (*among whom our religion was either disseminated by the first doctors of the Gospel, and preserved from the defilement of superstition, or else restored to its pristine sincerity, long before other nations obtained that felicity*), and determines their utter extirpation and destruction; we are ready to take such other course and counsels with yourselves, in common with the rest of our conformed friends and confederates, as may be most necessary for the preservation of just and good men, upon the brink of inevitable ruin; and to make the duke himself sensible that we can no longer neglect the heavy oppressions and calamities of our orthodox brethren." — *Prose Works*, II. pp. 253, 254.

Also in Letters to the "Evangelic Cantons and Cities of Switzerland," on the same subject, after alluding to the "abundant proof of their singular love and affection for the orthodox faith," he says :

"Seeing then, by the most strict communion of religion, that you, together with ourselves, are all brethren alike, or rather one body with these unfortunate people, . . . we thought it convenient to write to your lordships concerning our brethren."

A little further on, he calls these inhabitants of these Alpine valleys, "professing our religion," "*most dearly beloved brethren in Christ.*"

Milton repeats these terms, so expressive of unity of faith and love, in Letters to "Lewis, king of France," "Frederic III., king of Denmark, Norway," etc., adding often other terms, such as "*purity of faith*," "*evangelic faith*," to show his estimation of the Piedmontois.

Though these Letters are written in the "name of the Parliament and of Oliver, Protector of the Commonwealth of England," yet the sentiments of John Milton are seen in them as plainly as are those of Daniel Webster in his Letter to the Austrian Ambassador, Chevalier Hulseman, or in any State Paper he ever dictated. Of these Letters, Symmons says :

"It may be observed that the character of their immediate author is too great to be altogether lost in that of the ministerial organ ; and that, in many of them Milton may be traced in distinct though not in discordant existence, from the power for whom he acts." — *Symmons's Life of Milton*, p. 271.

It is, in fact, because of the embodiment in the person, of the mind and will of the State, and his ability to express them, that he is chosen as its representative. What Lewis XIV. of France said : "*L'etat, c'est moi*," is true of every Secretary of State, and especially true when he is a Webster or a Milton. The mere fact, then, that John Milton was the chosen Secretary of the Presbyterian Parliament, and of Oliver Cromwell, is strong presumptive proof that he now held the orthodox faith. This, with the spirit of his Letters, leaves little doubt on this point.

Dilemma of Aubrey, Wood, and of all that hold with them concerning the Christian Doctrine.

The works now noticed, it must be remembered, cover a period of thirty years — from 1641 to 1671. They appeared not all at, or near, the beginning or close of this period, but successively throughout its whole length. Only a few years came between any two ; so that their testimony is continuous and unbroken. That Milton's views of the Son of God and the Spirit of God, and other doctrines of revealed re-

ligion that might be named, throughout the whole of this period, are directly contradictory to those he advocates in Christian Doctrine, is as plain as that his words are the true expression of his views. This, then, is the dilemma into which all fall who hold, with Aubrey and Wood, that Milton composed *Paradise Lost* and *Christian Doctrine* at or near the same time; or, in fact, that he composed *Christian Doctrine* at any time between 1641 and 1671; they make him both hold and advocate contradictory opinions concerning the Son and the Holy Spirit at the same time. Or if any hold that *Christian Doctrine* was later than *Paradise Regained* (1671), as some may, who say it was Milton's latest, or among his latest works, for they dare not be very definite on this point, then they maintain that the severely logical, profound, and mature Milton changed his opinions on these fundamental doctrines during the last two or three years of his life; that, just as this great and good man was stepping into the grave, he denied the Son of God, in whom he had, all along, so heartily trusted, and the Spirit of God, to whom he had so earnestly and reverently prayed.

A change in Milton's views of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and other kindred doctrines, is too evident to be disputed. When, setting all historical evidence aside, is it most likely this change took place? In his youth, or manhood and old age? after 1671, or before 1641? when his knowledge had grown, and his mind and strength matured, and he had had time to search into these transcendently great subjects, or when he first began to think and inquire concerning them?

"Of True Religion, Heresy, Schism, Toleration, etc."

That Milton did not waver, much less change and deny himself, on the fundamental doctrines of the Christian Religion, as his knowledge increased, and his mind enlarged and matured; that he continued to hold, as long as life lasted, the opinions respecting the Son of God and the Holy Spirit found in "*Of Reformation in England*," "*Prelatical*

Episcopacy," "Animadversions," "Reasons of Church Government," "Treatise on Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes," "Ready and Easy Way," "State Letters," "Paradise Lost," and "Paradise Regained," we have not only these strong presumptive arguments, but more positive proof.

In 1673, the year before his decease, he published the treatise "Of True Religion, Heresy, Schism, Toleration." This, as all acknowledge, is the last work published by John Milton. He wrote it, during the last year of his life, for a specific purpose, viz. to define what is true religion, what is heresy and schism, and who are to be tolerated. Here then, if anywhere, we expect to find the real opinions and sentiments of John Milton. Here he defines :

"True religion is the true worship and service of God, learned and believed from the word of God only." "No man or angel can know how God should be worshipped and served, unless God reveal it; He hath revealed it and taught it us, in the Holy Scriptures, by inspired ministers, and in the Gospel by his Son and his Apostles."—Vol. II. p. 509.

In ascertaining the sense of scripture, and learning how it directs God to be worshipped, he advocates the use of :

"All diligence and sincerity of heart, by reading, by learning, by study, by prayer for the illumination of the Holy Spirit."—Id. p. 511.

Twice or thrice he thus speaks of the Holy Spirit, and advocates prayer to Him who, in Christian Doctrine, he maintains is nothing more than an inferior creature, and not worthy to be prayed to.

Again, in this treatise Milton classes Anabaptists, Arians, Arminians, and Socinians together as errorists, and schismatics ; but pleads for their toleration because they profess to prove their errors by the word of God. He maintains they should be confuted and confounded, not silenced. Their errors should be shown by an appeal to the word of God, whose authority they profess to reverence, rather than by denying them existence, and by persecution. (Id. p. 517,

518.) Or, to use his own words in "Areopagitica," "Their confuting is the best and surest suppressing."

Finally, in this treatise Milton declares of the Trinity in scripture, "it is a plain doctrine." This passage has, indeed, been called ambiguous, by no less an authority than Dr. Sumner, and quoted by him to prove exactly the opposite of what it does really prove. Dr. S. quotes it to prove that Milton, in this his last work, rejects the doctrine of the Trinity as unscriptural. (Prose Works, IV. p. xxxi.) Mitford, also, quotes a part of the passage, for the same purpose. (Mitford's Life of Milton, p. xcix.) We will, therefore, give the passage, in its connection, that each may judge for himself.

Milton, as we have already said, is pleading for toleration of all errorists who profess to take the word of God as the rule of faith and doctrine.

"It is a human frailty," he says, "to err, and no man is infallible here on earth. But so long as all these profess to set the word of God only before them, as the rule of faith and obedience; and use all diligence and sincerity of heart, by reading, by learning, by study, by prayer for illumination of the Holy Spirit, to understand the rule and obey it, they have done what man can do; God, assuredly, will pardon them, as He did the friends of Job — good and pious men, though much mistaken, as there it appears, on some points of doctrine. But some will say, With Christians it is otherwise, whom God hath promised, by his Spirit, to teach all things. True: all things absolutely necessary to salvation; but the hottest disputes among Protestants, calmly and charitably inquired into, will be found less than such: The Lutheran holds consubstantiation — an error indeed, but not mortal."

Notice that Milton here, and in several sentences following, gives his opinion of the doctrines of the sects he calls over, as he says of consubstantiation, the doctrine of the Lutherans: "an error indeed, but not mortal."

"The Calvinist," he continues, "is taxed with predestination, and to make God the author of sin; not with any dishonorable thought of God, but it may be over-zealously asserting His absolute power, *not without plea of Scripture*. The Anabaptist is accused of denying infants their right to baptism; again, they say, They deny nothing but what the Scripture denies them. The Arian and Socinian are charged to dispute against the Trinity. They affirm to believe the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, according to Scripture and the Apostolic Creed; as for terms of trinity, triniunity, coëssentiality, tripersonality, and the like, they reject them as scholastic notions, not to

be found in Scripture, which, by a general Protestant maxim, is plain and perspicuous abundantly to explain its own meaning in the properest words belonging to so high a matter, and so necessary to be known; *a mystery indeed, in their sophistic subtleties, but in Scripture a plain doctrine.*"

What is it, now, that is a mystery in their sophistic subtleties, but in Scripture a plain doctrine? Plainly, not "scholastic notions," as Dr. Sumner asserts; but that to which these scholastic notions and terms relate, and try to describe—the Trinity. But this interpretation will be made plainer, if we read on.

"Their other opinions," he continues, "are of less moment. They dispute the satisfaction of Christ, or rather the word 'satisfaction,' as not Scriptural; but they acknowledge Him both God and their Saviour. The Arminian, lastly, is condemned for setting up free will against free grace; but that imputation he disclaims, in all his writings, and grounds himself largely upon Scripture only. It cannot be denied that the authors or late revivers of all these sects and opinions were learned, worthy, zealous, and religious men, as it appears by their lives written, and the same of their many eminent and learned followers, perfect and powerful in the Scriptures, holy and unblamable in their lives; and it cannot be imagined that God would desert such painful and zealous laborers in His church, and oftentimes great sufferers for their conscience, to damnable errors and a reprobate sense, who had so often implored the assistance of His Spirit; but rather, having made no man infallible, that He hath pardoned their errors, and accepts their pious endeavors, sincerely searching all things according to the rule of Scripture, with such guidance and direction as they can obtain of God by prayer. What Protestant, then, who himself maintains the same principles, and disavows all implicit faith, would persecute, and not rather charitably tolerate, such men as these, unless he mean to aljure the principles of his own religion? If it be asked, How far they should be tolerated? I answer: Doubtless equally, as being all Protestants; that is, on all occasions to give account of their faith, either by arguing, preaching in their several assemblies, public writing, and the freedom of printing."—Id. p. 511.

Further quotation or commentary is needless. Notwithstanding the assertion of Dr. Sumner, if the passage is taken in its connection and scope, there is no ambiguity. It admits of no other interpretation than that we have given. Milton does mean, in this his last work, to represent the Arian and Socinian as sects and errorists, and the doctrine which they deny as a plain scriptural doctrine. He pleads, indeed, for the toleration of Arians and Socinians, notwithstanding their

errors, for he would give error even a "fair field," nothing doubting that, in the end, truth will be victorious, though "all the winds of false doctrine be let loose upon her."

If any doubt yet remain concerning Milton's intention to represent Arians and Socinians as errorists, and to avow his faith in the peculiar doctrine they deny — the doctrine of the Trinity, it must be all taken away by another passage, near the close of this, his last treatise. The passage has already been cited; but truth and the importance of the subject under discussion, justify us in bringing it forward again. Having quoted 1 Thess. 5 : 21, "Prove all things; hold fast that which is good," he inquires :

"How shall we prove all things, which includes all opinions, at least, founded on Scripture, unless we not only tolerate them, but patiently hear them, and seriously read them? If he who thinks himself in the truth professes to have learnt it, not by implicit faith, but by attentive study of the Scriptures and full persuasion of heart; with what equity can he refuse to hear or read him who demonstrates to have gained his knowledge by the same way? Is it a fair course, to assert truth by arrogating to himself the only freedom of speech, and stopping the mouths of others equally gifted? This is the direct way to bring in that papistical faith, which we all disclaim. They, i. e. those who refuse toleration, pretend it would unsettle the weaker sort; the same groundless fear is pretended by the Romish clergy. At least, then, let them have leave to write in Latin, which the common people understand not; that what they hold may be discussed among the learned only. We suffer the idolatrous books of papists without this fear, to be sold and read as common as our own; why not much rather of Anabaptists, Arians, Arminians, and Socinians? There is no learned man but will confess he hath much profited by reading controversies. . . . If then it be profitable for him to read, why should it not at least be tolerable and free for his adversary to write? In logic they teach that contraries laid together more evidently appear: it follows, then, that all controversy being permitted, falsehood will appear more false, and truth more true." — *Id.* p. 517.

The argument here, is plainly this : we suffer papists to write and publish. Now if we suffer those that hold the greatest error, the Papist, why not those that hold an error, indeed, but one less destructive, the Arian and Socinian? Besides, to place their falsehood or error beside the truth, will make their falsehood appear more false, and the truth more clear.

Thus the evidence is full and positive that Milton, in this his last work, abjures and condemns sects and doctrines that he advocates in Christian Doctrine, and died in what he so often, in his Letters of State, calls "the ancient," "the orthodox," the "evangelic faith," viz. that The Father, The Son, and The Holy Spirit, are really Divine and co-equal persons, constituting "one Tri-Personal Godhead."

Thus it is that John Milton, "the man to whom God communicated such measures of light and mental energy, that his name springs up spontaneously, when we think or would speak of the greatness of our nature; thus he shows us "in what conclusions he rested on that subject, which above all others presses upon men of thought and sensibility," rested, "after a life of extensive and profound research, of unanimous efforts for freedom and his country, and of communion with the most gifted minds of his own and former times." "His theological opinions were the fruits of patient, profound, reverent study of the scriptures. He came to them with a 'mind not narrowed by a technical, professional education, but accustomed to broad views, to the widest range of thought.'" "He was shackled by no party connections. He was warped by no clerical ambition, and subdued by no clerical timidity." He came to his conclusions respecting the Son of God, the Holy Spirit, and the Trinity, "in the fulness of his strength, with free mind, open to truth, and with unstained purity of life." He came to them from the very force of conviction, and in direct opposition to what he once held and taught; conviction wrought by "patient, reverent, and profound study of the word of God." "And what did this great and good man, whose intellectual energy and love of truth has made him a chief benefactor of the human mind? what, we ask, did he discover in the Scriptures? A triple Divinity? No." But that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, are "*One Tri-Personal Godhead*," and that this doctrine of the "Trinity is, in Scripture, a plain doctrine."¹

¹ It is due the memory of the late Dr. Channing, to transcribe the remark with which he closes his exultation over the discovery he supposed had been

ARTICLE II.

CHURCH THEOLOGY AND FREE INQUIRY IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY.

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It is often the fact that the qualities which mark a particular period in history are seen vividly portrayed in the lives of prominent individuals. The complexion of an age is the result of great moral causes, which are working widely and effectively upon the public mind. A revolutionary idea reaches its dominant energy by slow accretions and by a gradual widening of the sphere of its influence. It agitates many minds. Some men of congenial temperament it awakens; it sets them in motion. At first they are only subjects of a general movement. They identify themselves with it, they go before it, become leaders; and while they themselves are formed by the age, they assume the direction and, through the moral and intellectual force which circumstances have imperatively demanded, give the direction to the movement upon which they were thrown, and shape it after their own pleasure. Cromwell did not originate the historic epoch of which he was the life. He was called up by the political convulsions which shook Great Britain; the spirit of the times gave the direction to his imperious will, till that will seized the reins, and the whole train of events followed his resistless dictation. This representation of an era in a man, this impression of a man upon his age, so that the times produce the individual, and the individual moulds the times, is a fact observable in all marked periods.

made respecting John Milton. "Our principal object in these remarks," he says, "has been to show, that as far as great names are arguments, the cause of Anti-trinitarianism, or of God's proper unity, is supported by the strongest. But we owe it to truth to say, that we put little trust in these fashionable proofs. The chief use of great names in religious controversy is, to balance and neutralize one another, that the unawed and unfettered mind may think and judge with a due self-reverence, and with a solemn sense of accountableness to God alone."
—*Channing's Works*, Vol. I. p. 477.

It has been often asserted that Abelard and Bernard were the representatives of two great conflicting movements of the days in which they lived. This is undoubtedly true; while it is also true that neither of them were in such a sense master spirits as to accomplish and settle, for their own age, a character which was distinctively their work. Society did not, in their lives, reach a crisis. There is no historic epoch of which either of them were artificers. Things were in a transition state. Intense agitations, bold innovations, rebellion against authority, were dominant on one side; and, on the other, aspirations and advances, a determined and irresistible progress towards an ascendancy which had been the ambition of a previous age, and was the triumph of the next. Abelard was the champion of freedom; Bernard, the champion of authority. Neither of them originated the movements with which they were identified; neither of them lived to see the full development of the ideas and doctrines which they advocated.

After the fall of the old Roman empire, there was no concentration of power like it. It was a mighty shadow in the past, the magnificent embodiment of regal supremacy, the summit of a dominion upon which the eager eyes of the ambitious potentates were fixed as the model of a kingdom which would satisfy their aspirations. It is remarkable that the only approach made, by a temporal sovereign, to a centralization of power similar to that of Rome under the Caesars, was the brief empire of Charlemagne. With a comprehensiveness of view rarely surpassed, with an executive energy almost ubiquitous he combined, under a vigorous rule, the distant and the near, established laws, promoted education, refined barbarism, advanced civilization and justice, and left a great kingdom, to be dismembered with such suddenness, that one almost feels that the life of the empire was in him, and its dissolution necessarily involved in his death. The two competitors for the sway of universal power were the church (through the pontiffs) and the German empire. The emperors claimed their right to crown the pope. The popes claimed the supremacy over the emperors. For cen-

tures the great collisions in Europe involved this contested point.

Just before the birth of Bernard, a man had died whose extraordinary powers and zeal had given vigor and success to the orthodox church movement. This man was the monk Hildebrand, afterwards Gregory VII. He was identified with the struggle of the church to rise to an independence of the secular power. Laxity of discipline, corruption of morals, the wide disparity between the type of the church in the scriptures and the existing church, had excited a strong desire for reformation. The more thoughtful among the clergy, and all who were inspired with just views of the Christian life, were aroused to seek a reformation. The line of their effort was in the direction of ecclesiasticism, the elevation of the spiritual power of the church, the enforcement of a more rigid discipline, the exaltation of the papacy to a supremacy over the secular power. This was the peculiar and characteristic church movement of the age, beginning about the middle of the eleventh century and advancing, with decisive steps, till it reached its highest point, near the end of the twelfth century. It was this advance of the papacy which Bernard promoted with all the zeal, fervor, and sanctity of his energetic mind. He was the real pope of his active years, reproducing the spirit of Hildebrand, and working out, with a temper hardly less firm, and with a genius hardly less versatile and comprehensive, the same dominant idea.

The antagonism of new and revolutionary ideas was less formidable during the life of Hildebrand than of Bernard. Abelard was only six years old when Gregory died, in 1085. He was more singularly individual and self-moved than was Bernard. The rebellion against authority, into which he threw himself, was unorganized. It had broken out fitfully. It had combined itself with other agitations, and was, therefore, not a well-defined and consolidated movement. It was rather one of the unavoidable but impulsive reactions which, even in days of the deepest mental subjection, will show themselves: the indications of the native freedom which is

an inextinguishable element of vigorous thought. The exclusion of reason from the domain of religious truth is the ultimate despotism of authority. The harmonious teachings of reason and faith lead to the highest attainments in divine knowledge. The powerful mind of Augustine had seized the scriptural notion of the dependence of intellect upon faith, without discarding the offices of reason in the defence and elucidation of the subject matter of belief. Preceding Abelard and contemporary with him till his thirtieth year, lived the celebrated Anselm of Canterbury. The beauty of his saintly life, and the splendors of his intellect, are not altogether obscured by the darkness of the days in which he flourished, or the clouds of error which then floated in the horizon of thought. With a clearness at that time unusual, he imbibed the comprehensive sentiment of Christian love as the basis and pervading spirit of the Christian life. He was a churchman in the strict sense of that word in his age; but, through the formal in his religion, there ever breathed a tone of piety caught only by listening to the inspired voices which speak to all times in the word. He was a theologian, indulging a profoundly speculative turn of mind, and bringing the acuteness of dialectic skill to the definition of the sublimest doctrines of the Christian system. The sharpness of his logic left unimpaired the simplicity of his faith and the sincerity of his affections. The grandeur of his intellect was in harmony with the simplicity of his love. His meditative life partook of the sublimity of the scenes amongst which he was born. "Brought up among the mountains," says an accomplished historian, "he fancied that heaven was above their peaks, and that there God sat enthroned, surrounded by his court of state." That such a man as Anselm should have received truth in the formal dogmas which tradition transmitted, is less remarkable than that any man should have imbibed so much of the genuine temper and life of the gospel, while involved in the dry husk of conventional symbols and restricted by the jejune ceremonials of a rigid external discipline. Notwithstanding his adoption of the Hildebrandian principles of ecclesiasticism, and the full convic-

tion with which he defended the Augustinian apothegm: "fides preedit intellectum," he was nevertheless properly a forerunner of Abelard in the application of a keen logic to the analysis and defence of truth. He was speculative, dialectic, and profound, as well as meditative, childlike, and emotional. He combined, in his life and writings, the worthy elements, which were separated in Bernard and Abelard, without running into the bigoted though enthusiastic fervors of the one, or the restless and Quixotic extravagance of the other. He united, as far perhaps as was possible at that period, a scientific theology with a devout Christianity.

These preliminary remarks will serve to introduce us, more understandingly, into the era in which, principally under the lead of the two men who have been called its representatives, the conflicting elements of thought came out in bold and relentless antagonism.

Bernard was the son of a respectable knight of Fontaigne in Burgundy. He was born in 1091. His mother consecrated him, with his five brothers and a sister, to God, in their earliest infancy. Her devout piety gave the direction to his life. At the age of twenty-two he became a monk in connection with the monastery at Cîteaux, and after three years residence there, he was made abbot of a new monastery of the Cisterians, at Clara vallis or Clairvaux. It was in connection with this fraternity that his religious character was developed, and those displays of intellectual and spiritual energy were made which gave him an influence so unbounded and a reputation so enduring.

To the life and labors of a monk he was devoted with all his heart. One hardly knows whether most to admire his persuasive sincerity, or to be amazed at his intense zeal. He subjected himself to the most exhausting discipline, applied himself to prayer and study with unsubdued eagerness, and submitted, with uncomplaining diligence to a useless round of menial services, till he was reduced to a skeleton. Bernard's extraordinary power lay, not in a single endowment, but in a combination of qualities, which though often possessed singly in as great strength, are rarely seen united

so auspiciously as in him. There have been ascetics who have practised the severities of a torturing humiliation as unsparingly as he did; but they had not the discernment which he had to distinguish true humility from the pride which wore its semblance. Others have been emaciated as he was by a pious abstinence, but few have been recalled to the use of food for the sake of an active benevolence. He united, as few of the monkish order ever did, a fervid love of the church and a burning zeal for the pope, with a genuine love of the souls of men, and a desire for the glory of God. In his eye a true priest was one who kept back nought for himself, of all the wealth that passed through his hands, whether it be the dew of heaven from above, or the vows of men that are offered unto God; seeking not the gifts but the good of the flock, not his own glory but the glory of God. Bernard indulged in all the luxury of contemplation, which spreads its charms over mystical piety. At the same time he was earnest in an external activity, which not only checked the excess of a meditative life, but made him felt throughout the one hundred and sixty Cistercian convents, which had grown up under his influence, extended his power over magistrates and monarchs, and gave him the ascendancy in the college of the cardinals and in the palace of the Vatican. The retirement of the cloister did not dry up those sympathies which connect us with the masses of men whose hearts and natures are like our own. Bernard was a preacher, upon whose burning eloquence the multitudes hung with enthusiastic admiration. The meditations of his leafy bower, the favorite place of his retreat, came forth in the overpowering eloquence which, at once, melted and astonished his hearers. Nothing is more unlike the arid and empty formalism of monkish homilies, than the earnest, devout, and affectionate appeals of Bernard. "Serve God with love," said he to his brethren of Clairvaux, "with that perfect love which casteth out fear, which feels not the burden of the day, which counts not the cost of the labor, which works not for wages, and yet is the most powerful motive of action. When he rose to impassioned eloquence, as in his effort to pro-

mote the crusades, his voice, his gesture, his fiery sentences, his whole action, were such as to thrill his auditors, subdue their wills, break them off from their vices, inspire them with loathing of the world, hurry them into the seclusion of monachism or into the restless scenes of danger and glory opened before them in the Holy Land. And yet while pouring forth these torrents of passion, and kindling uncontrollable emotions of sorrow or zeal in the minds of sensitive or enthusiastic thousands, he retained in himself that calmness of reason which opposed itself to the wildness of frenzied excitement, and plainly declared, that the holy war demanded not saintly monks, but soldierly men. These contrasts are everywhere visible in the character of Bernard. He was a church theologian, a teacher of profound submission to the traditional dogmas and authoritative decrees of councils and of popes. His idea of the advancement of the church was the approach to papal absolutism, the church dominant over thrones, the church giving law to the state, the church regulating war and peace, St. Peter in the Vatican binding and loosing all on earth, as well as all in heaven. And yet, with a freedom, not of his creed, but of that spiritual understanding which received a light through the word itself, he declared that we must examine what we obey, or the scripture is denied, which enjoins to prove all things and hold fast that which is good. Bernard was a scholar in the learning of his times, a student of the scriptures, a reader in the days when learning, which had been buried, was just beginning to awake and re-illumine the minds of men, a philosopher on the church side; and yet, with a piety not unworthy to be imitated in a more enlightened age, he said, "my most sublime philosophy is to know Jesus Christ and him crucified." It is remarkable that a mind burdened with the rubbish of tradition, tethered by the dicta of ecclesiastic superiors, enveloped in the dreams of hoary superstitions, and impressed with a sacred and reverential homage for the church as the family of God and the bride of Christ, and of the pope as the true vicar of Christ, should still have retained so much of the childlike simplicity and affection of a devout believer, so

much of the benevolence of a disciple, the zeal of an apostle, the self-denial of a martyr, and withal that imperious and despotic will, by which he made himself the terror of thrones, the dictator of councils, the arbiter of disputes, and the real power behind the chair of St. Peter. To appeal from Bernard to Rome, it was said, was to appeal from Bernard to himself. Such was the thoughtful, saintly, earnest, and zealous man, who stood in the conflicts of this age as the champion of orthodoxy, the bulwark of the true faith, to defend it against the shocks of a proud philosophy, the aggressions of the spirit of free inquiry, the rising genius of an incipient democracy, and the reflex influence of that corruption which, abhorred by all simple minded Christians, was reacting upon the sacred institution which harbored and apparently sanctified it.

No open collision took place between Abelard and Bernard until the career of the former was nearly finished. He was older, by twelve years, than Bernard, and very early exhibited those traits of character which distinguished him through life. By nature bold, self-reliant, and acute, logic had for him an invincible charm. He sought disputation with the same enthusiastic relish with which a knight of the Middle Ages galloped to the tournament. Unlike Bernard, he began with philosophy, not with religion. His youthful impetuosity was neither directed nor chastened by pious sentiments and holy aspirations. Conquest was his motive, as truly as it is that of the martial hero; for he says, himself: "I preferred the triumph of disputation to the trophies of war." A mind so constituted, as much marked by aggressiveness as by alertness, ardent for conflict, confident in its own strength, and snuffing like the war-horse the scent of tumult from afar, could not fail to raise agitation and excite attention. His youth was spent in wandering through France, challenging disputes and winning laurels in every trial of logical skill. His fame as a philosopher may be said to have commenced in his twenty-first year. At that time he came to Paris, where the celebrated dialectician William of Champeaux was then "at the height of his fame." To

the astonishment of the scholars, who were attracted by the fame of the rising schools of Paris, Abelard tried his adventurous skill upon William, and was completely successful. His fame rose above that of his teacher. His own school, after various reverses, drew off all the patronage from that of William, and he had the gratification of finding himself the popular philosopher in the city where learning was cultivated with so great assiduity as to make it the central attraction for the scholars of Europe. Such a discipline, and a success so inflating, cannot but be esteemed unfavorable preparations for the study of theology. This sacred field was the arena on which the educated mind of the age was displaying its strength. The teacher of the previous period, Anselm, had combined a devout spirit with a vigorous speculative bent. But Abelard ventured upon theology with all the dangerous thirst for power and superiority which his early fame had excited in him. He brought to it, not merely a freedom from the shackles of authority and an ardent longing for investigation, but a pride in the weapons of logical warfare, which unavoidably encouraged his imperious and overbearing temper. He gave himself up to all the startling inquiries which shocked the submissive piety of devout churchmen. He claimed for philosophy the position of the guide to truth. He wrangled and disputed. He bore himself haughtily in the presence of his superiors. He gathered around him multitudes of young men, whose oracle he became. His name spread everywhere. The attention of men of letters and of theologians, from every quarter, was turned to him. His opinions spread. His errors created alarm. His impetuosity and zeal, his free inquiry, threatened the overthrow of the faith, which Christendom had been taught to receive, not as truths to be analyzed and known, but believed and obeyed. That so reckless and daring an innovator, a man who ventured to assert that if creeds were not understood, we might believe error as well as truth; a philosopher who approached the awful doctrine of the Trinity with the same weapons with which he had refuted the nominalism of Roscelinus, and the realism of William of

Champeaux ; that a disputant so adroit and unscrupulous, and at the same time elated with a succession of triumphs and a breadth of fame which gave him adherents even in Rome, and in the very college of the cardinals ; that such a leader of the restless enemies of the church system should have awakened great alarms, and set the adherents of the papacy to study their defence, is only reasonable. A progress such as Abelard exhibited, rarely goes unchecked. The cry of heresy was raised. The ecclesiastical power was summoned against him. He was compelled to burn his writings and to repeat, before a council, the Athanasian creed.

The fact that Abelard was so vigorously attacked, the populace excited against him to such a degree that his life was endangered, is significant of the prevailing tone of the times. The serious clergy wished a reformation. The Christian part of the community were indignant against the corruptions of the priesthood and the scandalous immoralities of the bishops. But both of these parties only desired such a reformation as would leave intact the dogma of traditional authority, and the absolute power of the church in all matters of faith and practice. While they were outraged by the licentiousness of the clergy, they were ready, at any time, to go to war for the mischievous doctrine of celibacy. The degree to which the idea of church purity had gained the ascendancy over a clean heart, is illustrated in the history of Abelard. He had passed through the period of life when the passions are most easily excited, without indulging in the irregularities which prevailed so frightfully around him, especially among ecclesiastics. But when near forty years of age, he entered upon that flagitious course of criminal gratification, which has made his name more familiar as the betrayer of Heloise, than as the champion of free inquiry. The fact to be noticed is, that his guilt was no barrier to church preferment or to philosophic renown ; while an honorable marriage was the insuperable obstacle to any ecclesiastical advancement. The sin against an atrocious decision of council, was more injurious to the prospects of a divine

and theologian, than an outrage against the most precious rights of our nature, and the most flagrant violation of the law of God. But precisely such was the moral tone of the age. The most abject licentiousness was more tolerable in the church, than an infringement of a single conventional dictum of the successors to the apostles.

It is always cheering to trace the glimpses of right conceptions even in the midst of degradation and error. The movements of those who were attempting the reformation of the clergy and of religious houses, had its origin in a true but imperfect conception of the evil and its remedy. In fact, the mistaken remedy was, itself, the most fruitful cause of evil. The monastery had grown to be the centre of corruption. The introduction of stricter rules was a necessity demanded by every conviction of right. But the monastery itself was a mistaken contrivance. An imperfect apprehension of a religious life, a desire to be separated from the pollutions of the world, the constant force which wealth and luxury everywhere exerted against the cultivation of a life with God, very naturally led to the foundation of religious houses. Recluses, anchorites, and cenobites, the rigid rules of the earlier monks, all contained in them a true idea, a worthy aspiration after a greater freedom from worldly pollution, and a nearer communion with God. Even celibacy, as the reaction against licentiousness, was only a bad device erected upon a right desire. So strongly had the notion fixed itself, that purity was inseparable from celibacy, and that a life of seclusion was essential to a life of piety, that the recovery from abuses, the purification of the church, and the ascendancy of religion to the great mass of minds, meant nothing more than an absolute enforcement of monastic rules, and the absolute subjection of the clergy and bishops to the rule of the church. The valiant attacks upon false doctrine, the exposure of clerical vices, the incensed acclamations of the people against the villanies of monks and bishops, all indicated an existing but imperfect sense of the moral and spiritual diseases which had fastened upon all religious associations. The vital currents were not so low but that a health-

ful pulsation could now and then be felt, and the warm blush of shame would sometimes show itself, even upon livid countenances wasting under a spiritual consumption. But while the theory involved such monstrous incongruities and falsehoods as the church theory did, not even the sanctity and ardor of Bernard, his breathing piety, his soul-stirring eloquence, his spiritual expositions, and his indomitable zeal, could accomplish a reformation. It needed a volcanic agitation, working upward from a lower stratum than their convictions reached, to throw off the incumbrances and abominations which were crushing out the very soul of religion.

Even Abelard, with all his towering views and undaunted courage, did not comprehend the wants of the age. His opening career was too intense through the working of a philosophic pride, to augur either safety for himself or a successful revolution. His will was too lofty and arrogant. His aims were too selfish and worldly to effect a change in the spiritual tendencies which were strengthened by men so much more deserving of confidence than he was. He himself, after his mortification in the exposure of his base betrayal of Heloise, fell somewhat into the current of false notions prevalent around him, and retired into a desert, where he established the monastery, famous under the name of the Paraclete; his own resort for comfort in his calamity, and afterwards the asylum and the grave of Heloise.

His influence here revived. The wilderness was peopled by pupils that thronged to hear his discourses. Men of all classes subjected themselves to the hardships of the desert to enjoy his instructions. The Paraclete was unable to hold the votaries of this new monk, or the wilderness to supply food sufficient for his admirers. The exercises of the Paraclete, it may well be supposed, were unlike those of Clairvaux, Cîteaux, or any of the regular monasteries. Disputations and discussions, lectures and philosophical speculations, the analysis and proof of doctrine, daring scrutiny into the profound mysteries of religion, occupied the time and thought of this community of scholars, rather than of religious recluses.

The early attacks upon Abelard were as much the fruit of jealousy as of zeal for truth. In these Bernard had taken no part. His first impressions of him seem to have been favorable. But when the intense activity of Abelard and his enthusiastic disciples had given so wide a currency to his opinions, and made his fame conterminous with the limits of Christendom, the more zealous defenders of the church system were alarmed. Bernard was exhorted to forego all ties of friendship for the cause of religion, and to part with Abelard though he were "a foot, a hand, or an eye." He devoted himself to an examination of the dangerous opinions, and sought a private conference with Abelard, in the hope that by personal appeals, and a faithful exposure of his errors, he might persuade him to rectify them. This praiseworthy and admirable measure was unsuccessful. Bernard then visited Abelard again, in conformity with the rule laid down by Christ, taking with him two or more others, and in their presence resumed the effort, but still without success. He then entered openly upon public measures to arrest the influence of the novelties and heresies, which were so rapidly corrupting the young and ardent.

It would extend these remarks too far to attempt even a condensed view of the separate doctrines upon which Abelard expressed opinions, or tried the power of his keen speculation. It will be only possible to exhibit the ground of the antagonism, and the opposite tendencies which brought these two great minds into conflict. It has already been mentioned, that in Bernard and Abelard were separated those peculiar movements which coalesced in the devout but intellectual Anselm. He had that calmness of temperament with the clearness of discernment which enabled him to cultivate a spiritual life, and a humble practical faith, while he studied profoundly, thought accurately, analyzed philosophically, and applied to the truths of religion all the known helps of science. The misfortune of Abelard was, that his ardor of inquiry was not kept in submission to the humble spirit of a subdued piety. The misfortune of Ber-

nard was, that his reverence for the church was so great that he lost sight of the fact that there was, below the basis of the church system, a deeper foundation of truth in the word of God, by which all dogmas and decrees of the church were to be rationally tested. His idea of the Christian life was mystical. Looking with a devout spirit upon the sublime truths of the gospel, he conceived that we could only reach an apprehension of them by a spiritual elevation, leaving behind what is human and assimilating to the heavenly. He could not look upon progress in the religious life as a work of intellectual development or culture. With him the highest religion was not an application of the plain teachings of the word of God to the duties which grow out of our relations to men like ourselves, and to God who is infinitely above us, so that Christianity would elevate man in the social sphere, enlarge and purify his activity while it cultivated feelings of reverence, submission and love towards God, by which he would be prepared for the divine presence. It was rather a separation from the human, rising above earthly relations and ideas, and in a contemplative and devout frame, as if by an inspiration, reaching an intimate communion with God. Thus he himself says: "The greatest man is he, who despising the use of things of sense, so far as human frailty may be permitted to do so, not by a slowly ascending progress, but by a sudden spring is sometimes wont to reach those lofty heights." The highest, he taught, was attained by prayer and purity of heart, after the preparation of a worthy life. He did not wholly deny the value of knowledge, nor its power to minister to our happiness; but always made it subservient to faith. He not only took the Augustinian ground, that spiritual knowledge was not like other objects of knowledge, to be sought by the unaided understanding, a moral preparation being necessary, but maintained that faith reposed on authority, possessing the truth enveloped and hid under a veil. Intellectual apprehension possessed it unveiled and revealed. Hence it was his life's work to receive, and then by contemplation and after study to realize the power of truth in his own soul.

With such a mind, deeply read, long disciplined in his own method of prayer and contemplation, Bernard shrunk from a dispute with Abelard. His philosophical notions bore to the saintly champion of the church the hue of impiety. It was sacrilegious to bring out the pearls of the sanctuary from the Holy of Holies, where the piety of the church had enshrined them for ages, and expose them to the rough feet of unbelieving swine. Abelard's errors should be condemned, not confuted. It was the sacred duty of the bishop to convict the heretic, by comparing his innovations and subtleties with the standards. For, as the truth was already settled, discussion was out of place; comparison with the church doctrines, and the exposure of the variations, were all that was necessary. The refusal of Bernard to discuss the points of difference tended to inflame the pride, not only of Abelard's disciples, but his own also. The charm of his life was the spirit of free inquiry. He had been the defender of the old philosophers, as men who had been endowed by God with a discernment of the true and the good. He had claimed for them a close affinity with the followers of Christ, who were the true philosophers. He was admired for his bold attempts to define knowledge. His pupils boasted that he had cleared all the great truths of theology of their incomprehensibleness, and reduced them to the sphere of human intelligence; and, although they greatly exaggerated the pretensions of their master, yet it was true that, in his speculation, as separated from practical religion, his purpose was to establish a belief in the truth upon the basis of reason. He would prove the doctrines of the Bible in a way that the sceptics who discarded inspiration would be compelled to believe them. He put human power first, and, after its work, came the blessing of God bestowing the unattainable knowledge. Paul knew more than Peter, because of his higher intellectual discipline, and not from his more adequate inspiration. He strove to make even the Trinity consistent with reason, while it was not inconsistent with revelation. Notwithstanding the absolute agreement of these two men, in much which enters into

the essentials of a religious life, and in much which comprises the object matter of faith, it was morally impossible that they should not be irreconcilably hostile. Their modes of thought and their religious bent were so opposite, that a discussion was not to be expected. While both would have admitted the validity of the scriptures, they differed so widely in the use to be made of them, and in the tests of truth that no reasonable hope could be entertained of harmonizing with each other, or of convincing each other.

Bernard realized the difficulty, but it was soon apparent that his refusal to meet the advocate of free discussion was trumpeted abroad as a triumph. Abelard gained wider fame than ever. Bernard was compelled to meet his adversary. But he says he went to the assembly unprepared, mindful of the words of scripture: "Do not premeditate how you shall answer; for it shall be given you, in that same hour, what ye shall say;" and of that other: "The Lord is my helper; whom, then, shall I fear."

The meeting at Sens, where the synod was at first called, was attended by the king, surrounded by eminent prelates and abbots. A great multitude were gathered. The adherents of Abelard were there in great numbers, anxious for the victory of philosophy. The occasion called up learned men, from all parts of France. Bernard was there; but he was there unchanged in all his views of conducting the controversy. Nothing can more vividly illustrate the two men, than the scene here presented: Abelard, after all his conflicts, defeats, persecutions, submissions, already past the vigor of manhood, stood ready and anxious to do battle with the oracle and renowned leader of his opponents. His most cherished desire would have been gratified in the use of his keen dialectics upon the fixed and unquestioned traditional belief of his opponent. But Bernard had no intention of arguing. He was not there to do the profane work of subjecting absolute truth, settled and established, and which every pious mind should humbly accept without investigation, to the rude shocks of a logical disputation. His only preparation was a selection of Abelard's errors. His only method of con-

futing him, an appeal to the standards and the Fathers. Here the two currents met ; or rather, here the church party, with the inflexible tenacity of purpose which the whole ecclesiastical power of the church, as well as the spirit of piety, sustained, presented the old stone-work and solid masonry which ages had slowly built up, to the flowing torrent which beat furiously, but harmlessly upon its massive abutments. Authority stood motionless in the front of the daring spirit of free inquiry.

Such a method was hopeless to Abelard. He found that all that was expected of him was to make such acknowledgment of his opinions as would authorize his condemnation as a heretic. The matter terminated in an appeal to Rome. The appeal was made by Abelard, with great confidence. Not only had his fame reached the imperial city, and the boldness of his philosophy, the power of his writings, and the lofty spirit of free inquiry won for him both a name and friends there, but he had also been felt, in this centre of Christendom, through the remarkable movements of one of his disciples. Arnold of Brescia had been kindled to a high enthusiasm amongst the thousands of ardent young men who listened to the inspiring words of Abelard. With a soul as intrepid, a zeal as intense, and an eloquence more impassioned than that of his master, he identified himself with the conflicts which were engaging all the active minds of Europe. His views were neither in harmony with those of Bernard, nor of his teacher. The current in which his impetuous energies ran, was directed against the church, but not against its doctrines. His burning indignation against abuses spent itself, not in erecting a purer organization upon the basis of the church system. He concentrated his attacks upon the secularities of the church. He was at the very opposite pole from Hildebrand, and so at the farthest remove from Bernard. He profoundly revered the church doctrine, and so did not harmonize with the reformatory purposes of Abelard. At the same time he was identified with the spirit which sought to reclaim the church from its worldliness, its licentiousness, its deep and shameful immoralities. But his idea

embraced a thoroughly renovated church organization — an entire renouncement of all secular jurisdiction, the absolute poverty of bishops, priests, and monks; in short, a church divested of all power, authority, and worldly position, and purely spiritual in its offices and dignities. This orthodox zeal for church reformation was allied with a patriotism as pure and, in that age, as impracticable. He aimed at the overthrow of all despotism in government, the whole fabric of feudal tyranny, and the narrow usurpations of aristocratic oligarchies. Arnold was a theoretic republican, launched upon the world at a period when power had long forsaken the people, and the supremacy of the pontificate was rapidly becoming the supremacy of the throne. Arnold was a practical man, boldly eloquent, impassioned, persuasive — the demagogue of his era. His appeals to the multitudes were effective. His revival of the old Roman spirit, which had for centuries been sleeping amid the tombs of the Cæsars, gave him currency even at Rome. Where he was felt, the hierarchy trembled. Where his doctrines produced effects, the enthusiasm for liberty was quickened, and its friends were encouraged. It was perhaps more directly through Arnold, than in any other way, that Abelard was known at Rome. Led by his natural, but somewhat exaggerated, confidence in the position and influence of Arnold, he entertained a strong hope that his hearing before the pontiff would result in his favor. But in this he was disappointed. He did not carefully measure the subtle influence of Bernard, not less the enemy of Arnold than of himself. All the energy of Bernard was aroused to shield the church against the popular violence to which it was exposed through the attractive eloquence and impassioned appeals of Arnold, and the presumptuous logic of the arrogant philosopher. He not only sent a partial account of the council to the pope, but wrote a private letter, filled with that pathetic argument in which he was preëminent, piously exhorting his supremacy to put a stop to these dangers, which threatened the holy church, and to silence the profane tongues which were filling the world with heresy and discord. With a boldness singularly indic-

ative of consciousness of his own power, he not only inveighs against the condemned opinions, in unmeasured invective, but urges, and almost commands, the pope to proceed, immediately, to pronounce sentence against the heretic. "For what has God raised thee up," he inquires of Innocent, "lowly as thou wert in thine own eyes, and placed thee above kings and nations; not that thou shouldest destroy, but that thou shouldest build up the faith. God has stirred up the fury of the schismatics, that thou mightest have the glory of crushing it. This only was wanting to make thee equal to the glory of thy predecessors—the condemnation of a heresy."

A second epistle, in the same strain of emphatic authority and urgency, followed. The pope knew his dependence upon Bernard. He owed to him his own elevation to the pontificate, and dared not resist him.

Thus without a hearing, upon the representations of his bitter enemies, Abelard was condemned by the pope. "The decree of Innocent reprov'd all public disputations on the mysteries of religion. Abelard was condemned to silence; his disciples, to excommunication."

Bernard was not satisfied. He still urged upon the pope further restrictions: He demanded that Abelard and Arnold should be put in safe custody, and their books burned. It was ordered that the books which contained their heresies should be publicly cast into the fire, and the "two heresiarchs imprisoned in some religious house." This sentence was eagerly spread abroad by Bernard. Arnold found refuge with a legate, afterwards a pope. Bernard still pursued him. He took refuge in Zurich; and the Waldenses still revere his memory, while they are reaping the fruits of those germs which he set in an ungenial soil, but which afterwards sprung up in a luxurious growth of free principles, in a land singularly blessed in escaping both spiritual and temporal despotism.

Abelard found an asylum at Clugny, where Peter the Venerable cherished him with all the tenderness of a father and all the assiduity of a brother. In this retreat he spent two

years, occupied in pious studies, devout meditations, and humble religious acts. As life wore out, his fiery temper was chastened, his lofty spirit was humbled, his restless zeal gave place to quietness and submission. "I never saw his equal," says the Venerable Peter, "for humility of manners and habits. He allowed no moment to escape unoccupied in prayer, reading, writing, working, or dictation." The heavenly visitor surprised him in the midst of these holy works. He died, at the age of sixty-three, at Chalons, on the Saone, whither he had been taken for the benefit of his declining health; and his body was deposited in the tomb of the Paraclete, where Heloise continued, for twenty-one years, to mourn for him, and then rested by his side.

Bernard closed his memorable and active life in 1153, eleven years afterwards, at Claravallis, the beloved retreat which will ever be associated with his name and form.

Two such men cannot fulfil their earthly career without leaving impressions upon the minds with which they conversed, and the current of events in which they were actors. The thoughts which occupied them are living thoughts, which survive the generations and the ages which were engrossed by them. Not only the wisdom but the errors of such men are instructive. We learn from their worthy example, and not less perhaps from their unworthy mistakes. They were both great men, entitled to the gratitude and admiration of posterity. The faults of each were as prominent as their excellences were conspicuous. We admire the devotion, the humility, the earnest religious affection of Bernard. We deplore that reverence which was soiled by superstition, and that intemperate zeal which blighted the fair blossoms of charity. In Abelard we are attracted by the nobleness and independence, which, in its aims at truth, could close its eye to all the frowns of power and the authority of proscription. At the same time, we lament a recklessness and impetuosity of bearing, an arrogant and vaunting tone of superiority, which savors more of personal pride and ambition, than of the dispassionate temper of thoughtful philosophy. The practical religion of Bernard

was better than his creed. The uprightness and manliness, with which Abelard sought the promotion of a sound morality and a pure life, recommend him more than the severity of his logic. Both of these men had noble objects in view. They labored, one for the exaltation and greater power of the church, as the organ of religion and its earthly temple; the other for the freer scope and more intelligent conception of the truth, as the ground of all that is ennobling in life and hopeful for salvation. In their methods both were defective. The saintly monk, conscious of his power, used every available art to crush an adversary, with the seeming belief that the safety of the church justified the unscrupulousness of means. The philosopher, elated by his successes and proud of his artillery, was ardent for victory with an ambition which overlooked the triumphs of truth in a personal achievement. Both possessed a piety tinged with the vices and misconceptions of the age in which they lived. Bernard had the advantage. His lot was cast in harmony with the great movement of the day. It was easy to be self-consistent. Abelard was an innovator. His work was partly destructive. He wrangled in the midst of the transitions of thought and the emancipations of belief. It was hard to hold an even course. His later years are more in contrast with his life than are those of Bernard. His previous humiliations and concessions were brief, and soon retracted. The last quiet into which his restless spirit was brought, as it is given to us by his partial biographer, looks more like the serenity of a soul preparing for heaven. Bernard, just before his death, dictated these words: "Pray to the Saviour who willeth not the death of a sinner, that he delay not my departure, and yet that he will be pleased to guard it; support him who hath no merits of his own by your prayers, that the adversary of our salvation may not find any place open to his attacks." "Thus," says Luther, "died Bernard, a man so godly, so holy, and so chaste, that he is to be commended and preferred before all the Fathers. He being grievously sick, and having no hope of life, put not his trust in his single life, wherein he had yet lived most

chastely; not in his good works and deeds of charity, whereof he had done many; but removing them far out of his sight, and receiving the benefit of Christ by faith, he said, I have lived wickedly, but thou Lord Jesus dost possess the kingdom of heaven by double right; first, because thou art the Son of God; secondly, because thou hast purchased it by thy death and passion. The first thou keepest for thyself, as thy birth-right; the second, thou givest me, not by the right of my works, but by the right of grace. He set not against the wrath of God his own monkery nor his angelical life, but he took of that one thing which was necessary, and so was saved."

ARTICLE III.

LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT ADJUSTED.

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How may we attain the thought of a being who is personal, creative, and at the same time infinite and absolute? This general question, in some way, underlies all the speculations which, through varied processes, eventuate in theism, pantheism, atheism, and universal scepticism. Its comprehensiveness and complication of difficulties can be appreciated only after long and patient toiling for a solution. From the first dawnings of philosophical thought, it has engaged and exhausted the powers of the human mind more than any or perhaps all other speculative inquiries, with which philosophy has been conversant. The position thus attained enables us, now, to look back upon the track gone over, and forward in the sure direction, to a satisfactory answer. The impassable limits, which have hitherto seemed to lie directly across the path, will be found in truth to be only guiding and

conservative lines on each hand, with the open way, between, to the recognition of a personal and absolute Deity, without hesitation or contradiction. It is practicable accurately to adjust the limits of religious thought.

In the compass which may be allowed to this Article, an outline of the subject with little detail is all that can be attempted; yet will care be taken to make the investigation clear and plain. The general method needs first to attain the present state of speculation on this question, and then to indicate the steps yet to be taken for a full solution.

Two prominent names may be used as the representatives of the present aspect of the discussion, viz. Sir William Hamilton, whose views may be found by our readers in the edition of his Works edited by O. W. Wight: *Philosophy of the Conditioned*; and Henry Longueville Mansell, B. D., in his *Bampton Lectures: Limits of Religious Thought*.

Hamilton gives the distinction between the infinite and the absolute, by calling the first "the unconditionally unlimited," meaning that which is beyond all limits, and "the unconditionally limited," meaning a whole beyond all conditions. When then, from any point, we seek the immensity of space on all sides; or from any instant, the eternity of time up and down its successions, we are in pursuit of the infinite; when we take the immensity of space or the eternity of time as each a concrete whole, we assume to have the absolute. So, also, with the changing phenomena of nature: as we go up the series for its origin, we are in search of the infinite; and as we take the whole in one, we assume the absolute. To follow events, through all causes, up to a First Cause, and find the many in the One, is a search for the infinite; and to take any cause to be the first, as already possessing the many in the one, is an assumption of the absolute. In opposition to both the infinite and the absolute, stands "the conditionally limited," meaning that which is limited by, and related to, something other than it, and which is to be known as "the conditioned."

Hamilton still further teaches, that thinking is possible only by distinguishing one from others, and which is a con-

conditioning of that thing by limits or relations ; and thus " to think is to condition." We can think nothing, and therefore can know nothing, which is not limited or related ; and therefore the infinite and the absolute must lie beyond the laws of thought and knowledge. They are, each, one and simple, viz. a whole beyond limits, or a whole including all limits ; and there is nothing, besides itself, to limit either, or to stand in any relation to it. The conditioned is, therefore, the only field for thinking and knowing ; while a philosophy of the unconditioned is impossible. The infinite and the absolute are negations, conceived only by thinking away and abstracting the very conditions by which thought must itself be realized. They are " the negatives of the conceivable itself."

Mansel is a disciple of Hamilton, and has availed himself of the acute analyses of the master, yet applying the laws which limit thought after his own independent manner. This is to take the infinite and the absolute and subject them to the processes of logical thought, and run them out to the contradictions and absurdities which necessarily follow.

His starting-point is with the true conception of God as necessarily including First Cause, the Absolute and the Infinite. As First Cause, he produces all things and is produced of none. As Absolute, he has existence in himself, without any necessary relation to another. As Infinite, he is beyond all limits, and can receive no additions. He then logically and very abundantly shows that these cannot meet in one and the same being, nor that the being can be a person, or a creator, without the most insoluble contradictions and intrinsic absurdities.

A first cause cannot be absolute, for it cannot be cause except in relation to its effects ; whereas, the absolute must be without relations. If it be assumed that the absolute exists first as absolute, and afterwards becomes cause ; then could the being not have been infinite ; for he becomes other than he was, and has passed out of his former limits. But suppose the absolute to be cause : then must the cause be freed from all necessity ; for a necessary cause can be neither in-

finite nor absolute. The cause must then be voluntary, and volition must have consciousness. But consciousness can be only of the relative as subject and object; and any assumed identification of subject and object, in an absolute, would throw the absolute beyond consciousness, without volition, and under necessity, and so neither the infinite nor the absolute. We have then, in his own words, the inextricable dilemma: "the absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious; it cannot be conceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple; it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be conceived by the absence of difference; it cannot be identified with the universe, neither can it be distinguished from it. The one and the many, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus, alike, incomprehensible." — Bampton Lectures, p. 79.

Suppose the absolute to be, it cannot become cause; for causal action, voluntary or necessitated, must be either a higher or inferior state than quiescence, and the absolute has gone into a state of more or less comparative perfection, and so not the absolute. Again, the relative cannot come into being; for, if distinct from the absolute, it comes from a non-existence, and the thought is self-contradictory; and if we say it is the same as the absolute, then has not the relative been yet generated, and creation is simply the absolute still, only in another mode. He says: "The whole of this web of contradictions (and it might be extended, if necessary, to a far greater length) is woven from one original warp and woof, namely, the impossibility of conceiving the coexistence of the infinite and the finite; and the cognate impossibility of conceiving a first commencement of phenomena, or the absolute giving birth to the relative. The laws of thought appear to admit of no possible escape from the meshes in which thought is entangled, save by destroying one or the other of the cords of which they are composed." — Bampton Lectures, p. 81.

Then, on "the opposite side," in reference to the mental laws under which they are formed, it is argued that con-

consciousness implies *distinction*, and this implies *limitation*; the infinite, therefore, cannot come into consciousness except as a self-contradiction. Consciousness, also, implies *relation*; the absolute, then, cannot come as relative object to the subject of consciousness, without self-contradiction. Consciousness, also, is subject to *laws of time*, as successive and continuous. But what succeeds another must be finite; and what is continuous must be made up of parts, and grow in completeness with the addition of each, and be never the infinite. So the first act of the first cause, as creative, would be the first point of temporal succession, and there must then be a consciousness of a phenomenon in time and a cause out of time, and thus a consciousness at once out of time and in time. Myself and my thought must be limited and related, each by and to each; and thus, as limited and related, personality cannot become either infinite or absolute in a consciousness, without direct absurdity.

Thus, in the negations of Hamilton and the self-contradictions of Mansel, all thought and knowledge of God as infinite and absolute, as personal and creative, become utterly empty and vain, and we can help ourselves in our religious wants and experience in no way by any processes of logical thinking. But inasmuch as the logical intellect runs itself into no contradictions in thinking within the province of the finite and the relative, and only attains these empty negations and absurdities when passing over into the region of the unconditioned, we are hence to learn that the limits of human thought are fixed between the conditioned and the unconditioned, the natural and the supernatural, and that we can think and know truly and validly on this side, but are scourged with doubts and delusions whenever we set our foot upon the other side. Within the limit, the human intellect is strong and sure; it was designed to work only here; to operate practically, not speculatively; and is only weak and deceptive in transgressing its laws. Thought is only for the phenomenal; we must rely on something else for the unseen and immortal. And as religion, both in its object of worship and its end of hope, has its relevancy

mainly to the unseen world, so thought is specially limited in the truths of religion, and we are to renounce the use of reason here and substitute faith. "In this impotence of reason we are compelled to take refuge in faith, and to believe that an Infinite Being exists though we know not how, and that he is the same with that Being who is made known in consciousness as our sustainer and law-giver." — Bampton Lectures, p. 127.

It becomes thus a momentous, a vital question for humanity: How shall we find a warrant, in the negations of thought and the self-contradictions of knowledge, that this faith can save us? Nothing can now be of so much importance as an assurance, from some quarter, for the validity of this ground of faith. We need to look carefully to itself and its entire connections to see how firm a resting-place it may afford. Hamilton finds his ground for faith in one way, and Mansel in another; we shall need to give to each a separate examination.

We will first examine this ground for faith as laid for us by Hamilton. His analytical result, that both the infinite and the absolute are beyond the reach of the logical understanding, is doubtless correct, and a very important attainment. Neither can be presented in logical thought except by thinking away all limits and relations, and that must leave only a negation in the consciousness, for the elements of an object of thought are thereby taken away. We may as well attempt to think a figure bounded by two straight lines, or a cause acting upon nothing that shall condition the effect. If there is no other intellectual function, we have nothing else but to make the most of faith. Hamilton does this in his way thus:

The infinite and the absolute are both in themselves single and simple, and thus are each inconceivable, but they are distinguished each from each, and therefore nothing hinders from thinking that one of them may be in the non-being of the other. Yea, not only may be, but, from their mutual repugnance and opposition, one must be in the absence of the other. Space and time must each possess either infinite

immensity, or absolute totality; and nature, also, must be an endless series, or an entire universe. From the logical law of contradiction or excluded middle, that of two opposites only one can be, and that one must be and no third thing can come between, it follows, that either an infinite or an absolute being is logically necessary. "The mind is not represented as conceiving two propositions subversive of each other to be equally possible; but only as unable to understand as possible either of two extremes, one of which, however, on the ground of their mutual repugnance, it is compelled to recognize as true." — Wight's Hamilton, p. 157. In this way reason is assumed to be "weak but not deceitful;" and, while we cannot trust in its direct action to secure any object for our knowledge, he would have us trust in this principle of logical contradiction to secure an object for our faith. "We are thus taught the salutary lesson," he continues, "that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted into the measure of existence; and are warned from recognizing the domain of our knowledge as necessarily coëxtensive with the horizon of our faith. And by a wonderful revelation, we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and the finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality." We in this are furnished with a basis for a belief *that* God is, though we can have no thought *what* he is.

Hamilton supposes that he has herein solved the difficulties presented in the antinomies of Kant, of whom he says that "he endeavored to evince that pure reason, that intelligence is naturally, is necessarily, repugnant with itself, and that speculation ends in a series of insoluble antilogies. In its highest potency, in its very essence, thought is thus infected with contradiction, and the worst and most pervading scepticism is the melancholy result." And then of himself he says: "If I have done anything meritorious in philosophy, it is in the attempt to explain the phenomena of these contradictions; in showing that they arise only when intelligence transcends the limits to which its legitimate

exercise is restricted." — Hamilton's Lectures, Appendix, p. 647.

Now that this can give no secure warrant for faith is evident as follows: 1. The faith is made to rest on a process of thought which is as truly beyond its law as that of the knowledge which has been rejected. We can think and know within the limits of the conditioned, and the process will be neither "fallible nor mendacious;" but contradictions and absurdities, and thus a negation of all object, come when thought transcends the conditioned. And yet this whole work of laying a basis for faith is a logical process which is made to go on and complete itself in a conclusion beyond the legitimate boundary, and quite over within the region of the unconditioned. We are warned not to trust the logical thought for our knowledge, but we put our faith upon the logical thought that can appear nowhere else except in this same delusive region. If the logical process is not valid for attaining either the infinite or the absolute, because carried on beyond the region of the conditioned, then surely that process which must take them as given, and apply the logical law of contradiction to them, must still more transcend the safe limit.

2. The infinite and the absolute are mere negatives of thought, and yet they are to be taken as positive realities in our faith. If we could legitimately take and safely rely upon the logical process of the excluded middle, in this region of the unconditioned, we could only embrace one of them in our conclusion as a self-contradictory negative. The infinite and the absolute are possible in our thought only as such negations, and the exclusion of either by the logical law can only leave the other for our faith such as it was in our thought, and thus our faith can embrace nothing other than such an absurd and empty Deity. But no man's faith can be satisfied in such an object any more than his knowledge could before have been. And elsewhere Hamilton shows that he supposes the faith should embrace more, for he says: "We are unable to think the divine attributes as in themselves they are; we cannot think God without

impiety unless we also implicitly confess our impotence to think him worthily, and if we should assert that God is as we think or can affirm him to be, we actually blaspheme." — Hamilton's Lectures, Appendix, p. 692. The logic on which faith rests can give only a negative, but quite inconsequently the faith assumes a positive.

3. If a ground were in this given that could sustain a positive existence, still that existing being could not be a God both infinite and absolute. The logical law of contradiction can, at the best, only give one, and must exclude the other. But can any man's faith stop short with one to the exclusion of the other? Is it not necessary that we believe God to be both without beginning of days and that he inhabiteth eternity? that he is unbounded fulness, and that also he filleth immensity? If so, the ground is utterly unsatisfactory; it only can sustain one, and cannot at all indicate which one, while our faith needs both.

The basis for faith is then just as unsound as it would be for our knowledge, and in what it is assumed to sustain we can find only half we want. In taking for faith either the infinite or the absolute, we transgress the legitimate limits of thought, and then in taking both the infinite and absolute, we annihilate the law of contradiction, which gave the only ground on which we could take either. Surely the human intellect is not here, as Hamilton has assumed, merely weak; it is, as Kant found and affirmed, wholly self-repugnant. The only result which Hamilton's analysis can reach is, that the logical faculty he uses can do nothing with the problems of the infinite and the absolute. It runs them both into contradictions and negations, and can as little supply a ground for faith as for knowledge. In the very act of faith there is the contradiction to logical thought. It becomes not merely a trusting beyond thought, but directly against thought; not a faith that God is, while unable to think how he is; but a faith that he is, while neither the thought nor the faith can take him as any other than the absurdity of a self-contradictory negation. We must, on this ground, not merely erect our altars to the Unknown God, but to a God,

the knowledge of whom and the faith in whom must alike be self-repugnant.

We will next examine the ground of faith, as understood by Mansel. His elaborate exhibitions of the contradictions and absurdities to which a logical process must run in attempting to reach the infinite or the absolute, and especially in applying these to God as First Cause, a personal Creator and moral Governor, are both conclusive and important. But his assumption that in this the human intellect is impotent and limited only, and not also deceptive, is, like Hamilton before him, a mistake, if only the logical process is apprehended, and from which much evil follows. This logical process, alone, can in no way free itself from these absurdities; and then the support to faith, wherever placed, must itself necessarily encounter all the danger from such proved and admitted contradictions. We must be able to correct these antinomies of the understanding by a higher faculty, or no possible basis for faith can stand secure against the charges of credulity or superstition.

Mansel, at the outset, assumes that God is both infinite *and* absolute, and thus at once cuts himself off from all reliance for faith upon Hamilton's principle of logical contradiction or excluded middle, which can admit only that God is infinite *or* absolute. He hardly seems, himself, conscious of this disagreement; and, at times, makes a hesitating use of what might seem to be similar to Hamilton's ground: "The attempt to construct, in thought, an object answering to such names, necessarily results in contradictions; it proves our impotence, and it proves nothing more. Or rather, it *indirectly* leads us to believe in the existence of the infinite, which we cannot conceive; for the denial of its existence involves a contradiction *no less than* the assertion of its conceivability." — Bampton Lectures, p. 110.

In other places he alludes to man's dependence and subjective need of a God on which to rely, as some source of authority for faith. "Man learns to pray before he learns to reason; he feels within him the consciousness of a Supreme Being, and the instinct of worship before he can argue from

effects to causes, or estimate the traces of wisdom and benevolence scattered through creation.”—Bampton Lectures, p. 115. But the direct and abiding reliance for faith, with Mansel, is not a logical nor a philosophical basis, but the interposition of the Bible. A divine revelation, in its express declarations, constitutes that ground on which he would have us place our faith, against all the weakness or the contradictoriness of human reason ; and this appears all through his lectures. While he exposes the contradictions of all processes of thought beyond the limits of the phenomenal world, and assumes that these contradictions are but the evidence of a weakness that comes from the rashness and waywardness of speculation, he yet admits that these religious themes can have no place in thought but under such contradictions, and that “in this impotence of Reason we are compelled to take refuge in faith,” and this faith must rest on the direct declarations of scripture. We are, here, in a more hazardous position than on the ground of Hamilton ; since not a logical law, but an assumed declaration from Heaven, is put over against direct, and admitted, and even inevitable contradictions of logic. We must believe either with no thought and no object, or with a contradictory thought and an intrinsically absurd object. We must believe either without thinking, or against thought if we do think ; for, on these points the logical faculty can think only in contradictions. The inherent antinomy of the understanding which Kant found and Hamilton boasted to have solved, comes out in all its necessity and with all its perplexity.

Great and good as is the service rendered by Mansel in bringing out, so glaringly and extensively, the necessary absurdities, when the logical faculty is set to expounding the problems of the infinite and the absolute ; the danger perhaps more than counterbalances it, when he sets the Bible directly over against the contradictions, and makes our faith in it to stand in direct and necessary conflict with our thought. No matter how much it may be repeated, that the thought is unlicensed and transgressing its proper limits, it is the only

way admitted that we can think on these topics; and the alternative presented is faith without thinking. Instead of recognizing, in such a dilemma, that there must somehow be, here, a gross fallacy, and carefully going back to a deeper psychology to discover and remove it, he goes intrepidly and, we think, quite rashly on in the interposition of revelation, and demanding faith in it, while he allows and proves that, if reason be permitted to speak at all, it must be against it; and then himself finds and allows the following consequences, resulting from this method of sustaining faith:

1. Truth must differ with different orders of intelligence. Truth is relative to the subject only, and not any property in things themselves. What is truth to a man, may be very different from truth to an angel or God. Just as the phenomenon must be modified by the organ, and the taste of the same viands may be pleasant to one and disagreeable to another; so, the fundamental truths of philosophy and religion may be one thing to the human intellect, and another thing to angelic intelligences and to God. There can be no standard and test of even ultimate truths, but only the general consent of the specific order of intelligence; and, though the highest conception of truth would be that which is true for all intelligences, yet we can know nothing of such truth, and only that which is common to the human intelligence. "Truth, therefore, in relation to man, admits of no other test than the harmonious consent of all human faculties; and, as no such faculties can take cognizance of the absolute, it follows that correspondence with the absolute can never be required as a test for truth. The utmost deficiency that can be charged against the human faculties amounts only to this: that we cannot say that we know God as God knows himself; that the truth of which our finite minds are susceptible may, for aught we know, be but the passing shadow of some higher reality, which exists only in the divine intelligence." — Bampton Lectures, p. 147. Thus God and man can have no communion in the same truths; and therefore the infinite and the absolute, though absurdities and contradictory negatives to us, may be positive and consistent realities

to God. And yet, even if this were admitted, we should be obliged still to say that *our* faith can embrace only *our* truth.

2. Then is the Bible only an accommodation to our faculties. The infinite and the absolute can, in no way, be brought within our thought; and thus God, as he is, can in no way be revealed to us. To give him as he is, would at once contradict our reason; and therefore the representations made of him must conform to our powers of apprehension. And as this must be true of God himself, so also of all that relates to a future state of being: to our minds all these truths of the eternal and spiritual world would involve absurdities; and not merely transcend our thought, but stand self-repugnant in our thought. They must therefore be presented to us, in the Bible, not as they are, but as we can apprehend them. "There are two modes in which we may endeavor to contemplate the Deity: one, negative, a vain attempt to expand consciousness to the infinite; the other, positive, viewing the object as accommodated to the finite capacities of the human thinker."—Bampton Lectures, p. 131. That the Bible is not delusive, may be believed; but such belief must be against the convictions which reason produces. "We may indeed believe, and ought to believe, that the knowledge which our Creator has permitted us to attain to, whether by revelation or our natural faculties, is not given us as an instrument of deception.—But in thus believing, we desert the evidence of reason to rest on that of faith."—p. 144.

3. The attributes of God are, in our faith, different from the reality. We have God represented to us under the forms and passions of man; but these are not for the purpose of assisting us to raise our minds to any true conceptions of the divine attributes, for they cannot be, in God, such as they are in humanity; and no communication can be made to us that shall give the truth. The representations of these attributes are only for a practical use, but not for instruction in truth. That any truth should be communicated here, would oblige us to be able to apprehend the divine attributes in the contradictions of their absolute being.

"If there be any who maintain that they can conceive justice, and mercy, and wisdom as neither existing in a merciful, and just, and wise being, nor in any way distinguished from each other; these, and these alone, may aspire to correct revelation by the aid of philosophy; for such alone are the conditions under which philosophy can attain to a rational knowledge of the infinite God." — Bampton Lectures, p. 225.

4. It also involves that, while God's moral government rests on an absolute right, yet that this must be wholly different from our morality. Right with God as much transcends our thought as does the infinite and the absolute, for his right must be both infinite and absolute. If we should attempt to attain and follow it, the morality must not only be different from ours but contradictory to our human ethics. "That there is an absolute morality based upon, or rather identical with, the eternal nature of God, is, indeed, a conviction forced upon us by the same evidence as that on which we believe that God exists at all. But *what* that absolute morality is, we are as unable to fix in any human conception as we are to define the other attributes of the same divine nature." — "God did not create absolute morality; it is coeternal with himself; but God did create the human manifestations of morality when he created the moral constitution of man, and placed him in those circumstances by which the eternal principles of right and wrong are modified in relation to the present life." — "We cannot from our present point of view examine the same duties apart from their human element, and separate that which is relative and peculiar to man in this life, from that which is absolute and common to all moral beings." — Bampton Lectures, pp. 186—188.

On this ground are to be interpreted many of the mysterious providences and requisitions of the Bible; such as the sacrifice of Isaac, the destruction of the Canaanites, etc., which are only the cropping out of the divine morality within our phenomenal experience, and which are shocking to our ethical perceptions, but which are the true and right-

eous exhibitions of God's deeper absolute morality. And just as miracles reveal a hidden power deeper and stronger than nature, so these surprising and shocking workings of the Deity are only "Moral Miracles," revealing the hidden absolute right which deeply underlies the morality of the divine government. "In both, the Almighty is regarded as suspending for special purposes, not the eternal laws which constitute his own absolute nature, but the created laws which he imposed at a certain time upon a particular portion of his creatures." — Bampton Lectures, p. 212.

5. It induces a disparagement of natural theology and the internal evidences of revelation. The logical process can only pass up and down the perpetual series of cause and effect, and can never pass beyond, and thus all attempts to find a first cause, and apprehend any liberty and personality in it, necessitates perpetual contradictions. The true argument for a Deity from his works is hereby precluded, and all modes of worship and grounds of dependence and hope are shut off from all support by natural reason. Natural theology is in this way lost. And on the same grounds of contradiction and absurdity necessarily induced, in applying personal attributes to the absolute and a moral character that the human mind can recognize, we are unfitted to say, from the things revealed, anything about the evidences for a divine origin of the Bible. Miracles and prophecy must be the great sources of evidence that God has spoken to men, and we cannot help our faith from the consideration of what has been spoken. We are too incompetent to say anything about what is reasonable to be revealed, to admit that we should put any dependence upon our study of internal evidences. The position taken would, indeed, exclude all such evidences entirely, and the manifest undervaluing of these proofs in the Lectures shows the necessary tendencies of the speculation, though restrained as yet from their full effect.

6. It places the believer and the sceptic in the same position; they only deduce different conclusions from the same data, while that of the sceptic is the more consecutive. All reasoning about the infinite and the absolute necessarily

leads to self-contradictions, and so far as thinking can go, the whole terminates in unavoidable absurdities. Yea, there must at last be admitted an inherent antinomy and self-repugnance in the human understanding. All are forced to this conclusion and come at length together in this position. The sceptic says: I can bring my thought to no other result, and I must here doubt all about these matters; I cannot but be sceptical whether there be any absolute. The believer can only say, even so; I stand on your logical position; but you should thence conclude as I do, namely: whether we apply the infinite and absolute to nature as in philosophy, or to God as in theology, it is all the same. We must believe in both cases, if we believe at all, against logical contradictions and absurdities. I desert reason and rely on faith, specially in theology. Have faith in philosophy so far as you can, but for your immortal soul's sake have faith in religion. But here the sceptic far more conclusively answers: I cannot stop thinking and logically concluding. You believe in both philosophy and theology because you do not reason; I do reason, and therefore can have faith in neither. Yea, I find my very understanding in its logical processes self-contradictory, and I am shut up to universal doubting. My very faculties for knowing deceive me, and there is no longer any possible ground for either knowing or believing.

7. The only logical escape from this scepticism is into either Atheism or Pantheism. All logical thought of the infinite and the absolute induces contradiction, and thus doubt. But in this complete distrust, you say: 'I must have some relief, and, as opposites, one must be true.' You first seek for the infinite. In every new position you take, you find the infinite still beyond. You can never reach the one; you can only keep adding to the many. No amount of multiples can be the infinite; no counting of links can find an origin for the whole chain. You have concluded in Atheism. Dissatisfied with this, you assume some link, arbitrarily taken, to be the first and make this your absolute. You follow down through its successive dependent events

and seek to get the many from this one. Each is condition for the conditioned below it; the consequent was in and came from the antecedent; and nothing can anywhere be that is not some form of this primal antecedent produced to a consequent. The whole chain can be only different modes of existence for what was once the first. The ongoing living power has lived on through all. You have concluded in Pantheism; and the most athletic logical thinker cannot leap out of it.

Here, Mansel interposes revelation. Believe in a personal God on the ground of a Bible confirmed by miracles. You assume in the miracles you have found the infinite and absolute God, and this is his accredited word of life to man. You would fain rest on the veracity, love, and mercy of the God herein revealed. But the first reflection when your faith is tried must be, that the very God whom I have been supposing to have wrought the miracles, is a necessary contradiction and self-absurdity in the very thought. And no rejection of the miracle against any evidence can be so contradictory to reason as the admission of the infinite and the absolute together in one first cause. You are necessarily driven back again from the ground of your faith to atheism, pantheism, or universal scepticism. So far, then, are we from relying on a Bible tested by miracles, that we cannot find ground for faith in a God that might work the miracles. The God must first be, and then the miracles and the attested Bible; but you have proved that the very thought of such an existing God is an absurdity. If you keep to your logic, you are helpless. If you discard what you here call reason, you have a faith which is only blind credulity. No man can stand contentedly here. No religion can give peace which rests at last on such sliding sand. The application of much indignant rhetoric, and strong demands for a factitious humility, in both of which the Bampton Lectures abound, cannot help us. The abundance of logic here tried, that was to silence the infidel, has annihilated the foundations for faith, and confirmed the scepticism. Indignantly does the Lecturer declaim against the pantheist: "Personality

with all its limitations, though far from exhibiting the absolute nature of God as he is, is yet truer, grander, more elevating, more religious, than those barren, vague, meaningless abstractions in which men babble about nothing under the name of the infinite and the absolute;" and yet may not this pantheist very courteously reply: 'But, my dear sir, is not your whole book filled with this babble about the infinite, and showing it to be a mere "nothing," though you urge it upon our faith as if it were a reality? And then, too, what if "personality be truer, and grander, and more elevating than these barren, vague, meaningless abstractions?" yet have you not yourself been proving to us, that this very application of personality to the absolute is a most unmitigated absurdity?'

The grand difficulty, all along, is with these over-hoivering shadows of the infinite and the absolute. The very thought of them is self-contradictory; and if you had the infinite, it would be as meaningless as unlimited void space and time; and if you had the absolute, it would be only a first cause conditioned in its very constitution, and necessitated to one order of development. And then if you attempted to put both in one being, you would have the augmentation of two contradictory processes — a contradictory bundle of logical contradictions, and in which your logical faculty itself would be given over into the jaws of an all-devouring scepticism. Say you, then, you will get along without recognizing any absolute? But that will be trying to get along without God. Say you, you will then rest this contradictory thought of the absolute upon faith, and will go to a miraculously attested Bible as your ground for believing that he is? But your contradictory absolute God must be believed first to be, before you can have the miracle to confirm the Bible, which is to reveal that such a personal God exists. Yes, but then you retort upon the sceptic and say, you are as badly off in your denials as I am in my affirmations; you can have no philosophy if I cannot have my theology. To all this, that sceptic fairly answers: "Very true, but with this quite significant difference; my scepticism lives and your faith dies

on these self-contradictions. And now what can Hamilton and Mansel, what can Kant and all the critical philosophy here do more? Can it satisfy any dependent dying man to say, you must have faith where your reason contradicts? even if it contradicts as much for your faith as against it? Can such faith sustain when trouble comes, and the light shines on its foundations?

That teaching, then, is weak and treacherous, which sends out its disciples to meet infidelity and to succor and guide the inquiring with no other and better preparation than this. The point of difficulty, and thus the place for relief, is precisely in this vague, shadowy, shifting notion of God as the infinite and the absolute. No infinite and absolute, then no God. A self-absurdity in each, and a double absurdity in putting both in one, and then eminently no God. We must have both the infinite and the absolute; and we must have them without inherent contradiction and absurdity; and this cannot be through any possible agency of the logical understanding. The German critical school has at last, in Hegel, exhausted all the powers of analysis the human understanding can employ. Hamilton and Mansel have shown the necessary result in contradictions and negations as clearly as demonstration can teach us. Thanks to the German critical school for exhausting the process, and thanks to Hamilton and Mansel for showing that this exhausted process is utter negation; "a running through the sieves of the Danaides into the abyss of nothing." We have no more work to do in all this region. The giants have been here and piled the mountains together. None of us can do this work better, nor make here for ourselves a higher point of observation. And yet from the clear transparent top, we can see nothing of the true absolute. All we can catch is a delusive mist which we can neither penetrate nor make up its outline; and we may be permitted to rejoice that at length it is made sure that all this intense search has been a looking in the wrong direction.

Let us put ourselves upon another course of inquiry. The limits of thought, we now find, are directly in the face

of our progress, and shut us back from faith as well as from knowledge. When the human mind clearly sees the condition in which it is thus put, it cannot rest. There is in it the irrepressible claim for access to its God, both in thought and faith, and the instinctive conviction will by no speculation be abolished, that there is, and must be, some way to the presence and knowledge of an infinite and absolute God without meeting a negation or a self-contradiction in his place. The human mind is not shut up to absurdities in the place of truth. The use of the right faculty will give the true solution. Whence comes this want of a God? Whence this yearning for faith? Not from the sense—the faculty which brings the phenomenal world into forms: this does not need anything save its own functions and the objects it constructs into forms. The eye may never be tired of seeing, nor the ear of hearing; but the eye wants nothing but to see; nor the ear, but to hear. The sense never seeks to leap beyond its own province. And just so of the faculty which puts the phenomena together into things. The understanding needs nothing but the function for thinking in judgments, and connecting qualities as inhering in their substances and events as adhering to their causes. It may never tire of thinking, but it wants nothing but to think. Given an unobstructed way back and forth, along the connected series of conditions and conditioned, and the understanding is satisfied. The logical faculty never seeks to rise above its major term; it wants only to be permitted to draw its conclusions through its minor from its major. Neither the sense nor the understanding are crying for a God, nor yearning for faith in his being. These faculties for knowing are content in and with nature; and, as exercised together in all the animal creation, they work wholly self-satisfied without a God in either their knowledge or their faith. It is the unmistakable evidence of the possession of a faculty other and higher than either the sense or the logical understanding, when we hear this irrepressible cry for a God, and find this unappeasable yearning for faith in his being and goodness. And now this part of our being, which thus cries and yearns,

must alone be put to the work of knowing and trusting its object. All the difficulties above exhibited, have arisen solely from this, that our rational and immortal being wants an infinite and absolute God, and faith in his being and goodness, and only the functions of the sense and the logical judgment have been put to the task of attaining them.

This want comes from altogether another and a higher source than the agency that has been sent to help it. Hence, and only from this, the logical contradictions and absurdities of the infinite and the absolute, and the incessant "babble" of the sceptic and the believer about them. Nor can these babel voices be harmonized into one speech, until we cease all attempt to settle the matter by the conditioned connections of logic, and bring in the distinct agency of a higher and more comprehensive faculty. We can, by this, attain an infinite and an absolute which shall neither be absurd in themselves, nor contradictory to each other when put together in the one personal Jehovah. A true rational psychology must be introduced, and in this there will be found a sufficient resource for the difficulty, and a valid critic for determining and adjusting the true limits of religious thought. We shall here put, in the shortest compass, what has a direct bearing on the questions of the true infinite and absolute.

One peculiar and specific function of the human intellect is its capability to give limits. In the exercise of this function we can construct, or put within limits, any portions of space, and thereby make figure, and any portion of time, and thereby make period. We can possess no figure nor period, in pure space and time, without such a constructing act. I can draw any line in space, and thus surround and limit any portion of space, and I can pass along up and down any successions in time, and thus begin and end, and thereby define, any portion of pure time; and, in this way, all possible figures and periods may be constructed. But such figure and period will not somehow come to me in void space and time, unless I so define them, and thus make them, by my own intellectual agency. And so, also, when any color is

given in the eye, I can make the intellectual action pass all around it and get its shape, and when that color changes or varied colors come and go, I can also make the intellectual action fix the limits of before and after, and thereby have its duration in a beginning and an end. But no organic sensation will have its shape or its period in my consciousness, except as, by my own intellectual action, I so construct it. No distinct colors in the eye will have definite shapes, and no passing succession will have definite periods, unless I so construct them for myself. I can have distinct color on a distant sign-board, but I cannot read the letters, unless I can attentively construct and thus define them. The universal law for knowing any figure or period is, that the intellectual agency must *conjoin the contents within limits*. This intellectual function for *conjoining* and thus constructing forms in space and time, belongs to the sense, and the result is *an immediate beholding*; whether the object be a pure mathematical figure, or an empirical appearance.

Now, whenever I make such a constructed figure, I have with it a space; and when I have a constructed succession, there is also a time. But thus far, as we have now gone in the sense, the figures and periods I perceive are *my* figures and periods, and the spaces and times, in which they are, are solely *my* spaces and times. The pure diagram, say a mathematical circle, is constructed and then lost, and the subjective space in which it is, comes and goes with it. The figure, and the space in which it is, are both *mine*. No other intellect can commune with me in the same; he can only construct, and have for himself, the similar. And just so with the organic sensation; it is in *my* organ, and has *my* constructed shape, and stands in *my* space, and no other intellect can have, in any of these, the same but only the similar. And so with the conjoining of limits in time. Each mind must have its *own* forms in its *own* spaces and times; and the spaces and times are as truly his, and not another's, as the forms are his. Each mind can determine whether its forms, and spaces, and times are pure or empirical, by determining whether they are purely mental or experienced in

the organ, but by no sense-construction can any one say that his clearest phenomena and their spaces and times are other than subjective. We can, in the sense, determine no outer world, and no one space and one time as common to all, but only as significant in each for each.

And now, in this subjective world of forms and phenomena, every mind will see that the largest form he has yet constructed, leaves still the opportunity for a larger; and the constructing faculty finds no hindrance nor constraint, and has no occasion to ask for the infinite, which still lies beyond its furthest construction. The sense is completely satisfied in its unhindered constructive agency, and never seeks to find whether its province be infinite or not, or its objects absolute or not. It can propound to itself no such problems.

Again: another distinct and peculiar intellectual function is the capability to put phenomena together and make out of them a connected order of experience. If I think a force to exist that will exclude all else from its place, except as it is removed; and then, that such impenetrable space-filling force is occasion for impressing each separate organ after its peculiar manner; and, that all the phenomena I have constructed into forms, were the varied modes in which the different space-filling forces had affected my organs; I could then refer all such phenomena to the action of those forces upon my organs, and I should at once judge these phenomena to be the qualities of these substantial forces. If, again, it be thought that these substantial forces are invaded by, or combined with, others distinct from them; and that such interferences induced varied substantial changes, making varied organic impressions, and thus varied phenomenal constructions; I should then, at once, judge these passing events to be the products of such changing causes. Such changes of substances, giving varied phenomena, secure that the series of events must stand connected, through these causes, into a determined order of experience. Such putting of the substances under the qualities, and of the causes between the events, is the proper and distinctive work of the under-

standing; and this discursive connection is wholly another work than the defining construction above given in the sense, and is *a judgment according to sense*. The sense-construction gave phenomena; the understanding-connection gives things in a determined order.

And now, when such permanent substance gives its qualities, their organic impression and intellectual construction are *my own*; but that same permanent substance also impresses the organs of others, and these other intellectual agencies construct their phenomena as *their own*; but all must refer the impressions, and thus the constructions, to the same permanent substance and the events to the same causes; and therefore, though each have their own experience, yet the experience of all is the *same one determined order*. The spaces of each will be determined from the same space-filling substances, and the times in each will be determined from the same time-enduring causes; and thus to all there will be one and the same space and the same ongoing of time in common. The objective substances and causes will secure that all the subjective spaces and times shall be alike. We could never so determine one common space for all, except through such objective substances; nor one common time for all, except through such objective causes; and that we do determine space to be one space in common for all, and time to be one time in common for all, is abundant proof that the substances and causes are the same to all, and thus proof for a real objective world, giving its own changes as the occasion for a common experience and a common history of nature.

With this objective world of changing events, any one may make his progress and regress down and up the series, and he will be thinking the same nature of things and possessing the same space and time in common with all others that may follow out these connected judgments. The logical understanding will here find its connecting agency unhindered up and down the series of events in nature, and feel no constraint nor imprisonment in the universe it traverses, and can never need to inquire for an infinite beyond its fur-

theist march, nor an absolute as a first cause of all the changes. Its unimpeded discursions suffice and satisfy, and with no want, it can never put itself to the search for any object of faith beyond the connected judgments of experience. It knows nature; it has no function for knowing a supernatural who may comprehend nature.

If, then, man had no higher functions than the sense and the logical understanding, he could have nothing to do with the infinite or the absolute. The sense may never go beyond its own constructions, nor the understanding beyond its own connections, and we could never want nor suppose anything beyond the flow of conditioned successions. A God and immortality, religion and faith, would be words and thoughts as unmeaning and irrelevant to us as to the animals. Our psychology would be only the sensuous physiology of the brute. That man needs a God, and yearns for faith in his being and benevolence, is an abundant evidence that he has an intellectual capacity distinct from the sense and the understanding, and above them both.

The eye cannot see itself, nor determine from its own perceptions anything about its structure or its acts. That we can get and apply optical principles to vision is an evidence that we are more than merely sense percipients. That we can determine the processes of constructing in limits, and connecting qualities in things and in an order of experience, evinces that we are intelligent above and beyond all that sense, and any faculty of judging according to sense, can secure. We rise above the processes of the logical understanding, and see through them and over them; we subject them to our insight, and bring them within our comprehension; plain proof that we have a distinct and higher function for knowing; and this peculiar function we know, specifically and distinguishingly from all other intellectual faculties, as the reason.

Hamilton denies that the reason with Kant is anything radically different from the understanding, and affirms that "the idea in the reason is only the conception in the understanding sublimated into the inconceivable; reason only the

understanding which has overleaped itself." This is mainly true. With Kant, the understanding is the logical process passing through single syllogisms, and distributing through the minor in a conclusion what was before given in the major term. The reason is only the process from one syllogism to another, and a mere march through indefinite pro-syllogisms, to find a first, or the absolute, which it can never reach. It is really the demand for the absolute, unrecognized as the claim of the reason and only put as a regulative conception primitively in the human mind, and then the logical understanding sent on the vain chase up the endless ladder of pro-syllogisms to find it. The Kantian reason is no true apprehension of the Platonic reason, and has no insight nor comprehension. The true reason is that function by which we overlook and penetrate both the functions of conjoining in the sense and giving limits, and of connecting in the understanding and giving things and series of events, and thus it determines what is necessary to them in their principles, and thereby comprehends and expounds them. That we have this distinctive function capacitates us to be philosophers, and that we can philosophize about the infinite and the absolute capacitates us to be theologians. It is this part of our being only that calls for a God and wants faith in his government, and it is the work of this faculty alone that can answer and satisfy this call. Even a revelation from God can be addressed only to and received by this part of our being, and without it our Bibles were as well given to the brutes.

It is solely because the truths of the infinite and of the absolute have been kept from the reason, and degraded to the processes of the logical understanding, that they have been made to present such paradoxes and contradictions. The contained has been set to measuring the container, and the medium for connecting has been taken as the compass for comprehending, and it need not be surprising that such absurdities have followed, and that all forms of scepticism have grown bold. We would here, then, apply ourselves altogether to the use of this distinctive intellectual function, the comprehending reason.

The intellectual process of construction in the sense, would never suggest to itself the attempt to construct all of space into one, and all of time into one; this faculty is abundantly satisfied in that it has no hindrance to its constructions. But the insight and oversight of this process by the higher function of the reason, at once suggests the want of a common space and a common time for all constructing beings. How may all commune, in the common experience of things and events, in one space and one time? If the constructing sense be put to the task of answering, we can, by the reason, see at once that it must be, and why it must be, vain. The constructing act can be only in and for its own consciousness, and the spaces and times in which it makes its limits and forms can be only its own subjective spaces and times, and thus the merely sense-agent is as truly shut up to his own spaces and times as the mind that dreams. But this inseeing and overseeing function can at once determine, that if some permanent substance be given which may occasion all sense-constructions, in all sentient beings and organs, to describe its outlines, then all will have one common figure and one common point from which to go out and estimate bearing and direction; and thus all subjective spaces will stand in conformity with one and the same common space. And also, if this substance have its causal changes, then all will construct the same events in the same ordered successions, and all the subjective times will stand in conformity to the one common time of these successive changes. The common space and the common time, in which all the beings of sense participate, will come only in and by the universal constructions of those sensations which have been occasioned by the common substances and causes. Take away these permanent substances and their changes, and you doom every man to be shut in upon his own separate constructions, and to dream on alone; but place all where these permanent substances and changing causes may act in common upon their sensuous organism, and they at once commune in one space and one time. The one nature makes the one common space and time for all; and

their communion in this one space and time, and their participation of experience in one history, are their valid proofs for a real objective world. The reason only can attain this one common space and time, and show how they can so be without an error or absurdity ; while, if the sense be put to this work, through its constructions, or the understanding through its connections, nothing but contradiction and delusion can follow. With this one space and one time in common to all men, and the one history of nature's ongoing, we are prepared to see the only remaining step that must be taken, to put us face to face with a self-consistent infinite and absolute Being.

There must be the clear idea of what is necessary, in order that a cause for such a nature and its one space and one time may be truly First Cause. The understanding-conception of a cause can never be a first cause ; and the attempt to put the logical function of the understanding to the attainment of such an idea, would lead to all the self-contradictions already so fully noticed. This conception of cause always carries with it an inherent constitutional efficiency which gives its own nature to it, and makes it specifically what it is, and makes it also necessary that it should go out in its own order of development when occasion is given. It must go out into effect, and in one order of effects, according to its inherent nature. It can only give a development of its own constitution, and can put forth nothing new, but such alone as it already possesses in itself. Here there can be no first ; for, let us assume any cause we may as first, the very conception of the cause has already a constitution, a nature, an inherent characteristic of efficiency, which determines necessarily what must come from it. The very thought of it demands that another should have been there, and given to it its essential peculiarity. It is a cause already caused, and it would be a self-contradiction to speak of it as first cause.

The higher function of the reason takes this understanding, conception of cause, and subjects it to its own insight, and at once sees what is necessary that it may be first cause. The efficiency must have, in its essential being, the ideals or

archetypes of all possible existence, and in this the competency to go out in action, not merely in one way without an alternative, but in all possible ways. There must also be self-knowledge and self-estimate of intrinsic excellency of being, and thus an exact seeing that which is due to and worthy of itself; and in this the competency to decide, which of all possibles it behooves, for its own worthiness' sake, should be taken. In this we have *self-hood*, the mind's capability to stand self-separate and self-balanced, and originate acts from within its own being with no dependence on an outer and an other. It is taken out from all necessity and which has no alternative, and in its self-sufficiency is truly *cause in liberty*. It has self-law and directory in the imperative that sounds through its whole being for his glory's sake, and is thus a *personal cause*. And now, when we recognize this personal Being, in his proper position as Creator and Governor, we shall also see that he is truly *infinite* and truly *absolute*.

In his own being, there is nothing for organic impression, and thus nothing for sense-construction, which may give one common space from the same substance; and also nothing for understanding-connections, which may give one common time from the same order of cause and events. He has truly nothing for sense and logical understanding, and is thus wholly independent of space, time, and nature. Place, period, and change are wholly irrelevant and insignificant words as applied to him. These can have no meaning except as an objective nature is. From what he sees his own glory or moral worthiness requires, and in accordance with that archetypal pattern which is determined for his glory's sake, he puts forth such efficient action as shall fix a force permanent and substantial, and thus making an existence in what else was an utter void. Such existing substantial force gives, at once, occasion for impressing organic senses, and introducing sense-constructions, and in the ongoing changes introducing also understanding-connections. A common space and time and history of events are all given in it. The sense and the understanding functions may here

go to their work, and find all their respective objects. Perception and thinking in judgments may here begin. A creator, and a cosmos other than its creator, have both a real being. Here is the place for determining a true and complete rational cosmology; and when the scientific world shall be ready to study it thoroughly, and appreciate it honestly, such true and complete rational cosmology is already substantially and intelligibly furnished to their hands.

Put, now, the contemplating mind which is to study this creator and his works, within the cosmos he has created. In his search for the creator he must go out of, and get beyond, the cosmos in which he lives. If he set the logical understanding to work within, he will find all the contradictions, in going through space and time for the infinite and the absolute, which have been so fully exposed by Hamilton and Mansel. He will be preposterously striving to comprehend nature, and nature's space and time, by carrying his measures up and down within nature and its space and time, and this work the comprehending reason can beforehand see must be absurdity and emptiness. But instead of this connecting process within nature, he takes the process for comprehending nature within the supernatural. He may begin in nature, and he looks for that which did not come from nature, but which must have been put within it. A miraculous counteraction of nature; a geological testimony of some new organic species originating in and not from nature; and the working of moral agency which can resist and go against the current of nature; all these may be sources for determining a beginning within nature, and proving the being of a causality which does not belong to nature; and which, by the harmony of the new introduced events with nature, proves, also, itself to be the author both of the new events and nature. In these originations within nature the reason sees the plain footprints of the Deity, and at once rises to the contemplation of a personal Jehovah, above and independent of the works of his hand in nature. He knows him to be truly infinite, for he is at once out of nature's space and nature's time, and can be limited by

neither. As the maker of nature, he gave both nature's space and nature's time to be. He knows him also to be absolute, for he originated from himself those primal forces in which nature's substances began, and by which nature's causes and events commenced their flow. Nature's places and periods are wholly irrelevant to him, who determined them, in the bringing of nature itself to stand out in the void where nothing, not even the one common space and time, yet was. The reason, thus, overlooks both nature and nature's space and time, and finds the independent God, who has made them all to be. His infinity and absoluteness are without contradiction or absurdity, and reduce themselves to no negations by abstracting the conceivable from them, for he positively stands unbounded by any spacial and temporal limits, and unconditioned by any of nature's substances and causes. Here is left no room for scepticism, for there is here no conflicting thought. There is no place for pantheism, for a personal creator is found, and the cosmos is an origination from his agency, and not the mere development of God himself into another mode of being. Atheism also is wholly excluded, for a personal God, creator and governor, infinite and absolute, has been fully recognized.

In the presence of this Deity there is awakened the feeling of humility as a dependent creature, and of self-debasement as a sinner, which is consciously reasonable and salutary. But that factitious humility, urged upon us under the assumption of our weakness and limitation of faculties, but which is really the self-contradiction of the intellect, and the demand for faith which can be only credulity and superstition in such a mind, can never be morally wholesome. It is a feeling that irritates and corrodes the spirit, and sours the disposition. True humility before the true God covers the face in reverence and adoration, and to the sinner secures contrition and confession, and inspires hope and praise.

With this self-consistent and clear idea of God, we can also see that his revelation of himself, either by his works or his inspired word, can find no hindrance from the intellect

nor obstacles from conflicting thought to the full exercise of an enlightened and intelligent faith. It is manifestly our highest worthiness and blessedness to believe, obey and trust the accredited messages of such a God, for nothing tends to weaken but all we know tends to strengthen our confidence. Our thought and our faith accord with and reciprocally sustain each other.

And the true limits of religious thought are also fully found and fairly adjusted. We know how, completely, to correct the antinomies of the sense and the understanding, and to put their processes of constructing and connecting on each hand, that they may guide us through and out of nature's conditions, and the common space and time of nature, to the plainly apprehended infinite and absolute above them. Here the self-existent Jehovah dwells, limitless and relationless, so far as it regards all the measures and changes of nature. The phenomenal and the logical have no applicability to him, and only the inner principles of the rational direct his counsels. "He is a Spirit, and those who worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth."

ARTICLE IV.

THE TWOFOLD LIFE OF JESUS CHRIST.

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A COMPLETE human culture requires the true embodiment of the two great forms or modes of life to which we give the names of Godhead and Manhood. These are everywhere inseparably intertwined in moral and spiritual relations; and no advance can be made in fulfilling the designs of a rational existence except on the basis of a just understanding of what God is and man should be. The ideal

type of each must be made actual and visible in the world as the indispensable preliminary of the world's regeneration.

This demand has found its only adequate satisfaction in the incarnation of Jesus Christ. In him "the life was manifested," — the double life embracing the entire circuit and significance of spiritual being in its normal state. The Son of God and Son of man united in himself these two revelations. On the one side, his character presents the heavenly, the divine likeness in distinct expression. On the other, it portrays, in equal clearness, the perfect man. These two requisites, then, of the reestablishment of our race in the position for which its adaptations assure us it was made, are supplied by Christianity.

That this twofold representation is thus essential to human improvement upon the highest scale, is as undeniable as is the fact that it has never been produced from any other source than the history of Jesus Christ. By a remarkable accord of sentiment, the reflecting minds of all nations have pronounced the culture of the godlike to be the legitimate and noblest business of an intelligent being. It is felt as generally to be true, that the best model of manhood must come from a sphere of life above its own; that no earthly saint or hero has altogether filled out the symmetrical conception of a soul's progress in the knowledge and the power of goodness. Humanity has always looked to Divinity for its pattern of resemblance, its law of growth. Where its theology has been no better than that of the heathen, "gods many, and lords many," it has had no other resource from which to draw the form and the motive of its development. Ashamed of their deities, as conscientious idolators must have sometimes been, they could find no worthier models of character elsewhere. If disgusted with the sensualism of the "Immortals," still the instincts of the heart returned inevitably to their region of a higher, wider, nobler, if not adequately purer, existence, in search of (however unsuccessfully) the perfect in reason, will, emotion, conduct. This may be said, that, defective and vile as the false objects of the world's worship have generally been, human

nature would have sunk to immeasurably deeper abysses of brutality with no conceptions of deity at all. With an utter negation of the thought of God in any shape of personal activity and superintendence, nothing could have restrained the race from fatal and total demoralization. A simple belief in the invisible spiritual realm, though peopled only with the progeny of a Jove or a Brahma, has exerted an incalculable power to hold up mankind from gravitating to the lowest possible degree of mental and moral grossness.

But it is not enough to save men from becoming as bad as they can be. Both religion and philanthropy profess it to be their errand to make society as pure as is practicable with the very best helps to the comprehension and attainment of its right position. These helps centre in Christ as the only competent interpreter of truth upon this subject, the only supplier of aid to realize that truth in actual experience. This is asserted. If it be denied, we then affirm that there is no help in the case; that neither God nor man has ever found a full manifestation; that the life of neither is yet in the world's possession in its just conception; that, on this ground of the challenger, the world still waits in more than the heart-sickness of hope deferred—in the sombre gloom of a deepening despair—his advent who shall embody to the eye the divine and the human ideals in their perfectness, and shall declare the method through which their spirit shall enter into, and assimilate to itself, the advancing civilization of our earth.

Concerning the Supreme Being it is to be noted, that he is partly revealed to creatures as an object of wonder and adoration; but that another phase is shown us as a subject of intelligible study and hopeful imitation. What are classed as the natural attributes of Deity, can neither be entirely understood, or at all reproduced by the finite. Thus, absolute past eternity, infinite power, knowledge, diffusibility or omnipresence, are facts to be accepted as necessary to a proper Divine existence; and so we find the pagans made their father of the gods almighty. But we vainly grapple with that thought of infinitude in any of its forms; and to

think to share it one's self is the dream of insanity. The moral qualities of God, on the other hand, address us differently. They too, indeed, run into the illimitable; and, on that side of their extension, consequently, far outreach our range of sight. It is no more within our ability fully to conceive what infinite holiness is, than infinite strength. But, on the side nearest us, these perfections present aspects which we rationally grasp and approve; which we can and should reproduce in our lives; which we must, or never really live. The divine purity, benevolence, truthfulness, justice, in a word, goodness, are characteristic of his nature. We know what these terms convey. Our eye takes in their beauty, as we gaze up into the sapphire sky and revel in its mild splendor. We do not pierce that arching vault of light to its deepest source of brilliance; nor do we compass, in spiritual vision, all that is meant by that "goodness" of the Uncreated. But we seize and hold a part of each revelation. We are conscious that our souls are capable of the culture of these virtues which glow down upon us from the celestial throne; that they may be one in their essential temper, if not to the superhuman measure of their full expression. This the spirit within, on which its Author stamped his image in Eden, tells us.

God, thus, is both incomprehensible and comprehensible. Reason cannot enfold his idea as the infinite; but moral sense can know him as the purely right and good. We shrink from the thought of omniscience as an unresolvable mystery. But we do not ask any one to tell us what love is, when God even calls himself by this benignant name. And so the scriptures are harmonized, in our own consciousness, which demand in bold challenge: "Who, by searching, can find out God? Who can find out the Almighty to perfection?" — and which command in positive terms: "Acquaint, now, thyself with Him and be at peace."

While the Godhead is beyond our grasp of apprehension, in its infinite capacities of being and acting, these facts of its constitution¹ are indispensable as the ground-work of

¹ We cannot well avoid using a human phraseology, but not of course as intimating that Deity was ever *constituted*, *ab extra aut infra*.

such a *moral* development as a true Godhead implies. That is, this must be set up on a basis of unlimited extent. We require the conviction of a God of all power and wisdom and presence to go along with that of a God of all moral excellence. We can conceive of a perfect, that is, a faultless and most amiable angelic being. But though thus perfect, that being does not answer our ideal of the Divine. It lacks the proportions of an uncreated, self-existent, boundless life and energy. Moral completeness, consequently, is not enough, without the accompaniment of natural infinitude, to give us the model of the supreme excellence. And, further, these elements must work in entire concord ever and everywhere; the external or natural strengthening the internal or moral, and these, in turn, regulating, guiding those; thus realizing the spherul harmonies of the highest heavens.

Our purpose does not require a more expanded statement of the divine existence and character. We turn, now, to its representative, the **WORD** made flesh, to find the embodiment of all this spiritual and infinite glory. For if *all* this be inseparable from the Godhead, it must be discoverable in the Son of God, if he be its express image and likeness to men. Nor do we look in vain. It certainly does a violence to the spontaneous sense of a reader of the gospels, to regard their history as that of a common human being: common, not as to native or acquired virtue, but as to original organization. Every one feels that a mystery of nature hangs around his person; that the phrase so often on his lips: "I came down from heaven," is full of the intimations of a higher than mortal birth; that Christ was not *a* son of God, as sharing his whole life with that generation; but that he stood on a unique, an exclusive footing; in one word, as joining the heavenly to the earthly, in an entirely unprecedented way. This persuasion of an unbiassed mind points in the true direction. Nor does the path to which it guides stop until it ascends, beyond the grades of angelic glory, to the height of Christ's unqualified divineness. For God cannot be shown forth, in just dimensions and adequate relief, save by a divinity which is the unabridged measure of himself. God alone can impersonate God.

To this demand Christ proved his sufficiency in his superhuman insight of men's hearts, reading their most hidden tablets of motive and purpose with intuitive ease and accuracy; and in his sovereign control of the material world. He thus "manifested forth" the glory of Jehovah, the Creator and Upholder, as he showed himself to possess "the fullness of the Godhead bodily." This was needful to demonstrate his claim as the Revealer of God. Christ could never have held our faith as the *moral* representative of the All-perfect, unless he had made good his proprietorship of the *natural* endowments of the Godhead. This point is considered of fundamental importance. But still it must be kept in mind that the chief purpose of Christ's supernatural¹ exhibitions of power and wisdom, was to enforce the authority of right principles of moral government; to put God's spiritual laws before his creatures in proper strength of command; to bring God into contact with us, influentially, at the points where he would, and ought to, exert the happiest, the weightiest agency in forming our characters and shaping our destinies.

At this point, the two parts of our subject unite and flow onward in a single stream. The moral ideal of the Godhead is the true ideal of Manhood. What the first is, the second should be, in voluntary characteristics. This had its illustration in Christ's entire life. It shone and still shines in his precepts, his expositions of elementary religious duty, in his pure and benevolent sentiments, in the play of emo-

¹ Whately's Christian Evidences, V. § 2, criticizes this word as of doubtful accuracy: "for if we believe that 'nature' is merely another word to signify that state of things, and course of events, which God has appointed, nothing that occurs can be strictly called *supernatural*." He gives its common use as "something at variance with those laws of nature which we have been accustomed to." Theologically, a supernatural event is a *miracle*; so Webster defines the term. Bushnell (Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 37, 38) makes *this* to be any interruption of the processes, combinations, results of our system of nature, or any varying of them, by the action of God, or angels, or men, so as that shall come to pass which would not come to pass in it by its own internal action, under the laws of mere cause and effect. The supernaturalism claimed for Christ is the highest form of such interruption or variation of the processes of nature.

tion and sensibility, in his firmness of will invincible to temptation, in his holy deeds unstained by an open or a secret sin. It is too late, by many centuries, to open now the issue as to Christ's absolute sinlessness. The best intellects will not discuss that question, except it may be now and then to demolish summarily the bold blasphemy which here and there may risk an impeachment of the morality of Jesus. It is demonstrable that such impeachment is false from the entire gospel-record of the Son of Mary, and from the influence of the religion which he taught, upon its honest and thorough adherents. Nor can any valid objection lie against this statement from the development of the person of Christ; from the development of the plan of his kingdom; from his temptation, or other facts of his life; or from philosophical and empirical arguments against the possibility of such moral perfection in a human being.¹ His existence on earth in mortal form gives us the exact definition of those terms which in God are full-orbed realities — as justice, truthfulness, love, purity, benevolence.

Looking around us at current exhibitions of these qualities, and taking our impressions of their beauty and worth from what we see of their outgrowth in the best specimens of men, we come to have a very deficient conception of their nature as absolute virtues, until they mean to us something quite unlike their normal significance. We think of this or that uncommonly upright, philanthropic, unworldly person; and he becomes to us the standard of what these attributes are in celestial natures, and of what their legitimate culture is able to do for our race. Such virtues or graces, if genuine, are godlike in kind wherever found. But in symmetry, in ripeness, in the rounded fulness and loveliness, and in the exquisite flavor of their possible perfectness, what are these samples of them which we behold? It is as if we should form our conception of the rare flowers and fruits of the tropics from the dwarfed and puny slips which we succeed

¹ Dr. Ullman's Treatise on this topic pursues the above general line of reasoning to a triumphant vindication of Christ's actual impeccability. — Sixth edition, 1853.

in keeping alive in a warm window through the winter frosts. This is doubly injurious. It dims to us the resplendence of God, paling his brightness to our vision from that of a spotless sun to the feebleness of a tremulous starlight. And it subtracts immensely from our proper idea of the spiritual elevation, nobleness, and approximative divineness to which humanity can and should attain. This whole habit of forming our judgment of moral traits and capabilities from the finite and the faulty, however conscientious and comparatively correct, is a dwarfing process directly hostile to a true human advancement. Still more is this so, when men go for their models of morality, virtue, piety to the unregenerate world. Carlyle's "Heroes" would not answer this demand, were all its chapters devoted to the Pauls, and Luthers, and Washingtons, of the ages. But when he puts into the ranks of the "holy ones," a Mohammed, a Goethe, a Burns; and even tells us that 'as a spiritual man James Boswell was one of the first of the age;' we feel our sense of right not only rudely shocked, but trifled with and outraged. A conception of an ideal manhood derived from references like these, must be radically insufficient; and, if practically followed out, must lead to utter corruption and hopeless perdition, in its ultimate social issues.

The proper corrective of these mistakes is found in the acceptance of the life of Christ as the one, the only impersonation on earth of the divine and the human in their completed proportions. God thus descended to man, that man might thus ascend to God. Imagination may attempt to picture how transcendently beautiful, attractive, blissful, would be a manhood universally and thoroughly moulded after that of Christ; but it has not colors bright enough for the tinting of a world peopled with the pureness and love, the righteousness and compassionateness which that beloved Son of God every day exhibited. Yet this is manliness in the culmination of its honor and greatness. The truest Christian gentleman is the truest hero—the type of the highest chivalry, "without fear and without reproach." It startles us even to suggest what a different story human

history would have been, made up and written out of such materials. But just that kind of record it ought to have been in every period, if the loftiest virtue be always obligatory.

This is, however, to be observed, in speaking of the imitation of Christ, that "it is the spirit of his example that we are to follow, not the letter. We are to endeavor that the principles of our actions may be the same which he manifested in his, but not to cleave servilely to the outward form." Each age, each individual has a special work to do, or office to fill; but diverse as these may be externally, the internal impulse should be alike, and should be controllingly Christ-like. As the author¹ just quoted puts this point — because Jesus was not a husband, a father, a statesman, a lawyer, a merchant, an author, it does not prove that there should be no family organization, nor that trade, jurisprudence, science, poetry, philosophy are unchristian. Not at all. "As rationally might it be argued," he goes on to say, "that, because there are no trees or houses in the sky it is therefore profane and sinful to plant trees and build houses on the earth. Jeremy Taylor, when speaking of the things which Christ did, but which are not 'imitable by us,' touches on this very point. 'We never read (he says) that Jesus laughed, and but once that he rejoiced in spirit; but the declensions of our natures cannot bear the weight of a perpetual grave deportment, without the intervals of refreshment and free alacrity.'" These relations and pursuits, so familiar to us, did not comport with Christ's peculiar errand here. And so he declined them. They may be the proper calling of others. But if undertaken, they are to draw the motive and the temper of their exercise from the one true fount of spiritual life — the mind and the heart of Jesus. Thus history awaits its regeneration. It will still be the narrative of men, society, political institutions and changes; it will have to deal with the progress of art, legislation, general knowledge and discovery, commerce and manufactures, and material produc-

¹ Archdeacon Hare in "Guesses at Truth," Series first, pp. 360, 361.

tion. But what it ought to depict, as man is rational, accountable, immortal, is the movement of all this enterprise and triumph under the law of the holy, benevolent, honest, unselfish man of Nazareth. His presence must walk our streets, and frequent our marts of business, and sit in our council-halls, and dwell in our homes, and travel with us by land and sea, to give us the spirit and the form, the pattern and the power of that only manhood which is worthy of a man, be he rich or poor, known or unknown to fame. That which cannot endure this test must be expelled from our world. Civilization must become Christianization. Putting words into the lips of those who shall see that day, we may employ the language of the suggestive writer cited last concerning our own superiority to the barbarous brutalities of the past; and suppose those coming men to say: "The praise is not of man but of God. It is only by His light that we see light. If we are at all better than those first men who were of the earth, earthy, it is because the second man was the Lord from heaven."¹

¹ F. W. Robertson (Sermons, XVIII. and XIX. Second Series). propounds a theory of Mariolatry and its Cure, which is ingenious and perhaps true. "The only safeguard against the idolatrous error of Virgin-worship, is a *full* recognition of the perfect humanity of Christ: — for it is only a partial acknowledgment of the meaning of the Incarnation when we think of Him as the Divine man. It was not manhood [distinctively, i. e. masculinity], but humanity that was made divine in him. Humanity has its two sides: one side in the strength and intellect of manhood; the other, in the tenderness, and faith, and submissiveness of womanhood; man and woman — make up human nature. In Christ, not one alone, but both were glorified. Strength and grace — wisdom and love — courage and purity — divine manliness, divine womanliness. In all noble characters you find the two blended in Him, the noblest; blended into one entire and perfect humanity." — II. 276.

It is the feminine side of this whole humanity, as moulded by Christianity, which the Virgin-worshippers have deified, because Christ has been too exclusively represented as distinctively the model-man. "With a half-thought of Christ, safe you art not." — "Christianity has in it an awful gap, a void, a want, the inevitable supply and relief to which will be Mariolatry." And so the Romanists have gone to Mary for the woman's heart, whereas *this* is perfect in Jesus as well. His nature is neither man's nor woman's, but both in actualized deal. To this, Mr. Robertson cites Gal. 3: 28: "There is neither [in Christ] Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither *male nor female*;" the reference, if not primary, being considered legitimate. Thus Christ alone furnishes us "the truth which Romanism has marred and perverted into an

This impersonation of the full Deity and humanity in Christ, is to lead on the improvement of the latter towards its perfect type in the former. But it cannot do this without the clear and steady recognition of one other truth, namely, that Christ is not only to be imitated as an example, but also, and as a necessary step to this, that he is to be accepted and trusted as a Redeemer. In the order of his earthly history, the delineation of his example preceded the expiation of his death. But in the order of recovery through his incarnation, the virtues of his death must precede the purifying influences of his life in human experience. That is, no form of goodness can effectually attract a fallen soul until a preparatory work has transpired in it; a work of repentance, a restoration of that soul to harmony with God in affection and purpose. In exhibiting to us the actual God, Christ has given to us the spirit, the conception of the true man. But to whom has he made this matchless revelation of moral beauty? To those who "like not to retain God in their knowledge;" who "are alienated from God by wicked works;" who "love darkness rather than light;" — to persons beclouded, benumbed, petrified, enslaved by selfishness, worldliness, the law of the flesh which worketh in the children of disobedience. It is the revelation of beauty to those who have contracted a morbid preference for deformed sights and shapes. So will the Indian refuse to leave his smoky wigwam for a palace. To him it is *the* palace. Its want of comfort and taste does not affect him unpleasantly; his nature is educated to nothing higher, more refined; he enjoys that which, to the civilized man, would be unendurable. Nor can he be put out of complacency with his savage customs by merely showing him new and better modes of life, nor by any urgency of eloquent persuasion to adopt them. There is not only a lack of education in the right direction, but a positive and long-continued education in the wrong direction. No more is the problem of the elevation of man

idolatry pernicious to all; in less spiritual worshippers sensualizing and debasing." — I. 279. The bearing of these observations upon the present discussion is obvious. Their general truthfulness is unquestionable.

and society to their required condition solved by simply unveiling, however vividly, the loveliness, the majesty, of pure goodness. This is a topic upon which history, both individual and general, is entitled to pronounce a decided opinion. It does; and its judgment is an overwhelming denial of the assumption that it is enough to place before mankind the attractions of virtue to secure its transformation into the same image. Statuary, and painting, and summer sun-sets will never unsensualize a sensual heart. Sinless humanity, walking among men in the person of the Son of God, has never won to him a follower by the mere charm of spiritual excellence. Aesthetics may hang ornaments of costly elegance in the temple of holiness, when erected; but cannot put one stone into that temple's foundation. If there were, therefore, no difficulties on the part of the divine government to the solution of our problem, there are most formidable obstacles to this in the condition, itself, of the human soul. But there are difficulties on that side, as well as this, of the breach between the Creator and the creature, the law-Administrator and the law-transgressor. These facts all conspire to make the chasm fearfully wide and deep. Life is on that side of it, and death on this, until the great Atoner appears to reunite the severed, to build across a way of return to duty and to peace. Without this further manifestation of life in Christ, which is the resultant of his twofold nature, man might have looked off from these earthly shores towards realms of blessedness above, but only as the worldling whose probation was spent, caught glimpses of Lazarus in Abraham's bosom — a far-away and hopelessly-unattainable rest. Just at this point stands high, between the earth and heaven, the cross of Calvary. Of the wondrous scene of sacrifice there enacted, of its deep significance to the divine glory and to human well-being, it was, that the seraphim, hovering over the spot, communed in strange amazement.

“He dieth. Through the dark,
He still, He only, is discernible —
The naked hands and feet, transfixed stark,

The countenance of patient anguish white,
 Do make themselves a light
 More dreadful than the glooms which round them dwell,
 And therein do they shine.

God! Father God!

Perpetual Radiance on the radiant throne!
 Light up this dark, where there is nought to see,
 Except the unimagined agony
 Upon the sinless forehead of thy Son.

* * * No reply,

O unforsaking Father? —

Hark!

Instead of downward voice, a cry

Is uttered from beneath!

IT IS FINISHED.

Hark, again!

Like a victor speaks the Slain —

Finished is the mystic pain!

His deathly forehead at the word

Gleameth like a seraph sword.

Finished is the demon-reign.

His breath, as living God, createth —

His breath, as dying man, completeth.”¹

To reject, then, that revelation of life which Jesus made in his death, is to vitiate, to nullify, the effect of the impersonations of the divine and the human ideals, which are contained in his history. Before these can work any radical change in society, a redemption from guilt and condemnation must put men right towards God’s resisted government; a regeneration of the spirit of the world must put it in accord with God’s sympathies and purposes. All these designs of benevolence, preliminary and ultimate, belong to the true conception of the mission of the Son of God; and for the accomplishment of what remains of the sublime undertaking, the Spirit of Christ ever dwells among men.

Here is the point of relief to souls in search of security, ennoblement, repose; to society, toiling laboriously after a thorough rectification, an inward tranquillity. If Christianity cannot do all this for our race, it is proved to be, in-

¹ Mrs. E. B. Browning’s Poems, Vol. I. “The Seraphim.”

deed, a failure; it must go to the rubbish-room of all the other worn-out things; its place is wanted for some better instrument of renovating power. We accept the grave issue, as morally and religiously inevitable. But Christianity is equal to this task, with just its present gospel and Saviour; and is doing that task, slowly, as Almighty skill made the universe, through the long geological days. How calmly assuring, to those who are tempted to be impatient, or distrustful of the adequacy of our faith to its whole human mission, are these words of highest inspiration, telling us not to question the perfected result: "That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the Word of life. For the life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and show unto you that eternal life which was with the Father and was manifested unto us. That which we have seen and heard declare we unto you, that ye also may have fellowship with us," *ye* to whom these glad tidings and this grace shall come, in all lands, to the end of time. "And truly our fellowship is with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ. And these things write we unto you, that your joy may be full."

Our discussion has not attempted an exhaustive view of this topic, which would require much wider limits than the present; for a like reason, in drawing it to a close, we can indicate but two or three of its lines of special bearing upon our common interests and duties. Beyond the brief mention of these, we must leave the train of investigation now laid down to make its own further suggestions.

If we mistake not, we are on the right track to a better understanding of the nature of a genuine Christian love. Christ is its central object. But not alone as man's personal Redeemer. This does, indeed, bind the renewed soul to him in bonds which are stronger than death. But Christian love goes beyond this individual relationship of Saviour and saved. It affectionately delights in Jesus Christ as the perfect Revealer of God to us, and of us to ourselves. It is

the love of God in Christ, and the love of man in Christ; of God as he is, and of man as he should be actually, and *as he is ideally*. It is thus impossible for us to love God, and not to love his well-beloved Son and representative. God is no more to be loved, than he is to be approached, save in and through Christ. A right affection for one, is a true complacency in both.

And so of man: to love God and to be indifferent or averse to human well-being, individually and generally, is as great a contradiction. A Christian misanthrope is an un-reality. The heart which fastens upon Christ sympathetically, loves the faultless manhood which shone through him, and kindles with desire that this may become the practical working-draft of every rational soul — the most degraded, even, on earth. Christ discovers to us the moral capabilities of our race: and that which thus survives, in man, the havoc of sin, damaged as it may be, is not a thing to be disesteemed by any one who pretends to fraternize with the world's Deliverer.

A sound philanthropy, consequently, is a sincere Christianity. Each is essentially and necessarily religious. Each reaches its object through Christ, the life-revealer, divine and human. Hence, the whole law of spiritual obligation is comprised in the love of God and our neighbor — an indivisible emotion or principle, when really exercised, of which Christ is the medium. Therefore no one keeps either part of that commandment without keeping both.

It seems quite impossible, at this point, to avoid confronting a fatal condemnation of all the wrongs and abuses which men inflict on one another, from the petty frauds and thefts of unfair trade, the slanderous words of thoughtless or malicious tongues, to the violences of war and servile oppression. They are, alike, an outrage upon the manhood which Jesus Christ condescended to wear, in its symmetrical beauty and nobleness; the humanity thus glorified which every son and daughter of Adam holds from God as a charter of the rights of a free, a peaceful, an unabridged existence of happiness and progressive spiritual culture. To a mind fully occupying this point of view, Christianity would

hardly appear to utter a bolder or a more exterminating decree against slavery, for example, than it now does, were that system rebuked and outlawed, by name, on every page of the New Testament.

We catch a glimpse of the peculiar pleasure which the redeemed in heaven will have in one another's society. It will not so much consist in the renewal of the associations of time, even in a sinless form, though this may be in reserve as a very delightful feature of the life to come ; it will rather be in the perception, the sense, of Christ, the perfect divine-man, reproduced and reflected by his saints, in every conceivable type of spiritual loveliness and attractiveness. Christ's "members" will then be loved in their immediate connection with Christ the "Head." We anticipate the destruction or confusion of individual identities. Paul and John, Luther and Melancthon, will be relatively the same as here, and, as such, will draw to themselves congenial natures. Like variously-colored glasses, souls will transfuse a diversely-tinted light, each beautiful to behold ; yet it is the light, and not its particular hue, which will be the real attraction and glory of the heavenly spheres. That light, effulgent and perpetual, is Christ. "The Lamb is the light thereof." As saints shall be full of it, and shall reflect and transmit its radiance, so will they draw around themselves the admiration, the love of their companions. Natural affections will yield to spiritual ; but if both shall draw to the same point, how blissful will be the bond. This teaches us how the law of attraction should operate in the earthly kingdom of God : what centres of power should here be established. As in the kingdom celestial, this twofold ideal of Christ's nature and life, so far as it is within the limits of finite imitation, is the model of aspiration and the magnet of love ; so here should every human energy be tasked to realize its possession, to diffuse its influence ; to build up a manhood, universally, which shall be the living representative of the Godlike humanity of the Redeemer of the world.

ARTICLE V.

OBJECTIONS FROM REASON AGAINST THE ENDLESS PUNISHMENT OF THE WICKED.

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In the following discussion it is proposed to consider, *first*, the proper source of information on the subject of future punishment; *secondly*, the bearing of the scripture testimony; *thirdly*, the force of the objections to endless punishment; and *fourthly*, the proper mode of overcoming objections.

I. Who but that Being to whom all the future is present, and who will determine the awards of the judgment, can inform us whether the retributions of the righteous and the wicked will be, alike, eternal? We cannot be so certain of the duration which justice must assign to the punishment of the unbeliever, as to be able to affirm that it cannot be continued without end. We cannot pretend to have, in our reason, any positive knowledge of the condition of the lost, like that founded on the testimony of a competent witness, that we should place it in competition with the word of Him who can neither falsify nor be deceived. The speculations of the pure reason, concerning the facts of another world, might be allowed some weight, in the absence of all reliable means of information; but to set them in opposition to the divine testimony, would be the same error in theology, as the denial of the facts of astronomy would be in physics, because inconsistent with the Ptolemaic system. It is no more the province of reason to supply the facts of the world to come, than it is to furnish the facts of the natural world. Man is but the interpreter of nature; and it was just when this truth began to be recognized, that the first decided impulse was given to the science of nature. So likewise is man only the interpreter of a revelation; it does not belong to him to make a revelation, or to revise and improve that which has been made. The philosophy, falsely so called,

which determines, in advance, the facts of a new dispensation, in a world without end, is like those natural philosophies which were framed before the phenomena of nature had been studied. We might guess, as well as we were able, what is likely to happen hereafter, if the only mind that is directly cognizant of the everlasting future, had not furnished us with all needful information. But having the sure word of prophecy, we do well that we take heed to it as to a light shining in a dark place. Our guesses can no more withstand the light of his testimony, than the Ptolemaic system could withstand the true system of nature. If it could be supposed possible that a number of finite minds should be present to all the future, and directly observe the eternal punishment of the wicked, their testimony would dash all opposing theories in pieces. How much more frail must all human conjectures be, which conflict with the word of Him whose knowledge is infallible, and who cannot lie.

Those who endeavor, by interpretation, to eliminate from the scriptures the doctrine of an endless punishment of the wicked, tacitly acknowledge that they are of divine authority. Supposing them to be the word of man, it would be immaterial what they taught on this or any other subject. No theorizer could then be anxious to bring them into agreement with himself. It is only with persons who thus recognize the authority of the scriptures while denying the eternity of future punishment, that we have any controversy. They admit that the declarations of the Bible respecting the penal sufferings of unbelievers are the best possible testimony concerning a fact. They grant that it is just as impossible to conceive that this testimony should be false, as that God, who is essentially and necessarily omniscient and true, should be himself deceived or should deceive others. We therefore have a right to expect that they will, in consistency with themselves, submit to the teachings of the scriptures. Their reason must be admitted to be fallible; the reason of other persons, who differ from them, may have discovered the truth; when there are so many clashing opinions, no one can pretend that *his* faculties, which indeed are

not superior to those of any other man, can be trusted with absolute certainty. No speculations of our reason can stand in opposition to *any* good testimony. No presumptions we might favor can influence, or tend to influence, any sound mind, in opposition to the *divine* testimony. In these circumstances, it is right to expect that a person in doubt about the eternal duration of future punishment, and appealing to the scriptures, will not impose his preconceived views upon the sacred text, and make it speak his mind; but will suffer his own views to be determined by the inspired word. He will come to the sacred oracles, not to dictate, but to learn.

II. Now to one in this candid temper, it must seem to be agreeable to the teachings of the New Testament, that the retributions of the wicked will be of the same duration as those of the righteous. An interpreter having no opinion of his own on the subject, but seeking to found one on the basis of the scripture testimony, must conceive that the word translated *everlasting* and *eternal*, in our English Bible (Matt. 25: 46), "these shall go away into *everlasting* punishment, but the righteous into life *eternal*" (for it is one and the same word), must express the same thought, when it is predicated of the pains of the lost, as when it qualifies the blessedness of the saved. If he supposes that it affirms endless duration of the latter, he must take it in the same sense when applied to the former. Should he make a difference between the recompense of the evil and the good, when the scriptures have made none, he would abandon his proper character as an interpreter of the revelation, and would assume that of a prophet. The word rendered *eternal*, appropriately designates the endless duration of the happiness of God's people, and it is accepted in this signification. Why does not the same epithet, when it is connected with punishment, as fitly denote an unlimited retribution of sorrow? No one can pretend that it does not, without forsaking his true position as an interpreter of the authoritative word of Christ.

Again: it must appear, to the candid student of God's

word, that the everlasting punishment which is denounced against the enemies of Christ, is a state of suffering. It could hardly occur to one who has no theory to support, that the absence of all feeling and all consciousness is punishment. It seems essential to the idea of punishment that it is an infliction, on a person, of some kind of pain. If no *person* is punished, there is no punishment. If no person is *aware* that he is punished, there is no punishment. Everlasting punishment is thus everlasting consciousness of pain, inflicted on account of sin. To say that everlasting punishment is annihilation, or a stroke of divine power that puts one forever beyond the reach of any further penal infliction, seems to be self-contradictory and absurd. And a further absurdity is involved in an infliction of *everlasting* non-existence: the supposition, namely, that non-existence is a state that lasts forever, and which the wicked will endure; whereas, they must have already endured their punishment before their annihilation, in the anticipation of that event. Annihilation might more fitly be called an eternal deliverance from punishment. The humble disciple, the mere learner, who sits at the feet of Christ and hears his word, will therefore understand by punishment, as it is denounced by our Lord, a condition of pain. He who puts the other construction, just alluded to, on his language, comes to the holy oracles to impose a meaning upon them, not to take one from them; to act the part of a rationalist philosopher, not of a believing Christian.

The scripture context confirms this view of punishment. Those who will be condemned of Christ will be sent away into everlasting fire. Of what is this an image, but of everlasting pain? We need not fear that we shall exaggerate the sufferings of lost men, if we represent them just as they are set forth by our Lord. Shall we dare to pronounce a milder sentence of condemnation on sinners than the infinitely merciful Saviour? Does he mean, by everlasting fire, a stroke of divine justice that ends the existence of the wicked, and excludes forever all possibility of an infliction of pain? The fire of perdition is also that which is "prepared for the Devil

and his angels." The enemies of Christ will share in their punishment. We learn from the Revelation (20:10), that *their* doom will be infinitely more dreadful than that of a deliverance from all evil by annihilation: "They shall be tormented, day and night, forever and ever." This is that punishment prepared for them; and into this punishment all, standing on the left hand of the judgment-seat will be sent. It cannot be affirmed that sinners of our race will not have the physical power of endurance to sustain so heavy a weight of condemnation. Their life is not their own, but was imparted, and is upheld, by the power of God; and he is able to continue it as long as he sees that it may be necessary for the ends of justice. Moreover, a passage in the Revelation (which can be understood of nothing but this very retribution prepared for the fallen angels, and to such a reference of which no serious objection can be made) tells us that certain of the wicked of this world there described, will be tormented, with fire, forever and ever, and will know no rest, day nor night. Rev. 14:10, 11.

It is certainly a fearful thing for a sinner, who knows that he himself is justly condemned and personally deserves all that the justice of God has in store for his enemies — for every man, therefore, it is a fearful thing — to believe that Christ will hereafter appear, to take such vengeance as this on them that know not God and obey not the gospel. But it is a much more fearful thing to deny it. Let God be true and every man (who would mitigate the severity of His denunciations against sin) a liar. When our Lord foretold, in the presence of Peter, the sufferings he should endure at Jerusalem, that falsely-benevolent disciple said to his Master: "Be it far from thee, Lord; this shall not be unto thee." But the Saviour turned and said unto Peter: "Get thee behind me, Satan; for thou savorest not the things that be of God, but the things that be of men." So likewise may it be said of every man who is more compassionate than Christ towards unbelievers. Their benevolence is not mercy, it is license. They are more concerned for the enjoyment of sinners, than for the righteousness of God. They would strip

his justice of nearly all its terrors ; would reduce the evil of sin and punishment, to a minimum ; would go far to place themselves among the number of those false prophets who cry peace and safety, when God says there is no peace. Christ is as much engaged for the righteousness of God as he is for the salvation of men. In him righteousness and peace have kissed each other. Shall we pretend to be more merciful than Christ ?

We ought, therefore, to interpret his words as the just judge interprets the laws of the state. The upright judge does not consider what the law ought to be, even although it is the law of fallible, sinful men. He is not set to make the law ; but to ascertain and apply it. He may be a man of humane, tender feelings. It may shock his sensibilities to pronounce sentence of death on a fellow man, every way as estimable, by nature, it may be, as himself. But if he gives way to his compassionate regard for the happiness of the miserable criminal, and misconstrues the law, and instructs the jury to acquit, he himself becomes a sharer in the guilt of the crime.

The word of Christ is more authoritative than the law of the state. To add anything to it, or subtract anything from it, is to place ourselves on a level with Him whose supremacy over us is absolute. It is an inconceivably severe penalty, we admit, which Christ has attached to our refusal to minister unto Him, by feeding and clothing his naked and hungry poor. What Christian can bear to think that many of his acquaintances, many of his associates and friends, perhaps the members of his own household, the very partners of his blood, are obnoxious to the penalty ? But what is his office as an interpreter, and, so far as the duty of Christian instruction devolves on him, an expounder of Christ's word ? May he consider, under the dictation of the pure reason and the promptings of natural feeling, what justice requires, what benevolence craves ? Like the upright judge, he must take the law as he finds it : he must declare the mind of Christ. If he alters Christ's revelation, to make it more agreeable to his own sense of right or his tender feel-

ings, he properly brings upon himself the plagues that are written in this Book. He makes himself a participant in the guilt of those whom he would shield from the penalty of the law. If the judge becomes a criminal, even when he administers imperfect human laws according to his own views of right and the impulse of his compassion ; how much more obviously criminal must he be, who substitutes his own notions of right for the declared righteousness of God !

We are taught that Christians are to sit on Christ's throne, and to be, in some sort, judges of the world and even of angels. Supposing it were possible for them innocently to entertain the opinion that Christ, the Lamb of God, who shed his blood for the sins of the world, could be too severe ; they must, as upright judges, give their decisions according to the law. It is written, that the wicked shall go away, from the tribunal of Christ, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels. Have we any alternative but to declare the law ? Shall we join ourselves, in character and destiny, to him who said to our first parents : " Ye shall not surely die ? "

Personal feeling should not influence our interpretation of the divine law on the one side or the other. It is not necessary that the judge should save himself from the imputation of cruelty by construing the law in favor of the criminal. The faithful administration of justice does not imply any want of kindness. Benevolence is as compatible with rigor in the exercise of judicial authority, as paternal affection with the infliction of stripes upon a child. " He that spareth his rod hateth his son ; but he that loveth him, chasteneth him betimes." If the execution of penal justice has not for its object the benefit of the criminal, it does him no injury. It is the giving to him of that which is his due — the payment of his wages — the satisfaction of his claim. The desert of evil must not go unrewarded any more than the desert of good. All unrighteous action of creatures cries to Heaven for a recompense ; and, in a perfect government, it will receive it. Righteousness bears sway, and there is a state of moral order, where the law is obeyed ; and so there

is, where the just penalty is inflicted. If it were not for the partiality felt by every offender towards his own interest ; if every offender could vindicate his own rights in a perfectly unselfish spirit, he would claim that the debt of penalty due to him should be paid, as earnestly as that an equivalent should be given him for valuable services rendered. Penalty is the reward which wrong-doing merits. When it has been paid, no further demerit remains ; guilt is removed, a state of moral order is restored. Penalty is the proper and necessary atonement for sin ; and the sinner who adequately feels the need he has of this satisfaction, will comprehend that penal justice is not cruelty. The sentiment of justice is not a feeling of personal hostility to offenders, that it should repel us to the opposite extreme of connivance at sin. If the punishment of the wicked is a voluntary infliction of pain, of inconceivable severity and of endless duration, according to the plain words of Christ, we need not soften his denunciations, to save him from the reproach of taking a malicious pleasure in the sufferings of his enemies. Is the upright judge vindictive or malicious ? It is more honorable to Christ, as well as more consonant with the character of interpreters and learners, that we should suffer his words to convey to our minds their natural impression.

But we have not cited all the scripture testimony on the subject under consideration. The punishment of unbelievers, which is declared to be alike eternal with the happiness of the righteous, is also negatively represented as continuing without end. The everlasting fire is never quenched. Mark 9 : 43—48. Literal fire cannot burn forever ; it must go out when the fuel with which it is supplied is all consumed. The literal unquenched fire is one that is not extinguished by man. In this view, it is a figure of the everlasting fire. The punishment which Christ will inflict on his enemies, he will never bring to an end.

The advocate of the doctrine of annihilation says, however, that it may come to an end by the extermination of the object on which it is inflicted. Where, then, we ask, is the force of the threatening ?—in this : that the fire is inextin-

guishable, and utterly consumes the sufferer? That would afford a desirable means of escape from the wrath of God. The objection mistakes the nature of the symbol: the significance of the fire consists in its being a tormenting agent. It was the misery of the rich man that he could get no relief from the torment of the flames. The punishment of the worshippers of the beast (Rev. 14: 10, 11), was not to be utter destruction, but everlasting torment in the fires of perdition. The meaning of the image by which the punishment of the wicked is depicted, appears thus to be, that their pains shall never come to an end. It is noticeable, also, that the epithet *ἀσβεστον* is defined, in the passage itself, as that which "is not quenched," not as that which is unquenchable; and further, that it is connected with another image, which can signify nothing else but that the punishment will continue without end: "their worm dieth not." On the whole, from the design of the representation as intended to persuade men from the "terror of the Lord," from the nature of the emblem made use of, from the explanation which is given of its significance in many passages, from the connection in which it is found, we conclude that here the doctrine is revealed, in a negative form, of endless punishment.

But this conclusion, let it be remarked, is not slowly and laboriously deduced by the reader. It is agreeable to the plain and obvious sense of the words of scripture. The sacred text might have been left to produce its own impression, if the attempt had not been made, by persons unwilling to believe that a God of benevolence will punish sin forever, to evade the force of the terms used by our Lord in relation to the subject. The objector has sought, through the words of Christ ingeniously misinterpreted, to set forth his own views of future retribution. He will not allow the infallible testimony of scripture to inform him what is to be hereafter, but insists on shaping the testimony to make it agree with the suggestions of his fallible reason. He does not assume towards the Lord the position of a humble disciple, but of a teacher and patron. He does not try his reason by the Lord's word, but he tries the Lord's word by his

reason. He says not, as he ought, the Lord has revealed this doctrine, therefore it is reasonable, and right, and good; but he says, it is an unreasonable and odious doctrine, and therefore the Lord has not revealed it. Now this last is undoubtedly a valid conclusion from such a premise; but who has a right to lay down such a premise, when the infallible teacher seems so clearly to have informed us that there shall be no end to the misery of the wicked? Does any man know so certainly the exact demerit of sin, or the relation which its eternal existence and punishment has to the glory of God, as to be able to deny successfully what the Son of God himself seems to have affirmed? Future events, ascertained by the perfectly satisfactory testimony of Christ, are *facts* as certain and established as any that history records. Is it reasonable to deny well authenticated facts, because we, in our shortsightedness, cannot understand why they should be suffered to exist? The facts of the future are as stubborn as those of the past; our unbelief will not annihilate or alter them.

But to proceed with our examination of proof-texts. Many passages speak of a state of penal suffering as final. One of these is in John 3: 36: "He that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him." The exclusion from heaven of unbelievers will be permanent; and the positive infliction of punishment will continue without end. The wrath of God, being represented as something felt by the unbeliever, must be understood of the suffering which wrath brings upon its object. The lost are not dead in the sense of being insensible to pain; the opposite of life, in respect to future retributions, is the felt "wrath" of God; *this* is eternal death. The effect of the divine anger is not annihilation. To say that an experience of wrath is "on" one who is not, and that such a non-entity is punished by being forbidden to pass from under the wrath of God into existence, is absurd. The evil from which unbelievers shall never escape into eternal life, is evidently that elsewhere shadowed forth as the torment of the wicked in the fires of perdition, which will allow them no rest, day nor night, forever.

A perverse ingenuity might suggest, that, although unbelievers, continuing in that character, will never see life, yet they may renounce their unbelief, and thus escape from the wrath of God. It is clear, however, that a hypothetical case is not contemplated; the truth intended to be conveyed is not, that if one should remain in unbelief he would be forever punished, but that persons of that character will actually suffer without end from the displeasure of God. And the theory of an eternal probation is put to rest by the revealed fact, that there will be a day of decision, a crisis (*κρίσις*), after which there will be no changes of destiny. The wicked will then go away into everlasting punishment. The Master of the house will rise up and shut to the door, and none of those who are without will afterwards gain admission. A time will come when there will be no more invitations to believe and be saved. Christ himself will then say to unbelievers, "depart from me all ye workers of iniquity." There is "a day of wrath and of revelation of the righteous judgment of God," against which the hard and impenitent of heart are "treasuring up unto themselves wrath," as the wages of their sin.

It is not our purpose to present the full scripture argument, but to show, by citing a sufficient number of proof texts, that the eternity of future punishment is not objected to from any uncertainty respecting the purport of the divine testimony. An argument of this sort would not be conclusive with an infidel. But whoever professes his belief in the divine authority of the scriptures, must yield his objections when he sees that they conflict with the plain meaning of the word of God. If it should appear to him reasonable, in the absence of a revelation, to suppose that sin and misery must ultimately come to an end, under the government of a Being of infinite goodness and power, it must also appear quite as reasonable to give an unquestioning assent to what that Being has said. In fact he *does* submit to his authority, virtually, in regard to every disputed matter of faith, when he receives the scriptures as his word. It is involved in the idea of a revelation from God that it cannot be false.

It is further implied that we do not ingraft our meaning upon it. God's word conveys his own mind, not the mind of the reader. And it follows from this, that the obvious meaning is to be received. If we prefer one which is less obvious, because we entertain a different view of the subject-matter from that which the plain sense of scripture would teach, we substitute our mind for the mind of God. The letter is God's, but the meaning is ours. And even this empty concession to Him of the letter turns to our advantage, because it seems to give the sanction of divinity to our view. We assume to know already what the revelation should contain. We come to the Bible to dogmatize, not to be instructed. If in other instances we receive the truth, as being coincident with our notions, it is not on the ground of faith in God. We are unbelievers in spirit, as well when we agree with, as when we differ from, the inspired word.

The purport of our argument, therefore, so far as it has proceeded, is to convince the professed believer in the scriptures, that it is infidelity to interpret them so as to make them inculcate the doctrine of a limited punishment of the wicked. This form of rationalism is as really a rejection of the sacred oracles, as that which openly repudiates their authority. We do not admit, however, that our mode of dealing with objections against the endless punishment of the wicked, although it is opposed to rationalism, is contradictory to reason. To use reasoning for the purpose of putting down reason is suicidal. On the contrary, we maintain that it is the highest reason to yield implicit faith to the divine testimony. Nothing is more reasonable than to believe that whatever doctrine God has revealed is consistent with reason. The objector says: it is reasonable to think that God will not allow the evil of sin and its punishment to exist forever. We say: it is reasonable to believe that what God has said is true. And we leave it to the rationalist himself to decide which of these principles reason must receive in preference to the other. There can be no doubt what his decision must be, if he does not take refuge in atheism.

III. In further remarking on the subject, we propose to

show that the objection to the *eternal* existence of sin and its penalty is as valid against *any* suffering for sin. If it is a good reason why moral and physical evil should not exist forever, that a God of infinite power and infinite goodness will bring them to an end, it is as good a reason why they should not exist for a moment.

Why, then, is it, that eternal sin and suffering are thought to militate with the character of God? Would their eternity render them a very great evil? And is it true that the goodness of God is opposed to no evil but that of the greatest magnitude? Is the existence of a little sin and suffering consistent with holiness and benevolence, but the existence of a larger amount of the same an evil too great to be borne? God hates sin for what it is in itself; and therefore he hates *all* sin. God is perfectly benevolent, and therefore he cannot take pleasure in *any* suffering in itself considered. It is not the *degree* of moral and physical evil that renders them inconsistent with his goodness. "He is of purer eyes than to behold" any "evil and cannot look on iniquity." Hence the mystery of his allowance of sin during the short life of man on the earth, as expressed by the prophet: "Wherefore," then, "lookest thou upon them that deal treacherously, and holdest thy tongue when the wicked devoureth the man that is more righteous than he?" If the moral purity of the Almighty is a reason why he should not suffer sin and its consequence to exist *forever*, it is equally a reason why he should not allow it to *begin* to exist.

But moral and physical evil are not wholly prevented, notwithstanding that in themselves God can have no pleasure in them. That reason which is as incompatible with the temporary as with the eternal existence of sin and sorrow, does not, in fact, forbid the former, it may not forbid the latter. It does not prove the existence of evil to be impossible in time; the fact of sin and misery everywhere stares us in the face; it cannot prove it to be impossible in eternity.

There is in truth a greater mystery in the permission of sin in the present world, than in its continuance in a world of retribution. Unpunished sin appears to be a reproach to

the justice of God. Its guilt is desert of pain of a degree which will adequately express its hateful nature. A just Moral Governor cannot suffer it to escape the proper retribution. But there is not, at present, any fitting testimony of God's hatred towards the sins of men, in the painful consequences which it brings with it. Many of the notoriously wicked are more prosperous apparently than many of God's people. "Their eyes stand out with fatness, they have more than heart could wish." God's people are sorely tried by the inequality they witness. Bitter "waters of a full cup are wrung out to them," till they are constrained to say: "How doth God know, and is there knowledge in the Most High?" If the existence of sin in the future state, where it will be accompanied with a suitable recompense, and may therefore be regarded as an evil corrected, so far at least as it respects the divine administration; if sin punished will be a stain upon the divine perfections, what must be thought of sin so apparently triumphant as it is at present? Does not the reason of the objector tell him that this is a condition of things which ought far less to be tolerated, than the penal sufferings of the future state? But this seeming reproach to the divine administration is before his eyes; he cannot blink it out of existence. May not that less mysterious state of things to which he objects, exist hereafter; and may not the reason which will justify its existence, continue to justify it without end?

The objector ought to show that there is a difference in principle between a limited and an unlimited duration of evil. He ought to show that sin and penalty are not evil in themselves, but that it is only eternal sin and penalty whose existence cannot be justified. He feels concerned for the honor of God, as compromised by the latter. Everlasting sinfulness and sorrow would necessarily be an evil, and if God should permit it, he would be involved in the evil; so he reasons. But he can hardly feel satisfied in reducing the evil to a minimum. For then he will have to grant that God is not absolutely perfect—that he is a little tolerant of an evil, which he ought wholly to suppress. But what is

the difference whether our Moral Governor is a little wanting in goodness or more seriously deficient? It is essential to our idea of God that he is absolutely faultless. We could not adore him as God, if we could conceive him capable of the slightest deviation from the line of rectitude. Any argument against eternal punishment that would condemn the existence of that moral and physical evil which we cannot but see and acknowledge, is as truly atheistic as that which supposes that with him there is neither good nor evil. Iniquity everywhere abounds; its painful effects are too manifest to be denied. They exist by the divine permission; God could have prevented them. Yet God is infinitely holy, and just are all his ways. We cannot explain his conduct. "His righteousness is like the great mountains; his judgments are a great deep." But he is God, and therefore there is no flaw in his administration.

It behooves the rationalist, then, to find a reason for condemning eternal sinfulness and infliction of penal evils, which will not embrace in its sweep the moral disorders of this present evil world. The reason which he does give, is that God is good, and can have no pleasure in sin and suffering. But does he not hate that wrong doing with which the world is filled and under the burden of which it groans? The reason given by the objector for the faith that is in him seems to condemn the permission of the manifold evils of time; for our life we cannot see why it does not. And it comes to this, that there is no God in whose sight the heavens are not clean, and who charges his angels with folly, who is of purer eyes than to behold evil, and who cannot look on iniquity.

If the rationalist would lay the responsibility for the moral evils of the world on the free agency of man, why may not the same apology be found for the eternal existence of sin and punishment? Is it said, that the possibility of sin is implied in free agency, that that which is possible may become actual, and that the prevention of sin among free agents is not an object of power? So likewise it is possible, we might reply, that free agents should sin forever, that it

does not belong to omnipotence to prevent it, and that eternal sin merits, and under the government of a just God must suffer, eternal punishment. If sin be an incident of freedom which it does not belong to power to prevent, it may surely be an eternal incident of freedom.

Besides, it belongs to omniscience to foresee the bad use of freedom which any might make; and, on the supposition that God cannot allow anything to exist with which he is displeased, he could forbear to create such free agents as would do evil and merit punishment. He knew what man would do when he made him, but he chose that man should exist, and therefore also that the sin which was the foreseen consequence of his creation, should exist. He therefore had even more responsibility for the beginning of man's wickedness, than he will have for its perpetuation, if it is an incident of freedom. On the supposition, however, that man is not intended for immortality by his nature, and that God will annihilate the wicked, he can prevent the permanent abuse of freedom on the part of the sinner. But then, he could also cut him down in the first moment of his sin. Why does he not, if a little sin is as truly hateful to him as a larger measure, and if the hatefulness of sin is a reason why it should not be permitted. The rationalist must grant that he ought. *We* maintain that he is able to justify himself; but we will not attempt to justify him. "Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight." For some reason, which we cannot fully comprehend, which possibly we do not even apprehend, except in the most general way, that it is for his glory, we must admit that it is right and best for God to keep sinful men alive and coerce them by his power. For this is just what he does, and he does himself no dishonor. Why may we not believe that he may do the same forever? We see that he is not under the necessity, as a God of boundless moral perfection, to prevent sin to the utmost extent of his power — that though in itself hateful, he finds good reason to uphold it; we may conceive it possible that the same or other reasons may exist, why it should never be exterminated. A "thus saith the Lord" can easily command our faith.

We have considered the relation of moral evil, thus far, to the moral perfections of God. We have seen that his hatred of evil cannot be urged as a ground for the belief that he will not suffer it to exist forever. But we may consider the relation of sin and punishment to his power. And we remark, that there is no more reason why the *eternity* of moral evil should be incompatible with omnipotence, than why their existence in *time* should infer want of power in God. It cannot be alleged that sin must be God's necessity, if it exists forever, but that it is subject to his control, if it is limited in duration. Why should it be thought that an eternal permission (which implies superiority) is an impossibility; that if it exists without end, it exists by its own power and in defiance of the Almighty? The sinner is dependent for his existence on God. The continuance of his existence forever would not convert it into self-existence. He could not acquire independence by being eternally upheld. The immortality of the people of God is admitted. Does their immortality render them any the less dependent? Must everything that is finite in its nature be of limited duration, even if it should be the pleasure of God that it should never perish? And if the sinner might have his *being* in God in a world without end, would he not also *act* by God's permission, and derive from him the power to sin?

Is it said that God would certainly put an end to sin if he could, because it is the object of his abhorrence? The answer is at hand, that he hates *all* sin, yet all sin is not prevented; therefore he is unable to prevent it, and *any* sin is his necessity, and a triumph over his authority. The argument proves too much.

Every kind of necessity for the existence of sin is not incompatible with omnipotence. It is necessary that God should have regard, in his government of the world, to his own glory. When he permitted the existence of sin, he must have sought to glorify himself; for he could propose to himself no higher end, and he could not act without an end. In determining to make a free agent who should live forever, who would fall into sin, would never repent, and

would subject himself to everlasting punishment, he must have governed himself by the consideration of what his glory required. But this necessity is that of the highest reason, not the necessity of force. If it should exist forever, and should have a constraining force, it could not be pretended that God was, in any dishonorable sense necessitated. Or if it could, the same reason for the temporary allowance of sin, must likewise be admitted to place him under the law of natural necessity.

We may suppose the highest good, not in the sense of happiness but of the just ground of happiness to intelligent beings, was a constraining necessity to our Maker. It could not move him contrary to justice. But, justice being satisfied, it might be conceived to influence the Supreme Intelligence in the introduction of sin, and in its perpetuation and punishment. If no one is injured, and therefore no one can justly complain, we may rejoice that God pursues a course, in his administration of this world's affairs, which will be productive of the largest measure of good, although a necessary condition should be the introduction of sin. Good comes out of evil, as when the truth of God more abounds unto his glory through the punishment of men's sins. Can it be thought that God has not a view to this good when he permits the sins? That which *we* seek, we always pursue as something good. That which is absolutely good we are bound to seek. And we cannot conceive that God is free from the same necessity. It would be dishonorable to Him and to us not to be under its influence. But if it should be contended, that it would render Him the subject of fate, it must be conceded that the influence of this motive would be alike fatalistic, whether it led to the first beginning, or the perpetuation of sin.

IV. We will conclude this discussion with the remark, that whatever difficulty the existence and everlasting continuance of sin and punishment may occasion, our faith may and ought to overcome it. We are bound to love God with all the heart from the first moment of moral agency, and therefore to believe that he is worthy of our supreme affection, whatever may be his relations to evil.

A Perfect Being is the first principle of religion. We cannot allow ourselves to call it in question, because, if it were doubtful, it would be doubtful whether the essence of all real goodness ought to exist within us — the supreme love of an absolutely Perfect Being. The existence of God cannot require to be demonstrated for the purposes of practical religion, whatever may be thought of the possibility of a satisfactory proof. It would be our duty to go about the work of demonstrating the existence of God in a spirit of love to Him. Nothing can be rightly done without that spirit. It would be necessary in this case, to act the part of an advocate, and determine in advance what the conclusion of the reasoning must be. We should be obliged, furthermore, to reject that kind of proof from which we could only deduce a probable conclusion. We must not suffer ourselves to regard it as a contingent truth, whether an infinitely glorious Being claims the adoration of all rational creatures. We must not, therefore, form our conclusion from a balance of probabilities. It must not be submitted to the test of an inductive argument whether *He* exists, whom it is a sin not to love with all our hearts, from the beginning of our moral life. The issue we make with the atheist must not be put on the ground that what we see of design in the creation is proof of an infinitely benevolent designer. We cannot properly admit that the degree of our faith should be only just in proportion to the number of instances of benevolent intention we can allege; and that instances of apparent evil should be allowed to detract so much from the validity of the proof. That is not a successful argument which only shows that it is likely the world was made by a good being; that there is a preponderance of good over evil in his works of creation and providence, and he is on the whole worthy of love; that possibly the instances of seeming evil might be explained in consistency with the supposition that God is absolutely good. The atheist comes out of the discussion victorious, if the conclusion of the reasoning is, that it is only probable there is a perfect Being who is worthy of, and may justly claim our supreme love. Our obligations are not condi-

tioned on the result of such a demonstration. They are perfect, despite the imperfection of such an argument, or any appearance of evil in the world, which would countenance the belief that God is not absolutely good. Nothing so morally necessary, so imperatively binding, can be conceived as that duty on which all other duties are founded — to love God supremely. And just as necessary as supreme love to God is the conceived perfection of the divine character. We must believe that he cannot do evil. We must believe that the necessity of his perfections is just as great as of his existence: that if he is, he is boundless in goodness; that to deny his supreme excellence, is to deny his being. The rationalist, who concedes to the atheist that the certainty of the divine existence rests on inductive proof, concedes everything. He grants that God may possibly be an imperfect being; that he can do evil; that what he does in nature, or rather what to our finite apprehension he appears to do, is proof of what he is; that, as there is apparently a mixture of good and evil in the world, so there is, or may be, a mixture of good and evil in the Author of nature. By consenting to submit the question of the existence of God to the test of an inductive argument, he virtually yields the matter in dispute.

One who would be a consistent atheist should deny the reality of sin, and affirm that our consciences deceive us when they convict us of guilt in leading a godless life. The allegation of the fact of sin as evidence that there is no God of boundless moral perfections, is insufficient for the purpose; for why is it that sin is so great a mystery in God's universe, but that there is just such a Being to be sinned against. Want of supreme love to God, which is what we mean by sin, would not be the hateful thing it is, but for the existence of a God of supreme excellence. He who points to sin and penal evils for proof that the moral government of the world is not well administered, tacitly admits that one who justly requires us to love him with all our hearts, does really exist. His objection is self-contradictory and nullifies itself. There can be no consistent opposition to the moral

attributes of God which affirms the fact of sin. Sin is an offence against a moral authority who justly claims our supreme affection. The rationalist of the type now under consideration should either hold that there is no foundation for moral distinctions, and that holiness and sin are chimeras, or should grant that the mystery of sin and penal suffering does not afford reasonable ground for doubting the holiness and goodness of God.

Difficulties in religion must be overcome by a firm adherence to first principles. We must accept it as necessarily and immutably true that God is a perfect being. If we cannot see why there should be sinners in the world, when God hates all sin and is able to prevent it, we should never yield our conviction that there is good reason for the permission of moral evil, because it exists under the government of a perfect being. We should not allow ourselves to judge of the divine character solely by appearances, and from what we see of evil to infer, either that God takes pleasure in it, or that it is too strong for him, and has obtained a triumph. But assuming, with a confidence not to be shaken, that his character is spotless, we should overcome all the suggestions of unbelief by the faith that the administration of a perfect being must be without a fault. We should judge of what God *does* by what he *is*. We should hold it as an axiom — a truth certain and indisputable, and a test of moral conclusions — that God can do no wrong. Appearances are deceptive; God must ever be true to himself. It was “by” this “faith that Abraham, when he was tried, offered up Isaac, and he that had received the promises offered up his only begotten son, to whom it was said, that in Isaac shall thy seed be called.” It is the only right mode of removing doubts, because it is essential to our perseverance in holiness. We cannot love God as God, in which our holiness consists, if we do not believe, all things to the contrary notwithstanding, that his will, without which nothing comes to pass, is a perfectly righteous, benevolent, and reasonable will.

We do not insist that difficulties should be overcome by the arbitrary determination that we will have none. We

need not take the position that there is a radical difference between holiness and sin, and that there is a Being whom it is holiness to love and sin to hate, in mere wilfulness. The conviction is spontaneous that holy and sinful character, and all that is implied in them, are realities. They display themselves before us, and we give our testimony concerning them, just as we do in regard to the events that impress themselves on our senses. We may doubt *what* a man's character is, but that he is either a saint or a sinner we cannot doubt. Do not bad men, whose moral sensibilities are exceedingly obtuse, feel an involuntary respect for persons who profess the fear of God and act accordingly? Do they not believe that there is an essential moral difference between such persons and themselves? Was it a mere fancy of Peter, which led him to exclaim, when a supernatural event awakened in his mind the conviction that he was in the presence of a divine being, "depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord?" We predicate holiness and sin of men with the same certainty as we do knowledge and ignorance, wisdom and folly. We do not see them with our eyes; neither do we *see* human intelligence in the conduct of mankind. They are not of a nature to be seen. Yet they directly reveal themselves to us. And as we can refer to nothing but intelligence itself for proof that it exists, so we can evince the reality of holiness by nothing but holiness. It is an indemonstrable reality, yet as undeniably certain as any fact of mind or of the outward world, the existence of all of which it surpasses the power of our logic to prove. The conscience of every man testifies against his own sinfulness, and convicts him of guilt or desert of punishment, and leads him to anticipate that the retribution which ought to be inflicted will be meted out to him, if there be no just way of deliverance. Indeed, the reality of sin and guilt is the great mystery that is objected to the divine government.

If, then, the belief in holiness and sin is so facile; if we find sin in ourselves and observe it in others; if all history declares it, and the creation itself groans and travails in pain on account of it, it can require no arbitrary determination of

will to assume that which is implied in these moral facts. Is God really obeyed by some men? Is God really sinned against by all? Does the evil of disobedience consist in opposition to perfect moral excellence, self-subsisting, immutable, eternal? Does all this enter into our idea of sin? The mode of overcoming difficulties arising out of the existence of moral evil, which has been insisted on, does not, then, require of us a blind, unreasonable faith.

It is pertinent to the object of this discussion to say, that, to a firm believer in the first principle of true religion, as thus exhibited, it is not material whether a less or a greater degree of mystery obscures his counsels. A being who cannot do wrong, will not forfeit the confidence of the believer, because he permits sin to continue without end, and inflicts upon it the endless retribution it merits. The responsibility for the sin, from its very nature as sin, will forever attach to the sinner. And in a righteous government sin must draw after it punishment as its proper consequence. Happiness is better in itself than suffering; but suffering, as penalty for sin, is better than happiness would be in its place — as much better, as justice is better than license, and order is better than confusion. The holiness of God obliges him to inflict it, just as imperatively as it previously required of the now fallen sinner that he should perfectly obey his will. The law was to be fulfilled, in the first instance, by obedience; but having been broken, it must not be trampled in the dust; it must be reinstated in its authority, and the sin which was not prevented must be blotted out. God must provide a sufficient *amende* for the transgression; and this he does by the infliction of an adequate penalty. He maintains his character as a righteous Sovereign, preserves among his subjects a state of moral order, and makes perfect satisfaction for sin, by visiting it with deserved punishment. He blots out the sin he permits; it no longer stands a reproach to his holiness and justice. The question may still be asked: Why does he not secure the righteousness of the law by preventing sin and punishment? And we might offer some plausible conjectures in the way of reply. But we choose

to insist, that the character of God, as we must conceive it, is a sufficient guaranty that sin, with punishment and with redemption, will be the occasion of greater honor to Him, than would have been a state of sinless perfection; and, furthermore, that eternal sin and eternal punishment, the last being the just and necessary consequence of the first, can be believed to be a part of the divine plan, on the infallible testimony of God's word, with as little difficulty, as we can believe that our own sin, and the unrest it brings, were foreordained of Him.

ARTICLE VI.

HYMNOLOGY.

[Continued from Vol. XVI. p. 229.]

THE TEXT OF HYMNS.

THE criticism on the text of church hymns is always perilous. They are associated with the most imposing scenes of the present life, or with the august realities of the future. If they become suggestive of mere verbal disputes; if their faults be made more prominent in the popular mind than their excellences, their sanctity is impaired. It is easy to lessen the influence of these odes, because many of them abound with faults. Some of the best of them are disfigured by mixed metaphors, strained comparisons, incongruous images. They live by their own spiritual power, which triumphs over their literary defects. Indeed, their rhetorical blemishes are, in one respect, a positive gain to the influence of the poetry; for they set off, by contrast, its vital force, and attest the superiority of pure and fervid sentiment over all the graces of style. But their diction is still open to criticism. It is easy to make this criticism, and to expose many

of our most precious hymns to ridicule. "Nothing is easier," said Napoleon Buonaparte, "than to find fault." There are no two books which can with more facility be made the theme of sport, than the Bible and the Hymn Book. "Wit," says lord Kaimes, "consists chiefly in joining things by distant and fanciful relations, which surprise us because they are unexpected." The more sacred the composition, so much the more facile is it to startle men by connecting it with something secular or contemptible. This surprise is agreeable to an irreligious and vulgar mind. To such a mind, the unexpected association of solemn words with low images is one of the most fascinating, as it is the most demoralizing, species of wit. But in a free censure of some excellent hymns, there is danger of making ludicrous suggestions, and of degrading, if not spoiling, those forms of expression which are not commonly regarded as inappropriate to the worship of God. The spirit of even a just criticism often proves that the critic is unfit for his calling; that he has aspired to a sphere too lofty for him. He injures his own character, not less than his reputation, while he corrupts the minds of men who would have thought no evil, if he had not suggested it.

Still there will, there must, be discussion on the faults of hymns. Let it be conducted, then, in the spirit of decorum and of meek reverence. This discussion is most apt to arise when we are debating whether, on the one hand, we will adhere to the original form of our sacred odes, or, on the other hand, by certain changes in the stanzas, accommodate them to the real or imagined wants of the community. On this question, extravagant opinions are maintained by some advocates and by some opposers of alterations. All hymnologists unite in *practically adopting* alterations; but all do not agree in the theory that they ought to be adopted. Let us now examine, under various topics, the evils and the advantages of deviating from the original form of hymns.

§ 1. *The Relation of Changes in the Text to the Rights of Authors.*

It is affirmed by some, that an author has a perfect right to control the use that shall be made of his compositions; and that all alterations of what he has written are not merely "infringements" upon his property; they are "frauds," "trespasses," literary "theft," "robbery," "swindling," and (it has even been added), "felony." If we desire to print the hymn of an author, we must print it just as he wrote it. If we will not take his form, we have no right to take his hymn.

Now there is no question, that an author has a legal right to withhold from the community the productions of his pen; and also, if he publish them, and if he comply with certain legal conditions, he has a legal right to prevent their republication, in any form, during a limited period of time. But at the close of that period, all his legal rights expire. The benevolent law *gives* his productions, freely, to the world.

Further : there is no question that an author has a moral right to all the honor with which the merits of his work are fitted to crown him ; and he may, therefore, within certain limits, claim to have his work presented to the public in that form which will be most creditable to himself.

But there are limits to this claim. The good of the community must not be sacrificed to the honor of a single individual. The whole poem may reflect a brighter glory on its author than a few detached parts of it ; but those parts are all that can be sung in a church hymn, and they may be selected, even although the writer fail of securing all the praise which the omitted verses would have given him. As inapposite stanzas may be omitted, so inapposite words may be sacrificed, for more church-like phrases. If the author wrote his poem chiefly for his own fame, the omission of his inappropriate lines is a fit comment on his selfishness ; if he wrote it for the general welfare, he will be willing to advance this end, even at the sacrifice of his personal reputation. When he publishes a hymn, he gives it to the com-

ing ages; he *gives up* his control over it. If he does not mean to give it away, he should keep it to himself. We are quite free from anxiety lest the bliss of Gregory, and Ambrose, and Bernard, and Baxter should be disturbed on account of the damage to their poetic fame, from the changes in their lyrics. The lines of bishop Ken breathe the sentiment of a dying psalmist:

“And should the well-meant song I leave behind,
With Jesus’ lovers some acceptance find,
’Twill heighten even the joys of heaven to know
That, in my verse, saints sing God’s praise below.”

All this discussion with regard to the “rights of authorship,” may be terminated by considering that a manual for church song is not designed to perpetuate the renown of men. It is designed for the worship of God; and in some respects it would, better than now, fulfil its main intent, if it contained no allusion to the majority of names connected with its hymns. A church prayer book would lower its tone of sacredness, if it should append to each separate petition the name of its original writer; and, when a church hymn book parades the names and titles of its numerous authors on the same pages with the songs, it seems almost equally adapted to the glory of God and the renown of poets. The manual for church worship must not be regarded as the original repository of sacred songs; it must not be consulted as a literary witness; it must be looked upon as a book of prayer and praise. Its materials, in their original form, are found in other places. In those places, they may contribute to the honor of their authors. But in the church manual, the fame of poets should be lost in the glory of Him whom they adore.

Men of exclusively literary tastes, and also men who affect to be the *litterati* of the world, are apt to form an inaccurate and a low estimate of the very nature of a church hymn book. The book is considered as a collection of choice poems, specimens of the taste and genius of eminent composers. In this view it ought not to be, like the work of Dr. Vicessimus Knox, a volume of “*Elegant Extracts*,” for an

extract from a poem fails to display the symmetry of the whole. But if extracts are admitted, they must be quoted precisely as they were written. They are historical specimens. They profess to be mere reproductions. Of course, all changes of the original become falsehoods. An extract of six stanzas, which are consecutive in the hymn but not consecutive in the original, is a misrepresentation of its author. On the title-page of the book, and as a title of every song, is virtually published the announcement: "These are the beautiful or sublime words of this or that man." To deviate from these words, in such a case, falsifies the entire aim and pretension of the book. It is indeed important to have repertories or encyclopaedias of Christian hymns in their pristine form. But when we regard a hymn book as such an encyclopaedia, or as a beautiful abridgment of such an authoritative repertory, we substitute an historical and a scholastic standard for the higher standard of piety and devotion.

§ 2. *The Relation of Changes in the Text to the Encouragement of Authorship.*

If we concede that it is right, still is it expedient to leave an author uncertain whether the exact words of his hymn will be transmitted to posterity? Pained with the prospect of changes in his song, many an author will shrink back from giving it to the world. So far forth as a sensitive poet is deterred from authorship by the fear of these changes, they are an evil. The evil should never be encountered, except in the prospect of an overbalancing good.

But on this topic, as on the preceding, men entertain degrading views of the office of a hymn book. The poet is not dependent on the church manual for the faithful preservation of his words. They are guarded in the literary remains, in the scholastic repositories, in the archives of the university, in the historical collections. He is not injured by the fact that, superadded to all the literary and scientific channels through which his words may flow down to posterity, there

are more or less exact quotations from them, in manuals for public worship. Very frequently, the changes made in his hymn are the occasion of its being more widely known in its original form, than it otherwise would have been. Its real merits would never have been discovered by the majority of worshippers, if some critic had not removed the rubbish of uncouth or fantastic words under which the solid worth of the hymn lay hidden. As amended, it became a favorite lyric; when it had become such, its original was sought out; if it had not been pruned, it would have been forgotten. A man of poetic genius ought to be stimulated, rather than discouraged, by the thought that posterity will not willingly let his verses die, and that, even if they become antiquated in their present form, they will still live in new and fresh modifications, or become the germs of other and better songs. A philosopher propounds theories in the expectation that they will be improved by the scholars of a coming age. Does this expectation repress his love of contributing to the advancement of science? Was David deterred from giving his hymns to the world through fear that they would be modified by some future Milton or Montgomery?

There are two men who represent two classes of poets, in relation to this theme. Dr. Watts is one, and he is a representative of the larger class. These are his words, breathing forth his unselfish desire that his hymns be a "living sacrifice" to God, rising up to heaven, in any form which may be congenial with the devout aspirations of the worshipper: "If any expressions occur to the reader that savor of an opinion different from his own, yet he may observe, these are generally such as are capable of an extensive sense, and may be used with a charitable latitude. I think it is most agreeable, that what is provided for public singing, should give to sincere consciences as little disturbance as possible. However, where any unpleasing word is found, he that leads the worship may substitute a better; for, blessed be God, we are not confined to the words of any man in our public solemnities."¹

¹ Watts's Works (Preface to his Hymns), Vol. IV. p. 149.

The noble-hearted psalmist who gave this authority, even to precentors, to make extemporaneous changes in his hymns, would not have regarded it as an outrage upon his rights, if he had foreseen that Wesley and Conder and Worcester would make studied and careful changes in them.

But there is another, less numerous, class of poets, represented by James Montgomery. In the year 1819, he united with Rev. Thomas Cotterill in the publication of a hymn book, and Montgomery contributed "the benefit of his judgment in the choice and *amendment* of available compositions from various quarters." In 1824, he said: "Good Mr. Cotterill and I bestowed a great deal of labor and care on the compilation of that book: clipping, interlining, and remodeling hymns of all sorts, as we thought we could correct the sentiment or improve the expression." Speaking of his toil on a lyric of Cowper, he then remarked: "I entirely rewrote the first verse of that favorite hymn, commencing: "There is a fountain filled with blood," etc. The words are objectionable as representing a fountain being *filled*, instead of *springing up*: I think my version is unexceptionable:

From Calvary's cross a fountain flows,
Of water and of blood;
More healing than Bethesda's pool,
Or famed Siloa's flood."

In the year 1835, Mr. Montgomery was officially requested, and he consented, to make an entire revision of the Moravian hymn book, containing twelve hundred hymns. "And it is hardly too much to say, that the time and thought spent in the reformation of such a mass of matter, much of it of a peculiar character, was not less than would have sufficed for the composition of a like quantity of original verse. He was often compelled either to change an obsolete or equivocal term, to soften down a too striking sentiment into a general meaning, or entirely to remodel the structure of a verse, or even of a whole hymn." He labored on these amendments, more or less frequently, through the lengthened period of twelve years. In 1849 the hymn book was pub-

lished, containing a multitude, but not the whole, of his emendations.¹

Notwithstanding this labor, continued at intervals for more than thirty years, in the modifying of sacred lyrics, Mr. Montgomery requests other men not to modify his own verses; and says, that "if good people cannot conscientiously adopt *his* diction and doctrine, it is a little questionable in them to impose upon him *theirs*." "When I am gone," he says, "my hymns will, no doubt, be altered to suit the taste of appropriators; for it is astonishing how really religious persons will sometimes feel scruples about a turn or a term."² What Mr. Montgomery predicted, has come to pass. There is not a hymn book, English or American, which contains twenty of his hymns, without modifying some of them. That remarkable man, John Wesley, also requested that his poetical effusions remain unaltered. But as he made many, and some splendid, changes in the lyrics of Henry More, Watts, and others, so his own lyrics are now more deeply imbedded in the hearts of worshippers, and the original forms of them are more faithfully studied, than they would have been, if they had not, in a modified style, been ingratiated into the love of the churches. The entreaty of these and other eminent poets, that there may be no changes in their songs, reminds us of Dr. Joseph Huntington's Introduction to his "Calvinism Improved:"³ — "The author has one request to make to all that may see or hear of this book. He asks that none would either *approve* or *censure* it, until after careful reading. And that all who may have read it with attention, and then speak freely their own opinion concerning it, as every one in that case has a good right to do, would also communicate this humble request from the author, to all such as have knowledge of it only by report." If men, because requested, are bound to withhold their condemnation of Dr. Huntington's treatise, they will soon be obligated, because they will soon be requested by some author, to pur-

¹ Memoirs of James Montgomery, Vol. III. p. 158. Vol. IV. pp. 69, 70. Vol. VI. pp. 266—268. Vol. VII. pp. 154—157.

² Memoirs, IV. p. 70.

³ See page xxiii.

chase some particular volume of his, to circulate it gratuitously, to write reviews of it, to read it semi-annually in a standing or kneeling posture. That petition, which will more probably be granted than any other, was made by Henry Vaughan, in the preface to his *Silex Scintillans*, p. 7: "And if the world will be so charitable as to grant my request, I do here most humbly, earnestly, beg that none would read them [my earlier writings]."

But it is asked: Should the hymns as altered, be ascribed to the poet who never indited them in that form? Is not this ascription a falsehood? We have already implied that there are evils connected with any allusion in a Hymn Book to the names of its authors, especially such authors as Barlow, Burns, Campbell, Dryden, Hogg, Thomas Moore, Pope, Walter Scott, and others who have no consecrated name in the church. Additional evils are connected with such allusions, where the stanzas appear in a new diction. If the hymn is essentially changed in style, or more especially in doctrine, and if the author's name be mentioned, there should be some announcement that the modifications are made.¹ Where the changes are not important, the notice of them would only confuse the reader. If all the alterations found in Worcester's "Watts and Select Hymns" were signified by an asterisk or dagger prefixed to the altered stanzas, the number of hymns without the asterisk or dagger would be very insignificant. But how could we, then,

¹ Often the Presbyterian Old School Collection makes a change in the doctrinal expression of its Psalms and Hymns, without giving sufficient notice of the change, as in the following instances:

ORIGINAL FORM.

Watts's 18th Psalm.

Or if my feet did e'er depart
'T was never with a wicked heart.

Watts's 32nd Psalm.

Blest is the man to whom the Lord
Imputes not his iniquities.

Beddome.

When on the cross my Saviour died
A righteous God was pacified.

PRESBYTERIAN O. S. FORM.

Or if my feet did e'er depart
Thy love reclaimed my wandering heart.

Before his judgment seat the Lord
No more permits his crimes to rise.

Hymn 106.

When on the cross my Saviour died,
God's holy law he satisfied.

distinguish, whether the modifications were important or trivial?¹

It must be observed, further, that *usage* has long ago explained the meaning of a Hymn Book when it refers an *altered* hymn to its original author. Long established custom has taught men, not to expect that the hymn will be always quoted with punctilious accuracy, not to look upon a manual for worship as a standard of weights and measures, of antique styles and historical phrases, but as a peculiar and a privileged volume, intended for nobler than anti-quarian ends, and superior to the petty jealousies of authors. This being understood as the explanation of an Index to a Hymn Book, no wrong is done when a hymn is referred to a poet who did not give the present finishing touches to his lines. The reference is interpreted by custom; it is prescriptively right. The usage began and continues on the assumption, that the sweet Psalmists of Israel, even although they were once as tenacious as Pontius Pilate of what they had written, will now suffer their hymns to rise toward heaven in the incense of devotion, and in that form which is most congenial with the devotional spirit of the worshippers.

There are so many readers who desire to know the authorship of their favorite songs, that editors who prefer to do otherwise, feel compelled to gratify the general curiosity. And then there are so many precious influences flowing from an association of these songs with names like those of Cowper and Newton, Luther and Ambrose, that editors feel bound to connect the memory of a sanctified poet with the other rich reminiscences of the hymn, even when, as individual editors, they would prefer to fasten the worshipper's mind upon the *spirit*, rather than the *origin*, of what he sings.

¹ In Worcester's Watts there are not many changes affecting the doctrinal character of the lyrics. Where John Newton says of the Saviour: "Oh my soul, *he bore thy load*," Dr. Worcester says: "Oh my soul, *behold the load*."—Select Hymn, 174. Where Dr. Watts says of men: "Their hearts by nature *all unclean*," Dr. Worcester says: "Their hearts by nature *are unclean*."—B. I. H. 94. In changes like these, however, Dr. Worcester did not probably intend to modify the sentiment, but only the style.

In all this, they *mean* to be understood, and they *are* understood, as referring, not to the orthography, or punctuation, or symmetry, or completeness, or the minuter graces of the hymn, when they ascribe it to a particular writer, but rather as referring to its aim, spirit, and general phraseology. The pious Toplady, the devout Gibbons, William Bengo Collier, Josiah Conder, indeed a majority of the most accurate and exemplary compilers during the last hundred years, have openly announced that their selections from other authors have not been, in all instances, exact quotations. Here, as in a thousand other instances, common, immemorial usage interprets and justifies a well-intended deed. The conscientious Bickersteth, in the Preface to his *Christian Psalmody* (p. v.), thus explains the meaning of references to authors in a church hymn book: "As alterations have been made probably by every collector of hymns, the only effective way of enabling the reader to know what the hymn originally was, is to give the name of the author, by which reference may be made to it, as first written." Among the boldest advocates of the changes adopted in the *Church Psalmody* by Dr. Lowell Mason and Rev. David Greene, were Professor Ebenezer Porter of Andover,¹ and Dr. Benjamin B. Wisner of Boston, both of them distinguished for their punctilious accuracy, and both of them defending alterations of

¹ It is a great error to suppose, that all the changes adopted in the *Church Psalmody*, were first made by its Editors. Many of them had been long established in England and in this country. Dr. Porter of Andover, although eminent as a judge and critic of psalmody, yet, as we think, carried his love of alterations too far. He condemned indiscriminately the erotic expressions in hymns, even such as have their parallel in the inspired word. He insisted on modifying not only such phrases as *Dear God*, but also *Dear Lord*. He once remarked, that the line "*Jesus Saviour of my soul*," was "*infinitely better*" than the endeared line of Wesley: "*Jesus Lover of my soul*." It was Dr. Porter, also, who urged more strenuously than any other man, that the *Church Psalmody* should have on its margins the marks for musical expression. These are a blemish to the manual, and also to Worcester's Watts. What would be thought of a Prayer Book, which appended to its supplications the following rules: "*Offer this part of the prayer mezzo piano*;" "*Utter these petitions diminuendo*;" "*Now pray affetuoso*;" "*Here pray staccato*;" or — "*swell*;" or "*fortissimo*." A book of devotion is no more a book of elocution, than it is of antiquarian researches.

hymns, on the ground that a church manual *needs* them, and has a prescriptive right to them, and cannot properly be understood as implying that all its authors wrote the lyrics in the exact form which is demanded for public worship.

§ 3. *The Immodesty of Changing the Text of Hymns.*

There are indeed not many poets who can lay claim to an equality with Addison, Gerhard, Heber and Keble. A reverent mind will hesitate long, before it will even suggest an improvement of the words of such men. There is an immodesty in allowing one jot or tittle of their writings to pass away, unless there be an obvious reason for the change. But "*aliquando bonus dormitat Homerus*;" and even when the stanza of a great master is perfect in its pristine relations, it may be imperfect in a manual of church song. Milton wrote: "For His mercies *aye* endure;" but in our less obsolete form of his version of the one hundred and thirty-sixth Psalm we sing: "For his mercies *shall* endure." He said: "Let us *blaze* his name abroad;" an Episcopal hymn book substitutes: "Let us *sound* his name abroad." He crowds eight syllables into lines which admit only seven, and writes:

Who by *his* wis'dom did' create'
The *pain'ted* heavens' so full' of state'.

The Episcopal version reduces these lines to their proper measure:

Who' by wis'dom did' create'
Heaven's *expanse'* and all' its state'.

Addison, also, with all the exquisite chasteness of his imagination, wrote a stanza which it was not immodest for the English hymnologists to modify:

ORIGINAL FORM.

Then see the sorrows of my heart
Ere yet it is too late;
And add my Saviour's dying groans,
To give those sorrows weight.

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ALTERED FORM.

Sabbath Hymn Book, Hymn 1280.
Then see my sorrows, gracious Lord!
Let mercy set me free,
While in the confidence of prayer
My heart takes hold of thee.

13

The exquisite Cowper, whose verses it were often profane to tamper with, has written the couplet:

Israel's *young ones*, when of old,
Pharaoh threatened to withhold.

This couplet appears in the 167th Select Hymn of Worcester's Watts, but there the word "*infants*" is substituted for "*young ones*." In the 47th Select Hymn of Dr. Worcester's manual, another stanza of Cowper remains unaltered:

Not such as hypocrites suppose
Who with a graceless heart
Taste not of Thee, but *drink a dose*
Prepared by Satan's art.

If now the choice minds of our most seraphic poets have sometimes let a word fall, which it is not indelicate to alter, can we regard the less admirable genius of other men as elevated above the reach of criticism? An American scholar, previously unknown to Wordsworth, suggested to him several emendations of the poet laureate's verses; and the author of the *Excursion* adopted, as his own, all the proposed amendments. It is not implied, in a criticism, that the critic regards himself superior to the genius in which he detects a flaw. Apelles modified his picture, at the hint of a cobbler. An artist who does not feel worthy to loosen the latchet of the shoe of Raphael, may yet discern a fault in the Transfiguration. There is no manifestation of vanity or arrogance in the editors of the Presbyterian (Old School) hymn book, adopting the following alterations of Dr. Watts's Psalms:

ORIGINAL FORM.

Watts's 7th Psalm.

*For me their malice dig'd a pit,
But there themselves are cast;
My God makes all their mischiefs light
On their own heads at last.*

Watts's 15th Psalm.

While others gripe and grind the poor.

PRESBYTERIAN O. S. COLLECTION.

*Though leagued in guile, their malice spread
A snare before my way;
Their mischiefs on their impious head
His vengeance shall repay.*

While others scorn and wrong the poor.

ORIGINAL FORM.

Watts's 34th Psalm.

To him the poor lift up their eyes,
Their faces feel the heavenly shine.

Watts's 35th Psalm.

Behold the love, the generous love
That holy David shows;
See how his sounding bowels move
To his afflicted foes.

Watts's 37th Psalm.

His lips abhor to talk profane.

Watts's 49th Psalm.

Life is a blessing can't be sold.

Watts's 49th Psalm.

Like thoughtless sheep the sinner dies,
Laid in the grave for worms to eat.

Watts's 71st Psalm.

My tongue shall all the day proclaim
My Saviour and my God,
His death has brought my foes to shame
And drowned them in his blood.

Watts's 104th Psalm.

Tame heifers there their thirst allay.

PRESBYTERIAN O. S. COLLECTION.

To him the poor lift up their eyes
With heavenly joy their faces shine.

Behold the love, the generous love
That holy David shows;
Behold his kind compassion move
For his afflicted foes.

His soul abhors discourse profane.

Eternal life can ne'er be sold.

Like thoughtless sheep the sinner dies
And leaves his glories in the tomb.

My tongue shall all the day proclaim
My Saviour and my God,
His death has brought my foes to shame
And saved me by his blood.

There gentle herds their thirst allay.

§ 4. *The Probability that a Poet's Inspiration will surpass a Critic's Amendment.*

In the glow of composition, the thoughts are more genial and healthful than in the cold business of criticism. Images throng upon the mind of the *poet*, words come of their own accord, and marshal themselves in their own places; but the *critic* looks anxiously around to find more fitting images, and he seeks after more appropriate words; and the very anxiety of his search makes his conceptions unnatural, his phrases cold and chilling. Editors are often audacious, when they venture to omit or supplement a stanza once finished by a royal poet. They would less frequently attempt their rash enterprise, if they remembered that the poet indited his words in the fervor of inspiration, and was borne onward by the impulses of a mind and heart sanctified and therefore made accurate by the true spirit of song, and, above all, by

the Spirit of grace; while the *critic* comes up to his work in cold blood, and calculates, and measures, and counts syllables, and works up his faculties to find out some phrase which will *fit in*, and *fill out* a chasm made, often ruthlessly, by himself. There is no doubt that costly gems have been broken, and exquisite settings have been marred by the hammer and file of careless menders of hymns.

For ourselves, we have never studied a hymn book, printed during the last thirty years, in which we have not found many alterations that appeared to us unadvisable. It would be well nigh a miracle, for even *two* independent men to coincide perfectly with regard to the structure of the twenty thousand lines in a manual for church song.

But it is the prerogative of good judgment to use a good principle rationally. While we recognize the truth that the original readings are commonly the best, and that ill-considered changes are apt to turn poetry into prose, or sense into nonsense, we must also remember that no lyrist has yet attained perfection, and our duty is to "cease from man whose breath is in his nostrils." The afflatus of the poet commonly wafts him onward in a graceful or a sublime movement, but now and then the gales of his fancy bear him into the dry sand. Among the sacred lyrists of the English, or of any other language, there has not arisen a greater than Isaac Watts, since the days of supernatural inspiration. But we are compelled to own, that besides other far more unworthy stanzas, he wrote the following:

My foot is ever apt to slide,
My foes rejoice to see't;
They raise their pleasure and their pride
When they supplant my feet.

Psalm 38, C. M.

Yet, if my God prolong my breath,
The saint may profit by't;
The saints, the glory of the earth,
The men of my delight.

Psalm 16, C. M., first part.

In reading Dr. Worcester's Abridgment of Watts's Psalms and Hymns, we are surprised at the multitude of couplets and entire lyrics, so faulty "as seldom, perhaps never, to be given out in public," and therefore excluded from his Christian Psalmody. Many of these stanzas, as restored in Worcester's Watts, have never, we presume, been *sung* since their restoration, and some of them, as, for instance, Psalm 83, stanzas 4—6, have so infrequently been even *perused*, that their very existence is unknown to the great majority of worshippers using that manual.

§ 5. *Changes in the Text, as Affecting Old Associations.*

"I will make Jerusalem heaps;" "I will make Jerusalem a cup of trembling;" "I will make Jerusalem a burdensome stone;" "I create Jerusalem a rejoicing;" — such phrases are frequent, in the prophetic style. Dr. Doddridge preached a discourse on Isaiah 62: 6, 7, "Ye that make mention of the Lord, keep not silence; and give him no rest, till he establish, and *till he make Jerusalem a praise* in the earth." One of his best hymns followed that discourse:

2. How shall thy servants give thee rest,
Till Zion's mouldering walls thou raise;
Till thy own power shall stand confessed,
And make Jerusalem a praise.

10. — And Zion, *made a praise by thee*
To thee shall render back the praise.

In some recent versions, the fourth line here quoted is exchanged for another: "*And thine own church be filled with praise.*" The Sabbath Hymn Book, hymn 1122, rejected this interpolation, because it is not hallowed by common use, and is in no way an improvement upon Doddridges's own biblical quotation. Yet an advocate of the original text has quoted the line in the Sabbath Hymn Book, "*And make Jerusalem a praise*"! and has appended to it an exclamation point, as if it were a *signal* instance of "clumsy and

prosaic aleration," "very objectionable innovation," and places over against it what he mistakes for Doddridge's own words: "*And thine own church be filled with praise.*" This is one among numerous examples of the love which a man acquires to verses which he has often perused, and the facility with which he sees more excellence in those verses than in any which can be substituted for them. The same writer objects to the 383d hymn in the Sabbath Hymn Book, as "in a form very different from what [he has] *been accustomed to,*" and yet every word remains precisely as Mrs. Steele left it, with the exception of the first line, where instead of "Triumphant *he* ascends on high," a more appropriate beginning is chosen: "Triumphant *Christ* ascends on high."

The same Review which contains the two preceding criticisms adds the following: "All other collections [than the Sabbath Hymn Book] in which this hymn [Wesley's 'Rejoice, the Lord is King'] is found, so far as our knowledge extends, gives the chorus of that hymn, repeated in every stanza, thus:

Lift up *the* heart, lift up *the* voice,
Rejoice *aloud*, *ye* saints, rejoice.

which (for some musical reason, surely, and no other) is changed by the Sabbath Hymn Book into

Lift up *your* hearts, lift up *your* voice,
Rejoice! *again I say*, rejoice!"

Now the truth is, that the Sabbath Hymn Book retains that chorus exactly as Wesley left it, and as it is still retained in Montgomery's Psalmist, the Revised edition of the Methodist Hymn Book, and in other authoritative manuals. Some manuals ascribe the hymn to Dr. Rippon, and we first discovered that *changed* form of it, which our reviewer prefers, in Rippon's Selection, printed in 1813. And then as to "*some musical reason surely, and no other*" which induced Charles Wesley to select his original reading in preference to Rippon's interpolation, — this "musical reason" is found in the fourth verse of the fourth chapter of the epistle to the

Philippians: "Rejoice in the Lord always, and *again I say*, rejoice." There is music in this inspired phrase, which breathes delightfully through Wesley's biblical hymn. His expressive quotation is as much superior to the altered form "Rejoice aloud," as an inspired, quickening, cheering, and reiterated call, is better than a *loud* joy.

The three criticisms just mentioned, develop an attachment to old poetic reminiscences, which is in itself amiable, and suggestive of important rules in church song. For, very peculiarly is our worship of the Ancient of Days affected by associating it with times gone by. There are some lyrics of historical celebrity, like the first English hymn for the Old Hundredth tune, "All people that on earth do dwell," and the old Scotch version of the twenty third Psalm, "The Lord's my shepherd, I'll not want," which in the simple homeliness of their style, transport us into the near, warm presence of our ancestors, as with tearful eye and aching heart, amid sicknesses, persecutions, and still more disheartening fears, they warbled forth these identical words. They should be in every Hymn Book. They should remain unaltered, even when a change would remove here and there a rhetorical blemish. The antiquity of their form is the prominent excellence of it. They are an exception from the general rule. They may be easily ridiculed, but in the final event, a spirit of reverence will prevail over the disposition to sneer at simple-hearted devotion.

Perhaps there are no words in the English language, that express more feelingly and more justly the importance of adhering to the original form of our sacred songs, than the following words of the late Professor B. B. Edwards. Speaking of those hymns which are "the product of earthly genius and of heavenly inspiration," "which had their origin almost in heaven," he says:¹

"These compositions should remain unchanged, so that the ancient recollections connected with them may be preserved. It is well known, that such associations are often

¹ Writings of Prof. B. B. Edwards, with a Memoir, Vol. I. pp. 156, 157.

a principal cause of the extraordinary effects which are produced by popular music. The poetry and the music may be indifferent, but the composition was used in some great crisis of the country, in some new turn of human affairs; and tradition, and popular sympathy, and recollection impart to it astonishing power.

“In like manner, some pieces of sacred music, some standard hymns, excellent as they may be in themselves, are greatly indebted to the reminiscences that have been clustering around them for ages. They were sung in the fastnesses of the mountains, when it was unsafe to utter the louder notes; or in some almost fathomless glen, where the eucharistic wine might be mingled with the blood of the communicant. Some of them aroused the fainting spirit of the reformer, when the fate of Protestantism was depending on the turn which a half enlightened human will might take, in the caprice of a moment. Others were sung on a wintry sea by pilgrim voices. Some are hallowed by missionary reminiscences, or by all the sad, yet joyful images of the chamber of death. A thousand times have they quivered on lips, which in a moment were motionless forever. A thousand times have they been wept rather than sung, while the grave was unveiling her faithful bosom; while a mother’s precious remains were descending to their last resting-place, or while they came as life from the dead to the solitary mourner, whose entire household were beneath the clods of the valley. Everywhere, in innumerable burying places, fragments of them are engraven with rude devices, teaching the rustic moralist how to die, or pointing him to the sure and certain hope. They are embalmed in the most sacred affections of the heart. They often come like unseen ministers of grace to the soul. We would not lose a line, or suffer the alteration of a word. The *slightest* change breaks the link. It is sacrilege to touch them. They connect us with the holy dead on the other side of the ocean; they bring up the hallowed memories of Watts, and Wesley, and Cowper; they make us at home in the venerable churchyards where our forefathers’ dust is garnered. We are *fellow-cit-*

izens with the great commonwealth of the happy dead in both hemispheres. We feel new chords of relationship to the saints in glory."

The author of this eloquent protest against altering the text of hymns, and especially those hymns which are "cut in the rock forever," was advocating a general principle, and was not intending to preclude all exceptions to it; for when he was called to prepare an epitaph for his first born, "the delight of his existence," he selected the touching lines of Henry Kirke White, and adopted that alteration of them which makes them so tenderly applicable to the graves of children. He did not carve on the marble, "These ashes *too*, this little dust,"¹ but

These ashes *few*, this little dust,
Our Father's care shall keep,
Till the last angel rise and break
The long and dreary sleep.

This incident recalls the suggestion already made, that an *altered* form often acquires more sacredness than the original. More precious associations may cluster around a *common* reading than around the first one. The same reason, then, which exists ordinarily for *avoiding* changes of the original text, becomes occasionally a reason for *retaining* them when made. Worshippers have become not only wonted to them, but also attached to them, and are pained, shocked, by a return to the pristine phrases which seem to them like innovations. What is old in reality, is new to them. The love of novelty in doctrine, leads one man to revive an ancient but exploded error. The prurient desire of change induces another man to adopt some antiquated ecclesiastical ceremony. The same fondness for innovation betrays another man into the use of old terms, which have been so long disused as to appear like words just coined. We often hear objections made to certain changes in a hymn, on the ground that they break up the most cherished

¹ See Sabbath Hymn Book, H. 1276.

associations, when in fact the editor of that hymn would have restored the ancient text, were it not for the fear of disturbing the sacred memories clustering around the established departure from it. We should not *alter* the original line, says the objector, because we thus divert the pious mind from the solemnity of worship to the inquiry: "Why have my favorite words been displaced?" "We should not *restore* the original," says the editor, "because we thereby distract the attention of the worshipper with criticisms upon the words, which appear to him strange, and perhaps inferior. The *reasons* for and against the accommodated style, are often nearly balanced. The balance may often be struck in favor of that style, by the fact that custom *has* sanctioned, or seems *likely* to sanction the altered form; and that a deviation from what *is*, or is destined to *become*, the common reading would give more pain than pleasure. "Go now and boast of all your stores, And tell how bright *you* shine," are words which would startle many a worshipper as a novelty; yet they are the original words of Watts. Men have become familiar with the line, "Let the dark benighted pagan," who would be startled at the *innovation* of the *original* line, "Let the Indian, let the negro." It is common to condemn changes like the following, but they are adopted in the Sabbath Hymn Book, partly for the reason that a majority of those who will ever use that manual, would be painfully disappointed if their favorite changes had not been retained.

ORIGINAL.

How terrible thy glories be!

How bright thine armies shine!

Where is the power *that vies with thee*,
Or truth compared to thine!

Thorns of heartfelt tribulation. Cowper.

*O were I like a feathered dove,
And innocence had wings,
I'd fly, and make a long remove, etc.*

SABBATH HYMN BOOK.

Hymn 132.

Great God! how high thy glories rise;

How bright thine armies shine!

Where is the power *with thee that vies*,
Or truth compared to thine!

(See also Presbyterian O. S. Collection, Ps. 89.)

Hymn 964.

Scenes of heartfelt tribulation.

Hymn 199.

Oh! were I like some gentle dove,

Soon would I stretch my wings,

And fly, and make a long remove, etc.

ORIGINAL.

Their feet shall never slide to fall.

And glory to th' eternal king
Who lays his *fury* by.

His loving kindness *is so free*,
— "*is so great*" — "*is so strong*,"
— *is so good* —.

Be thou my strength and righteousness,
My *Jesus* and my all.

But wisdom shows a *narrower* path,
With here and there a traveller.

The fearful soul that *tries* and faints.

And to his heavenly kingdom *keep*
This feeble soul of mine.

Stoop down my thoughts that *use* to rise.

While thine eternal *thought* moves on,
Thine undisturbed affairs.

The saints above, how great their joys,
And bright their glories be.

And thou, my God, whose piercing eye
Distinct surveys each dark recess,
In these *abstracted* hours draw nigh.

The eternal *states* of all the dead.

Dear Lord, and shall we ever *lie*
At this poor dying rate.

And turn *each* cursed idol out
That dares to rival thee.

Yes, and I must and will esteem
All things but *lost* for *Jesus*' sake.

SABBATH HYMN BOOK.

Hymn 232.

Their *steadfast* feet shall never fall.

Hymn 309.

And glory to th' eternal king
Who lays his *anger* by.

Hymn 431.

His loving kindness, *Oh how free*,
— "*Oh how great*" — "*Oh how strong*,"
— "*Oh how good*" —.

Hymn 493.

Be thou my strength and righteousness,
May *Saviour* and my all.

Hymn 548.

But wisdom shows a *narrow* path,
With here and there a traveller.

Hymn 548.

The fearful soul that *tires* and faints.

Hymn 1170.

And to his heavenly kingdom *take*
This feeble soul of mine.

Hymn 1172.

Stoop down my thoughts that *used* to rise.

Hymn 142.

While thine eternal *thoughts* move on,
Thine undisturbed affairs.

Hymn 1245.

The saints above, how great their joys,
How bright their glories be !

Hymn 590.

O thou, great God ! whose piercing eye,
Distinctly marks each deep retreat,
In these *sequestered* hours draw nigh.

Hymn 1157.

The eternal *state* of all the dead.

Hymn 462.

Dear Lord ! and shall we ever *live*,
At this poor dying rate !

Hymn 698.

And turn *the dearest* idol out,
That dares to rival thee.

Hymn 724.

Yes ; and I must and will esteem
All things but *loss* for *Jesus*' sake.

ORIGINAL.

But ere *some* fleeting hour is past.

Watts.

But the *best* volume thou hast writ.

Wesley.

Love Divine all *loves* excelling.

And on the wings of *all the* winds.

Now *Satan* threatens to prevail.

SABBATH HYMN BOOK.

Hymn 629.

But ere *one* fleeting hour is past.

Hymn 479.

But the *best* volume thou hast writ.

Hymn 997.

Love Divine all *love* excelling.

Hymn 124.

And on the wings of *mighty* winds.

Hymn 617.

Rise, Saviour! help me to prevail.

During the last forty years, multitudes of American and English worshippers have been accustomed to the following variation of one of Doddridge's hymns; the variation making the hymn more appropriate to *public* worship.

ORIGINAL FORM.

*My Saviour, I am Thine,
By everlasting bands;
My name, my heart, I would resign:
My soul is in Thy hands.*

*To Thee I still would cleave
With ever-growing zeal:
Let millions tempt me Christ to leave,
They never shall prevail.*

*His Spirit shall unite
My soul to Him, my Head;
Shall form me to His image bright,
And teach His path to tread.*

*Death may my soul divide
From this abode of clay;
But love shall keep me near His side,
Through all the gloomy way.*

*Since Christ and we are one,
What should remain to fear?
If He in heaven hath fixed His throne,
He'll fix his members there.*

SABBATH HYMN BOOK.

*Dear Savior! we are thine
By everlasting bands;
Our hearts, our souls, we would resign,
Entirely to thy hands.*

*To thee we still would cleave
With ever-growing zeal;
If millions tempt us Christ to leave,
O let them ne'er prevail!*

*Thy Spirit shall unite
Our souls to thee, our head;
Shall form in us thine image bright,
And teach thy paths to tread.*

*Death may our souls divide
From these abodes of clay;
But love shall keep us near thy side,
Through all the gloomy way.*

*Since Christ and we are one,
Why should we doubt or fear?
If he in heaven has fixed his throne,
He'll fix his members there.*

That indispensable hymn of Dr. Raffles: "High in yonder realms of light," consists of forty-eight lines, as published by William Bengo Collier in 1812. As published by Dr. Raffles himself, in 1853, it consists of thirty-two lines. As it ordinarily appears, in English and American hymn books, it is variously combined and altered. The following are specimen copies:

WILLIAM BENGOLLIER'S EDITION
OF 1812.

DR. RAFFLES'S OWN EDITION OF 1853.

1

High in yonder realms of light,
Far above these lower skies,
Fair and exquisitely bright,
Heaven's unfading mansions rise :
Built of pure and massy gold,
Strong and durable are they ;
Deck'd with gems of worth untold,
Subjected to no decay !

2

Glad within these blest abodes,
Dwell the raptured saints above,
Where no anxious care corrodes,
Happy in Emmanuel's love !
Once, *indeed*, like us below,
Pilgrims in this vale of tears,
Torturing pain and heavy woe,
Gloomy doubts, distressing fears :

3

These, alas ! full well they knew,
Sad companions of their way :
Oft on them the tempest blew
Through the long, the cheerless day !
Oft their vileness they deplor'd,
Wills perverse and hearts untrue,
Grieved they could not love their Lord,
Love him as they wished to do !

4

Oft the big, unbidden tear,
Stealing down the furrow'd cheek,
Told in eloquence sincere,
Tales of woe they could not speak.
But these days of weeping o'er,
Past this scene of toil and pain,
They shall feel distress no more,
Never — never weep again !

5

'Mid the chorus of the skies,
'Mid the angelic lyres above.
Hark — their songs melodious rise,
Songs of praise to Jesus' love !
Happy spirits ! — ye are fled,
Where no grief can entrance find,
Lull'd to rest the aching head,
Sooth'd the anguish of the mind !

6

All is tranquil and serene,
Calm and undisturbed repose,
There no cloud can intervene,
There no angry tempest blows !
Every tear is wiped away,
Sighs no more shall heave the breast ;
Night is lost in endless day —
Sorrow — in eternal rest !

1

High in yonder realms of light,
Far above these lower skies,
Fair and exquisitely bright,
Heaven's unfading mansions rise ;
Glad, within these blest abodes,
Dwell the raptured saints above,
Where no anxious care corrodes,
Happy in Emmanuel's love.

2

Once the big unbidden tear,
Stealing down the furrowed cheek,
Told, in eloquence sincere,
Tales of woe they could not speak ;
But, these days of weeping o'er,
Passed this scene of toil and pain,
They shall feel distress no more,
Never, never weep again.

3

'Mid the chorus of the skies,
'Mid the angelic lyres above,
Hark ! their songs melodious rise,
Songs of praise to Jesus' love !
Happy spirits ! ye are fled
Where no grief can entrance find
Lulled to rest the aching head,
Soothed the anguish of the mind.

4

All is tranquil and serene,
Calm and undisturbed repose ;
There no cloud can intervene,
There no angry tempest blows :
Every tear is wiped away,
Sighs no more shall heave the breast,
Night is lost in endless day,
Sorrow in eternal rest.

Many worshippers would be shocked at the novelty of either of the first stanzas given above ; for the following appears as the first stanza in the Church Psalms, the Presbyterian Old School and the Dutch Reformed Church Collections ; Nettleton's Village Hymns, the Sabbath Hymn Book, and many other manuals.

High in yonder realms of light,
Dwell the raptured saints above ;
Far beyond our feeble sight,
Happy in Immanuel's love :
Pilgrims in this vale of tears,
Once *they knew*, like us below,
Gloomy doubts, distressing fears,
Torturing pain and heavy woe.

§ 6. *Changes in the Text, as affecting the Uniformity of Worship.*

A great evil resulting from the alteration of hymns is, that various forms are used by various congregations ; and men, accustomed to sing from one manual, are confused by the new phrases which they find in another manual; and sometimes the same assembly utter, on the same notes, different words, or even different verses, and thus there is no distinction of sound, but "every-one hath a psalm," "hath a tongue," "hath an interpretation." This is an infelicity, and therefore manuals for song should adopt the original, partly because this is more apt to be the prevailing, form of the lyrics.

But *exceptions* prove the wisdom of this general rule. We must not blame the original collector of the "Psalms of David," even if we adopt a common theory, that he inserted the eighteenth Psalm in a form different from the original, as found in the twenty-second chapter of second Samuel. It has been remarked by those who believe that the Book of Samuel contains the *earliest* copy of that song, that the first notable instance of departure from the original draught of a sacred lyric, was made by the editor of the inspired Psalms. Many persons have been "shocked," still more have been "confused," and some have been ruinously prejudiced against the revealed word, by the fact that the old songs of the temple are "altered," when cited by the apostles ; and that the quotations made in the New Testament from the Old, are often so far "modified," that it is difficult, if not impossible, to recognize and identify them. We believe that, in many instances, the writers of the New Testament quoted the "changed form," simply because it had become more familiar than the original words, to the men whom the apostles immediately addressed. But the *original* form remains, and is now better known, and has become far more precious to many readers, than is the Septuagint, which the writers of the New Testament have preferred to cite. There were valid reasons for accommodating the words of the old poets

and prophets to the times of the new dispensation. So there were valid reasons for giving us two different versions of the Lord's Prayer, both of them promoting an excellent end, although the "*uniformity of worship*" is not always secured by them. In like manner, there are reasons for adapting to modern tastes some of the ancient hymns, notwithstanding all the inconveniences which attend the adaptation.

§ 7. *The Principle of Changes in the Text lies at the Basis of Modern English Hymnology.*

More than twenty English versions of Hebrew Psalms appeared before the time of Dr. Watts. They were written by Sir Philip Sidney, Christopher Hatton, H. Dodd, Dr. Henry King, Miles Smith, Dr. Samuel Woodford, John Milton, William Barton, Dr. Simon Ford, Sir Richard Blackmore, Dr. John Patrick, Mr. Addison, archdeacon Daniel, Dr. Joseph Trapp, Dr. Walter Harte, Dr. Broome, George Sandys, Sir John Denham, and others. It was the aim of their versions to represent, exactly, the spirit and style of the Psalter; but every one of them frequently, though unintentionally, failed in the correctness of its translation. The Psalter, as versified by Dr. Watts, introduced a new era into English psalmody, and constitutes the basis of our modern hymnological literature. But he has designedly "altered" the Psalms of David. "I could never persuade myself," he writes, "that the best Way to raise a devout Frame, in *plain Christians*, was to bring a *King* or a *Captain* into their Churches, and let him lead and dictate the Worship, in his own Style of royalty, or in the language of a field of Battel."¹ Accordingly, we find such notes as the following appended, frequently, to his *Imitations* of the Psalms.

¹ This quotation is made from page xlii of the first edition of Watts's Psalms. It was printed in London "for J. Clark, at the Bible and Crown in the Poultry; R. Ford, at the Angel in the Poultry; and R. Cruttenden, at the Bible and Three Crowns in Cheapside. 1719." The copy of this edition now lying before us was a presentation copy of the author himself, and contains his autograph on the blank leaf: "To y^e Rev^d M^r Stinton. — I. WATTS." From this copy the notes printed on the following pages are extracted.

Psalm 5. "Stanzas 2 and 5. Where any just occasion is given to make mention of Christ and the Holy Spirit, I refuse it not; and I am persuaded David would not have refused it, had he lived under the Gospel; nor St. Paul, had he written a Psalm Book."

Psalm 35. "Stanza 6. Among the Imprecations that David uses against his Adversaries, in this Psalm, I have adventured to turn the Edge of them away from Personal Enemies, against the implacable Enemies of God in the World.

Stanzas 7 and 8. Agreeably to the Spirit of the Gospel, I have here further mollified these Imprecations by a charitable distinction and Petition for their Souls, which Spirit of Evangelic Charity appears so conspicuous in the 12th, 13th, and 14th verses of the Psalm, that I could not forbear to form them into a short, distinct Hymn, enlarging on that Glorious Character of a Christian — Love to our Enemies — commanded so particularly, and so divinely exemplified by Christ himself."

Psalm 37. "This long Psalm abounds with useful Instructions and Encouragements to Piety, but the Verses are very much unconnected and independent; Therefore I have contracted and transposed them so as to reduce them to three Hymns of a moderate length, and with some connection of the sense."

Psalm 39. "I have not confined myself, here, to the Sense of the Psalmist; but have taken occasion, from the three first Verses, to write a short Hymn on the Government of the Tongue."

Psalm 40. "If David had written this Psalm in the Days of the Gospel, surely he would have given a much more express and particular account of the Sacrifice of Christ, as he hath done of his preaching, vs. 9, 10, and enlarged, as Paul does in Heb. 10 : 4, etc., where this Psalm is cited. I have done no more, therefore, in this paraphrase, than what I am persuaded the Psalmist himself would have done in the time of Christianity."

Psalm 55. "I have left out some whole Psalms, and several parts of others that tend to fill the Mind with overwhelming sorrows, or sharp resentment; neither of which are so well suited to the Spirit of the Gospel, and therefore the particular Complaints of David against Achitophel, here, are entirely omitted."

Psalm 92. "Stanza 6. Rejoicing in the destruction of our personal Enemies, is not so evangelical a practice, therefore I have given the 11th verse of this Psalm another Turn."

It is common to speak of Dr. Watts's "Imitations" as model psalms. They are such, and they ratify the principle of occasional departures from the main text. It is a singular fact, that even although *he* is not condemned, when he

exchanges the idioms of David for more prosaic idioms, his *editors* are accused of trespassing on vested rights, when they reinstate the inspired phrases in the place of Dr. Watts's acknowledged innovations. They are accused of injustice when they substitute the biblical phrase "Within the tents of sin," for Watts's drawling line, "In *pleasurable* sin." Although many of his departures from the sacred text are needed, yet some of them are unwarrantable. What and where would be the end of the obloquy poured on a modern editor, who should interpolate into one of Watts's hymns, such stanzas as the following, which he has thrust into the old Hebrew lyric? In that magnificent eighth Psalm, which begins: "O Lord, our God, how wondrous great, Is thine exalted name," we find the sixth stanza devoted to one of our Lord's miracles:

The waves lay spread beneath his feet;
And fish at his command,
Bring their large shoals to *Peter's* net,
Bring tribute to his hand.

As the prince of English psalmists has changed not barely the words, but also the images and the ideas of the text which he versified, so have succeeding lyrists modified the style of the hymns transfused by them from the Greek, Latin, German, French, and Welch tongues. Luther's imitation of the old "*Media in Vita*," and his looser imitation of the "*Veni Sancte Spiritus*;" the versions of the hymns of Gregory, Ambrose, Bernard, Thomas von Caelano; Wesley's translations from Gerhard and other German lyrists, abound with deviations from the original text. The favorite lyric, "Guide me, O thou great Jehovah," is rather more distant from the old Welsh, than Walter Scott's lines, "That day of wrath, that dreadful day," are different from the old "*Dies Irae*." All the English translations of Gerhard's passion hymn, "O sacred head, now wounded," differ from the original German, as that, in its turn, is diverse from the Latin ode on which it is founded. In fact a literal translation of any, and especially an ancient, poem, must be too artificial and

frigid for an English or American worshipper. As our versions of foreign lyrics are necessarily accommodated to our Anglo-Saxon tastes, so we have several favorite songs founded on antique English poems. They disagree unnecessarily, sometimes, with the stanzas from which they are derived; but even this disagreement illustrates the truth that our hymnody, as well as psalmody, has adopted the fundamental principle of departing from the original text. The hymn extracted from Milton's poem on the Morning of Christ's Nativity, is a signal example of this free accommodation. At least four highly acceptable hymns have been culled from an old English poem, the MS. of which is now in the British Museum, and begins with the well-known words: "Jerusalem, my happy home."

There is no question that, in several particulars, the original of these hymns is better than either and all of the abridgments and imitations; yet, for various reasons, the original cannot be introduced into our hymn books. Not only private hymns, but also the *standard* psalms of the English church, began to be altered very soon after they were printed. The first edition of the *entire* Psalter versified, and authorized to be sung in the church of England, was published in 1562, and contains in the very *first* stanza of the *first* psalm, a variation from Sternhold's original text, printed in 1549, and 1552. The edition of 1696 exhibits numerous variations from that of 1562, and the edition of 1726 adds yet more and greater amendments. The version by Tate and Brady supplanted that by Sternhold and Hopkins; but this new version never maintained a uniform text. What is true of the hymns, is also true of the tunes; they have all been varied to meet the real or the imagined wants of various ages. Some of the amendments have been ill-advised; but the practice and the theory of the church has been in favor of *some* innovations adapted to new exigencies.

§ 8. *The principle of deviating from another's text, is substantially the principle of quoting another's words.*

When we make a quotation from a writer, we need not quote everything which that writer has affirmed. We may cite one-half, or one-eighth, or one verse, or one clause of the one hundred and nineteenth psalm, without imposing on ourselves an obligation to repeat the whole. We may quote the entire fifteen stanzas of Tate and Brady's lyric: "Let all the land with shouts of joy," etc., or we may quote only four of them, or only four couplets, or four phrases, or four words. If the substance of the psalm be thus derived from those veteran hymnologists, the whole may, in an indiscriminating style, be ascribed to them, while it is understood that, in stricter speech, there must be some exceptions and abatements. We often pay honor to Watts, as the original versifier of the psalms and hymns ascribed to him. But he has frequently and frankly confessed his obligation to preceding writers. His versions of the 6th and 63d psalms are in great degree borrowed from those of Dr. Patrick; his imitations of the 21st, 112th and 139th psalms are largely taken from those of Tate and Brady. Many of his admirable "first lines," are transferred from the Psalter of Sir John Denham. Some of these psalms cannot properly be ascribed to the sole authorship of Dr. Watts, as they are by Dr. Worcester and others. If they be attributed to any versifiers, they should be referred in a general way to Watts *and* Tate and Brady, or Dr. Patrick or Sir John Denham, from whom the characteristic features of them were borrowed. It is further evident that these altered forms of the psalms must have "confused" the minds of worshippers in 1719, as much as other quotations have "created disturbance and confusion" in the nineteenth century. The old forms of these psalms were inwrought into the fond associations of thousands. The "new version" of Tate and Brady was an authorized part of the English church service. The dissenting poet of Southampton "dislocated" the favorite

stanzas of men, "inverted" the order of long-cherished phrases, impaired the "uniformity" of worship, etc. These were real evils. Were they not counterbalanced by superior advantages? It is also evident, that the charge of "plagiarism," wrongly made against recent poets who have borrowed lines from their predecessors, may, with equal propriety, and, we prefer to say, with equal impropriety, be made against the very prince of our sacred lyrists. From the days of Homer down to those of Shakspeare, from Shakspeare to Longfellow, men have blended with their own verses the phrases, the metaphors, the prevailing air and tone of other poems. The principle on which these and other poets have incorporated the words of preceding writers with their own words, is the very principle on which the lyrists of the sanctuary have constructed hymns embodying entire stanzas from their predecessors.¹ They have borrowed sometimes more, sometimes less, from lyrics in which they discovered elements too precious to be lost; but whether more or less, they esteemed the borrowed words as substantially a quotation, and equally justifiable with every other quotation. In all our more popular hymn books, there are what may be termed *composite lyrics*, which are made up of extracts from other songs, and which fuse into *one* hymn the better portions of two or three. In the Presbyterian Old School Collection, the 14th, 21st, 33d, 66th, 75th, and 124th Psalms; the 129th, 139th, 169th, 174th, 381st, 559th, 601st hymns, are either "*composite lyrics*," or else contain new interpolated lines or stanzas; so in the Presbyterian New School collection, are psalm 21; hymns, 6, 137,

¹ When we begin to insist on entire originality in a hymn, we know not where we can end. Pope writes:

He from thick films shall purge the visual ray,
And on the sightless eye-balls pour the day.

Dr. Doddridge was no plagiarist, and still wrote:

He comes from thickest films of vice
To clear the mental ray,
And on the eye-balls of the blind
To pour celestial day.

205, 350, 533, 553, 624, 661, and others; likewise in the Connecticut Collection, are the 152d, 220th, 393d, 373d, 699th, and other hymns; also in Mr. Beecher's Plymouth Collection, are the 75th, 215th, 264th, 273rd, 545th, 688th, 813th, 1113th, 1158th, 1256th, 1291st, 1317th, 1318th, and other hymns.

§ 9. *Difficulty of Ascertaining the Original Text of some Hymns.*

"If four persons have used four different selections [of lyrics], it will be found on comparison that many a verse has four different readings, while perhaps the original differs from them all; in coming, therefore, to the use of one book, three of them at least must find a different reading from that with which they are familiar. In some popular hymns, the various readings are so numerous that identity is almost lost, and the original cannot now be ascertained."¹

This fact suggests the reason why it has become so common to condemn certain phrases as *departures* from the original, when in fact they are *returns* to it. The author's own words have been stigmatized as innovations, even in a lyric so celebrated as:

Lo! on a narrow neck of land,
'Twixt two unbounded seas I stand;
Secure, insensible! etc.

O God, my inmost soul convert,
And deeply on my *thoughtful* heart
Eternal things impress, etc.²

The Village Hymns of Dr. Nettleton, the manual commonly known as Worcester's Watts, the Presbyterian N. S. Collection, the Reformed Dutch Hymn Book, and more than one Episcopal Selection, substitute for the second and fifth of the preceding lines: "*Yet how insensible,*" "*And deeply on my **thoughtless** heart.*" These latter readings have been

¹ Preface to the fifty-third edition of the English Baptist Selection of Hymns, p. vi.

² See Sabbath Hymn Book, Hymn 495.

even cited as illustrating the great superiority of the author's own words to the interpolations of critics. But in the first editions of Wesley's lyrics we find the words "*secure*," "*thoughtful*."

Even a hymn so noted and so new as Montgomery's "Forever with the Lord" (Sabbath Hymn Book, 1237), is seldom published correctly. Often it is made to contain the following words:

My father's house on high,
Home of my soul, how near
At times to faith's *far-seeing* eye
Thy golden gates appear.

Frequently the word *discerning* is substituted for *far-seeing*. In the dislike of such a prosaic term, some have exchanged it for *aspiring*, thus imitating Doddridge, who sings of an "aspiring eye." But others who commend this phrase in Doddridge, condemn it as infelicitous when it appears in Montgomery, and insist that the original *discerning* is more poetic. But the truth is, that not one of these three words was chosen by Montgomery. His term was, — and it is superior to either of the other three, *foreseeing*. It so appears in the earlier and better editions of his works.

The Missionary Hymn of Heber is generally printed with the following inaccuracies:

"*Shall* we whose souls are lighted," etc.
"*Shall* we to man benighted," etc.
"Till *earth's* remotest nation," etc.

The editors of the Sabbath Hymn Book originally printed these lines as they were written by their author:

"*Can* we whose souls are lighted," etc.
"*Can* we to men benighted," etc.
"Till *each* remotest nation," etc.

By the importunity of a friend, who remonstrated against violating the sacred associations of the word *shall* in the first two of the above cited lines, the editors were induced to

restore the common, which is, however, what certain critics are pleased to call a "*garbled*" reading. But it has been necessary to consult numerous editions of Heber's writings, before his own chosen words could be indisputably ascertained. Dr. Raffles of Liverpool possesses the identical manuscript which Bishop Heber sent to the press, and we have now lying before us an exact copy of that manuscript, corresponding precisely with the first printed impressions of the Missionary Hymn, and with the version in the Sabbath Hymn Book (H. 1132) except in the use of "*can*" for "*shall*."

Now if in four such favorite compositions from authors so recent and eminent as Charles Wesley, James Montgomery, and Bishop Heber, the common readings have been inaccurate for so many years, how much more difficult must it be to ascertain the exact form in which older and less familiar hymns, from less conspicuous authors, originally appeared? The difficulty is greater than can be rewarded by the *practical* (we do not say the *historical* and *antiquarian*) results of the search. Still further: in numerous instances it is not barely arduous, it is impossible to determine which is the primitive of many conflicting versions; and in these instances the charge of departing from the primitive style is made in blank uncertainty, whether the charge be true or false. Here, the author is unknown; there, the original copy is unknown. Even in an author so near us and so noted as Doddridge, we are not always sure that we have his own words. The honest Job Orton, who first edited Doddridge's hymns, says in his first Preface to them, p. x.: "There may perhaps be some improprieties [in these hymns], owing to my not being able to read the author's manuscript in particular places, and being obliged, without a poetic genius, to supply those deficiencies, whereby the beauty of the stanza may be greatly defaced, though the sense is preserved." With some persons, if a hymn deviates from Worcester's Watts, the deviation is thought to be a departure from the original; but a careful scrutiny has disclosed the fact, that in only nine hundred and twenty-five of even the more common lyrics in that manual, there are fourteen hundred and four-

teen alterations, besides a large number of omissions. There is a multitude of readers who rely implicitly on the text of the Presbyterian (Old School) Collection; and regard every instance of departure from this text as a violation of the rights of authorship; yet in seven hundred and forty of the more common lyrics in that Collection, there are thirteen hundred and twenty-seven variations, exclusive of the frequent omissions. In the preface or advertisement of that manual it is stated: "The psalms have been left without alteration; the Committee believing that it would be extremely difficult to furnish a more acceptable version than that of Watts. The hymns, as may be seen, have undergone great and essential modifications," p. 3. But in the three hundred and forty-five versions of psalms contained in the Collection, there are six hundred and ninety-seven alterations. Indeed there are not one hundred and ten of these psalms unaltered. In seven hundred and seventy-four of the most noted hymns in the Presbyterian (New School) Collection, there are thirteen hundred and thirty-six variations of the original text. In eight hundred and ten familiar hymns of the Connecticut Hymn Book (two hundred and fifty at least of which are hallowed by long use), there are eleven hundred and twenty-six changes. In five hundred and fifty well-known hymns of Mr. Beecher's Plymouth Collection, there are nine hundred and seven changes. In many English manuals for song, the departures from the original text are still more numerous. We believe that there has not been published, either in England or America, during the last thirty years, a single hymn book in which there are not more changes of the text than there are hymns. Among the less noted lyrics, the diversity is greater than among the more noted; and amid all this diversity the labor of determining the author's primitive reading is often great, and not seldom utterly fruitless. If editors have blundered in altering the text, critics have blundered far more in conjecturing what was the first draught. On this theme, as well as others, we are apt to be positive in proportion to our ignorance.

There has been a singular and a prolonged misunderstanding with regard to both the text and the authorship of a noted hymn, which appears in the following, among other versions :

HYMN AS ASCRIBED TO TOPLADY.

Blow ye the trumpet, blow,
The gladly solemn sound ;
Let all the nations know,
To earth's remotest bound :
The year of jubilee is come,
Return, ye ransom'd sinners, home !

Exalt the Lamb of God,
The *sin-atoning* Lamb ;
Redemption *by* his blood,
Through all the world proclaim :
The year of jubilee is come ;
Return, ye ransom'd sinners, home.

Ye who have sold for nought,
The heritage above,
Come take it back unbought,
The gift of Jesus' love :
The year of jubilee is come ;
Return, ye ransom'd sinners, home.

Ye slaves of sin and hell,
Your liberty receive ;
And safe in Jesus dwell,
And blest in Jesus live :
The year of jubilee is come ;
Return, ye ransom'd sinners, home.

The gospel trumpet hear,
The news of *pard'ning* grace ;
Ye *happy* souls, draw near,
Behold your Saviour's face :
The year of jubilee is come,
Return, ye ransom'd sinners, home.

Jesus, our great high priest,
Has full atonement made ;
Ye weary spirits, rest ;
Ye *mourning* souls, be glad :
The year of jubilee is come,
Return, ye ransom'd sinners, home.

HYMN REPRESENTED AS ALTERED.

Blow ye the trumpet, blow
The gladly-solemn sound ;
Let all the nations know,
To earth's remotest bound :
The year of jubilee is come ;
Return, ye ransom'd sinners, home.

Jesus, our great High Priest,
Hath full atonement made :
Ye weary spirits, rest ;
Ye *mournful* souls, be glad :
The year of jubilee is come ;
Return, ye ransom'd sinners, home.

Extol the Lamb of God, —
The *all-atoning* Lamb ;
Redemption *in* his blood
Throughout the world proclaim :
The year of jubilee is come ;
Return, ye ransom'd sinners, home.

Ye slaves of sin and hell,
Your liberty receive.
And safe in Jesus dwell,
And blest in Jesus live :
The year of jubilee is come ;
Return, ye ransom'd sinners, home.

Ye who have sold for naught
Your heritage above,
Shall have it back unbought,
The gift of Jesus' love :
The year of jubilee is come ;
Return, ye ransom'd sinners, home.

The gospel trumpet hear, —
The news of *heavenly* grace ;
And, *saved from earth*, appear
Before your Saviour's face :
The year of jubilee is come ;
Return, ye ransom'd sinners, home.

This hymn is ascribed to Toplady in Worcester's Watts, in the Methodist Protestant, the Presbyterian (Old School), the Connecticut, the Dutch Reformed Church, the Plymouth, and, indeed, in nearly all the Collections that adopt the hymn as it is given in the left hand column above. Many admirers of Toplady seem to reason thus : " *he* was a more gifted lyrist than his successors ; *therefore* his version is superior: the origi-

nal is always better than the altered form ; his is the original ; therefore it is the preferable one." But so far as we can ascertain, Toplady did not publish this hymn until 1776, and the hymn is found as early as 1755, in a little tract entitled "Hymns for New Years' Day," containing only seven odes, and all of them by Charles Wesley. Toplady *altered* the hymn, and published it *as modified*. Some of his admirers, then, must reason thus : "Toplady was superior to Wesley ; therefore his version of this hymn is to be preferred to Wesley's : the original is always superior to the altered form ; therefore Wesley's *first* draught must be preferred to Toplady's *second*." The Sabbath Hymn Book has rejected seven, and adopted only three of the ten changes made by Toplady, and has omitted (as several other manuals have done) the fourth and fifth of Wesley's stanzas. But an advocate for the original readings has condemned the Sabbath Hymn Book, because it has "omitted" these twelve of the original thirty-six lines, and has "altered" the hymn ; and then the reviewer adds : two of the stanzas are "*most unpoetically transposed*. By a curious coincidence the genius of Toplady is again the victim." It is indeed curious. But the transpositions are all on the other side. The Sabbath Hymn Book rejects the transpositions made by the "genius of Toplady," and it holds fast seven of the ten phrases given up by that genius, and excludes seven of his interpolated words, which are now called superior, because original ! This is one of a hundred instances in which we believe that a verse is admirable, when we imagine it to have come from a favorite lyrist, but if that same good come out of Nazareth, it is a root out of a dry ground.

§ 10. *Changes in the Text, as affecting its Biblical and Evangelical Character.*

"We must have versifications of all the Psalms, because our hymn books must be modelled after the Bible." This is a common plea. It is an extravagant expression of a great truth. Our hymn books *must* be conformed to the standard

of the inspired word. A *sacred* song becomes, often, the more poetical by becoming more biblical. The word of God has in, and around, itself a *poetic* association. When a hymn is transformed from its mere human to a divine idiom, it is restored to its proper original. If there come forth an aroma from the very name of Watts, there comes a still more fragrant incense from the name of David. If there be a kind of poetry in the mere fact that a phrase has been sanctioned by Reginald Heber and Henry Kirke White; yet more, that it has been sanctified by Isaiah or Jeremiah. A profound emotion is often excited, by the sudden out-breaking of an inspired thought or phrase from the human song. The Bible, too, is our standard of sentiment, as well as style, and it is often an advantage to see that our poetry is the exact expression of revealed science. "Show thy *reconciling* face," is not only more poetical, but more instructive and biblical than "Show thy *reconciled* face,"¹ as, in the scriptures, God is repeatedly affirmed to "reconcile" men to himself; never, to be "reconciled" to men.

In such changes as the following, the biblical language is more nearly retained, by altering the phrases of the hymn.

ORIGINAL FORM.	SABBATH HYMN BOOK.
<i>What's man, say I, Lord, that Thou lov'st</i> To keep him in thy mind?	<i>Hymn 170.</i> <i>Lord, what is man, that thou shouldst deign</i> To bear him in thy mind?
Thy friendly <i>crook</i> shall give me aid.	<i>Hymn 219.</i> Thy friendly <i>rod</i> shall give me aid.
The <i>med'cine</i> of my broken heart.	<i>Hymn 253.</i> The <i>healing</i> of my broken heart.
Till Christ, with his reviving light, Over our souls arise.	<i>Hymn 312.</i> Till Christ, with his reviving light, <i>Upon</i> our souls arise.
Nor in thy righteous anger swear, T'exclude me from thy people's rest.	<i>Hymn 461.</i> Nor in thy righteous anger swear <i>I shall not see</i> thy people's rest.
Mark and revenge iniquity.	<i>Hymn 600.</i> <i>Be strict to mark</i> iniquity.

¹ Sabbath Hymn Book, Hymn 55. See also Presbyterian (O. S.) Collection.

ORIGINAL FORM.

A fane unbuilt by hands.

*Being of beings ! may our praise
Thy courts with grateful fragrance fill.*

Sweet cherubs learn Immanuel's name.

The *antidote* of death.

Fanned by some *angel's purple* wing.

"The Lord has risen indeed :
Then hell has lost its prey."

Jesus, our Lord, *arise !*
Scatter our enemies
And make them fall.

Up to the Lord our *flesh* shall fly.

That were a *present* far too small.

The *Patron* of mankind appears.

Come, at the *shrine of God* fervently kneel.

Where is, O Grave ! thy victory now ?
And where, insidious *Death*, thy sting ?

Say "Live forever, wondrous king :
Born to redeem and strong to save !
Then ask the monster, where's his sting,
And *where's* thy victory, boasting grave ?

Nor leave thy *sacred* seat.

And, midst th' *embraces of his God*.

Thy *sacramental* cup I'll take.

Oh bid us turn, *Almighty Lord !*

Erect your heads, eternal gates.

SABBATH HYMN BOOK.

Hymn 1038.

A house not made by hands.

*Lord God of hosts ! oh ! may our praise
Thy courts with grateful incense fill.*

Bright seraphs learn Immanuel's name.

The *conqueror* of death.

Fanned by some *guardian angel's* wing.

The Lord is risen indeed :
The grave has lost its prey.

Hymn 474.

Jesus, our Lord. *descend ;*
From all our foes defend :
Nor let us fall.

Hymn 1210.

Up to the Lord our *souls* shall fly.

Hymn 316.

That were an *offering* far too small.

Hymn 855.

The *Guardian* of mankind appears.

Hymn 952.

Come to the *mercy-seat*, fervently kneel.

Hymn 1193.

O Grave, where is thy victory now ?
And where, *O Death, where is* thy sting ?

Hymn 388.

Say, "Live forever, *glorious King,*
Born to redeem, and strong to save ;
Where now, O Death, where is thy sting ?
And *where's* thy victory, boasting grave ?

Nor leave thy *mercy* seat.

Hymn 873.

And, in the *Father's bosom* blest.

Salvation's sacred cup I'll take.

Oh turn us, turn us, *mighty Lord !*

Hymn 363.

Lift up your heads, eternal gates.

There are many hymns which, if they do not become more biblical in language, yet become more biblical, or at least more evangelical in sentiment and spirit, by slight modifi-

cations of their style. Sometimes they contain phrases of classical but pagan origin; sometimes, of the fashionable secular poetry; sometimes, of economical prose; which may well be exchanged for phrases more intimately associated with the Gospel.

ORIGINAL FORM.

He rears his *red right* arm on high,
And *ruin bares* the sword.

The *muse* stands trembling while she
sings.

Chained to his throne a volume lies.

Go, return, immortal Saviour!

He bids his *plasts* the fields deform;
Then, when his thunders cease,
He *sits like an angel* 'mid the storm,
And *smiles* the winds to peace.

The king of terrors, then, would be
A welcome messenger to me,
That bids me come away:
Unclogged by earth or earthly things,
I'd mount *upon his sable wings*
To everlasting day.

ALTERED FORM.

He rears his *mighty* arm on high,
They fall before his sword.

My soul stands trembling while she
sings.

Before his throne a volume lies.

Reäscend, immortal Saviour!

He bids his *gales* the fields deform;
Then, when his thunders cease,
He *paints his rainbow* on the storm,
And *lulls* the winds to peace.

The king of terrors, then, would be
A welcome messenger to me,
To bid me come away:
Unclogged by earth or earthly things,
I'd mount, *I'd fly* with eager wings,
To everlasting day.

It is indeed a biblical truth that there are evil spirits, and that incorrigible men will be consigned to "everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." But the Bible does not inform us of the unrenewed soul, that "*devils plunge it down to hell.*" This line of Dr. Watts produces an impression more exactly biblical, and better adapted to the spirit of sacred harmony, if it be modified, at least as much as in the Sabbath Hymn Book, H. 1172:

Up to the courts where angels dwell,
It [the soul] mounts triumphant there,
Or *plunges guilty* down to hell
In infinite despair.

Hymnologists have differed among themselves with regard to the propriety of the line: "When God the mighty Maker died."¹ The Connecticut Hymn Book has written it:

¹ An old German hymn contains the couplet:

O welcher noth
Gott selbst ist todt.

"When Christ, the Lord of glory died." The Church Psalmody has: "When Christ th' almighty Saviour died." Others have: "When Christ, the mighty Saviour died," or "When the almighty Saviour died," or "When Christ, the mighty Maker died." The line is thus changed, because it is said to be unscriptural, as well as revolting, to speak of the death of God. Others contend that the idea is scriptural, and they refer to the passage (of which there are various readings, however), "Feed the church of *God*, which *he* hath purchased with *his own* blood;" Acts 20:28. But the contested line of Watts has become endeared to so many Christians, and is so carefully inwrought into the inmost texture of his celebrated Hymn (the ninth of his second book), that it is probably safer to retain it, even although it is repugnant to the tastes of a large, and certainly an honored, minority of those who use it. A similar reason exists for retaining the lines, "Beheld our rising God," and "The rising God forsakes the tomb," in the Sabbath Hymn Book, Hymns 59, 358. Still there can be no doubt, that the ordinary style of the Bible is to represent *Christ*, rather than *God* as dying; just as it represents God, and not the son of Mary, as eternal. The usual style of the Bible then is more exactly represented by the lines:

"Oh, the sweet wonders of that cross
Where *my Redeemer* loved and died;" — (*Hymn* 348).

than by the original lines of Watts:

"Oh, the sweet wonders of that cross,
Where *God the Saviour* loved and died."

One of Dr. Watts's deeply affecting hymns begins thus: "Here at thy cross, my *dying* God." The Presbyterian Old School Collection modifies the line: "Here at thy cross, *incarnate* God." The Sabbath Hymn Book substitutes the words, "my gracious Lord." In the fourth stanza of the hymn, Watts wrote:

Hosanna to my *dying* God,
And my best honors to his name.

The Presbyterian Old School Collection expunges *dying* and supplies its place by "Saviour." The Sabbath Hymn Book has :

Hosanna to my *Saviour* God,
And *loudest* praises to his name.

Whatever of doubt may linger in any mind with regard to the wisdom of these changes, there can be none with regard to the impropriety of such stanzas as those of Watts, Book I. 13 :

"This infant is the mighty God,
Come to be suckled and adored."

Dr. Worcester omitted this couplet from his Christian Psalmody, but felt compelled to insert it in his Worcester's Watts.

We are accustomed to the biblical phrases: Christ will *draw* all men unto him, the Father *draws* his children to him; but we are not so much wonted to the phrase, that God *forces* us to become his friends. Therefore, it is more agreeable to the inspired idiom to celebrate the love "That sweetly *drew* us in," than the love "That sweetly *forced* us in;" see Sabbath Hymn Book, Hymn 1055.

§ 11. *Alterations in the Text, as affecting its Dignity.*

"Lift up thy feet, and march in haste." This is the call sent up to Jehovah in the seventy-fourth of Dr. Watts's Psalms. It is made more harmonious to an occidental ear, by an alteration in the Church Psalmist:¹ "Oh, come to our relief in haste." It is defended by some as an imitation of the old Hebrew Psalm 74:3. But this may be translated: "Lift thy steps to the perpetual ruins." Besides, if our English version were the only accurate one: "Lift up thy feet unto the perpetual desolations," it would not justify the paraphrase of Watts. There are inspired words, which ought not to be repeated except with literal

¹ Presbyterian (New School) Hymn Book, Ps. 74.

exactness. This version of Watts is one example, there are many far more faulty instances, proving that in the heat of the first composition, an author sometimes neglects, if he does not despise, that elevated manner, which, even when dependent on the *minutiae* of rhetoric, is singularly conducive to the great ends of worship. A change so insignificant as that of the familiar, for the solemn style, will often elevate a domestic song into a sacred hymn, a stirring lyric into a solemn prayer. "To what a stubborn frame, *Hath* sin reduced our mind," is a more dignified couplet than the original "*Has* sin," etc. A mother, retiring from her household for her twilight devotion, may well sing, "I love to steal awhile away, From *little ones* and care;" but when she prepares these lines for the sanctuary, she may exalt them by saying, "From *every cumbering* care." Dr. Watts, in view of death, addresses his Saviour thus: "Scarce shall I feel death's cold embrace, If Christ be in my arms." The Presbyterian (N. S.) Hymn Book has made the line less indecorous by changing it thus: "While in the Saviour's arms." Many a hymn composed for the seclusion of private thought, has admitted commonplaces which need to be transformed into more select idioms, when that same hymn is transferred from the closet to the temple. The persecuted Madame Guyon wrote in a familiar way:

*"My Love, how full of sweet content
I pass my years of banishment!"*

but in the assembly of worshippers at the house of God, it is more appropriate to sing,

*"O Lord, how full of sweet content
Our years of pilgrimage are spent!"*¹

A favorite hymn of Watts,² begins with the stanza:

*He dies, the Heavenly Lover dies!
The tidings strike a doleful sound
On my poor heart-strings: deep he lies
In the cold caverns of the ground.*

¹ Sabbath Hymn Book, Hymn 140.

² Ibid., Hymn 358.

But there is a greater majesty, as well as a delicate and biblical propriety, in the stanza as thus transformed by Wesley :

He dies ! the *Friend of sinners* dies ;
Lo ! Salem's daughters weep around :
A solemn darkness veils the skies ;
A sudden trembling shakes the ground.

So in the following instances, there is either a familiarity or an uncouthness which may fitly give place to a more elevated style :

ORIGINAL FORM.	SABBATH HYMN BOOK.
When <i>he</i> , dear Lord, will bring me home.	<i>Hymn 433.</i> When my dear Lord will bring me home.
<i>I yield to thy dear conquering arms.</i>	<i>Hymn 435.</i> <i>Incarnate God ! now to thine arms.</i>
<i>Sweet Jesus ! every smile of thine.</i>	<i>Hymn 1252.</i> <i>My Saviour ! every smile of thine.</i>
<i>O dear almighty Lord.</i>	<i>Hymn 440.</i> <i>O thou almighty Lord.</i>
Jesus ! my Shepherd, <i>Husband</i> , Friend.	<i>Hymn 441.</i> Jesus, my Shepherd, <i>Guardian</i> , Friend.
Shepherd, Brother, <i>Husband</i> , Friend.	<i>Hymn 442.</i> Shepherd, Brother, <i>Lord and</i> Friend.
Oh, that I could forever sit With <i>Mary</i> , at the <i>Master's</i> feet. (Wesley.)	<i>Hymn 703.</i> Oh that I could forever sit In transport, at my <i>Saviour's</i> feet.
Oh that I could forever dwell With <i>Mary</i> , at my <i>Saviour's</i> feet. (Dr. Reed.)	<i>Hymn 788.</i> Oh that I could forever dwell Delighted at the <i>Saviour's</i> feet.
While his [God's] <i>left hand</i> my head sustains.	<i>Hymn 886.</i> While he my <i>sinking head</i> sustains.
Here speaks the Comforter, in <i>God's</i> <i>name</i> , saying.	<i>Hymn 952.</i> Here speaks the Comforter, <i>tenderly</i> saying.
And breaks the <i>cursed</i> chain.	<i>Hymn 312.</i> And breaks <i>th'</i> <i>accursed</i> chain.
By power oppressed, and mocked by pride, — <i>O God !</i> is this the crucified ?	<i>Hymn 1267.</i> By power oppressed, and mocked by pride, — <i>The Nazarene</i> , the crucified.

ORIGINAL FORM.

*Things of precious Christ he took,
Gave us hearts and eyes to look.*

*Meet it is that we should own,
What thy grace has done for us.
Saved we are by grace alone;
And we joy to have it thus.*

*My soul doth long, and almost die,
Thy courts, O Lord, to see.*

He shall be damned, who wont believe.

*Uphold thou me, and I shall stand,
Fight, and I shall prevail.*

*Such peace as reason never planned,
As worldlings never knew.*

*I want a principle within
Of jealous, godly, fear.
A sensibility to sin,
A pain to feel it near.*

*I want that grace that springs from thee.
(Cowper.)*

*And when his saints complain,
It sha'n't be said. etc.*

From now my weary soul release.

Oft abused Thee to thy face.

SABBATH HYMN BOOK.

*Filled our minds with grief and fear,
Brought the precious Saviour near.*

Hymn 1007.

*Joyful are we now to own,
Rapture thrills us, as we trace
All the deeds thy love has done,
All the riches of thy grace.*

Hymn 13.

*My soul doth long, and fainting sigh,
Thy courts, O Lord, to see.*

Hymn 1135.

And they condemned who disbelieve.

Hymn 1237.

*Uphold thou me, and I shall stand,
Help, and I shall prevail.*

*Such peace as reason never planned,
Nor sinners ever knew.*

Hymn 635.

*Oh for a principle within,
Of jealous, godly fear;
Oh for a tender dread of sin,
A pain to feel it near.*

Hymn 708.

*Oh for that grace which springs from
thee.*

Hymn 1034.

*Nor when his saints complain,
Shall it be said, etc.*

Hymn 461.

O Lord, my weary soul release.

Hymn 592.

Oft have sinned before thy face.

§ 12. *Changes in the Text, as affecting its Vivacity.*

“ There is no other name than thine,” “ O speak of Jesus,”
“ I lay my sins on Jesus,” “ O gift of gifts, O Grace of
Faith,” “ 'Tis not that I did choose thee,” “ Oh where is
he that trod the sea,” “ Come, let us sing the song of songs,”
“ I've found the pearl of greatest price,” “ There is laid up
for me a crown,” “ Thou must go forth alone, my soul,”
“ That solemn hour will come for me,” “ Gently, my Saviour,

let me down," "No, no, it is not dying," "I love thee, O my God," "Jesus, the very thought of thee," "Thy mighty working, mighty God," "Oft in sorrow, oft in woe," "Stand up, stand up for Jesus," "Oh where are kings and empires now,"¹—as we listen to the ring of the true metal in lyrics like these, we long for the day when men will be allured to the sanctuary by the liveliness of the song, and the heartiness with which the whole assembly offer it to the Lord. We are confident that often the vivacity of hymns has been impaired by so altering them, as to secure some other excellence. In aiming at one perfection, critics have, here and there, sacrificed a different and a higher one. The allegation is not true, however, that the changes in our psalmody have always been intended to improve its musical adaptation, at the expense of its poetic liveliness. Certainly this has not been the design of such changes as "*Swift on the wings of time it flies*," for "*On all the wings of time it flies*;" "*Wide let the earth resound the deeds*;" for "*Let the wide earth resound the deeds*;" "*Come let us bow before his feet*," for "*Now we may bow before his feet*." Instead of deadening our psalmody, wise alterations will enliven it. Many hymns, frequently those of Doddridge, gain a new animation by so slight a change as that of a masculine or feminine, for a neuter pronoun; a singular for a plural noun; the present for the past tense, thus:

ORIGINAL FORM.

Still would my spirit rest on thee,
Its Saviour and its God.

Till love dissolves my inmost soul,
At its Redeemer's feet.

And tell the boldest *foes* without
That Jesus reigns within.

God of my life through all *its* days.

SABBATH HYMN BOOK.

Hymn 736.

Still would my spirit rest on thee,
My Saviour and *my* God.

Hymn 736.

Till love dissolves my inmost soul,
At *my* Redeemer's feet.

Hymn 736.

And tell the boldest *foe* without
That Jesus reigns within.

Hymn 961.

God of my life through all *my* days.

¹ Sabbath Hymn Book, 302, 434, 746, 240, 297, 339, 439, 753, 1173, 1174, 1183, 1177, 681, 687, 1154, 896, 902, 1038.

ORIGINAL FORM.

When death o'er nature shall prevail,
And all *its* powers of language fail.

In wild dismay | *Fell* to the ground
The guard around | And *sunk* away.

SABBATH HYMN BOOK.

Hymn 961.

When death o'er nature shall prevail,
And all *my* powers of language fail.

Hymn 356.

In wild dismay | *Fall* to the ground
The guard around | And *sink* away.

It is an interesting fact, that the same excellences which augment the solemnity of worship, may also favor its vivacity. While they prevent giddiness they promote liveliness. The *prayer* is more animating than the *history*; the personal appeal, than the instructive comment. Dr. Watts wrote the inimitable poem, "*Keep silence all created things*," in twelve stanzas, not designed at first for public worship, but now adapted to the sanctuary by omitting a third or half of its verses. As thus accommodated we often find the animated prayer, "My God, I *would not long* to see my fate with curious eyes." But in the original, we have the more biographical and less precativè announcement, "My God, I *never longed* to see, etc.

The following Hymn of Doddridge becomes the more inspiring, when it is felt to be our own *present* utterance in relation to *present* scenes; our united expression of what *is*, rather than an individual and historical narrative of what *was*.

THE PRIVATE POEM.

My Helper God! I bless *his* name:
The same *his* power, *his* Grace the same.
The tokens of *his* friendly care,
Open, and crown, and close the year.

I 'midst ten thousand dangers stand,
Supported by *his* guardian hand;
And see, when *I* survey my ways,
Ten thousand monuments of praise.

Thus far *his* arm, hath led me on;
Thus far *I* make *his* mercy known;
And while *I* tread this desert land,
New mercies shall new songs demand.

My grateful soul, on Jordan's shore,
Shall raise one sacred pillar more;
Then bear in *his* bright courts above,
Inscriptions of immortal love.

THE GENERAL HYMN.¹

Our Helper God! we bless *thy* name,
The same *thy* power, *thy* Grace the same;
The tokens of *thy* loving care
Open and crown and close the year.

Amid ten thousand snares we stand,
Supported by *thy* guardian hand;
And see, when *we* survey *our* ways,
Ten thousand monuments of praise.

Thus far *thine* arm hath led us on;
Thus far *we* make *thy* mercy known;
And while *we* tread this desert land,
New mercies shall new songs demand.

Our grateful souls on Jordan's shore,
Shall raise one sacred pillar more;
Then bear in *thy* bright courts above,
Inscriptions of immortal love.

¹ See Sabbath Hymn Book, Hymn 1151. The same is found in the Presbyterian (N. S.) Collection, and with different modifications in "Hymns for the Church of Christ," compiled by Drs. Hedge and Huntington.

Sometimes the vivacity of a hymn is increased, by changing its measure from the long to the common. The common metre is more permanently enlivening, than any other. Hence it is the prevailing measure of the old English ballad. By repeating several times continuously a stanza in the long metre (having four lines each of them divided into eight syllables, four feet), and then immediately repeating a stanza of the common metre (having four lines, of which the first and third have four feet, eight syllables, and the second and fourth have only three feet, six syllables), we cannot fail to notice the superior ease, elasticity, liveliness of the more varied measure. Let the experiment be tried on the simple letters of the alphabet, arranged in Iambic feet, and by frequent repetition of them, especially with music, we soon become wearied with the long drawn monotony of the one measure, and are suddenly relieved by the quicker, more flexile movement of the other. We are aware that the sentiment of some hymns requires the majestic and uniform rhythm of the old hundredth psalm. "Not to the mount that burned with flame," "Lord, my weak thought in vain would climb," "Thee we adore, eternal Lord," are the first lines of hymns too majestic for the measure of the English ballad. But the sentiment of many other hymns is more congenially expressed in that ballad form. For instance, the eighteenth psalm of Tate and Brady, contains forty-four stanzas in long metre, of which four are ordinarily extracted for a modern hymn. The following are the four stanzas, and in a parallel column are the same in the more quickening measure :¹

ORIGINAL FORM.

No change of *times* shall ever shock
 My *firm* affection, Lord, to thee ;
 For thou hast always been my rock,
 A *fortress* and defense to me.

ALTERED FORM.

No change of time shall ever shock
 My trust, O Lord, in thee ;
 For thou hast always been my Rock,
 A sure defense to me.

¹ The altered form is found in the Sabbath Hymn Book, H. 669. Substantially the same alterations are in the Psalmist, the popular Hymn Book of the Baptists, also in the Church Psalmody, and other collections. For similar changes of metre in the Connecticut Collection, see Psalm 93, second version ; also Hymn 319.

ORIGINAL FORM.

Thou my deliverer art, my God ;
 My trust is in thy mighty power ;
 Thou art my shield from foes abroad,
At home, my safeguard and my tower.

To thee *I will* address my prayer,
 To whom all praise *we justly* owe ;
 So shall *I*, by thy watchful care,
Be guarded from my treach'rous foe.

Who then deserves to be adored
 But God, on whom my hopes depend ;
 Or, who, except the mighty Lord,
 Can with resistless power defend ?

ALTERED FORM.

Thou my deliv'rer art, O God ;
 My trust is in thy power ;
 Thou art my shield from foes abroad,
My safeguard, and my tower.

To thee *will I* address my prayer,
 To whom all praise *I* owe ;
 So shall *I*, by thy watchful care,
Be saved from every foe.

Then let Jehovah be adored,
 On whom my hopes depend ;
 For who, except the mighty Lord,
His people can defend ?

A favorite hymn in six stanzas by William Bengo Collier has been reduced to four stanzas, and also pruned of its superfluous words, and in becoming more concise, has taken a movement more rapid, and more appropriate to the stirring sentiment of the lines :

ORIGINAL FORM.

Return, O wanderer, return !
 He *heard* thy deep repentant sigh ;
 He *saw* thy softened spirit mourn,
 When no intruding ear was nigh.

Return, O wanderer, return,
 And wipe away the falling tear ;
 'Tis God who says, no longer mourn ;
 'Tis mercy's voice invites thee near.

CHURCH PSALMODY.

Hymn 263.

Return, O wanderer, *now* return !
 He *hears* thy humble sigh ;
 He *sees* thy softened spirit mourn,
 When no one else is nigh.

Return, O wanderer, *now* return,
 And wipe the falling tear !
 Thy Father calls — no longer mourn :
 'Tis love invites thee near.¹

In like manner, a hymn of Swain, "*Firmly* I stand on Zion's mount," "The lofty hills and *stately* towers," "The vaulted Heavens shall melt away," was reduced by the editors of the Connecticut Collection from the common to the short metre by simply omitting the words "*firmly*" and "*stately*," and changing *melt away* into "*fall*." Is not the change vivifying ? Compare Sabbath Hymn Book, Hymn 681, with Church Psalmody, Hymn 429.

The old English ballad metre not only gives to some hymns more vivacity than they would have in the stately

¹ The adverb "*now*" is inserted in the first line of each stanza, because the word "wanderer" is in fact ordinarily *sung* with only two syllables, and has a drawling sound when *sung* with three. The Psalmist, edited by Rev. Dr. Baron Stowe, and by Rev. S. F. Smith, avoids this trisyllabic utterance of "wanderer," so tedious in song, by substituting the words: "Return, my wandering soul, return."

march of four uniform feet, but it also sometimes makes their style less flaunting, and more appropriate to the worship of God. The majestic hymn of Mrs. Barbauld, "When as returns this solemn day,"¹ if used as a poem to be *read*, should not be reduced to the common metre; but when it is sung in the solemn assembly, there is a greater chasteness, a more modest reverence, more sober earnestness in the lines: "Shall clouds of incense rise;" "The costly sacrifice;" "Thine offerings well may spare;" than in the original lines: "Shall *curling* clouds of incense rise;" "The costly *pomp* of sacrifice;" "Thy *golden* offerings well may spare."

"Praise to the Spirit *Paraclete*;" "Above the *ruinable* skies;" "Sweet *lenitive* of grief and care;" "In all the *plenitude* of grace;" "Be universal honors paid, *Coëqual* honors done;" "Their *name* of earthly gods is vain;" "An *instantaneous* night;" "Thou dwellest in *self-existent* light;" "With *serious industry* and fear;" "Ye *dangerous inmates*, hence depart;" "Tell me, *Radiancy* divine;" "Unmeasurably high;" "T' *invigorate* my faint desires;" "Ye *specious* baits of sense;" "With *diligence* may I pursue;" — all verses like the above, containing long, Greek, Latin, abstract, or prosaic words, tend to benumb a lyric, and may sometimes be made more vivid by modifications like the following:

ORIGINAL FORM.

Great God ! I would not ask to see
What *my futurity* shall be.

Jesus *dissipates* its gloom.

Dark and cheerless is the morn
Unaccompanied by thee.

Oh, sweetly *influence* every breast.

Should I, to gain the world's applause,
Or to escape its harmless frown,
Refuse to *countenance* thy cause.
The captive surety now is freed.
Thine *obvious* glory shine.

SABBATH HYMN BOOK.

Hymn 234.

Great God ! I would not ask to see
What in my *coming life* shall be.

Hymn 360.

Jesus *scatters* all its gloom.

Hymn 425.

Dark and cheerless is the morn,
If thy light is hid from me.

Hymn 531.

Oh, sweetly *reign* in every breast.

Hymn 802.

Should I, to gain the world's applause,
Or to escape its harmless frown,
Refuse to *love and plead* thy cause.
Now is the mighty captive freed.
Thy *power* and glory shine.

¹ Sabbath Hymn Book, Hymn 41.

§ 13. *Changes in the Text, as affecting its neatness.*

While the words chosen in the fervor of original composition, are apt to be more vivid than those which the critic substitutes for them ; yet, on the other hand, the liveliness of a hymn is often gained at the expense of its neatness. There are graces of style, there are delicate niceties of structure, which are overlooked in the onward march of the first composition. They may be supplied in the critical review. Often the neatness of a hymn may be promoted by even a *literal* change in its phraseology. Why need the most punctilious opponent of alterations in the text, forbid our singing : “ And bends his footsteps *downward* too,” “ Our soaring spirits *upward* rise,” “ *Upward*, Lord, our spirits raise,” instead of “ *upwards* ” and “ *downwards*,” as in the original ? What harm to the rights of authorship will come from our singing : “ Wonder and *joy* shall tune my heart,” instead of the original, “ *joys*.” It is certainly neater to say :

“ In thee I shall conquer by flood and by field,
Jehovah my anchor, Jehovah my shield.”—SAB. H. B. 1006.

than to mingle the incongruous metaphors :

“ In thee I shall conquer by flood and by field,
My cable, my anchor, my breast-plate, my shield.”

Sometimes the want of chasteness in the style of a hymn, calls away the attention from its religious aim ; and the mind is repelled, by disagreeable associations, into a train of thought uncongenial with worship. The following instances will suggest others of a still more objectionable character.

ORIGINAL FORM.

And on the *eye-balls* of the blind
To pour celestial day.

His heart is made of tenderness,
His *bowels* melt with love.

Oh, let thy *bowels* answer me.

My *bowels* yearn o'er dying men.

SABBATH HYMN BOOK.

Hymn 274.

And, on the *eyes long closed* in night,
To pour celestial day.

Hymn 424.

His heart is made of tenderness, —
It *melts* with *pitying* love.

Oh, let thy *mercy* answer me.

Hymn 547.

My *spirit* yearns o'er dying men.

ORIGINAL FORM.

And dances his glad heart for joy.

*A moment give a loose to grief :
Let grateful sorrows rise ;
And wash the bloody stains away
With torrents from your eyes.*

*Then will the angels clap their wings
And bear the news above.*

*I lay my soul beneath thy love :
Beneath the droppings of thy blood,
Jesus, nor shall it e'er remove.*

*My God, my God ! on thee I call ;
Thee only would I know ;
One drop of blood on me let fall,
And wash me white as snow.*

H K. White's Hymn on the Resurrection.
*And the long-silent dust shall burst
With shouts of endless praise.*

*Why should we tremble to convey
Their bodies to the tomb ?
There the dear flesh of Jesus lay,
And left a long perfume.*

And there's no weeping there.

To snatch me from eternal death.

And thy rebellious worm is still.

Behold the gaping tomb.

In the dear bosom of his love.

*Those wandering cisterns [clouds] in the sky,
Borne by the winds around,
With ventry treasures well supply
The furrows of the ground.*

*The thirsty ridges drink their fill,
And ranks of corn appear ;
Thy ways abound with blessings still,
Thy goodness crowns the year.*

SABBATH HYMN BOOK.

Hymn 318.

And bounds his gladdened heart with joy.

Hymn 359.

*A moment now indulge your grief :
Let grateful sorrows rise ;
And wash the crimson stains away,
With torrents from your eyes.*

Hymn 516.

*Then will the angels swiftly fly
To bear the news above.*

Hymn 566.

*I lay my soul beneath thy love :
Oh, cleanse me with atoning blood,
Nor let me from thy feet remove.*

Hymn 705.

*My God, my God ! to thee I cry ;
Thee only would I know :
Thy purifying blood apply,
And wash me white as snow.*

Hy. 1276 (see, also, Conn Hy. Bk., h. 396).
*And the long-silent voice awakes,
With shouts of endless praise.*

Hymn 1210.

*Why should we tremble to convey
Their bodies to the tomb ?
There the dear flesh of Jesus lay,
There hopes unfading bloom.*

Hymn 286.

And weeping is not there.

Hymn 725.

To save me from eternal death.

Hymn 780.

And thy rebellious child is still.

Hymn 1180.

Behold the opening tomb.

Hymn 882.

Safe in the bosom of his love.

Hymn 1150.

*Thy showers the thirsty furrows fill ;
And ranks of corn appear ;
Thy ways abound with blessings still —
Thy goodness crowns the year.*

ORIGINAL FORM.

Come, ye sinners, poor and wretched,
Weak and wounded, sick and sore.

May purge our souls from *sense* and sin.

Compelled by bleeding love,
Ye wandering sheep, draw near;
Christ calls you from above,
His charming accents hear.
Let whosoever will now come,
In *mercy's* breast there still is room.

And though his arm be strong to smite,
'*Tis* also strong to save.

Wait thou his time; *so shall this* night
Soon end in *joyous* day.

SABBATH HYMN BOOK.

Hymn 518. (2 Cor. 6:2)

Come, ye sinners, poor and wretched,
This is your accepted hour:

Hymn 1002.

May *purify* our souls from sin.

Hymn 524.

Drawn by his bleeding love,
Ye wand'ring sheep, draw near;
Christ calls you from above;
The Shepherd's voice now hear.
Let whosoever will now come;
In *Jesus' arms* there still is room.

Hymn 585.

His arm, though it be strong to smite,
Is also strong to save.

Hymn 676.

Wait thou his time; *the darkest* night
Shall end in *brightest* day.

It is often objected that we make a hymn feeble by making it neat. The attempt to prune it of its rank growth, results in destroying its masculine vigor. But a song may be energetic, and yet chaste in its diction. Indeed, an immodest or extravagant air is often fatal to the manly robustness of a sacred lyric. The strength of it is impaired, when it contains any word which dissipates the thoughts of the singer by awakening a suspicion of excess or wildness in the poet. There is a degree of soberness which is the hiding of the Christian lyricist's power. The line of Mrs. Steele, "*Tremendous judgments from thy hand,*" is not so forcible as the altered line, "*Dark frowning judgments from thy hand*" (Sabbath Hymn Book, H. 1118). It is very true that some of the alterations made for the beauty of a hymn may interfere with its energy. Some of them may mitigate the force of a *single line*, by toning down its boisterous spirit, while the power of the entire hymn is heightened, by giving a more considerate meaning to its violent words. Some of the changes in the Presbyterian Old School Collection are tamer than they need be;

still they augment the general impressiveness of the lyrics which contain them; thus

ORIGINAL FORM.

Watts, 6th Psalm.

In anger, Lord, rebuke me not,
Withdraw the dreadful storm,
Nor let thy fury grow so hot
Against a feeble worm.

Watts, 9th Psalm, also 99th.

And make his vengeance known.

Watts, 11th Hymn.

On impious wretches he shall rain
Tempests of brimstone, fire and death.

PRESBYTERIAN O. S. HYMN BOOK.

In anger, Lord, do not chastise,
Withdraw the dreadful storm,
Nor let thine awful wrath arise
Against a feeble worm.

And make his justice known.

On impious wretches he will rain,
Sulphureous flames of wasting death.

§ 14. *Changes in the Text, as Affecting its Vigor.*

The great evil in the alteration of hymns, consists in its lessening their energy. It is better that they be forceful and rough, than "coldly correct and critically dull." Nothing but a taste well cultivated, can determine when to leave an extravagant phrase in its pristine wildness, and when to chasten it. But we err, if we suppose that all the changes in a hymn are designed to augment its refinement and delicacy. Some of them are intended to invigorate its more languid phrases. When we are singing of *God*, we form a weaker conception of his omniscience, if we say, with Watts, that he "*often*" looks down upon our dust, than if we say, as in the Sabbath Hymn Book, H. 1274,

God, my Redeemer, lives,
And ever from the skies
Looks down and watches all my dust,
Till he shall bid it rise.

Injudicious criticisms are often made on an alteration of lyrical phrases, because it suggests no one *prominent* reason in its favor. But in fact there may be several different reasons combined in its behalf; as in the following instances, where vigor is one of the attributes gained in the change:

ORIGINAL FORM.

The joy and labor of their tongue.

O mem'ry ! leave no other name [than
Christ's].
So deeply graven there.

Our cautioned souls prepare.

Jesus ! in that important hour.

To Jesus, our superior King.

Atoned for sins which we had done.

And hence our hopes arise.

Creatures as numerous as they be.

I urge no merits of my own,
For I, alas ! am all that's vile.

Come, humble sinner.

His the fight, the arduous toil.

Grant that we, too, may go.

No cloud those blissful regions know,
Forever bright and fair.

No chilling winds or poisonous breath,
Can reach that healthful shore.

Let the whole earth his power confess ;
Let the whole earth adore his grace ;
The Gentile with the Jew shall join
In work and worship so divine.

Stronger his love than death and hell,
Its riches are unspeakable ;
The first-born sons of light
Desire in vain its depths to see ;
They cannot reach the mystery,
And length, and breadth, and height.

SABBATH HYMN BOOK.

Hymn 824.

The joy and triumph of their tongue.

Hymn 1056.

O mem'ry ! leave no other name
But his recorded there.

Hymn 1279.

Our anxious souls prepare.

Hymn 704.

Jesus ! in that momentous hour.

Hymn 325.

To Jesus, our eternal King.

Hymn 310.

Atoned for crimes which we had done.

Hymn 308.

Hence all our hopes arise.

Hymn 118.

Creatures that borrow life from thee.

Hymn 723.

I urge no merits of my own,
No worth to claim thy gracious smile,

Hymn 558.

Come, trembling sinner.

Hymn 380.

His the battle, his the toil.

Hymn 366.

Oh, grant that we may go.

Hymn 1236.

No cloud those blissful regions know —
Realms ever bright and fair.

Hymn 1234.

No chilling winds, no poisonous breath,
Can reach that healthful shore.

Hymn 159.

Let every land his power confess ;
Let all the earth adore his grace ;
My heart and tongue with rapture join,
In work and worship so divine.

Hymn 703.

Stronger his love than death or hell :
No mortal can its riches tell,
Nor first-born sons of light :
In vain they long its depths to see ;
They cannot reach the mystery —
The length, the breadth, the height.

§ 15. *Alterations in the Text, as Affecting its Poetical and Lyrical Character.*

Then seek the Lord betimes, and choose
The ways of heavenly truth ;
The earth affords no lovelier sight
Than a religious youth.

This fourth line suggests a wholesome thought, but is not a *lyrical* ending of a hymn. Yet the excellent Dr. Thomas Gibbons has admitted it as the close of a church lyric. The final verse of a hymn should often condense into itself the whole spirit of the preceding verses ; and, like the rudder of a ship, control all that goes before it.

“ His love hath animating power.”

This is a didactic peroration of an affecting ode by Doddridge. It is a judicious verse, but is not poetry. The hymn will close with a line more in sympathy with all that precedes it, if it be modified in one of the following methods :

“ His work my hoary head shall bless,
When youthful vigor is no more,
And my last hour of life confess
His dying love's constraining power.”
(*Connecticut, and Plymouth, Collections*) ; or,
“ His saving love, his glorious power.”
(*Church Psalmody*) ; or
“ His dying love, his saving power.”
(*Sabbath Hymn Book, Hymn 832.*)

Let the sweet hope that thou art mine,
My life and death attend ;
Thy presence through my journey shine,
And crown my journey's end.
(*Sabbath Hymn Book, Hymn 926.*)

This is the closing line of a hymn by Mrs. Steele. It is like the final tone of an anthem. It appears in all our choicest hymn books. But it is not the line with which her exquisite hymn closed at first. *Her* concluding words were less crowning :

“ And bless us happy end.”

A lyric is that kind of poetry which prompts us to sing. We are not incited to utter in musical cadence, phrases merely instructive; turns of encomical or philosophical discourse. It is more in harmony with the very nature of a lyric to exclaim: "In the cold prison of the tomb, The great Redeemer lay," than "The dead Redeemer lay" (we need not hear that he was deceased, if he was entombed); to sing: "*When in want, or when in wealth,*" than "*Whether then in want or wealth;*" to cry out: "Nor could the bow-ers of Eden give," than "Nor could untainted Eden give." All feeble, stale, hackneyed phrases, like Watts's "Yet I would not be much concerned," "Nor milk nor honey taste so well," may be exchanged for lines better adapted to awaken the spirit of song. The following are specimens of numerous alterations made in one standard Hymn Book, on purely lyrical grounds:

ORIGINAL FORM.

Watts, 105th Psalm.

▲ *little, feeble band.*

Watts, 105th Psalm.

Each some Egyptian spoils had got.

Watts, 107th Psalm.

'Twas the right path to Canaan's ground.

Watts, 107th Psalm.

Who trade in floating ships.

Watts, 112th Psalm.

While envious sinners fret in vain.

Watts, 113th Psalm.

And makes them company for kings.

Watts, 132d Psalm.

Not Aaron in his costly dress,
Made an appearance so divine.

Watts, 132d Psalm.

But we have no such lengths to go,
Nor wander far abroad;
Where'er thy saints assemble now,
There is a house for God.

Watts, 144th Psalm.

Happy the country where the sheep,
Cattle, and corn, have large increase,
Where men securely work or sleep, etc.

Watts, 135th Psalm.

Their gods have tongues that cannot talk.

PRESBYTERIAN O. S. COLLECTION.

A small and feeble band.

Rich with Egyptian spoils they fled.

And brought their tribes to Canaan's
ground.

Who tempt the dangerous way.

While envious sinners rage in vain.

And seats them on the thrones of kings.

Not Aaron in his costly dress,
*Appears so glorious, so divine.*We trace no more those devious ways,
Nor wander far abroad;
Where'er thy people meet for praise,
There is a house for God.Happy the land in culture drest,
Whose flocks and corn have large increase,
Where men securely work or rest, etc.Their gods have tongues that speechless
prove, etc.

Dr. Watts, in more than one hymn, speaks of "wild world;" more vivid than "wide world," to which Dr. Worcester changes it, Bk. ii. 73 and 138. Dr. Watts writes: "We shout with *joyful* tongues;" more animating than "*cheerful* tongues," as written by Dr. Worcester, Bk. ii. 42. "And unbelief *the* spear," is the line of Watts; made less lively by Worcester: "And unbelief *a* spear," Bk. ii. 95. Cowper writes: "And if her faith was firm and *strong*, Had *strong* misgivings too;" which, feeble at best, is still feebler in Worcester's Watts: "Had *some* misgivings too." (Select Hymn, 76.) Dr. Watts writes: "As potter's earthen *work* is broke;" Worcester does not *mend* this line by saying: "As potter's earthen *ware* is broke," Ps. ii. The following alteration is not disrespectful to the Olney Hymns:

John Newton's original.

He himself has *bid thee pray*,
Therefore will not say *thee nay*.

Connecticut and Plymouth Collections.

He himself *invites thee near* —
Bids thee ask him — waits to hear.

The spirit of song often disdains the trammels of a precise philosophy. It flies aloft, and leaves the rules of logic in the low ground of unimpassioned thought. The naked statement of a truth is sometimes poetical; but at other times the truth must be intimated in metaphors, or veiled in some attractive drapery. When the rationalists of the last age gained possession of the German pulpit, they found that the poet had written in their hymn book, concerning the midnight hour: "Now *all* the world is locked in sleep." But this is not philosophical. The earth is round; therefore the rationalists merged the poet's hyperbole into the more undeniable theorem: "Now *half* the world is locked in sleep." The Presbyterian (Old School) Collection of hymns has stumbled at the simple line of Watts, concerning *that* sound which "Bid the new-made *heavens* go round." This line is not true. It falsifies the Copernican system. The "*heavens*" do not go round. Hence that Collection has reduced the poetry of the line to accurate astronomy, thus: "That bid the new-made *world* go round."

On the same principle, the Hymn of Watts: "Once

more, my soul, the rising day," is changed from an expression of lively praise, "To Him that *rolls* the skies," into the more philosophical dictum: "To Him that *rules* the skies." In another instance, however, a scientific line is metamorphosed by the same Presbyterian Collection into the freer poetical form; the poet wrote: "How *most exact* is nature's frame;" the critic has preferred to write: "How *fair and beauteous* nature's frame." The 65th Psalm of Watts affirms that sailors are especially affrighted

"When tempests rage, and billows roar,
At dreadful distance from the shore."

It has been objected that the further off from the shore the sailors are in a tempest, so much the safer are they. But, however this may be in prose, it is not so in poetry. A favorite hymn asserts: "Fire ascending seeks the sun." This is not the fact in *midnight* prose; but shall we therefore qualify the poetic assertion?

If a hymn leaves a decidedly erroneous impression, and is adapted to deprave the moral sentiment by its false doctrine, it should be either omitted or amended. Truth is more essential than poetry. An injurious influence is worse than a prosaic expression. If, however, the hymn does not inculcate an unsound doctrine by its unscientific style; if it merely employ a less technical, or more indirect, or ambiguous phrase, than is demanded by a precise theology, the uses of the hymn require that the old form be retained for the explanation of a didactic hour, rather than that the flow of song be checked by a rigid analytic emendation. We query whether the Presbyterian Old School Manual (Hymn 549,) has at all heightened the moral excellence of Mrs. Steele's stanza, by translating the affectionate words:

"'Tis thine, Almighty Saviour, thine,
To form the heart anew,"

into the more accurate language: "'Tis thine, *Eternal Spirit*, thine," etc. On the other hand, the Connecticut Hymn Book, Hymn 86, has made a more healthful impres-

sion by describing the divine goodness as "*unceasing*," than was made by Doddridge, who represents it as "*redundant*."

While all poetry shrinks from the cold argumentative methods of science, lyrical poetry urges a peculiar demand for the lively, impassioned, stirring diction. In the present state of hymnology, we cannot look for a strict adherence to the rules; still, the rules are admirable which are thus laid down in the Preface to the Church Psalmody (p. vi.):

"Sentences and clauses should contain, as far as is practicable without occasioning a stiff and tedious uniformity, *complete sense in themselves*. A succession of clauses bound together by weak connectives, exhausts the performer, by allowing no opportunity for pausing; while, by multiplying unmeaning words, and keeping the mind too long on the same course, it also wearies the hearer. It contributes greatly to the spirit and force of the hymn, as well as to the ease of the performer, to throw off rapidly, in a concise form, one thought after another, each complete in itself, and with each beginning a new rhetorical clause.

The structure of each stanza should be such that the *mind shall perceive the meaning immediately*. All hypothetical clauses, placed at the beginning, or other clauses containing positions or arguments having reference to some conclusion which is to follow, are to be avoided. They contain no meaning in themselves, and bring nothing before the mind expressive or productive of feeling, till the performer reaches the important words at the close of perhaps the second or fourth line. The only method of wading through such lines, set to music, is for the performer to suspend all thought and feeling, and struggle hard and patiently, till he shall come to the light. The first word should, if possible, express something in itself, and every word should add to it. But, from a spirited clause at the beginning, the mind may derive an impulse which shall carry it through a heavy one that may follow. Clauses, however, which follow the main one, to qualify it, connected by a relative, are always heavy and injurious."

In all our hymn books we can discover many violations of this rule. Prof. B. B. Edwards has cited the following violation, in a manual which is remarkably free from this species of fault.¹

"The 15th Psalm, 2d part of the Church Psalmody, furnishes a specimen of the complex [structure of hymns]. In the second stanza begins a protasis, and the fifth stanza

¹ Writings of Prof. B. B. Edwards, with a Memoir, pp. 143, 144.

contains the apodosis. Thus the second stanza introduces the condition :

The man who walks in pious ways,
And works with righteous hands ;
Who trusts his Maker's promises,
And follows his commands ; —

The third and fourth stanzas continue in the same style, and the last two lines of the fifth introduce the consequence :

His [whose] hands disdain a golden bribe,
And never wrong the poor : —
*This man shall dwell with God on earth,
And find his heaven secure."*

One of the most radical emendations of a church song is that made by Logan on a hymn of Doddridge, and subsequently modified by an English hymnologist.¹ The main superiority of the amended over the original hymn, is the quicker and more direct expression of its thought, the avoidance of the far-separated protasis and apodosis, and also of the apparently *conditional* homage.

ORIGINAL FORM.

O God of Jacob, by whose hand
Thine Israel still is fed,
Who thro' this weary pilgrimage
Hast all our fathers led.

To thee our humble vows we raise,
To thee address our prayer,
And in thy kind and faithful breast
Deposit all our care.

If thou, thro' each perplexing path,
Wilt be our constant guide ;
If thou wilt daily bread supply,
And raiment wilt provide ;

If thou wilt spread thy shield around,
Till these our wand'rings cease,
And at our Father's lov'd abode,
Our souls arrive in peace :

To Thee, as to our Cov'nant God,
We'll our whole selves resign :
And count that not one *tenth* alone,
But all we have is thine.

AMENDED FORM.

O God of Bethel ! by whose hand
Thy people still are fed ;
Who through this weary pilgrimage
Hast all our fathers led ; —

Our vows, our prayers, we now present
Before thy throne of grace ;
God of our fathers ! be the God
Of their succeeding race.

Through each perplexing path of life
Our wandering footsteps guide ;
Give us, each day, our daily bread,
And raiment fit provide.

Oh, spread thy covering wings around,
Till all our wanderings cease,
And at our Father's loved abode,
Our souls arrive in peace.

Such blessings from thy gracious hand
Our humble prayers implore ;
And thou shalt be our chosen God,
Our portion evermore.

¹ Logan's modified emendation is found in the *Sabbath Hymn Book*, H. 216, and in nearly all the recent manuals.

§ 16. *The Adaptation of a Hymn to the State of Mind in Public Worship.*

We are living, we are dwelling,
In a grand and awful time,
In an age on ages telling,
To be living is sublime.
Hark! the waking up of nations,
Gog and Magog to the fray.
Hark! what soundeth? is creation
Groaning for its latter day?

Will ye play, then, will ye dally,
With your music and your wine?
Up! it is Jehovah's rally!
God's own arm hath need of thine.
Hark! the onset! will ye fold your
Faith-clad arms in lazy lock?
Up, O up, thou drowsy soldier;
Worlds are charging to the shock.

Worlds are charging — heaven beholding;
Thou hast but an hour to fight;
Now the blazoned cross unfolding,
On — right onward, for the right.
Oh! let all the soul within you
For the truth's sake go abroad!
Strike! let every nerve and sinew
Tell on ages — tell for God!

This lyric, found in one of our church hymn books, is an excellent illustration of certain principles, easily misunderstood. A song may be vivid, vigorous, highly poetical, and still not church-like in its tone. The statements already made in the 12th, 14th, and 15th sections, may be misapprehended as favoring that kind of giddiness which we often find in an Independence ode, but which we never ought to find in a sanctuary hymn. As men of exclusively literary tastes are prone to sigh for the standard old text, so men of exclusively poetical aspirations are prompted to cry for verses that are soul-stirring, that "sound like a trumpet." The flowers of rhetoric cannot grow too luxuriantly and rankly

for these children of the imagination. They insist upon retaining all such lines as "Now resplendent shine his [Christ's] *nail-prints*," "A *bottle* for my tears," "My prayers are now a *chattering* noise," "And *fling* his wrath abroad," "Then will the angels *clap* their wings," "And *claps* his wings of fire," "Behold what *cursed* snares," "Dress thee in arms, most mighty Lord," "How terrible is God in arms," "Wind, hail, and *flashing* fire," "And pours the *rattling* hail." Such lines are good because they are rousing, it is said. Many of them may be sung with an accompaniment of drum and fife.

But a just and refined taste is needed for distinguishing between the appropriate brilliancy or strength of a church song, and that of a martial or even a temperance ode. A delicate Christian sentiment in regard to hymns, is like common sense in regard to the affairs of daily life; it knows how, where, and when, to make an exception to a rule. Vivid images, glowing metaphors, breathing words, do give immortality to a song of praise. Critics, however, mistake the nature of a hymn book, when they treat it as a bouquet of bright-flowers, or a coronet of glistening jewels. That is not always the best church song, which sparkles most with rhetorical gems. There are spangled hymns, which will never excite devotional feeling. The state of a congregation during the worship of God, is peculiar. The rich and the poor, the learned and the ignorant, the strong-minded and the superannuated, are uniting in a solemn address to Jehovah. When the conceptions of the song are too brilliant, when its rhetoric is too gorgeous, when its allusions are too brisk and lively, there are untutored minds which *cannot* comprehend them, and there are cultivated minds which *will* sympathize with the unlettered, and demand a simpler mode of speech. *Alleviating* the line of Watts, who says that God "*pushed*" the wheels of the universe "into motion first," Dr. Worcester wrote "*put* them into motion first," Bk. ii. 13. Many young men will prefer "pushing" to "putting;" not so with the old, however. Frequently a hymn is a prayer; and it is a rule for the structure of prayers, that they ex-

clude all those recondite figures, dazzling comparisons, flashing metaphors, which, while grateful to certain minds of poetic excitability, are offensive to more sober and staid natures, and are not congenial with the lowly spirit of a suppliant at the throne of grace. All individualities of expression, all idiosyncracies in which few worshippers will feel a sympathetic interest, and from which the majority will turn away with disgust or mere indifference, are infelicitous parts of a church song. A simile may be shining, but it may not be exactly chaste; and a hymn prefers pure beauty to bedizen-ing ornament. In his one hundred and forty-eighth Psalm Dr. Watts has written :

Ye creeping ants and worms,
His various wisdom show;
And flies, in all your shining forms,
Praise him that drest you so.

All such lines may be called *lively*, but they are too *buzzing* for a hymn of worship. It were better to retain Mrs. Steele's long word: "Their bright *inimitable* dyes," than to introduce Dr. Worcester's more *picturesque* alteration: "The smallest worms, the meanest flies," Select H. 1. It is true, that sometimes Dr. Worcester has added to the intensity of the original verses by such changes as: "Can make this *world* (for *load*) of guilt remove," Bk. ii. 41; but more frequently he has relieved the intense phrases, as: "Nor let thy fury *grow* (for "*burn*") so hot," Ps. 6; "Herself a *frighted* (for "*frightful*") ghost," Bk. ii. 2; "Rebelled *against* (for "*and lost*") their God," Bk. ii. 78; "*Impatient* (for "*insatiate*") panting for thy blood," Select, 16; "And scatters slaughtered *millions round*" (for "*heaps around*"), Select, 114. Often, if he does not chasten a rank phrase, he marks the entire hymn for omission, as: "*lumps* of lifeless clay," "*heaps* of meaner bones," "My wrath has struck the rebels dead," "My *fury stamped them down*," Bk. i. 24 and 28: The Connecticut Hymn Book abounds with lenient alterations; as: "*Before the moth we sink to dust*," for "*A moth may crush us in the dust*." Hy. 61; "And put the *hosts* of hell

to flight," for "*troops* of hell," Ps. 68; "Of *dust and worms* thy power can frame," for "Of *meanest things* thy power can frame," Ps. 8; see, also, Hymns 84, 380, and others. The terms *wretch*, *wretched*, are so often used in an extravagant and ironical way, that they may, here and there, be exchanged for more biblical terms; as in Sabbath Hymn Book, 595, 73.

The prosperity of religion is so intimately involved in the improvement of our hymnology, that we feel impelled, but are forbidden by the want of room, to discuss the disputed questions: How far may a hymn, which was written for a peculiar time, place, or occasion, be modified in order to become appropriate to other times, places, or occasions? In what circumstances may a hymn, consisting of ten, fifteen, twenty, fifty stanzas be abridged, and thus subjected to that most perilous form of "mutilation," the omitting of many, sometimes the majority, of its original stanzas? How far may the parts which are retained in the shortened hymn, be altered, so that stanzas which the author never designed to put in close proximity, may be adjusted to each other? How often may changes be made, in order to promote the verbal purity, propriety, transparency of a hymn; its adapt-
edness to the service of song; its consistency with itself; its harmony with the other hymns associated with it in the Collection; its general availability for use in worship? The answer, which general custom prompts to these questions is, that the main excellence of a lyric is neither its newness nor its oldness, but its inherent fitness to express religious emotion; that we are not to sacrifice the best reading to our love of novelty nor to our love of antiquity; but are to sacrifice all our fondnesses for the novel or the ancient, to that reading which is the best in itself and on the whole.

ARTICLE VII.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

NOTE ON SOLI OF CILICIA, WITH AN INSCRIPTION; BY FISK P. BREWER, TUTOR OF GREEK IN YALE COLLEGE.

SOLI is now easily reached from the port of Mersina, about five miles to the east, where a British consul resides, and a line of French steamers, between Smyrna and Beirût, stop once a fortnight. From there we visited the ruins on the 11th of Feb. 1859.

The plain between was covered with scattered shrubs and a very few groves of low trees. We crossed on our way a brook about fifteen feet wide, at the mouth of which was the magazine of a European trading company, with a pile of lumber on the beach. This stream may be the *Liparis*, of which Vitruvius speaks; but we did not observe any oiliness in the water. Far outside of the ancient city, the road was lined with rubbish of coarse bricks and tiles. On raking it over, a few bits of oxidized glass, and a single fragment of the fine-grained, bright-red pottery of the ancients were found. The ground in some places seemed as if prepared for the erection of new buildings, trenches showing where the stone foundations had been dug out for use in Mersina. In only one spot did we see white marble.

Passing on, we climbed the side of a low, but steep hill, which proved to be the wall of the theatre. Traces remain of twenty-three rows of seats. Here we saw fragments of stone mouldings, and the scroll of an Ionic capital.

Proceeding westward, we came upon two rows of columns, which meet at right angles, the angular column at the south-west corner being gone. In the row parallel to the sea, there were two columns standing, of which the more remote only was fluted. In the other row, there had been seven columns, of which one at each extremity is wanting. Their circumference was ten feet four inches, and the intercolumnar spaces, measured on the stylobate, were eight feet eight inches. A low foundation wall indicated the other two sides of the inclosure. The five standing pillars had consoles near the middle of the shafts, or showed the square holes in which they had been fixed. From a fragment of one which was lying on the ground, the following inscription was copied. The stone, a dark marble, not well adapted for its use at first, was corroded by the weather. Pains was taken to copy only those marks which were unmistakably made by the chisel, disregarding some which, in a more favorable light, might have been recognized as original. The unbroken stone may have contained three lines more, or two or three additional letters at the beginning and end of each line.

...ΑΛΑΡΡ.ΙΙΙ.Ε...
 ...ΓΕΜΟΝΑΚΙΑΙ...
 ...ΑΙΟΝΑΠΟΔΕΔ...
 ...ΝΟΝΤΟΝ..ΝΟΝΚ...

In line first, the dot after P was on the stone. F is evidently a mistake, either for Γ, or possibly for Τ or Π.

Boeckh gives an inscription (No. 4485) from Soli: *in quinta columna stoæ, a septentrione in orientem*,—and another *ex eodem genere*. From collating the two, he infers that each should be read

Ἀρμένιον Περεγρεῖνον τὸν λαμπρότατον.

Ours also is an honorary inscription, with the principal noun in the accusative. If, in the second line, the last letter but one be considered Λ, the whole may be naturally completed :

ΤΙΒΚ]Λ ΑΓΡΠ[ΠΠ]Ε[ΙΝΟΝ
 ΤΟΝΗ]ΓΕΜΟΝΑΚΙΑΙ[ΚΙΑΣ
 ΡΩΜ]ΑΙΟΝ ΑΠΟΔΕΔ[ΕΙΓ
 ΜΕ]ΝΟΝΤΟΝ[ΑΓ]ΝΟΝΚ[ΑΙ

Τιβ. κλ. Ἀγριππεῖνον ἡγεμόνα Κιλικίας Ῥωμαίων, ἀποδεδεγμένον τὸν ἀγρὸν καὶ δίκαιον. There are not letters enough given in the first line to fix the reading. The name Titus Aelius Agrippinus is found in a Pisidian inscription. The word *ἡγεμών* is used in speaking of the towns of Cilicia by Strabo (xiv. 5), who alludes to the disadvantage of their being *ὑπὸ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἡγεμόσιν*. He also refers to a governor of Tarsus, as being honored, both *παρὰ τοῖς ἡγεμόσι* and in the city. But Eckhel maintains (Doct. Num. 1, 14, page 243) that, though the word may be used as a general term for any magistrate, the officers called *ἡγεμόνες* were properly Roman prefects, who governed a whole province, and not local city magistrates; and also that they belonged to the provinces of Augustus, and not to those which were assigned to the Roman senate. Rasche, in his Lexicon, accordingly says: '*ἡγεμόνες plerumque dicti, non qui populi, sed qui Cæsaris provinciis præerant*'. Our inscription, if rightly read, confirms this view, as we know that Cilicia was an imperial province.

The row of five columns is but the beginning of a longer one which runs back from the sea. Thirty-five more are standing with vacancies which show that there must have been not far from sixty-four when the series was perfect. Though all were of the same size and material, they differed in their ornaments. Ten had consoles on their western side, bearing inscriptions, which were illegible to me on the ground. One near the northern extremity had four human heads on the sides of the capital. On another, nearer the centre, there was represented in high relief a full length figure, carrying a branch, probably symbolic of victory.

Beaufort, whose description, in his "*Karamania*," published in 1818, is quoted in the *Modern Traveller*, and in *Smith's Dictionary of Ancient Geography*, speaks of "a double row of two hundred columns, which, crossing the town, communicates with the principal gate towards the country." The second row entirely escaped my observation. In his plan of the city, the standing columns are represented in two parallel rows. This is certainly erroneous. All except the two first mentioned, are in the same line, as I repeatedly observed.

The part of the city to the westward seemed to have been more densely built. In one house, on passing under a brick arch into an entry, the doorway on the right opened into an apartment which had a double walk on two sides, forming a broad gnomon around a small room; but there was little to direct attention to one building more than another. The piles of masonry on the seashore were noticeable only for their size; for the construction was rude. On returning by a different route, after descending the ridge which Beaufort lays down as the fortifications, the only remaining objects of antiquity were two large and plain sarcophagi of white marble. The roof-shaped cover of one lay near it.

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

RECENT WORKS ON MATERIALISM.

THE old controversy about matter and spirit, which occupied the attention of the Greek philosophers long before the time of Socrates and Plato, and which has never since been entirely at rest, was revived in its full force by the French, near the end of the last century. From that time to the present, little of importance has been written on the subject, except in the works which we are about to notice. This question, which has generally been considered as turning on points purely metaphysical, has of late been reopened by a class of youthful and bold spirits, who have no particular distinction out of the department of physical science. Modern science is, therefore, the armory from which they profess to draw their weapons. The leader, and ablest representative, of this new school of materialists, is J. Moleschott, who commenced a somewhat brilliant career as an academic teacher and author, but finally lost his place in the university in consequence of his avowed materialism. Finding that his pupils were strongly inclined to adhere to him, he opened a private course of instruction, and his lecture-

room was soon filled. His principal work on the subject is entitled "*The Circuit of Life.*"¹ The public controversy was commenced at the meeting of the German Scientific Association, held in Göttingen, Sept. 1854, when Prof. Rudolf Wagner delivered his celebrated discourse on the "*Creation of Man and the Substance of the Soul,*"² afterwards published and followed by another pamphlet on "*Knowledge and Faith with special Reference to the Future Existence of the Soul.*"³

Wagner is the distinguished anatomist and physiologist who succeeded Blumenbach as professor in Göttingen. Of his numerous works, the most important by far is the *Dictionary of Physiology* (*Handwörterbuch der Physiologie*), edited by him. His public address, above referred to, called forth opposition from all sides of the house. In it, instead of attempting to harmonize science and revelation, or maintaining that the one must be adhered to and the other abandoned, he argued that both were to be received notwithstanding their acknowledged contradictions; that science and faith had two such different spheres, that it was not necessary for them to agree. He professed to unite in himself the scientific sceptic and the Christian believer. The controversy, however, was narrowed down to the points of difference between him and the materialists. That between him and the orthodox theologians was not prolonged.

A fiercer onset was made upon him by Carl Vogt, a spirited young naturalist, known as one of the companions of Agassiz in his sojourn among the glaciers of Switzerland, and as his associate in authorship while at Neufchatel. He acted a prominent part in the revolution of 1848; and consequently lost his place as professor in Giessen; but, in 1852, was made professor of geology in Geneva. The title of his book against Wagner is "*Blind Faith and Science,*"⁴ which appeared in 1855. In Schwab and Klüpfel's *Guide to German Literature*,⁵ it is characterized as an acute and witty production, in which the arguments against the unity of the human race are well presented, but in which inferences are drawn that lie far beyond the sphere of observation. The argument is conducted more upon the assumption of materialistic principles and in the spirit of ridicule than upon philosophical grounds.

According to him, natural science knows nothing of an immaterial soul, separable from the body. The soul is only a collective name for the different functions which pertain to the nervous system. If the organ, or the body to which it belongs, perishes, the function ceases, and the soul comes

¹ *Der Keislauf des Lebens. Physiologische Antworten auf Liebig's Chemische Briefe.* 1852.

² *Menschenschöpfung und Seelensubstanz.* 1854.

³ *Ueber Wissen und Glauben, mit besonderer Beziehung zur Zukunft der Seelen.* Göttingen, 1854.

⁴ *Köhlerglaube und Wissenschaft. Eine Streitschrift gegen Hofrath Rudolf Wagner.* 4te. Auflage, 1856.

⁵ *Wegweiser durch die Literatur der Deutschen.* 1847—58.

to an end. There is no such thing as free will, or accountability, as taught by moral philosophy and the penal law. We are not, for a moment, master of ourselves. Our reason and understanding act just as much under the force of immutable law as do, for instance, the secretive organs in the human body.

The most zealous propagandist of the new faith is the *quasi* philosopher L. Büchner, who, in his chief work on "Force and Matter,"¹ and in his more recent and more popular book on "Nature and Spirit, or Dialogues on Materialism,"² has, with great pretension, undertaken to show that science and materialism are nearly synonymous terms. In the latter work, he professes to give both sides of the question; but the interlocutor who represents spiritualism is, of course, the weaker party.

Beginning with what he calls "the exact sciences," — under which he includes physiology and geology, — as his starting point he makes bold assertions, which cannot be proved, and creates a philosophy of his own, from whose lofty eminence he looks down, with contempt, not only upon religion, but upon all that is sacred in society. His first work was written with the express design of creating a sensation; as much so as the *Life of Jesus* by Strauss; and the demand for it has been such that it has been carried through four editions.

Another work deserving particular notice, is H. Czolbe's "New Representation of Sensualism,"³ which is a good exhibition and able defence of the sensualistic philosophy, showing the weakness and logical inconsistencies of its former supporters, and pointing to materialism as its legitimate result. Professedly written to establish the doctrines of materialism, it shows with a merciless logic, though without design, how impossible it is for that philosophy to rise above downright sensualism. This must suffice for the recent literature on the side of materialism.

Let us now turn our attention to some of the best writers on the other side. The first thorough-going work which appeared against the new materialism, and, we may add, the most comprehensive and profound in its metaphysical character, was written by Julius Schaller, a former disciple of Hegel, and teacher of his philosophy, but now an investigator in physical science. It appeared under the title of "Body and Soul,"⁴ and has deservedly passed through three editions. He saw, with deep concern, that the recent tendencies of philosophical speculation to materialism, were rapidly undermining the public confidence in philosophy itself. Materialism, indeed, has not, in itself, he observes, acted a very important part in recent scientific inquiries. It has done little more than repeat, under a new form, what had often been said before. It has chosen to shelter itself under the

¹ Kraft und Stoff. Empirisch-naturphilosophische Studien. 1855.

² Natur und Geist. Gespräche zweier Freunde über den Materialismus und über die real-philosophischen Fragen der Gegenwart. 1857.

³ Neue Darstellung des Sensualismus. 1855.

⁴ Leib und Seele. Zur Aufklärung über Köhlerglauben und Wissenschaft. Dritte vermehrte Ausgabe. 1858.

name of physical science. It seems proper, therefore, to inquire how far it has a right to appeal to the results of modern science in support of its pretensions. No doubt, he continues, it is indicative of the spirit and culture of the times, that the hollow speculations to which materialism resorts, should present themselves as making an epoch in history, without being at once put aside, like all other pretended illuminations. There is, at present, no excessive idealism adapted to produce a reaction in favor of materialism. The explanation is rather to be sought in the fact that the exorbitant passion for material prosperity and sensual gratification, which characterizes the times, is seeking to give expression to itself under the form of a philosophical theory. It is not strange, perhaps, that this spirit should seek to express itself courageously and boldly. But that scholars should become zealots and even fanatics in propagating, among the common people, a system which so robs men of their spiritual worth and dignity, placing them in the same category with the brute creation, may well excite surprise. Are the discoveries, which they claim to have made, of such a nature as to inspire a noble enthusiasm? Must not these doctrines, so far as they are received, check the efforts of earnest-minded men to raise themselves to a high moral elevation, and induce them to give over the useless contest with their sensual passions, and to sink down into an easy compliance with inclinations once supposed to be base and criminal, but now proved to be not only indifferent but innocent? It hardly seems necessary to persuade men to relinquish the pursuit of an unattained ideal excellence, and prefer convenience and indulgence to the rugged and difficult path of higher spiritual knowledge and virtue. Is it not the interest of philosophy and science to rescue society from the influence of principles which diminish the power of motives to the highest knowledge as well as to virtue? We grant to science all the freedom she claims. We concede, and even maintain, that she is to listen to no dictates but those of truth. But this liberty should not be made a cloak for licentiousness. Men should not be led to death under the illusion that they are going to a feast. Freedom of inquiry does not imply the right to be sophistical, to cajole the people with seeming demonstrations, and hasty conclusions, which sober science rebukes. The doctrines now so boldly put forth are many of them of such a nature that they never can be either proved or disproved by science.

The over-confident materialist pursues his investigation as far as he is able, or as far as he pleases, and then anticipates the result by a bold conjecture. He deals out a few aphorisms, taken without proof, and then reasons out his facts. Beginning with experiment and observation, and boasting of the power of induction, and of the irresistible authority of the exact sciences, he outstrips his facts, frames hypotheses on points confessedly the most obscure and difficult, and then rails at men for their prejudices if they do not fly into the dark abyss before them with as light a wing as he does.

The physiologist and chemist may properly study the laws of matter as they operate in the organization of the human body. Certain kinds of

observation and certain methods are here appropriate and necessary. Let him pursue these methods, and push his appropriate inquiries as far as he pleases. But when he passes over the boundary of matter, and enters into the world of spirit, which has a new set of facts and of laws entirely its own, let him not bring his chemical analyses and chemical laws here, applying them to psychology as he would to physiology. When he analyzes thought, and finds it to consist of phosphorus, or feeling, and finds it to consist of an electric current, he may indeed maintain the appearance of a man of science, but he must not expect us to receive him in that character. So far he is a charlatan and nothing else. The good physiologist or chemist may be a neophyte in psychology. The facts of this science are as numerous and as subtle as the facts of those sciences; and are so diverse that a knowledge of the one is no proof of a knowledge of the other. Indeed, the greatest aberrations of men of undoubted ability are, at the present, no uncommon thing, when they pass the limits of their own science, and utter their speculations on other subjects. Men of the most cautious and careful habits of observation and reasoning, in their own appropriate sphere, frequently shock the sober-minded inquirer, when they leave the ground with which they are familiar, and enter, without experience or training, upon ground which is new to them but familiar to others. Indeed, some of the maxims and habits of a man devoted to physical science are a hindrance to him when he enters upon the philosophy of the mind.

Let us now look a little into the logic of the materialists. It is found, for example, that the action of the mind is more or less dependent on the action of the brain. Has physiology ever been able to demonstrate a complete correspondence between the two? Can it point out a distinct act of the brain for every variety of mental activity? Does the brain act as a whole in the action of the mind, or divisibly by separate organs? How many kinds of experiments has it been possible to make on this point? There are some cases of malformation whose effects have been observed; but they furnish no sort of solution to the great majority of questions which arise on the subject. Some remarkable accidents have happened, removing parts of the brain, and the effect of these has also been observed. Still, where some one correspondent action of the brain and of the mind has been supposed to be ascertained, there are ninety-nine cases of mental action in which nothing whatever can be observed in the state of the brain. Besides, who knows how far, an injury to one part of the brain may induce an abnormal action in the other parts? The effect may not show what the ordinary functions of certain parts of the brain are, but what functions they may perform under certain extraordinary conditions. But it will be said, if, from the nature of the case, but few actual observations can be made upon the mutilated parts of the human brain, experiments can be made indefinitely upon the lower animals. It is enough to say that no complete system of mental development has yet been established by such experiments. The mind of the brute is still nearly a *terra incognita*. Where can we find a definite system of brute psychology, on which we can rely

for a theory of the human mind? We do not know that the perceptions of the brutes are the same as ours. All our perceptions are modified by our intuitive ideas, without which there could be no logical thought. How is it with the generic conceptions of the brute? What ideals does it carry in the mind? Has it a complete personal consciousness, or a sense of the beautiful, the true, and the good? Materialism makes the difference between man and other animals to consist merely in degree.

But suppose all necessary experiments upon the human mind and the brain could be successfully made, and the act of the latter could be ascertained in every variety of thought and feeling, would that prove the identity of mind and brain? May not both exist and act in connection, the act of the one merely corresponding to that of the other? We venture to affirm that physiology not only never has proved, but never can prove, their identity, or that the soul is not a spiritual substance. That it is a quality of matter which can be developed only under certain circumstances and in certain combinations, is as bold and unsubstantial a hypothesis as ever was made. This is but one specimen of "exact science," and "the inductive philosophy," terms which are ever on the lips of these new-fledged psychologists!

According to the theory of materialism so confidently set forth, there is no difference in the laws of organic and inorganic matter. A plant or an animal is formed like any other mass of matter by the force of physical laws. We will not stop to remark upon the absurdity of supposing that a structure containing a complicated and nicely adjusted plan could originate in matter itself. All such forms originate in ideas. What is there in any known law of matter to preserve the hand from growing into any imaginable deformity? Does gravitation, or chemical affinity, or magnetism, or any other property of matter, prevent the fore finger from growing to the length of the middle finger? Why are the types of the different orders of animals so fixed and invariable? Why does the domesticated race of animals which has been changed by being brought under the influence of the human mind, degenerate and return to its original type when left to go wild again? Furthermore, what is there in any of the forces of matter, that should make every particle in different parts of the body agree to move in concert? That there should be a unity in the will, as a spiritual power, is conceivable. But how shall the particles of matter individually move so as to produce the will?

How can the absolute oneness which is found in consciousness, by which all the acts of the mind are referred to one and the same indivisible essence, and all its successive acts to the same enduring and unchanging personality, be explained on the principles of the materialist? It is an undeniable fact, that all the particles of matter which enter into the composition of the human body, are perpetually changing, successively coming and going, thereby rendering a material unity impossible. If then, in this constant change of matter, there is still a complete unity, it must be referred to some other cause. Surely, if the whole substance of the body is changed in a

given period, the consciousness and personal identity which have only a material basis, must also be completely changed at the same time. These successive periods of consciousness may be as much alike as the bodies of water within the banks of a river at different times; but the former can be no more identical than the latter. It may be said, that all the matter pertaining to the body is represented by the nervous system, and that this centres in the brain. Besides the absurdity of supposing that there can be a union of matter like the union of different wills, and that there can be a central representative action, there is the still more palpable absurdity of making the same thing both cause and effect. The union is the *effect* of certain combinations of matter. It cannot, then, be the *cause* of those combinations. This is a fatal objection to the whole theory. In all organic life, *organism* is the first fact we know. It is the indispensable condition of all the chemical changes which the body undergoes; and therefore cannot be itself the *effect* of those changes. It must be remembered, furthermore, that physical and chemical laws are the same in organic and inorganic matter. They themselves, therefore, cannot be the cause of the difference between organic and inorganic matter. Another objection still lies in the fact that no organic action of the brain can produce that peculiar mental action which is called consciousness. If the material organism itself had the power of feeling, all the knowledge that could be evolved from sensation would be limited to the fact that there were such and such sensations. Now consciousness is not the knowledge of the feeling, but the *double* knowledge that there is a particular feeling, and that *you are the subject of it*. This last element cannot exist without a knowledge of one's personality as distinct from the feeling. Sensation alone does not comprehend within itself any such ingredient. Consequently it cannot produce consciousness. There can be neither personality nor identity on such a theory.

We pass to the subject of the will. Will supposes liberty of choice, a conception or idea to be realized, motives influencing the mind, an act of judgment, and a decision. What becomes of all this on the principle of materialism? As will is nothing but the motion of matter, and as all motion is governed by fixed laws, there is no more will in man than there is in the union of chemical agents. If a man is conscious of exerting this faculty, that consciousness is a mistake, but it is also the result of the laws of matter, and is consequently necessary. There is really no deliberation, for that contemplates two possible courses, whereas the laws of matter can have but one. The idea of deliberation is groundless, and yet necessary, for it results from physical laws which are immutable. Crime, therefore, is imaginary. It is inevitable under the circumstances, being the product of necessary laws. On this account, it has been zealously contended by some of these very philosophers, that penal law is unjust, and capital punishment absurd, just as if the crime of the legislative body in passing such laws, and that of the hangman in executing them, were not also necessary, rendering the crime of punishing criminals just as unreal and imaginary as any other. If this theory be true, we are not moral agents, nor even

agents at all in any proper sense. We are merely the *place* where nature carries on her invariable processes. What contradictions in one's moral feelings are introduced by such a view! A man commits a crime intentionally. He feels remorse for it. He becomes a materialist, and quiets his conscience for the time. His moral feeling rises up again, and, finding that he cannot cast it out of himself, he falls back to his original belief, and now repents of his first change, and bitterly reproaches the materialists for deceiving him. According to the doctrines of materialism, his first act was not criminal. The intention was false, because there was no crime, which he could commit; and yet the intention was right and even true, because it was necessary. The remorse was an illusion, which reason would have cleared away; but was a proper illusion, because, under the circumstances, reason could not remove it. The conversion to materialism was right; and it would have been better still, though impossible, if all had been converted, and so thoroughly converted that they could never relapse. His present quiet conscience is right for the same reason that his former disquieted conscience was, namely, because both were produced by an immutable law of nature. His new fears are right for the same reason, though they are groundless and absurd; his relapse was right, or innocent, because necessary, and yet wrong, because it was into error; and so of his maledictions on those who led him to the truth. What a spectacle would society present if the moral ideas of all men were in the same state of confusion! Would rare and difficult virtues ever become common? Would the right prevail over interest and passion? Would men live for the truth and the public good? Would the love of excellence for its own sake and universal charity be likely to stimulate and govern human activity? Yet these men believe the golden age would soon return, and that every lover of his race ought to bless such reformers of science as angels of mercy!

We break off reluctantly from the train of remark suggested by the contents of a book so pregnant with philosophic ideas, in order to bestow some attention upon another, written in a more diffuse and popular style, but with hardly less vigor and skill. We refer to F. Fabri's "*Letters on Materialism*."¹

The author opens his discussion by a train of remark which we will indicate here in a few words.

The most recent form which the denial of all higher religious truth has assumed is that of materialism. After a long preparation for it, in the strong tendency of the public mind to material interests and sensual enjoyments, it has come out openly, throwing off every disguise, and declared war against all religious truth, and against the very foundations of social order. This is no longer a mere question of the schools, where bold and even wild speculations are comparatively harmless. The champions of the new philosophy give it out themselves that their object is nothing less than the overthrow of the present order of society.

¹ Briefe gegen den Materialismus. 1856.

They proclaim their sensual and atheistic doctrines as founded on the irresistible evidence of physical science, and have undertaken to propagate their sentiments by addressing themselves directly to all classes of society. They are cordially met in advance by thousands who have been sighing for freedom from the restraints of morality and religion. The popular literature in which these demoralizing principles are set forth, has already become quite extensive. It is highly proper, therefore, to inquire how far the facts justify the language put forth with so much pretension and so often repeated, namely, that the Christian faith and Christian philosophy are thoroughly refuted, and set aside forever by the revelations of modern science. No doubt, as Göthe somewhere remarks: "the great theme of all history, that to which every other is subordinate, is the contest between unbelief and faith." The philosophy of sensualism is indeed directly and entirely opposed to the spirit of the Christian religion. It professes to settle, at once and forever, those great questions respecting matter and spirit, the real and the ideal world, society as it is, and society as it should aim to be, which, in all ages, have occupied the attention of the great and the good. All this profound thought by the sages that have preceded us, will be regarded as idle and futile, the moment the new philosophy shall gain currency. All things will find their true solution in the fundamental doctrine that thought is nothing but a quality of matter, evolved from it under certain conditions and then perishing forever.

It were easy to show the moral worthlessness and perversity of materialism. But this would not be enough. It is necessary, also, to expose the logical weakness of the system, the contradictions which it involves, and its insufficiency to explain the phenomena of life and of the world; in short, to show that it is as absurd as it is immoral. The two principles on which the whole structure of materialism, whether ancient or modern, rests, are: first, that the senses are the sources of all knowledge; and, secondly, that mind is only a quality of matter, and therefore the soul is material and mortal. Even if it were true that there is nothing in the intellect which was not first in the sense, it would still be necessary to admit that the act of perception and the act of thinking are two distinct functions. They differ in time, the latter always following the former. They differ in their respective organs; for, while perception depends on the organs of sense, thought depends on the brain. Grant that there is a necessary connection between the object and the sense, so that the one truly represents the other, it does not follow that there is a like correspondence between sensation and thought. What right has the materialist, in his exact science, to take this for granted? All experience shows that the same thoughts do not follow the same perceptions in different individuals, or in the same individuals at different times. Men have even the power to think of other things, while the senses are directed to a particular object. If, now, these different acts of thought depend on different excitements of the brain, how can it be said that, in contemplating one and the same object, different excitements of the brain proceed from the same object and the same sensation? Sensation may be deter-

mined by the object, but thought is free, and may vary from the sensation. But suppose it were not so. Suppose thought and sensation necessarily go together. Why does not this take place also in the brute? It will be replied that both the quantity and structure of the brain are different in man and in the brute. Very well; the difference, then, in the result is not owing to different sensations, but to a difference in the brain. Sensation, then, cannot be the direct productive cause of thought. What, then, becomes of the theory of the materialist? There is something in the intellect which was not in the sense. There are myriads of thoughts which the senses cannot produce. It would be nearer the truth to say that all thought is supersensible. We cannot even know all the qualities of matter directly by the senses. They often elude our observation, and we are obliged to arrive at our knowledge of them by a circuitous process, of which a part is a pure act of thought or reasoning. This is particularly true of the dynamical properties of matter. We observe only matter, and generally only the surface of it. The immanent form, which is the main thing in our inquiry, cannot be reached by the sense. We argue its existence from its effects. The senses do not argue.

If sensuous knowledge is the only real and true knowledge, of what use is thought or consciousness? What constitutes the real difference between man and the brute?

If sensation and thought are identical, how are we to account for the fact that in dreams sensation ceases, while thought or mental activity still goes on? How is it with the basis of this whole theory — the doctrines of atoms — by whose combination according to certain laws all things are produced? Which of the five senses gives a knowledge of the existence of atoms? Are they not supersensible? Is it not by a pure process of reasoning that we reach them? The world as it now is, in its systems of organizations, is either eternal, or it is not. If it was created, the senses do not teach us so. If it is uncreated, that fact can as little be reached by the senses. How does the sensuous materialist know that thought is one of the properties of matter? Is thought an object which reveals itself to the senses? If knowledge and sensation are identical, then thought is not a thing to be known, as it eludes the grasp of the senses. There is no room for consciousness to recognize thought in such a philosophy. It is said that matter, which has always been what it now is, will always continue to be so; that it is indestructible. How is that known by the senses? It is said that matter is governed by immutable laws. Are those laws visible or tangible? Matter has certain forces, permanent forces. Have they been seen, and seen in their permanence? It is by the power of reason that we arrive at such results as these, proceeding from a few data; and reason is transcendental in respect to sense.

Again, according to this theory, thought and sensibility must be in matter, else they could not come out of it. We leave it to others to conceive how this can be. If thought is really contained in matter, and is consequently subject to necessary laws, then the materialist's thought and my thought are both contained in it; and, though they contradict each other, they are

nevertheless both as true as anything can be. If, under certain conditions of matter, my thought is necessarily evolved; and, under certain other conditions of matter, the thought of the materialist is evolved, both have their foundation equally in nature, and the one is as consonant to nature as the other. But to say that contradictions are both true, is the same as to say there is, in reality, no such thing as truth; that the distinction between truth and falsehood is factitious. Why, then, should the materialist trouble himself to refute a system which is just as true as his own? I suppose he will admit, that the laws of matter never err. Can men who admit such principles consistently talk about science or philosophy? Neither is possible, upon the supposition that all thought is nothing but the action or motion of matter. That which is opposed to science or philosophy has just as much foundation, in the nature of things, as these.

A work of a somewhat different character from either of the preceding, but perhaps even more interesting to readers of scientific habits and tastes, is Dr. A. Weber's "*Most Recent Deification of Matter*,"¹ first published in 1859. He takes up the subject as a man of science, and calmly discusses the question how far physics, chemistry or physiology lends a support to the doctrines of materialism. While the book is addressed to the general scholar, and is not professional or technical in its character, such is the nature of the subject that the facts and principles of these sciences must be constantly kept before the mind. The author admits that there is no such thing as indeterminate matter in general that enters equally into the formation of all substances, that is, homogeneous matter, without any distinctive qualities; that, on the contrary, there are several kinds of matter originally different from each other, which are for that reason adapted for combination. The whole realm of matter is made up of substances which have distinct properties, and as such are so related to each other as to cause all those processes about which physics and chemistry are employed. No part of these original substances is made for itself, but each finds its complement in another, and these mutual relations and dependencies are immanent in all. All the actual forms of matter which we see, are produced by the union of particles which are related to each other. The ultimate particles, which it is necessary to suppose, atoms as they are called, are combined according to certain laws of proportion. Hence the theory of atoms is necessary to explain the causal connections which exist between the elementary substances. That theory fixes limits to the power of elementary substances. Each class of atoms has certain powers or forces beyond which it cannot go in producing effects. The explanation of nature on mechanical principles must stop where these forces are exhausted. However great and extensive the influence of natural causes in the world which is known to us, there is a bound which they cannot pass. They cannot pass beyond the relation of particles or masses of matter to each other. They can unite and separate matter, where parts of it are already *put* into relation to each other;

¹ Die neueste Vergötterung des Stoffs. 2te Ausgabe. 1858.

but they have no architectonic or constructive power to select and arrange parts in conformity with a given plan so as to construct a whole. The heavenly bodies, when placed in their positions and put in motion, can continue to move, but matter could not arrange itself in this exact order, nor set the system in motion. It has no spontaneous power. It can originate no purpose. In a word, the principle of organic development does not lie in matter itself. The action of matter never passes out of the sphere of mechanical law. Nature is a willing, but blind servant where the way is prepared for her. But she cannot lay out her own course, or mark out the limits of her own action. Here is the broad and ineffaceable distinction between mechanical force and organic laws.

But the argument of the author is so compact and yet so extended that it cannot well be given except in his own words. His object is to show how many unjustifiable assumptions are necessary in order to make out any logical deduction in favor of materialism. Indeed, we have never seen the physiological view of the subject treated more completely and satisfactorily. It is a work which physiologists will best know how to appreciate, and on account of its special character we must relinquish the idea of presenting a more particular analysis of it in these pages.

DR. EDWARD ZELLER'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS, in its Historical Development. Second Volume. Second Edition. 1859.¹

THE schools of Hegel and Baur, if they have not produced very satisfactory results in philosophy and theology, have produced some of the ablest and best writers on the history of philosophy. Hegel himself opened a new path for the philosophy of history. Baur has given equal proof of power in developing the history of the theological opinions. His method, which in his own hands is not without its faults, becomes, when chastened and rendered more cautious by such men as Dörner, as nearly perfect as any that has yet been made known. Recently, Schwegler and Zeller, whose theology was so poor that they both, very wisely, deserted the study, have found a more congenial soil in pagan philosophy; and have given, the one an outline, and the other a full and critical history, of the Grecian philosophy, equal to anything of the kind that has been produced. In like manner Erdmann, a disciple of Hegel, gave us, not long since, the most complete and lucid history of modern philosophy. Even Kuno Fischer writes with clearness, and not without skill, on this subject. Zeller's work, which in the first edition was an accurate and complete outline of the various philosophical systems of the Greeks, and which, at once, became an authority, is much enlarged in the New Edition, exhausting each subject, and giving in the Notes the results of modern critical learning on almost every point of literary or philosophical interest. If a scholar were to limit himself to one book on the subject, no other would

¹ Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung dargestellt. In drei Theilen, 2te Auflage. 1856—1859.

answer his purpose, in all respects, so well as this. Its great merit is, that it unites rare scholarship with philosophical ability. In historical research, in nicety of interpretation, in the development of a philosophical system from its germ, in definiteness and clearness on subjects of great difficulty and obscurity, he ranks with the best class of writers. There is no English work that, in learning and ability, resembles it so much as Cudworth's *Intellectual System of the Universe*. Indeed, that book, with Mosheim's *Notes* (which contain as great an amount of matter as the *Text*), together with Zeller, will teach one nearly all that is known of the Grecian philosophers. As Mosheim could correct many of the slips of Cudworth; so will Zeller supply what was wanting in the critical learning of the age of Mosheim. To be at once in the society of three such Greek scholars, treating essentially of the same subjects, though in different forms and with very different aims, is a rare felicity, than which nothing can be more inspiring to the true scholar.

OTTO VON RUTENBERG'S HISTORY OF THE BALTIC PROVINCES of Livland, Esthland, and Curland, from the Earliest Times till the close of their Independence. Vol. I. 1859.¹

THIS volume contains a specimen of border history which is well worth reading. Livonia, Esthonia, and Courland, as these provinces are generally called in English, were made the homes of German colonists, on the utmost boundaries of European civilization, nearly a thousand years ago. The conflicts, first between the pagan population and these Christian colonies; then, between the different native tribes; and, finally, between the Order of the Sword and the church, which lived in perpetual jealousy of each other; together with the inroads of the Danes, the Teutonic Knights from Prussia, of the Russians, the Poles, and other surrounding petty states, furnish materials of romantic interest for history. But the chief attraction of the work is the clear light that it casts, for many successive centuries, upon the border provinces between the Teutonic and the Slavonic races: between the Germans, Danes, and Swedes, on the one hand; and the Russians and Poles, on the other. Indeed, we see Russia rising up by our side, upon which gleams of light are constantly shooting from our imaginary point of view. Prussia and Poland, on the other side, pass through the various phases of their history, under our immediate observation. The condition of the three German colonies or provinces being dependent on their relation to the larger states around them, the history of the former involves a knowledge of the policy of the latter. Nothing can give a better comprehension of the spirit of the different governments which surrounded them, than an intimate knowledge of that watchfulness over them which was necessary to the colonies in their close contact with them. Placed, in imagination, on the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea, on the banks of the river Duna and around the waters of the Gulf of Riga

¹ Geschichte der Ostseeprovinzen Liv- Esth- und Kurland von der ältesten Zeit bis zum Untergange ihrer Selbständigkeit.

and narrowly observing what takes place there during seven or eight centuries, we contract an acquaintance not only with these provinces, but with their powerful neighbors, which is of use to us in understanding some of the more obscure portions of European history. Rutenberg's work will be a fit companion of Voight's History of Prussia ; that is, of the territory now called the Provinces of Prussia, at the mouth of the Vistula and along the coast of the Baltic. These two works in connection with each other will, sufficiently for all ordinary purposes, clear up the history of the Baltic border-land between Germany and Russia.

VON SCHLÖZER'S *FREDERIC THE GREAT AND CATHERINE THE SECOND*. Berlin, 1859.¹

THIS little volume is a most interesting contribution to the history of the Prussian and Russian courts from the time of the first and second Silesian Wars, and the Seven Years' War, to the Partition of Poland. The diplomacy of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and, to some extent, that of France and England, are here set in a very clear light. The author has had access to a vast amount of documentary evidence not used by previous historians. There is a romantic interest in tracing the history of a young princess who at the early age of fourteen was selected from one of the smallest German courts to be the consort of the future emperor of Russia, and who, in her maturity, became as great and imperious as she was delicate and beautiful in her early years. Indeed, she united the winning influences of the woman with the energy and authority of a man ; the fascinations of a Mary, Queen of Scots, with the talents of a Queen Elizabeth. She justly dethroned her weak and despicable husband, Peter III., and took the reins into her own more powerful hands. In her circle we see all the splendid vices of the northern courts. The prize for which favorites and ambitious politicians contended was great, and their alternate success and disgrace were in striking contrast. The fates and fortunes of the leading ministers of state, and of the Prussian ambassadors at Petersburg, make up no small part of the narrative.

The Prussian monarch appears before us in all his various situations from the beginning of his reign up to the zenith of his power and greatness, when he took rank among the ablest generals and the first statesmen of his age. He showed consummate political wisdom in the most critical state of his affairs, and was perfectly successful in subduing Austria and in winning that important alliance with Russia, to which he was indebted for his independence. As the work is mostly made up of the accounts of ambassadors and the correspondence of the chief actors in these stirring scenes, no class of readers will derive more pleasure from the perusal than statesmen and diplomatists. The author has brought rare talents and acquisitions to the elucidation of his theme.

¹ *Friderich der Grosse and Katharina die Zweite*, von Kurd von Schlözer. Berlin, 1859.

WINER'S GRAMMAR OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.¹

In the last Number of the Bibliotheca we noticed the appearance of the first volume of this standard grammar in an English dress. We have now the privilege of announcing that the second volume is published, so that the biblical scholar can have access to the whole work, translated into English by an able German scholar.

Since preparing our notice of the first volume, our attention has been called by the *Christian Examiner* to the omission from Mr. Masson's translation, of certain passages found in the original German. We have compared the passages in the original and in the translation, and to avoid any misapprehension that might come from indefinite allusions, we give the results in full.

On p. 118 of the sixth German edition, from which the translation is made, occurs the following passage :

"Tit. 2 : 13, ἐπιφάνεια τῆς δόξης τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χρ. halte ich aus Gründen, welche in dem Lehrsystem des Paulus liegen, σωτ. nicht für ein zweites Prädicat neben θεοῦ, als ob Christus erst δ μέγας θ. und dann σωτῆρ genannt würde. Der Artik. ist bei σωτῆρ. ausgelassen, weil das Wort durch den Genitiv ἡμῶν bestimmt ist, und die apposition trat vor das nom. proprium: *des grossen Gottes und unsers Erlösers J. Chr.*² Aehnlich 2 P. 1 : 1. wo nicht einmal ein pronom. bei σωτῆρος steht. So liesse sich auch Jud. 4. auf zwei verschiedene Subj. beziehen, da κύριος, als durch ἡμῶν bestimmt, den Art. nicht braucht, f. Ἰησ. χρ. ὅς ἐστι κύριος ἡμῶν. [2 Th. 1 : 12. reducirt sich einfach auf κύριος st. ὁ κύριος.]"

Mr. Masson's translation of the above is as follows :

"In regard to Tit. 2 : 13, ἐπιφάνεια τῆς δόξης τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χρ., the word σωτῆρος does not appear to me a second predicate of θεοῦ, as if Christ were first styled μέγας θεός and then σωτῆρ. My reasons for taking this view of the passage are grounded on Paul's teaching. The article is omitted before σωτῆρος, as the apposition *precedes* the proper name: *of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ*. Similar is 2 Pet. 1 : 1, where there is no pronoun with σωτῆρος. In 2 Th. 1 : 12, we have simply an instance of κύριος for ὁ κύριος." Vol. I. p. 142.

By comparing the translation with the original, it appears that the clause, "weil das Wort durch den Genitiv ἡμῶν bestimmt ist," — "because the word is made definite by the Genitive ἡμῶν," (which contains the gist of Winer's argument), and also the sentence, "So liesse sich," etc. ; that is, "So also

¹ A Grammar of the New Testament Diction: intended as an Introduction to the Critical study of the New Testament Diction, by George Benedict Winer. translated by Edward Masson, M. A., formerly Professor in the University of Athens. Vol. II. Philadelphia: Smith, English and Co., No. 40 North Sixth Street; New York: R. Carter and Brothers; Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1859. pp. x and 373—708. 8vo.

in Jude 4, two different subjects may be referred to, since *κύριος*, as being made definite by *ἡμῶν*, does not need the article for expressing the meaning, 'Jesus Christ who is our Lord,' (where the same argument is repeated) — it appears, we say, that both these are omitted.

The reference in the original after "*des grossen Gottes und unsers Erlösers J. Chr.*," is to a foot-note of nineteen lines, in which the author's view of the above passage in Titus is further maintained and defended against an anonymous writer in Tholuck's *Litterarischer Anzeiger*. This note is wholly omitted by the translator. His own asterisk points to the foot-note, "See Prolegomena. Tr.," in which Prolegomena, however, while he refers to his own occasional notes, he says nothing of omissions.

Again, on p. 142 of the original work, where the author is endeavoring to establish the position that "the pronoun *οὗτος* sometimes refers not to the noun which is nearest in position, but to one more remote," he gives the following as an illustration: "1 Jo. 5: 20, *οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθινὸς θεός* naml. *ὁ θεός*, nicht *Χριστός* (was gleich vorher steht), wie die ältern Theologen aus dogmat. Rücksichten wollten; denn theils ist *ἀληθ. θεός* ein beständiges und ausschliessliches Epitheton des Vaters, theils folgt eine Warnung vor Götzendienst; den *εἰδώλοις* wird aber stets *ἀληθ. θεός* entgegengesetzt"; that is, "In 1 John 5: 20, *οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθινὸς θεός* [this is the true God], *οὗτος* [this] refers to *θεός* [God], not *Χριστός* [Christ] (which latter immediately precedes), as the old theologians supposed, influenced by dogmatic considerations. For, in the first place, *ἀληθινὸς θεός* is a constant and exclusive epithet of the Father; in the second place, a warning against idolatry follows; but *ἀληθινὸς θεός* [the true God] is always opposed to *εἰδωλα* [idols]."

This passage is also omitted.

Our readers have now the whole matter, of which the *Christian Examiner* complains, before them, and can judge for themselves. The question is not as to the correctness of Winer's positions, but as to the true principle to be followed by a translator who proposes to reproduce his original work. We cannot but regret that so able a translator of such a standard work as Winer's *Grammar of the New Testament* has not everywhere adhered to the full original text, adding, where he thought it necessary, his own cautionary notes over his proper signature, as he has done in several instances.

The reader will understand our strictures as limited to the point under consideration, and not intended to detract from the general excellence of the translation.

DR. TYLER'S MEMOIR AND LECTURES.¹

THE memoir of Dr. Tyler is an appropriate introduction to his lectures. These lectures are well fitted to interest the theological community. They are on the State of Man before the Fall, on the Fall and its Consequences, on Native Depravity, the Universality of Sin, the Decrees of God, Moral Agency, and Regeneration. These themes exhibit only a small part of Dr. Tyler's system of theology. We trust that his entire system will be given to the public. A divine who held so conspicuous a position as Dr. Tyler, and for so long a time, has probably left writings which exhibit his theological views in their symmetry and completeness; and all his discussions would receive, as they deserve, the serious attention of the community. The eighteen lectures now published, are planned with special reference to the theological controversy in which Dr. Tyler was engaged during a large part of his life. They discuss the important themes to which they are devoted, in the aspects of that controversy, and not in all the aspects which the themes may properly assume. A more enlarged representation, therefore, of Dr. Tyler's theological system, in reference to the doctrines which he has here considered in some of their bearings, and in reference to other doctrines which he has not explained in this volume, would be cordially welcomed by inquirers after the truth.

Dr. Tyler is a representative man. He exhibits an important phase of New England theology. He writes, in many respects, after the model of the New England divines. Incidentally, as well as consciously, he often exhibits his New England character and training. The mould in which his speculations are cast, is obvious in the deference which he often pays to the intuitions of men (as on pp. 313, 314); also in the frequency with which he reasons, on the ground of optimism, that the present system of the universe is the best possible; also, in the prominence which he gives to the truth, that the decrees of God are the rule or plan by which God regulates *his own* conduct; they relate immediately and directly to the *divine* acts; also, in the confidence with which he speaks of the atonement as general, not less universal than is the depravity of the race.

It is frequently alleged, that some advocates of the New England theology have been driven, by some of their recent controversies with each other, to an abandonment of their early faith. But we are pleased to observe that Dr. Tyler, in his later years, continued to defend many of the disputed propositions which he advocated in the vigor of his manhood. Thus we find him maintaining, in the present lectures, that the punishment

¹ Lectures on Theology, by Bennet Tyler, D. D., late President and Professor of Christian Theology in the Theological Institute of Connecticut. With a Memoir by Rev. Nahum Gale, D. D. Boston: J. E. Tilton and Company. 1859. pp. 395. 8vo.

threatened to Adam in paradise was, distinctively, not temporal nor spiritual death, but eternal destruction. He says: "That spiritual death was not the thing chiefly intended in the threatening, is evident from the fact that it is sin itself, and cannot properly be regarded as the punishment of sin. As one observes: 'Sin and rebellion, or transgression of the divine law, cannot be the proper matter of a threatening as a punishment of transgression, and the evil to be inflicted for it; for this is the evil or crime for which the punishment is threatened, and not the punishment itself. This is the crime threatened with a punishment, and not the punishment threatened. Moral evil and rebellion is always criminal, in every instance and degree of it, and this deserves punishment, and this only can be punished. The punishment, therefore, cannot be sin itself, or moral evil; for to suppose this, is to confound the crime and punishment as one and the same thing. The only proper punishment of sin, or moral evil, is natural evil, or pain and suffering; and this alone can be the proper matter of a threatening. If sinning and rebellion be a punishment, then the first act of sin of which man was guilty was a punishment as really as any after acts; but this could not be a punishment unless man was punished for his antecedent innocence, and therefore could not be threatened as a punishment. It is true that sinners are sometimes given over to judicial blindness and hardness of heart, and are left to walk in the way of their own hearts and in the sight of their own eyes; and they are thus left to bring upon themselves a swift destruction. But it is the destruction which is, properly speaking, the punishment they receive, and not their persisting in sin.'" (pp. 175, 176.)

Dr. Tyler admits that this eternal punishment *implies* both temporal and spiritual death; but the temporal and spiritual death *are not* the punishment in which they *are implied*.

Again: we find that, in his present lectures, Dr. Tyler represents the posterity of Adam as not chargeable with Adam's sin. "There is," he teaches, "no such oneness between Adam and his posterity, that they may be considered one person, so that his act may properly be said to be their act. If this were true, then the race of Adam were sinners before they had a personal existence. But how it is possible for a creature to sin before he has a personal existence, is utterly inconceivable. The supposition is grossly absurd. It may with as much truth be said that we breathed when Adam breathed, that we walked when Adam walked, as that we sinned when Adam sinned. It is true that when Adam sinned, we were in his loins, as Levi was in the loins of Abraham when he paid tithes to Melchisedec; and in the same sense in which Levi paid tithes in Abraham, it may be said that we sinned in Adam, and fell with him in his first transgression. But we are not to understand the apostle as asserting this in a strictly literal sense; that is, that the personal act of Abraham was the personal act of Levi" (p. 179.) "But if it be literally true that, when Adam ate the forbidden fruit, that act was ours as well as his, I see not but every act of Adam was ours as well as his; consequently, that if Adam repented, all his posterity repented at the same time; for they were as truly in his

loins when he repented as when he sinned. It may be as truly affirmed of every father, that he and his children constitute but one person, and that what he does all his children do, and that what he did before they were born they did also, as that the posterity of Adam actually ate of the forbidden fruit in the garden. Adam and his posterity are distinct agents, individually responsible. And it is utterly impossible that the moral actions of one agent should be the moral actions of another agent. Nor was the sin of Adam so imputed to his posterity, as to be transferred to them and become their personal sin. Moral character cannot be transferred. Holiness and sin must, from their very nature, be personal" (p. 180.) "Besides : if all mankind are chargeable with having eaten the forbidden fruit, it is their duty to repent of that sin ; and they must repent of it in order to be pardoned. But what one of Adam's race ever repented of that sin ? In order to the exercise of repentance, there must be consciousness of blame. But who, except our first parents, were ever conscious of having eaten the forbidden fruit ? Further : the Scriptures nowhere declare that we are chargeable with Adam's sin. It is said that by one man sin entered into the world ; but it is not said that his sin was the sin of the whole world. It is said, also, that by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men unto condemnation, and that by one man's disobedience many were made sinners ; but this does not amount to a declaration that all men are chargeable with that one offence by which sin and death have entered into the world," (p. 181.) "The scriptures nowhere affirm that men are punished for Adam's sin. It is said, that 'by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men unto condemnation.' By the offence of one—not for the offence of one. By means of Adam's sin, all men have become sinners ; and, being sinners, they are under condemnation. Thus it is said : 'By one man's disobedience many were made sinners.' It is not said, that *for* one man's disobedience many were condemned, they themselves being innocent ; but *by* one man's disobedience many were made sinners ; and, being sinners, they are personally ill deserving, and justly suffer. Again : it is said, 'By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men. Why ?—because that one man sinned ? No : but 'for that ALL have sinned.' Again : 'The soul that sinneth, it shall die.' 'The son shall not bear the iniquity' of the father ; neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son. The righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the iniquity of the wicked shall be upon him.' It would seem from these declarations to be a principle in the Divine government, that one man shall not be punished for the sin of another ; especially, that children shall not be punished for the sins of their parents : consequently, that the children of Adam shall not be punished for his sin." (p. 182.)

Still again, we notice that Dr. Tyler continued, in despite of many remonstrances from theological partisans, to maintain the doctrine that man's natural ability is commensurate with his moral obligation. He insists that our depravity "does not imply any change in the powers of the mind, but a disposition to make a wrong use of those powers" (p. 200) ; that "the free

agency of man was not impaired by the fall. Mankind are laid under no compulsion. They are free to choose or refuse. Good and evil are set before them; and although they are naturally induced to choose the evil, they do it as freely as Adam did the first time he sinned." (p. 202.)

Dr. Tyler does not believe that men have *both* a sinful disposition and *also*, as a distinct thing, an inability to be holy; but he believes that the inability and the sinful disposition are *one and the same* attribute of men. The *utter disinclination* of a child to obey his parent, is the child's *inveterate obstinacy*; and this inveterate obstinacy is the child's *moral inability*. "And we say, moreover, that his sin is in proportion to his obstinacy. So in every case: the inability which consists in disinclination never excuses. On the contrary, when it is an inability to do what God requires, it is the very thing of which blame is predicable." (p. 273. See, also, p. 279.)

"There is one way in which an attempt has been made to evade the force of this reasoning: it has been said that mankind have lost, by their own fault, their power to obey the Divine commandments, and therefore may be justly held bound to do all of which they were originally capable. But I would ask, When and how they have lost their power? It must have been in the original apostasy; that is, before they had a personal existence. But how they could possess ability to do their duty, and lose it, by their own fault, thousands of years before they had a being, it is certainly difficult to see." (p. 277.)

"But supposing that mankind had lost, by their own fault, their natural ability to obey God; this would not make it right to require of them, now, natural impossibilities. If a servant, to avoid labor, should cut off his hands, he might be justly punished for disabling himself; but if, in addition to this, his master should assign him daily his wonted task, and daily punish him for not performing it, he would be pronounced by every man to be a cruel tyrant." (pp. 277, 278.)

The last objection against our unimpaired and complete freedom of moral agency is, that the Bible does not expressly teach man's natural ability, but does repeatedly declare man's moral inability to do right. Dr. Tyler thus happily replies to this final objection: "But does not God virtually assert the ability for which we contend in every command, in every invitation, and in every threatening which is addressed to sinners? It is admitted that if mankind did not possess all the faculties which are essential to moral agency, they would not be responsible. But the scriptures nowhere assert that men are moral agents, or that they possess the faculties which are essential to moral agency. But this, we are told, is not necessary, because the possession of these faculties is taken for granted, and implied in every Divine command. If, then, as we mentioned, the possession of these faculties constitutes what we call natural ability, this ability is taken for granted, and implied in every divine command." (p. 282.)

Dr. Tyler's theory with regard to the nature and the commencement of sin, has been variously understood by different men.

Some have supposed him to teach that sin is, in our fallen state, a part of our very constitution ; because he says, that " depravity is as natural to man as reason, or speech, or sympathy, or natural affection, or any other property which is said to be natural " (p. 189) ; and " a moral [by which he is supposed to mean a holy or sinful] disposition is an essential ingredient in the constitution of an immortal mind." (p. 190.)

Others have considered him as teaching, that sin " does not pertain to the structure of the mind, but is a moral state of the soul (p. 200) ; that the disposition must be in a state to be pleased with that which is good, or that which is evil " (pp. 189, 190) ; and a man's state is either right or wrong, holy or sinful, antecedently to the fact of his being actually pleased with either good or evil.

Accordingly, some have looked upon Dr. Tyler as believing that sin, being a passive condition, begins to exist in a child, as soon as the child's soul begins to exist ; it may be, before the child's birth. We read : " It is perfectly proper, however, to say, that a depraved heart is coeval with the existence of a rational soul." " From the moment the soul begins to exist, it must possess, in an incipient degree, a moral character ; otherwise, it cannot be a moral being, or sustain any other relation to the moral government of God, than that of the beasts that perish. If we may say of the infant child, that it has a rational soul, we may say with equal truth, that it has a depraved heart ; both of which will be developed in due time, unless some change is effected in the natural constitution or disposition of the mind." (p. 190.)

Others have regarded Dr. Tyler as, in the main, intending to teach that sin does not consist in the structure, nor in a *passive* state of the soul, but in its *active* state ; not, indeed, in its *imperative volitions*, but in its *affections* ; not in its affections as powers or sensibilities, but as *acts* of the powers or sensibilities. He thus explains himself : " When we say, then, that man is, by nature, depraved, we mean that he naturally loves that which is evil, and hates that which is good ; the very first emotions of his heart are wrong " (p. 190.) Dr. Tyler often distinguishes between the heart as a capacity, and the feelings of that heart, which constitute holiness or sin. Thus he says : If Adam " had a heart or disposition, the objects presented to his view must have awakened feelings of some sort in his mind. He must have liked or disliked, loved or hated them. This is essential to the nature of man. He does not view objects with indifference. A heart, or disposition, is as essential a part of the human soul as the intellect or will. When the character of God was presented to the view of Adam, it must have awakened in his mind feelings of delight or aversion. He could not have viewed it with indifference. But if he loved God, he was holy ; if he hated him, he was sinful." (pp. 154, 155.)

In defending the doctrine that infants are sinners, Dr. Tyler takes pains to disown the belief that they are *passive* ; and he quotes the following words : " Who is authorized to say that the soul is in a dormant state for a moment, while at the same time the body is performing its functions ? The soul is, from its very nature, active " (p. 211.) If sin be a merely *passive* state, why is it necessary to insist that the soul is always active ? (see

p. 339.) Accordingly, some have supposed that Dr. Tyler does not mean to represent the child's character as sinful before the child is born; but rather to represent the child as possessing a distinct soul, and as being actively sinful, as soon as, and not before, the moment of the child's birth. They consider him as believing that the heart or disposition, *as a capacity or power*, "is essential to his [man's] constitution as a moral being, without which he never could have any such thing as preference or choice" (p. 189), but that the *character* consists in the affections of this constitutional power; that while "the very first emotions of his [man's] heart are wrong," yet "how soon these begin to exist, it may perhaps be difficult to determine" (p. 190); notwithstanding the difficulties, however, we are warranted in deciding that sinful affections exist at birth, but are not warranted in deciding that they exist before birth. In commenting on Rom. 9: 11 ("the children, being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil"), Dr. Tyler says: "Our inquiry relates to the character of those who are born; and not of those who are unborn" (p. 213). He does indeed ask: "Who is competent to decide that moral agency does not commence with the first existence of the rational soul? I know there are difficulties attending this subject" (p. 209.) But this phrase, "the first existence of the rational soul," is supposed by some to denote the rational soul of a child who has an outward existence detached from that of the mother; the child who is "an accountable being when he comes into the world" (p. 211), but is not affirmed, by Dr. Tyler, to be a moral agent, an accountable being, *before* the period of his birth.

If the entire theological system of Dr. Tyler were published, it would probably unfold, in a more distinct and luminous manner, his theories with regard to the nature and commencement of sin.

This author has been often accused of misunderstanding the views of his opponents. We care not now to examine the justice or injustice of this accusation; but we simply assert that many of the propositions which he earnestly labors to refute, are evidently false. Thus he combats the error that a man must choose to be holy *before* he can be holy; the choice must come *first*, and then, as a consequence, comes the holiness. Now the doctrine that all holiness *consists in* choice, is occasionally misunderstood as implying that all holiness *results from* choice. That all holiness does not result from choice; that a holy agent does not put forth an act of preference *first*, and then, as a consequence, receive a holy character, is abundantly shown by Dr. Tyler. In showing this, however, he does not invalidate the theory that all holiness consists in the elective preference of the soul. This preference is not holy because and *after* it is preferred in a distinct, elective act, but is holy in itself, i. e. because it is a preference.

So Dr. Tyler opposes successfully a theory, that "all the natural conceptions [conceptions?] of the human heart remain as strong in the regenerate man as they are in the unregenerate man. All those feelings which lie back of the governing purpose, and which are not under its control — such as pride, envy, lust, anger, malice, revenge, delight in sin, aversion to holi-

ness, and enmity against God — remain unchecked. The work of regeneration goes not so deep. It does not enter into these deep recesses of the soul. It effects only a change in the governing purpose of the mind, by which a man chooses a new object of pursuit, prompted by the same motive as that by which he had ever been influenced." (p. 335.)

It is certainly safe to combat a theory that envy, malice, delight in sin, aversion to holiness, enmity against God, and similar feelings are innocent. The opponents of Dr. Tyler affirm that they never dreamed of entertaining such a theory. His peculiar method of stating their belief leads him, sometimes, into a self-contradiction. Thus he remarks: "If these feelings are in themselves innocent, what sin can there be in cherishing them? Can there be any sin in cherishing or gratifying innocent feelings? If it is not wrong to exercise anger, pride, lust, covetousness, envy, malice, and revenge for one moment, it cannot be wrong to exercise them for two moments, or for an hour, or a year" (p. 297.) All admit that there can be no innocence in cherishing malice, for one moment. Does Dr. Tyler, however, really believe that there can be no sin in cherishing an innocent feeling? He says, in another connection: "But is man blamable for being actuated by principles which are natural, and in themselves innocent? Certainly, if he is actuated by these principles alone; because it is his duty to be governed by higher motives. For example: the appetites of hunger and thirst are, in themselves, innocent; but if a man eats and drinks solely to gratify these appetites, he sins; because it is his duty, whether he eats or drinks, or whatever he does, to do all to the glory of God. Again: parental affection is a natural affection, and, in itself, innocent. But suppose a parent, in the education of his children, is actuated exclusively by the promptings of his natural affection: does he not sin? Certainly, because he is required to be actuated by higher motives." (pp. 200, 201.)

Dr. Tyler devotes no small part of his lectures to the refutation of a theory that holiness consists in one's choosing to obey the law for the sake of promoting one's own happiness as the sole, or chief ultimate good. He represents the theory thus: "Finding, by thought and reflection, that he was capable of deriving happiness from different objects, he [Adam] took into consideration the question, in what way he should be likely to obtain the greatest amount of happiness, whether in the service of his Maker or in the service of sin. After mature deliberation, he came to the conclusion that he should be more happy in obeying than in disobeying his Maker, and therefore determined to obey him" (p. 159.) That every act performed with the voluntary intent of promoting the agent's own happiness as the ultimate good — performed with the supreme choice of the agent's own welfare, or with an intelligent aim to secure his own well-being as the only or the chief object of pursuit, is selfish or sinful, Dr. Tyler has proved clearly and abundantly. Whether the theory which he has thus satisfactorily refuted, was ever held by the divines to whom he ascribes it, we need not inquire at present. We only add, that in nearly all the controversies among our evangelical divines, the errors which the assailant disproves most triumphantly, are theories

which his antagonists most emphatically disclaim. Such controversies, therefore, may do a temporary harm to the men who are misunderstood, but will do no permanent injury to the truth itself.

M. BAUTAIN ON EXTEMPORARY SPEAKING.¹

THE author of this treatise takes profound and philosophical views of his theme. He writes from his individual experience, and therefore his ideas are his own. His volume is characterized, not only by an originality of thought, but also by a freshness of style, a glow of personal interest, vivid conceptions, brilliant images. It is a *natural* treatise, and describes, as in an autobiography, the experiences of an orator. M. Bautain recommends an art of extemporaneous speaking, which is as far as possible from the superficial, declamatory style prevalent among the preachers of unwritten discourses. If our clergymen would follow his wise rules, and oftener intermingle the extemporaneous with the written discourse, they would improve their style of composition, and augment the general interest of their pulpit ministrations. The theory of this volume demands that the extemporaneous orator accustom himself to sound thought, to a rigid analysis of his themes, to a thorough discipline of his sensibilities, to a choice selection of words in his ordinary discourse.

On page 3 we find the following definition of extemporaneous speech; "Extemporization consists of speaking on the first impulse; that is to say: without a preliminary arrangement of phrases. It is the instantaneous manifestation, the expression of an actual thought, or the sudden explosion of a feeling or mental movement." We here, as elsewhere in the volume, notice a new word, not authorized by Webster, even in his latest edition, — the word *extemporization*; and we are sorry to see that, in more than one instance, the word *improvisation* is used as synonymous with *extemporization*. This mode of defining "extemporaneous discourse" misrepresents unfavorably the general spirit of the volume. M. Bautain does not encourage *improvisation*; but he stimulates the orator to a profound and accurate investigation of his subject, to the logical arrangement of its parts, the preparation of written notes for the main heads or divisions of the theme, the careful review of the discourse after it has been delivered, and such alterations of the previously formed plan as were suggested in the fervor of public speaking. Nothing, indeed, is strictly extemporaneous, except the general flow of the language, and those thoughts which incidentally present themselves, in the glow of the sympathetic delivery. The *improvisation* is partial, incidental; indeed, in the strict use of language, it is *improvisation* only by analogy.

¹The Art of Extempore Speaking. Hints for the Pulpit, the Senate, and the Bar. By M. Bautain, Vicar General and Professor at the Sorbonne, etc., etc. With Additions by a Member of the New York Bar. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street. 1859. pp. 364. 18mo.

We are particularly pleased with this volume, on account of its religious deference to *the laws of nature*. It does not waste itself in detailing minute rules for the extemporaneous orator, but it refers him to general principles, founded in the constitution of the human mind. It stimulates him to "follow his inspiration." It thus avoids the common fault of treatises on rhetoric, which is the multiplication of artificial and empirical prescriptions for the style and delivery of a discourse. The laws of nature, too, are regarded in this volume, not as blind forces, but as the ordinances of God, and as immediately administered by God. Hence the orator is required to be a reverential man. He must be in sympathy with the Author and Ruler of mind. He must recognize eloquence as a gift of Heaven. He must feel his dependence on the great Being who superintends all our mental processes. He must be a man of prayer; *vir bonus peritus dicendi*. The whole treatise proceeds on the principle, *Pectus est quod disertum facit*, and this principle is developed in a truly philosophical spirit.

While there is much in this volume worthy of commendation, there is not an entire freedom from fault. We notice the same metaphor repeated and reiterated, often pushed into an allegory, and sometimes mistaken for an argument. We read too frequently of the "fecundated germ" of thought, the "mental incubation of meditation," etc. The old Greek comparison of the delivery of an oration with the begetting, the conception, and the birth of a child, is carried out by M. Bautain, into very minute details, and becomes anatomical, rather than rhetorical. He is occasionally indelicate, as well as artificial, in his extension of his metaphors. "The best way," he says, "is to go with resolution straight to the heart of your subject, the main idea, and to disembowel it, so to speak, in order to get forth its entrails, and lay them out" (p. 249). Our author's imagination is not only rich, but rank. It is fertile, but has been poorly cultivated. His taste is not severely chastised, and his fancies occasionally control his judgment. Here and there he presses his metaphors and allegories into the inmost structure of theology. Thus the plainest rules for sensible discourse lead our author into the depths of the theory of eternal generation. In advising the orator to meditate closely on his theme, to become familiar with it, he says that "a fecundation of the mind, or *subject*, is affected by the *object*; and the result is the idea of the object, begotten and brought into a living state in the understanding, by its own force." He then proceeds:

"If the mind be simple, unwarped, pure, greedy of knowledge, and eager after truth, — when it places itself before the object fully, considers it generally, at the same time that it opens itself unreservedly to its light, with a wish to be penetrated by it, and to penetrate it, to become united to it with all its strength and capacity; and if, further, it have the energy and persistency to maintain itself in this attitude of attention without distraction, and collecting all its faculties, concentrating all its lights, it makes them converge upon this single point, and becomes wholly absorbed in the union which thus ensures intellectual fecundity, the conception then takes place after a normal and a plenary fashion. The very life of the object or thing

contemplated passes with its light into the subject or mind contemplating, and from the life-endowed mental germ springs the IDEA, at first weak and darkling, like whatever is newly-begotten, but growing afterwards by the labor of the mind and by nutrition. It will become gradually organized, full-grown, and complete; as soon as its constitution is strong enough to emerge from the understanding, it will seek the birth of words, in order to unfold to the world the treasures of truth and life which it contains within it.

"But if it be only examined obliquely, under an incidental or restricted agent, the result will be a conception analogous to the connection which produces it, and consequently an idea of the object, possessing perhaps some truth and some life, but representing the object only in one phase, only in part, and thus leading to a narrow and inadequate knowledge.

"It is clear that as it is in the physical, so in the moral world. Knowledge is formed by the same laws as existence; the knowledge of metaphysical, like that of sensible things, although these differ essentially in their nature and in their limits. The laws by which life is transmitted are those by which thought is transmitted, which is, after its own fashion, conceived and generated; a fact arising from the application to the production of all living beings of the eternal law of the Divine generation, by which the Being of beings, the Principle of life, Who is life itself, engenders in Himself His image or His Word, by the knowledge which he has eternally of Himself, and by the love of His own perfection, which he contemplates."

THEREMIN'S RHETORIC.¹

THE favorite phrases of Theremin are, that "Eloquence is a Virtue;" the nature of Eloquence is ethical; "Eloquence is not only the most innocent of all influences, but is Virtue itself." He does not ordinarily mean, by these phrases, that simple virtue, without any attendant instrumentalities, is Eloquence, but that the ethical law determines *where, how, and in what degree*, the orator shall employ the various means of persuading the will. He does not ordinarily mean that Eloquence consists merely in that holiness of heart which will be rewarded with everlasting life; but he would probably add, that it consists, also, in that ethical principle which is called natural virtue. When Theremin affirms, "Every man wills to fulfil his duty, wills to form himself to virtue, wills to promote his own happiness" (p. 74), he does not commonly intend to teach that every man is holy, possesses true, spiritual religion, but that every man is more or less actuated by the impulses of natural virtue. He says: "Every man by nature possesses the ethical ideas" (p. 139); and his general principle is, that an idea

¹ Eloquence a Virtue: or, Outlines of a Systematic Rhetoric. Translated from the German of Dr. Francis Theremin, by William G. T. Shedd. With an Introductory Essay. Revised edition. Andover: Warren F. Draper; Boston: Gould and Lincoln; New York: Wiley and Halsted; Philadelphia: Smith, English and Co. 1859. pp. 216. 12mo.

is in itself energetic, contains an impulse to activity; and an ethical idea therefore excites to virtuous action. But this virtuous action is not, necessarily, that holiness of heart which is the condition of endless blessedness. The general theory of Theremin seems to be, not that every eloquent orator must be a regenerate man, but that every such orator must have either true religion, or else that kind of goodness which is denominated pathematic, pathological, (natural, animal,—a goodness connected with voluntary acts, but not necessarily consisting in the supreme love to God, and the spiritual abnegation of self. He does indeed assert that, among the heathen, “not even a purely moral Eloquence could be developed along with practical Eloquence,” “and that a religio-moral Eloquence did not appear until Christianity appeared. This species of Eloquence rises and sets according as faith in a divine revelation grows stronger or weaker” (pp. 98, 99). But Theremin here distinguishes between Eloquence and “a purely moral,” “a religio-moral” Eloquence. It must be confessed, that there is often a confusion, an indefiniteness, an oscillation in this author's use of terms; but the main current of his phraseology is not inconsistent with the positions, that all men, whether eloquent or not, are totally depraved, until they are regenerated, and that the mere gift of Eloquence is no proof of a will renewed and sanctified by the Holy Ghost. The phrase, “Eloquence is a Virtue,” starts many objections; but, as generally used by Theremin and his disciples, it is little more than a condensed, terse, epigrammatic, and impressive way of asserting such propositions as the following: the *highest species of Eloquence involves, rather than is, true holiness of heart; all Eloquence involves, rather than is, either the reality or the appearance of either spiritual or pathological goodness; morality and holiness are always conducive to the intrinsic power of an orator, and would promote his success, even if they did not augment his inherent ability; every effort of the orator ought to be made with a holy motive on his part, and with a design to awaken holy feelings in his hearers; every effort of the orator does and must spring from his own moral action, and tend to the moral action of his auditors; it therefore does and must possess a moral nature, and produce a moral result; and while this moral nature may be wrong, it ought to be right; and if it be right, the Eloquence is the greater; and while this moral result may be bad, it ought to be good; and if it be good, it indicates that the Eloquence was, so far forth, coincident with the laws of the soul. These and similar ideas are suggested throughout the volume of Theremin, particularly on pp. 64—71, 89, 90, 156—178, 206.*

We are pleased with the distinction which Theremin, Schott, and other German rhetoricians draw between Eloquence and Philosophy,—the former being the *picturesque*, and the latter being the *statuesque* method of exhibiting a theme. We are pleased with the emphatic manner in which Theremin and other rhetoricians require an orator to show the *possibility* of the course which he recommends. If he would persuade men to perform a duty, he must convince them that the duty is *practicable*; see pp. 91, 106, 115, et al.

The Introductory Essay which Professor Shedd has prefixed to this valuable treatise, is elaborate, vigorous, impressive. It excites the mind, not only to thought, but also to the expression of thought, to inward and outward activity. The whole volume is characterized by a freshness and originality of remark, a purity and earnestness of moral feeling. If the style of Theremin were less hyperbolical, the influence of the volume would be more healthful.

KINGSLEY'S SERMONS.¹

This new volume of Sermons evinces its author's rare power of language, and his directness, occasional pungency of appeal to the conscience. Few preachers clothe their thoughts in so plain and simple an attire. The ease and naturalness of Mr. Kingsley in his Discourses, are a model for our more evangelical pastors.

One of the most striking sermons in this volume is entitled: "A God in Pain," and among the bold utterances in this discourse (for Good Friday), none is more adventurous than the following: "And so God is a being which man can love, admire, have fellow-feeling for; cling to God with all the noble feelings of his heart, with admiration, gratitude and tenderness, even on this day with pity" (p. 336). It is taught by some theologians who do not believe in the real suffering, much less in the death of the *Godhead*, that it is yet proper to affirm, in theological treatises and in theological style: *God suffered and died*. If this be proper, then Mr. Kingsley is consistent, decorous and accurate, in affirming that we *may look on God with pity*. But we are appalled by such a remark. It is no more correct than a scientific formula: "Jehovah died and was buried."

While we find many utterances in this volume which are in sympathy with an extravagant hyper-orthodoxy, we find still more which are latitudinarian and disorganizing. We discover many signs of the author's disbelief in the doctrine of endless punishment. The volume becomes particularly injurious on this account. It proves nothing on the subject, but makes those bold assertions, those unqualified, startling appeals which create a prejudice against the truth, and tend to undermine the whole Christian faith. If the doctrine of eternal punishment be not true, then sin is not so great an evil as to require an atonement; there is no need of what Mr. Kingsley calls "a God in pain," on whom we may take "pity." We accordingly find, that while the author of these Discourses employs extravagant language in describing the Incarnation, he yet rejects the very substance of the atonement, and the essential idea of Justification by Faith.

¹ The Good News of God. Sermons by Charles Kingsley, Rector of Eversley. New York: Burt, Hutchinson and Abbey, 523 Broadway. 1859. pp. 270. 12mo.

RAMBLES AMONG WORDS.¹

THIS volume was designed for the entertainment of its readers. Its materials are not arranged on philosophical principles, but in a form adapted to interest the popular mind. Many of its suggestions are enlivening; some of them, amusing. As the work was not intended to be scientifically philological, it ought not to be sweepingly condemned for its want of philological exactness.

In the researches of etymology, there is an ever-present danger of substituting fancy for judgment; an imaginative resemblance between words, for an historical connection. The present volume has by no means escaped this peril: see its conjectures with regard to the words *Cant* (p. 129), *Gospel* (p. 64), *News* (p. 141). The volume contains various inaccurate statements: as, on p. 45, it informs us that “a *meeting* almost always conveys the idea of something sinister hidden beneath it;” whereas this “sinister” design is very seldom intimated by the word. On pp. 184, 185, we read: “Right is no other than *rectum* (*regitum*), the participle of the Latin verb *regere*, to order, to command.” “Right, then, is just what is *ordered, commanded, laid down*, in the laws of eternal justice.” But the primary meaning of the word *regere* is not *to order, to command*, but *to stretch, to keep or lead in a straight line*; and the etymological history of the word *right* is not that which is *commanded, ordered*, but that which is *stretched so as to be straight*. The etymology of the word does not favor the idea that rectitude is founded in the will of a ruler; but rather the idea that rectitude is founded in the nature of things. (See p. 186, on Rectitude.)

HITCHCOCK'S RELIGION OF GEOLOGY.²

THE first edition of this excellent work was published in 1851. The present edition contains a new and valuable lecture, of sixty-eight pages, giving a summary of the author's present opinions on the whole subject of the connection of religion with geology and its kindred sciences. In this lecture, Prof. Hitchcock resists the attempt to interpret the first chapters of Genesis as scientific statements of geological truth, or as minutely accurate in developing the order and method of the successive creations. He adopts, as our readers well know, the theory that the Mosaic narrative was designed, not to be a philosophical or chronological history of the creative

¹ *Rambles among Words: their Poetry, History and Wisdom.* William Swinton. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street; London: Sampson Low, Son and Co. 1859. pp. 302. 12mo.

² *The Religion of Geology, and its Connected Sciences.* By Edward Hitchcock, D. D., LL. D., late President of Amherst College, and Professor of Natural Theology and Geology. A New Edition: with an Additional Lecture, giving a Summary of the author's present views of the whole subject. Boston: Phillips, Sampson and Company. 1859. pp. 592.

work ; but to represent, in successive pictures, the acts of God, and the changes of the created universe. The great truths relating to the divine agency and its results, are exhibited to us in symbols ; and it is a mistake to interpret these symbols as literal exponents of scientific verities. The word "*day*" means a period of twenty-four hours ; but this period is a symbol of an indefinitely long duration. As the Gospels are not minutely accurate chronological statements, so the first chapters of Genesis contain memorabilia of the first scenes ; and these memorabilia are expressed in words which are more properly termed *symbolical* than *figurative*. The Mosaic record of the creation is not a pictorial *poem*, but a pictorial *history*.

The spirit of Prof. Hitchcock's volume is eminently reverential and Christian. The style is perspicuous and animating. We hope to notice the work hereafter, and in an extended Article.

DWIGHT'S HIGHER CHRISTIAN EDUCATION.¹

THE readers of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* have become acquainted with Mr. Dwight, through his various philological Articles that have appeared in our pages. He is an enthusiastic teacher. The present volume gives lucid evidence of his intense interest in his profession. His fervid utterances are well adapted to awaken, in all instructors, a zeal for the high ends of their calling ; and, in all scholars, a desire for a symmetrical and healthful growth of mind and heart. A fair specimen of Mr. Dwight's earnest diction, and of his large, comprehensive views of mental and moral discipline, is found in his Chapter on the "True Style and Measure of the Higher Christian Education ; first, in reference to the Body ; secondly, in reference to the Intellect ; thirdly, in reference to the Heart." The Intelligence is improved by "acquaintance with Man," "with Science," "with Nature," "with Art," "with God." Under the general topic of "Acquaintance with Nature," he remarks ; "A youth should be taught both at home and in school ; and for this reason, life in the country is so much better than in the city ; to observe the ever-changing forms and scenes of nature, around and above him. Fine landscapes, sunrises and sunsets, the ever-varying clouds, majestic storms with their thunder-trumpets, the moon and stars by night, mountain heights, dells, and gorges and deep caves, the solemn hush of the forest, and its more solemn moan, the calm hour of twilight, the noise of water-falls, the laughing stream, the placid lake, the surging sea, the universal chorus of birds, as the gates of day open at dawn and shut at eve upon us, and all nature full, in high keys and low, of the voices of happy creatures summering away their lives in gladness : what endless food do these all furnish for the inspiration of thought and feeling !

"Beauty of form or outline is to be seen and studied in nature, as also

¹ The Higher Christian Education. By Benjamin W. Dwight, author of "Modern Philology, its History, Discoveries and Results." New York : A. S. Barnes and Burr, 51 and 53 John Street. 1859. pp. 347. 12mo.

beauty of color or of light and shade ; and not alone these mere external aspects, but also the inward order of mechanism, and the designs of love that they reveal, and of which the glittering or elegant exterior is but the fitting enclosure.

"It is surely one of the most surprising proofs of man's inward blindness, that nature, the very book whose letters are largest, and which God holds most closely before the eyes of men, and the only one containing the lessons of His wisdom and love, which is ever opened to the mass of mankind, is still the very one, in which the great majority of the race read not a lesson, and see not even a single letter.

"Let no student feel, wherever he is, that he is denied a high and true intercourse with nature. There are walks for meditation, and heights for prospect even in the crowded city, where swarms cover every open space, and where all original variations of surface are carefully evened ; and the scenery of the sky is there, and of the sea, or of some mighty stream hastening towards it ; whose bosom is ever heaving with the burdens of commerce, and within whose arms its sails, like doves whispering to each other, gather themselves together. And in the want of all material stimulations to poetic sensibility, there are yet books full of thought-pictures of the selectest beauty, which indeed have been nearly always drawn with the most effect by those, who amid the cares of city life have pined for the remembrances of a youth spent under more open skies, and on broader fields, and under the shadow of the everlasting hills."

SMITH'S CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES.¹

"Most sciences," remarks Hume, "in proportion as they increase and improve, invent methods by which they facilitate their reasonings ; and, employing general theorems, are enabled to comprehend, in a few propositions, a great number of inferences and conclusions. History, also, being a collection of facts which are multiplying without end, is obliged to adopt such arts of abridgment." Such a work has been performed for the student of Ecclesiastical History, in these very excellent Tables. The author has made a judicious selection of the materials, from the principal manuals and tables in both sacred and secular history ; and has combined them with great skill and excellent taste. We have been surprised to find such an immense amount of historical data compressed within such narrow limits. The substance of the work is evidently the gradual accumulation of years ; but the more immediate labor of putting the aggregate into form, for the press, must have been severe. The student will here find given to his hand, and indexed, the statistical matter of many volumes in German, English, and French, together with no little amount of philosophic generalization.

¹ History of the Church of Christ in Chronological Tables, by Henry B. Smith, D. D. New York : Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street.

The most interesting, and yet the least complete, portion of such a work as this, is the column that includes the intellectual and doctrinal history of the church. It is impossible to do justice to this subject, within the inexorable limits of the table. Vorlander's attempt to tabularize Neander's doctrinal section, is a constant conflict between the wish to be compact, and the desire to be comprehensive. Hence, his tables verge closely upon the manual. Professor Smith's tables, in this respect, will compare favorably with either those of Hagenbach or Vorlander; and yet it would not always be safe for a student blindly to infer the intellectual tendency of a distinguished mind, from the brief disconnected extract to which the tabulist is confined. What, for example, would be the inference of a servile reader, respecting the anthropology of Wiclif, from the statement that "Wiclif argues against all Pelagianism, and in favor of a strict necessity: *Deus necessitat creaturas singulas activas ad quemlibet actum* (p. 48. m)?" Similar extracts might be quoted from the dogmatic and polemic writings of Luther and Calvin. And yet, nothing would be more inaccurate than the deduction which they warrant, if taken thus in isolation. It would be like inferring the theology of Cowper from the lines:

. . . . there lives and works
A soul in all things, and that soul is God.

Still, Historical Tables, and these in particular, are a great aid to an advanced student, even within the province of internal history; because such an one is competent to make the requisite qualifications, and to look up the citations in their original connections. After a careful study of the general history, the monograph, the immediate sources, and the manual, there is no more important exercise, than to review and condense the whole, in the clear and succinct resumé of these tables.

We observe typographical errors which will doubtless be corrected in future issues from the plates. We notice, also, that Professor Smith repeats the error, to which some currency has been given of late, of representing the elder Edwards as rejecting the doctrine of immediate imputation, and holding to that of "mediate imputation" (p. 73, m). Neither Edwards nor Stapfer adopted the view of the school of Saumur, but held, as did Turretine and Heidegger, to *both* immediate and mediate imputation.

We hope that the author and the publisher of these very convenient and elegant tables may find their reward for their labors, in an extensive circulation. It is one of the encouraging signs of the times, that historical works are multiplying in our young and unhistorical country; and, among the publications of the American press, we know of no one that will do more to facilitate the studies of historical students than this.

THE PRONUNCIATION, VOWEL-SOUNDS, AND ACCENTUATION OF THE
LATIN LANGUAGE, by W. CORSSSEN. First volume. 1858.¹

THE Prize offered by the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin for the best treatise on the Ancient Pronunciation of the Latin Language, furnished the occasion for the present work. It received the prize from the Academy in 1857, and has since been carefully revised for publication. The plan of the work embraces three distinct topics: I. The Latin Alphabet; II. The System of Vowel-Sounds; III. Accentuation. The last subject, which is reserved for a future volume, will embrace: 1. The System of Accentuation; 2. Its Relation to Latin Versification. The volume before us discusses the first two topics, under a long array of sub-divisions.

The work bears unmistakable evidence of ripe scholarship, and of patient research. It is a thorough and elaborate investigation, evincing a familiarity with the literature of the subject, and a ready command of all the requisite materials, whether furnished by Latin poets, by ancient grammarians, by inscriptions, or by modern research. A thorough and exhaustive treatise on this subject, like the one before us, could have been produced only by the present school of philology. Many of its conclusions could have been reached only in the light of recent philological researches. It could not have preceded the great works of Lachmann, Ritschl, Mommsen, Hensen, Bopp, and Lepsius, for it is itself the fruit of these works. We commend it to the attention of American scholars, as the most learned and complete investigation of the subject with which we are acquainted.

PROF. SCHAFF'S HYMN BOOK.²

There are some important differences between a German and an American or English collection of hymns for the sanctuary. One of the most notable distinctions is seen in the comparative length of the hymns. The Germans are so enthusiastically attached to sacred song, that they love to sing sixty or seventy lines at one time. The first hymn in Dr. Schaff's Collection consists of forty lines; the sixth, of seventy-two lines; the one hundredth and tenth contains one hundred lines.

Dr. Schaff has made a rich selection from the treasures of German song. It is refreshing to peruse these old and deeply spiritual stanzas; and to reflect on their wonderful history. The historical notes of Dr. Schaff are also

¹ Ueber Aussprache, Vocalismus, und Betonung der lateinischen Sprache.

² Deutsches Gesangbuch. Eine Auswahl geistlicher Lieder aus allen Zeiten der christlichen Kirche. Nach den besten hymnologischen Quellen bearbeitet und mit erläuternden Bemerkungen über die Verfasser, den Inhalt und die Geschichte der Lieder versehen: von Philipp Schaff, Doctor und Professor der Theologie. Probe Ausgabe. Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston; Schäffer und Koradi. Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben. 1859. pp. 663. 12mo.

of great interest. He has many admirable qualifications for the work which he has performed, and we shall often feel personally indebted to him for this beautiful selection, and his instructive comments.

TULLOCH'S LEADERS OF THE REFORMATION.¹

The first portraiture in this volume is that of Martin Luther, who has been over-rated as a philosopher, a scholar, an accurate divine; but who wins our admiration as a hero, a large-hearted Christian, a whole-souled man. Inconsistent with himself, imperfectly convinced of even the right of private judgment, he yet snapped the chain that held in bondage the mind of the race, and he broke open the way through which others have arrived at a system of doctrines more harmonious with each other than he had learned.

The second portraiture is that of John Calvin. It is vivid in a high degree. In many passages, it is more brilliant than any other description of Calvin in the English language. The character of the Reformer is analyzed in a masterly way. Its dark lines are here and there too heavily shaded; but, on the whole, the impression of the critique is nearer to the historical truth, than is the impression which we generally obtain from so brief an analysis. Simple and severe, unimaginative and ungenial, laborious and persevering, acute, penetrating, logical, devout, Calvin achieved for a theological system, what Luther achieved for one glowing truth.

Hugh Latimer is the third character portrayed in this volume. We have perused the description of this plain and honest preacher, the willing and even joyous martyr, with less interest than is awakened by the greater and richer characters that were previously exhibited to us. Dr. Tulloch evinces his usual candor and penetration in the sketch of the English Reformer, as also in the portraiture of John Knox, with which he concludes his brilliant volume.

The Works of Nathanael Emmons, D. D., Third Pastor of the Church in Franklin, Mass. With a Memoir by Jacob Ide, D. D. Vol. II. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication, 23 Chauncey Street. 1860. pp. 838. 8vo.

Clergymen and intelligent laymen will derive solid instruction from the sound thoughts, expressed in the lucid style, of Dr. Emmons. The present volume commences his System of Theology. The first volume will not be published until the other five shall have been completed. The Society which undertakes the publication of this great work, deserves the liberal patronage of thinking men.

¹ Leaders of the Reformation: Luther, Calvin, Latimer, Knox, the Representative Men of Germany, France, England, and Scotland. By John Tulloch, D. D., Principal and Primarius Professor of Theology, St. Mary's College, St. Andrew's; author of "Theism" (Burnet Prize Treatise), etc. pp. 309. 12mo.

PAUL THE PREACHER; or, a Popular and Practical Exposition of his Discourses and Speeches, as recorded in the Acts of the Apostles. By John Eadie, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the United Presbyterian Church. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1859. pp. 453. 12mo.

Dr. Eadie happily compares this volume to the "dial of the watch, which shows the hour while it conceals the mechanism." The work indicates, everywhere, the labor expended upon it; but it does not obtrude upon the reader all the toilsome processes which it has cost. It gives us graphic pictures of the apostle; condensed and pithy versions of his addresses; and stirs up the reader to an imitation of the man whose last recorded words were: "They will hear it."

GRAHAM LECTURES.—Human Society: its Providential Structure, Relations, and Offices. Eight Lectures, delivered at the Brooklyn Institute, Brooklyn, N. Y., by F. D. Huntington, D. D. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1860. pp. 307. 8vo.

These Lectures are on the following themes: Human Society, 1. a divine appointment; 2. a living instrument of divine thought; 3. a discipline of individual character; 4. a school for mutual help; 5. in relation to social theories; 6. in relation to the intellect; 7. subject to a law of advancement; 8. the sphere of the kingdom of Christ on earth. Many a profound thought, clothed in graceful words, enriches this volume. Its author evinces a habit of wide generalization, and of extensive reading. The spirit of his lectures is religious and evangelical.

Sermons by Richard Fuller, D. D., of Baltimore. New York: Shelden and Company, 115 Nassau street. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1860. pp. 384. 12mo.

Dr. Fuller has been long known as an eloquent preacher. His discourses are written in a fervid style, and exhibit warm and deep emotion. They betray a familiarity with books and with the forum. They are not devoid of classical allusion. Their main excellence, however, is their earnest religious spirit, and their direct energetic, rousing appeal to the conscience and the heart.

The Atonement: Discourses and Treatises, by Edwards, Smalley, Maxcy, Emmons, Griffin, Burge, and Weeks; with an Introductory Essay. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication, Chauncy street. 1859. pp. 596. 8vo.

The Dialogue of Dr. Weeks, contained in this volume, cannot be readily obtained elsewhere, and is of great worth. The Treatise of Mr. Burge has

rare merits, and is not easily accessible, except in the present collection. The Discourses of Dr. Maxcy deserve a far wider circulation than they have yet enjoyed. They will obtain it, we hope, in their new form, by the side of the masterly sermons of Dr. Edwards and Dr. Smalley. The views of Emmons and Griffin are here presented, as they should be, in connection with each other, and deserve a careful study. The doctrine of the Atonement, as presented by the divines of New England whose treatises are now republished, is biblical and reasonable; it has commanded the assent of some of the ablest theologians in Great Britain and America; and is the centre to which the tendencies of the ripest thought of the present day are converging.

A Treatise on Theism and on the Modern Skeptical Theories. By Francis Wharton, Professor in Kenyon College, Ohio. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Company. London: Trübner and Company. 1859. pp. 394. 12mo.

The propositions defended in this volume are generally sound and important. They are arranged with remarkable care, and illustrated with great felicity and skill.

Moral Philosophy: including Theoretical and Practical Ethics. By Joseph Haven, D. D., Professor in Chicago Theological Seminary. Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 59 Washington street. New York: Sheldon and Company. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1859. pp. 366. 12mo.

We have perused this volume with great pleasure. It breathes a philosophical spirit, and is written in a clear and chaste style. It enforces ethical truth by Scriptural argument and Christian appeal. It is well adapted to the wants of the present age.

Political Economy: designed as a Text Book for Colleges. By John Bascom, A. M., Professor in Williams College. Andover: published by W. F. Draper. 1859. pp. 366. 12mo.

WE are seldom more impressed by the fact of the intellectual advancement of the race, than when we peruse a new volume on political economy. The science may be said to have originated in 1776; yet, since that period, it has called forth the energies of the ablest minds, and has developed a wonderful amount of philosophical and historical investigation. Professor Bascom has given us a condensed system of political economy, and has well adapted it to the wants of students in college. We trust that the present volume is an earnest of many scientific contributions, yet to come from his pen.

The History of the Religious Movement of the [Eighteenth Century, called Methodism, considered in its different Denominational Forms, and its Relations to British and American Protestantism. By Abel Stevens, LL. D. Vol. I : From the Origin of Methodism to the Death of Whitefield. Vol. II : From the Death of Whitefield to the Death of Wesley. New York : published by Carlton and Porter, 200 Mulberry street. London : Alexander Heylin, 28 Paternoster Row. pp. 480 and 520. 8vo.

Few persons consider the influence which Methodism has exerted on the literature of the world. It has appealed to the *masses* ; and, by waking up the common mind, has elevated the character of nations. Hence the history of Methodism has a peculiar interest and importance. Dr. Stevens has, thus far, narrated this history with rare candor and fidelity. We anticipate equal evidence of his extensive and careful research, in the concluding parts of the work so auspiciously commenced.

The Book of the Twelve Minor Prophets ; translated from the original Hebrew. With a Commentary Critical, Philological, and Exegetical. By E. Henderson, D. D. With a Biographical Sketch of the Author by E. P. Barrows, Hitchcock Professor in Andover Theological Seminary. Andover : Warren F. Draper. Boston : Gould and Lincoln. New York : John Wiley. Philadelphia : Smith, English, and Co. 1860. pp. 458. 8vo.

In the death of Dr. Henderson, we have suffered a personal loss. He was so genial in his manners, so catholic in his spirit, so rich in his learning, that his departure from the world is a social and a public calamity. We have perused his Memoir with much profit. Professor Barrows has given us a faithful abridgment of it, in the present volume. This Commentary on the Minor Prophets, like that on the Prophecy of Isaiah, has been highly and deservedly esteemed by professional scholars, and has been of great service to the working ministry. We are happy to welcome it in an American Edition, very neatly printed.

The Ancient Church : its History, Doctrine, Worship, and Constitution, traced for the first three hundred years. By W. D. Killen, D. D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History and Pastoral Theology to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland. New York : Charles Scribner, 124 Grand street. 1859. pp. 656. 8vo.

Dr. Killen expresses his own opinions on controverted subjects, with plainness and decision. Many of his opinions we heartily adopt. Some of them we regard as untenable. We admire his frankness and learning. We are particularly pleased with his treatment of the Ignatian Epistles, on pp. 389—428. Dr. Killen is a thorough opponent of the Prelacy, and an equally enthusiastic defender of Presbyterianism. We do not know where the friends of the Presbyterian polity can find a more plausible defence of their denominational views.

The Puritans : or, The Church, Court, and Parliament of England during the Reigns of Edward VI. and Queen Elizabeth. By Samuel Hopkins. In three volumes. Vol. I. Boston : Gould and Lincoln, 59 Washington street. New York : Sheldon and Company. Cincinnati : George S. Blanchard. 1859. pp. 549. 8vo.

The printers and publishers of this work deserve the highest praise for the superb style in which it is issued. There are very few specimens of even English typography that surpass it. Mr. Hopkins writes in a sprightly, graphic style. He gives to his history the interest of a romance. We are excited by the tale ; we turn over the beautiful leaves with enthusiasm. Here lies the excellence, and also the peril of the work. How far it is allowable to introduce supposititious speeches into an historical narrative, is a question of grave moment. What will be the effect of the *imaginary* upon the *historical* authority of the work, we can determine with more accuracy, when the whole work shall have been published. We will not judge of the edifice, by an examination of the mere façade. We would not recommend that the style of the work be less animated than it is ; but a greater dignity would better fit an historical treatise ; especially on the Puritans.

The Christian public of Great Britain and America are under great obligation to Messrs. T. and T. Clark, 38 George Street, Edinburgh, for their inestimable "Foreign Library." We have just risen from consulting their English edition of Hengstenberg's "Christology of the Old Testament, and a Commentary on the Messianic Predictions." It is a *Thesaurus* of materials, in four octavos, on this momentous subject.

We hope to notice more at length hereafter, a profound work from the press of the Messrs. Clark, entitled : "The Essentials of Philosophy, wherein its Constituent Principles are traced throughout the Various Departments of Science : with Analytical Strictures on the Views of some of our Leading Philosophers. By the Rev. George Jamieson, M. A., one of the Ministers of the Parish of Old Machar, Aberdeen." pp. 260. 8vo.

Two other valuable works which we have received during the past year from the same press, are :

"The Primeval World : A Treatise on the Relations of Geology to Theology. By Rev. Paton J. Gloag, author of a 'Treatise on the Assurance of Salvation,' and a 'Treatise on Justification by Faith.'" pp. 194. 12mo.

"Illustrations, Expository and Practical, of the Farewell Discourse of Jesus : being a Series of Lectures on the Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Chapters of the Gospel of St. John. By the late Rev. John B. Paterson, M. A., Minister of Falkirk. Second edition." pp. 479. 12mo.

Among the works which we have received during the past year from Robert Carter and Brothers, 530, Broadway, New York, and which we have not been able to notice at length, are the following :

"An Exposition of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians. By Charles Hodge, D. D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Princeton, N. J." pp. 314. 12mo.

"Sermons by the Rev. H. Grattan Guinness." pp. 363. 12mo.

"The Missing Link; or Bible-Women in the Homes of the London Poor. By L. N. R., author of 'The Book and its Story.'" pp. 302. 12mo.

"The Hart and the Water-Brooks; a Practical Exposition of the Forty-Second Psalm. By the Rev. John R. Macduff, D. D., author of 'Morning and Night Watches,' 'Memories of Gennesaret,' 'Words of Jesus,' 'The Footsteps of St. Paul,' etc., etc." pp. 229. 18mo. — This volume is one of rare practical interest. — Several of its chapters are uncommonly beautiful.

"The Precious Things of God. By Octavius Winslow, D. D." pp. 424. 18mo.

"The Three Wakings. With Hymns and Songs. By the author of 'The Voice of Christian Life in Song.' pp. 228. 18mo.

We have received from Lindsay and Blakiston, Philadelphia, the very valuable "History of the Old Covenant. From the German of J. H. Kurtz, D. D., Professor of Theology at Dorpat. Vol. I. Translated, Annotated, and Prefaced by a Condensed Abstract of Kurtz's 'Bible and Astronomy.' By the Rev. Alfred Edersheim, Ph. D., author of 'History of the Jewish Nation;' translator of 'Chalybäus's Historical Development of Speculative Philosophy,' etc., etc." pp. 380. 8vo. — "Vol. II. Translated by James Martin, B. A., Nottingham." pp. 329. 8vo.

From the same enterprising house of Lindsay and Blakiston we have received:

"The Crucifixion of Christ. By Daniel H. Hill, Superintendent of the North Carolina Military Institute, and late Brevet Major in the United States Army." pp. 345. 12mo.

"The Typology of Scripture: Viewed in Connection with the Entire Scheme of the Divine Dispensations. By Patrick Fairbairn, D. D., Professor of Divinity, Free Church College, Glasgow. In two volumes. From the Third Edinburgh Edition." pp. 399 and 452 8vo. — We have often referred to this work as one of great worth.

"Parochial Lectures on the Psalms. By the late Rev. David Caldwell, A. M. Psalms 1—50." pp. 586. 12mo.

"Lectures on the First Two Visions of the Book of Daniel. By William Newton, Rector of the Church of the Holy Trinity, West Chester, Pennsylvania." pp. 250. 12mo.

"Igdrasil; or The Tree of Existence. By James Challen, author of the Cave of Machpelah, and other Poems." pp. 170. 12mo.

"Anna Clayton; or The Inquirer after Truth. By Rev. Francis Marion Dimmick, A. M." pp. 427. 12mo.

"Frank Elliott; or, Wells in the Desert. By James Challen, author of 'the Cave of Machpelah,' 'Christian Morals,' etc., etc." pp. 347. 12mo.

Among the works which we have received during the past year from Gould and Lincoln, 59 Washington Street, Boston, and which have received from us no extended review, are the following :

"A Commentary, Explanatory, Doctrinal, and Practical, on the Epistle to the Ephesians. By R. E. Pattison, D. D., late President of Waterville College." pp. 230. 12mo. — We have examined this Commentary, and have been highly gratified with its candid and evangelical spirit, its many judicious and sound remarks.

"British Novelists and their Styles: being a Critical Sketch of the History of British Prose Fiction. By David Masson, M. A., Professor of English Literature, University College, London. Author of 'The Life and Times of John Milton,' etc." pp. 312. 18mo. — Professor Masson needs no eulogium. His *Life of Milton*, if we may judge from the first volume of it, will establish his reputation as a man of letters. His '*British Novelists*' is a work of much philosophical as well as literary merit.

"*Gotthold's Emblems: or, Invisible Things understood by Things that are Made.* By Christian Scriver, Minister of Magdeburg in 1671. Translated from the twenty-eighth German edition, by the Rev. Robert Menzies, Hoddam, England." pp. 316. 12mo. — We are delighted to see this work in an American reprint. It is a beautiful volume, and now appears in a beautiful dress.

We have been compelled, thus far, to omit the mention of several works published during the year 1859, by J. E. Tilton and Company, 161 Washington Street, Boston. Among these works is a touching and impressive one entitled: "*Catharine.* By the author of '*Agnes and the Little Key.*' Third thousand." pp. 192. 12mo.

An ingenious and plausible volume, although inaccurate in its reasonings and conclusions, is: "*Eschatology; or, the Scripture Doctrine of the Coming of the Lord, the Judgment, and the Resurrection.* By Samuel Lee." pp. 267. 12mo.

A practical work of much interest is: "*The Mothers of the Bible.* By Mrs. S. G. Ashton. With an Introductory Essay, by Rev. A. L. Stone." pp. 335. 18mo.

THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA,
No. LXVI.
AND
BIBLICAL REPOSITORY,
No. CXVIII.

APRIL, 1860.

ARTICLE I.

ROTHE'S ETHICS.¹

BY REV. C. C. TIFFANY, DERBY, CONN.

DR. RICHARD ROTHE is universally regarded, in Germany, as one of the most richly gifted theologians the nation has ever produced. Widely known as having been connected with the Theological Seminary at Wittenberg, the University at Bonn, and the University at Heidelberg; eminently distinguished for the originality of his views and the extent of his learning as displayed in his volume on "The Beginnings of the Christian Church;" and, moreover, introduced to the English and American Public, in words of the highest encomium and heartiest commendation, by the Chevalier Bunsen in his celebrated work "God and Mankind," we have thought that it might be doing a good service to present to our readers a sketch of the philosophical principles and chief topics of interest contained in his most elaborate work, *The Theological Ethics*; a work which, from its size and peculiar phraseology, we may scarcely hope ever to see translated.

As a theologian, Dr. Rothe is eminently progressive. He

¹ *Theologische Ethik*, von Dr. Richard Rothe. Wittenberg, 1845.

believes in development and growth. He is too historic to cut loose from the past; but he looks backward only to gain impulse to move on.

"Sunt quibus unum opus est, intactæ Palladis arces
Carminē perpetuo celebrare,"

but Dr. Rothe is not one of them. He reveres the past, but he believes also in a future. In the work before us he attempts, while preserving the essence of the Christian faith as contained in the New Testament, to reconstruct its formula in accordance with the scientific requirements of the present age.

Of the origin of this work, the author thus speaks in the Introduction. "I have been constrained, as it were, by an inward necessity, to express my theological views. Although it has ever been my inclination to take a place in some already existing school, I have never been able to do so. In spite of myself, I have gradually erected a theological edifice, of which I am conscious I am the sole occupant. But I have an irresistible desire to break through the limits of this scientific hermitage, and invite others to enter it, even though I thereby incur the charge of importunacy. For my system is no artificial elaboration, but a natural and necessary growth out of the depth of my nature, and it stands in the closest relation to my individual development; it is, in fact, the expression of it." We are thus prepared to expect, in this treatise on theological ethics, a discussion of human life in all its moral bearings. Nor are we disappointed. Our author proposes to himself the task of treating of "the moral," in the widest sense of the word, including in it "the whole life of the human mind, viewed as a mastery of material nature by the rational personality; and this life, not only in its individual form, but also in all the social relations of the family, science and art, church and state. For morality is, to him, the absolute dominion of mind over matter; or of reason over nature: the perfect kingdom of Christ on the new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness." But as morality is based upon religion, a complete discussion of the for-

mer involves, of necessity, a right view of the latter ; and hence we have, as a propaedeutic to the strictly ethical discussion, a treatise on speculative theology. This treatise is the germ of all that follows. It shows us, at once, the method which the author constantly employs, while it reveals the doctrine of God and his relation to Creation, which forms the basis and criterion of man's ethical relations. It is to this part of the work that the present Article will be devoted. To it, therefore, we now turn.

The Nature and Relative Value of Speculative Thought.

In order to show the true method of developing his theory of ethics, Dr. Rothe starts with the inquiry: What is morality? What is that quality, in any subject, which enables us to class it under the general head of moral subjects? He does not ask, with those who have written on moral philosophy among us: "What constitutes the moral quality of an *action*?" His question has reference rather to the grounds on which we ascribe a moral quality, at all. He will not identify morality with goodness, either ; but, acknowledging a moral turpitude, seeks to discover the one quality which goodness and turpitude equally share, and which entitles us to class both under the same category of "moral." To say "that is moral, of which goodness or badness may be affirmed," is no answer to him ; he still reiterates the inquiry: What constitutes a subject such that I call it good or bad ; or, in other words : On what ground can I predicate goodness or badness — on what is based my idea of good and of evil ?

This generic idea of the "moral," must be gained, before we can move a step in our investigation of moral relations. How, then, shall we gain it? Science demands that it shall be gained by a speculative method ; that it shall be developed from its original elements, and not obtained empirically ; religion demands that this idea be not borrowed from philosophy, but that theological speculation develop it. Hence arises the need of a speculative theology, if we are to have a religious and at the same time a scientific doctrine of

ethics. For real ideas — those which lie at the basis of all doctrine and practice — can only be attained in a speculative way; for speculative thought is thought in its purest form. Reflection gives us definitions, but it can never impart an organic system of ideas. Thought, in its deepest significance, is seminal, and produces its completed system out of itself. The fragmentary and disjointed products of reflection, therefore, are not thought, in its purest and strictest form. This, only speculation can be; for that alone is, in the truest sense, germinant.

Speculation is, moreover, distinguished from reflection, in that it is *à priori* in its method, while reflection is *à posteriori*. The one is dialectically critical and empirically contemplative, while the other is constructive and germinant. The latter must have a given object, on which to work; the former produces its thoughts from itself, and develops them with inner logical necessity, thus building up an organic system of mutually dependent ideas, in every one of which the others are implicitly contained. Reflection, however, stands in a most intimate and useful correlation to speculative thought: for, while the speculative thinker is to borrow nothing, but must move onward, in his strictly logical course of thought, looking neither to the right nor to the left for direction or guidance, and while he is to seek for the error in his results, only in a departure from the strictly logical method of his speculation, yet the product of all his thought must be able to stand the most scrutinizing gaze of reflection. The ability to stand this test, is a proof of its validity; for reflection may detect an error which yet it cannot rectify. It may declare there is a fault, which speculation must make good. For the results of speculation and reflection must harmonize, as truly as those of analysis and synthesis; though like these two, the one cannot do the other's work. The reflective method might, perhaps, be compared to the electrical tests brought to bear upon the Atlantic telegraphic cable: they detect faults which a wholly different process must correct. They show that the current is broken, and this proves a defective cable; but the current must be restored by the

wholly different process of rejoining the wire at the point indicated. And thus it is that the speculative error must be righted by a strictly speculative process, while yet the reflective methods, applied to its results, may indicate the nature and extent of the fault. Reflection is thus a most valuable auxiliary, whose aid, however, speculation can only call in when its process is completed; and then only to detect error, not to correct it.

Such being the nature of speculation — its task being to develop its results from their most original elements; its method being, of necessity, isolated and abstract; it is evident that no one man can fulfil its requirements, or exhaust its contents. In its completed form it must produce, in thought, the reflected image of the whole universe. From God to the minutest atom of his creation, is the range of its province. It will show all things, in their entire correlation, which correlation must be made plain by reference to the source of all things, from which it is developed; which source must be understood, in its nature, so that all proceeding from it, may be proved rational and necessary, and not arbitrary or by chance; for, otherwise, it could not be understood. To complete and perfect this formula of the universe, is the task of humanity. No one member of the race can hope to state the vast problem. No one individual may aspire to produce, from himself alone, the scientific statement of the meaning of the universe — the subjective correlative of the objective reality. But, as the attainment of this explanation, in thought, of outward things, is a necessity to man, the individual may contribute to the great result, and help to advance it, though in but a small degree. The speculative thinker, therefore, cannot cut loose from the past, or reject its results. They are invaluable to him; only, he must not depend upon them. He must grow out of them, as they grew out of what preceded them. He must begin at the beginning himself, and work out his own problem, but he will have learned much from them, before he commences his own task.

The Starting Point of Speculative Theology.

The assumption, however, that speculation, because shut up within itself, and pursued irrespective of experience, starts with absolutely no presupposition, is false. In the hand of the creature it is true, to all eternity, *ex nihilo nihil fit*. To create, in the absolute sense, belongs to the majesty of God alone. Man must have some original datum with which to begin his speculation. He must start from some one point, or he will never start at all. But if his method is to be speculative, i. e. *à priori*, this starting point cannot be the beginning, end, and entire course. That which is given to begin with, cannot be the totality of what shall result. Yet if we are to have a development, this original datum must contain implicitly, all that shall follow. It must be, like the acorn, enwrapping within itself the germ of the full-grown oak. This germ, or *πρὸν σπῶν*, must be a real, original element of the consciousness, underived from anything without. It must be, not contingent, but necessary; it must be objectively given, not merely subjectively thought. Its unconditional certainty must be shown by its being the absolute condition of all thought. This datum, therefore, can be nothing else than the pure self-consciousness, distinguished from any particular thing which this consciousness may contain. For self-consciousness, and not what this makes known to us, is the necessary condition of all thought.

It may be objected, that to start with the self-consciousness and develop our speculation from it, is to produce a philosophy, and not a theology; and this objection is valid. How, then, is a speculative *theology* possible? To be speculative, it must start with a datum, which is the condition of all thought. Since this condition, then, is the self-consciousness, a speculative theology must have, as its germ, something necessarily involved in the existence of self-consciousness and conditioning it. This something is the God-consciousness. For self-consciousness is not, originally and essentially, mere consciousness of self; but is, at the same

time, a religiously conditioned self-consciousness. Man is conscious of himself, only as he is, at the same time, conscious of his relation to God. He is as immediately conscious of the one as of the other, for the two are inextricably intertwined. Within the circle of theology, which lies within the province of piety, this cannot be a controverted question ; for there can be no theology without the presupposition of piety, and the recognition of its absolute validity. Those who do not recognize the religious element as an original element of human nature, cannot be convinced of it by proof. The presupposition that it is, is essential to any just understanding of the subject. For piety ceases to be piety, when proof of its reality and the reality of the object which awakens it, is necessary to establish its certainty. It cannot maintain its character and be dependent upon anything outside of itself for its validity. Its creed is : " God is as immediately certain to me, as my own self ; " " I am first assured of my own existence, when I am sure of God's existence."

Speculative theology must, then, start from the God-consciousness as its datum, and from that, and that alone, develop itself, as philosophy unfolds itself out of the self-consciousness. Both these systems aim at a theoretical construction of the universe *à priori*: philosophy, by means of the idea¹ of the " me ; " theology, by means of the idea of " God."

The Relations of Speculative Theology,

1. TO RELIGION. Piety demands this speculative procedure. Its highest interests cannot be subserved without it. And this is so, not because it is not immediately and completely certain of its own reality and sure foundation, but that it may fully comprehend itself. Originally, at the very outset, it feels the truth ; but it must not only feel it,

¹ Strictly speaking it is incorrect to say that either philosophy or theology start with an *idea*. The feeling or consciousness which is the starting-point is not yet an *idea* ; it becomes such only by a matured process of thought.

it must also understand ; it must feel after it, if haply it may *find* it. Speculative theology aims to satisfy this want of the understanding. Its relation to religion is equivalent to the relation of philosophy to the intellect. The one is the development of what is contained in the other. It is the tree, not potentially in the seed, but, in actual, full growth. As piety in its complete form, and when true to its rightful claims, concerns itself not only with the heart and feelings, but permeates the whole nature, leavens the understanding and the will, and modifies and directs the powers of perception and of action, speculative theology is a necessary demand of piety. It springs immediately out of a religious interest ; for it insures an understanding of what is acknowledged as fact, and gives to it an adequate expression in ideas. Piety, however, has an absolute authority over speculative theology, just as facts have a control over the science which explains them. The former proves a rule and measure for the latter. As that is a false science which rejects or perverts known facts, so that is a false theology which overlooks or disturbs the interests of piety. Speculation to be speculation, must indeed develop itself from its original idea ; but its completed process must agree with the religious consciousness. Thus (as before stated), while independent of facts in its method, it must correspond to them in its results. And while a true speculation, starting from a true datum, cannot err, any particular speculation may ; and so its results must be compared with facts, in order to prove its truth.

2. To DOGMA. Speculative theology will differ with every different form of religion, notwithstanding the strenuously strict nature of the speculative process ; for, in every such religion there is a different starting point, which must affect the whole subsequent movement ; and a different test, by which the result must be tried. There is, therefore, a special Christian speculative theology, and even this will vary in differing parts of the church. It is in this diversity of sentiment that we discover the origin of speculative theology and the immediate impulse to its attainment. For, while a dogma satisfies all, there is no need or occasion for any fur-

ther development of it. Protestantism first gave a chance for it to exist; and when it arises, it is a sign that the church is beginning to change its form; for its peculiar province is, to extend and develop the dogma, to get greater fulness; and in this good sense, therefore, speculative theology is essentially heterodox. Not that it will take away any vital function of doctrine; not that it will add anything foreign to the body; but in that it will develop the dogma yet further, and so will change its form. It cannot, therefore, be bound by the dogmas of the church.

3. TO THE BIBLE. Wholly different, however, is the relation of speculative theology to the holy scriptures. These, being the authentic expression of the pious Christian consciousness, in its original purity and fulness, must be recognized as an authoritative canon. In the Bible, the speculative theologian must be able to show the germ of all his constructions, and all the links of his system. But while this is true, he must not mistake the sharp scientific expressions of his speculation for contradictions of that which is only expressed in general and popular language by the sacred writers. If, however, a real difference appear between the two, the speculative theologian must acknowledge himself at fault, and immediately begin to search for his error; since no such difference could have appeared, had he reasoned rightly. Still, the speculative process must be carried on, without even a side glance at the scriptures, until it is completed, or coming at all under their authority, save in its results. Like a boy with a difficult problem to solve, he must first work it, and then look to the key only to ascertain if the answer is right. It will be seen that this reference to the Bible and the church confessions, as expressions of its truth, takes away the *individual* character of the speculation. And this is especially evident when we consider that the speculation presupposes such an individual religious consciousness in the speculative thinker as reflects in itself the general religious consciousness of the church.

The Relation of Theological Ethics,

1. TO PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS. Theological ethics are thus distinguished from philosophical ethics, in that the latter proceed from the moral consciousness as such, while the former grow from the moral consciousness considered as a religiously limited possession of the individual, and from the historically given ideal in the Redeemer, of which the former is the reflection.

2. TO DOGMATIC THEOLOGY. Theological ethics are also distinguished from dogmatic theology, in that they belong to a different and yet equally important department of theology: the former is a part of speculative theology; the latter, a part of historical theology. They are distinguished from each other, not by their subject matter, but by the different mode of its scientific treatment. The object of dogmatic theology is to reduce the various dogmas of the church, separately and historically given, to an organic and scientific system. But, while this procedure includes speculative elements, this only shows that dogmatics presuppose speculative theology, and not that the two are identical. Theological ethics, on the contrary, has nothing to do with church teaching, but must proceed in a purely speculative manner. It forms an integral part of speculative theology, which divides itself into two chief divisions: first, theology, in the narrower sense; second, cosmology; which last is subdivided into ethics and physics, corresponding to the moral and natural worlds. With ethics, speculative theology completes its course.

3. TO BIBLICAL ETHICS. Theological ethics, even as evangelical, cannot, without explanation, be declared identical with biblical teaching. The Bible contains no doctrine of morals as such. There is, throughout both the Old and New Testaments, a religious doctrine which is the norm of theological ethics. In this sense, theological ethics represent biblical teaching. They are not, however, a transcript of the same.

The Basis of Theological Ethics.

A scientific construction of the doctrine of morality can only be accomplished after we have obtained a clear idea of what morality is. To apprehend this idea is, therefore, the indispensable prerequisite to a thorough ethical treatise. And if it be true, as we have before remarked, that this idea can only be gained in the earlier portions of a speculative theology, where it may show itself unsought, then we are compelled to begin this course of speculative thought; for we have no such system to refer to; and hence arises our necessity, first of all, to construct speculatively, from a theological point of view, theology in its narrower sense, and then cosmology to that point where it passes beyond the realm of physics and enters that of ethics.

We have already indicated the religious consciousness, and for us the evangelical consciousness, as the point from which theological speculation must start. In this, no proof is needed, it being the surest of all things. This particular Christian consciousness, as well as the general religious consciousness, is, in its essence, a God-consciousness; so that its very first object is God. Out of this object it develops all other objects as lying implicitly in it; i. e. it knows all things by means of a knowledge of God. Inclosed in this consciousness we have, not only a feeling or an intimation, but also a *thought* of God. Originally, this thought is not a completed one, but it exists in the form of a mere vague conception. This vagueness, however, does not disparage the truth of the content of the conception, though it does show the incompatibility of the form to the substance, and thus, at the same time, indicates the propriety of developing it into a clear idea of God. Now in the vague notion of God, he is conceived, on the one hand, as the Unconditioned, or the Absolute, and yet, on the other, as partaking of a multitude of positive characteristics, by which he is conditioned, the Infinite. These two conceptions, which are equally valid, contradict each other. They would not, however, contradict

each other, nor would the latter appear to be a limitation of the divine nature, were these characteristics seen to be conditioned only by the Absolute itself. But this can only be made manifest by means of the dialectical mode of procedure. These different characteristics may be seen as absolutely related, when conceived as implicitly contained the one in the other. For this end, however, we must gain such an idea of God as shall contain, as its essential constituents, both these conceptions (of absoluteness and infinity), so seemingly contradictory. But this can be gained only in a speculative theology.

The dialectical process can meet the demand only by getting rid of all those ingredients¹ in the thought of God, which contradict the substance of the idea. We, therefore, must begin with the thought of the Absolute, the primal and essential conception, and proceed from that.² On a closer analysis we discover the idea of *Aseität*, or that God is *causa sui* (a se), included in that of absoluteness. So the eternity of God is only his absoluteness viewed in the light of his self-origination (*aseität*). The unity of God is also included in his absoluteness, for the Unconditioned can only be conceived of as One. A number of Absolutes destroys the very idea of the Unconditioned; since we could only conceive of these as standing under relation to each other, or, in other words, as conditioned. By means of this procedure, we necessarily attain to the thought of God as the Absolutely Pure Being, i. e. the absolutely predicateless Being. Further than this, we cannot carry the negative process, for nothing remains, beyond pure being, but pure non-being. We must not, however,

¹ If in the course of the exposition upon which we are now entering, the phrases used may seem awkward and unintelligible, the writer can only plead as an excuse, the author's mode of thought, so foreign to the English mind, and consequently so difficult to be expressed in English phraseology. Indeed, Dr. Rothe often coins new German words for his own especial use.

² The thought of the absolute originally arises from reflection on the existence seen in the world. In this province we find every individual existence conditioned in a causal way through others, both in regard to its existence and the mode of its existence. The necessary reaction against this is the thought of something conditioned by itself — of an existence absolutely *causa sui* — standing in relation to all else as cause and not as effect.

conceive of this absolute pureness as a particular condition. Nothing is predicated in this thought but absolute simplicity of being, a self-identity in form and content—the indifference-point, as it were—between subject and predicate. But these are mere negative predicates. God is so far only conceived as pure existence, not as something existing. Yet in this relation we call him, most properly, the Absolute Being. In this thought is the thought of the absolute Substance; the idea of substance, being that of the substratum which forms the basis for all the predicates of being. Thus God as Absolute Being, is, for us, the absolutely hidden God, since thought is discriminating, and here God is conceived, as without distinction. Indeed this God—the God of the pantheist—must be one hidden to himself; unconscious, because unrevealed, even to himself. Here God is nothing, in the sense of *not anything*, nothing separated or distinct. And yet, while this is, for our thought, purely negative, the object is not negative and empty, but contains a fulness of being, although as yet undistinguished. It is, as it were, the solution, before the string is put into it, around which it may crystalize into tangible shape. It contains all as possible, though nothing as actual. The idea of possibility, however, is the idea of potency. Positively expressed, then, the absolute being, which is yet nothing (that is, as above, no-thing definite), is Absolute Potence. So the positive expression, for the negative formula: “God is absolute, pure being,” is: God is the Absolute Potence, the Absolute Power. But this Absolute Potence can only be thought of as actualizing itself, and that in an absolute way. In this actualization, however, God does not lay aside his absolute being, but merely re-asserts it. In the very act of removing his potentiality, he posits it anew; and only thus is he conditioned through himself, or *causa sui*. The meaning of the proposition that God, as pure being, i. e. as Absolute Potentiality, actualizes himself, is this; that he brings out *in actu*, what is in him *in potentia*. In this process, he must lose his absolute simplicity of existence, and distinguish the content of his being from its predicateless form. He thus becomes an object to

himself, as well as subject; in other words, becomes conscious of himself, or thinks. This involves a consciousness of himself, as something set and something thought. Hence as actualized potentiality, God distinguishes himself as *real* and *ideal*; and these two not separate, but thoroughly interpenetrated, and completely coincident and equivalent. Thus God is the absolute unity of the *real* and *ideal*, of being and thought. This, however, is the essential idea of *spirit*; and so God, in actualizing his potentiality, determines himself as Spirit. For spirit is not merely thought, nor is it merely being, but the absolute unity of the two. It is analogous to art. All the ideas in the world are not art. All the existence is not. Art is the idea embodied in a form which perfectly expresses it. So spirit is the complete identity of thought and being.

God, in thus determining himself as Spirit, determines himself to a process of development. For this distinction, in himself, of ideal and real, is essentially an unfolding act, the unfolding of all contained in the absolute Spirit. This, however, in its nearer idea, is the idea of Nature. So that God, as Spirit, determines himself as Nature. For Nature is not something made. It is from *nasci*, and is distinguished from derivatives of *facere*, in that it is a development from within outward, and not something created by means of outward force brought to bear upon it. Nor does it include the idea of materiality. The divine Nature is a biblical idea. The Nature of God is his instrument of revelation.

But God, in that he determines himself as object, at the same time determines himself as subject; for the one involves the other. Thought and determination demand a thinker and a determiner. This thinking is self-consciousness, which, in its perfected form, is reason. The determining is self-activity, which, in its perfect form, is freedom. So that God, in objectifying himself, determines himself, under the form of absolute Nature, to *absolute reason* and *freedom*. The self-consciousness and self-activity, in this their absolute form, constitute absolute Personality; and only in personality does the divine nature become truly *organism*, because here,

first, the particular characteristics are all blended into one bearing the characteristics. While then Personality is, as it were, the completing of the divine nature, it is as well a new, peculiar form of existence. For that alone is true personality which receives all, that else were separate and particular, into itself as the form of itself, and not merely as a determination or characteristic joined to it. It is thus a new self-contained form of being. This distinction between nature and personality is seen in man; who, though the last link in the chain of nature, is yet above and distinct from it, belonging no more to the sphere of material nature, but existing a self-contained being in another sphere. But personality does not wholly absorb nature, or remove it. The two mutually demand each other. The divine nature only has true existence when it results in divine Personality. But it lies also in the idea of divine Personality, to have the divine Nature as its cause. Both must have real existence, or neither can exist. God as absolute spirit, must have both: he must be *ἐν καὶ πᾶν*. As, in *nature*, the content of God's being was *realized*, so, in *personality*, we have its *perfected* form. The relation of the two is that of mutual action and reaction; and hence we have the LIVING GOD. The union of nature and personality constitutes God a Person. Personality is the idea of which person is the realization, but it is realized only in and through nature; just as, in art, the thought is realized only in and through the material, the union of both being what, alone, neither one could be, viz., art. As Person, then, God is the Revealed God. Here, then, must end the development of the idea of God, for here the idea is completed. In the Revealed God we have the many and the one conjoined, the general and the particular organically united; and, with this, the content of the God-thought of the pious consciousness is exhausted. It is only necessary to remember that the process of development here described is an absolute process, to keep clear of the erroneous and dangerous thought that God is not, always and from eternity, complete—the “I AM.” In the absolute process, time is necessarily excluded; there can be no such thing as succession in time, in the Ab-

solute Being. The succession is logical; only, we represent it to our minds as temporal, because we cannot rid ourselves of this mode of conception. But the absolute process is wholly beyond the sphere of time, and is not to be confounded with temporal affairs.

The result of this dialectical process shows, therefore, that God only truly is, when he exists in the three modi, of Being, Nature, and Personality. These modi, of course, are eternal; and are objectively existing, not merely subjectively conceived. This threefoldness, however, is not the church doctrine of the Trinity, and is not advanced as such. Rothe disclaims any such identity. He criticises the expression "three persons" as conveying either a tritheistic idea, or no idea at all. He thinks that his representation gives a real threefoldness and a real unity; whereas, the church dogma must sacrifice the one or the other. He does not acknowledge a biblical doctrine of an *immanent* Trinity. The germs of it are in the scriptures; but the Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost is only the *revealed* Trinity, or God as related to the world. The true doctrine, to him, is: God exists in the three eternal modi of Being, Nature, Personality, correlative, the one impossible to be thought without the other, in the absolute Person.

Having thus discovered the three eternal modi of God, in his existence as Person, we come to a group of divine attributes, which arise from that relation of God to himself, which we have seen must necessarily exist. As these attributes rest in the relation in which God's personal self-consciousness stands to the three modi of his existence, they divide themselves into three classes, corresponding to these modi and dependent upon them. Taken altogether, in their unity, they constitute God's self-knowledge, or idea of himself. Of these modi, the Being of God is reflected in the divine self-consciousness as All-sufficiency; i. e. God, as *causa sui*, is conscious of himself as the One all-sufficient. The divine Nature stands, in the self-consciousness, as blessedness; the divine self-activity (which, together with the self-conscious, constitutes the divine personality) is reflected, in

the self-consciousness, as majesty ; i. e. so far as God, in his self-consciousness as pure soul, finds himself possessed of a nature, or spiritual body, as it were, so far is he happy ; and so far as he is conscious of himself, in his activity as self-active and free, so far is the consciousness that of absolute majesty. All-sufficiency, blessedness and majesty are thus the three absolute and immanent attributes dependent on the divine existence. The relative and transeunt attributes, those which arise from God's relation to the world, are but narrower modifications of these. God can have attributes only as he has relations. For attributes are not mere modes of working, nor are they essential determinations of being ; but they are the revelation of the specific immanent determinations of a being, as shown in its relation with another being. The relative attributes are, indeed, the first which we perceive, but they have their ground in the deeper relation of God to himself. Thus those attributes which depend upon the divine Being may be called, especially, the *absolute* attributes ; while those which arise from the divine nature divide themselves into *moral* and *natural* ; as nature divides itself into ethics and physics.

Here, then, we have God existing as Person with attributes, and here the immanent life process of God is perfected. Here the demand of his absoluteness is met. He is perfect in himself, and has no need of anything from without to be, in its highest sense, God blessed for evermore. But at this point Rothe proceeds to show the inherent necessity of the act of creation ; and, as he has been accused of pantheism on account of this part of his work, he interposes, in his lectures on this subject, a disclaimer of any such intention, showing the distinction between his theory and the pantheistic doctrine. Pantheism, he says, cannot be predicated of a system which represents God as perfect, complete in himself, before any trace of a world appears ; for that system requires a universe for its existence. Pantheism, moreover, is the denial of the personality of God ; but here we have God as Person. And indeed, a system of speculative theology, which has piety for its presupposition, would deny

itself, were the personality of God shut out of it. For piety can only exist where there is a mutual interchange of love, and this is impossible save between persons. If it be objected that absoluteness and personality mutually exclude each other, the one suffering no limit or distinction, the other involving both; the reply is, that the presupposition on which this theory is based is false. It is true that personality presupposes something from which the person distinguishes himself; but this something is not without, but within. There can, indeed, be no subject without a corresponding object; but this corresponding object must be inward, if the subject is to be truly person. The beast distinguishes himself from an outward nature; he knows he is not the food he eats. But this is only a negative consciousness, which does not raise him to the dignity of personality. This, only self-consciousness can do. Man is person, not in virtue of distinguishing himself from external nature, but by his self-distinction, wherein he makes himself object to himself by *self-consciousness*, not a consciousness of *something without*. The Absolute Being may, therefore, be personal; since the distinction, from which personality springs, presupposes no other existence and consequently imposes no limit from without, nor takes away the independence of the Deity.

Notwithstanding the completeness of the Deity in himself, the All-sufficient, Blessed and Majestic One, who, before the mountains are brought forth, or ever He forms the earth and the world, is God from everlasting to everlasting, our author proceeds to demonstrate the necessity inherent in Him to create. This necessity is a moral, not a physical one; but this does not lessen its stringency. Creation is an absolutely necessary, because it is an absolutely free, act. For freedom and necessity are identical in God. What his omnipotence makes possible, if it be in accordance with his nature, his benevolence makes necessary. The necessity to create arises, therefore, in this wise. God's positive thought of himself includes, by logical necessity, the negative thought of what is not himself; or, in stricter philosophical phrase, the thought of the *me* involves, of necessity, the thought of

the *not me*. For affirmation and negation are absolute correlatives; every affirmative has, as its unavoidable echo, a corresponding negative. For an affirmative is an affirmative only by means of the thought of the negative which stands opposed to it. Thus : $a = a$ means a cannot be thought as *not-a*. This principle is equally involved in the perfecting of the self-consciousness. This consciousness, which declares I am myself, or $I = I$, involves the negative proposition $I > < \text{not-I}$, or I cannot conceive myself as not-I. And this principle obtains, in all its force, of God as person. He cannot be self-conscious without thereby involving the thought of his not-me. But this necessity to think, does not involve the necessity to posit, set, or make real, God's opposite; although in God, on account of his absoluteness, to think and to set must, as we have seen, be conceived as essentially involved the one in the other. On the contrary, God's absoluteness demands that He have full power over His thought, to make it real, or to leave it only ideal. He must relate himself to it in some way; but that may be positively or negatively, so far as absoluteness is concerned. God has physical ability to determine himself arbitrarily in regard to it, but he has no such moral ability; for the absolutely Perfect One can only do what is best. His perfect freedom secures the necessity of the best action. What he will do, therefore, depends upon what will be the result. Now were God to relate himself affirmatively to this negation, he would introduce a pure contradiction to himself; for, in its original form, it is the pure opposition to God. This, God would not do; though, even in this form, it would be no limit to his absoluteness, since he has it absolutely in his power. He must relate himself to it negatively. He will not refuse to make it real, but he will set it negatively, as it were: give to it existence, not as his opposite, but rather as his double; or, to follow more closely the idiom of our author, God sets his not-me, but takes away that in it which is contradictory of Him; from a *simple not-me*, a contradiction, he makes it *his own not-me*, a reflexion. Thus it becomes something correspondent to, not opposed to, him; his true image, distinct

from him, but in which he may be manifested; his other self: "Sein wahres Du." This process of distinguishing his own personality from its shadow — the not-me — by making that real, is the process of creation. For the not-me of God is the universe, which he creates in order that His life and being may be manifest therein. Thus the world must always be distinct from God; though, at the same time, it perfectly corresponds to him. Pantheism is, consequently, excluded; for two things may be in each other, and yet not be the same; indeed, where there is no distinction, there can be no unity, but only simplicity.

To give reality to His not-me in this manner, corresponds to the divine perfection; for it is to impart of the divine blessedness to others. And herein we perceive a new distinctive element (*bestimmtheit*) in God, which is no mere attribute, but an immanent essential determination which connects the absolute and relative attributes together, viz. the necessity of a self imparting to others, or, more distinctly, Love. This, of course, is a moral, not a physical necessity; and yet an absolute necessity of the absolute personality. It springs from personality. Only a person can love. The All-perfect One must, therefore, create, for He must love. To love, in the highest sense, a something, without the self-consciousness, is necessary; for, love is not love to self, but an imparting of self to another. Thus, again, while the necessity for the creation is shown to be immanent in God, it is shielded from the fatalistic necessity of pantheism, in that it is the moral necessity of a free person. For, nothing is more free, and at the same time more necessary, than love. Just in proportion as love is only a relative necessity, is it wanting in fulness and truth; and yet only the free personality is capable of the sentiment.

God is thus necessitated, by his love, to create. He creates, by an act of his personality, through his nature, as the instrument of his working. The act of creation is not a purely absolute act. It must have relativity. For an *absolute* act of the Absolute One would produce an Absolute. The product would be, not *another than* God, but a *second* God, which is a con-

tradiction. God's not-me is only conceivable as a relative existence; and such an existence can only arise through an act which is not purely absolute. Hence God cannot create a world which is immediately complete, nor create by an act which immediately realizes its aim. The creating of God must be conceived as a number of creative acts, a successive series of gradually increasing manifestations of Him. And that is what we find in the universe. For proof of it, we have not to refer to the moon and stars above us. Our own world, in its various eras, shows its gradual completing.

Since the creation is the setting of the Divine not-me, God must set it as that which He himself is. But, as we have seen, God is only something determinate, in that He is nature and personality, or Spirit. As divine being or essence (*wesen*) — the first of the three modi of his existence — he is neither active or thinking, and can have no relation. As mere Being, therefore, he must forever remain without the universe; only as divine nature and personality can he be manifested in creation; his essence is always separate and distinct from it; and thus, again, the *immanence* of pantheism is excluded.

On the one side, then, the universe is necessarily related existence,—finite; on the other side, it must be correspondent to God, — infinite. It must, therefore, be an infinite world of finite existence. This infinite finite universe God makes real, or sets, as correspondent to His Nature and Personality, i. e. as Spirit; for spirit alone cannot be interpenetrated by spirit. Only in a spiritual world can God have cosmical existence. This spiritual world is the heavens, and this alone is the adequate realization of the creative thought; all else is merely scaffolding for its erection. But while God must, on the one side, think this infinite finite universe as complete; he must, on the other, think it as incomplete; and this antinomy is only solved by the thought of the creation as an infinite, but organic, multiplicity of particular circles of creation, each successive circle more perfect than the one preceding; thus causing the cosmical existence of God to become more and more adequately correspondent to his real existence, though

never attaining to absolute completeness: each creation perfectly finished; but the creation never finished.

Though the different circles of creation are varied, they will yet correspond, specifically, to each other. The one begins where the other ends; and all together compose one great organism of the spiritual world. Thus the creation, the longer it continues, is the more glorious; and since each new creation is developed into greater unity with God, and yet in perfect harmony with the preceding creations, the whole creation, as one, is developed into greater oneness with God. The culmination of the several world-spheres is also the culmination of the separate persons of those spheres. Each world-sphere has its centre individual; and these form, as it were, the axis of the whole spiritual world.

Though each creature has a beginning, we may not speak of the creation as beginning. Time is a product of the divine creation, and so this cannot be begun in time. As the creation is a free self-determination in God, no interval can be conceived between the thought and the act. He always creates.

The world being in existence, we have, from the relation of God to it, a new class of divine attributes, the relative and transeunt. They are divided into the *essential* and the *hypostatic*, according as they refer to the divine existence in general, or to the modi of his existence. These *essential relative* attributes are *negative* in their signification. Thus God's relation to the world cannot, conformably with the idea of Him, change or limit God in his existence. He does not become finite thereby, i. e. He is *infinite*. This infiniteness in relation to the world, is His *immensity* and *unchangeableness*. Of the positive essential relative and transeunt attributes, we have only the divine goodness; that is, the divine love modifies itself, in relation to the world, to *benevolence*. The hypostatic relative and transeunt attributes are divided according to the two modi of nature and personality. The relative attribute of the divine nature is *omnipresence*; i. e. the *absolute* working of the nature of God in relation to this world. The relative attributes of the divine personal-

ity are, on the side of the self-consciousness, Omniscience : on the side of self-activity, Omnipotence. These two are the concrete forms of Omnipresence.

The creative activity of God, applied to the already existing world, is His Government ; and this is administered on an eternal world-plan. This world-plan is the idea of the world-government in its completed form. More nearly defined, it is the action of the goodness of God by means of his omniscience and omnipotence, or omnipresence. Thus the world-government is part of the creative activity of God.

The first act of creation is the setting of the not-me as the pure absolute not-me of God, i. e. as the simple opposition of spirit. This is no other than *matter*. The idea of pure matter can only be negatively expressed. It is the direct opposite to spirit. This pure matter is infinite ; for every limit of it is a limit to the not-me in itself considered, which is a contradiction of its essential idea ; for, were the Not-me merely relative, it would be no pure opposite to the Absolute Existence. There is, therefore, no end to matter as such. An end can only be predicated of *material things*, the forms of matter. The infiniteness of matter is the real cause of the infiniteness of creation. And so we see, at the outset, that the relation of God to matter is that of pure opposition.

But creation is no mere production of creatures ; it is the positing of a development of new ideas out of God, occasioned by the relation of that which is already existing to him. But while a development, it is yet real creation ; since the cause of it lies, not in the creature, but in God. Thus the creation is essentially a multiplicity of progressively developing grades of creative existences ; and, in this way, it becomes nature. This progressive development is constant. There is no jump in the chain, and its process is as follows : God directs his thought toward the creation already existent. He makes the thought of this the object of his thought ; i. e. he reflects upon it, and this reflection is,

a. An analyzing of the thought which appears, in the consciousness, as simple unity.

b. A relating of the elements of the thought thus analyzed,

so that they mutually determine each other, (and from this process arise more concrete and higher determinations of thought).

c. These must be, again, brought together in the unity of the consciousness. Thus: to say that God thinks, or takes into his thought, the already existent creation, is to affirm —

1. That He separates, in His consciousness, the elements contained in the thought, but which are not yet distinguished from each other. He relates these to each other; and from this process a new course, of more perfect and concrete single thoughts of creation, arise. This is the analytic process.

2. He does not let these newly born thoughts stand separate, but combines them into ideas. Thus the product of the new thoughts is the product of new and higher ideas combined to unity, i. e. of new and higher grades of creative existence.

So far, we have merely been engaged with the *thought* of God. But what is thought must be brought into *being*, for the divine creation is both thinking and realizing, and the described theoretic process must have a corresponding practical reality. Thus every higher grade of creation recedes from mere matter, and, until creation is raised to that point which corresponds to the creative idea, i. e. to spirit, the creative work of God cannot cease.

We have traced to this point an outline of Dr. Rothe's theory of the existence of God and his relation to the universe, because so far new principles and new applications of old principles are constantly brought to light, and to grasp them is essential to any clear view of his method. To comprehend this method, in its most fundamental features, is the necessary prerequisite to a full understanding of the doctrine of ethics, which is based upon the results, theological and cosmical, achieved by it, and to parts of which we may, in some future Numbers of this periodical, call attention. It were interesting to proceed further, and trace the ingenious and philosophical course of thought which seeks to explain the whole sphere of Physics to that point where Ethics

properly begins. But to do so would be to attempt, in a language foreign to the author, a condensation of what is not too easily comprehended in the full statement of the original. It is not essential, either, to the comprehension of the ethical treatise, save in certain particulars, which may be singled out when needed.

In regard to the general features of the Book, it may be sufficient to state, as a reply to objections which may be made to its highly abstract character, that it attempts the same problem which Dr. Hickok considers in his 'Rational Cosmology, and is the most ripened product of the speculative method as applied to theology. What Hegel attempted to do for Philosophy, Rothe has tried to accomplish for 'Theology, though he is far more in harmony and sympathy with Schelling, especially so far as we can judge as yet concerning his later Philosophy of Revelation. The whole subject of the legitimacy of this mode of thought, has occupied the attention of reading men, to a very great extent, since Sir William Hamilton's Essays have been published, and Mr. Mansel, in his recently published Bampton Lectures on the Limits of Religious Thought, has brought the question prominently before us. We may not shirk an investigation as to its value; and a glance at its results may aid us in forming an opinion. Should any agree with Mr. Mansel, in his adoption of the Kantian philosophy, so ably applied by him to the problems of theology, and regard the structure which Rothe has reared, as a "castle in the air," without solid foundation, and untenable as a refuge from unbelief, still it is interesting and profitable to see what may be done, in the pantheist's chosen province, to refute his chilling and morally disastrous creed. We may war against pantheism by seeking to remove the ground on which it rests, as Kant, Hamilton, and Mansel have done; or we may meet it on its own chosen arena, and contend for victory with its own weapons. Rothe has chosen the latter course; and, though we may consign him and his opponent, alike, to the region of the unconditioned, as to a place intangible by reason of the darkness which, alone, may be felt, yet, let us rejoice that even there,

a vigorous intellect and an earnest soul is contending for the Christian faith. Not that the work before us is a polemic against pantheism, or any heresy. It is the product of positive and independent thought ; its negative results are not, however, on that account, the less valuable.

That this delineation of so peculiar and original a course of thought has been, in all respects, successful, is too much to hope. If, however, it does not correctly express the leading features of the system examined, to those used to the peculiar phraseology and mode of thought of modern German philosophical writers, it is not because a conscientious and painstaking endeavor has not been made.

ARTICLE II.

COMPARATIVE PHONOLOGY ; OR THE PHONETIC SYSTEM OF THE INDO-EUROPEAN LANGUAGES.

BY BENJAMIN W. DWIGHT, CLINTON, N. Y.

[Continued from Vol. XVI., p. 722.]

A Brief View of the Sanskrit Consonants, in their relations to the Other Classical Languages.

THE different classes of consonants, in the Sanskrit, are as follows :

(1) Gutturals. These are k, kh, g, gh, and n pronounced like our nasal n in ng and nk, as in sing and sink. This nasal n is found only before gutturals : as in the middle of a word, or at the end of a word in place of m, if that word is succeeded immediately by one beginning with a guttural. K is represented, in Greek, by κ, and in Latin by c (k) and q : as in Sansk. kapâlas, the skull ; Greek, κεφαλή ; and Lat. caput. Kh is represented, in Greek, by χ : as in Sansk. nakhas, a nail ; Gr. δνυξ stem δνυχ (the o being euphonic) ; and

so khan, to dig, Gr. *χαίειν*, pure stem *χαν*. G is equivalent to the same sound in Greek and Latin: as in Sansk. *sthaḡ*, to cover; Gr. *στέγω*; Lat. *tego*. Gh, as in Sansk. *gharma*; Gr. *θερμός*; Lat. *formus*; Eng. *warmth*; is represented by the aspirates of different organs in other languages. In the case of *laghu*, light, it is represented, in Latin, by the labial *v*, in the word *levis*, light; while yet in the German *leicht* and English *light*, the original guttural form is preserved.

(2) Palatals. These are *ch*, *chh*, *j*, *jh*, and *n*. This class of consonants may be viewed as derivative from the preceding, and but as a mere softened form of it. They occur only before vowels and weak consonants, as semivowels and nasals; while before strong consonants they fall back at once into the class of gutturals from which they came. In the various cognate languages, we find this class of letters represented oftenest by gutturals; next, by labials, on account of the mutual etymological sympathy so apparent in various languages between gutturals and labials; next in frequency, by some *t*-sound, as this is the initial element of the palatal sounds generally; and, last of all, by the sibilants. Thus compare

SANSKRIT.	GREEK.	LATIN.
panchan, five.	πέντε	quinque.
pachâmi, I cook.	πέσσω (for πέσσαμι)	coquo (for coquam).
jânu, the knee.	γόνυ	genu.
jam, to unite with.	γαμειν	
jribh, to open or draw apart.	γράφειν, to scratch, to write.	

Chh finds its equivalent, in Greek and Latin, in *σκ* and *sc*: as in *chhâyâ*, a shadow, and *σκιά*; and also in *chhinadmi*, I cleave; and Lat. *scindo* (for *scindami*); *chhauna*, a covering, and *σκηνή*, a tent, as well as *chhali* and *σκύλος*, the hide of an animal. When terminal in a root, it appears as *g*: as in Sansk. *prachh*, to ask; Lat. *rogo* for *progo*, stem *prog* (cf. also Lat. *precor*, Eng. *pray*); and German, *fragen*.

(3) Linguals of a special sort, peculiar to the Sanskrit.

These are written as t, th, d, dh, n, each with a dot underneath, to distinguish them from the ordinary dentals having the same symbols in their natural form.

(4) Dentals. This class embraces the common linguals of other languages, both simple and compound : as d, dh, t, th, and n. D is sometimes interchanged with l in Greek and Latin : as in *δάκρυμα*, a tear, and *lacryma* for *dacryma* ; *δαήρ* (for *δαFήρ*), a brother-in-law, and *levir* (Sansk. *dêvaras*) ; and *lingua*, the tongue, archaic, *dingua* ; and *δάφνη*, a laurel, with its parallel form *λάφνη*. Bopp regards similarly, and with good reason therefore, *λαμπάς* as representing the Sanskrit *dîpa*, a lamp, in a strengthened form ; and so, *-λικος* in *ήλικος* he compares with *drisa* Prâkrit *disa*, like. Compare also, in the same way, *licet* and *δίκη*, custom, right ; and *lorum*, a thong, with *δορά*, a skin. The Sanskrit d, besides being represented by its own simple equivalent in Greek and Latin, is, like dh, often represented by *ϑ* (th) ; while dh itself, in addition to such an equivalent in Greek, is represented, also, by f and b in Latin. Thus compare :

SANSKRIT.	GREEK.	LATIN.
dêvas, a shining one.	Δεός.	deus.
dvar, a door.	Δύρα.	
dubitri, a daughter.	Δύγατηρ.	
dadhâmi, I place ; stem, dhâ.	τιDημι, stem, Dε.	
madhu, an intoxicating drink.	μέDυ.	mel.
dhumas, smoke.	δυμός.	fumus.
ûdhar, a teat.	οὐDαρ.	uber.

Th, in Sanskrit, is never represented by *ϑ* in the Greek, but always by *τ* : as, in Sansk., *stha*, to stand, in the present, from *tishthami*, I stand, compared with *ἵστημι* for *σίστημι* (root, *στα*), Lat. *sto*, stare, stem, *sta*. So, compare Sansk. *asthi*, a bone, with *ὀστέον*, Lat. *os*, stem, *oss* for *ost* ; and also *rath*, a carriage, Lat. *rota*, a wheel.

(5) Labials. These are p, ph, b, bh, and m. Ph occurs rarely, while bh is, like dh, of frequent occurrence. In Greek, *φ*, and in Latin, *f*, represents, commonly, this aspirate, as in

Sansk. *bhar*, to bear, Gr. *φέρω*, Lat. *fero*; and also in *bhû*, to be, Gr. *φύω*, Lat. *fui*. In the Germanic languages, Sansk. *bh* becomes also *b*, as in (*ge*)*bären*, to bring forth, Eng. *bear*; compare, also, German *fahren*, to carry, Eng. *ferry*; and Germ. *bin*, I am, Eng. *be*, and Sansk. *bhû*.

In the dative plural ending *-bus*, Sansk. *-bhyas*, we see *bh* represented by *b*, as its equivalent in Latin. In the interior of a word, indeed, the Latin prefers the medial labial (*b*) to the aspirates. Compare, in connection with Sansk. *tubhyam*, to thee, Lat. *tibi*; also, Sansk. *abhi*, both, Gr. *ἄμφω*, and Lat. *ambo*; and Sansk. *nabhas*, *rabh* and *lubhyati* with their Latin equivalents, *nubes*, a cloud, *rabies*, *rage*, and *libet* or *libet*, it pleases. Sanskrit *p*, *b*, and *m* are each abundantly represented by their own simple equivalents in Greek and Latin.

(6) Semivowels. These are *y*, *r*, *l*, *v*. *Y* is, in sound, our *y*, as in *year*. In Prâkrit, as in Persian and Latin, it often passes into *j*; as in Sansk. *yuvan*, young, Persian *javân*, Lat. *juvenis*. In Greek, its equivalent is *ζ*. Thus compare *yuj*, to bind, and *ζευγνύναι* and *ζωννύναι*, Lat. *jungere*, stem; *jung* and *jug*, as in *jungo*, and *jugum*; also, Sansk. *yava*, barley, and *ζέα* for *ζέφα*; as also *yas* and *ζεῖν*, to boil. So the termination *-aζω* (for *-αζαμι*) corresponds with the similar Sanskrit verbal ending *-ayâmi*. *R* is commonly represented by *r* in the other languages; and *l* sometimes passes over into *r* in them: as in Sansk. *lup* and *lump*, to break, Lat. *rum-po*, perf. *rupi*. *V* has the sound of our English *v*, except after consonants: as in *tvâm*, where it is sounded like *w*. Neither *v* nor *y* can stand at the end of a word, since the voice cannot rest on them. As the semivowels are of so flexible and flowing a nature, they easily interchange one with the other, in the different languages, as not only an original *l* with *r*, as has been already indicated, but also an original *n* with *l*. Thus compare Sansk. *anyaś*, another, and Gr. *ἄλλος* (for *ἄλιος*) and Lat. *alius*; and also Sansk. *antaras* and Lat. *alter*.

(7) Sibilants. These are *ç*, *sh* and *s*. *H* is also classified here. The sibilant *ç* is very slightly aspirated. It ap-

pears to have sprung from an original k; and, in Greek and Latin, k and c regularly correspond with it. The Gothic substitutes for it h, while the Lithuanian represents it by a compound sibilant sz, pronounced like our sh. Thus Sansk. çvan, a dog, gen. çunas, is, in Greek, κύων, gen. κυνός; in Gothic, hunds; and, in Lithuanian, szuo, gen. szunų. So, açvas, a horse, is, in Latin, equus (pronounced, originally, as if written ekus) and Lithuanian, aszwa. At the end of a word, and in the middle before strong consonants, it usually reverts to its original k-sound. With the tendency of this sibilant to vibrate between a hard and soft sound, compare the double sound of c in our language, as s and k, or hard and soft; as, likewise, in the French. In Italian, also, it has a double sound, as k and ch.

The sibilant sh is pronounced as in English. Combined with k as in ksh, it is represented, in Greek, by ξ, and in Latin by x: as, in Sansk. dakshina, Gr. δεξιός, Lat. dexter, Lith. deszine. It occurs sometimes initially and sometimes terminally: as in shash, six; where it is represented, when initial, by s in Latin and the aspirate in Greek; and when terminal by x (ξ) in both languages; as in ἔξ and Lat. sex; compare Lithuanian szeszi. At the end of a word, and in the middle before a strong consonant, as t and th, it passes into k and t, in Sanskrit. So, in Greek ὀκτώ; Lat. octo; Italian otto; as compared with the Sansk. ashtau, eight; a similar style of interchanges appears in the other languages. The sibilant s is the ordinary s of other languages. It is changed, in different cases, according to special euphonic rules, into ç, sh, r, and other letters, and only remains unaltered before t and th.

H was never admitted at the end of words, or in the middle before strong consonants. When coming into such positions or conjunctions, it passed, according to definite rules, into subdotted t or d, k or g; which it would be of no value to state or illustrate here, as they lie so exclusively within the bounds of specific Sanskrit scholarship, as such. The Sansk. h is represented, often, by κ in Greek and c in Latin: as in Sansk. hard, hrid, and hridaya, the heart; Gr.

καρδία and *κῆρ*; Lat. *cor*, stem *cord*, with which compare Gothic *hairto*; Germ. *hertz*; Eng. *heart*; and Lith. *szirdis*. In Greek, *χ* is often, also, the equivalent of the Sansk. *h*: as in Sansk. *hima*, Gr. *χείμων*, Lat. *hiems*; and also *hrish*, to rejoice, Gr. *χαίρω*; *hansas*, a goose, Gr. *χῆν*, Lat. *anser* for *hanser*; and *hyas*, yesterday, Gr. *χθές*, Lat. *heri* for *hesi*; with *he-ternus*, the adjective form of which, compare Germ. *gestern* and Eng. *yesterday*.

2dly. The Consonantal System of the several Classical Languages, viewed pathologically.

The true laws of consonantal combinations, in reference to their proper euphonic effect, are better developed in Greek than in any, not to say all, other languages, besides the Sanskrit. In no direction was their acute sense of the fitness of things more exact and artistic; and in none was their skill more vigorously employed, than in their mode of constructing word-architecture, and adorning it according to their ideas of true taste. In the forms of words that they moulded and chiselled, or, in other language, in the additions, accommodations, abrasions, contractions, and prosodial changes, that they left as the marks of their skill upon them, we see as in fixed type, the rules of art that they discovered and applied, in the mutual arrangement and harmonious distribution of sounds. Phonetic complications occur but on a very limited scale in Latin, whose laws of life and growth, in this part of its framework, are very simple.

That department of philology, which concerns itself with the affections or changes of letters and syllables, constitutes the pathology of language, and embraces the whole range of mutilations and corruptions, whether effected by time, or dialectic causes, or the influences of climatic agency; as well as the whole range of euphonic additions, substitutions and suppressions, wrought by earnest determined hands, according to real or supposed rules of art.

Letters once radical and characteristic of words in their original state, have dropped from their place, under the pressure of phonetic instincts and tastes upon them, like boughs encumbering the parent stem of a tree, beneath the pruning

knife; so that, in the scientific study of etymology, it becomes often necessary to know, not only the course of the changes that have occurred, but also the laws that have determined their rise and progress.

The consonantal, like the vowel, elements of speech, have their different degrees of weight; and their weight is but another name for the amount of their phonetic force, or the density, as it were, of their phonetic substance. The breathing *h* is lighter even than the vowels; to which the aspirates and semi-vowels stand next in order; then follow the liquids and in the following sequence, from light to heavy, *r, l, n, m*. The heaviest of all the consonantal sounds are the mutes; and in the order for increasing weight of middle, smooth and rough. So also labials and palatals of the same several classes, smooth, middle and rough, as *p* and *k*, *b* and *g*, are heavier than the corresponding dentals of each class respectively, as *t* compared with *p* and *k*, and so also *d* compared with *b* and *g*. These subtle mechanical relations of sounds to each other, indicate the directions in which the inward forces at work upon language, to modify its combinations, exert their energy.

As the facts and laws that pertain to consonantal combinations are intimately interwoven with those pertaining to consonantal changes, they must, many of them, in order that either should be properly comprehended, be exhibited together in one view.

(1) Generally: with a view of the general laws of change in word-forms. These laws of change are the following:

§ 1. The tendency is always, in the course of time, and in the passage of words from one country to another, forwards from complicated to simple forms, and not backwards from simple to complicated. Time abrades and rounds off words in its perpetually flowing stream, as it does stones and boulders on the floor of the ever heaving sea.

§ 2. The greatest mutilations in the volume of words occur in their terminal, rather than in their initial syllables; although in the latter, changes of single letters occur more frequently than in the former.

§ 3. Vowels are much more sensitive to changes in the volume of a word, and correspond more instinctively with them, than consonants.

§ 4. In vowel-changes the course of change is, for the most part, from the primary to the secondary vowels, and not backwards. The primary vowel, *a*, can be transformed into any of the other vowels; but they do not revert to it. So in Latin, *e* and *o* often settle down into the weaker vowels, *i* and *u*.

§ 5. The interchanges of consonants with each other, which constitute a very large class of all phonetic changes, are made on the following principles:

1. Inasmuch as sounds made by different organs would, when proximate, often jar phonetically upon each other, or, which is the same thing, would require special effort to be distinctly uttered in conjunction, they are harmonized on the principle that a smooth mute must precede a smooth, a medial a medial, and a rough, a rough: as in *ἑπτα* and *ἔβδομος*, *ὄκτω* and *ὄγδοος*, *γράφω*, *γραπτός* and *γράφδην*. The law, stated in its simplest form, is this: consonants brought into immediate juxtaposition must be made homogeneous. Thus, *κδ* and *χδ* become *γδ*; *κδ*¹ and *γδ* become *χδ*; *γτ* and *χτ* become *κτ*; *πδ* and *φδ* become *βδ*; *πδ* and *βδ* become *φδ*; and *βτ* and *φτ* become *πτ*.

2. Homogeneous consonants of different organs are often exchanged for each other.

(a) Semi-vowels and aspirates, one with the other; as *h* and *s*, in *ἔξ* and *sex*, *ἑπτά* and *septem*; and *h* and *v*, in *ἑσπερος* (*Ἑσπερος*) and *vesper*. So *f* in Latin becomes *h* in Spanish, as in Lat. *filius*, Span. *hijo*; and *filum*, Span. *hilo*.

(b) Different liquids, one with the other, as *l* and *r*, *l* and *n*, *m* and *n*; examples of which will be furnished hereafter, under the head of Substitution of Sounds for each other.

(c) Different mutes, one with the other, in each of the three kinds respectively, smooth, middle, and rough; abundant illustrations of which will be furnished hereafter.

¹ In the preposition *ἐκ*, *κ* remains unchanged before *δ*, as in *ἐκθεσις*.

3. Homorganous consonants, or those of any one specific class, as labials, palatals or dentals, severally, may readily pass into others of the same class, that is, others made by the same organs. The following are a few among many specimens: βούλομαι and volo, I wish; χεῖμα and hiems, wintry weather; ἄρτος and hortus, a garden; σύ (Aeol. τύ) and tu, thou; μέσος and medius, middle; βροτός (for μοτός, Cf. Sanskrit marttas, Lat. mortuus, dead, from Sansk. mri, to die, Lat. mori); and τύπτουσι, Aeol. and Dor. τύπτουντι and τύπτονσι.

The styles or forms of consonantal changes are various, as

- A. Substitutions.
- B. Insertions and Additions.
- C. Suppressions.
- D. Weakened Consonantal Forms.
- E. Strengthened Consonantal Forms.

A. Substitution. This is of two kinds:

1. Literal, or pertaining to a mere change of letters.
2. Topical, or pertaining to a change of place or order, in respect either to a mere letter, or an entire syllable.

1. Literal Substitution. This is of two kinds:

- (1) General, or weak.
- (2) Directly assimilative, or intensive.

Assimilative substitution occurs, when, by the strong phonetic attraction of another letter preceding or succeeding it, a consonant is changed to the same letter, or to one directly homogeneous with it; while, by general or weak substitution is described any other change of a consonant, made under the influence of weak phonetic attraction, or of indeterminate subtle affinities of any kind, or for the mere sake of avoiding phonetic monotony.

As the modes and forms of substitution are so often the same in both Greek and Latin, and these two languages are so cognate and correlated in every way, illustrations will be drawn indiscriminately from them both.

(1) General or weak substitutions occur in each of the different classes of consonants.

I. Palatals or Gutturals. These are in Greek κ, γ, χ, and in Latin c, g, ch.

§ 1. The gutturals when followed by σ become in Greek ξ , which, therefore, always represents as a double consonant either κ , γ or χ compounded with σ . As in Latin g is exchanged before s and t into c , x commonly represents $c + s$, but often also $g + s$, and sometimes $v + s$, as in *vixi*, perf. of *vivo*, for *vivsi*, and *nix* (gen. *nivis*) for *nivs*.

§ 2. The gutturals, when originally followed by ι , were afterwards changed to σ or τ ; and the vowel was itself also subsequently assimilated to the same letter, which thus become double. This is the true analysis of stems ending in $-\sigma\sigma$, or $-\tau\tau$. Thus,

τάσσω,	stem ταγ,	is for ταγιω.
φυλάσσω,	" φυλακ,	" φυλακιω.
ταράσσω, ¹	" παραχ,	" παραχιω.
ὀρύσσω,	" ὀρυχ,	" ὀρυχιω.

So *μείζων* for *μεζίων* is for original *μεγίων*, and *ῥασσε* (stem *οκ*) is for *ῥκιε*. Accordingly $\sigma\sigma$ represents not only $\tau\iota$, as in many instances, but also $\gamma\iota$, $\kappa\iota$, $\chi\iota$. Sometimes, as in *κράζω* (stem *κραγ*) for *κραγίω*, $\gamma\iota$ passed into ξ .

§ 3. In Latin, c^2 becomes, several times, g : as, (1) After n : as in *quadringenti* and *septingenti*, compared with *ducenti*, *sexcenti*, etc.

(2) Before n . Thus: *salignus*, willow, from *salix* (stem, *salic*), is for *salicnus*, as *dignus* is also for *dicnus*; for the proper appreciation of which, compare *δική*, *δίκαιος*, and *dico* (stem, *dic*), and *disco*.

(3) Before l : as in *negligo* for *neclego*. (4) Before m : as in *segmentum* from *seco*. (5) Before a vowel: as in *negotium* for *nec-otium*. So the Latin *lacus*, a lake, has become the Italian *lago*.

In such words as *ignarus* (= *in-gnarus*), *ignavus*, *cognosco*, and *ignosco*, the g represents an original guttural belonging to the simple root in Latin, but now lost: as in

¹ The form *τέτρηχα*, formerly thought to have come from an imaginary verb *τρέχω*, was shown by Buttmann to be derived from *ταράσσω*.

² C and g were pronounced hard in Latin; c like our k , and g as our hard g .

gnosco, the archaic form of nosco and gnavus, of navus. Compare *γινώσκω* (stem *γνω*) and *γένναιος*.

§ 4. G becomes c before t : as in actum and rectum, from ago and rego ; c (for k) being the smooth mute with t, another smooth one.

II. Linguals.

These are, in Greek, τ, δ, θ, λ, ν, ρ, σ ; and, in Latin, d, t, th, l, n, r, s.

1st. The Substitution of Greek Linguals for each other.

§ 1. The liquids are interchangeable with each other : as, (1) λ and ρ. Thus : *κεφαλαργία*, headache, is for *κεφαλαλγία*, and *ἀργαλέος*, difficult, is for *ἀλγαλέος*. Compare, similarly, *ἐρέβινθος* and *λέβινθος*, pulse ; *σιγηλός* and *σιγηρός*, silent ; *λείριον* and Lat. *lilium*, a lily ; and also Lat. *rumpo*, perf. *rupi* (stem, *rup*), and Sansk. *lup* and *lump*, to break. In the same relation stand *ἔρις*, strife, with Lat. *lis* ; mille and millia, a thousand, with *μύριοι* ; *gramia*, a humor in the eyes, with *γλάμη*. So *coerulus*, from *coelum*, is for *coeluleus*. In French, similarly, r often represents the Latin l : as in *épître* from *epistola* ; *apôtre* (*apostolus*) and *rossignol* (*lusciniola*). Gibraltar is said, likewise, to stand for *gebel al Tarik*, the mountains of Tarik. So, our English word *frock* is derived from a Middle Latin word *flocus*, a monk's garment. The Latin *peregrinus* (*per-ager*) is the Italian *pelegrino*, French *pélerin*, German *pilger*, Eng. *pilgrim* ; so that peregrinate and pilgrim come, immediately, from the same root. In the English word *purple* (Gr. *πορφύρα*, Lat. *purpura*, Fr. *pourpre*), we have a similar substitution of l for r.

(2) λ and ν : as *πλεύμων*¹ and *πνεύμων*, the lungs ; *λίτρον* and *νίτρον* (Lat. *natrum*), soda. In double forms of this sort, the Doric had a preference for the ν, and the Attic for the λ. So compare Lat. *lympha* and *nympha*, water, with *νύμφη*. Ancient Panormus, in Sicily, is now called Palermo ; and the name of the modern Bologna was, originally, Bononia.

The Spanish *nivel* and French *niveau*, correspond, in the

¹ In the Latin *pulmo(n)* there is a metathesis of the l.

same way, with the Lat. *libella*, a level; as do the Latin *lutra* and Spanish *nutria*, the otter, and the Latin *venenum*, poison, and its Italian equivalent *veleno*.

(3) μ and ν : as $\mu\nu$ Ionic, and Doric $\nu\nu$, in the sense of $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\nu$. So compare $\mu\eta$ and Latin *ne*, not; $\mu\acute{\omega}\nu$, whether, and Latin *num*; and also Sansk. accusative suffix -am, Gr. -ον, Lat. -um. Final ν , in Greek, is generally an alternate for μ , as in the 1st pers. sing. of the imperf. act. $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\upsilon\pi\tau\omicron\nu$ for $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\upsilon\pi\tau\omicron\mu(\iota)$; and in the acc. sing. ending ν of nouns; but sometimes it springs from σ , as afterwards shown.

(4) ν and ρ . Compare the masculine comparative forms of Latin and Greek adjectives: as $\acute{\omega}\kappa\acute{\iota}\omega\nu$ and *ocior*, $\mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omega\nu$ (for $\mu\epsilon\gamma\acute{\iota}\omega\nu$) and *major*; also $\delta\epsilon\iota\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$ and *dirus*, terrible, and $\delta\acute{\omega}\rho\omicron\nu$ and *donum*, a gift.

§ 2. The other linguals (the dentals and sibilant, which is but the dental aspirate) are interchangeable with each other.

(1) A radical δ or τ before ι , becomes generally σ , and sometimes ζ , while in Sanskrit it remained unchanged; as in $\pi\lambda\acute{o}\upsilon\sigma\iota\omicron\varsigma$ for $\pi\lambda\acute{o}\upsilon\tau\iota\omicron\varsigma$ (from $\pi\lambda\acute{o}\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$) and $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$, being, essence, for $\omicron\nu\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$, and $\gamma\epsilon\rho\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$, a senate, for $\gamma\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$. So, $\acute{\epsilon}\zeta\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$ (stem, $\acute{\epsilon}\delta$ -) is for $\acute{\epsilon}\delta\acute{\iota}\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$, with which compare Lat. *se-deo*; and $\delta\zeta\omega$ (stem $\delta\delta$ -) is for $\delta\delta\acute{\iota}\omega$; and $\sigma\chi\acute{\iota}\omega$ is for $\sigma\chi\acute{\iota}\delta\acute{\iota}\omega$. In a few cases, double forms of the same word in - $\sigma\iota\alpha$ and - $\tau\iota\alpha$ exist, as in $\nu\alpha\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ (from $\nu\alpha\upsilon\varsigma$, a ship) and $\nu\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$, Lat. *nausea*, sea-sickness.

The change of τ to σ , in feminine adjective and participial forms, originally ending in - $\tau\iota\alpha$, is especially interesting. Thus the feminine suffix - $\sigma\alpha$, of participles ending in - $\omega\nu$, - $\alpha\varsigma$, and - $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, as $\tau\upsilon\pi\tau\omicron\upsilon\sigma\alpha$, $\tau\upsilon\psi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha$ and $\tau\upsilon\phi\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\alpha$, stands for - $\tau\iota\alpha$. The proper feminine ending is here, as in $\acute{\eta}\delta\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$ (stem $\acute{\eta}\delta\epsilon$ -), that of - $\iota\alpha$; and the final letters of the stem are, in each case, - $\nu\tau$. So that

$\tau\upsilon\pi\tau\omicron\upsilon\sigma\alpha$ is for $\tau\upsilon\pi\tau\acute{o}\nu\tau\text{-}\iota\alpha$, originally.

$\tau\upsilon\psi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha$ ¹ “ $\tau\upsilon\psi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\text{-}\iota\alpha$, “

$\tau\upsilon\phi\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\alpha$ “ $\tau\upsilon\phi\theta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\tau\text{-}\iota\alpha$. “

¹ So in $\pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$, $\pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha$, $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$ we have represented with several changes the following original forms: $\pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ for $\pi\alpha\nu\tau(\varsigma)$ — $\pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha$ for $\pi\alpha\nu\tau\iota\alpha$ — $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$ for $\pi\alpha\nu\tau$. $\acute{\Lambda}\nu\alpha\iota\sigma\delta\eta\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$, likewise is for $\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\iota\sigma\delta\eta\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$, from adj. $\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\iota\sigma\delta\eta\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$; $\phi\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}$ is for $\phi\alpha\nu\tau\acute{\iota}$, in which origi-

The true analysis of the changes that have occurred in the above forms, is the following: τ was changed to σ before ι , and the ι afterwards rejected; while also ν was, according to uniform Greek custom, cast away before σ , and the previous vowel was lengthened by way of etymological compensation. Stems in $-\epsilon\iota\tau$ preceded by a vowel, as $\chiαρίεις$ (stem $\chiαρίεντ$) for $\chiαριεντς$, have, in the feminine, the ending $-\epsilonσσα$ for the original $-\epsilonντια$. Here, not only is $-\tauια$ changed to $-\sigmaα$, as above, but ν also, instead of being dropped, is assimilated to it, and changed to ς . In such feminine forms as

$\muέλαινα$, of $\muέλας$ (for $\muελανς$) stem $\muελαν$,
 $\τάλαινα$, of $τάλας$ (for $ταλανς$) stem $ταλαν$,
 $τέρεινα$, of $τέρην$ (for $τερεινς$) stem $τερειν$,

the same feminine suffix, $-\iotaα$, really exists, but the ι is placed, by metathesis, before the final letter ν , of the stem, because probably, as that is one of the strongest of all the consonants in itself, the Greek ear forbade its being weakened in the feminine, compared with the other genders, by having two vowels after it, one of them the soft ι : so that $\muέλαινα$ represents an original $\muελάνια$.

(2) The sibilant (σ) is also interchanged with τ , in many forms where it would be final, and in some, also, where it would occur initially. For the exchange of σ for τ final, compare, with $\piρός$, the Homeric form $\piροτί$ (Lat. prod-), Sansk. prati. So the neuter suffix $-\sigma$, of the perf. participle active, as in $\tauετυφός$, is but an euphonic form of the radical $-\sigmaτ$, as the masculine suffix $-\ως$ ($\tauετυφός$) is also of $-\στς$ ($\tauετυφός$). So also the final τ of those neuter stems which end in τ , and do not, like $\sigmaῶμα$, drop it in the nominative, is changed, in that case, to ς , as in $τέρας$ (stem $τέρατ$) and $κέρας$ and $κρέας$ (stems $κέρατ$ and $κρέατ$). For the exchange of σ for τ initial, compare $τέός$, epic and Ionic form of $σός$, with the same; also, Sansk. tvam, Lat. tu, and Gr. $\sigmaύ$ and the

nal form ($-\nuτι$) of the third pers. pl. act. of all verbs in Greek (cf. Latin third pers. pl. ending in $-\nuτ$), the principal tenses are still found ending in the Doric dialect throughout. Compare also Attic $\epsilonἴκοσι$, twenty, with Doric $\phiείκατι$, Latin viginti, Sansk. vinçati.

Cretan *τρέ* (for *τFe*, Sansk. *tvam*) with *σέ*, acc. case. Compare, also, *τόσος*, so great, and Lat. *tot* and *totus*; and also *τέκος* offspring, and Lat. *secus* and *sexus*.

The interchangeableness of *τ* and *σ*, both phonetically and graphically, is a fact very noticeable in the pronunciation and orthography, one or both, of almost all languages. The interchangeable spelling of the Latin adjective suffix *-tius*, as such, or as *-cius* (as in *adventitius* or *adventicius*), and so of the nominal suffix *-tio*, as such, or as *-cio* (as in *conditio* and *condicio*), is noticeable in this direction. So, in the modern languages generally, *t* before *i*, in the same syllable, has a simple or mixed, *s*-sound. Thus, in French, *nation* is pronounced as if *nāshion*; in German, as if *nah-tsi-ōne*; and, in English, as if *na-shun*.

In the Laconic dialect, even *θ* was often changed into *σ*, as in *σιός* for *θεός*, a god, and *ἀγασός* for *ἀγαθός*, good, *σάλασσα* for *θάλασσα*; and *πάσορ* and *πίσορ* for *πάθος* and *πίθος* (when, also, *ς* final is changed euphonically to *ρ*).

(3) An original sibilant is also, itself, sometimes represented by *ν* final. Compare *ἦν*, he was, with the Doric *ἦς* and the Vêdic *as*. So, in the 1st pers. pl. pres. act. of the verb, *ν* final stands for *ς*: as in *τύπτομεν* for *τύπτομες* (Doric form); with which compare the corresponding suffix *-mas*, in Sanskrit, as in *dadamas*, we give, and the corresponding Latin form in *-mus*, as in *damus*, we give. The Greek dual suffix *-τον* is the equivalent of the Sanskrit *-thas*. 'Αἰέν, poetic form of *αἰεί* (Eng. *aye*), always, is, in Doric, *αἰές*.

2d. The Substitution of Latin Linguals for each other.

§ 1. D. (1) *D* is sometimes substituted for *t*, especially before *r*: as in *quadraginta* for *quatraginta*, and *quadratus* for *quatratus*. So, the ancient *Mutina* is now *Modena*; the river *Athesis*, of old, in Italy, is the present *Adige*; and *Padua* represents the ancient *Patavium*.

(2) Other letters are, in several cases, substituted for an original *d*: as,

(a) *R*, in one case: *meridies* is for *medidies* (*medius* + *dies*), noon. So *r*, in *parricida* for *patricida*, is equivalent in one case similarly to an original *t*.

(b) L, also, represents, in some cases, an archaic d : as in *lingua*, archaic *dingua*, and *lacrima*, archaic *dacrima* (Gr. *δάκρυμα*). So, the Spanish *cola*, a tail, is but another form of the Latin *cauda*.

(c) B, sometimes, represents an original d followed by u or v : as in *bonus*, archaic *duonus* ; *bellum*, archaic *duelum* ; and *bis* for *dvis* (Cf. Gr. *δῖς* for *δFῖς*).

§ 2. T. (1) T often becomes s, after r, as in the supines of many verbs. Thus *tersum*, *mersum*, *cursum*, *versum*, and other supines in -sum stand for *tertum*, *mertum*, etc., according to the analogy of the regular supine formation in -tum, of the various conjugations. The liquids, in fact, generally, except m, evince a special fondness for having s succeed them.

(2) T is in one case interchangeable with r, as in *parricida*.

§ 3. S. S is readily interchanged with r ; as in *arbor* and *arbos*, honor and honos. The archaic forms of *plurimus* and *melior* were *plusimus* and *melios*, as in *meliose*m. *Corpus* (stem *corpor*) is for *corpos*, and this for *corpor* ; and *genus* (stem *gener*) is for *genes*, and this for *gener*. So the *Iacónians* often changed σ to ρ in the end of words, as in *τίρ* for *τίς*, and *πόρ* for *πούς*. Ancient *Massilia* has become similarly the modern *Marseilles*. In German, a like interchangeableness of r and s is noticeable in the words *darum*, therefore, and *warum*, wherefore, which are compounded of *um* + *das*, reversed, and *um* + *was* ; as in English *therefore* stands for *that-for* ; and *wherefore* for *which-for*. Compare in the same way, German *Hase* and English *hare* ; German *Eisen* and English *iron*.

III. Labials.

These are in Greek π, β, φ, and μ ; and in Latin p, b, v, f, ph and m.

As the changes and substitutions that occur in them belong, almost all, to the class of assimilative substitutions, they demand no full, distinct treatment here, except in the following general particulars :

§ 1. In Greek, initial μ is sometimes interchanged with β, as in *βλίττειν* for *μλίττειν* ; *βλώσκω* for *μλώσκω* ; and *βροτός* for *μροτός*.

§ 2. In Latin, *v* becomes *u*, or is vowelized before a consonant, as in *cautum* for *cavtum* (*caveo*); *fautum* for *favtum*, and *lautum* for *lavatum*. As *b* and *v*, like *p* and *f* or *ph*, are all correlated labials of but different degrees of hardness, the substitution of *u* for *b* in such words as *aufero* and *aufugio*, for *abfero* and *abfugio*, is of the same sort.

§ 3. One of the most frequent of all correspondences and interchanges in different languages is that of gutturals and labials, one with the other. Labials in Greek often correspond to gutturals in equivalent Sanskrit and Latin forms, as in *ἐπομαι* (stem *ἐπ.* for *σеп.*), to follow, compared with Sansk. *sach* and Latin *sequor* (pronounced as *sekor*), root *seq.*; *ἵππος*, Aeol. *ἱκκος*, and *equus* (as if *ekus*); *πέντε* and *quinque* (as if *kinke*). So the interrogative and indefinite words *πῶς*, *πότε*, and *ποῖος*, are in the Ionic dialect *κῶς*, *κότε*, and *κοῖος*, corresponding with the Sanskrit *kati*, *kadâ*, etc.

§ 4. In a few cases, also, linguals and labials interchange in different languages, especially *τ* and *π* (*t* and *p*); as *στάδιον*, Doric *σπάδιον*, Latin *spatium*; and so *σπεύδω* and Lat. *studeo*.

IV. The aspirate H.

The Latin *h* is a much harder aspirate than the Sanskrit *h*, which it sometimes represents. Before *s* they both become *x*; as in *vexit* from *veho*, Sansk. *avâkshit* from *vah*, to carry (cf. Greek *ὀχέω*). In *traxit*, perf. of *traho* (perhaps for *tra-veho*), the same fact appears.

(2) Assimilative Substitution. Assimilation is the result of a strongly determinative, phonetic attraction between one consonant and another, when in immediate juxtaposition. The law of assimilation commonly works backwards, or from the second consonant to the preceding one, as in *ἐννυμι* for *ξεννυμι* (for *Ἰέσνυμι*, Lat. *vestio*), and *jussi*, perf. of *jubeo*, for *jubsi*. But sometimes the law works forwards, from the first consonant to the second, as in *δλλυμι* for *δλνυμι*, *θάρρος* for *θάρσος*, and *ἄλλος* for *ἄλιος*, Sansk. *anyas*, Lat. *alius*. So when *πρόσω* was changed by metathesis to *πόρσω* in the Attic dialect, it was ere long harmonized to *πόρρσω*. Positive full assimilation is the literal change of one consonant

to the same as the other connected with it; as in *suffero* for *sub-fero*, and *illatus* for *in-latus*. A more incomplete assimilation occurs in the change of one consonant, in juxtaposition with another, to one of the same class with it; as in *imberbis* for *in-berbis*, and *impertio* for *in-pertio*: *m*, *b* and *p* being all labials. In *nihil* for *ne-hilum*, and *nisi* for *ne-si*, and *bubus* for *bobus* (for *bovibus*), we seem to have a few cases also of a retrogressive vowel-assimilation.

I. Gutturals.

The law of harmonization is the same with them, as with all the other mutes, in Greek; that smooth mutes must combine with smooth, middle with middle, and rough with rough; except that, in reference to the rough mutes, there can neither be a duplication of the same mute in juxtaposition, nor a repetition of it even in successive syllables. *Σαφφώ* is accordingly changed to *Σαπφώ*, and *Βάχχος* to *Βάκχος*, and *τίδημι* takes the place of *θίδημι*, and *πεφίληκα* of *φεφίληκα*. Before *μ* a guttural of whatever degree becomes uniformly *γ*, or medial. Thus *διωκμός* becomes *διωγμός*, and *βέβρεχμαι* becomes *βέβρεγμαi*.

II. Linguals.

1. Greek.

§ 1. The Dentals, τ, δ, θ.

(1) Before dental mutes, other dentals are changed into the semi-vowel *σ*; to which Pott, Curtius, and Heyse agree in giving the appropriate name of *dis-similation*; so that *ἀνυττός* becomes *ἀνυστός*; *ἀδτέον* becomes *ἀστέον*, and *πειθ-δῆναι*, *πεισθῆναι*.

(2) Before *μ* a dental becomes *σ*; as in *ἴσμεν*, first pers. pl. of *οἶδα* for *ἰδμεν*, and *ἤνυσμαι* for *ἤνυτμαι*, perf. pass. of *ἀνύω*, Attic form of *ἀνύω*.

§ 2. The Liquids.

(1) L. (a) The weak vowel *ι* (or *γ*) originally succeeding *λ* in many forms was afterwards converted into *λ*, as in *μᾶλλον* for *μάλιον*, comp. of *μαλα*; *ἄλλος* for *ἄλιος*; *ἄλλομαι* for *ἰλίομαι* (Lat. *salio* for *saliomi*); *στέλλω* for *στελίω*; *βάλ-λω* for *βαλίω*.

(b) In the Aeolic dialect *σ* was assimilated to a preceding

λ, as it was indeed also to μ, ν and ρ. We sometimes find this same style of assimilation in Homer, as in ὤφειλλα for ὤφειλα, Attic ὤφειλα, first Aor. of ὀφέλλω. In the Attic form the tense-characteristic σ is rejected; and the preceding vowel ε is lengthened by way of compensation.

(2) N. (a) Before λ or μ, ν is changed into the same liquid, as in συλλογίζω for συν-λογίζω, and ἐμμένω for ἐν-μένω. (b) Before ρ, ν is not thus changed, as in ἐνρίπτω, ἐνρήγνυμι; except in words compounded with συν, as in συρρίω. (c) Before σ, ν is, in the word σύν, assimilated to σ, as in συσσεύω, or dropped, as in συσπάω (συν + σπάω). In πάλιν, also, we find ν changed to σ in the compound παλίσσυτος. (d) Before a guttural, ν is always written γ, as in συγκαλέω. If the guttural is itself γ, then it is to the nasal gamma (Eng. ng final) that ν is converted, as in συγγενής (σύν + γένω).

(3) S. Before the dentals, and the labial liquid m, any dental may be changed into σ, as in οἶσθα for οἶδα, and ὁσμή for ὀδμή. So, in Latin est, he eats, third pers. Sing. of edo, for edt (for edit), we have d turned to s, before t.

2. Latin.

The Dentals.

(1) The dentals, d and t and the liquid r, are sometimes before s assimilated to it; as in cessi, perf. of cedo, for cedsi, gessi, perf. of gero, for gersi, concussi for concutsi, possum for potsum, fissum for fidsum, for fidtum, and missum for mitsum, for mittum. Such perfects as sēdi, fīdi and scīdi, with supines in -ssum are undoubtedly contracted forms of original perfects in -si, as sedsi, fidsi, etc.; from which afterwards the s was rejected for better euphonic effect, and the short radical vowel, e or i, was lengthened by way of compensation.

(2) D was sometimes assimilated to l before l: as in sella for sedla, for sedela from sedeo, to sit, and lapillus (for lapidlus) for lapidulus.

(3) N was assimilated to l, m, and r: as in illino (in + lino, immineo (in + mineo), irruo (in + ruo).

In some of the modern languages, especially the Italian,

the law of assimilation is quite active: as in Ital. *atto*, an act (Lat. *actum*); *patto*, a pact (Lat. *pactum*), *fitto*,¹ trans-fixed (Lat. *fixus*).

The letters most frequently doubled by assimilation, in the middle of words, are the liquids.

III. Labials.

1st. In Greek.

§ 1. *M*. Whenever a labial precedes μ , in the middle of a word, it is changed to μ : as in *γραμμή* for *γραφμή* from *γράφω*.

§ 2. *Π, B, Φ*. These all, when preceding σ , combine with it, into the compound consonant Ψ ; which, while having, analytically, either one of the labials for its base, has yet, to the ear, always the sound of the smooth mute π . So, in Latin, *scripsi*, perf. of *scribo*, becomes *scripsi*.

2d. In Latin.

M is, in a few cases, changed to *n*: as in *tunc* for *tum-ce*; *princeps* for *primum* (sc. *gradum*) *capio*: *clandestinus*, adj. formed from *clam* (for *celam*); *tandem* (from *tam*); and so *quanquam*, *eundem*, etc.

The interchanges of the different labials, one with the other, in various languages, may be here advantageously recalled: as in

SANSKRIT.	GREEK.	LATIN.	GERMAN.	ENGLISH.
upari.	ὑπέρ.	super.	über.	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{over.} \\ \text{upper.} \\ \text{super.} \\ \text{hyper.} \end{array} \right.$
saptan.	ἑπτα.	septem.	sieben.	

2dly. Topical Substitution.

By this is meant a change of place, in a letter or syllable, either by accident, if there be any accidents in language, or for better euphonic effect. Topical substitution is of two kinds:

(1) Metathesis. (2) Hyperthesis.

(1) Metathesis (from *μετατίθημι*, I exchange) is a change in the order of the letters of a word, in the same syllable.

1st. In Greek.

¹ Webster's reference to *peto*, as the etymological radical of the noun *fit*, is absurd.

§ 1. It occurs in several, separate, individual words, that have no common elements of classification, unless it be that the consonant, before and after which the vowel plays interchangeably, is a liquid (ρ): as *κάρτος* and *κράτος*, strength; *θάρσος* and *θράσος*, courage; *θρόσκω* (stem, *θρο*), I leap; *κράδι* and *καρδία*, the heart. In Homer we find both *κάρτερος* and *κράτερος*, strong. *Πρόσω* became, afterwards, *πόρσω*, and, still later, *πόρρω*, Lat. *porro*. So, compare Aeol. *τέρτος* (Lat. *tertius*), Eng. tierce and tier, with *τρίτος*.

§ 2. It occurs, frequently, in the perfect of verbs whose stems end in a liquid: as *τέτμηκα* from *τέμνω* (root, *τεμ* or *ταμ*), *βέβληκα* from *βάλλω* (stem, *βαλ*), *τέθνηκα* from *θνήσκω* (root, *θαν*). Compare, also, the perfects of *καλέω*, *κάμνω*, etc.

2d. In Latin.

§ 1. A few cases occur, in proper Latin forms, compared one with the other: as, *tero*, perf. *trivi*; *sterno*, perf. *stravi*; *ferveo*, supine *fretum*, *cerno*, and *cretum*, *sperno* and *spretum*.

§ 2. There are, also, a few cases of metathesis,¹ in equivalent forms to certain Greek words; as *σκέπτομαι*, I look around, and Lat. *specio*; *κρινω*, I judge, and *cerno*; *ψύω* and *spuo*, I spit.

(2) Hyperthesis.

This (derived from *ὑπερτίθημι*, I place or carry over) consists in changing letters from one syllable to another.

1st. In Greek.

§ 1. This occurs in a few single words: as in the genitive of *Πνύξ*, the Pnyx, *Πυκνός*, which case, from its resemblance to the adj. *πυκνός*, crowded, shows us the undoubted etymology of the word. Compare *ὄχλος* for *δλχος*, the people, Cretan *πόλχος*, Lat. *vulgus*, Germ. *volk*, Eng. *folk*.

§ 2. Many verbs, having now the diphthong *ει* in their stems, exhibit therein a change of place of the weak vowel *ι*,

¹ In English, an orthoepical metathesis often occurs, if not an orthographical; as in the pronunciation of iron and fire, and in the utterance of the aspirate first in its combinations with an initial *w*, as in such words as *which*, *what*, *where*, etc.

which originally followed, instead of preceding, the final consonant of the stem. Thus :

τείνω,	stem	τεν,	is for	τενίω.
χείρων,	"	χερ	"	χερίων.
ἁμείνων,	"	ἁμεν,	"	ἁμενίων.
βαίνω,	"	βαν,	"	βανίω (cf. Lat. venio).
μαίνομαι,	"	μαν,	"	μανίωμαι.
φαίνω,	"	φαν	"	φανίω.

§ 3. Several feminine adjective forms in *-αυα* exhibit the same change : as μέλαινα for μελάνια, τάλαινα for ταλάνια, etc.

2d. In Latin.

There is, in the word *nervus*, in Latin, as the equivalent of νεῦρον, a single instance of hyperthesis, in the one language as compared with the other.

So Bosra, in Africa, now represents the original Βύρσα. Some French derivatives from the Latin, exhibiting the fact of hyperthesis, will not be inappropriate : as, *tremper*, to temper, Lat. *temperare* ; *tout*, all, Lat. *totus* ; *noeud*, a knot, Lat. *nodus* ; *peuple*, the people, Lat. *populus*. In *raison* (*ratio*), *maison* (*mansio*), *palais* (*palatium*), we have undoubted instances of the same sort, in which the *ι* is to be regarded as radical, and not inserted, as in *faim* (*fames*) and *foin* (*fenum*), as a diphthongal compensation for a shortening of the original form.

In the case of some aspirated forms, there occurs a curious transfer, not indeed of a letter or syllable itself, but of a special affection belonging to it : as in *τρέψω* fut. of *τρέφω*, *ἔξω* fut. of *ἔχω* ; *πάσχω* (for *πάθσκω*), stem *παθ* ; and *θρίξ*, gen. *τριχός*. Compare, also, *θεσμός* with Doric *τεθμός*, a statute. Here the aspirate, when lost in one part of the word by contraction or flexion, is carefully borne, for preservation, to another part.

The next style of Consonantal Changes consists :

B. Of Insertions and Additions. These are of a threefold character :

1st. Prosthesis. 2d. Epenthesis. 3d. Epithesis.

1st. Prosthesis. This consists in prefixing a single letter or syllable to the beginning of a word, and for the purpose simply, in nearly every case, of better euphonic effect.

§ 1. The vowel prefixes of a prosthetic sort, in Greek, are *α*, *ε*, and *ο*, and, once or twice, *ι*.

(1) *α*. Compare *ἀμέργω*, to pluck, with its other form *μέργω*, and so *ἀμέρδω* and *μέρδω*, to bereave; *ἀμέλγω* and Lat. *mulgeo*.

(2) *ε*. Compare *ἐρυθρός*, red; Sansk. *rohita*, Lat. *ruber*; *ἐχδές* (also *χδές*), Sansk. *hyas*, Lat. *heri* for *hesi*. In *ἐδέλω* and *δέλω* we have both a fuller and contracted form of the same original word, in which the *ε* is radical and not prosthetic.

(3) *ο*. Compare *ὄδους* (for *ὄδοντες*), Sansk. *dantas*, Latin *dens* for *dents*; *ὄνομα*, a name, Sansk. *naman*, Lat. *nomen*; *ὀμυχέω*, Sansk. *mih*, Lat. *mingo*, I void water.

(4) *ι*. As *ἰαύω*; I sleep, compared with *αὔω*.

§ 2. The letter *σ* is found initial in some words, which appear at other times without it: as in *σμικρός* and *μικρός*, *τέγος* (Lat. *tectum*) and *στέγος*, *σμίραινα* and *μίραινα*. In some cases where *σ* thus occurs, it is radical to the original form; and in some cases it may be, possibly, the fragmentary representative of a lost preposition (*εἰς* or *ἐς*), serving to give the form to which it was prefixed a more strongly directive sense; just as, in words beginning with *νη*-, *ν*-, and *α*-, we often have fragments of an otherwise lost privative *ἀνευ*. Other prosthetic additions, particularly *ε*, may have sometimes originated in this way, and be but the remains, occasionally at least, of a primitive prepositional prefix.

Prosthetic additions to the original radical elements of a word often occur in French and Spanish. In Spanish, as in French, *e* is prefixed to words derived from the Latin beginning with *sc*, *sp*, and *st*: as in

SPANISH.	FRENCH.	LATIN.
escribir,	ecrire (originally, <i>escrire</i>),	scribere.
espeso,	epais,	spissus.
estado, ¹	état	status.

¹ In this way English orthography has been complicated with French-Latin forms of Latin words, as in *estate* (Lat. *status*), *esponse* (*sponsa*), *especial* (*species*), *establish* (*stabilio*).

2d. Epenthesis.

This is the insertion of a letter in the middle of a word, for the purpose of a better dynamical or musical effect. In the Sanskrit, after the prepositions *sam*, *ava*, *pari*, and *prati* and some words beginning with *k*, an euphonic *s* is introduced between them and the words with which they are compounded. With this euphonic use of *s*, a similar addition of it to *ab* and *ob*, in Latin, before *c*, *q*, and *p*, remarkably agrees. *Ob* sometimes retains it even when alone.

1st. In Greek.

§ 1. Σ has an affinity for τ , Θ , and μ , and often occurs before them, after short vowels : as, in the 2d pers. dual and plural person-endings passive of verbs, before Θ : as, $-\sigma\Theta\omicron\nu$ and $-\sigma\Theta\epsilon$; and in the 3d dual passive person-ending of the historical tenses $-\sigma\Theta\eta\nu$; with which compare the corresponding person-endings $\tau\omicron\nu$, $\tau\epsilon$, and $\tau\eta\nu$, in the active voice.

§ 2. We find also, in Greek, other epenthetic uses of different consonants : as, (1) Of β after μ ; as in $\mu\epsilon\sigma\eta\mu\beta\rho\iota\alpha$ (= $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\eta + \acute{\eta}\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha$) and $\Theta\acute{\alpha}\mu\beta\omicron\varsigma$, astonishment, compared with $\Theta\alpha\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$, wonder. In French, a similar fact appears in some words : as in *chambre*, Lat. *camera* ; *nombre*, Lat. *numerus*.

(2) Of δ after ν : as in $\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\pi\omicron\varsigma$, contracted $\acute{\alpha}\nu\delta\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$; with which also compare Fr. *gendre* and Lat. *gener*.

(3) Of Θ after σ : as in $\acute{\iota}\mu\acute{\alpha}\sigma\Theta\lambda\eta$, a thong ; with which compare $\acute{\iota}\mu\acute{\alpha}\sigma\sigma\omega$ and $\mu\acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\iota\xi$. The Θ serves, in such cases, to facilitate, phonetically, the union of μ or ν and σ with the succeeding λ or ρ .

2d. In Latin.

§ 1. *N*. In the Latin equivalents of some Greek and Sanskrit words an epenthetic *n*, or an *n* inserted for mere euphony, occurs : as in *anguis*, a snake, Gr. $\acute{\epsilon}\chi\iota\varsigma$, Sansk. *ahis*. The nasalization of various verb-stems, in the present and imperfect tenses of the different voices of the verb in both Greek and Latin, as in *fundo*, perf. *fudi*, and *κυνέω*, fut. *κύσω*, will be considered, by itself, under another head ; and is therefore not embraced in this section.

§ 2. P is epenthetically inserted between m and t or s: as in *sumpsi* and *promptus* from *sumo* and *promo*. Compare Fr. *dompter*, to subdue, and Lat. *domitare*; and also the English word *tempt*, and its Latin original, *tentare*.

§ 3. R is euphonically inserted, by epenthesis, in the genitive plural, between the stem-vowels a and o, of the 1st or A-declension and of the 2d or O-declension and the proper plural genitive case-suffix -um: -arum being for -aüm, and -orum for -oüum; with which compare -ων, gen. pl. suffix in Greek: as in *μουςά-ων*, contracted *μουσῶν*. The r epenthetic, in Latin, prevents the unpleasant hiatus otherwise made by the concurrence of a+o in the one case, and by o+o in the other.

§ 4. S is used epenthetically, with ab and ob, in compound forms: as in *abstineo*, *abstraho*, *obstinatus*, and *obsto*. In *subscus* (sub+cudo) compared with *incus*, we see a similar use of it with sub.

Caution: D, it is often said, is also epenthetically inserted between two vowels: as in *prodeo* (pro+eo), and in the 2d pers. sing. and pl. of *prosum* (*prodes* and *prodestis*), and elsewhere in that verb. The same fact is cited, also, in reference to *redeo* (re+eo), *reddo* (re+do), and *redarguo*. The d, however, in these forms, is not epenthetic, but radical. The Sanskrit original of both forms is *prati*. Its Greek equivalent, *πρός*, was accordingly, at first, *πρωτί*, in which form we find it in Homer, and from which, τ being interchanged for σ, it became *πρός* by contraction. Prod- and red- are, therefore, nearer their originals than pro- and re-, their shorter forms. In such forms as *praeo* and *deero*, no difficulty was felt by the Latins, on account of the hiatus caused, as there should have been, on the supposition that d, in the prefixes prod- and red- is of a mere euphonic origin.

3d. Epithesis.

This consists in adding a letter or syllable, at the end of a word, for better euphonic effect.

The ν *ἐφελεύστικον*, in Greek, is an addition of this sort, which, from its inherent phonetic strength, furnishes a good

staff on which the voice may rest, at the end of a clause or sentence.

No epithetic addition of letters, in the modern languages, occurs to the author. There are, however, in French usage, frequent instances of phonetic, if not of graphic epithesis, in the utterance of the final letters of words which, by themselves, are silent whenever they are in regimen with words immediately following them, which begin with a vowel. So, too, the cardinal numerals, in French, which end with a consonant, as six, sept, huit, dix, have their last letter, otherwise silent except before a vowel, distinctly pronounced when at the end of a clause or sentence.

The third class of Consonantal Changes we term :

C. Suppressions and Abridgments. These may occur in the three different parts of a word : its beginning, middle, or end. Such suppressions are denominated, according to their nature and position, by the following different names : aphaeresis, elision, syncope, ecthipsis, and apocope.

1st. A suppression of a letter in the beginning of a word. This is termed aphaeresis.

I. In Greek.

§ 1. Σ often vanishes entirely, in Greek, at the commencement of a word ; or, more frequently, is replaced rather by an aspirate, when a vowel follows. Sometimes both forms occur, as in σῦς and ὕς (Sansk. sūkara (s), Lat. sus, Germ. sau and schwein, Eng. sow and swine.) So also σάλασσα (Doric) and θάλασσα, the sea (for ἄλασσα) from ἅλς, salt, Lat. sal, Sansk. sara, salt. In respect to θάλασσα and ἅλς, compare ἄμα and θαμά. The Romans liked the letter σ much better than the Greeks ; and the aspirate is, accordingly, often initial in Greek where, in the equivalent forms of the Latin and the Sanskrit, the sibilant occupies its place : as in ἑπτα, seven, Lat. septem, Sansk. saptan ; and ἑξ, Lat. sex, Sansk. shash.

§ 2. In a few words λ was dropped when initial : as in ἱκμάω for λικμάω, to winnow, and ἱγδη, mortar, for λῆγδος. So, in the Aeolic dialect, μ was dropped from μία, one, which thus became ἱα.

II. In Latin.

§ 1. We often find *s* suppressed or wanting, initially, before other consonants; which is retained in the equivalent Greek forms, as found in the Sanskrit; or, in some cases, prosthetically applied in Greek: as,

LATIN.	GREEK.	SANSKRIT.
tego, I cover.	στέγω	sthaḡ.
fallo, I deceive.	σφάλλω	sphal.
fides, a cat-gut.	σφῖδη (cf. φείδομαι)	bhid, a filament.
cavo, I hollow.	σκάπτω	
vespa, a wasp.	σφήξ	

§ 2. There are some interesting cases of aphaeresis, in individual Latin words:

LATIN.	GREEK.	SANSKRIT.
sum is for esumi.	Cf. εἰμι (for ἐσμι)	asmi.
nosco “ gnosco.	“ γινώσκω	jñâ (desiderative form,
navus “ gnavus.	“ γενναῖος	[jijnâsâ.)

So the English word *stranger* (Lat. extraneus, Span. extranjero, Fr. étranger) has lost its initial *e*: as in *estrangle*; as also the word *story* (Gr. ἱστορία, Lat. historia, Ital. istoria and storia), has lost the initial syllable *hi*.

2d. A suppression of a letter or syllable, in the middle of a word. This is called by different names, according to circumstances.

§ 1. Elision. This occurs when a vowel is removed from before another vowel: as in *nullus* (= *ne+ullus*), *nunquam* (= *ne+unquam*), ἀνέρχομαι (= ἀνά+έρχομαι).

§ 2. Syncope. By this is meant the removal of a vowel from between two consonants: as in *patris*, gen. of *pater*, for *pateris*; and so *πατρός*, gen. of *πατήρ*, and Homeric *τίπτε* for *τίποτε*. *Valde*, in Latin, is for *valide*, by syncope.

§ 3. Ecthipsis. This is the removal of a consonant, or of an entire syllable, from the middle of a word.

1st. In Greek.

In Greek, *σ* is often rejected by ecthipsis; sometimes in

nouns, and sometimes in verbs: as in *γένεος* for *γένεσος*, gen. of *γένος*, and *βουλεύη* for *βουλεύει* for *βουλεύεται*.

While in Sanskrit euphonic principles ruled with a force greater than in any of the cognate languages, still many harsh combinations were allowable, which seemed to the Greeks and Romans, even when occurring in a regular way, altogether too dissonant. In the case accordingly of verbs, having roots terminating in a consonant, it was an almost universal rule, in both Greek and Latin, although not in Sanskrit, to connect the personal terminations with the stem, by means of an union-vowel. In the following roots, however, the connecting vowel was suppressed, when the personal ending was affixed: in Greek, the roots *ἐς*, to be, and *ἰδ*, to know; and in Latin, *es*, to be; *fer*, to bear; *vel*, to wish; and *ed*, to eat; so that we have the forms *ἐστί*, *ἐσμέν*, *ἴστε* and *ἴδμεν*, and also *est*, he is, *fert*, vult, and *est*, he eats.

As in Sanskrit, before the personal terminations beginning with *t*, *th* and *dh*, roots that end with a consonant other than *n* reject *s*, in order to avoid a harsh combination of three consonants; so, in Greek, roots terminating with a consonant abbreviate in the perfect passive the terminations *-σθον*, *-σθε*, to *-θον* and *-θε*, as *τέτυφθε* for *τέτυφσθε*, and *τέταχθε* for *τέταξθε*. Compare in Sanskrit the form *sthâ*, to stand, with itself as it is when compounded with the preposition "ut," up, as in *utthita*, upstood for *ut-sthita*.

Before *σ* the dentals and the dental liquid *ν* are dropped; as in *λαμπάς* for *λαμπάδς*, *κόρυς* for *κόρυδς*, *σώμασι* for *σώματςι*, and *δαίμοσι* for *δαίμονςι*. In *πούς*, stem *πόδ*, not only is *σ* dropped, but *ο* is lengthened also by way of compensation, as likewise in the perf. act. participle in *-ως*, as in *βεβουλευκώς* for *βεβουλευκός*.

When both a dental and *ν* are omitted before *σ*, the absorption is indicated by an elongation of the vowel, if *a*, or by its diphthongation, if *e* or *o*; *e* becoming in such a case *ει*, and *o* becoming *ου* and *ω*; as in *πᾶσι* for *πάντςι*, and *σπεῖσω*, fut. of *σπένδω*, for *σπένδσω*, *τυφθεῖς* for *τυφθέντς*, *λέων* for *λέοντς*, and *ὄδους* for *ὄδοντς*.

2. In Latin.

Abridgments by *ecthlipsis*, accompanied often by a subsequent contraction, are numerous : as, *debeo* and *praebeo* for *dehibeo* and *praehibeo* ; *promo* and *sumo* for *pro-emo* and *sub-emo* ; *malle* for *mavelle* (= *magis* and *velle*) ; *prudens* for *providens* ; *amavi* and *docui* for *ama-fui* and *doce-fui* ; *lumen* for *lucimen* ; *hodie* for *hoc die* ; *judex* for *jus-dex*, and *momentum* for *movimentum*. So the dative and ablative pl. suffix-ending *-is*, is a contraction, in the different declensions, of the original forms *-abus*, *-obus* and *-ibus* ; with which compare the double dative pl. forms, *queis* or *quibus* of the relative pronoun *qui*. So *poematis* is found in some authors for *poematibus*.

The above instances are of an individual sort, and better denoted by themselves, than by any attempted classification. The facts which remain, that are worthy of note, may be thus classified :

(1) *D* is often suppressed before *s*, and so sometimes is *t* ; as in *divîsi* for *dividsi*, *mîsi* for *mitsi*, *clausi* for *claudsi*, and *laesi* for *laedsi*. In *divîsi* and *mîsi*, or any such case, the first vowel *i* is long by way of contraction, as it would otherwise be made by way of compensation.

(2) *C*, *g* and *q* sometimes disappear in the same way before *s* ; as in *sparsi* for *spargsi*, *mulsi* for *mulgsi*, and *torsi* for *torqsi*.

Even in English, words are sometimes softened by the rejection of a letter belonging to the original root ; as in our words *speak*, *spake*, and *spoken*, from the German *sprechen*, *sprach*, *gesprochen*.

§ 3. A suppression at the end of a word is called *Apocope*.

In the Sanskrit, in the final form in which it has reached us, two consonants were no longer tolerated, as they once had been, at the end of a word ; but the latter was rejected. That this feature of the language was not fixed upon it, until after the separation of the other languages from the common parent-stock, would seem evident from the fact, that it is not true of the Zend or of the European languages, old or new. The result to the Sanskrit is a mutilation in the present aspect of many of its original forms, which, if found

now as they were in their primeval state, would furnish much valuable light on many etymological questions and theories.

1. In Greek.

(1) All final mutes are apocopated from forms, where they would otherwise appear as a radical part of the word. Thus μέλιτ becomes μέλι; σῶματ, σῶμα; ἔτυπτετ, third pers. sing. imperf. act. (for fuller form ἔτυπτετι) becomes ἔτυπτε; and ἔτυπτοντ(ι), third pers. pl. of same tense, becomes ἔτυπτον; γάλακτ becomes γάλα, and ἦσαντ(ι) (compare erant for esant) becomes ἦσαν, and πᾶντ (neut. of πᾶς) becomes πᾶν. In such nominatives neuter, as κέρας, κρέας, τέρας, the final τ of the stem is merely changed to σ.

(2) No consonant can properly end a word in Greek, except ν, ρ or σ. Οὐκ or οὐχ is but a mutilation of οὐκε and ἐκ or ἐξ of ἐκίς (cf. ἕκας, ἐκεῖ and ἐκεῖνος); and they are properly but proclitics, never occurring at the end of a sentence; οὐκ always preceding a word beginning with a vowel, and ἐκ one commencing with a consonant. In respect also to the three letters, ν, ρ and σ, it is to be remembered that ρ occurs rarely, and that ν often represents σ, or contains it by absorption, and also that σ final cannot be preceded by a dental or the liquid ν. Even ν and σ were themselves so weak at the end of words, as to be often omitted. Thus ἐγώ is for ἐγών, Sansk. aham; and τοῦτο, neuter of οὗτος, is for τοῦτον. Compare also πρόσδε and πρόσθεν, νύ and νύν.

(3) The passive person-endings -νται and -ντο cannot occur after a consonantal stem; the ν accordingly is changed to α, and the forms become τετύφαται and ἐτετύφατο instead of τετύφνται and ἐτετύφντο; like the change of the accusative case-sign ν in the third declension to α, after consonants, as in πατέρα for πατέρν, and κόρυθα for κόρνθν.

(4) When occurring between two short vowels in the end-syllable of a word, σ and ν tend to vanish, as in μείζους for μείζο(ν)ες and γένους for γένε(σ)ος.

(5) In the third pers. sing. active of all the tenses, and in the third pers. pl. of both the imperfect and aorist tenses, an original τ, still preserved in Latin, is dropped. Thus τύπτει,

ἐτύπτε, τέτυφε, ἔτυψε are for τύπτει(ι), ἐτύπτει(ι), τετύφε(ι), ἐτύφε(ι). Thus compare

SANSKRIT.	GREEK.	LATIN.
bharati, he bears,	φέρει(τ)ι,	fer(i)t(i).
abharat(i), he was bearing,	ἔφερε(τι),	fere-bat(i).

(6) Unsigmatized masculine and feminine nominatives, or those which would normally have the gender-sign σ affixed, but which, on account of an ν final in the stem, have rejected it, have their stem-vowel lengthened by way of compensation, as in ποιμήν for ποιμένος, and ἡγεμών for ἡγεμόνς.

2. In Latin.

The number of final consonants in Latin, c, l, n, r, s, t, is somewhat greater than in Greek.

Apocope occurs in Latin in several interesting classes of cases.

(1) In the loss of the final letters of many consonantal stems of nouns in the nominative; as in cor, the heart, for cord; lac, milk, stem lact; os, a bone, stem oss (Gr. stem ὄσσε); leo, a lion, stem leon; and mel, honey, stem mell.

(2) In the ablative singular form of all the declensions; in the dropping of its final characteristic d from them all; as domino for archaic dominod, and sermone for sermoned.

(3) In several imperatives, as dic for dice; duc for duce; fac for face; and fer for fere.

The next class of consonantal changes is composed of

IV. Weakened consonantal forms; or the weakening of individual consonants in certain specific forms or classes of forms.

(1) The very common one of τ into σ . Thus the ending -ουσι in the third pers. pl. of the pres. and fut. active of Greek verbs, as in τύπτουσι and τύψουσι, represents an original -οντι; which was the form also actually used by the Dorians. The analysis of the changes made in the form is this: τ was euphonicly changed to σ , after which ν was dropped, according to universal Greek usage before σ , and the vowel o was lengthened, by way of etymological compensation, into ou .

So in Latin, the proper supine-ending -tum is changed, when the stem of the verb ends in a dental, into -sum. After a long medial vowel the dental is thrown away, as in caesum for caedtum, from caedo, to kill, and laesum for laedtum, from laedo; as likewise in the supine and participial forms of cado and edo, to eat; in which the vowels a and e are accordingly lengthened by the contraction of the syllable to which they belong, as in cāsum for cādtum, supine of cādo, and the participles ambēsus and comēsus of ambēdo and comēdo. After a short vowel, the dental is also assimilated to the changed suffix, as in fissum for fidtum, and fossum for fodtum; supines of findo and fodio.

(2) That of the conversion of an original σ , in the beginning of a word, into the aspirate; as in $\upsilon\varsigma$ for $\sigma\upsilon\varsigma$, which two forms are both found in use together; and of $\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\iota$ for $\sigma\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\iota$ (Lat. sisto). This subject will, however, receive its proper treatment, under the subsequent head of Sibilation.

(3) That of the weakening of an original Digamma into various forms; another topic reserved for fuller discussion, by and by, alone by itself.

A special hint. It must not be forgotten, that some differences in the flexion-forms both of nouns and verbs are to be resolved, not by any mere phonological analysis, but on the theory of a manifest duplication of the stems of its different forms, and sometimes even by the aggregation of very different stems together, for grammatical convenience, into one form of conjugation. In such forms as μέγας, μεγάλη, μέγα; πολὺς, πολλή, πολὺ; πράος, πραεῖα, πράον we have two different original flexion-stems: μέγα and μεγάλο; πολὺ and πολλό; πράο and πράε. The two stem-forms of πολὺς and πολλή we find used interchangeably in Homer in most of the cases. In the Lat. fero, perf. tuli, supine latum, we have two absolutely different stems aggregated, fer and tul; two, not three, as latum is for tlatum (cf. Gr. τλάω and τλητός, and Lat. tolero); and tlatum is from the same root with tuli.

V. Strengthened consonantal forms.

Neither learner nor teacher, it is believed, can be harmed by occasional repetitions of the same fact, in other relations

and for other uses. It is difficult, if not impossible, to survey phonology thoroughly on its different sides, and to do justice to each one of them by itself, without at the same time catching views of other parts already examined, or demanding afterwards more distinct and complete consideration.

The use of strengthened forms was one of the early features of language, abounding in Sanskrit and Greek, and of frequent occurrence also in Latin; but occurring less and less in subsequent and derived languages, as we go in them further and further from their primeval source. As the Latin preserves in most of its aspects more of the simple strong characteristics of the Sanskrit, than the Greek, its departure in this respect to a wider degree from its original than the Greek, is to be accounted for probably by the strong practical tendency of the Roman mind, which did not relish double forms of the same thing, and multiplied modes of reaching the same end.

The modes of strengthening stems are various, as :

§ 1. By nasalization, as in *κάμνω*, stem *καμ*, and *τέμνω*, stem *ταμ*; and in Latin, *frango*, *findo*, *vinco*, compared with their simple bases *frag*, *fid* and *vic*. But the subject of nasalization must be treated afterwards by itself.

§ 2. By the reduplication of the radical syllable or sound.

A repetition or reduplication of words and syllables is the most natural and effective style of emphasizing their importance.¹ This occurs abundantly in Sanskrit and in Greek, but much less in Latin. See subsequent treatment of Reduplication by itself.

§ 3. By changing stems originally ending in one of the *κ* mutes or *τ* mutes, followed by the semivowel *ι* (as *γι*, *κι*, *χι*, *τι*, *θι*) into *σσ* or *ττ*; and stems ending in the liquid *λ* followed by *ι*, as *λι* into *λλ*. Thus : *τάσσω*, *λεύσσω*, *φρίσσω*, *λίσσομαι* are for the earlier forms *ταγίω*, *λευκίω*, *φρικίω*, *λιπίωμαι*; as, also, *βάλλω*, *μέλλω*, and *στέλλω* are for *βαλῖω*, *μελῖω*,

¹ This idea lies at the foundation of some of our most expressive words, as respect, regard, remark; where the idea, as in the word respect, is, that the person or thing respected is worthy of being looked at a second time, or, again and again.

and *στέλλω* ; with which compare *μᾶλλον*, comparative of *μάλα* for *μάλιον*.

The gemination of the final consonant of the stem, in this way, answers a double purpose : that of strengthening the stem, and that also of symbolizing, in a form so unusual in Greek, except as a special etymological contrivance, the previous changes that had occurred in these forms.

In Latin, the verbs in *-io*, of the third conjugation, represent the same class of verb-stems that, in Greek, were changed so as to present a duplication of the final letter of the stem : as *capio*, *cupio*, and *fugio*. In Greek, verbs and adjectives having *ν* or *ρ* for the final letter of the stem, followed by the half-vowel *ι*, a metathesis of the *ι* occurs, instead of a gemination of the final consonant ; as in *φαίνω*, stem *φαν*, for *φαίνω*, *βαίνω*, stem *βαν*, for *βανίω* (cf. Lat. *vevio*), etc. The half-vowel *i*, or *y*, of the original forms of these various words represents the Sanskrit *yâ*, properly meaning to go, occurring in verbs of what is called the fourth class, in that language, and characteristic, very extensively, of intransitive and passive verbs. But *y* was not a sound to be found in Greek ; and therefore it must either be vowelized, as if *ι*, or expressed by some other assimilated sound. In the adjective termination *-ιος* in Greek, as in *ἄγιος*, Sansk. *yajyas*, we see the equivalent of the Sanskrit adjective suffix *yas*. The Doric future suffix-form *-σιω*, answers, in the same way, to the Sansk. *syâmi*. The analogue, accordingly, in both Greek and Latin, of the fourth Sansk. conjugation-ending *yami*, is *ιω* or *ιο* (for *-ιαμι*). From such an original regular form in *ιω*, come not only the altered forms *-σσω*, *ττω*, *-ζω*, *λλω*, but also those in *-αινω* (for *-ανιω*) and *-αιρω* (for *αρω*). So, in Latin, the adjective and nominal suffixes *-ius*, *-ia*, *-ies*, answer to the Sansk. *yas* and *yâ*, like the verbal ending *-io* to the Sansk. *-yâmi*.

§ 4. By the epenthetic insertion of *σ* in the midst of the stem : as in *μίσσω* (Lat. *misceo*) compared with *μίσσνμι* ; *ἴσχω* and *ἴσχνέομαι* compared with *ἔχω* ; also *ἐσθίω* with *ἔδομαι*, to eat, Sansk. *ad*, Lat. *ed*.

§ 5. By adding to consonantal stems ending in *π* and *κ*

the letter τ , and to vowel-stems ϑ ; as in $\tau\acute{\upsilon}\pi\omega$ (stem $\tau\upsilon\pi$); $\kappa\acute{\omicron}\pi\tau\omega$ ($\kappa\omicron\pi$); $\kappa\rho\acute{\upsilon}\pi\tau\omega$ ($\kappa\rho\upsilon\beta$); $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\tau\omega$ ($\pi\epsilon\kappa$); and $\tau\acute{\iota}\kappa\tau\omega$ ($\tau\epsilon\kappa$); and for vowel-stems $\kappa\eta\vartheta\omega$, $\kappa\lambda\eta\vartheta\omega$, $\pi\rho\eta\vartheta\omega$ and $\sigma\eta\vartheta\omega$ (stems $\kappa\upsilon\alpha$, $\kappa\lambda\epsilon$, $\pi\rho\eta$, and $\sigma\alpha$). Such forms, in Latin, as *necto*, *plecto*, *flecto*, are of the same analytic origin.

Even in the forms of nouns, in Greek, the strengthening of the stem by the insertion of τ appears: as in the epic forms $\pi\acute{\omicron}\lambda\epsilon\mu\omicron\varsigma$ and $\pi\acute{\omicron}\tau\omicron\lambda\iota\varsigma$ for $\pi\acute{\omicron}\lambda\epsilon\mu\omicron\varsigma$ and $\pi\acute{\omicron}\lambda\iota\varsigma$. Compare, also, $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\upsilon\alpha$ and $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\tau\alpha$, the heel.

We come, now, to some of the special pathological affections of the classical languages.

A. The Greek.

1st. Its dialects.

Every language, covering an area of any considerable extent, for a long period of time, tends to break into separate dialects; determined, objectively, by different physical and local causes; and also subjectively, by difference of employment, development, and culture. The effects of time and space are as marked on men as on nature, and on the world of language and of letters, as on any part of the vegetable kingdom. In Greece, especially, dialectic developments were of the fullest and finest growth. Had ever a nation, in respect to all physical influences, so favorable a position, as such, for growth in all the elements of inward greatness? She was nursed in the mountains, among the giants. The air that she breathed was full of the seeds of life. In the broad blue sky above, and the bright blue sea below, she saw divine aspects of energy and beauty constantly mirrored to her view. Her eye and her heart were ever invited, by surrounding objects, to a perpetual festival. She laid the beams of her greatness on two continents: combining the stern strength of the one with the soft luxuriance of the other. She sat, as queen, on many waters, and girt around, as with a mantle of stars, with clusters of islands shining about her on every side.

On no spot upon earth can one be born, to this day, where Nature will bend down more lovingly and impressively over him, to breathe her life and beauty into all the opening ele-

ments of his being. The mountains and the sea have ever been the two greatest natural teachers of mankind. No people could come into more immediate contact with Nature, in either of these forms of her presentation ; none ever did so meet her constantly, in them both combined. Rome was, in some respects, similarly accoutred for greatness with Greece : with the mountains behind and the sea before ; but it was with no such fulness of preparation ; her home was, after all, upon a plain. Greece was, everywhere, a land full of broken and rugged surfaces, of bold shores, of short, dark, rapid, foaming streams, and of every variety of landscape, skirted, at ten thousand points of contact, with the sea, which not only surrounded it, but crept in, with its pulses of ever-quickenin'g force, into all the folds of its physical and national life. Amid such influences, as each vegetable and animal have not only their special geographical zone, but also even a specific climate and locality, where they will best fill out the whole ideal outline of their being, man finds his most favored spot for a large growth of life and action.

When the western fracture was made from the common Graeco-Italic stock, which, under the long action of many favoring circumstances, was perfected, in the end, into the round orb of Roman life and law, the portion remaining behind, within the boundaries of Northern Greece and Asia Minor, began slowly to form a local character and language, as they settled more and more upon the same soil, into fixed communities and habits. No language can bear greater evidence of home-growth, than does the Greek. Hellenic outgrowths, of all kinds, began early to thrust forth themselves, in all the communities of Greece, with great force : so that, ere long, Hellenic, or civilized and cultivated, ideas, words, accent, and euphonism, with the power also of Hellenic arms, greatly changed the first character of the people and of their language. The Hellenes were, in a word, the Greeks, in a more cultivated period of their history, than the pioneer Pelasgi or first settlers. Thus readily is the great paradox solved, which has perplexed so long a succession of historical writers, of the connected existence, and yet supposed diverse origin,

of the two races, that peopled Greece, to which they really have themselves given, in their imagination, all the reality that they ever possessed; and which it was as easy, of course, for them to set in grand antagonism to each other, as it was, in the first place, to invent them at all. Grecian literature, art, history, genius, and advancement, are therefore, by necessity, all Hellenic.

The three leading dialects of Greece were the Aeolic, Doric, and Ionic. The Aeolic prevailed in Boeotia, Thessaly, and the colony of Aeolis in Asia Minor. The Doric, in the Peloponnesus and among the Dorian colonies in Asia Minor, Italy, and Sicily; and the Ionic, which was spoken by the Ionian race, and especially in Asia Minor, and also in numerous islands, and in the Ionian colonies. This was the first of all the dialects, perfected by poetic composition; and it burst forth, at different times, into three kindred varieties: the Old Ionic or Epic, as seen in Homer and Hesiod, the New Ionic of Herodotus, and the Attic, which became ultimately the standard of all the other dialects, throughout the whole of Greece. This is the dialect, in which the many chief builders of Athenian greatness erected their various structures of beauty and of strength.

The Aeolic and Doric are more simple, severe, and even rough, in their forms. In the Aeolic, Alcaeus and Sappho sang. This is the dialect with which the forms of the Latin are more correlated than with any other; and which also presents to us the patterns of Greek words very nearly as they were at the first, when unbroken, or fused and recast into other moulds. The Doric abounds more in consonants than the others. In it the Muse of Theocritus and Pindar robed herself.

The Ionic is full of vowels, and therefore soft; while, possessing also an uncontracted fulness of syllables, it moves before the eye like an Asiatic princess, with a Grecian face and smile, but sweeping a long train, and arrayed in the strong colors of the oriental world. The Attic dialect is the Ionic arrived at maturity. The hand of Time has here chiselled all its forms, according to the pure ideals of taste;

the rules of art have been effectively applied to every side of it, by a long succession of workmen, busying themselves one after another in perfecting the details of its structure; and it contains in itself all the plain, deep strength of the Doric, with all the real, upper beauty of the Ionic.

The Attic dialect had certain classes of peculiarities, in different ages, which have led writers sometimes, and yet with no very important results, to divide it into three periods: the Older, the Middle, and the Later Attic. The Older Attic flourished five hundred years before Christ, as found in the writings of Thucydides, Aeschylus, etc.; the Middle Attic, a hundred years later, as found in the works of Plato and Xenophon; and the Later Attic, in the succeeding age, as seen in the orations of Demosthenes. On the margin between the Later Attic and the common Greek dialect, that prevailed 300 B. C., appeared that wonderful philosopher, Aristotle, who influenced the great speculative tides of thought in the ancient world quite as much perhaps as Calvin has those of the modern. Some of the leading writers in the Common Greek, into which Classic Greek slowly, and with ever increasing dimness, faded away, were Plutarch, Strabo, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Lucian.

[To be continued.]

NOTE. — ERRATA and additions in the portion of this Article (Vol. XVI.) previously published. Page 690, add after *râs*, in line 4, as part of the same sentence: or a representation of a $\vdash$ i, as in *amem* for *ama-im*. Page 691, lines 30, 31, for *dadâmi* read *dadhâmi*. Page 693, line 18, for *which* read *it*. Page 713, line 2 from bottom, for *going* read *agoing*. Page 722, transpose lines 3 and 4. Page 268, line 30, for *form* read *from*. Page 275, line 10, for *become* read *became*. Page 279, line 18, for *when* read *where*.

ARTICLE III.

EXEGESIS OF I. CORINTHIANS 15: 35—44, AS ILLUSTRATED
BY NATURAL HISTORY AND CHEMISTRY.¹

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THE apostle, in this passage, seems to have three leading objects in view: the first, is to answer a very natural and forcible objection to the resurrection of the body; the second, to show the great difference between the natural and spiritual body; the third, to show the superiority of the spiritual or resurrection body over the natural body laid in the grave.

The objection he states in the 35th verse: *How are the dead raised up; and with what body do they come?* That is, as it has been reiterated and amplified, in every age, especially since the days of Avicenna, the Arabian physician, in the tenth century: How can the body be raised out of the grave, when all the particles composing it have been scattered to the ends of the earth, and have entered into other bodies, even the bodies of other men? Can even Omnipotence make the same particles a part of two bodies?

The language and translation of this passage require but little attention; since there is but little diversity of opinion concerning them. I shall attempt only one or two critical remarks. John Locke supposed the meaning of *σάρξ*, in the 39th verse, to be "an organized animal body," instead of flesh as the substance of the body. This opinion seems to me quite probable. The word certainly had such a meaning, not only among the later classical writers, but in the New Testament (Matt. 26:41): *The spirit is willing; but the flesh is weak*. Now the apostle seems to be describing the difference between the various classes of animals, rather than the different character of their muscles. Or, if the latter, or com-

¹ Read by appointment before the Hampshire East Association in Massachusetts, Nov. 8, 1859.

mon interpretation be retained, it cannot be doubted that Paul meant to put a part for the whole; that is, he meant to describe the well-known permanent differences among various classes of animals. This brings the meaning of his *πᾶσα σὰρξ* into harmony with the other objects mentioned in the passage. But if we make *σὰρξ* literal flesh, the chemist and physiologist might raise a question whether the muscle of man can easily be distinguished from that of some of the beasts.

But my chief object is to look at this passage from the stand-point of natural history and chemistry. I have no idea, indeed, that Paul or any other sacred writer used the strict scientific language of the nineteenth century; but he does describe things in harmony with modern science. Let us look, first, at Paul's answer to the objection of the sceptic to the resurrection of the body.

I. The illustration used by the apostle, drawn from the germination and growth of a plant from a seed, completely answers this famous objection.

1. It shows that the resurrection-body need contain only an infinitesimal part of the body laid in the grave, in order to be identical with it.

A plant, in order to possess a specific identity with that from which it sprang, needs to have in it only that minute portion of the seed which begins the new stalk and root. In some species this would probably not form a millionth part of the full-grown plant. So also may it be with the resurrection of the dead; and the spiritual body, consequently, need have in it no larger portion of the natural body. Who can doubt that such an infinitesimal germ may be preserved, by Omnipotence, amid all the decompositions and recompositions of the grave?

2. Science goes further than this, and shows us that the identity of an organized body is preserved, in this world, though every particle of it has been changed repeatedly. To make it the same body, during the successive periods of its existence, it is only necessary that it should be composed of the same elementary matter, combined in the same proportions,

and moulded into essentially the same form and structure. The bodies, both of animals and plants, are several times entirely changed during a long life ; but if, as the old particles drop out, new ones of the same kind come in to take their place, we never suspect any loss of identity. If we plant the seed of a tree in childhood, and after nursing it for a time as it springs up, leave it for years, we never doubt, on our return, that we look upon the same tree, though it may be greatly expanded, and its form and aspect somewhat changed. Nor do we suspect, because our bodies have been, perhaps more than once, completely changed during our ten or twenty years' absence, that we are not the same persons, bodily as well as mentally, who planted the tree.

Science, then, would decide that it is not necessary that the resurrection-body should contain a single particle of the natural body, in order to make them identical. If we judge from the figure employed, by Paul, to illustrate the subject, derived from vegetation, it would seem that revelation does represent a minute part of the sleeping dust as entering into the spiritual body. But whether this be so, or not, either supposition completely meets and triumphantly refutes the objection : How are the dead raised ; and with what body do they come ? It shows how this might be done, even though the resurrection-body should possess the same organization as the natural body ; that is, consist of flesh and blood. But if the future body may, consistently with its identity, possess an entirely different organization, so as not to be composed of flesh and blood, and be as unlike the present as any plant is to the seed that produced it, still more completely does this illustration of the apostle refute an objection which, for eighteen hundred years, has hung like a venomous viper to the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. For there may be sameness of chemical composition without sameness of organization ; as there is, to some extent, between the seed and the plant springing from it. We might go further than this, and say that, though sameness of chemical composition be essential to the identity of the body, at different periods in this world, yet since the composition of the seed often differs considera-

bly from that of the plants, a like difference may exist between the natural and the spiritual body.

It ought to be distinctly stated, that the object of this discussion is not to ascertain the precise nature of the spiritual body, but to show that, even though the same laws of bodily identity which prevail among organized bodies in this world, apply to the natural and spiritual body, we can vindicate the scripture doctrine of a literal resurrection. But if we admit an organization in the spiritual body different from that in the natural, the vindication becomes yet more complete.

But since the preceding views of organic or bodily identity, in this world, were first made public, by myself, several years ago, at least two able writers have endeavored to prove them erroneous.

My former colleague, Prof. Haven, in his late work on *Mental Philosophy*, has not referred to me by name; but as he has described my theory as to identity, which no one else, so far as I know, has advanced, I cannot doubt that his remarks were intended for me. He says that "two bodies may be composed of the same chemical elements, in the same proportion, and possessing the same general form and structure, yet they are not the same body. A given piece of wood, or iron, may be divided into a number of parts, each closely resembling the others, of the same appearance, size, figure, color, weight, and of the same chemical components; yet no one of these is identical with any other." "There is no limit to the number of identical bodies which it is possible to conceive on this theory of identity."

These statements are all very true, if applied to inorganic homogeneous matter. But my theory refers alone to organic bodies. And here, too, it is easy to conceive that God might have made two, or a multitude of them, exactly alike as to composition, form, and structure; and these, of course, could not be identical. But when we come to inquire what God *has* done, we shall find that he has *not made any two alike, as to composition and structure*; and here, therefore, we have a means of identification of organic beings.

Prof. Haven, however, says that "it is only in a modified

and partial sense, that we can predicate identity of any material, organic existence. We mean by it simply, *continuity of life*, under the same general structure and organization."

I understand Edward H. Sears, the other writer to whom I have referred, to take the same ground, in his late brilliant work, entitled *Athanasia*, when he says (p. 27): "Is it a certain aggregate of particles, that constitutes the identity, and makes them at any time my body; or is it the ORGANIFIC PRINCIPLE, that belongs to my inmost life, and changes to its own purpose, all the matter it incorporates?"

Is it indeed true, that the vital principle is the essential thing in the identity of organic beings, and that there is no such thing as identity in an organic body, independent of intellect and life? I admit, indeed, that there is a mental as well as vital identity. That is, each person's mind has peculiarities which distinguish it from every other mind, and give the individual an assurance that he is the same, mentally, at different periods of his existence. Doubtless, too, the vital principle in every one, has peculiarities that distinguish it from the same principle in others; for organization results from vitality, and no two bodies among animals or plants are exactly alike, and it seems fair to impute the difference to the vital principle. But I maintain that there is also such a thing as organic identity in distinction from that of the mental or the vital principle, although resulting from the latter.

Your child or intimate friend leaves you, and returns only after years of absence. But when you meet him, must you wait to inquire about the "*organific principle*," or "*continuity of life*," before you can identify him? Suppose, what is certainly possible to Infinite Power, that his former vital principle had been taken from him, and that of another man had been substituted. You would not know it, unless the change had modified his organization or features; you would still recognize him as your child, or friend, without inquiring anything about the "*organific principle*" or "*continuity of life*." But suppose on examination you should find that his body was no longer composed of flesh and blood, but of some

other substance, say spermaceti, or India rubber. You would say at once, he is not my son — he is not my friend. You would say the same, if his form and features were so much changed that you could not explain it by time or circumstances. How clear, then, that sameness of chemical composition and peculiarity of form and structure, are the essential things that constitute organic identity.

The same tests enable the botanist and zoölogist to distinguish and describe the vast variety in the vegetable and animal kingdoms. There is something in the form of each species to mark it off from every other species; and by similar peculiarities, could each individual in every species be distinguished from every other. Or if in a few cases two individuals are so exactly alike that human penetration cannot distinguish them, we regard it as a remarkable anomaly, whose very infrequency proves the truth of my statement.

How clear, too, that in these cases the identity is not dependent on the principle of life. For it remains in the dead and dried specimens of the herbarium and the preserved animals of the zoölogical museum. The peculiarities of organic forms, on which the identity mainly depends, are indeed as in man, the result of the vital or organic principle, acting according to certain laws. These laws impress on one group of animals and plants certain characters that enable the naturalist to bring them into a certain class; on others, such characters as will form a genus; on others, such characters as will constitute them different species; and finally, on each individual such characters as distinguish it from every other individual. If these identifications could not be made out, the whole science of Natural History would be only another name for chaos.

To maintain, then, as I understand these gentlemen to do, that there is no such thing, except "in a modified and partial sense," as bodily identity, is opposed not only by common experience, but to settled scientific principles. If it were so, science would be a chaos, and society a Pandemonium. The fact is, this identity is as certain and decided as mental or vital identity, and far easier and safer for men to follow.

Assuming its existence, I was led to inquire, in what it consisted; and I could discover, and can now discover, nothing else than "sameness of chemical composition, and peculiarity of form and structure." When I formerly adopted this conclusion, I had no idea that I was coming into collision with any metaphysical or theological systems. I was aiming only to meet a famous objection to the resurrection of the body, which in my view had never been answered. It still seems to me that the ground I took was tenable, notwithstanding the efforts of my learned friends to force me from it.

2. The second object of the apostle in this passage, as seen from the view of Natural History, is to show the great difference between the natural and spiritual body. The natural body is represented as a seed lying in the earth and undergoing the process of germination, which is partly a process of decay, and the spiritual body as the plant which springs from it. We are allowed, therefore, to suppose as great a difference between the two as between the seed and the future plant. And to the eye what can often be more unlike? True, the microscope may reveal the future plant in the germ of the seed, and so, perhaps, the spiritual body may lie coiled up in the body laid in the grave. But it needs an eye little less keen than omniscience to discern the relation. Nay, when the apostle says in relation to the plant, that God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him, he may mean that the spiritual is so different from the natural body that there is no resemblance; yet it seems most probable that he would have us understand that, as the germ of the future plant is in the seed, so there is a starting point for the spiritual in the natural body.

3. The third object aimed at by the apostle in this passage is to show the superior glory of the spiritual over the natural body. He prepares the way, by first enumerating various objects differing from one another in glory, and then enters into a direct comparison, or rather contrast, at once the most brilliant and impressive which the eloquence of inspiration has given us: *It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory; it is sown*

in weakness, it is raised in power; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. And so on to the end of the chapter does the strain rise higher and higher till it becomes unearthly, and we are borne upwards to the very gates of the celestial city.

4. There is a fourth interesting conclusion which the naturalist cannot help drawing from this passage, even though the apostle may not have had it distinctly in mind. If his language implies this conclusion, even though we should have failed to see it without the aid of science, we need not hesitate to admit it into our creed, any more than we should a principle first brought to light by excavations at Nineveh. The naturalist does see in the passage under consideration evidence that there is a specific identity between the natural and the spiritual body. A vegetable physiologist of the nineteenth century could hardly state this principle more clearly and definitely in respect to plants than the apostle has done: *ὁ δὲ Θεὸς αὐτῷ δίδωσι σῶμα καθὼς ἠθέλησε, καὶ ἐκάστῳ τῶν σπερμάτων τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα.* Here it is declared that every species of plant has its peculiar body, by which it is distinguished from every other plant. But why limit the apostle's language to the species? Does it not clearly extend to individual plants? Might not *ἐκάστῳ τῶν σπερμάτων τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα* be properly translated: *to each one of the seeds its own body*? He had before spoken of species, when he said: *εἰ τύχοι, σίτου ἢ τινος τῶν λουπῶν.* If he meant nothing more by the *ἐκάστῳ τῶν σπερμάτων*, it would be tautology. Besides, we do know that each individual seed does produce a plant that may be distinguished from every other plant; or if such a translation be rejected, yet the doctrine is taught in this passage by implication at least, that each individual seed produces a plant different from that springing from any other seed of its own or any other species.

The apostle proceeds to instance other examples of fixed differences in nature in the animal kingdom, and also in inorganic nature — the sun, moon and stars. Then he adds: *so also is the resurrection of the dead.* His *οὕτω καὶ* in this phrase must embrace his first illustration of the plant spring-

ing from the decaying seed, as well as the other objects referred to. Indeed, in the beautiful contrasts which follow, he uses the same figure. *It is sown*, says he, *in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, etc.*

Now it can hardly be doubted that the leading object of the apostle, in referring to those several fixed differences in nature, is to show how easy it is for God to give the spiritual body a power and a glory vastly superior to the natural. But the naturalist cannot fail to infer from it that, if the spiritual retains such a specific and individual identity with the natural body, as a plant does with that from which it sprung; then whoever is acquainted with the natural, would recognize the spiritual body as easily as he can the different species of plants and animals that appear in the spring. It is their specific peculiarity and resemblance to the plants of the same species with which he was acquainted the previous year, that enables him to make this recognition in the spring. True, the spiritual body cannot have the same organization as the natural; for *flesh and blood*, says Paul, *cannot inherit the kingdom of God*. But it does not hence follow that it will be devoid of organization. Nay, its superior glory awakens the expectation that it will possess a still more exquisite organization. But this need not prevent its retention of certain appearances that will at once identify it with the body laid in the grave. Of the nature of those marks of identification, I know nothing. But it is by external resemblances, not internal organization, that we identify plants and animals as to species. "In the spring," to quote the words which I used, several years ago, in a sermon on the resurrections of spring, "every spire of grass is developed with the same form and color, and position as its progenitors; so that the *Festuca* is at once known from *Poa* and *Agrostis*, and the *Dactylis* from the *Phleum*. The *Anemones* and the *Violets*, the *Gnaphalium*, the *Trillium*, the *Trifolium*, the *Hepatica*, and *Leontodon*, are restored without the loss of a single tint of coloring, or change in the form of their leaves, their stems, or their flowers. The oak, also, and the maple, the elm and

the poplar, the willow and the birch, the Cornus and the Pyrus, the pine and the spruce, and a thousand other species of trees and shrubs, put forth the same peculiar flowers and leaves, and take the same specific shapes and colors, which they have had since first they rose out of the earth at the divine command. The same familiar voices, too, meet us from the fields and the groves. At the earliest dawn, the robin's cheerful song is heard, with the clear, rich note of the lark, the soft tone of the bluebird, the twitter of the swallow, the cooing of the dove, the clear and cheerful voice of the blackbird, and the hoarse yet welcome garrulity of the crow. In short, wherever we turn our eyes, or whenever we open our ears, forms and sounds of vegetable and animal life meet us in almost endless profusion, yet familiar to us from our earliest days; and most of them dear to us not only because of their inherent beauty and loveliness, but because they are associated with the most cherished recollections of our lives." "And when the apostle says, that *God giveth to every seed his own body*; and that *so will it be with the resurrection of the dead*; every naturalist feels sure that there will exist, also, such marks of identity between the natural and spiritual body, as will enable those familiar with the one, to recognize the other. I pretend not, indeed, to describe how that specific and individual identity can be preserved amid the decompositions of the grave. But I do know that the specific characteristics of plants and animals are maintained, in this world, under changes perhaps equally great; and when Jehovah declares that so it shall be in the resurrection of the dead, I joyfully acquiesce in the doctrine, because I know that Infinite Power can accomplish that which Infinite Wisdom determines."

ARTICLE IV.

JOHN GEORGE HAMANN.

BY REV. J. M. HOPPIN, NOW IN PARIS.

THERE are some men who have left behind them the reputation for transcendent abilities, that is not adequately shown by their works. Hamann was one of these. An author not much read even in his native land, and not much known out of Germany, he nevertheless exerted a great and beneficent, though silent and conservative, influence in his day, and deserves to be known wherever genius united with faith is honored. His memory should be precious to the church of Christ in all places and ages. We cull from German sources¹ the following brief account of his life.

John George Hamann was born Aug. 27, 1730, at Königsberg, in Prussia, of parents in good circumstances, his father being a surgeon of some note. He was reared in a faithful Christian manner. He was instructed in the liberal branches, the languages, the fine arts, and especially music. But his early education, notwithstanding these advantages, was very irregular. He was first in the hands of an ex-preacher named Hoffman, who taught him seven years, chiefly in Latin; he then came into the school of the pro-rector Köhl, a dull and pedantic man, who confined him entirely to the classics. "I obtained no knowledge of history," he himself says, "nor of geography, nor the least conception of style, nor any idea of poetry. I have never been able to make up the deficiency in the first two, and have acquired a taste for the latter too late; for I find it very difficult to arrange my thoughts in conversation or writing in an orderly manner, and to express them with ease." He next became the pupil of a neological tutor; and at last entered the government school, under the

¹ Biographies by Friedrich Roth, and Ersch and Gruber.

learned and pious rector Salthenius, where he gained the first idea of philosophy and mathematics, of theology and the Hebrew language. "Here," he says, "a new field was open to me, and my brain was in a market-booth of entirely new wares." In 1746, he entered the University of Königsberg, and studied philosophy with Knutzen, and for a time devoted himself to theology, and afterwards, in order to please his parents, to jurisprudence. But a strong inclination to the study of antiquity, criticism, and philology, turned his mind from the positive sciences. In order to live with more freedom, and to see somewhat of the world, he took the situation of a tutor in Liefland, but after a year and a half gave it up, through his restless desire for independence. Thereupon he lived some months with a countryman of his father's in Riga without occupation, until necessity compelled him, in 1753, again to become a tutor in Curland. But impatient and unsatisfied, he went back in 1755 to Riga. One of his youthful friends, Berens by name, took him into the company of the commercial house of Berens. This relation led him to the study of mercantile science, and political economy. Aided by his friends in Königsberg, he undertook a commercial journey to England for the house of Berens. On this journey he was frequently in desponding moods regarding his whole purpose of life. In London he found himself entirely unfitted to execute his business commission, and gave himself over in despair to much dissipation and excess, striving in vain for some other way to obtain a livelihood. Under the extreme pressure of necessity, brought on by his rash conduct, he was driven to seek higher aid. While reading the Bible, a light sprung up to him, revealing the life he had hitherto led, and a divine trust filled his soul. From this time he hung with the greatest fervor of faith upon the Christian revelation. He begins one of his books, entitled 'Bible meditations,' with an affecting allusion to his reading of the Bible in London: "London: 19 March 1758. I have to-day with God's help commenced reading the Bible. As my circumstances compel to the strictest solitude, wherein I sit and watch like a sparrow upon the house-top, I have

sought a relief from the bitterness of my thoughts over past follies, and the abused mercies of God, in the society of my books. But scientific books seem now like Job's friends, better suited to task my patience, than to afford me comfort; to open my wounds, than to sooth their pain. I am justified in placing the strongest confidence in the grace of God. It has not been from any want of evil inclination, nor of sufficient opportunity, that I have not fallen into deeper misery, and more presumptuous sin, than I am now in. God! we are such poor creatures, that even a smaller degree of wickedness is a cause of thankfulness unto thee. God! we are such unworthy beings, that nothing but our own unbelief can shorten thine arm, and set bounds to thy generosity in blessing us."

Established in soul, he left England in the summer of 1758, and journeyed back to Riga. He lived in Riga in the home of his former friend Berens, occupying himself in various ways, until his religious bent and his free humor brought on a separation between himself and his commercial friends. Hamann now lived four years in literary freedom in his father's house at Königsberg, and devoted his intellectual activity to serious studies, especially to oriental and classical literature. In this period he composed many of his works. He says of this part of his life: "In these happy years, I first learned how to study, and I have lived on that harvest ever since." After the death of his father, he was in great straits, sometimes travelling as a business agent, and sometimes picking up a scanty living as a copyist, until, through the influence of Kant and other friends, he secured the situation of writer and translator in the excise department. "I live," he wrote to Herder, "all day long at the plough, and have a hard vocation, but some instinct, I know not what, makes it sweet to me." After ten years of severe service, he obtained, in 1777, the comfortable office of superintendent in the royal customs, with a salary of three hundred dollars, a free dwelling, and some perquisites affording additional income. But these being soon removed, he was reduced to live, with his four children, in the narrowest

circumstances. In 1784, a young man by the name of Bucholz, having heard through Lavater of the distressed condition of this excellent man, generously made him the present of a considerable sum of money. Hamann now desired to take a journey to his friends in Western Germany, and if possible to renovate his care-worn frame. He waited some years for permission to leave, and finally gave up his office in 1787. In the summer of this year he made his journey, and spent the time alternately with friends in Münster and Welbergen, and also visited Jacobi in Düsseldorf. On the 20th of June he fell sick in Münster, and died on the following day. His monument stands in the garden of the princess Galiczin, in Münster, with a Latin inscription. Much of his life was consumed in barren journeyings, finding no resting-place for foot or heart. He was another illustration of genius without practicality, and of the man of thought, mistaken in the start for the man of action.

Hamann's mature life comprises nearly the last half of the eighteenth century, the period that prepared and preceded the French revolution; when the mind of Europe was in unwonted ferment; when the modern sciences, now so tranquilly and powerfully working, had their birth; and when philosophy, rising from the death of old ideas, was manifesting an unnatural and excited energy to unsettle all foundations, false or true. In France, the evil reign of the sensual philosophy was universal, having no more of true religious antagonism to contend with than what is found in Jesuitism. In Germany, there was a brilliant intellectual awakening; but there was also a false source of life and power, from which her Lessings, Wielands, and Goethes drew, insensibly degrading and materializing, while professing to free, the mind, and levelling the way for more recent pantheistic and selfish philosophies. Immanuel Kant had put forth his mighty labors; but whatever of good may be considered to be in them, was not yet recognized, nor was even, perhaps, known to himself. Hamann was born in the same town with Kant, six years later, and they were personal friends, though the former was the fearless reviewer of the latter, and his de-

cided opponent on many matters of opinion. But to Hamann belongs the pure glory of having "*kept the faith*," amid the unsettlings of this convulsive period, and the temptations of his own free, wayward, and original mind.

Yet his faithful spirit, in order to preserve its trust, unfortunately thought it to be necessary to *hide* the faith that was in it, in enigmas, as Christians, in time of trouble, have hid the Bible in false wainscots, and holes of the earth. From his mystic and oracular style, he obtained the name of "the magician of the north," and thus he gleams, somewhat mysteriously and formidably, athwart the literature of that period; but this name implied nothing specious in his writings or character. For, while he was enveloped in a degree of mystery, and ill understood by his age, he was, nevertheless, deeply revered; and he appears to have exercised an unconscious, hidden, almost magical, influence over minds, even over such men as Herder, Jacobi, Mendelssohn, and Goethe himself. His Correspondence with these, is now perhaps the most readable, natural, and valuable portion of his writings. It is to be regretted that he did not write, always, with more clearness; but we can hardly, now, judge of the emergencies of a fearfully unbelieving age. Goethe, in this relation, speaks of Hamann with something of tenderness: "He was regarded, indeed, by those who ruled the literature of the day, as an abstruse enthusiast; but the upstriving youth of the country yielded itself, without resistance, to his attractions. Even 'the silent in the land,' as, half in jest and half in earnest they were called, those pious souls who, without confessing to any particular communion, formed an invisible church, turned their attention toward him." Hamann undoubtedly felt his influence upon the restless mind of his country; and, whether judging rightly or wrongly, did not wish to lose that influence at so critical a period, by too sharp a definiteness in his religious expressions; rather choosing to attract and lead on, into truth, by hint, and inference, and thoughts, half-seen through the mist of metaphor. He carried this idea so far that he seems, in some of his writings, willing literally to be a 'fool,' in order to preach Christ

to infidel minds. Yet the impression should not be made, that he either wrongly or timidly concealed his religious convictions; for, on the contrary, he has, in many ways, in the course of his writings, expressed a clear, feeling, and experimental belief in the great essentials of the Christian faith. In some of his works, it is true, we may perceive the beginnings of the modern philosophy of Germany; but these speculative views were modified, in him, by a reverent spirit, that would have cast them to the winds, had they been seen to tend to the injury of faith.

Hamann holds a peculiar relation to the religious world, not having been a professed preacher or writer upon religious truth, but rather an independent thinker, a regenerated mind exercising its birthright to study and speak on the greatest of themes. He had large views of theology, not confining it to one separate science, but considering all things as embraced in its science. He had a deep religious philosophy, while, at the same time, he was true to the simple faith of the gospel. He was a favorite author with Neander; and there is much ground for the opinion, that he contributed to form that historian's profound method of reasoning: that method which refers the outer truth to the inner principle, and seeks to develop the spiritual law in events. There is a striking similarity in the views of these two authors, in the grandeur and centralness which they give to the doctrine of the Incarnation. They both draw, believingly, from the truth of an inward union with God in Christ, in the human soul, as the great and infinite fact of our history.¹ One leading idea, upon which Hamann dwells in his writings, is this: "All that man undertakes, whether by word or deed, or however performed, should spring out of the union of all his powers; every partial effort is to be condemned." He took broad

¹ The writer of this Article may perhaps be pardoned in alluding to a personal circumstance, which may possibly lend interest to the subject. Having had the privilege, with many other American students, of an acquaintance with Dr. Neander, he asked him one day while calling at his room, what religious German work he would recommend him to take home to America and study. He said at once, 'the works of John George Hamann.' A very imperfect reading of this author, since that time, has been the origin of this sketch.

views of the human powers, and aimed at a full development of our nature. He despised no attribute of humanity, whether physical or spiritual. He magnified human nature, not for itself, but as the manifestation of God through it. Like the earliest Christian fathers, Irenæus, Origen, and Tertullian, he never would dissociate man from God; and while he held strongly to the facts of sin and depravity, he saw deeper and more encouraging truths than these, still left in nature. Hamann's views of Christ are marked by great feeling and depth; and on this account he is a favorite author with German evangelical commentators, especially Olshausen; and we notice that some American theological writers are beginning to quote Hamann. He has a future, we believe, more happy and powerful than the past. "The Word made flesh," he says, "is the only wonderful plan that reaches the inner relations, the limitless desires, and the infinite wants and sorrows, of our nature. It alone reveals the mystery of the divine nature, its Lord. It is the Tree of Life, in the midst of the garden. When all speculations fail, then the foundation-truth of the union of Divinity with humanity, and of humanity with Divinity, stands." His view of the depth of the work of Christ for us, would satisfy Augustine himself. He more than once quotes Luther's language: "a Christian does not behold his own virtue and holiness; but sees, in himself, guilt and unholiness. In a word, his holiness is in heaven, where Christ is." "There is a voice," he says, "which sin drowns, but which God hears. That voice, in the depth of our heart, is the blood of the Redeemer, crying: The depth of our heart is sprinkled with the blood shed for the whole world."

Something of Hamann's religious philosophy might, perhaps, be thus expressed: All the works of God are the manifestations of his qualities; and thus natural things are the images of spiritual things. God reveals himself, in Nature, in a more general manner. God reveals himself, in his word, in a more particular and secret manner, as it were, to the inmost soul of man. The unity of the authorship of both, is shown in the dialect of both; in which there is the same

tone of immeasurable height and depth, the same infinite majesty.

Now *man* himself belongs to this natural creation of God, in which God manifests himself. God, therefore, reveals himself in the nature of man. Where, then, nature *truly* speaks in man (or where nature is restored to its original divine truth), there is God speaking. Religion is simply the restoration of divine truth in the nature of man. As the *life* itself is essential to a perfect working or speaking of nature, so the pure reason in man cannot be separated from the real experience, in any true philosophy. The revealed Word, therefore, as the instructor of human experience, is absolutely essential. The reason, alone, is an imperfect guide. The study and obedience of the word of God are the indispensable wings of the reason, without which it hobbles upon the ground. When the Godhead manifests himself *both* through nature and through his word, philosophy must confess this, and is bound to show their harmony.

Though this is a crude statement, yet we may perceive in this, glimpses of the modern German philosophy, in which this double idea of nature and experience, of the subject and the object, is more fully carried out. Whatever there is true in it, is here foreshadowed; but in Hamann's case, it was joined with, and modified by, the great and saving truth of a belief in the essentialness and supreme authority of the word of God; in fact, of the true manifestation of God in Christ. In one of Hamann's letters, he recommends to a young theologian, to throw away his proud scientific preparations, and to study but three books: the Bible, Schulzen's Hymn-book, and Luther's Abridgment of Doctrine.

Hamann's published works, issued from the three periods of 1759—63, 1772—76 and 1779—84, are numerous, but are fragmentary and impulsive. He seemed to write to relieve an active mind, and to unburden a soul thoroughly dissatisfied with his age. He did not write, like Goethe, to build a temple to his own genius. His largest works are "the Memorabilia of Socrates," "Golgotha and Schleibimini," and "Sybilline leaves." He wrote upon philology, especially on

the Hebrew and Greek languages; upon religion and philosophy; freedom and education; law and legislation; contracts and trade; history and poetry. Most of these writings have a polemic tone, and are directed with great power of satire against the materialism, imitativeness, and shallow negation of his times; and this circumstance now assists in destroying these works, because the best polemical writings, like shells that have battered error, have done their work. Jean Paul Richter says of Hamann's style: "Hamann is a deep sky full of telescopic stars, and many nebulae that no eye can resolve." And again he says: "His style is a stream which a storm drives back toward its source, so that Dutch market-tubs cannot navigate it." Another writer thus characterizes his writings: "The *kernel* contains great thoughts, but the *shell* is a hard compound of all sorts of things." Owing to his irregular education, his powerful and almost oriental but undisciplined imagination, and his mistaken cautiousness in the expression of religious truth, his style is dark, metaphoric, involved. It is wheel within wheel, though they be all living creatures, instinct with intelligence, and glowing with the love of God. In its most grotesque, ironical and weirdlike form, it is pregnant with great and good thoughts. Or, to put Richter's idea into another shape, his style is like an old Flemish painting, very dusky at first, but the more one looks at it, the more *interior* it has. The following short extract, though quite simple for Hamann, may give some slight idea of his singular and allegorical method of writing. It is from the introduction to a little book entitled "Fragments."

"A host is bountifully fed from five loaves; this small portion is so abundant for the multitude in the desert place, that more baskets full are left over, than there was bread originally. We see a similar miracle of divine grace in the multitude of wisdoms. What a vast collect is the history of sciences! And upon what is it all based? Upon the five loaves, upon the five senses, which we share with irrational creatures. Not only the whole store-house of the reason, but the treasure-house of faith, rests upon the same

foundation. Our reason is like that blind Theban seer, to whom his daughter delineated the flight of birds, and he prophesied from her report. 'Faith,' says the apostle, 'comes through hearing,' through hearing the word of God. 'Go and show John those things which ye do hear and see,' said our Lord. — Man enjoys infinitely more than he has need of, and wastes infinitely more than he enjoys. What a prodigal mother Nature is to her children, and how great her condescension, when she diminishes the scale and proportion of our wants, but sets herself to supply sumptuously the hunger and extravagance of our desires. Must she not be the daughter of a loving and benevolent Father? — The visible world may be ever so like a desert in the eye of a soul created for heaven; the bread which God gives us here may seem ever so inconsiderable and insufficient; the fishes may be ever so small, but they are blest, multiplied and glorified, by a wonder-working, mysterious God, whom we Christians call *ours*, because he has manifested himself to us in such great lowliness and love. — But our souls may be guilty of wasting that nutriment of their strength which God supplies in the desert of this life. Besides the moderation which our poverty should prescribe to us, a frugal care of the *fragments* which fall in the heat of our appetite, and which we do not take the pains to collect, because we see more before us, cannot be blamed. We live here upon fragments. Our thoughts are nothing but fragments. Yes, our wisdom is piecemeal."

Hamann's metaphors, which form the invariable clothing of his thoughts, are sometimes full of simple majesty and beauty. He says in one place: "Faith is like the pillar of cloud by day, but when the night of affliction comes, it turns into a pillar of fire." "What," he says again, "is that voice of our own heart, which we sometimes call conscience, sometimes the voice of reason, sometimes the whisper of our ministering angel? Ah, it is *more* than our own heart, or than any angel. It is the Spirit of God speaking in us."

ARTICLE V.

ROMANISM AND A FREE BIBLE.

BY REV. WILLIAM BARROWS, READING, MASS.

WHAT place does Romanism assign to the Bible, as a book for the people? This is becoming a question of grave interest in our country. Several minor issues concerning its use have sprung up in communities where the papal and protestant communions are mixed, showing that two widely different policies form the usage of the two denominations. The uniformity of action, and the persistency in it, shown by Romanism, make it evident that they are not experimenting to discover the true theory. They act as from principles settled and well-understood. Their action is as definite, as prompt, and as cordial, as is the protestant, in the use they wish to make of the scriptures, as a book for the people.

It is evident, and latterly there has been painful growth of the evidence, that the two theories of these two great divisions of Christendom are antagonistic.

It is a matter of the first consequence that the two parties understand each other. Probably an issue of greater moment to us could not be raised respecting our prosperity and perpetuity as a people, than the question, which of these two theories shall prevail. As we understand our history, our beginning, so fruitful in what makes a people truly great, lies far back in the wrenching of the Bible from the iron grasp of the hierarchy. The principal freight of the Mayflower was a free Bible. Plymouth Rock is but a common landing for any band of adventurers, till we discover that the English Bible of the Puritans is coupled with it. This book it is that, among us, has aroused the mind, freed and cleared the conscience, and defined and enlarged the limits of civil, social, and religious liberty. It is the Bible that has stimulated industry, and developed national resources and growth, till we span the continent and lay a hand on either ocean. In contrast with

countries of the Old World, where the Bible is a prohibited book, our standing army is made up of Sabbath schools, and our police of secret watch are the prophets and the apostles.

Undoubtedly our national prosperity, from the landing of the Pilgrims hitherto, is largely from the influence of the scriptures, as a common and popular book. He, then, who would exclude it as a text-book for the popular mind, smites the people in the very hidings of their strength. To adopt the noble words of Webster, he "touches the very foundations of public law, and the Constitution, and the whole welfare of the State."¹ A free Bible has been our strength, as it is our glory, and must be our guarantee for the future.

Romanism, however, has another theory and another practice. The ancient, comprehensive, and unchanged policy of the papacy is the suppression of the word of God in the mother tongue of a people. The ground of their objection to our Protestant management in the public use of the scriptures is not the difference between "hallowed" and "sanctified," nor yet the division of the decalogue, nor the unfaithfulness of the common version, nor the exclusion of the Douay. Their objection is against having *any version* in popular and general use, as a book designed for, and common with, the multitude. Their scruples of conscience, and difficulties and objections, grow out of an ancient and leading principle in the Roman Catholic Church, that *the Bible is not for the people*.

It is the design of this Article to show the rise and prevalence, and general adoption of this principle, in the papal communion.

The pen of inspiration has always written in the language best understood by the readers more immediately intended. So Moses wrote in the language of his people. And from Moses to David, the golden age of the Hebrew tongue, the Hebrew was used as the medium of revelation, that the people might understand the words of God. And so it was

¹ Argument in the Girard Will Case, Works, Vol. VI. p. 142.

from David to the captivity, though the language was less pure. When the Jews returned from the captivity, and had so far forgotten the Hebrew in their use of the Chaldee, as to be unable to understand the reading of the law in its original language, the Levites "gave the sense and caused them to understand the reading," by translating the same into the Chaldee dialect. And afterward Ezra, Jeremiah, and Daniel wrote in this dialect to some extent. So careful was God lest his word should be shut up in a foreign language, and so be kept from the people. And so he caused the New Testament to be written in the language best understood by those for whom it was immediately intended. But because there were and would continue to be nations who could not understand the scriptures in their original tongues, he provided the gift of tongues and translators. So the apostles and their immediate successors took up the work of giving the scriptures to the nations in the mother tongue. So well did they carry out this design of God, that Eusebius says, A. D. 315, that the scriptures were translated into all languages, Greek and barbarian, throughout the known world, where the gospel had gone. When a nation that spoke a strange tongue was converted to Christianity, the scriptures were immediately translated into it. And so Theodoret, who died about A. D. 450, says that every nation had the scriptures in their own tongue. And to this agree Chrysostom, Jerome, and Augustine. And when, A. D. 561, one writer attempted to show that it was impossible to corrupt the scriptures, he gave as a reason that they were already translated into the languages of seventy-two nations or tribes.¹ Such were the theory, tendency, and prospects for a free Bible in the vernacular of a people in the earlier and purer ages of Christianity.

Of the decline of letters, the apostasy of the church, and the almost entire loss of primitive Christianity, it is needless to speak. The night was long and awful. It was even "a horror of great darkness." The only thing that had light in

¹ Lewis's Hist. Translations, Diss. p. xii. Bingham's Christ. Antiqs. B. 13, c. 4.

itself was shut up in cloister and cave. The light that God had given to put on a candlestick, men had put under a bushel. The church was paganized, and had secured the making of the kings, and the controlling of the State. Her three greatest attributes were ignorance, despotism, and profligacy. When, therefore, in the twelfth century, the light of God's word struggled to come abroad again, the struggles were as those chaotic ones that precede a creation. Waldo, the first to introduce the scriptures into any modern language of Europe, barely saved his life from the persecutions of the church, while his followers were the first to bear the crown of martyrdom in defence of a free Bible. Other versions and versifications followed, exposing the unsound faith and unholy life of the priesthood. These efforts at a reformation annoyed the hierarchy exceedingly. They readily saw that the greatest force brought against them was the open word of God. With a boldness and a policy, therefore, rarely equalled even in a good cause, they struck at the root of their troubles by the absolute prohibition of the scriptures to the laity. This was at the Council of Toulouse in 1229. The original of the infamous decree is as follows: "*Prohibemus, etiam, ne libros Veteris Testamenti aut Novi laici permittantur habere: nisi, forte, Psalterium vel Breviarium pro divinis officiis, aut Horas B. Mariæ aliquis ex devotione habere velet; sed ne præmissos libros habeant in vulgari translatis arctissime inhibemus.*"¹ Since the days of Moses God has enacted otherwise. For centuries the contrary and apostolic theory and practice of the church had prevailed. Now Rome reverses all. Then and there, six hundred and thirty years ago, she turned the clasp on God's word. And from that day to this her position has been: *no Bible in the vernacular for the people*. Exceptions to this position she has allowed, but under protest, and in pressure of circumstances, and seemingly rather than really.

From the date of the decree of Tolosa to the introduction of printing in 1440, and while translations must lie in manu-

¹ Concil. Tholosan. Cap. 14.

script, it was not very difficult to restrict their circulation. This remark, however, should be applied to Wiclif's, with qualification. For Knighton, the papal historian of those times, says of Wiclif's work: "In this way the gospel pearl is cast abroad and trodden under foot of swine, and that which was before precious both to clergy and laity, is now rendered, as it were, the common jest of both. The jewel of the church is turned into the sport of the people, and what was hitherto the principal gift of the clergy and divines is made forever common to the laity."¹

And in 1408 Arundel, archbishop of Canterbury, secured the passage of the following decree, by a convocation of his clergy: "It is a dangerous thing . . . to translate the text of the holy scriptures, out of one language into another. . . . We, therefore, enact and ordain that no one hereafter do, by his own authority, translate any text of scripture into English, or any other tongue, by way of book, libel, or treatise."

The introduction of printing multiplied, vastly, the difficulties of the hierarchy in suppressing the Bible. The vicar of St. Paul's Cross, Surrey, went so far as to make the profound remark: "We must root out printing, or printing will root us out."²

The translation of Tyndale, that appeared in 1526, was received with bitter hostility. Tonstal, bishop of London, announced to his archdeacons, that "some sons of iniquity, and ministers of the Lutheran faction, had craftily translated the holy gospel of God into our vulgar English," and ordered all copies of it to be burned. The aid of Henry VIII. was invoked in 1531. And as he had borne the title of "Defender of the Faith," for ten years, he was ready to do papal service. He therefore declared "that the having the whole scripture in English is not necessary to Christian men;" and so decreed that the "translation of scripture corrupted by William Tyndale, as well in the Old Testament as in the New, should utterly be expelled, rejected," etc.³ Tyndale himself was imprisoned, strangled, and burned; many

¹ Dowling's *Hist. Romanism*, p. 383.

² Lewis's *Hist. Translations*, p. 55.

³ Lewis, pp. 59, 77.

of his books destroyed, and many of his readers executed. And in 1543 it was enacted that no "artificers, prentises, iourneymen, serving men of the degrees of yomen or under husbandmen, nor labourers, were to read the bible or New Testament in English, to himself or to any other, privately or openly, upon paine of one month's imprisonment."¹

So virulent was this hostility to God's law, in English, or even any portion of it, for the people, that bishop Bonner, by an order of Oct. 25, 1554, required all church-wardens, in the diocese of London, "to abolish and extinguish, so that they might not be read or seen," all passages from God's word, painted on the walls of the churches.²

Cardinal Pole, who succeeded Cranmer in the see of Canterbury, in 1556, removed, as is highly probable, all Bibles and prayer-books from the churches in his diocese, and all texts of scripture from the walls. He appointed commissioners, also, to visit the universities of Cambridge and Oxford, and effect a papal reform in them; which they did by burning all the English Bibles, and such other books as they judged to be heretical.³ And so, some years after, we find this entry in the account-book of the church-wardens of Crundal: "Paid for lack of a Bible at Canterbury, 1s. 3d."

When Elizabeth took the crown, and turned the State more fully with the Protestant Reformation, it would seem that the same question, of the Bible in the public schools, was then a party question between Protestants and papists, as it now is in our own land. For, in the second year of her reign, 1559, she addressed fifty-three articles of instruction and reform to the clergy and laity of the land; two of which read as follows:

"41. Schoolmasters shall exhort their children to love and reverence the true religion, now allowed by authority.

"42. They shall teach their scholars certain sentences of scripture, tending to godliness."⁴

But the hostility of the Roman Catholic church to a free

¹ Lewis, p. 149. See also Neal's *History of the Puritans*, I. 36, 42.

² Fox, *Acts and Monuments*, 3, 35.

³ Townley, 2. 277, 285.

⁴ Neal, I. 180.

Bible for the people, was as manifest in other countries as in England. A fact or two must suffice to indicate, where a volume might be given.

Before the Reformation, the Bible was an unknown book among the people of Scotland. Divine service was performed in Latin, of which even the leading ecclesiastics knew but little. Great care was taken to keep even a catechism from the laity. The importation of any of Luther's works was forbidden, under forfeiture of ship and cargo. A few copies of the English Bible were smuggled in and read, in secret and in conventicles. And till the death of the Fifth James, in 1542, many were those who went to the flames for using that Bible.¹

In 1523, the faculty of theology in Paris passed a decree, which, two years afterward, became a law of that realm, that "It is neither expedient nor useful for the Christian public that any translations of the Bible should be permitted to be printed; but that they ought rather to be suppressed, as injurious, considering the times."²

In the Netherlands, a similar hostility to vulgar translations was shown. In 1525, an imperial edict prohibited "all assemblies in order to read, speak, confer, or preach concerning the gospel or other holy writings, in the Latin, Flemish, or Walloon languages." In 1546, Charles V. issued an edict that specified the text books for the public schools. Among those prohibited were *thirty-nine* different translations or editions of the Bible, in the Latin, Flemish, Dutch, and French languages.³

About the year 1500, the scriptures, or parts of them, had been brought into many of the dialects of Spain, through the great labor and peril of those who loved the Word.

But in fifty years, nearly all these had been ferreted out by the emissaries of Rome, and committed to the flames. And efforts at new translations were held in check by the decree of Ferdinand and Isabella, that "no one should translate the scriptures into the vulgar tongue, or have

¹ M'Crie's Knox, Vol. I.

² Townley's Bib. Literature, I. 572.

³ Townley, II. 62—66.

them in their possession, under pain of the severest punishment." ¹

This survey of papal hostility to the translation and circulation of the scriptures, in the vulgar tongue, brings us down to about the year 1550. The facts adduced are few compared with the mass from which they have been taken. Yet they are enough to make the Roman Catholic spirit, toward a free Bible perfectly evident. They explain and illustrate the decree of Tolosa with an overwhelming clearness. No Bible, in the vernacular of a people, is the principle that, during all these years, she has carried as far as her church has extended its limits, and enforced as fully as her power would permit.

Still Rome was losing ground. The Reformation was making rapid advances. Her efforts to bind the word of God were but partially successful. For, during the first thirty-six years of this sixteenth century, to the middle of which we have come in our survey, about six hundred editions of the entire Bible, and parts of it, had been printed, in different languages.² This fact it was, no doubt, that suggested to John Fox, the martyrologist, that noble passage of his, on the printing-press. "Hereby tongues are known, knowledge groweth, judgment increaseth, books are dispersed, the scripture is seen, the doctors be read, stories be opened, times compared, truth discerned, falsehood detected, and with finger pointed; and all through the benefit of printing. Wherefore, I suppose that either the pope must abolish printing, or he must seek a new world to reign over; or else, as this world standeth, printing doubtless will abolish him."³

Does, then, Rome recede before the Bible? Does she recall her decrees against translations, and her anathemas against translators? Does she confess her error, welcome the printing-press, and throw open her dark domains to the in-coming light of God's word? We shall see.

The Roman Catholic church is now in great straits. This entrance of God's word, through so many vernacular

¹ Le Long. *Biblioth. Sac.* I. 361. Ed. of 1723.

² Townley, II. 151-4.

³ *Acts and Monuments*, I. 837.

editions, has shed light on her corrupt faith, debauched life, and canonical trumpery. She is aroused, pained, agonized. It is with her as when the probe goes down into the rottenness of the bones. She makes a desperate effort for recovery. She calls in all her strength. A universal council is convened at Trent, and organized on the 13th of December, 1545. This was the last general council ever held by that church, and taking notice of the question before us. Its decrees, therefore, are supreme and unchanged authority on this question. It concerns us, therefore, to inquire into their import.

One decree forbids any printer to print, any author to publish, any bookseller to sell, or any person to copy, read, lend, or possess, any book on religion that has not in it the printed or written certificate of approval by the inquisitors appointed for such purpose. Translations of the Old Testament are forbidden to all but the pious and learned, and they can have them only at the discretion of the bishop. But translations of the New Testament by heretics are forbidden to all.

But the Fourth Rule concerning prohibited books is worthy of an exact quotation. "Whereas it is evident from experience, that, if the sacred books be permitted in the vulgar tongue indiscriminately, more harm than utility arises therefrom, by reason of the temerity of men, in this respect let it depend on the discretion of the bishop or inquisitor, so that with the counsel of the parish priest or confessor, they can grant to them the reading of the books translated by Catholic authors in the vulgar tongue, such persons as they may consider may derive not injury, but an increase of faith and of piety from such reading, which power they may have with respect to the scriptures."¹ And so it appears, by the "infallible" judgment of the Holy Mother church, that a free Bible is of "more harm than utility." And her practice agrees with this judgment.

Rome has always been the very heart of Roman Catholi-

¹ "Quam facultatem in scriptis habeant," — which privilege they must have in writing? — Buckley's Translation, Lond. 1851, p. 285.

cism, and Italy its fairest vineyard. Here, if anywhere, the Holy Church has been able to show its principles, press its policy, and make boast of its fruits to the world. It is a significant fact, therefore, that not one edition of the Bible appeared by papal hands in the Italian language during the seventeenth century. The church was "at peace" in Italy, and so such a thing as an Italian Bible was not "tolerable." And yet the College de Propaganda, instituted at Rome in 1627, printed at its own presses, during the first fifty years of its existence, works in forty-eight different languages. But though unsupplied, no Bible in the vernacular was printed in Italy during that same century. Two thousand and fifty editions of the Bible, or parts of it, in the Latin and oriental languages, were printed during this century, but only twenty-three of them at Rome. And of the more than nine hundred and forty in modern languages, *not one of them was printed at Rome, or in the temporal domain of the pope.* But there were printed at Rome during this time fourteen indexes or catalogues of prohibited books, and among them a vast number of editions of the scriptures.¹

For the illustration of the papacy in its principles and workings, Spain serves almost as well as Italy. What is the will of the one, is the word of the other. Having, therefore, seen the disposition at Rome toward vernacular Bibles, we are not surprised to find that, during the century in question, no Bible or New Testament in any language, ancient or modern, was printed in Spain or Portugal. Several expurgatory and prohibitory indexes were published there. In only one of them, the edition of 1667, *more than one hundred and seventy editions of the Bible are censured.* Many of them were ordered to be suppressed, and others were to be corrected and expurgated.² And yet, during that whole century, the Romish church found not the will nor the way to give one acceptable edition to those countries. What a commentary are those century facts on the theory and practice of the Roman Catholic church concerning a free Bible! Indeed, as long after as 1786, Dr. Geddes, himself a Catholic,

¹ Townley, II. 457—465.

² Ibid.

observes in the Prospectus for his own English translation : " In Spain there is not, I believe, at this day, a single edited version of the whole Bible ! " The Romish church has shown the fertility of her Christian genius, and the excellence of her typography, in Prohibitory Indexes, rather than in modern versions of the Bible.

In objection to this statement, does any one say, that she has the Rhemish Testament and Douay Bible for her members ? It is true that in 1582, or two hundred and two years after Wiclif's translation, and after thousands, probably, of Protestant translations and editions, in different languages, had been published, Rome tardily gave the New Testament in English. And even this was not given willingly. Some statements, in their original Preface to it, deserve attention : " Which translation we doe not for all that publish, upon erroneous pinion of necessitie, that the holy scriptures should alwaies be in our mother tonge, or that they ought, or were ordained by God, to be read indifferently by all, . . . or that we generally and absolutely deemed it more convenient in itself, and more agreeable to God's word and honour, or edification of the faithful, to have them turned into vulgar tonges, then to be kept and studied only in the Ecclesiastical, learned languages. . . . We must not imagine that in the primitive church, either every one that understoode the learned tonges wherein the scriptures were written, or other languages into which they were translated, might without reprehension reade, reason, dispute, turne and tosse the scriptures : or that our forefathers suffered every scholemaister, scholer, or Grammarian, that had a little Greeke or Latin, straight to take in hand the holy ' Testament : or that the translated Bibles into the vulgar tonges, were in the handes of every husbandman, artificer, prentice, boies, girles, mistresse, maid, man, that they were sung, plaied, alleayed, of every tinker, taverner, rimer, minstrel ; that they were for table talk, for alebenches, for boates, and barges, and for every prophane person and companie. No, in those better times men were neither so ill, nor so curious of themselves, so to abuse the blessed booke of Christ, neither was there any such easy meanes, before

printing was invented, to disperse the copies into the hands of every man, as now there is."

Of the effects of a free Bible on the people, this Preface speaks very openly, in contrasting a nation that has the Bible with one that has it not. After an experiment of two centuries, we are very willing to accept the issue offered; and, in the passage about to be quoted, we will contrast Protestant England with Catholic Spain; Protestant Scotland with Catholic Ireland, or the New England States with the Roman States or States of the Church. "Looke whether your men be more vertuous, your women more chaste your childrē more obedient, your servants more trustie, your maides more modest, your frendes more faithful, your laitie more iust in dealing, your Cleargy more devout in praying; whether there be more religion, fear of God, faith and conscience in al states now, then of old, when there was not so much reading, chatting, and iangling of God's word, but much more sincere dealing, doing, and keeping of the same. Looke whether through this disorder [of vulgar translations] women teach not their husbands, children their parents, yong fooles their old and wise fathers, the scholars their maisters, the sheepe their pastor, and the People the Priest." Why, then, do they give the New Testament, in the Rhemish translation, to their English readers? They answer: "We translate this sacred booke upon special consideration of the present time, state, and condition of our countrie, unto which divers thinges are either necessarie, or profitable and medicinable *now*, that otherwise, in the peace of the church, were neither moch requisite, nor perchance wholly tolerable." And so, more than two hundred years after the first translation of the New Testament into English, they, with great reluctance, and under protest that it is done in policy, and against principle, give a papal translation. And even then, when they *seemed* to publish it, they did not, in reality. For, the first edition was kept from the people by the fewness of its number, and its great bulk and cost. A new edition was issued in 1635, and then *no other for one hundred and fifteen years*. When, therefore, Dr. Nary, a devoted papist, pub-

lished his New Testament in 1718, he remarked, in his preface of the Douay Bibles : " They are so bulky, that they cannot conveniently be carried about for public devotion, and so scarce and dear that the generality of the people neither have nor can procure them for private use." ¹

In 1792—97, Dr. Geddes, one of the best biblical scholars in the papal church at that time, proposed a new translation of his own. " My primary motive," he says, " was to give a tolerable, and if I could a creditable, version of the Holy Bible for the use of the English Catholics. The greater part of the Roman Catholics of Great Britain and Ireland might be said to be without a Bible." ² The cheap and portable edition of Dr. Nary was a failure. The papists would not purchase it ; while that of Dr. Geddes was condemned by three vicars apostolic, and the papists forbidden to use it.

In 1808, the only editions of the English Bible, in Ireland, were a large folio (Dublin, 1794), a quarto (1791), and an edition of 1796—1805, duodecimo, in five volumes ; their prices varying from four pounds to one pound twelve shillings. And in 1825, Right Rev. Dr. Doyle stated, before the House of Commons, that they had a " Bible of small print and low price, to circulate among all." Yet these cheap editions were three and five dollars a copy !

We have seen how they *seem* to give the Douay to all their English readers, while really they make the editions so expensive, and so wide asunder, and the copies so few, that it amounts to a practical prohibition and suppression of the book with the great mass. Or, according to the decrees of Trent, they so advise against the possession and use of the book, and so interpose the bishop and the father confessor with their convenient scruples and absolute judgments, between the layman anxious for the book and the book itself, that this often amounts to another prohibition and suppression of the scriptures.

¹ Cotton, p. 299. " Rhemes and Douay. An attempt to show what has been done by Roman Catholics for the diffusion of the Holy Scriptures in English. By the Rev. Henry Cotton, D. C. L., Archdeacon of Cashel, etc. Oxford, at the University Press, 1853."

² Cotton, p. 62.

But that the Roman Catholic hostility to a free Bible is to the book itself, as a book for the people, though it be their own authorized version, and gratuitously offered, is evident from many facts. One must suffice. In 1820 there was formed in Dublin, after mature consultation, a union Catholic and Protestant Committee, whose object was "the circulation of the Roman Catholic version of the New Testament, without note or comment." Arrangements were made at once with Mr. Coyne for stereotype plates and twenty thousand copies of the work. As these were specially designed for distribution in schools, hospitals, prisons, etc., they were prepared for gift, or for sale at the lowest possible prices. At first there was a seeming approval of the measure among the papists. But the bishops soon became dissatisfied with the action, and withdrew their coöperation. They discouraged the circulation of their own Rhemish Testament, which bore the "approbation" of Dr. Troy, and was brought out by the printer and publisher for Maynooth. The whole endeavor was a failure. To save himself, Mr. Coyne added as a Supplement to many copies the "Notes" common to the Rhemish Testament, and so was able to sell them. And many copies found their way into the hands of a London bookseller, who worked them off under a false title. And so the effort ended in Dublin among the Catholics to give their Testament to their own people.¹

There is another source of information on the question under discussion : it is a wide field of facts ; and as in drawing from other sources, we can take but few illustrative items from the vast mass.

The opposition of the Roman Catholic church to Bible Societies is well known ; but how old, and varied, and intense this opposition has been, may not be so well known. In each and all cases, the hostility has been total ; and whether the Society opposed was protestant or papal, seemed a slight thing ; showing that the hostility was to the vernacular Bible among the people.

In 1814, there was a Roman Catholic Bible Society in

¹ Cotton, pp. 119—122.

Russia, and the archbishop of Mohilew approved it by a pastoral letter. This highly offended the pope, Pius VII., and he drew up a Bull against the archbishop, in 1816, censuring him severely for favoring such an institution. A similar Society being in operation in Poland, at the same time, the pope sent a Bull, drawn in no very pleasant mood, to the archbishop of Gnesen, primate of Poland, commanding him to oppose and put down such Societies.

A few passages from this mandate to the primate of Poland, will throw light from Rome on our American system of a free Bible. "We have been truly shocked at this most crafty device [Bible Societies], by which the very foundations of religion are undermined; and having, because of the great importance of the subject, conferred in council with our venerable brethren, the cardinals of the holy Roman church, we have, with the utmost care and attention, deliberated upon the measures proper to be adopted by our pontifical authority, in order to abolish this pestilence, . . . this defilement of the faith, so eminently dangerous to souls. . . . It becomes an episcopal duty that you, first of all, expose the wickedness of this nefarious scheme. . . . For it is evident from experience that *the holy scriptures, when circulated in the vulgar tongue, have, through the temerity of men, produced more harm than benefit.* . . . It is therefore necessary to adhere to the salutary decree of the Congregation of the Index, that no versions of the Bible, in the vulgar tongue, be permitted, except such as are approved by the apostolic see, or published with annotations extracted from the writings of holy fathers of the church." . . .

When such denunciations, against such a cause, issue from unchangeable and infallible Rome, are we to suppose that the late papal contests, in our public schools, arise on our translation, or division of the decalogue, or on the difference between "hallowed" and "sanctified," in the fourth commandment? Or does any one dream that the substitution of the Douay for the Common version, book for book, would satisfy the Romanist? The difficulty is older than Douay or Wiclif, and deeper than any translation of the Ten Commandments.

But there are other voices, and they are not *ambiguas voces*, against Bible Societies, to be heard from Rome. Leo XII. uttered one in 1824. We extract a single sentence: "You are aware, venerable brothers, that a Society, vulgarly called Bible Society, audaciously spreads itself over all the land, and that in contempt of the traditions of the holy fathers, and against the celebrated decree of the Council of Trent, they aim with all their strength, and by every means, to translate, or rather to corrupt, the holy scriptures in the vulgar tongue of every nation," etc.¹

Pius VIII., though his pontificate lasted but twenty months, found time to utter his voice, in 1829, against "this most crafty device," "this pestilence," "this defilement of the faith," "this nefarious scheme." Gregory XVI. gave utterance twice against these Bible Societies: once in 1832, and again in 1844. From the last Bull we make some extracts: After endorsing the condemnations of Bible Societies, passed by many popes preceding him; and after condemning the Christian Alliance as well as Bible Societies, he proceeds to say: "You are consequently enjoined to remove, from the hands of the faithful, the Bibles in the vulgar tongue, which may have been printed contrary to the decrees above mentioned, of the Sovereign Pontiffs.... Let all know the enormity of the sin against God and his church, which they are guilty of who dare to associate themselves with any of these Societies, or abet them in any way. Moreover, we confirm and renew the decrees recited above, delivered in former times, by apostolic authority, against the publication, distribution, reading, and possession of books of the holy scriptures, translated into the vulgar tongue."

We might follow these quotations with similar ones from the edicts of Innocent III., Clement XI., and Benedict XIV. But it is not needful. The utterances from Rome, on this subject, are one and the same. For on no principle or policy is the church of Rome so unanimous and free spoken, from age to age, as that the Bible must not be a free and

¹ Bowers's Popes, Cox's edition, III. 450.

common book, in the mother tongue of a people. And hence its scarcity where she is supreme. As illustration, take a few facts : In 1835, the Rev. Wm. Rule was laboring in Spain, under the patronage of the English Wesleyan Methodist Society. With the purpose of circulating a Spanish translation of the scriptures, he wrote to booksellers in thirty-six of the principal towns in Spain, inquiring whether they would sell Bibles. Only seven booksellers answered him favorably.¹

Says Borrow, in his "Bible in Spain : " " At the doors of village inns, at the hearths of the rustics, in the fields where they labor, at the stone fountains by the wayside where they water their cattle, I have questioned the lower class of the children of Portugal about the scripture, the Bible, the Old and New Testament ; and in no one instance have they known what I was alluding to, or could return me a rational answer ; though, on all other matters, their replies were sensible enough."

" I went into a bookseller's shop [in Cadiz] and made inquiries respecting the demand for literature ; which, he informed me, was small. I produced a London edition of the New Testament in Spanish, and asked the bookseller whether he thought a book of that description would sell in Cadiz. He said, that both the type and paper were exceedingly beautiful ; but that it was a work not sought after, and very little known."²

The late Prof. B. B. Edwards informs us that, in 1844 or '45, " a gentleman found it impossible to procure a Bible, in the vernacular tongue, at any of the book-shops in Rome." Nor was it fitting that one should be found there. For the Bull of Gregory XVI., against Bible Societies, was issued from this same city in 1844. Professor Edwards makes the further remark that, " in 1846—47, no copy of an Italian Bible could be found for sale in several of the largest cities of the country, except that of Martini, which is in several volumes octavo."³ And even Martini's Testament, of the

¹ Rockwell's Foreign Travel and Life at Sea, I. 392.

² Carter's edition, 1847, pp. 16. 72.

³ Life and Writings, Vol. II. p. 41.

editions of 1817 and 1818, was put in the Index of Prohibited Books, in 1819, by Pius VII. But in a country where the most active employment would seem to be begging, it was doubtless thought safe, in 1846, to leave the heavy octavos of Martini exposed to sale. But the scarcity of the vulgar scriptures, in Italy, is in full accordance with the spirit of pope Martyn V.; who, when his permission was requested to found a university at Copenhagen, granted the request on one condition: that the holy scriptures should be neither read nor explained within its walls; and the Lectures be confined to profane literature.¹

If the limits of this Article would allow, it would be exceedingly instructive, on the policy of the Romish church as to a free Bible, to unfold her practice on the missionary field. But one comprehensive fact must suffice, standing as an index: "Bagster's Bible of Every Land," embraces outline histories of all translations of the Bible, or of considerable portions of it, into modern languages and dialects, prior to the year 1848. Of these translations, there are but very few produced by the Roman Catholic missionaries. The testimony of the volume is singularly against the papal church, as a sect that does not make a common use of the scriptures.

And so we find that, at home and abroad, in Italy and Congo, wherever Romanism prevails, the scriptures are unknown, or rare.

It is now due to the authors and defenders of such a theory and policy, that we give their statements of their position, and their reasons for it, in their own words. We introduce, first, an extract from a letter of the Bishops of Bologna to Paul III. It is an advisory letter. The reign of Paul III. began in 1534, and ended in 1549. During these years, the Reformation was in vigorous progress. Coverdale's, Matthews', Cranmer's, and Taverner's Bibles, appeared in English; and the current was setting strongly toward free scriptures on the Continent. "Lastly (which, among the counsels and directions given to your holiness at

¹ Townley, I. 472.

this time, is chiefest and most weighty), the greatest care and diligence must be used, that as little of the gospel as may be (especially in the vulgar tongue), be read in those cities which are within your dominions. Let that little suffice, which is wont to be read in the Mass : and more than that, let no mortal be allowed to read. For, so long as men were content with that little, your affairs succeeded according to desire ; but quite otherwise, since so much of the scriptures was publicly read. In short, *this is the book, which, above all others, has raised these storms and tempests.* And truly, if any one read that book, viz. the scriptures, and observe the customs and practices of our church, he will see that there is no agreement betwixt them ; and that the doctrine which we preach is altogether different from, and sometimes contrary to, that contained in the Bible.”¹

Dr. Milner, one of the most prominent English champions of the papacy, is free to confess that “substituting the dead letter of the Text for the living voice of the Church, was the ready mean of undermining the Catholic Faith.”² And the same author, in his “End of Religious Controversy,” slurs and depreciates the Bible, while he shows why he could not encourage a free circulation of it. “The apostles, before they separated to preach the gospel to different nations, agreed upon a short symbol or profession of faith, called the Apostles’ Creed ; but even this they did not commit to writing ; and whereas they made this, amongst other articles of it—‘I believe in the holy church’—they made no mention, at all, of the holy scriptures. This circumstance confirms what their example proves, that the Christian doctrine and discipline might have been propagated and preserved by the unwritten word, or tradition, joined with the authority of the church, though the scriptures had not been composed.”³ “If Christ had intended that all mankind should learn his religion from a *book*, namely the New Testament, he himself would have written that book, and would

¹ Pagano-Papismus. By Joshua Stopford, B. D. York, 1675. London edition, 1844. pp. 395, 396.

² Memoirs of English Catholics, p. 244. Ed. 1820.

³ Letter, X. § 3.

have enjoined the obligation of learning to read it, as the first and fundamental precept of his religion ; whereas, he never wrote anything at all ; unless, perhaps, the sins of the Pharisees, with his finger, upon the dust.”¹

All this makes the word of God a secondary affair, as a means to a Christian life, and to the spread of Christianity. “ Tradition, joined with the authority of the church,” could do very well, “ though the scriptures had not been composed.” A Roman Catholic may very well say this. Very likely it is true, that Romanism would succeed better, with only “ tradition joined with the authority of the church,” as its guide, than it would with the light and control of the holy scriptures, as “ the only infallible rule of faith and practice.” This has been the experience of the papal church. She has gained strength, numbers, and territory by the use of tradition and church authority ; and lost these, where God’s word was a free book, in the tongue of the people. Hence her policy, and aversion to a free circulation of the scriptures. Hence, where she must give them, in the common language, she invariably insists that they shall be accompanied by her notes and applications. And hence we see the cause of Rome’s deep and intense hatred of the liberty of the press. In his Bull of 1832, Gregory uses these words : “ Hitherto tends that *worst and never sufficiently to be execrated and detested* LIBERTY OF THE PRESS, for the diffusion of all manner of writings, which some so loudly contend for, and so actively promote.”

These are some of the principles and sayings we remember when we are asked to ease their religious scruples against saying “ hallowed ” instead of “ sanctified,” and against the repetition of the decalogue divided in the common way, and against saying “ give us, this day, our daily bread,” instead of saying, in the way of the Douay, “ give us, this day, our *supersubstantial* bread.” These scruples, of which they would be relieved, and that some think might be yielded to as trifles, are as the fleecy clouds that portend the line-storm.

¹ Letter VIII. § 1.

It is an utter folly, and the entire history of this question for six centuries shows it, to attempt any settlement by a compromise of this issue now forced on us. It is an antagonism of two great principles, of two universal policies, of two Christendoms; and a compromise is both an absurdity and an impossibility. Rome cannot accept a compromise, except as the basis for a new demand. Nothing but the absolute exclusion of the scriptures from the public schools, will satisfy her; and nothing but policy prevents her making the full demand at once. This is her historical testimony, and this the principle of her ablest living men.

It may seem to some that in unfolding this system of the Roman Catholic church concerning a free Bible, we have quoted only ancient authorities and foreign precedents, and that, therefore, this presentation of their system is not just to the policy and spirit of modern Catholicism. Such objector needs to have a more lively remembrance of the fact that in the opinions and principles of the Romish Church there is *nothing new*. She scorns the imputation. The fathers and tradition, — these are her great storehouse. He who varies from these, or adds to them, is a heretic. Her great doctrines, like the one in question, are those which have been held *semper, ubique, et ab omnibus*. She knows nothing of centuries as a modifying power. And so when Pius VII., in 1816, addresses a letter to the Archbishop of Mohilew on the suppression of Bible Societies in Russia, he quotes largely from the letter of Innocent III., written to the faithful of Metz in 1199, against the use of the scriptures in the vulgar tongue, — six hundred and seventeen years before! This great iron bedstead of Og, king of Bashan, is not enlarged by heat, or contracted by cold, nor is it affected by change of latitude or longitude, or by lapse of ages.

Yet for any who may think our quoted authorities too aged, though the major part of them fall within six hundred and seventeen years, we will cite more modern witnesses.

A few years since there was published in England a series of tracts, entitled: "The Clifton Tracts. By the Brotherhood of St. Vincent of Paul. Published under the

Sanction of the Bishop of Clifton, Cardinal Wiseman." They are cheap, popular tracts, designed, they say in the Preface, to "furnish inquirers with a plain and simple statement of Catholic doctrines, principles and practices." "The work was undertaken with the warm approval of his Lordship, the Bishop of Clifton," "with the encouraging sanction of all the Catholic bishops of England." "The editors have also the gratification of being able to add, that his Holiness the Pope, unsolicited, was graciously pleased to send them his benediction upon the work." It was "Republished with the Approbation of the Most Rev. John Hughes, D. D., Archbishop of New York," by Dunigan and Brother, New York, 1856. The original editors commend the work "To 'Our Lady of Good Counsel,' and their holy patron, St. Vincent."

Having thus showed that the work is both modern and authoritative, we proceed to commend some passages in it to any lady of good counsel, and to any reader as our patron. "We believe that it was the purpose of Almighty God that we should learn our faith, not from a book, but from a living teacher, that teacher being his church." "The church's principle, then, is this, that, as she is the sole infallible interpreter of holy scripture, so she is its sole authorized dispenser, and that it is both her right and her bounden duty to give or to withhold it, as shall seem to her most conducive to the spiritual benefit of her children, of which she alone is the judge."¹

In the Tract next following in the same volume, viz. "The Church our Instructor in Scripture," we find the same usurpation of revealed light. "The church is our appointed instructor in divine truth and the way of salvation. It is this knowledge — emphatically this, and not the mere text of the Bible — which it is the object of the church to impart. But inasmuch as the Bible is the inspired word of God, and a treasury of divine truths, when her children are sufficiently instructed in the faith, and have sufficient humility to derive benefit from the immediate perusal of the written word

¹ "Clifton Tracts." Vol. I. Tract: "The Church, the Dispenser of Scripture," pp. 4. 6.

under her guiding interpretation, she freely and joyfully puts *part* or the whole of it into their hands, that they may nourish their souls and grow thereby." "The New Testament was not intended as a promulgation of the faith to those who had it not, but it constantly presupposes that faith as already received. Thus the church, and not the Bible, is the teacher commissioned by God."¹

Here the scriptures are made secondary to the teachings of the church. Those teachings are her commentaries; the scriptures are what holy men of God recorded as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. In the primary teaching of Christianity, whether to adult or child, the church imparts her own lessons, and not God's. The true faith is to be learned, "not from *a book*, but from a living teacher." At length, when one has "sufficient humility" to profit by the direct use of the Bible, "under the guiding interpretation" of the church, "*part or the whole*" is given. If a man will question nothing and believe everything that the priest tells him, he may possibly gain access among us to a *part* of the Bible. But until the man will, of a certainty, make the scriptures say nothing but what the priest has previously taught him to say, he cannot have even a "part" of them. He has not yet "sufficient humility to derive benefit" from them. So does the Romish church, assuming to be the "Dispenser of Scripture," and the "Instructor in Scripture," over-ride the word of God by her traditions, and press in her "guiding interpretation" between the Great Teacher and his disciples. And the words of Prof. Park in his Dudleian Lecture before the University of Cambridge, 1845, are too full of truth and aptness to be omitted in this place: "She has given us creeds which claim to be inspired, and by thus compressing her doctrines into a narrow compass, has saved her disciples from the invigorating toil of a study like that of the Bereans. One of her greatest sins against the intellect is, her elevating the digests of her councils into an infallible standard of truth. She has made them equal to the

¹ "Clifton Tracts." Vol. I. Tract: "The Church, the Dispenser of Scripture," pp. 1—7.

Bible in authority, and superior in ease of reference, in systematic arrangement, in precise definitions. Hence the New Testament loses its appropriate place in her esteem; it is neither studied by her clergymen as the highest criterion of truth, nor read by her laymen as their familiar guide."¹

But more significant testimony remains. We now quote from "A General Introduction to the Sacred Scriptures. By the Rev. Joseph Dixon, D. D., Professor of Sacred Scripture and Hebrew, in the Royal College of St. Patrick, Maynooth, Archbishop of Armagh, and Primate of all Ireland." The work is designed to fill a place, in the Catholic church, that Horne's Introduction fills in the Protestant. Quotations from such a work, by such an author, and filling such a position, need no preface. "The practice of the Christian church, at all times, upon this head, has been quite irreconcilable with the supposition that the Founder of the church, or his apostles, imposed any obligation upon all Christians, generally, to read the scriptures."² "As to the simple faithful, the rule in the Christian church has always been, that they should learn the doctrines of religion, and their duty to God, by means of the instructions of the constituted teachers in the church. The private study or perusal of the sacred volume, has never been made obligatory upon them."³ "We lay it down as certain, that no divine precept exists, imposing upon the laity an obligation to read the scripture. . . . The reading of the scripture is not necessary to the laity, for the purpose of knowing either what must be believed, or what must be practised, in order to gain eternal life." "The people [in distinction from pastors and teachers] have only such a right to read the scriptures, as the church sanctions and approves." "We have arrived, now, at these two conclusions: First, that the simple faithful are bound by no divine law to read the scriptures. Second, that whatever right the simple faithful have to read the scripture, is not a right independent of the sanction and approval of the pastors of the church."⁴

¹ *Bibliotheca Sacra*, II. 454, 455.

² *Ib.* p. 146.

³ Vol. I. p. 145.

⁴ *Ib.* pp. 149, 152, 154.

But the archbishop has said that the reading of scripture may be granted to those "who bring the proper dispositions," and who fulfil certain conditions. He then proceeds to specify four "conditions upon which the church has a right to insist, before that the scriptures shall be thrown open to the people."

"First—That those who could read the scripture in a version, must procure a Catholic version.

"Secondly—The church has, also, a right to require that even a Catholic version, i. e. a version made by a Catholic author, shall not be put into the hands of the people, until it shall have received the approbation of the proper ecclesiastical authority.

"Thirdly—The church, when it pleases, has a right to require that the people shall read those versions only which are accompanied with explanatory notes, taken from the fathers or approved Catholic Commentators.

"Finally, the pastors of the church have a right to prohibit the reading of the scripture altogether to those who are, at the same time, unlearned and unstable — more likely to indulge in their own curious speculations, to the great danger of their faith, than to be guided by the notes of learned Catholic writers."¹

Here is a distinct enunciation of the position that God did not design the scriptures to be read by all his people. They are rather a professional than a popular book. It is laid down as "certain," that no divine precept imposes this duty. The laity have no need to read the Bible to know what they must believe or practise. The rule has always been, in the church, that they must learn these things from their priests and pastors. If they have the scriptures at all, and in any fragments, it is as a gratuity and favor from the church officers, and not of right, or in any necessity. And so the scriptures are, to the Roman Catholic people, what tables of logarithms are to a ship's company: they are for the officers alone, who navigate the vessel. Crew and passengers have, of right, nothing to do with them. And if, through the con-

¹ Vol. I. pp. 154, 155.

descension and grace of the priest, a Catholic layman obtain God's word, in part or wholly, it must be a "Catholic version," that has received the sanction of "the proper ecclesiastical authority," and that is accompanied with proper "explanatory notes." And the man must bring and prove the "proper dispositions" to receive, without questioning, the teaching of the notes, as the true import of the text; otherwise, the text will do him more harm than good, through his "curious speculations," and so must be withheld from him. This is the design of God, and the traditional usage of the church, concerning the scriptures, according to the primate of all Ireland. This is the right of the people to the Bible, and this the distribution of it, that the holy church is solemnly obligated to make.

Was ever assumption more arrogant, or a despotism more absolute in its claims? The scriptures of God are given to us, the people, that we may make them common to all eyes, as if by writing them "upon the door-posts of our houses, and upon our gates," that we may "teach" them as the Great Teacher commanded, and search them as the commended Bereans did. But this assumption of the papal church to be the sole keeper and dispenser of them, makes the whole world a suppliant at the foot of a priest, if it want but a chapter of gospel. Had the quotations first made, been taken from a some homily of the twelfth century, they might be turned aside as obsolete opinions, like so much of the monkish rubbish of those dark days. But they come fresh from Maynooth. They are from volumes in their first decade. They were written when this question of the Bible in the public schools was under warm debate, as a great practical question, in Ireland. They were written by a leader and champion of the English Catholic church, of whom they are proud, and who has since been made primate of all Ireland. These volumes of Dr. Dixon are reprinted in this country, says the American Preface, that the papists here may have the means in their hands of replying to the attacks of the protestants. "They [the protestants] must be reminded that they have *no right to the Bible*. . . . They are unjust prevaricators

against the law of God, if they attempt to use, *in any way*, that which belongs, of right, only to the church. . . . *If they use it without her authority, they are robbers, and robbers, too, of sacred things."*

This is the principle, and this the teaching, in the Roman Catholic church to-day. This issue in the public schools, therefore, over the decalogue and the pater noster, is but an incident in a great work. The motion in the particles of sand, at the feet of our children, indicates that the mountain has begun to slide. The thing done is, to the thing they would do, as the dew to the deluge. For "we have no right to the Bible;" and, having it now without Rome's authority, we are "robbers of sacred things," and must come under arrest by Rome's spiritual police.

Soon after the publication of these volumes by Dr. Dixon, they received an able review from the pen of cardinal Wiseman. He is believed to be the only one filling the bishopric of a people speaking the English tongue, who has attained to the dignity of a cardinal's hat. In his words, therefore, Rome speaks to all readers of English. The review devotes the most of its space to a discussion of our present question. As such, it was fitted to be an admirable tract for the times, and so was printed by Richardson and Son, Dublin, under the title of "*The Catholic Doctrine on the Use of the Bible.*" From a tract so authoritative in its utterances, and so singularly apt for our purpose, in its origin and circumstances of publication, we wish to make a few extracts.

In speaking of the high ground that the Catholics must take in opposition to those who claim an open Bible, his Eminence the cardinal says: "We must deny to Protestantism *any right to use the Bible*; much more, to interpret it."¹

A holy horror seems to seize him when he sees the fruits of Protestantism so widely diffused.

"The holy, the sublime, the awful word of God, over which saints have meditated in cells, for years of ineffable sweetness, yet of solemn reverence, which the silver voice of

¹ p. 11.

virgins or the deep tones of holy monks have chaunted in breathless midnight, that no earthy sound might disturb the depth of their meditation, etc.; this noblest, greatest, divinest of things unsacramental, is put, indiscriminately, unceremoniously, into the hands of every one. It is the school boy's task book, it is the jailor's present, it is the drunkard's pawned pledge, it is the dotard's text-book, it is the irreverent jester's butt, it is the fanatic's justification for every vice, blasphemy and profaneness that he commits. For into every one's hand it must needs be thrust, from the Chinese to the Ojibbawa, from the Laplander to the Bosjman, from the child to the dotard, from the stuttering peasant to the glib, self-righteous old dame." "In the worst inn's worst room,' in the ship's forecabin, in the shepherd's cottage, the well-known binding of the Society's Bible is to be seen."¹

Of the fruits of its free circulation, he speaks in very sorrowful terms: "It is only now that the experiment is being tried on a great scale of what the indiscriminate reading of the Bible will make a people. It has been tried in the dominions of Queen Pomare, with unexampled success. It has, under the judicious management of evangelical missionaries, transformed a mild and promising race into a pack of lazy, immoral infidels." "In Christian countries it has begotten heresies and sects that are fast plunging them into rationalism and infidelity."²

"If, therefore, we be asked, why we do not give the Bible indifferently to all, and the shutting up (as it is called) of God's word, be disdainfully thrown in our face, we will not seek to elude the question, or meet the taunt, by *denial*, or by attempts to prove that our principles on this subject are not antagonistic to those of Protestants. THEY ARE ANTAGONISTIC, AND WE GLORY IN AVOWING IT."

"1. We answer, therefore, boldly, that we give not the word of God indiscriminately to all, because God himself has not so given it."

"2. We further say, that we do not permit the indiscriminate and undirected use of the Bible, because God has not

¹ pp. 12, 14.

given to his church the instinct to do so." "Wherever it prevails, church government declines, insubordination of judgment springs up, and a spirit of self-sufficiency and pride takes the place of religious humility and docility."

"3. In fact, in answer to the question proposed, we answer that we cannot and must not adopt the Protestant course, because we have no reason to admire its fruits, or its expectations." "We do not see morals improving, or crime diminishing, but rather the contrary."¹

In showing the evils of a free Bible, Dr. Wiseman refers to Germany, and the fruits of Luther's labors: "Away were to go confession, and fasting, and mortification, and monachism, and celibacy, and penances, and restitution, and the indissolubility of marriages, and evangelical councils, and priestly admonition, and ecclesiastical censures," etc.² Yes, doubtless, much of all this must go away before the open and free word of God in the mother tongue of a people. And if confession and mortification, monachism and celibacy, councils and censures, as held and practised by the Romish church, are to be preserved, the Bible must be kept out of the way. The two can never go together. "They are antagonistic, and we glory in avowing it."

What is in store for us, if Rome ever gain the ascendancy here, is thus gently hinted by the Cardinal: "The time is perhaps approaching, when a fatal disease will break out again amongst us, and physicians will forbid us the use of delicious and generally wholesome food. And only because experience has shown them those who have partaken of it lying dead around them. In early times there was no need of legislation on the subject. The indiscriminate reading of scripture was an impossibility; few could read, manuscripts were rare and expensive," etc.³

If that possible time come, which the Cardinal says "is perhaps approaching," Protestantism may again be subjected to such mandate as Bonner, Bishop of London, issued to all parsons and vicars in that diocese, "to abolish and extin-

¹ pp. 20, 21, 22, 23.² p. 25.³ p. 23.

guish, so that they might not be read or seen," all and any texts of Holy Writ inscribed on the walls of the churches.¹ The bigoted and intolerant papist could not bear to see the words of the law written for the eye of the people upon the door-posts of the house of the Lord, and upon its gates. But even this would not be shutting up the word of God according to Dr. Wiseman. For, "in Catholic countries, such as can read, or do read, have access to the *Latin version without restraint!*"² A safe liberty, we think, and that the Catholic laity are not in any immediate danger of abusing.

More than this. The church reads the scriptures to her children. "When she unfolds it and solemnly reads from it, to her children, the smallest passage of her Spouse's life, she orders the tapers of the sanctuary to burn around it, and the incense to perfume the very atmosphere in which its words shall resound. And when the priest, kissing the blessed text, whispers his prayer: '*Per evangelica dicta deleantur nostra delicta,*' he expresses more confidence in the gospel of Jesus, than all the speeches in Exeter Hall can match."³ And all this, probably, in Latin. For Dr. Cheever says: "I have been, personally, in almost all the Roman Catholic countries, and attended the Romish service; and I do not remember that I have ever seen the service performed in a language that the people could understand."⁴ And all this is but following the pious will and judgment of pope Gregory VII.: "In our frequent meditations upon the holy scriptures, we have discovered that it has been and still is pleasing to Almighty God, that his sacred worship should be performed in an unknown language, in order that the whole world, and especially the most simple, may not be able to understand it. In a known language, the service would soon excite contempt and disgust; or it would happen that the common people, by repeating so often that which they could not comprehend, would fall into many great errors, from which it would be difficult to withdraw the heart of man."

And so we have this papal question, of the Bible for the

¹ Fox, Acts and Monuments, III. 107.

² p. 26.

³ p. 30.

⁴ Third Lecture on "Hierarchical Despotism."

public, placed before us in its historical origin and unfolding. Six hundred and thirty years ago the council of Toulouse solemnly forbade the laity to possess the scriptures in the vulgar tongue. Six centuries of struggle and intrigue, aided by banishment, the dungeon, and the stake, have illuminated, exemplified, and established that decree, so far as Rome had power. It is a part of the policy of an infallible church, that the simple word of God, in the mother tongue of a people, cannot be allowed. And his Eminence, cardinal Wiseman, "glories in avowing it."

It is this principle of popery, strengthened, hallowed, and stereotyped by this lapse of time, and by these pontifical and prelatical names, that we now meet at the door of our public school room. And we are to meet it, urged and defended by all the power, spiritual and temporal, learned, logical, jesuitical, that this ancient hierarchy can wield. It will be no child's play. No voting once, merely, in town or city, no management in one legislature or state, will settle it. More likely, it will be a vigorous contest for the remainder of this century. Grown old and wise in managing, the Romish church will yield the point when, *but only while*, she must. This historical gleanings has been made to show that the Bible or no Bible, in the public school, is no question of yesterday, likely to be settled to-morrow; nor yet any local and rather private issue, nor yet a question limited to the school-room. The gleanings has been made to show that it is a very broad question, coming home to the people in their solemn assemblies, in their households, and in their closets. Whether we may have an English Bible in our colleges, and churches, and families, and in our retirement — that is the question, as it has been for centuries. Rome has said: No; many others, thousands, have said: Yes, and they have burned for it. We may come to monosyllables again on it.

It is true, the papists deny the wish to give this question so broad a bearing. The bishop of Boston, in his letter of March 21, 1859, to the School Committee, says: "Whenever and wherever an effort has been made, by Catholics, to effect such changes as they desired, the question has been distorted

from its true sense, and a false issue has been set before the non-Catholic community. It has been represented that the design was to eliminate and practically annihilate the Bible. This has never been true; and yet this has always been believed." And in view of the entire history of the Romish treatment of the scriptures, as a book for the people, it is exceedingly difficult to believe otherwise. Very likely "the design," in each movement of this kind, has not been, to accomplish, at that time, and by that movement, all that the bishop cautiously denies; but only some particular and, perhaps, small part of it. The agents of the papacy, in labors to suppress the scriptures, may not, in every case, be possessed of the ulterior and broad purpose of that church. It is as a deduction from the aggregation of facts in the Romish management of the scriptures, when we say that the design of that church seems to be to "eliminate and practically annihilate the Bible."

The present issue, that the papists have seen fit to raise with our school system, devolves on us the necessity of closing or continuing a struggle of centuries. This historical outline will enable us to do the one or the other understandingly. It is not necessary to delay its conclusion by showing what we have to gain or lose in the result. Our origin as a nation, our prosperity and perpetuity, have evidently had the Bible, in our vernacular, as a basis. Because of this, our way has been prosperous, and we have had good success. It was not our purpose to make an argument on so grave a question; but simply to develop a policy. Our whole aim has been to show, from authentic sources, what the policy of the Roman Catholic church has been, on this question. The unfolding of such a system must be its best refutation. It is presumed to be safe to show their aim among us, by their actions and avowals elsewhere; and so leave the whole matter with an intelligent community.

We have been standing on a good foundation. We should be very slow and very reluctant to leave it. We have stood strong and safe only on the Bible. We stand only while on it. The Greeks fabled a giant, called Antaeus,

and born of Earth. He was famed for strength and victories in wrestling. He always triumphed ; because, standing on his mother Earth while he struggled, she constantly renewed his strength. He finally engaged with Hercules in a wrestling match. Hercules had learned the secret of Antaeus's strength ; and so, lifting him high in air, and above the strengthening touch of his mother Earth, he crushed him to death in his arms. We should not suffer ourselves to be lifted from our sure footing and source of national strength by this papal wrestler among the nations. Let it suffice that we look at Italy, and Tuscany, and Spain. And let us plant the feet of our little ones in a sure place, remembering that it is a foundation of God, for us and for our children, forever.

ARTICLE VI.

DR. NATHANIEL W. TAYLOR ON MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT.¹

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A SYSTEM of theology, if constructed upon the ideal of Dr. Taylor, would take, as its central truth, the fact that *God is administering a perfect moral government over men*. Around this central fact would be grouped all the teachings of nature and of revelation. The existence, character, and providence of God, would be studied with reference to his position as governor. The constitution and history of man would be investigated with reference to his position as a subject. The special teachings of the inspired word respecting

¹ Lectures on the Moral Government of God, by Nathaniel W. Taylor, D. D., late Dwight Professor of Didactic Theology in Yale College. New York: Published by Clark, Austin and Smith, 3 Park Row and 3 Ann Street. 1859. Vol. I. pp. 417. Vol. II. pp. 423.

the fall and recovery of the race, would be considered as an exceptional and extraordinary application of the principles of moral government to the work of forgiveness and redemption. Indeed, according to this ideal, it is easy to see that all human knowledge, whether of principles or of facts, whether in the form of science or of history, may be arranged and studied in its relations to the same great central fact, the whole being comprised among the means employed, or the results secured, under God's government of the intelligent universe.

It was Dr. Taylor's constant regret, not only that our systems of divinity are made up of partial examinations of subordinate and insulated topics, called forth by the exigencies of controversy, instead of being complete and symmetrical exhibitions of God's moral government; but that they contain absolutely no full or formal discussion whatever of this vital theme. Vid. *Mor. Gov.* II. p. 2.

In this conception, therefore, of God's moral government as centralizing and including all truth, we have the key to Dr. Taylor's system of theology. To the direct elucidation of God's moral government, in respect both to its abstract nature and its practical working, he devoted a large portion of his theological lectures. In the department of natural theology his plan was fully executed. And although he did not, in form, arrange the doctrines of revelation about this central idea; yet so fully are all his most elaborate discussions of these doctrines modelled upon the mould of thought brought out in his essays on moral government, that they may be considered as, in fact, a continuation of those essays, being the application of their principles in specific departments of theology.

The volumes before us contain a discussion of this subject under three different forms :

1. Moral government in its abstract principles, as cognizable by the intuitive and deductive powers of man, disconnected from any particular form of moral government, divine or human. This section is designed to answer the question : What is a perfect moral government ?

2. Moral government in its practical working, as seen in nature and in the experience and history of man. The object of this section is to prove that God's moral government, as seen in nature, is a perfect moral government, according to the exposition of the first section.

3. God's moral government as made known in revelation, especially as unfolded in the Jewish theocracy ; that being a representative system, in which the general principles of God's administration are made known through their exhibition in the temporal government of the Hebrew commonwealth.

It is proposed in the present Article, to give, in a condensed form, the course of thought followed in discussing the first of these points, viz. *Moral government in the abstract*. The object of the Article is to present an outline of this great argument, such as shall be accepted by Dr. Taylor's friends as a fair representation of his views, and such as shall be adapted to the wants of those who may have occasion to become acquainted simply with its prominent features and general scope. This design, of course, excludes any attempt either to advocate or to oppose his views. If these are misstated, in any quarter, the best reply will be a correct statement. If they are in any respect erroneous, such a statement will be the best antidote to the error.

It is, perhaps, desirable to remind the reader that the word "action," as constantly used in these lectures, refers, unless otherwise designated, to the action of the mind in the exercise of its *supreme* purpose or affection, all subordinate choices and all external actions being included only as they are dictated by the governing principle.

The precise language of Dr. Taylor is given in the definitions and in other important forms of phraseology. In such cases, quotation marks are employed. Elsewhere, the language is not that of Dr. Taylor ; and, of course, should not be made the basis of objection to his views, without a careful comparison with the treatise itself.

WHAT IS A PERFECT MORAL GOVERNMENT ?

"Moral government is the government of moral beings by the influence of authority." Its chief forms are, the government of God, of the state, and of the family. Of these, the government of God, alone, is perfect in its administration and tendencies; while those of the state and family are most imperfect in these respects. None of them, however, is perfect in its results, sin and misery being in existence under them all. Still we know what a perfect moral government is. Its nature, necessity, and design begin to be comprehended by the child, upon the first demand of the mother that its will yield to her will; they are more and more fully comprehended in connection with the relations of civil society, of friendship, and of personal intercourse among men. Though none of these forms furnish an example of perfect moral government, still the human mind is capable of perceiving their imperfections, and so of forming a conception of such a government. We can fully understand its nature and its design, and we can know also what measures are adapted to accomplish its design, as far as we comprehend the circumstances of the case. In God's moral government, while we can fully understand its nature and design, there must be much in its practical administration, of the fitness of which to the design, we are incompetent to judge. On the other hand, there are essential respects in which we can decide what a perfect moral governor will do, and what he will not do. We are not, therefore, doomed to look upon God's administration as an impenetrable mystery. We can know, "in all essential respects, what a perfect moral government must be, when administered by a perfect God." The definition of a perfect moral government, as it is thus known by the human mind, is as follows:

"THE INFLUENCE OF THE AUTHORITY OR OF THE RIGHTFUL AUTHORITY OF A MORAL GOVERNOR ON MORAL BEINGS, DESIGNED SO TO CONTROL THEIR ACTION AS TO SECURE THE GREAT END OF ACTION ON THEIR PART, THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF LAW."

This definition is considered, in its several parts.

I. "A moral government is an influence on *moral beings*, or on *beings capable of moral action*." This is perfectly evident. It is only necessary to observe that such a government is entirely distinct from the influence of physical causes. It gives, not the necessity, but only the certainty, of its effect. It may exist unimpaired, though wholly counteracted. It leaves the subject as free to perform the act which it forbids, as that which it commands.

II. A perfect moral government implies a *moral governor*. There may be a moral *system*, under which moral beings should act simply from motives derived from the perceived nature and tendencies of their action. But a moral government requires the personal influence of a moral governor.

III. The influence of a perfect moral government is designed *so to control the action of moral beings, as to secure the great end of action on their part*. This is perfectly evident, the only question being: What is the great end of action? It is to produce the highest well-being of all, and to prevent the highest misery of all. Every moral being is capable of acting in a manner which tends to secure this end. Hence a perfect moral government must require such action, and can require nothing less. Moreover, every moral being is, by necessity, compelled to choose one or the other of these objects. If he refuse to seek the highest well-being of all, as his supreme end, and chooses some inferior good, such as the temporal welfare of his family, still he chooses the highest misery of all. For, as he chooses the welfare of his family as his *supreme* end, all other objects, if necessary, will be sacrificed to it, even the entire happiness of the whole universe besides. Therefore his choice, and every other choice, except that of the highest well-being of all, is, "in its true tendency, fitted to produce the opposite result—the highest misery of all." Hence a supreme affection, whatever subordinate action it may dictate, has, in every case, a tendency to secure one of two objects: the highest well-being of all; or, the highest misery of all.

IV. The influence of a perfect moral government is the

influence of authority. Authority is defined to be "The influence of a right to command, which imposes an obligation to obey, as this right results from competence and disposition to give and maintain the best law." It is the *personal* influence of the ruler resulting from his power, wisdom, and goodness, leading the subject to accept his command as the highest *evidence* that the act commanded is fitted to secure the best end of action. It differs from the influence of natural good and evil, which give this evidence through the known nature and tendencies of action. These two influences may coexist and cooperate in giving evidence as to the tendency of action. But they are distinct. However powerful the latter may be, without the former, there can be no moral government. The right to govern never rests on any relation between the parties, but solely upon the competence and disposition of the governor. The right of a parent to govern his child, does not rest upon the fact that he is the parent; but from the fact that his being a parent is presumptive evidence that he will govern in the best manner. So the simple relation of Creator gives no right, of itself, to govern. A malignant Creator would have no just authority.

The view that the right to govern is given by power to reward and punish, places the influence of government solely in natural good and evil, appealing to the selfishness of the subject exclusively. It is the doctrine that might makes right. All permanent distinctions between right and wrong are thus destroyed; the one being changed to the other with every change of power.

V. A perfect moral government involves the exercise of authority *through the medium of law*. The following definition is given of the law of a perfect moral government:

"*The law of a perfect moral government, is the promulgated will of the moral governor, as a decisive rule of action to his subjects, requiring benevolence on their part, as the best kind of action, and as the sum of obedience, forbidding selfishness on their part as the worst kind of action and the sum of disobedience, expressing his preference of the action required to its opposite, all things considered, his satisfaction with obedi-*

ence and with nothing but obedience on the part of subjects, and his highest approbation of obedience and highest disapprobation of disobedience, and including the appropriate sanctions of the moral governor's authority."

The defence of the successive propositions of this definition, occupy the remainder of the treatise.

1. The law of a perfect moral government is the *promulgated* will of the moral governor as a *decisive rule* of action to his subjects. His will must be promulgated to be known; and, being promulgated, ignorance is no excuse for disobedience. It is decisive, because it emanates from one competent and disposed to give the best law; whose authority is therefore final on the question as to what the best law requires.

2. The law of a perfect moral government must require *benevolence* as the best kind of action, and forbid *selfishness* as the worst kind of action, on the part of moral beings.

(a) The influence of benevolence and selfishness *upon other sentient beings than the agent*, proves that the one is the best and the other the worst kind of action. This appears:

(a²) In the fact that each of these affections is *supreme*; that is, fixes upon its object as the *supreme end of action*; being thus distinguished from all subordinate acts of will; and in the fact that each is also *elective* or *voluntary*; being thus distinguished from mere instinctive or constitutional preferences.

Benevolence is the elective preference of the highest well-being of all, to every object that can come into competition with it. The highest well-being of the agent cannot come into competition with it, both being secured, in all cases, by the same action; therefore a man is never called to choose the loss of his own highest well-being for the sake of the general good. The necessary *means* of the highest well-being of the agent, e. g. his virtue, can never thus come into competition; therefore a man is never called upon to do wrong for the general good. But, with these exceptions, every other good to the agent, and the escape from every other evil by the agent, may thus come into competition

as an object of choice. These objects, which may compete with the general good, are termed in the scriptures "*the world*," in which sense the word is used in this treatise. To these the benevolent purpose prefers the highest well-being of all, together with all which is implied in that well-being, and all the means necessary to secure it. It is a purpose to sacrifice all good, and to endure all evil, which may be necessary to the highest well-being of all, with the exception of the agent's own highest well-being and its means; which, in the nature of things, cannot be inconsistent with the highest well-being of all. It is the true nature and tendency of benevolence, then, to secure the best end; and it is, therefore, the best kind of action.

Selfishness on the contrary elects, as its supreme object, the world and all means necessary to secure it; and its tendency is, of course, to destroy all good, viz. happiness and the means of it, and to produce all evil, viz. misery and the means of it, on the part of other sentient beings, so far as may be necessary to secure its end. Selfishness is, therefore, the worst kind of action.

(b^a) That benevolence is the best and selfishness the worst kind of action, to other beings than the agent himself, appears from the fact that each is an *intelligent* act. They are *intelligently* directed, each to its object; so that the disposition to do good or evil is allied to wisdom to do each. Knowledge gives power, and so enhances the capacity of benevolence to do good, and of selfishness to do harm.

(c^a) The same appears from the fact that each is a *morally free* act, each of which excludes the other: benevolence excluding selfishness, with all its power for evil; selfishness excluding benevolence with all its power for good. The opposite of each is something more than its mere non-existence. It is the non-existence of the other with all its power for good or evil. This expulsive power enhances the good of the one, and the evil of the other.

(d^a) A fourth consideration is, that both are permanent, not as being absolutely unchangeable, but as opposed to fluctuating, states of mind. The mind changes its governing purpose only with *great difficulty*. The whole tendency

of each of these principles is to perpetuate itself, with all its power for good or for evil.

(e²) A fifth consideration is, that both are predominant states of mind ; subordinating, each to its own purposes, *all the faculties of the being* ; thus increasing the power of each for good or for evil.

These facts, severally conclusive, furnish in their combination irresistible proof that benevolence is the best, and selfishness the worst, kind of action, so far as they are related to other beings than the agent.

(b) That benevolence is the best, and selfishness the worst, kind of action, appears from their *relation to the agent himself* ; benevolence being adapted to secure the highest happiness, and selfishness the highest misery of which he is capable from action.

(a²) This appears from the tendency of the *objects of action*, the one to give the highest happiness, the other to cause the highest misery, to the agent.

(a³) Benevolence seeks an object which is fitted to give the highest happiness to him who contemplates it. It will be admitted that the object best fitted to produce this result, is the highest happiness of all, together with all the means necessary to secure it, especially the perfect virtue of all other moral beings. But it has been shown that benevolence is the only action, on the part of the agent, which is fitted to produce the highest happiness of all other moral beings. Therefore, because benevolence alone tends to secure the *object* desired, it is indirectly adapted to secure the highest happiness of the agent.

The same is shown from the very nature of *good, worth, value, or excellence*. These belong to no object absolutely, but only as that object is *related to sentient beings*. Nothing is good but happiness and the means of happiness. The value of benevolence to all other beings, is its fitness to secure their highest happiness ; its value to the agent himself is its fitness to secure his highest happiness. Had not the highest happiness of all, and his benevolence as its means, this tendency to secure happiness to the agent, he could not choose it. There

would be no ground for motive.¹ But inasmuch as he is capable of receiving higher happiness from the highest happiness of all others, than from any other source, his own benevolence, as the means of the highest happiness of all others, becomes the best kind of action to him.

It is not necessary that these results should be actually secured. The worth of the action depends solely upon its *fitness* to secure them. Moreover in making these estimates of the value of benevolence to the agent, we are to regard him in his highest perfection of faculties and character, unhardened and unperverted by selfishness.

(b³).⁴ Selfishness, on the part of a moral being, is perfectly fitted to secure to him the highest misery of which he is capable from an object of action."

The argument here employed is precisely the reverse of that just considered. The highest misery of all is the object which is best fitted to cause misery in a moral being. It is

¹ This is the somewhat famous "*self-love theory*" of Dr. Taylor. It consists simply in the assertion that since "the will is as the greatest apparent good," any object chosen must contain a good to the mind, that is, must give happiness to it. This happiness from the object is not *directly* chosen, but the object is chosen, and yet the object is chosen *because* it gives happiness. In choosing the highest happiness of the universe, the agent does not make his own highest happiness, which is involved in it, an object of thought or pursuit, yet does this induce him to make the choice. If any prefer that phraseology, it may be said, that the happiness of the universe is the *objective* motive, while his own happiness, which is involved in this, is the *subjective* motive, in his choice. If he received no happiness in securing the happiness of others, he could not choose it. Some prefer to express this distinction thus: The agent's own happiness is *instinctively* regarded in his choices, but the object chosen is *deliberately* or *voluntarily* regarded. The former influences him unconsciously, the latter consciously.

This is distinct from the question as to *what that quality* is in benevolence which thus gives happiness to the agent. Dr. Taylor and other utilitarians would say: "It is its tendency to secure the highest happiness of the universe." Others would say: "It is the presence of the quality we call *rightness*, considered apart from all its tendencies." This quality, according to the latter view, admits of no further definition or analysis, being a simple idea. Those who hold this view would say: "The universal happiness is good, but the love of the universal happiness is better," — that is, the securing of the universal happiness gives great pleasure, but the *choice* of the universal happiness gives still greater pleasure to a moral agent; so that he would still choose the universal happiness, though all the present tendencies of that choice were so changed that the result would be the universal misery.

the direct tendency of selfishness to secure this object. Therefore selfishness is fitted to produce the highest misery in the agent. As there is no evil but misery and the means of it, and as selfishness is the means fitted to produce the highest misery, therefore it is the worst kind of action. Nor is it necessary that these results actually exist. The evil of the action to the agent is to be measured by its *fitness* to produce his highest misery, and that in the perfect unperverted action of his powers, unmarred by any previous act of selfishness.

(b²) The fitness of benevolence to afford the highest happiness, and of selfishness to cause the highest misery, to the agent himself, is further seen in the fact that each is intelligent action. The agent fully knows all the results, both of good and evil, which flow from his action; and will therefore gather from the one all the happiness which it is capable of giving, and receive misery from the other in like manner.

(c²) The same fitness of each to produce its result, is seen in the fact that it is the agent's *own action*.

As with full knowledge he surveys the results of his benevolence, he exclaims : " I have done it ;" or of his selfishness, he exclaims : " I have caused it ;" thus approval becomes *self*-approval ; and abhorrence, *self*-abhorrence.

(d²) The same is seen in the fact that moral *liberty* is an element in each kind of action. In the case of benevolence, the joy of the agent is immeasurably enhanced by the thought : " I did this voluntarily. I could have done otherwise." In the case of selfishness, misery would be immeasurably increased by the same thought.

(e²) The same is seen in the fact that each is *predominant* action, using for its purposes every power of the intellect, the sensibility, and the will. Under the sway of benevolence, all would be awakened to the highest activity, contemplating or achieving that which is best fitted to give happiness to the soul. Under the sway of selfishness, all these powers are employed in contemplating or causing all which is best fitted to create misery.

Thus is the proposition demonstrated, that benevolence is the best, and selfishness the worst, kind of action, considered

both in relation to the agent himself and in relation to all other sentient beings.

3. The third point in the definition of the law of a perfect moral government is, that it requires benevolence as the *sum of obedience*, and forbids selfishness as the *sum of disobedience*; that is, requires benevolence universally and only, and forbids selfishness universally and only, requiring subordinate action only when it is the appropriate expression of benevolence, and forbidding the same only when it is the appropriate expression of selfishness.

As moralists have often made executive actions alone cognizable by law, losing sight of the action of the will and heart, a distinction is now drawn between *predominant* and *subordinate* action — predominant being that action in which the agent selects his supreme object, — subordinate being that action which is dictated by this supreme preference. The only predominant acts possible to a moral being are benevolence and selfishness. These states of mind are here defined more fully than before, thus:

“Benevolence consists in the elective preference of, or in electively preferring, the highest well-being of all sentient beings, for its own sake, to every other object in competition with it, as an object of choice or preference.”

“Selfishness consists in the elective preference of, or in electively preferring, some inferior good to the highest well-being of all sentient beings; and is, of course, a preference of this inferior good to the prevention of the highest misery of all; that is, a preference of the highest misery of all to the absence of the inferior good, as these objects come into competition as objects of choice.”

Each of these is a mingled act of the will and heart, being at once a choice and an affection; each is intelligent, each is free, each permanent, and each predominant. They differ in their end and tendency: those of benevolence being the production of the highest well-being of all; those of selfishness being, through the choice of some inferior end, the production of the highest misery of all.

Subordinate action pertains to each of these forms of predominant action, and it consists of two kinds:

(a) Immanent subordinate action, including all "elective preferences, voluntary affections, dispositions, or purposes, in which no present act of mind or body is directly willed."

(b) Executive subordinate action, in which some act of body or mind is directly willed.

The latter may be divided also into :

(a²) Overt action, which is the act willed ; and :

(b²) Imperative volition ; which is the act willing it.

It is evident that, in this subordinate action, the agent does not aim *directly* at the great end of action, but only at some limited degree of happiness. Should this limited happiness be consistent with the highest well-being of all, then *indirectly* the agent promotes the great end of action ; should this be inconsistent with the highest well-being of all, then he *indirectly* defeats the end.

Having made these distinctions, the author proceeds to the proof of the proposition just stated, viz. that benevolence is the *sum of obedience*, and selfishness the *sum of disobedience* to the law of a perfect moral government.

(a) "*Predominant action, either in the form of selfishness or benevolence, is not only unavoidable, but it is the only action on the part of moral beings which, in all the circumstances essential to their condition, is possible.*"

It is possible that every moral being should choose between the highest good of the universe and some inferior object. It is certain that every moral being will choose between these, for *his own* highest happiness depends upon the choice of the former. He cannot exist as a moral being without deciding whether he will seek his own highest happiness or an inferior form of happiness. It follows, therefore, that "in all circumstances essential to his condition as a moral being," he must be benevolent or selfish. Since a perfect law must cover all the possible circumstances of a moral being, and since these forms of action alone are demanded in all such possible circumstances, it follows that these alone can be the sum of obedience or of disobedience.

But is not *subordinate* action, in some of its forms at least, also essential and universal in all the possible circumstances

of a moral being? It is not: because, first, it is conditional action, depending upon predominant action, without which it cannot exist; secondly, different kinds of subordinate action are required in different circumstances, so that no form of such action is possible in all circumstances; thirdly, the same subordinate action may be dictated by benevolence, in some circumstances, and by selfishness in others, e. g. taking human life, indignation, forbearance, etc. Some forms of subordinate action are invariably linked with a predominant purpose in the very name given them; e. g. murder is taking human life for a *selfish* end; patriotism is a *benevolent* love of country, etc. These are not properly subordinate actions, but are only specific manifestations of the predominant action, and of course are unchangeable. Inasmuch, therefore, as no form of subordinate action is possible under all the circumstances of a moral being, this cannot be the sum of obedience or of disobedience.

This view is confirmed by the fact that the law of a perfect moral government enjoins or prohibits subordinate actions solely through the predominant principle. In requiring benevolence, it requires all the *appropriate expressions* of benevolence, and, *vice versa*, of selfishness. Specific statutes may sometimes be given, as in the case of the ten commandments, on the ground that the acts specified are *so generally* expressions of the predominant principle, that it is proper to make them the subject of statute. Special statutes are also required in some cases to remove ignorance, on the part of the agent, of the true tendency of the subordinate action specified; in others, to deepen a correct conviction already formed. In all cases, they are to be interpreted as general directions as to the kind of predominant action to which the act specified belongs. The law, properly speaking, deals only with predominant action, and through this reaches surely and precisely all forms of subordinate action. All this is in full accordance with our Saviour's teaching, that the whole duty of man is comprised in the great law of love.

(b) The same appears, if we consider, "*That predominant action in the form of benevolence is the only morally right ac-*

tion, and in the form of selfishness, is the only morally wrong action on the part of moral beings." This is maintained:

(a²) From the established meanings of the words *right* and *wrong*, in common life, and of the word *moral*, as applied to action. *Right* signifies fitness to accomplish an end; *wrong*, fitness to prevent an end. To use these words to designate some other quality, would be as improper as to use the word *sound* to describe *color*. Now it has been shown that the great end of action, on the part of moral beings, is the highest well-being of all. Hence all morally *right* action is action which is fitted to promote that end; and all morally *wrong* action is action fitted to defeat that end. But it has been shown that benevolence and selfishness alone are thus fitted to promote or prevent the highest well-being of all. Hence these are the only morally *right* or *wrong* kinds of action.

Again, it has been shown that the word *moral* only applies to action which is intelligent, free, permanent, and predominant, and that these qualities belong only to benevolence and selfishness. These, therefore, are the only *morally* right or wrong kinds of action. The emotions of self-complacency and remorse can only be awakened by action possessing these qualities.

(b²) From the nature of *subordinate action*, which is the only other kind of action possible to a moral being. A moral being is always acting morally right or wrong, because he is always acting under the direction of the predominant principle. But none of his subordinate acts, when considered apart from the predominant principle, are *morally* right or wrong. They are right or wrong in the general sense of fitness, because they are fitted to secure some limited good or evil which are necessary to the general happiness or hostile to it. But they are not morally right or wrong. That this is so, is evident from the fact, that an act which is thus indirectly fitted to promote the general good, may be prompted by selfishness, so that, if such act is *morally* right, we have the absurdity of a being acting morally right and wrong at the same time. On the other hand, benevo-

lence may, in some cases, require a given subordinate act, and in other cases forbid it, as in changing circumstances the act may promote or prevent the highest well-being of all.¹ But *moral* action cannot thus change its character. Subordinate action, then, can be right or wrong in the *general* sense, but not in the *moral* sense.

The conclusion is therefore reached, that the law of a perfect moral government requires benevolence as the *sum of obedience*, and prohibits selfishness as the *sum of disobedience*.

4. The fourth point in the definition of the law of a perfect moral government is: "That it must express the lawgiver's preference of the action required to its opposite, *all things considered*." This is advanced in opposition to the view of some that God forbids sin "in itself considered," but prefers it "all things considered." As if a parent should say to his children: "You shall not lie," and should then add: "On the whole, considering all the advantages which are to result, I hope you will lie!" Such a law would be a mockery. It would be no expression of the choice of the lawgiver; for a choice is always made between two objects "all things considered," while at best only an involuntary desire can be awakened for an object "in itself considered." Moreover, if these two wills coexist, which of them are we to understand to be expressed in the law? This idea of two wills, in this form of it, making, as it does, holiness and sin direct competitors as objects of choice, is absurd. It is to be carefully distinguished from the choice of a *system* to which sin is incidental in preference to any *system*, possible to God, which excludes sin. In this case sin is chosen, not in preference to holiness, but in preference to the non-existence of the best system.

5. The fifth point in the definition of the law of a perfect moral government is: "That the lawgiver can be satisfied with obedience and with *nothing but obedience* on the part of subjects."

¹ It should again be borne in mind that nothing here said implies that acts such as we name justice, veracity, murder, profanity, etc., are changeable in their moral character. For these words bear a complex meaning, and include both subordinate and predominant action. A recent writer in the Princeton Review has overlooked this statement. See Taylor on Moral Government, Vol. I. p. 54. note.

This appears as follows. The law is the expression of his will, and he can be satisfied only when his will is done. The law is the means of securing the best end, and requires the best action, and he can be satisfied with nothing else. Moreover, if obedience alone will not satisfy him, it is impossible to ascertain what will satisfy him. Especially can the lawgiver be satisfied only with obedience, because obedience alone honors the law and sustains the authority of the lawgiver; while disobedience dishonors the law, and if uncounteracted would destroy the authority of the lawgiver. A single act of transgression, tolerated by the lawgiver, would break down his authority; for "what is done once, may be done again; and what is done by one, may be done by all." Aside from the intervention of an atonement, the pardon of a single sin would destroy the authority of the ruler. Why, then, is not the authority of human governments broken down by the failure to detect crime, and by the exercise of the pardoning power? Because they do all they *can*. While this disposition to do all they can is evinced, there will be authority up to the measure of their power. But the failure to do all they can, at once destroys all which can properly be called authority. There may be an acquiescence in their rule, on the part of subjects, which will prevent actual revolution and anarchy; but authority exists only in name. The exercise of the pardoning power, by human governments, results from their known fallibility. Its sole object is, to correct mistakes. If it oversteps this function, it destroys authority. Of course it has no place, in this form of it, in a perfect moral government. Nor can it be said that the transgressor, by any act of his own, can repair the injury he has inflicted upon the authority of the lawgiver, so that the lawgiver can be satisfied with anything else than his obedience. He cannot annihilate his act of sin. Not by repentance, nor by works of supererogation, nor by voluntary suffering, nor by the endurance of punishment, can the transgressor replace the authority of the lawgiver where he found it; for that authority required none of these, but obedience alone. The *infliction* of punishment will sustain authority. But this is the

act of the lawgiver, not of the transgressor ; while even this fails to reform the subject, or to restore him to happiness ; and hence is no substitute for obedience, in the estimation of a benevolent lawgiver.

The conclusion is, that the law of a perfect moral governor is an unqualified claim for obedience, and for obedience *alone*, and that he can be satisfied with *nothing else*.

6. The sixth point in the definition of the law of a perfect moral government is : " That it expresses the lawgiver's *highest approbation* of obedience, and *highest disapprobation* of disobedience."

By this is not meant that it expresses a higher approbation of obedience than of the highest happiness of all. These are related as means and end, and of course cannot come into competition as objects of choice. But it is meant that the law expresses as high an approbation of obedience as of the highest happiness of all, and a higher approbation, than of any object which can come into competition with it. On the other hand it expresses as high a disapprobation of disobedience as of the highest misery of all, of which it is the means, and a higher disapprobation than of any object which can come into competition with it. Hence a perfect moral governor will evince a greater repugnance to disobedience, than to any loss of happiness or experience of suffering which may be connected with or dependent on disobedience. That is to say : when the *universal* happiness and the means of it, become incompatible with the happiness or the exemption from suffering of a disobedient *individual*, the former will be chosen, in preference to the latter.

7. The seventh point in the definition of the law of a perfect moral government is : that it *involves sanctions*.

The discussion of the nature, necessity, and equity of legal sanctions, is preceded by a consideration of the relation sustained by the moral governor to his kingdom, his qualifications for office, the moral character which he must possess and manifest, and the mode of this manifestation.

Every moral being sustains relations to other moral beings, each of which has its peculiar object, function, and du-

ties. The object of the relation of the governor to the subject, is to secure right moral action. The means of securing this object must be the peculiar influence of a moral government, which is the influence of *authority*. Other influences, as that of natural good and evil, may and must be combined with this; but they are distinct from it. One cannot obey or disobey simply from regard to natural good or evil; for these acts have respect to a *person*, and are the accepting or rejecting of the authority of that person. *Authority*, then, is the peculiar influence of a moral government, without which it can have no existence.

This authority depends upon the manifested competence and disposition of the governor to govern in the best manner, that is, upon his knowledge and power, and upon his benevolence. Sanctions are not necessary to the proof of the knowledge and power of the governor. They can only affect his authority by their relation to the great question of his *benevolence*.

Now benevolence in a moral governor plainly involves the highest approbation of obedience, as the best thing, and the highest disapprobation of disobedience, as the worst thing. It involves, also, every possible effort, on his part, to secure the one and to prevent the other. Hence he must make it *manifest* to his subjects that his law, which pronounces right moral action the best thing and wrong moral action the worst thing, is a correct transcript of his own feelings. The possession of these feelings is necessary as the basis of his authority; their manifestation, as the proof of his authority. So that both the possession and manifestation are essential to the proof of his benevolence. Moreover, benevolence requires that this manifestation shall be so decisive that no doubt can remain in the minds of his subjects that he possesses these feelings. The simple prevention of the natural result of disobedience in causing the highest misery of all, is not such decisive proof of the possession of these feelings. For it is supposable that such prevention may be caused by a lower degree of disapprobation of disobedience than the highest. Nor will anything he may do in *other* relations

give such decisive proof, so long as he fails to do all he can in his relation as *moral governor* to manifest these feelings. The proof which admits of no doubt must be given in all relations. His highest approbation of obedience, and his highest disapprobation of disobedience, must not fail to appear wherever the manifestation of these feelings is called for. Least of all would such failure be admissible in his relations as moral governor.

We are now prepared to consider what a perfect moral governor must do, in his relation of moral governor, to manifest his highest approbation of obedience, and his highest disapprobation of disobedience, thus proving his benevolence and establishing his authority. Here we discover the office of *legal sanctions*, which are thus defined :

"The sanctions of the law of a perfect moral government consist in that natural good promised to obedience, and in that natural evil threatened to disobedience by the moral governor, which establish or ratify his authority as the decisive or necessary proof of it, by manifesting his benevolence in the form of his highest approbation of obedience and his highest disapprobation of disobedience : and which, for this purpose, include the highest possible degree of natural good in each case of obedience, and the highest possible degree of natural evil in each case of disobedience."

(a) Legal sanctions establish or ratify the authority of the moral governor, by manifesting his feelings toward obedience and disobedience, and by thus indirectly proving his benevolence : in this manner *sanctioning* his right to rule.

(b) They consist, exclusively, in natural good promised to obedience, and in natural evil threatened to disobedience. Nothing but these can *sanction* his authority. The evidence of knowledge and power cannot do it ; there must be evidence of benevolence, also. The evidence of benevolence, in giving the best rule of action, and in a kind and blameless deportment in other relations, cannot do it ; for all this may be consistent with the supposition that he does not feel the *highest* approbation of obedience and the *highest* disapprobation of disobedience. These feelings, from the nature of

the case, can only be decisively exhibited through the medium of natural good and evil in the form of reward and punishment.

(c) Legal sanctions, as now defined, ratify the moral governor's authority as the *decisive* proof of it. By decisive proof is meant, not a slight balance of probability, nor merely sufficient proof, but proof which is weakened by no opposing evidence, and which is the highest the nature of the case admits. No degree of natural good and evil, in the form of reward and punishment, would constitute legal sanctions, if, in other relations, the lawgiver failed to give evidence of perfect benevolence. The very word *sanction* implies the absence of all opposing evidence. It is a *decisive proof*.

(d) Legal sanctions become decisive proof of the moral governor's authority by manifesting his benevolence in the form of *his highest approbation of obedience, and his highest disapprobation of disobedience*.

Natural good and evil do not always possess the same significance. Natural good is sometimes conferred in the form of payment or wages for value received or services rendered. Natural evil is sometimes inflicted simply to reform the offender, in which case it is termed *chastisement, discipline*, and sometimes, in loose language, *punishment*. But when these become *legal sanctions*, their only office is to sustain the authority of the lawgiver. This demands, as we have seen, a manifestation of his highest approbation of obedience, and his highest disapprobation of disobedience. Hence natural good and evil, when employed as legal sanctions, must be used in that *form* and *degree* which will constitute such a manifestation.

Having thus proved that such a degree of natural good and evil, in the form of legal sanctions, as would manifest the highest approbation of obedience and the highest disapprobation of disobedience, would constitute a decisive proof of the governor's benevolence and authority, the author pauses in his argument to inquire, if it is a thing incredible that such a manifestation should be made. Though we should not advance to the next step in the argument, and

prove that such a manifestation is *necessary* to the proof of God's benevolence; yet have we already removed all presumption against such a manifestation. For no one can affirm that a manifestation which, if used, would be a decisive proof of God's benevolence, will not be used. No one can affirm that what would be a *decisive* proof, may not be a *necessary* proof of God's benevolence. One who leaves the argument from reason at this point, may go to the scriptures convinced, first, that such a manifestation, if made, would not be *inconsistent* with the benevolence of God; secondly, that it would, if made, be a *decisive proof* of his benevolence; and, thirdly, that the failure to make it, might be a decisive proof *against* his benevolence. In the words of our author: "Who knows, who can prove, that the highest blessedness of the moral universe — not to add also the promotion of the perfect misery of all — does not require this manifestation of God through the medium of legal sanctions, that all may see and know what a friend he is to right moral action, and what an enemy he is to wrong moral action. Who knows, who can prove, that the Book which declares that an infinitely perfect Being employs such an influence for such a purpose, declares a falsehood?"

Having thus shown that legal sanctions are the *decisive* proof of the moral governor's authority, the author now proceeds to argue that they are the *necessary* proof of his authority. That is, they are not only a proof without opposing proof, thus fully establishing his authority, but a proof without which there is no proof of his authority, but proof against it.

(c) "Legal sanctions are the *necessary* proof of the moral governor's authority, as the *necessary* proofs of his benevolence in the form of his highest approbation of obedience and his highest disapprobation of disobedience."

(a²) Legal sanctions are, in *some respect*, or under *some relations*, necessary as the proof of the moral governor's authority. This appears:

(a³) *From the import of the phrase "legal sanctions."*

The *sanction* of a treaty of the United States, is the ratification of the President and Senate. Without this, there is

not only no proof of its validity, but decisive proof of its invalidity. The word, as applied to law, carries with it this generic meaning.

(b³) From the *nature of the law* of a perfect moral government.

(a⁴) Such a law must be, as has been shown, not only an *expression* of proper feelings, on the part of the lawgiver, toward obedience and disobedience, but an expression fully proved to be a *sincere* expression. The proof, moreover, must be all the nature of the case admits. A moral governor may furnish proof of these feelings in three ways: by giving the best law; by annexing sanctions to it; and by executing those sanctions. If he fail, in any one of these ways, to manifest these feelings, then an essential part of the proof of his authority is wanting, and the omission to give an essential part of the proof of his authority, proves that he is not benevolent. The subject has a right to proof in *acts* as well as in *words*.

(b⁴) Such a law must be, also, an *authoritative* rule of action. But can a lawgiver claim obedience to his law while it remains uncertain whether he will reward obedience or punish disobedience; or rather while, by omitting to annex or execute sanctions, he gives evidence that he will do neither, and even furnishes reason to fear that he may reverse the treatment of the two classes? Such a law could possess no possible authority.

(c⁴) A law without sanctions is not law, but only *advice*. Advice is a simple declaration of what is best. It implies no feeling or preference, on the part of the adviser, and is even consistent with the preference that the thing advised should not be done. Law is the absolute and unqualified expression of the will of the lawgiver that the thing commanded should be done. Compliance with advice is discretionary; compliance with law must be unquestioning and unhesitating. Rejection of advice violates no right of him who gives it; rejection of law violates a most sacred right, upon which the general happiness depends. Advice involves no good or evil as coming from the giver; law is attended by reward and

punishment. Advice carries no binding influence from the will of the adviser; law binds the will of the subject to the will of the ruler. Law, then, divested of sanctions, loses all which makes it law. It is mere advice.

It is proved, therefore, from the very nature of law, that sanctions, in some form and degree, are necessary to the proof of the moral governor's authority. The same appears:

(c³) From the fact that a law without sanctions is a decisive proof that the lawgiver is unable or unwilling to execute sanctions. No other reasons than these can be conceived for their omission. But if he is unable, then he is incompetent to govern; if unwilling, then he is not benevolent. Sanctions, then, are *necessary* to the proof of his authority. The same appears:

(d³) From the fact that conformity and non-conformity to a law without sanctions, equally disprove and subvert the moral governor's authority. There being no evidence of such authority, conformity must be prompted by some other motive than regard for his authority, and so ignores its existence; while non-conformity is an open declaration that the governor is not entitled to the obedience claimed; and so, being uncounteracted by the infliction of punishment, bears testimony that he has no right to reign. A law without sanctions must stand wholly on its own merits, as estimated by the subject. All personal authority is impossible. The lawgiver is entirely hidden from him.

Legal sanctions, then, are necessary, *in some respect*, and *under some relation*, as the proof of the moral governor's authority.

(b²) "Legal sanctions are necessary to establish the authority of the moral governor, as the necessary manifestations or proof of *his benevolence*."

It is admitted that other things besides legal sanctions are necessary to this proof: such as a blameless, kind deportment in other relations. But it is claimed that the expression of proper feelings toward right and wrong moral action is likewise necessary. The question then is: Can this expression be made without legal sanctions?

(a³) It cannot be made by mere *professions* of the neces-

sary feelings of benevolence toward right and wrong moral action.

Mere professions of a principle which, if it exist at all, will show itself in action, only serve to awaken suspicion. They are consistent with indifference and even with insincerity. The worst tyrants have professed their regard for the general good. In such cases it is acts, not words, which are demanded.

Now there are three acts possible to a moral governor, through which he can exhibit his feelings toward right and wrong moral action. These are : giving the best law ; annexing the requisite sanctions ; and executing those sanctions. The *first* is necessary to the proof of his benevolence, but cannot, alone, constitute such proof ; for a selfish being might give such a law, and that only for selfish ends. The *second* would be necessary to such proof, and would, with the first, constitute such proof, so long as there is no demand for the execution of the sanctions. But should the lawgiver fail to annex sanctions to his law, he would fail to give the only unambiguous proof, possible in the circumstances, that he has the appropriate feelings of benevolence toward right and wrong moral action. The *third* would be necessary in the case of obedience or disobedience actually existing. In such a case the third must be combined with the first and second, in order to give the proof demanded in the circumstances. These are the acts which benevolence, if it exists at all, will prompt. Without these, mere professions are worse than useless.

(b³) This expression of the necessary feelings of benevolence toward right and wrong moral action, cannot be made in any other supposable way without legal sanctions.

(a⁴) It may be supposed that a greater amount of obedience to the best law might be secured without legal sanctions, than with them, so that these greater results of obedience would prove the benevolence of the moral governor. This derives the proof of the benevolence of the moral governor, and consequently of his authority, solely from the obedience of the subject. Of course obedience, in such a case

is not submission to authority ; for the authority of the governor is not established when the obedience is rendered ; nay, in consequence of the failure to annex sanctions, there exists, at the time the obedience is rendered, actual proof against his authority. The so-called obedience, then, is simply prompted by the nature and tendencies of such obedience as seen by the subject. Now there is a natural possibility that, in such circumstances, there may be a greater amount of obedience without legal sanctions. But the question, like all in moral reasoning, is one of probability. And the probability certainly is, that the greater the motive, the greater will be the amount of right moral action. We have, then, no reason to conclude that there will be a greater amount of right moral action without legal sanctions than with them, but reason to the contrary. But if we concede the correctness of the supposition, even then we have no proof of the benevolence of the lawgiver. For the obedience which results, is not rendered out of regard to him, but solely from the perceived nature and tendencies of the action ; and the happiness which results does not, in any sense, depend upon the will of the governor, else it would be legal reward. The results, then, have no connection with the lawgiver, and therefore prove nothing in regard to him ; while the omission to show the proper feelings, as a moral governor, toward right and wrong moral action, proves that he is not benevolent. In the case supposed, we have no personal authority, and of course no moral government. It is only a moral *system*. The governor would be entitled to no more authority than any other being who should propound the same rule of action.

(b⁴) It may be supposed that by promising a reward to obedience, while he threatens no penalty to disobedience, the moral governor would prove his benevolence and so establish his authority. But this is impossible ; for, all the evidence of benevolence which he gives in rewarding right moral action, is counteracted by the failure to show the appropriate feelings toward wrong moral action. In general it may be said, that if the lawgiver bestows no reward upon

obedience, he fails to express approbation of it, but rather disapprobation; and if he inflicts no punishment for disobedience, he expresses no disapprobation of it, but rather approbation. He punishes obedience by withholding the reward, and rewards disobedience by withholding punishment. His giving the best law without sanctions, is an act which must have been prompted by the selfish principle in some form, such as "caprice, despotic humor, favoritism, a spirit of self-aggrandizement, the love of applause, or of a weak, indulgent tenderness, which sacrifices public good to individual happiness."

Having thus proved (a²) that legal sanctions are necessary in *some* form and under *some* relation, and (b²) that they are necessary as the proofs of his *benevolence*, to establish the moral governor's authority, the author pauses before proceeding to the third point in the argument, to remark:

"We see why the attempts to prove the benevolence of God from the light of nature have been so often, not to say uniformly, unsuccessful." While all sound theists admit that God is administering a perfect moral government over men, this most important relation "has been wholly overlooked in its true and proper bearing on the conclusion." But how is it possible to frame a satisfactory argument for the benevolence of God, while we only examine his acts as the Creator and as the providential Disposer of events, and omit all notice of these acts, as directed by the necessities of his moral government? Suppose the act of a parent punishing a child, or that of a surgeon amputating a limb, were examined without any reference to the moral influence of the one and the physical necessity of the other in causing the happiness of the subject. What conclusion could be arrived at, but that they were dictated by cruelty? What wonder, then, that the argument for God's benevolence, from the light of nature, should be so unsatisfactory; while the fact which alone furnishes the key to his plan of action, is entirely overlooked. If the book of revelation, which is especially designed to reveal the fact that God is administering an economy of grace, assumes the existence of a perfect moral government, of which

such economy is a part, may we not expect that the book of nature will fully make known what the other assumes? Will not the Book which tells us what God is, *by what he says*, correspond with the book which tells us what God is, *by what he does*?

The author now proceeds to the third argument in proof of the necessity of legal sanctions, to the establishment of the moral governor's authority.

(c²) Legal sanctions are necessary for this purpose as proofs of his *highest approbation* of obedience and *highest disapprobation* of disobedience. In other words: only that degree of natural good and evil can constitute legal sanctions which shall manifest these feelings.

(a³) Other modes in which natural good and evil have been supposed to become legal sanctions are insufficient.

(a⁴) Natural good promised as a mere dictate of *individual kindness*, and natural evil inflicted as a mere dictate of *individual unkindness*, cannot constitute legal sanctions. Such a course simply proves the existence of certain feelings on the part of the lawgiver toward an individual, but give no indication of his feelings toward the universe. The love, in the case supposed, may, for aught that appears, be a selfish love; and the hatred, mere malignity. Natural good and evil, thus employed, give no decisive evidence of benevolence; while the failure to give such evidence as the case demands, proves unqualified selfishness.

(b⁴) Natural good and evil, employed simply as *moral discipline*, cannot constitute legal sanctions. It is credible that natural good and evil may be employed before the subject comes under the proper influence of moral government, to prepare the way for better results than could otherwise be secured. It is also credible that the same may be employed under an economy of grace, to reform the transgressor. In loose language, this may be called punishment. But, accurately speaking, it is chastisement. These differ essentially from each other. "Chastisement aims, exclusively, at reformation; legal penalty, not at all. Chastisement is inflicted in love; legal penalty, in wrath. Chastisement, in its design

and tendency, is a blessing to its subject ; legal penalty, an unmitigated curse. Chastisement has a special respect to the individual's benefit ; legal penalty respects the good of the public." It is plain, therefore, that chastisement cannot be the penalty of the law. It would be absurd to threaten a transgressor with a blessing.

(c⁴) Natural good cannot become a legal sanction as the *payment of a debt* to the subject, for something received which is not due. Obedience *is* due from the subject. If it were not, there is no proof that the payment might not be prompted by some other motive than regard for the general good. Besides, on the supposition, the proof of the lawgiver's authority depends on the obedience of the subject, obedience being demanded before authority is established. Reward can properly be termed a debt only in the sense that the general good requires that obedience be followed by happiness, but not in the sense of payment for a service not due from the subject.

(d⁴) Natural evil cannot become a legal sanction as the *payment of a debt* from the subject to the moral governor. The subject does not owe suffering, but obedience. The one is not an equivalent for the other. Moreover, the endurance of suffering is not the act of the lawgiver, and so can prove nothing in regard to his character. It is the infliction of suffering, alone, which evinces his feelings toward disobedience.

(e⁴) Nor do natural good and evil become legal sanctions as *so much motive* to secure right and prevent wrong moral action. Their influence as motives may be combined with their influence as proofs of the moral governor's authority. But if the former displace the latter, then the subject is acting without any regard for a personal lawgiver, solely from the perceived nature and tendencies of his action. Sanctions act upon the subject by awakening his respect for the ruler whose character prompts him to inflict them. Their influence upon his hopes and fears is only subordinate and incidental.

(f⁴) Nor do they become legal sanctions because it is *abstractly right* to reward and punish, irrespective of the ten-

dency of so doing to produce happiness and to prevent misery. It is often said that the ill desert of sin, and not the good of society, is the ground of punishment. But this is a distinction without a difference; for the ill desert of disobedience results entirely from the injury done to society by impairing the authority of the lawgiver. Otherwise it has no connection with the lawgiver or his authority or the good of society as dependent upon it. Is this affirmed on the ground that transgression is "evil in itself," and deserves punishment "for its own sake?" But what is meant by the phrase "evil in itself?" There are but two things to which these words apply: one is *suffering*; the other, the direct *means* of suffering, as ignorance or infamy. Sin is an evil in itself, because it is the direct means of suffering. To punish sin in a case in which no prevention of suffering would follow, would only increase the very suffering which gives ill-desert to sin. The justice of punishment depends upon the utility of punishment. It is to be vindicated solely on the ground that its infliction, by sustaining the authority of the lawgiver, is, on the whole, promotive of happiness. If the nature of things were so changed that the general happiness would be promoted and the universal misery prevented, by the punishment of innocence, then innocence ought to be punished. Obedience would then have the same relative nature as disobedience, and would differ from it only in name.

(g⁴) Nor do they become legal sanctions as the dictate of *justice* as distinct from benevolence. Justice is only a form of benevolence. It is benevolence upholding the authority of law for the public good. Their claims never clash.

(b³) It is argued that natural good and evil can only become legal sanctions by showing the moral governor's highest approbation of obedience and highest disapprobation of disobedience, from *the nature of legal sanctions*, as already shown. It has been shown that the sanctions of law must be natural good and evil, in the form of reward and punishment. It has been shown that the law can be sanctioned only by proof of the lawgiver's highest approbation of obedi-

ence and highest disapprobation of disobedience. It follows, therefore, that the natural good and evil, employed as sanctions, must furnish such proof.

(c³) It is utterly *insupposable* and *inconceivable* that natural good and evil should become legal sanctions in any other way than by showing the moral governor's highest approbation of obedience and highest disapprobation of disobedience.

(a⁴) Every one knows that natural good and evil, in the form of reward and punishment, are the most significant and appropriate expressions of the lawgiver's feelings toward obedience and disobedience, and that the degree of natural good promised, and of natural evil threatened, measures the degree of his feeling toward obedience and disobedience. Now, as has been shown, the governor is bound to give all the proof of his feeling possible in the case; and any failure to do this disproves his benevolence. It follows, that it is *necessary* that he use the most significant and appropriate expression of his feeling; and that any degree of natural good or evil which falls short of giving such expression, cannot be legal sanctions.

(b⁴) Again: if natural good and evil become legal sanctions in any other way than the above, it must be either by not manifesting *any* degree of the appropriate feelings, or by manifesting a *less* degree than the highest.

(a⁵) It cannot be the former, for he cannot use natural good and evil at all, for any reason, or with any motive, as legal sanctions without showing some degree of approbation of obedience and disapprobation of disobedience. Nor, if he could, would they give any sanction to his authority; for they would give no information as to his character.

(b⁵) It cannot be the latter; for:

(a⁶) Benevolence implies the *highest* approbation of obedience, and the *highest* disapprobation of disobedience; so that the degree of natural good and evil, in the form of reward and punishment, which expresses these feelings, is necessary to the proof of their existence; that is, is necessary to the existence of legal sanctions. If the lawgiver expresses a lower degree of these feelings than the highest, he fails to

express that degree of these feelings which a benevolent being possesses, and expresses only that degree which a selfish being possesses. Nor can this defect be supplied by combining with such a lower form of expression other influences which may go to prove the benevolence of the lawgiver. For such supposable influences are not legal sanctions, which sanctions have been shown to consist only in natural good and evil in the form of reward and punishment. Moreover, the supposed lower form of expression is incapable of being strengthened by any such influences, as proof of the moral governor's authority; because it has no validity, in itself, as such proof; but, on the contrary, furnishes proof against his benevolence. Being an *expression*, it not only furnishes no proof of the existence of any other degree of feeling than that which it expresses, but furnishes proof that no such degree of feeling exists. However strong other evidences may be of the moral governor's benevolence, this defective expression, contained in the sanctions of his law, would be sufficient to neutralize them.

(b⁶) Nor can it be shown that a less degree of natural good and evil than is necessary to express the lawgiver's highest approbation of obedience and highest disapprobation of disobedience can prove his benevolence, and so become legal sanctions, even on the supposition that such less degree would secure a *greater amount* of right moral action, and with it of happiness, than any higher degree; for:

(a⁷) Were this true, the moral governor could furnish no proof of the fact to his subjects, except his own declaration, which is no evidence, so long as his benevolence, and of course his veracity, remain unproved.

(b⁷) The *probability* would be, that the stronger the motive furnished by the sanctions of the law, the greater would be the amount of obedience; so that the evidence *within reach of the subject*, would preponderate against the moral governor's benevolence.

(c⁷) By failing to furnish the proof of his benevolence, which is given by its natural and proper expression in the form of legal sanctions, when he assumes the relation of

moral governor toward a subject, he gives *positive proof* that he is not benevolent.

(c⁶) Nor can it be shown that the supposed less degree of natural good and evil can constitute legal sanctions, even if we admit the *most favorable conceivable results* in the conduct of subjects, under its influence. We may suppose that, under such an influence, but *one instance* of such disobedience occurs, yet there is no proof that, under the stronger influence of the sanctions now advocated, that one instance would not have occurred. Or we may suppose that all are obedient, without a *solitary exception*; yet we have no proof that such obedience will continue another day; nor that, under the influence of the sanctions now advocated, it might not have continued forever.

(d⁶) Moreover, in the case supposed, the moral governor gives no evidence that he would annex the highest sanctions to his law, even if the highest good required it.

In other words: it is impossible to prove the benevolence of the moral governor by any present favorable results of his government, or by any supposed future results. It can only be proved by the fact that he has done all he can to secure the best results. On this basis, let the results be what they may, the proof of his benevolence rests securely. It is given, when it ought to be given, at the time of the promulgation of the law. Then, if ever, must the question of his authority be settled. Should he propose, to his subjects, to test the question of his authority, by making a trial of his law, and watching its results, he puts himself in the position of a petitioner for obedience, and not of a ruler who demands obedience; while, at the same time, he is giving decisive proof against his benevolence, by refusing to express the necessary feelings of benevolence toward right and wrong moral action.

By this reasoning is the proposition (c³) established, that it is utterly *insupposable* and *inconceivable* that natural good and evil should become legal sanctions, in any other way than by showing the moral governor's *highest* approbation of obedience, and *highest* disapprobation of disobedience.

(d³) A fourth argument in support of the same proposi-

tion (c³), is derived from the fact that men regard the supreme law of the State, so far as it is administered by a disinterested patriotism, as expressing, through its sanctions, the highest approbation of obedience and the highest disapprobation of disobedience.

Inasmuch as, in the opinion of Dr. Taylor, the errors of Universalists and infidels, concerning the sanctions of God's government, are to be traced, in part, to certain false assumptions concerning the penalties of civil law, a chapter in the second volume is devoted to a consideration of this topic, a brief notice of which is here inserted. In this essay it is maintained that the supreme law of the state is the law which requires "the elective preference of the highest happiness of the state to every object which can come into competition with it;" that in administering this law, the governor takes cognizance only of overt action as proof of obedience, or disobedience; that the reward of obedience is the protection of the life, liberty, and property of the subject, which is the highest good a civil government can confer; that the punishment of disobedience is death; which, even unattended with torture, is the supreme evil to man; and that this civil government evinces its highest approbation of obedience, and its highest disapprobation of disobedience to the supreme law.

The overt action which constitutes the decisive proof of a violation of the supreme law of the state, is murder or treason. In some extraordinary exigencies, other acts may be considered equally hostile to the very existence of government, and to the public good as depending upon it. All such overt action must, in every wisely-administered government, be made punishable by death. Such law, alone, is the supreme law; such acts, alone, are a violation of that law; such penalties, alone, are legal sanctions.

But there are other acts which are only in a limited degree injurious; and which, therefore, are not proof that the perpetrator cherishes any principle of hostility to the state. These are simply *mala prohibita*, and comprise all crimes from the highest to the lowest — from burglary to the careless turning to the left instead of the right, on the high-

way, which do not receive the penalty of death. The penalty, in such cases, is not to be regarded as the expression of the lawgiver's feelings toward obedience or disobedience to the supreme law, since there is no proof that that law has been violated; but only as so much motive to induce the subject to conform to certain minor regulations, which are not the supreme law. Hence such penalties are not legal sanctions; and any reasoning from them to the sanctions of God's government, will be fallacious.

The principle then is, that only such overt acts as, to human intelligence, are decisive proof of hostility to the state, are, properly speaking, a violation of law and punishable by legal sanctions. All acts injurious to the public welfare which, to mere human intelligence, are not decisive proof of such hostility, are not a violation of law, in the highest sense of that term, but only of certain rules and regulations; and these, though enforced by sundry pains and penalties, are not punishable by legal sanctions. In the former class are to be found all acts of hostility to human life, and to the existence of the government. In the latter are to be placed all crimes against property, the social relations, the public convenience, etc. The former are *mala in se*, so far as the state is concerned; though, as in the case of David and Uriah, they may, in extraordinary cases, be committed by one who is still loyal to the government of God. The latter, though only *mala prohibita* so far as the state is concerned, may involve the principle of hostility to the divine law of love, and so be absolutely *mala in se*. Hence the importance of discriminating, in our reasonings from the government of imperfect men who can take cognizance only of overt acts, to the government of God who searches the heart. Such discrimination shows that, in every well-administered human government, the principle is recognized, however imperfectly it may be carried into execution, that the violation of the supreme law must be followed by a punishment expressive of the highest disapprobation of the crime, which is the punishment of death.

Thus is the proposition (e) established, that legal sanc-

tions are *necessary* to the proof of the moral governor's benevolence in the form of his highest approbation of obedience and highest disapprobation of disobedience. After remarking that Christianity is not a selfish system of religion, inasmuch as its sanctions are primarily and chiefly designed to present *God* to the mind, in all the attractiveness of his benevolence and the majesty of his authority, and showing that Universalists and infidels cannot, on their system, prove the benevolence of God, the author proceeds to the concluding proposition in the definition of legal sanctions :

(f) "*The legal sanctions of a perfect moral government include the highest natural good possible in each case of obedience, and the highest natural evil possible in each case of disobedience.*"

It will be perceived that the argument upon which this proposition rests, has already been fully considered ; so that we have before us a conclusion reached, rather than a proposition to be demonstrated. It is not, therefore, deemed necessary to prolong this Article with a minute analysis of the remainder of the treatise. It may be well, however, to note that the obedience to be thus rewarded is *continued* obedience. So that the reward ceases when the obedience ceases, and that from the commencement of disobedience the penalty of unmingled and eternal misery is incurred. Subsequent repentance cannot reëstablish the claim to reward, nor can it relieve the transgressor from the penalty, except so far as it diminishes his capacity for suffering. Another point prominently insisted upon by the author is, that, while no one can prove that these highest forms of reward and punishment are not necessary simply as *motives* to maintain allegiance among the subjects of a moral government, yet "that the present argument does not rest upon this basis, but rests solely on the ground that they are necessary for another purpose, that of sanctioning or establishing the *authority* of the moral governor."

The author concludes by answering three objections:

Objection 1. "It is said that on the principle that reward

is to be continued only while obedience continues, it follows, that punishment is to be continued only while disobedience continues; or, in other words, that repentance and reformation are a just ground of forgiveness."

The objection arises from a false view of the essential claim of law. Law demands *uninterrupted* obedience. Such obedience alone sustains the moral governor's authority. The moment obedience ceases, the support ceases. On the other hand, the relation of disobedience to the moral governor's authority is eternal. One act of transgression, if uncounteracted, would break down his authority forever. But as the basis of reward is the support of authority, when the support ceases, the reward must cease. As the basis of punishment is the destruction of authority, the single act deserves the punishment. Its effects can only be counteracted by a full display of the lawgiver's *highest* disapprobation, which display of course demands the highest punishment. "As the tendency of the act to destroy his authority is eternal, the expression of his highest disapprobation must be eternal." Moreover, the objection proceeds upon the assumption that *equity* demands the pardon of the penitent transgressor. This assumption is groundless; it is not admitted in human governments; it connects ill-desert, not with transgression, but with impenitence; it makes repentance for transgression impossible, since there can be no repentance where there is no ill-desert; it makes forgiveness for transgression impossible, and also for impenitence, since impenitence is impossible where there has been no sin; it destroys the influence of penalty as a motive to obedience, since there is no punishment for transgression, but only for impenitence. But, aside from all these absurdities which are involved in the objection, the principle which settles the whole question is, that sin on its *first* appearance is a fit object of the highest disapprobation. For although, by continuance, it will increase in strength and extend its actual desolations, yet in its very *inception*, is it fully capable, if uncounteracted, of utterly destroying law and authority, and, with these, the universal happiness. It thus becomes worthy of the highest punish-

ment, not on account of its continuance, but from its *intrinsic nature*. It is not the actual results of sin, limited as these are by the agency of the moral governor, but its *tendency* and *capability*, which give its ill-desert.

Objection 2. "Since punishment is only justified on the ground that the public good requires it, it would follow that if *all* rebel, benevolence would forbid their endless punishment, since none would remain to receive the benefit."

This objection, if correct, would certainly not apply to any state of things now existing. Moreover, it might be that in such a case other worlds and races might be created who should receive the benefit of such an example. But if this were not possible, then the objection supposes a case in which not only such sanctions are impossible, but in which moral government, from which they have been proved to be inseparable, is impossible.

Objection 3. "It is said that it is incredible and impossible that benevolence should adopt a moral government with a legal penalty consisting of the highest degree of natural evil."

No being who is not omniscient is competent to make such an assertion as this. For no finite mind can know that such a system of government is not "the best means of the best end, which an infinitely perfect Being can accomplish," nor even that, great as the evil may be to individual sufferers, it may not be absolutely insignificant as compared with the good thereby secured.

If these reasonings concerning the nature of moral government, considered in the abstract, are sound, it is plain that their application to God's moral government, as this is unfolded in nature and revelation, effectually sweeps away one of the strongest objections of infidelity to Christianity, and establishes both the justice and the *benevolence*, both the possibility and the *necessity*, of those sanctions which have been annexed to God's law, in the majestic words : "THESE SHALL GO AWAY INTO EVERLASTING PUNISHMENT; BUT THE RIGHTEOUS INTO LIFE ETERNAL."

NOTES ON THE PRECEDING ARTICLE.

It should be observed that the *personality* demanded by the argument as an attribute of the moral governor need not be vested in an individual. A Triumvirate, a Parliament, or a Democracy may possess it. Public opinion may possess authority as well as an individual.

The note on page 364 has been objected to as implying that Dr. Taylor would make the universal happiness more important than the love of universal happiness. He expressly declines making any comparison between them, on the ground that, being related as means and end, they cannot come into competition as objects of choice, or as subjects of valuation. Vid. p. 372. It is worth while also to notice that the phrase "self-love," which has occasioned much misconception in regard to this theory, did not originate with Dr. Taylor, but was adopted by him from Dugald Stewart, who employs it in his Essay on the Active and Moral Powers (Vid. Chris. Spec. for Mar. 1830, Article on the Means of Regeneration). Edwards, also, uses the phrase in his Essay on the Nature of Virtue, and so does Griffin in his Park St. Lectures. Hopkins, also, draws out the distinction fully in his Essay on the Nature of True Holiness.²

ARTICLE VII.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

THE GOSPEL IN LEVITICUS.¹

WITH some forced constructions, some straining for analogies, some artificial turns of thought and style, this volume combines many good traits. It is both evangelical and popular. It will interest the majority of Christians. It will instruct all classes.

¹ The Gospel in Leviticus; or the Exposition of the Hebrew Ritual. By Joseph A. Seiss, D. D., Author of Lectures on the Epistle to the Hebrews, The Last Times, etc. Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston. 1860. pp. 403. 12mo.

² For Syllabus of Dr. Taylor's treatise on Moral Government, see page 452.

In his comment on Lev. 1:4, Dr. Seiss gives a definition of the atonement, which corresponds with that given by several New England divines:

"If the man who brought it," he says of the burnt-offering, "would lay his hand upon its head, and so acknowledge it as that by which he hoped and prayed and trusted to be forgiven, the Lord said '*it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him.*' That is, the devoting of such a victim to death and fire was to answer as a substitute for the death and burning of the sinner himself. The word rendered *atonement*, primarily signifies *to cover*; especially in the sense of an adhesive covering, as with pitch or plaster. From this original meaning came its metaphorical signification of *appeasing, pacifying*, covering over anger or wrath. 'Its predominant usage,' says Bush, 'is in relation to the reconciliation effected between God and sinners; in which sense *atonement for sin* is the *covering* of sin, or the securing of the sinner from punishment. Thus when sin is pardoned, or its consequent calamity removed, the sin or person is said to be *covered*, made *safe*, expiated, or *atoned*.' The English word *atonement*, or *at-one-ment*, clearly expresses the idea. It involves such a removal or covering of the cause of offence or variance, as to produce reconciliation and friendly relations. The idea here is, that the sinner who should bring the prescribed offering, and lay his hand on it in humble confession, should thereby be absolved, forgiven, exonerated, saved from the consequences which would otherwise follow his transgressions" (pp. 37, 38).

A more particular elucidation of the atonement, as viewed by Dr. Seiss, he gives in his comment on Lev. 9:15. "You read there," he says, "that Aaron 'took the sin-offering for the people, and slew it, and offered it *for sin.*' A stricter rendering of the original, as noted by various critics, would be: '*He sinned it,*' or '*He made it to be sin.*' The same diction occurs in ch. 6:23. The idea is, that the sin-offering somehow had the sin transferred to it, or laid on it, or was so linked with the sin for which it was to atone, as to become itself the sinful or sinning one, not actually, but imputatively and constructively. The animal had no sin, and was not capable of sinning; but, having been devoted as a sin-offering, and having received upon its head the burden of the guilty one who substituted its life for his own, it came to be viewed and treated as a creature which was nothing but sin.

And this brings us to a feature in the sacrificial work of Christ at which many have stumbled, but which deserves to be profoundly considered: Jesus died not only as a martyr to the cause he had espoused, not only as an offering apart from the sins of those for whom he came to atone, but as a victim who had received all those sins upon his own head, and so united them with his own innocent and holy person as to be viewed and treated, in part at least, as if he himself had sinned the sins of all sinners. He so effectually put himself into the room and stead of sinners, and so really assumed their wickedness, that he came to be the only wicked one which the law could see. Personally he was not a sinner, but '*holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners;*' nevertheless, as he surrendered to become the substitute of the guilty, and undertook to answer for all their crimes, he thereby became

to the law as if he were a mere mass of sin, upon which the hottest furies of just indignation and wrath were let loose. Though in his own proper self as unsullied as the highest heavens, in his character as our sin-offering, he took a guiltiness upon him, and a volume of iniquity covered him, as intense and terrible as the combined wickedness of all men. Though never the committer, he became the receiver of sin, and stood to the law as a reservoir into which all the streams of human guilt had emptied themselves" (pp. 166, 167).

"As the sins of Israel were so put upon the sin-offering that it came to be viewed and treated as nothing but sin, so the Lord hath made our great sin-offering to be, not merely a *sinner*, but the very substance and essence of criminality. 'He made him to be SIN,' a mere mass of guilt, laid bare to the judgments of divine wrath. How could it have been otherwise, when, as Isaiah tells us, 'The Lord laid on him the iniquity of us all?' The iniquity of us all, is no small iniquity. A ten-thousandth part of the sin that cleaves even to the most virtuous among men, would be enough, if uncanceled, to sink them to eternal death. How, then, are we to estimate the mightiness of that sum of crime, which has been accumulating since the world began? How shall we measure the ocean of guilt which has been gathering from every generation, as from a thousand Amazons? Aye, 'there are shadows upon the world that we cannot penetrate; masses of sin and misery that overwhelm us with wonder and awe.' Not vaster is the five-mile thickness of atmosphere around this globe, than the measure of the iniquities of those who have lived upon its surface. Yet every one of them was laid upon Jesus, as the great sin-offering of man. When the holy inquisition of Heaven was sent forth to deal out just indignation for earth's amazing wickedness, there was not a sin, from Adam's fall to last night's theft, or the wandering thoughts of yon inattentive hearer, which was not found lying to the charge of that spotless Lamb who had undertaken to answer for all. And of all the monsters in crime that this world has ever borne, none ever had upon him such an intensity and vastness of guilt as that which the holy Christ assumed and took upon himself in that dark hour when his soul was made an offering for sin. The law could have seen in him nothing but sin — an embodiment of condensed and unspeakable guiltiness — the very purity of heaven so shrouded and buried up in a sea of villainess, that the Father, with all his tender love for his only-begotten, for a while turned away his face in abhorrence. Hence that awful cry of the dying Saviour: 'MY GOD! MY GOD! WHY HAST THOU FORSAKEN ME!' 'The Lord laid on him the iniquity of us all!' 'He made him, who knew no sin, to be sin for us'" (pp. 168, 169; see, also, pp. 174, 306).

Nothing, then, can be plainer than that Dr. Seiss regards the imputation of our sins to Christ, as the transfer not only of our guilt, in the sense of liability to punishment, but also of our iniquities themselves, which make us liable to punishment. This is the old Calvinistic view, although many professed Calvinists now deny that it was ever maintained.

The following graphic illustration of the atonement is given by Dr. Seiss:

"I remember to have met with an affecting little incident in Roman his-

tory connected with the death of Manlius Capitolinus, a renowned consul and general, who was once proudly hailed as the savior of Rome. It happened one night when the Gauls threatened to overwhelm the capitol, that he bravely took his stand upon the wall where they came on with their attack, and there fought singly and alone until he had repelled them, and so saved the city from destruction. It so occurred that this distinguished man was afterwards accused of some great public fault, and put upon trial for his life. But just as the judges were about to pass sentence upon him, he looked up at the walls of the capitol, which towered in view, and, with tears in his eyes, pointed to where he had fought for his accusers, and perilled his life for their safety. The people remembered the heroic achievement, and wept. No one had the heart to say aught against him, and the judges were compelled to forbear. Again he was tried, and with the same result. Nor could he be convicted until his trial was removed to some low and distant point, from which the capitol was invisible. And so, while Calvary is in full view, in vain will earth and hell seek to bring the Christian into condemnation. One serious look at the cross, and at the love which there, unaided and alone, when all was dark and lost, interposed for our salvation, is enough to break the power of passion at once, and to strike dead every guilty proceeding. Low must the believer sink, and blotted from his heart must be the recollection of that scene of suffering for him, before he can ever become faithless to his Redeemer, or perfidious to his Saviour's cause. There is a power in the bloody monument of redeeming love, which baffles all the allurements and accusations of hell. It is the great propelling motive to a holy life. It is the potent source of Christian loyalty and devotion. And if we would be virtuous and good, the first and grand requisite is, never to lose sight of Christ's atoning blood" (pp. 313, 314).

LIFE OF JESUS.¹

The author of this work is well known as an acute logician, a careful historian, a scholar of vast resources, and a man of exemplary life. The present volume betrays, on every page, his habit of strictly independent investigation. He avoids the violent theories of Strauss and of Bruno Bauer, while he does not reach the highest evangelical interpretation of the Saviour's life. He often doubts, where he might logically believe. His objections to the common view of the Redeemer's miracles, appear sometimes to be arbitrary. There seems to be no more reason for his scepticism where he wavers, than for a like scepticism where he assents. Still, the volume is suggestive and valuable. It is translated faithfully and perspicuously.

¹ Life of Jesus. A Manual for Academic Study. By Dr. Carl Hase, Professor of Theology at Jena. Translated from the German of the third and fourth improved editions, by James Freeman Clarke. Boston: Walker, Wise and Company, 245 Washington Street. 1860. pp. 267. 12mo.

VITAL CHRISTIANS of the Lutheran Church, of all Ranks, before and during the Thirty-Years' War. By A. Tholuck. Berlin: 1859.¹

It has been a favorite project of the author, for more than a quarter of a century, to write a complete history of Rationalism, of which he gave a sketch many years ago, published in the early numbers of this Journal. But as this grew, historically, out of the excesses of pietism, and as pietism itself grew out of what has been fitly called the "dead orthodoxy" of a previous period, it was necessary for the author to extend his investigations back so far as to embrace them as the preliminary or introductory part of his work. The theology of the church was what the theological faculties of the universities made it. Hence the beginning must be made with an account of the schools of theology. Even preliminary to this, he published a volume on "the Spirit of the Wittenberg Theologians of the Seventeenth Century."² Then he opened his chief work with two volumes of the Preliminary History of Rationalism, under the special title of "the Academic Life of the Seventeenth Century."³ In the first of these volumes, he treats of "the state of the universities," and in the second, of "the history of the universities," having chiefly in view the theological faculties of the Protestant church. An account of the ecclesiastical Life of the same century is to follow, as a second part of the preliminary history of Rationalism. The present volume gives the portraiture of eminent religious men, in that barren period, which could not be embraced in the history without giving it too much of a biographical character. It is therefore a collateral and independent volume of Christian biography. It contains graphic sketches of the religious history of more than fifty men of various stations in life: princes, nobles, scholars, clergymen, and teachers. These biographical accounts have a two-fold interest, religious and historical. They show us brilliant individual lights in a time of general moral darkness; and they give us a clear insight into the former life and habits of a people, which would appear almost as strange to their descendants now, as to us.

The first saint introduced to us is of a princely and somewhat doubtful character. It is the elector Augustus I. of Saxony, the brother and successor of Maurice, so well known in history. The name of Augustus is associated with the hyper-orthodox Formula of Concord. As a Christian he believed in *Luther*. This characterizes both what was good and what was evil in his piety. He considered that, being a ruler in the very seat and centre of the Reformation, it was his duty to preserve Lutheranism in its purity, and to exclude everything that savored of Calvinism. But Calvinism, as

¹ Lebenszeugen der lutherischen Kirche aus allen Ständen vor und während der Zeit des dreissigjährigen Krieges.

² Der Geist der lutherischen Theologen Wittenbergs im Verlauf des 17ten Jahrhunderts.

³ Vorgeschichte des Rationalismus. Erster Theil. Das akademische Leben des 17. Jahrhunderts. Halle, 1853, 1854.

the milder and more rational views of Melanchthon were then called, is a very different thing from what we mean by the term at the present day. Luther held to predestination as strongly as Calvin did. The controversy related simply to the nature of Christ's presence in the eucharist, which Luther affirmed to be corporeal, while Calvin maintained that it was spiritual. We will not deny that Cracov, Peucer, Stössel, and Schütz went altogether too far in attempting, secretly, to introduce the Calvinistic doctrine into Saxony, and especially in abusing the confidence which the elector put in them as his minister, physician, and confessor. The elector regarded it as little less than treason that a plan should be formed to change the religion of the state, without his knowledge or consent, by his most confidential servants. These persons were all arrested, and their papers seized. Cracov, his prime minister, died in his dungeon. Peucer was kept in close confinement twelve years, notwithstanding he was Melanchthon's son-in-law. The other two had a similar fate: the one dying a year after Cracov; and the other being liberated two years after Peucer. We must not complain of a prince for revering the authority of the great reformer. We must not be too strict in condemning him for the narrow theology of the Formula of Concord, which he enforced. But we must be permitted to say, that a persecuting Christian prince is to be regarded as a saint only in a modified sense of the term.

The sixth in the series of biographies, that of duke Ernest the Pious, of Gotha, is unusually interesting from the pure and elevated character of the subject. His piety was as sincere as it was intelligent. Cromwell names him as one of the three greatest rulers of that age. He gathered around him such excellent Christian men and scholars as Glasius, Ludolph, and Sekendorf. He improved the whole system of education, rendering it at the same time less mechanical and more useful. He reformed the schools with great moderation and judgment, avoiding the radicalism of Rattich, the school-reformer of that age. Religious instruction, through the clergy, underwent as great and salutary a change. Indeed no German state, at that time, was more favored in respect to the condition of the schools and churches.

Landgrave George II. of Hesse Darmstadt was a ruler of similar character, and was himself a highly educated man. It is not a little interesting and amusing to read an order given by him, in 1649, respecting religious instruction and improvement. The preachers are therein required to meditate diligently on the subjects of their discourses, and not be satisfied with running over a few commentaries, and making up a patch-work of indigested remarks. The passage of scripture, and the subject, were to be thoroughly studied and analyzed; the instruction to be clear and solid; and the topics to be well arranged. The preachers were warned against trusting too much to extemporaneous thoughts and language, which often made men blunder and stammer; and against writing their preparations on loose scraps of paper. The catechism was to be explained from the pulpit, and the children and even adults to be examined on it afterwards. Not only were boys to

be taught to sing in church, but girls also, "which would be pleasing to God, angels, and men." When the parish was so large that the pastor could not visit all, a certain number of pious elders were to be appointed, to each of whom certain streets or portions of the city or village should be assigned, and these were to meet monthly with the pastor and make a report of the condition of the people.

Some of the names here brought to our notice are little known in history; others are familiar to every scholar. The two Tarnovs (Paul and John), professors of theology in Rostock: the former, the pupil and successor of Chytræus; the latter, the pupil of Buxtorf, were among the best commentators of their times. The commentary of the younger, on the Minor Prophets, is highly valued for its sound critical character even at the present day. It is pleasant to know that both these distinguished theologians were most estimable men, warmly attached to biblical truth, and quite unshackled by the authority of great names which, in that age, held so many men in a state of abject servitude. Of course the zealots of Lutheran orthodoxy complained of their independence in daring to differ from Luther in interpreting certain passages of scripture.

The same mild and charitable spirit and manly independence characterized their successor Questorp, the founder of a family of scholars, which for two centuries have adorned all the learned professions. He it was whom Grotius selected to be his spiritual guide and comforter in his last hours, and whose letter, describing that death-bed scene, has been so universally known.

Although Jena at that time was more under the influence of partisanship than Rostock, it possessed a bright Christian ornament in the person of John Gerhard, the most learned of the older Lutheran theologians. The reader of the *Loci*, a body of divinity in nine volumes, will look upon the work with new interest after learning the gentleness and kindness which distinguishes him from his contemporaries, who are chiefly known as bitter controversialists. His biographer mentions that a painful impression is made by one trait of his character, which is revealed by the fact that he kept an exact account of every purchase of a rabbit, a ham, a lobster, or a citron; as also of the presents received from princes! He even lent money, *upon interest*, to princes and to city governments! But it is mentioned, as a partial atonement for this vice, that he was charitable to the poor.

Another very interesting and well-known character is Arndt, the author of *True Christianity*, a work read by every German. It is remarkable that so good a man should excite so much envy and jealousy. His life is a continued series of persecutions. His enemies found all kinds of heresy in his book. But their envy only heightens the glory of his triumph.

We may add, in conclusion, that these biographical sketches, though written in a popular style, contain for the theologian valuable contributions to the religious history of the seventeenth century.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY. By Dr. Ehrenfeuchter. Part First. pp. 460. Göttingen : 1859.¹

IT is a good indication that some of the oldest German theologians are beginning to turn their attention to the philosophical study of practical theology. There has been heretofore, indeed, no want of works which treated of the subject ; but the works themselves have been of such a character, that the student has found it more agreeable to take their conclusions upon trust, than to study them. The importance of a profounder treatment of the subject is no less demanded, at present, in this country than in Germany. The most vital interests of the church, in its present condition, depend quite as much upon the decision of questions in practical theology, as upon those in other departments of theological study. Practical theology relates to what the church *is to do* : how it may best fulfil its divine mission. In an age so characterized by action as ours, it cannot be unimportant that its religious activity should be governed by great principles thoroughly philosophical, and yet distinctively Christian. Most of the questions which agitate religious bodies at the present day, relate to matters not settled by any direct and positive commands of Christ or of his apostles. We may instance the subject of missions, and the many controverted points in respect to the best way of conducting them. In fact, no topics more nearly concern the Christian public just now, than those here referred to and others of a kindred nature. Nor can it be questioned that the church needs to be guided, on this whole class of subjects, by as profound a Christian philosophy as in the settlement of a doctrine or the exposition of a text of scripture.

Practical theology is the last in order of all the branches of theology, and presupposes all the rest. It is dependent, more or less, on the fundamental principles of doctrinal theology, on the interpretation of the scriptures, and on the experience of the church as taught in history. While its province is that of contemplating directly the *action* of the church, the clear and steady light in which it lives and moves, comes from all these quarters. Yet it has a distinct sphere. Even when the subjects are the same as in other departments of theology, they are viewed under new and peculiar aspects. Its relation to the other theological studies on which it depends, is not unlike that of applied science to pure science.

The author, a friend and associate of the excellent Dörner, and a sympathizer with him in his religious spirit and theological views, comprehends both the importance and the difficulty of his theme, and approaches it with a wealth of ideas and a breadth of view well adapted to inspire confidence. He justly maintains that Christianity, as a whole, ought to be contemplated from this point of view as well as from others. The interpreter looks at Christianity, as a whole, in the light of interpretation ; the historian does

¹ Die praktische Theologie dargestellt von Dr. Friedrich Ehrenfeuchter. Erste Abtheilung.

the same in the light of history. After vindicating a place for this as a distinct branch of theology, the writer enters upon a profound preliminary discussion of the nature and extent of Christianity as a practical system, and its connection with the development of society from the time of its introduction to the present, together with its grand dimensions and its imposing attitude in respect to the future.

We select and present, in a condensed form, some of his views of the relation of the ministry to the church, as introductory to the main subject.

In the church are, first, members, whose office it is, mutually, to serve each other, each performing the kind of service to which he is, by nature and culture, best adapted. But inasmuch as the church is an organized body, it must have administrative powers, and therefore persons acting, not in a private sphere, but publicly, for the increase and prosperity of the whole. Though they may not have a distinct power, essentially different from that of other members, still their relations are not the same as those of others, merely of an individual to individuals, but they are those of an individual to the whole. Such persons, in order to discharge successfully the duties of their office, must have a thorough knowledge of all that relates to the church : its doctrines, its aims, and its principles of action. In other words, there must be official capacities and qualifications. This is the fundamental argument for a professional education in the ministry.

The Christian minister is to give a true exposition of Christianity. But this can be accurately known only through the medium of an ancient language, and the history of a past age. The study of the language and history of the Bible runs into many ramifications, and requires a distribution of the science of theology into various coördinate departments. Even to understand the language of the New Testament and whatever is necessary to its elucidation, and to transfer all the ideas contained in it, faithfully and adequately, into a modern tongue, and to comprehend the spirit and scope of the history of Christianity, and to see how the church of to-day has grown out of the primitive church, and how the person, work, and teachings of Christ have acted upon later ages, is a study of wide compass.

The faith of the church must have a basis of knowledge. A well-instructed church must have a well-instructed ministry. Though the preacher is not to think for the people, but to teach them to think, so that intelligence may address itself to intelligence, and spirit to spirit, still the fountain must be higher than the stream, and the exuberance of the one must produce the fulness of the other. The church with an intelligent faith, and the ministry well-grounded in theology, presuppose each other.

The world, also, into which the church enters as the field of its operations, and on whose character and condition it proposes to act, needs to be studied, both in respect to the facts of its moral history, and the principles and maxims by which it is governed. No small part of the argument for Christianity and for evangelical piety is to be drawn from the failures of other moral systems as they lie scattered all along the whole line of the world's history.

If we look over the whole field of theological inquiry, with which the preacher ought to be familiar, and lay it out in its different parts, we shall have before us, first, *exegetical theology*, or the study of the scriptures, including their origin, history, divine authority, and literature, commonly called *introduction*; and then language, criticism, and interpretation, which constitute, in a stricter sense, the development of exegesis, to which is sometimes added biblical theology, or a summary of the doctrines expressly taught either in the Old Testament or in the New, or by any single writer in the New Testament. Second, *doctrinal theology* in a wider sense, the ultimate result of all our investigations in respect to Christianity, in its whole extent, as an intellectual system, making up the whole body of our present religious belief, founded upon revelation philosophically developed by the power of reason. In such a system of theology, natural and revealed religion are combined, and the theology itself is generally found to be constructed after the type of some leading confession. Third, *historical theology*, which, making the origin of Christianity its starting-point, takes cognizance of the manner in which, from a divine and miraculous spiritual cause, the church came into being, became a great and permanent power in society, and allied itself with all the social interests of mankind. In addition to the external history of the church, it embraces the history of theological speculations, tracing the growth of one system of opinions out of another, in successive ages, after the manner of the history of philosophy. Fourth, *practical theology*, relating directly to the *present action* of the church. It is with this last division that we are now immediately concerned.

It has often been supposed that practical theology is nothing more nor less than Christian ethics. This is a mistake. Like all the departments of theology, they are closely related to each other. Christian ethics is a science which grows directly out of Christian doctrines, and which consists in a philosophical view of the *principles* of right and wrong, as taught and illustrated by Christianity. This science is *one* of the many conditions of practical theology. Its principles are often used by the latter, but with just the same difference that always obtains between theory and practice. Besides, it has, in one direction, a much wider range than practical theology, applying to civil government and law as well as to the church; and, in another, a narrower range, having no direct connection with the forms of church service. Practical theology is the last and the crowning part of theological science. It is concerned, immediately, with the propagation of Christianity and the employment of all the energies and influence of the church for the benefit of mankind at large; with the edification of the church by means of stated worship; and, finally, with the discipline and government of the church. *Christian missions, religious worship, and church polity* are the three great divisions of practical theology. Christ is not only prophet, priest, and king, but he dwells in his church as such. Under his Spirit and direction, and in his name, the church is to perform corresponding offices. Christ in his church, as prophet, goes forth to teach all nations; as priest, in the hearts of his people, he performs the acts of

worship which belong to his church ; as king, in his spiritual Israel, he establishes and maintains church order, and discipline. These three offices were not formally separated from each other in the personal ministry of Christ ; neither should they be in his church. They are inseparable parts of a living organism, which are reciprocally dependent on each other. The order here laid down, though natural, is not necessary. The second or even the third division might come first. But in general, the order as given above, will be found to correspond with that which exists, in fact, in those periods of history in which the church is most active and successful in propagating itself abroad. Since it is the object of practical theology to produce such a state of things in the church, it can hardly be questioned that the method proposed is both natural and appropriate.

In the part of the author's work thus far published, he has confined himself to the first division of his subject, and given us the Christian theory of *missions*.

This subject is not only important, as pointing out one of the chief objects for which the church exists, but attractive, as bringing us back immediately to the primitive standard of Christian activity, and also as showing, in the prosecution of the missionary work, the creative and life-giving power of the gospel. Nowhere do the essential elements of a vital Christianity : repentance, faith, and the miracle of regeneration, appear more conspicuous than in missionary life.

Here a two-fold view opens before us : the one, that of the work of missionaries themselves, in their own peculiar sphere of duty ; the other, that of the church at home, as a missionary church. It is with the latter, chiefly, that we are here concerned. Indeed, missions themselves can no longer be regarded as the work of a few individuals, distinct in spirit and action from the rest of the church ; but everything now indicates that a crisis in respect to the whole heathen world is approaching, and that a historical view of the progress of the race, and a spirit of humanity, conspire with Christianity to arouse the whole church to a sense of its obligations to the afflicted and suffering nations of the earth.

There are three distinct topics that require attention, if we would take an exhaustive view of the subject : *the heathen world ; Christianity viewed as the regenerator of the race ; and the method of conducting missions.*

The first of these has received a philosophical treatment only within a few years. It is the relation of Christianity to the nations that is forcing men to a deeper study of the subject. There are two theories in respect to the division of mankind into distinct nationalities : the one, that this is their proper and normal state ; the other, that in the original condition of man, there was a common humanity which was more prominent than national diversity ; that there was a crisis, in early times, that produced a rupture ; and that, since then, mankind has existed in a state more or less abnormal. Evidence of this has been found in the accidental character and incongruous mixtures of the origin of so many nations, in the fragmentary nature, disconnected parts, and unfinished development of others, and in

the fact that, in the history of the formation of most nations, there is more of arbitrary arrangement and of accident than of the uniformity of law. The truth probably lies between these two extremes : namely, that national diversity, growing out of our original nature has been exaggerated and made the source of many evils, by the departure of mankind from the primeval state. Whatever is uniform, in the development of human nature, must be referred to an original type, faintly represented at least in every copy. Here opens to our view an indefinite field of inquiry in natural history, psychology, language, and history, upon which we cannot enter. It is the relation of all the nations of the earth to God, that lies most directly in our way.

We must pass over this discussion, simply indicating the result, that the whole system of paganism, in its numerous forms, is traceable to the disturbance of the normal relations between the Creator and the human family.

The next general topic, Christianity as the regenerator of the pagan world, must be omitted for the same reason.

As it regards the method of conducting missions, there seem to be certain great historical laws to be fixed in the mind at the outset. Christianity itself is a mission to mankind; and hence all missionary work is a part of Christianity. Being, in its original establishment by Christ and the apostles, a germ and pattern of a perfectly restored universal humanity, it is the secret spring of the mightiest movements in history. For this reason missions form a most important element in universal history. As a realization and continuation of the divine mission of God to man, it insinuates itself into the very heart of history, and shows itself especially in great epochs. It stands most intimately connected with what is commonly called historical development. Whenever it enters a tribe or nation, the greatest crisis of that tribe or nation has arrived. It connects such a people, at once, with Christendom and brings it into the brotherhood of civilized nations, and makes it participate in the advancement of the progressive portion of mankind. The great providential movements in history are the precursors of missions. There appear to be appointed seasons, when an invisible power throws open whole quarters of the globe that had been shut up for ages before. Wherever the scenes of history are shifted, by discovery and immigration, and great communities or nations are newly formed, there we usually find the Christian missionary, working noiselessly and almost unobserved, but in reality laying the foundation of a nation's future greatness. Even the weaker races of men, and the more barbarous tribes, gradually feel the invigorating and restoring power of Christianity, when nothing else can rescue them from their miserable condition. As Christ healed diseased individuals in his personal ministry, so he heals nations now, and restores them to the common stock of humanity, and raises them up to a place side by side with more favored nations. The process is slow; but, with God, a thousand years are as one day. There is, no doubt, an order which is followed by Divine Providence in calling nations into his kingdom. Those precede, in time, which are, in some way or other, fitted to be bearers of

Christianity to other portions of mankind. It is impossible to see the progressive races of mankind in the possession of Christianity for centuries, and then, after a long period of preparation, the stationary races of India, China, and Japan thrown open to Christian influence, without believing that, as it was originally, to the Jew first, and then to the gentile, that the gospel was offered; so now there is, in the facilities furnished by Providence, an order of calling, though men may not always perceive it.

Missions, then, strike deep into the historical development of mankind. It is no work of mere human calculation to enter upon them, nor of individual adventure, but an ordination of Heaven, given in the apostolic commission, and repeated in signal events of Providence.

The Divine method of bringing a heathen people into connection with the spiritual church, is fitly represented as cutting a branch from a wild olive tree and engrafting it into a good olive tree. As the good tree makes the branch fruit-bearing at an early period, so the fostering care and aid of thriving mother-churches bring to an earlier maturity infant churches in pagan lands. Left to themselves, the heathen would never come into the kingdom of God. Left to the unaided hands of individual Christians, the process would be slow, variable, and uncertain.

The Divine method is also one of moral and religious training. Though the grace of God (without which nothing can be effected), as germinal, is a new creation; it is, in its further development, also a matter of culture, and is progressive — is a growth, as is everything in human character. The method, therefore, is founded on the principle of antecedents and consequences, a continuous chain of moral causes and effects. The commission is to give the gospel to "the nations," that is, to offer it to the people at large, and to aim at a national effect. Though conversions always take place in individuals, Christian ideas take possession of whole communities, and the work of conversion is never to be given over till there shall be left no unconverted individuals in these communities. In a true theory of missions, there will be no opposite or jarring elements of national and individual conversions. The former will not be reached directly by the simultaneous act of a promiscuous multitude, — against which history gives us so many warnings, — but indirectly, and only through the latter. The culture, which it is the office of the missionary to promote, is not merely human culture, or the training of the faculties of the mind; but the culture which emanates from Christ, and whose aim is to form the image of Christ in the heart. Entrance into the external church is not the chief object to be sought, but entrance into a spiritual, filial relation to God, without which outward communion with the saints will be of no avail. If in Christian lands, where there are already formed a Christian public sentiment, a Christian literature, and a system of Christian institutions and worship, religious education is indispensable to the prosperity of the church, how much greater is the necessity of such Christian training and culture, where the whole intellectual and moral atmosphere is contaminated with the abominations of heathenism!

But precisely here, where the necessity for diligent and continued instruction is so great, in order to eradicate pernicious heathen sentiments and superstitions, cluster many of the dangers to which the missionary is exposed in his work. On the one hand, there is the danger of adopting the mechanical method of teaching creeds, forms, and church usages. This is the shortest and surest way of obtaining temporary and apparent success ; and hence the temptation to yield to it. The frequent failure of the Catholic missions is to be attributed, in part, to this cause. Nor is the error limited to them. On the other hand, is the danger of individuals following their own idiosyncrasies, and speculating and experimenting as though there were no established principles, and as though everything depended on individual invention. One missionary goes to the extreme of secular education, first civilizing, then Christianizing the heathen. Another leaves his converts uninstructed, to relapse into paganism, while he passes on to preach to others. A third depends on the circulation of the printed scriptures, without oral instruction or preaching. One adopts a heathen mode of life, descending so low as not to be able to rise again much above the level of those with whom he lives. Another makes it a capital point to introduce all the national customs, usages, and maxims, and even the language of his native country.

Missions, like Christianity, have a natural historical development so far as they relate to what is essential and unchanged in the nature of man, as an intellectual and social being ; but not so in respect to what is superinduced by sin. Here opposition and conflict ensue, and missionary work must move in the line of its victories, and spread where it finds an entrance. Schleiermacher distinguishes two possible modes of procedure, the one that of a continuous expansion from the heart of Christendom in all directions till it reaches from the centre to the circumference ; the other that of passing over some nations temporarily, where peculiar obstacles are in the way, and planting the gospel deep in the heart of paganism, where there are no border Christian influences. We ought to be slow to adopt the former as the only normal method, regarding the latter as proper only in exceptional cases. The world itself is rendered irregular and chaotic by sin ; and Christianity is creative, and as such can operate effectually at points where there is no continuity of local influence. It is not only a root that spreads in the soil, but seed that can be scattered widely and take root wherever it falls. The history of the Dutch missions in India shows that there may be a complete *cortege* of missionary stations, and great regularity in the ecclesiastical order and in traditionary instructions, and yet very little fruit come of it all.

This suggests another theory, that of planting colonies as a basis for missionary operations. It would seem that such a method would furnish personal security to the missionary, and greatly multiply his facilities for disseminating Christian truth. Hence, in the minds of not a few good men, missions and colonies, or missions and trade, have been associated together. And yet the history of the propagation of Christianity has shown the fruit-

lessness of those missions that have followed in the train of colonies. Whence comes this discrepancy between plans and results? We must answer, that the secular interests, which are the moving spring of all colonial undertakings, produce a spirit very different from that which the missionary ought to cherish. It is true that the extension of the sphere of commerce tends to bind nations together, and to produce some of the effects which Christianity contemplates; but the spirit of the adventurer who goes abroad for gain, or of a trading company whose object is to increase their wealth or the wealth of their country, is the reverse of that which should influence the missionary. By the former, the natives are often overreached, or oppressed, and taught the vices of commercial nations, rather than the virtues of Christian nations. But this contrariety does not exist, where a Christian colony grows out of a mission, and retains its purely missionary character. In a wandering barbarous tribe, it may be necessary to introduce the nucleus of a settled agricultural community. A Christian civilization may thus be developed from a missionary station, and ultimately such a germ of Christian society may change the whole aspect of society. In such instances, the religious character of the enterprise remains the same, and the mission influences secular affairs in a legitimate way, without receiving injury from them or being impeded by them.

The excellence of the author's views in the latter part of the volume depends so much on the richness, minuteness, and carefulness of his discussions, with ample illustrations drawn from the missionary history of the whole church for eighteen centuries, that it is quite impossible to convey a just idea of them by any general representation. The most that can be done, in a brief space, is to indicate the character of some of the topics discussed.

Having completed his outline of the theory of missions in general, he passes to a minute analysis of the work itself, and first propounds and answers the three following questions: From what authoritative source does a specific mission proceed? To whom is it given? What country or place should be designated as the field of its operations?

In regard to the first point, it is essential to the character of a true Christian missionary that he do not assume the work from a mere fancy of his own, but that he go forth in the name and at the command of another. This is the fundamental idea of a *mission*. The author, true to his theory, that the subject of missions in all its parts, carries us at once back to the Apostolic age, as the missionary age of the church, inquires how the gospel was heralded by the Seventy: how it was afterwards more fully communicated by the apostles from Jerusalem to Samaria, and then from Antioch to the cities of Asia Minor, and reaches the conclusion that, in some cases, the mission seems to issue directly from God himself; in others, directly from the church: but that in reality these two modes not only harmonize with each other, but involve each other. Except in extraordinary cases, where there is no church to act, and where one is yet to be formed, the mission proceeding from God connects itself immediately with the church; and the church, in sending out teachers to communicate the gospel to the destitute,

acts instrumentally in the name and by the authority of the Head of the church. After the same analogy, at the present day, where there is the union of a spiritual call and a call of the church, the vocation to the service is complete. Whether the inward or the outward call precede, the one must be regarded as incomplete without the other. Considerations of expediency would bring us to the same conclusion, for the missionary is not only to seek the salvation of individuals, but to form churches and administer Christian ordinances.

This prepares the way for answering the second inquiry: To what individuals is the missionary work to be entrusted? Not to every one who offers himself for the service. Such an one may lack self-knowledge, may misunderstand his own character and talents, and even mistake his own motives and feelings. His spirit needs to be tried, and his case submitted to the judgment of his brethren. While we may not forbid any Christian disciple to teach Christ privately as an individual, the church must authorize and employ only those who give evidence of fitness for their calling. The author enters into a description of the personal and Christian character, qualifications and literary training necessary for a successful Christian missionary, making due allowances for natural diversities in men, and also for the various states of society in different pagan nations. Illustrations on all these points are drawn from the example of Patricius, or Patrick, Columban, Boniface, Anscar, missionaries of the earlier periods of the church; and of Ziegenbalg, Van der Kemp, Carey, and others, down to Livingstone in later times. He finds in history, as well as in the nature of the case, arguments against a constrained service. There must be, on the part of the missionary, a voluntary and hearty acquiescence in an invitation or appointment by the church in order to any prospect of great usefulness.

The third topic named relates to the theatre of Christian missions. The apostles, and those who came after them, followed in their missionary tours the great lines of intercourse in the Roman Empire. From Jerusalem the gospel was carried to Asia Minor and to Egypt; from the latter place to Arabia and to India. In a westerly direction, it proceeded to Rome, and from thence to Gaul and the British Isles. From near the end of the sixth century, it spread from these various countries in different directions; from Rome to the Anglo-Saxons, the old British churches having become nearly extinct; from the British Islands to Germany, and the country of the Rhine; from Germany to the Scandinavians and the Slavonic tribes, where were met missionaries from the Greek church. In the early part of the Middle Ages, after the Empire was overrun by the Barbarians, Europe itself became a vast missionary field, where the church had as much as it could do to maintain its ground even nominally. After the discoveries were made, which opened the way by the ocean to India and America, these highways of nations were used to reach the people to whom they led. The way for missionaries to pagan tribes has been opened, also, by military campaigns, by treaties of peace, by garrisons and military stations, by imprisonment and exile, by commercial relations, by political revolutions, and the

union of different races to form new nations. There are advantages in carrying the gospel to a nation that is in the process of transition from one state to another. While great changes are going on, there is a favorable opportunity to introduce Christian elements that shall be developed with the development of the people. So it has been with several tribes of Asia and of the islands of the Pacific, and of other countries. In the selection of stations in a given country, the localities themselves, the course of rivers, the routes of travel, and whatever else either attracts a population or produces intercourse with other places, will influence the choice.

The work of missions, as has been already intimated, is of two kinds, one in which Christianity spreads from a people to another bordering upon it, through the influence of Christians collectively; the other, in which a limited number of individuals go to a distant country to introduce and propagate the gospel there. The methods which would be appropriate in the one, may not be so in the other. The same end in both cases is sought, but by somewhat different means. There are many gradations between these two kinds of missions, requiring corresponding differences in the mode of carrying on missionary work.

There is one more suggestion to be made in respect to the selection of missionary posts; and that is, that, in the divisions which now exist in the Christian church, it would be well for all to remember the example of Paul, who desired to preach the gospel where Christ had not been named, so as not to build on another man's foundation. As orphan children are distributed in different families, so different countries or districts may be allotted to different Christian denominations, which may reasonably be expected to act rather in the spirit of a confederacy for a common object than in that of parties having opposing interests.

We must break off at this point, for want of space, remarking, in conclusion, that what we have here presented to the reader is not so much an analysis of the book as a free report of its nature and spirit. We have not been careful to give the words, nor, in all instances, the precise ideas of the author.

BIOGRAPHICAL LITERATURE CONNECTED WITH THE CENTENARY OF SCHILLER'S BIRTH.

The little work of Carlyle, miscalled the *life* of Schiller, written many years ago, has accomplished a very important object in conveying to the English reader a powerful and, in the main, correct impression of the character and works of this most German of the German poets. As a life, it is so meagre and so inaccurate as to have little value at the present day, after such a harvest of investigations as has been gathered within the last few years. The admirers of Shakspeare have not been more faithful to his memory than the admirers of the great German tragedian have been to his. The permanent value of Carlyle's book consists in its just appreciation and enthusiastic representation of Schiller's genius and productions. To

pass over less important biographical works, which have appeared in Germany, we may mention that of Döring, still valuable for its collection of facts, though evincing no great literary talent; that of Caroline von Wolzogen, a rich and authentic source of information on the domestic relations of the poet, valuable on account of her great intimacy with the family as sister of Schiller's wife; that of Heinrichs, a work of more ambitious pretensions, and not badly executed; and that of Schwab, written with poetic feeling and a fair amount of critical ability. All these, however, are cast more or less into the shade by Hoffmeister's *Life of Schiller*, the abridgment of which by himself and Viehoff, in three volumes, is a model of this species of composition. Other works of that period may have given the facts as completely and as accurately as this epitome: but none excelled or even equalled it, in the perfect mastery of the materials, in the development of the poet's character, and in the history and characteristics of his several productions.

But we hasten to notice a few of the most recent books published about the time of the centennial celebration, Nov. 10, 1859.

SCHILLER'S LIFE AND WORKS, by Emil Palleske, in two volumes. Berlin. 1858, 1859.¹

The last volume of this new biography justifies the high expectations raised by the appearance of the first. As a historical production it has a decided advantage over its predecessors, in coming after the extraordinary activity awakened within a few years in searching out everything, even the minutest details relating to the life of the great German dramatist. The author himself partakes of this enthusiasm to a remarkable degree, without at all losing sight of his main object. He excels all who have gone before him in the completeness with which he gives the whole compass of influences under which the character, tastes, and habits of the poet were formed. In the special history of whatever was connected with Schiller's early life, — localities, domestic relations, schools in their organization, instruction and discipline, teachers with all their individualities, school companions and the like, the work is rich and luminous. In all that relates to Schiller's external history, and the influences exerted upon him from without, nothing more could be expected, and little desired. The author has a correct instinct as to what his readers will wish to know. He often corrects the mistakes that others have fallen into, still more frequently supplies what was omitted from want of his means of information, but most frequently of all sheds a broader and clearer light upon what was imperfectly and dimly seen before. The hazy atmosphere becomes a clear blue sky, and probabilities are exchanged for certainties. This feature, which characterizes the whole work, is particularly observable in that part of it which treats of the first

¹ Schiller's *Leben und Werke* von Emil Palleske. 1858–59. An English translation by Lady Wallace has just appeared. London, 1860.

half of his life. The year 1782, that in which his first piece was acted upon the stage, and in which he quitted his native Suabia as a voluntary exile in order to escape from the hard exactions of his sovereign, and to devote himself exclusively to the muses, divides his life into two equal periods of twenty-three years each. Nearly all his biographers dispatch the first half in a few pages, and hasten to the period when his name is conspicuous among the writers of his day. But the reflecting reader wishes to know the process by which the poet became what he was. Palleske satisfies this desire more perfectly than any other of Schiller's biographers. He presents a clear and connected history of the academic life of this remarkable youth; of the government and policy of the Duke; of the life and influence of his favorite the countess Francisca; of Schiller's earliest poetical effusions and of the circumstances under which they were produced; of his relation to Louise Vischer (his supposed "Laura"); and of his nobler and far more important connection with Lady von Wolzogen and her family. A similar flood of collateral light shines upon the subsequent and more public career of the poet, historical writer, and professor, to which we cannot more particularly refer. With all the abundance of historical materials at the author's command, nothing unnecessary to his object is admitted. Schiller is always the main figure, around which all the others are grouped in their proper places. As some artists give vivacity to their pictures by a skilful choice, arrangement, and execution of subordinate figures, so does our author in a few words, without too much diverting the attention from the principal subject, give the reader vivid pictures of Schiller's friends and acquaintances. Wieland's "character (as well as his writings) was quite in accordance with the hundreds of fine, almost imperceptible lines traced in his face, denoting anything rather than simple grandeur of mind." Herder's "choleric temperament, embittered by bad health, was most trying to him, especially being in direct opposition to the principles he advocated. Neither his associates nor the ideas which he, with them, encouraged harmonized with his sacred profession." The celebrated Bertuch, "an encyclopedia of universal knowledge, was the hero of the 'Weimar Industry,' and speculated as eagerly and cleverly with his garden, and his Pandora, as with his collection of flowers and his literary paper."

The delicate relations of Schiller to Lady von Kalb, whose husband, as well as Baron von Kalb, was an officer in the war of the American revolution, are more perfectly elucidated in this than in any preceding biography. The history of her parents and of her childhood is highly romantic. Her long but virtuous intimacy with Schiller seemed to exert the most genial influence upon him; but her life towards its end became sad in the extreme, clearly showing the inexpediency of the whole system of platonic love so much in vogue in Germany at that time. After Schiller was married, and her husband and her son had both committed suicide, there was little to cheer her on earth.

The sentimental nature of Schiller, which idealized female characters, which converted them into poems as it did his poems into persons, and

which led him to cherish similar affections towards both, manifested itself in a singular manner in the plan he formed for married life. Between him and Charlotte and Caroline von Lengefeld, there was from the beginning a trio of lovers. As he was a burgher and they of a noble family, he did not venture to intimate any personal wishes beyond cultivating the friendship of both sisters. Indeed his conversation was more frequently directed to the older sister than to the younger, both of whom were intensely interested in him. At length, the elder sister, out of magnanimity and affection for the younger, before Schiller's preferences were known, gave him the intimation that her sister returned his affection. It was then amicably agreed that the three should live together, and that with the third party there should ever subsist a friendship scarcely distinguishable from the love that bound together the other two. This understanding continued as long as might be expected, till the nuptials were celebrated. From that time on, nature took its own course, and the parties became as sensible as they were amiable. Schiller's life now found its true resting place, and his was a model of domestic life.

Of Schiller's religious character it is difficult to give a clear idea. Though religiously educated, he became sceptical. The lifeless orthodoxy of the church had no attractions for him. The rationalism of the age got complete possession of his mind. But the coldness of the new theology and the emptiness of its pulpit harangues were as little to his taste. He therefore fell back upon an idealism of his own, which he at one time attempted to prop up by the Kantian philosophy, but afterwards left to rest upon its own foundation. His idealism sometimes verged towards paganism, and sometimes towards Christianity. Aesthetically, he embraced an ideal world which was much nearer to Christianity than to Platonism. In this he differed from Göthe, who only had transient glimpses of the Christian ideal, without embracing the substance of it in his imagination. Schiller was a great man and a great poet. But he would have been greater with a definite and positive faith in Christianity. The moral tendency of his writings is elevating and inspiring, if not religious. In earnestness and in a genuine and noble humanity, he belongs to the nineteenth century, as Göthe, for the want of these qualities, belongs to the eighteenth. But though his dramatic writings may be the pride and glory of modern German literature, his ideas of reforming society through the influence of the stage, have, like all similar fancies, been doomed to disappointment. What theatre was ever more favored than that of Weimar, supported by the genius and guided by the direction of Göthe and Schiller? And what has been the effect of this great outlay of dramatic and histrionic talent upon the moral condition of society in that Athens of Germany? It has been said by Neander and others that the state of society in ancient Greece was a preparation for Christianity by demonstrating its necessity. So it may be affirmed that the biographies of such men as Wieland, Herder, Göthe, and Schiller are arguments for Christianity, inasmuch as the moral weaknesses of these great men were owing more to a deficiency in Christian ideas and Christian character than to any other cause.

We have already portrayed some of the features of this biography by Pallese. Appearing, as it does, somewhat in the character of a rival of Hoffmeister's life of Schiller, it is natural to institute a comparison between them. Hoffmeister is more philosophical, or perhaps we should say metaphysical. He carries in his mind a universal system, embracing all species of poetry, an ideal philosophy rising above all individual poets as the standard by which they are to be judged. Pallese, on the contrary, makes the facts before him his starting point, and constructs his theory as he advances. The philosophy, which he brings out is the child of the biography. An aesthetic feeling springs up in his mind as he follows the genius of the poet, and the analysis of this feeling, and the reference of it to its causes, constitutes his philosophy. His work abounds in brilliant sallies and in genial thoughts. In the one, we see the tactician with all his thoughts marshalled; in the other, the man of spontaneous feeling, whose thoughts play as freely as deer in a park. In the one we feel the firm grasp of a sturdy and well-stored intellect; in the other the warmth and fine tact of a mind familiar with the stage. Although both biographers are men of universal culture, in the one, we see more of Johnson; in the other, more of Garrick. But both are true to their German origin, the one occasionally obscure from his abstract philosophy; the other from a fiery imagination or playful fancy, which sometimes leaps at its results. As might be expected from two such different orders of mind, they often disagree in their critical judgments, although both are equally admirers of their hero. Hoffmeister is the best critic of Schiller's philosophical and historical writings, and Pallese of his earlier and more questionable tragedies. Of the rest of the poet's works they present two aspects, neither of which is untrue, while neither contains the whole truth. A great mind offers different sides to the contemplation of other minds less comprehensive. Nothing proves the greatness of Shakspeare more than the fact, that so many men may commune with him who cannot commune with each other. This praise also belongs to Schiller.

SCHILLER AND HIS TIMES.¹

This work was published in Leipsic last year simultaneously in two forms, in a splendid quarto of six hundred and ninety pages, with twenty-four wood engravings, and in a cheap edition in three small volumes. The New York reprint, without date, is very neatly and even beautifully executed. Scherr is a well-known writer of the liberal school, and was probably in exile when he wrote this book. There is a certain tartness of expression, when he speaks of the political condition of Germany, which betrays a disaffection with the present state of things. In this biography, as the title indicates, the times of Schiller are more conspicuous than his works, though both

¹ Schiller und seine Zeit von Johannes Scherr in zwei Bände. New York. 1860.

receive due attention. The author has studied his subject faithfully, and appears to have had before him nearly the same materials as Palleske had, but never refers to that writer, though the first volume must have been known to him. He abounds more in general views and descriptions, while Palleske is more minute and trusts more to his facts and to choice selections from his documents to make their own impressions. The one reads and thinks more *for* us; the other, more *with* us. And yet the former gives the reader many brief, characteristic extracts, and makes him well acquainted with the subject. We took up the book with the feeling that it was unfortunate for the author to follow Palleske; but laid it down with the conviction, that he had spent so many years in preparing it, and had succeeded so well that it would be a pity that his labors should be lost. He comes nearest to Palleske in the completeness of his narrative, though he is wanting in the massive strength and sober judgment of Hoffmeister. There is, in short, a little too much of the "Young Germany" in him, though he has both learning and ability. In some things he is superior to Palleske. He seems to be more familiar with general history, finding more points of connection between his biography and the social and literary history of his country. Indeed, we should say that his preëminence is in history, as Palleske's is in dramatic literature, and Hoffmeister's in philosophy. Setting aside a few peculiarities, and his loose views of Christianity, we are required in candor to say that his book has much solid merit.

SCHILLER'S RELATIONS TO HIS PARENTS, TO HIS SISTERS, AND TO THE FAMILY VON WOLZOGEN.¹

This is a charming book. It is not a biography; but it is an important supplement to all the biographies of Schiller. Of the recent contributions called forth by the "Schiller Festival" of last year, none are more interesting than this one relating to his father's household.

The first character presented to us in this family correspondence is Schiller's father, a stern, but upright and honorable man of the old school. After a wandering soldier's life, in which he appears in various capacities, as private, surgeon, subaltern, and captain, he was at last settled as superintendent of the ducal garden or nursery at Solitude, near Stuttgart. In the letters of the father to the son, nearly sixty in number, we are struck, and sometimes amused, at the contrast between the calculating, industrious, and loyal old soldier, and the inconsiderate, moody, and unloyal young poet, who felt no particular pleasure at being forced to the study of an irksome profession, and being as pensioner put under obligation to the arbitrary Duke. His love of the muses, his aversion to that odd combination of military discipline and medical study, his apostasy from it, together with his fondness for theat-

¹ Schiller's Beziehungen zu Eltern, Geschwistern und der Familie von Wolzogen aus den Familien-Papieren mitgetheilt. pp. 487. Stuttgart, 1859.

rical compositions, which brought upon him the frown of his patron, and his consequent flight to Mannheim, where he could write for the stage, and breathe more freely, were all contrary both to the feelings and to the judgment of the precise, discreet, and sober-minded father. It is not strange, therefore, that, when the unpractical runaway poet found it easier to contract debts than to pay them, the frugal gardener and old soldier should write some decidedly sensible letters to him. These letters are models of old-fashioned, excellent parental advice. If Schiller had turned out a dissipated youth, the letters of the father would not only have been justified, but highly commended by all good fathers. Though some of the first dramatic pieces, in which the young poet protested, in the name of humanity, against the restraints imposed upon society, were of a somewhat questionable tendency, his undoubted genius, and his better nature, which elevated his poetry into a purer intellectual and moral atmosphere, soon won upon the heart of the father as it did upon everybody who could appreciate genius; and the gradual change in the tone of correspondence into tenderness, love, and respect, give it a peculiar charm.

The next character introduced by these letters, and one of still greater interest, is Schiller's mother. Here, as in so many other instances, more of the mother than of the father reappears in the mind and character of the son. She had capacities and tastes above her humble sphere. She valued education and the refinements of cultivated society, and attended more to their intellectual and moral interest than to the means of her own personal comfort; and how well she succeeded appears in the superior character of all her children. In her letters to her children, occupying nearly fifty pages of the volume, she shows herself elevated in her views of life, pure in sentiment, and equally truthful and genial in her feelings, words and actions. We cannot avoid imagining what she would have been, if she had enjoyed the means of culture wasted upon so many others. "To give a splendid education to my children," she remarks in one of her letters, "is out of my power. But to form their hearts, to train them to virtue and honesty, to industry and economy, and especially to leave upon them the impress of Christianity, I hold to be my first duty; nor will the contempt and ridicule of the free-thinking world ever deter me from it." Here, in part at least, is the cause of the difference in the moral tone of Schiller's and Göthe's compositions. If there were more such mothers, there would be more such sons.

His eldest sister Christophine, or Fene, as she was called, afterwards married to the librarian Reinwald, at Meiningen, understood him and sympathized with him more perfectly than any other member of the family. She alone of the family was in the secret of his feelings and plans before his escape from Stuttgart, and knew all his early poetical attempts, when they were concealed from others. It is truly affecting to see how this excellent woman, who had a hard fortune in life, was intellectually nourished and even educated to high artistic excellence by the productions of her brother's genius. Her sympathizing heart is apparent in the first letter from her pen in the

collection, where she says: "Is it not too great an effort for you to produce three such pieces in one year? I should suppose that one such piece as *Fiesco* or the *Robbers* would be quite enough for one year. It will be a truly royal pleasure to me to visit you, and speak with you again. My dear brother, I have much to say to you when we can again chat together. I have suffered much the past year, — for you left us a year ago this month, — and have had many a wearisome day and sleepless night. But, thank God, all is now over. The thought that you are happy, makes me forget all the past."

In reading her highly intellectual letters, one feels that she deserved a better lot than to be tied down to a learned, but musty, parsimonious, and saturnine old husband, doing a thousand-fold more for him than he did for her. We become reconciled to it only when we consider that it gave her an opportunity of exhibiting the rarest virtues, and making the noblest sacrifices. Her letters, extending through a hundred and fifty pages, are the gem of the book.

One chapter is devoted to the letters of Schiller's second sister, Louise, who became the wife of pastor Frankh. The first part of the series is connected with domestic scenes of a mournful and even tragic nature. The elder Schiller, whose health was giving way, suffered the most excruciating pains of a rheumatic or neuralgic nature, which produced not only cries of agony, but singular outbursts of passion. None but the youngest daughter had the fortitude to remain with him during these paroxysms, and she, from filial affection, concealed much that she suffered on account of his nervous irritability. Meanwhile the French army under Jourdan and Moreau was approaching, and the Austrian hospital had been established at Solitude. Here a malignant fever now broke out, and extended to the family of Schiller. Nanette, as this youngest daughter was called, was the earliest victim. She was a delicate, innocent, highly intellectual and charming young creature, and, next to the poet, the idol of the family. Two or three of her letters are inserted in this collection. Her last describes her father's sufferings.

The next letter is by Louise, giving an account of the sickness and death of her sister. After an interval of nearly two months, during which she lay at the point of death from the same disease, she writes one letter to her brother as soon as she has strength to hold her pen; and does not write again till she announces the death of her father. He, in his last illness, had but one worldly anxiety. His eldest daughter was married. His son was now well established in Jena. His youngest daughter had gone before him; and for his wife he hoped a pension would be secured which, with his small estate, would make her comfortable. But Louise was wholly unprovided for. In the same letter which announced her father's death to her brother, she adds: "My dear mother wrote you something in her last about my friend. I should have written myself, had it not been that my prospects were much less certain then than they now are. My father called him to his bedside, about ten days before his death, and said to him that there was one thing

that lay upon his heart. He had perceived his (Frankh's) attachment to his daughter, and his sympathy with the family; and now his only remaining desire was to see his daughter Louise provided for. Then he could die in peace. My friend assured him that he might be entirely at rest; that as soon as he himself should have a place and a living, I should share it with him; that this had long been his purpose. He gave him his hand as a pledge. Now we regard him as belonging to the family." The union was a very suitable and happy one. Her excellent character and frugal habits fitted her admirably to be the wife of a country clergyman. Her husband was finally promoted, and she had a long life of usefulness and honor. She died in 1836 at the age of seventy, two years after her husband, and one year after her son. Of her two daughters, one, who had been married to a merchant, died in 1844; the other is still living as the wife of a clergyman.

Schiller's eldest sister Christophine had no children. His widow died in the arms of her son Ernest at Bonn in July 1826. Of their children, the following account is given. His oldest son, Carl, died in the south of Germany in 1857, after having filled several honorable posts in the government of Wirttemberg. His second son, Ernest, who, at the recommendation of William von Humboldt, held office under the Prussian government, died in 1841. His eldest daughter, Caroline, who was married to Junot, of Rudolstadt, died in 1850, six years after her only child. His only surviving daughter, who is the wife of von Gleichen-Russwurm, is now nearly fifty-six years of age. She is associate editor of this work with Alfred von Wolzogen, the grandson of Henriette von Wolzogen, Schiller's early friend and protectress. There is only one grandson to transmit the name and line of the great poet, F. L. E. von Schiller, an officer in the Austrian cavalry, son of Carl, born in 1826.

SCHILLER AND GÖTHE: Views and Illustrations of the Correspondence between Schiller and Göthe, by Heinrich Düntzer.¹

Göthe and Schiller were very unlike in their genius, their culture, and their fortunes. Göthe's mind worked with ease and grace, and moved like a flowing stream; it was cultivated from the beginning under happy influences; and fortune smiled upon him through his whole career. Schiller had great depth of thought, but could bring forth the pure gold only by digging deep and working hard for it. His early training was unfavorable, and he was deficient in the knowledge both of men and of books; and fortune dealt hardly with him as it so often does with great poets. Besides, these two great men represented the two opposite poles of the world of mind, as much as Plato and Aristotle did in philosophy. Their first

¹ Schiller und Göthe. Uebersichten und Erläuterungen zum Briefwechsel zwischen Schiller und Göthe. pp. 319. Stuttgart, 1859.

acquaintance, therefore, promised nothing but a distant and reserved intercourse. Their deepest convictions rendered them repellant to each other. Göthe thought Schiller was likely to revive that sentimentalism which he had long been striving to put down. Schiller thought Göthe cold and selfish. Schiller's poetry and philosophy came from an ideal world ; Göthe's from the real. The one belonged to the spiritual, the other to the sensual school. Nothing but earnest discussion and friendly controversy finally brought them nearer together. Göthe felt the necessity of intercourse with a philosophic mind. Neither in aesthetics nor in natural science could he find by mere experience those universal principles which he desired, and yet he acknowledged nothing beyond experience. Schiller startled him with the assertion, that universal principles were not to be sought in the facts of experience, but in ideas. A single point of contact was here found, and from this time to Schiller's death these two great men labored to understand each other, and each derived from the other more instruction from that time forth than from all other sources. The record of this process by which two opposite polarities were harmonized, and in which each felt himself improved as he approached the other, is found in this correspondence. Hence its peculiar charm and permanent value. Göthe said that these letters of Schiller are among the best things he ever wrote ; and Schiller put a similar estimate upon his friend's letters. Of course, much discussion was conducted orally in their visits to each other. Many things in the correspondence will be less clear to others than they were to the correspondents themselves. Many allusions both to themselves and to others, to daily occurrences, to their friends, to books, and to subjects of public interest, are now necessarily somewhat obscure. It is the aim of Düntzer's book to remove such obscurities ; to give the daily history of these two men during the ten years of their active correspondence, and to supply what is wanting to a complete understanding of these letters.

In an introduction of nearly sixty closely printed pages, he gives a minute account of their relations to each other from the beginning of their acquaintance up to the year 1794, when their intimacy commenced. In the remainder of the volume there is a chapter for each year, beginning with the history of both parties during the year, and ending with a body of notes illustrating all the letters during the same period. The chapters vary from fifteen to thirty pages in length, the notes being printed in small type. In the execution of his task, the author seems to have exercised great diligence and care ; and the volume is a most welcome aid to those who wish to trace the history of two such minds through the last and most interesting stage of their development. We have often regarded this remarkable correspondence, where genius breathes in almost every line, as worth more, in matters of criticism and taste, than volumes of rhetoric as taught in the schools. Certainly they furnish to the rhetorical student an invaluable treasure for supplementary reading.

THE CONCORD OF AGES.¹

THIS book may be regarded as a second part of "the Conflict of Ages"—a work published by Dr. Beecher in 1853, and noticed by us soon after publication.² In both, the same views are set forth, as to the preëxistence of the human race, their sin and fall in a former life, and their being sent into this world, and placed here under redemptive influences, with a view to their recovery and final salvation; also with a further view to the reorganizing, through them, of God's great system of the universe, which had been broken in upon by the revolt of Satan and his angels. This theory as to the origin of human depravity, is adopted in order to clear the subject from the alleged absurdities of connecting our moral corruptions with the first sin of Adam.

The main features of Dr. Beecher's hypothesis are the following; and may be stated in few words: At some remote period in the ages of eternity, God brought into existence a vast number of intelligent spirits, with noble powers, enlarged capacities, and all of them holy and happy, like himself. To test their characters, he placed them, for a season, on probation, or trial; in the progress of which a part of them fell. One of the tallest of the arch-angels first revolted; and through his influence a great multitude, of different orders, and at subsequent periods, were drawn into sin.

The original temptation, which overcame the sinning angels, has usually been regarded as among the secret things of God. But by some means Dr. B. has discovered it, and has brought it to light. "We know, of necessity, what it was, from which the first generation [of angels] revolted. From pleasure, of course, there was no temptation to revolt; but *from a discipline of suffering*, such as was needed to fit them to be the founders of the universe, with God, they could be tempted to revolt. And if they did, the issue between them and God would be, as to the duty of benevolent and obedient endurance of suffering, according to his will" (p. 98). "How he formed Christ and the church by suffering, we know in fact. That Satan and his fellows needed, in some way, an equivalent discipline of suffering, and were called to it, and also that they revolted from it, renouncing faith, obedience, and patience, and enthroning self-will, and self-indulgence, the very nature of the case, and their spirit and policy, in all ages since, most clearly evince." p. 254.

The great God was, of course, grieved and distressed, at the fall and ruin of so many of his creatures; but he could not prevent it. He did what he could; but "in the earlier periods of creation, there was a necessary limitation of his power" (p. 20).³ The revolt came, in spite of him; his grand system

¹ The Concord of Ages; or the Individual and Organic Harmony of God and Man. By Edward Beecher, D. D. New York: Derby and Jackson. 1860. pp. 581.

² See Bib. Sacra for Jan. 1854, p. 186.

³ "Either the limitation of divine power, in the earlier stages of creation, which I advocate, exists, or it does not exist. If it does not exist, then no man

was disorganized, and it only remained that he should restore it, in the best way possible.

With this view — having abandoned Satan and the other great leaders in the revolt, to the ruin they had incurred, and having reserved the less guilty rebels in safe keeping somewhere — he resolved to create for them a material universe, and to send them, one after another, in a way of ordinary generation, into bodies on the earth. He would here provide for them a Saviour; he would furnish them with new spiritual influences and means of grace; he would make even their material organizations and surroundings (which are so often represented as a temptation and a snare) a means of instruction and profit to them; and by these methods would recover great numbers to himself. Those who cannot be in this way restored, must be left under the power of their great leader and destroyer, and go with him to his own place.

The course of things here indicated, has been in progress now for a long period, — ever since the placing of man upon earth; in all which time God has been gathering in his own elect, and “enduring, with much long-suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction.” But this endurance must have an end. The period of suspended light and full moral influence is well nigh over. The repressed emotions of the Deity will soon burst forth; his anger will burn like fire; Satan and his host will be confounded and confined; the glory of the Lord will be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together; Christ will be married to his redeemed church, and “the Concord of Ages” will be consummated. All this is to take place at the pouring out of the seventh vial, spoken of in Rev. 16 : 17, an event to be expected in a little time.

After a long season of rest and peace, during which the company of the redeemed will be vastly augmented, and Christ will be carrying on, through them, his work of reorganization throughout the universe, Satan will be loosed for a short period. But he will be speedily smitten down again, and involved in a more dreadful, hopeless ruin than ever before; and from that time forward “the Concord of Ages” will be perpetual and eternal: it will be disturbed no more forever.

The final victory over Satan and his host will not be, however, one of force, but rather of light, of conviction, of resistless moral influence. “The power which prevails is the power of long-suffering, goodness, and truth. It is this which, when the fulness of time comes, will react, and destroy, with a terrific destruction, those who have destroyed the earth.” “The whole is, on the part of God, a victory, not of force, but of logic, of truth,

can defend God against the charge of malevolence. If it does exist, then there is, as I have shown, a simple and natural solution of the origin of evil.” — *Conflict of Ages*, p. 486. “So long as infinite and unconditioned power, at all times, to exclude all sin, is ascribed to God, and his suffering is denied, the malignant spirit of the system of evil cannot be exposed. These positions give strength to the Satanic conception of God, which is its life.” — *Concord of Ages*, p. 176.

and of holy emotion, purifying and uniting the universe forever" (pp. 555, 523).

On this condensed statement of the theory of Dr. B., it would be easy to multiply remarks ; but we must confine ourselves to a very few. One of the first inquiries which suggests itself is this : " How does Dr. B. *know* all that is involved in this startling hypothesis ? The Bible, to be sure, discloses some things ; but above and beyond what it reveals, *how does Dr. B. know ?* The Bible informs us that, at some time, previous to the creation of man, God brought into being a multitude of angels ; that a portion of them fell into sin ; and that the great leader of the rebel host, under the guise of a serpent, became the seducer of our first parents. But how does Dr. B. know that the revolt of the angels took place away back in the remote ages of eternity, anterior to the inception of a material universe ; and that the material universe was formed with a view to the recovery of a part of these rebel spirits to holiness and heaven ? How does he know as to the nature of that probation on which the angels were originally placed, the injunctions laid upon them, and the precise form of the temptation before which they fell ? How does he know so much of God's vast system of the universe, which was broken in upon by the revolt of the angels, and which, through the instrumentality of his redeemed church, he has undertaken to restore ? The Bible intimates, if it does not directly assert, that *all* " the angels, who kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation, are reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day." Jude 6. How does Dr. B. know that only a part of them are in this hopeless condition, while the other part are reserved for a probation on the earth ? How does he know that we ourselves belong to this apostate company ; that we existed and sinned in a previous life ; and that our present depravity, though we are not at all conscious of it, is the result of such sin ? How does he know that the final readjustment of the disorganized universe is to be brought about in the way he has indicated, — by the sudden, surprising, overwhelming manifestation of a long-waiting and suffering God ? We might multiply questions of this sort, and wait long for an answer, were it not that Dr. Beecher has told us, in part, how he came by his knowledge. It is not all the result of his logic, although he lays a mighty stress upon that. Christ, he tells us, " is the great leader of his church in philosophy and logic ;" and Satan's " beasts are as sensitive to it as they are to fire " (pp. 459, 542). But his superior knowledge on these high and mysterious subjects is the result, chiefly, of *intuition* or *revelation*. " The human mind has divinely inspired *intuitions* of intellectual and moral truth " (p. 314). " The true and highest ground of certainty lies in the fact that God is a real Being, and that he has a *self-revealing power*, such that he can make his presence, thoughts, emotions, and character a vivid reality to the mind." p. 41. Again : " there may be a thousand mysteries in God, . . . and yet we may have a true and reliable knowledge of him, as an intelligent, moral, and affectionate person, and may so truly understand his ends, plans, and emotions, that we may be in full and perfect sympathy with him, especially

if he discloses these things to us, as he has promised, in the way of *self-revelation*" (p. 115).

With this revelation of God to his own soul, Dr. B. is confident that he has been favored; and this is his reliance, in engaging, as he has done, in "the Conflict of Ages." "It has been feared that I should unsettle men, by assailing certain views of God which I deemed false; because, in so doing, I shake the old foundations, and men, it is said, cannot or will not, reconstruct the system on the better basis proposed by me. But this will be as it pleases God. He exists as a real God, in a definite character, and with a *self-manifesting power*. This is my reliance. This is a defence of the truth that can never fail" (p. 43).

Dr. B. doubtless remembers that others besides himself have had supposed revelations, and have relied upon them to their hurt. There is scarcely any extravagance, whether of doctrine or practice, which has not been justified in this way. The monks and mystics had revelations in abundance, received, in most instances, as Dr. B. describes. To trust to revelations and impressions, beyond what the Bible reveals, is in the highest degree delusive and dangerous. Our good friend will pardon us in the suggestion that here, as it seems to us, is his greatest danger.

Dr. B. has much to say of a "suffering God," and thinks himself far in advance of Christians generally in regard to this point. Indeed, it is this feature of the divine character, — long, patient, benevolent *suffering* in behalf of his enemies, — which is to be disclosed at the last, to their utter discomfiture and ruin.

There have been two kinds of suffering ascribed to God: the one a direct result of his benevolent emotional nature; the other, consisting in the inflictions of the cross. The former of these, on which Dr. B. chiefly insists, the generality of Christians ascribe to God, as really as he does. The latter kind of suffering, growing out of the inflictions of the cross, has generally been referred to Christ's human nature.

That God is a personal, spiritual being, possessing not only intellect and will, but a most perfectly constituted *emotional nature*, the Bible abundantly teaches, and most Christians believe. He not only sees what is doing in the earth, but he *feels* in view of it; and feels precisely as a being of infinite wisdom and goodness ought to feel. He feels delight in view of holiness, and displeasure in view of sin. He is happy in the contemplation of his own amiable and perfect character, and in the love of all his obedient subjects, while he is angry with the wicked every day. He cannot look upon sinners but with abhorrence. God sympathizes with his people in their trials and sorrows. "Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him. "In all their afflictions he is afflicted." But of the wicked God saith: "Your new moons and your appointed feasts my soul hateth. They are a *trouble* unto me; I am *weary* to bear them."

That God has an emotional nature, as these and many other scriptures indicate, — a nature keenly sensitive, and yet most perfectly adjusted and regulated, — is no new doctrine in the church. More than fifty years ago,

Dr. Emmons published a sermon entitled: "Affections essential to the Moral Perfection of the Deity," in which this view of the subject is clearly exhibited. "When God is represented as having bodily members, such as eyes, ears, hands, or feet, the dictates of reason and the general tenor of scripture, oblige us to understand the expressions in a figurative sense. But when God is said to have love, joy, pity, and all other benevolent affections, there is no occasion for departing from the plain and literal sense of the words. For such affections are neither contrary to the nature of things, nor to the nature and character of an absolutely perfect being."¹

Dr. Emmons did not teach, as Dr. Beecher does, that God is, or ever was, pained in view of evils *which he had no power to prevent*; for this would be inconsistent with his immutable and perfect blessedness. But that God sees thousands of things taking place in the world which, in themselves, are disagreeable to him, and that he feels a suffering in view of them, and just that kind and degree of suffering which is most suitable to him as a benevolent Being, there can be no doubt. Nor is this kind and degree of suffering at all inconsistent with his perfect happiness. On the contrary, his happiness is involved in it. He could not be holy or happy, on any other supposition. How could God be holy or happy, if he had no sympathy in suffering, and could not be displeased in view of sin?

But there is another form of suffering which Dr. B. ascribes to God, respecting which there is more room for doubt. He supposes the divine nature of Christ to have participated in all the inflictions and agonies of the cross. Without doubt, God sympathized with his Son, as no other being could, in the pains and agonies of crucifixion; but did those material, physical agonies reach to the divine nature itself? Did the driving of the nails, the rearing up of the cross, the long and cruel suspension of the Sufferer upon it, the groans, the pains, the sweat, the thirst, the twinging nerves, the dying strife,—did this reach the Divinity within him; or were they confined to the suffering, God-sustained man? Without going at large into this question here, we feel constrained to limit the inflictions of the cross to Christ's human nature. We cannot reconcile such sufferings with the nature of God, or with the perfections everywhere ascribed to him in the Bible. God cannot be immutable, on such a supposition as this. Much less can he be unchangeably and eternally happy.

Besides, the scriptures teach, in a variety of ways, that the sufferings of Christ on the cross were those of a man. He became a man, that he might suffer. "He was made a little lower than the angels," or, in other words, a man, "for the suffering of death, that he, by the grace of God, should taste death for every man" (Heb. 2: 9). "Forasmuch as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself, likewise, took part of the same, that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil" (Heb. 2: 14). He was "put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit" (1 Pet. 3: 18). "Who bare our sins in his own body, on the

tree" (1 Pet. 2: 24). "Being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross" (Phil. 2: 8).

In view of representations such as these, and of what we know of the essential attributes of God, we *must* believe that Christ suffered in his human nature only. Still, he did not suffer as a mere man, for he was not a mere man. We believe him to have suffered more, inconceivably more, than any mere man could have suffered in the same time. He suffered enough, — considering the infinite dignity and glory of his person, and his ineffable nearness to the Father, — to make as bright a display of the justice of God, of his regard for his law, of his holy hatred of sin, and his determination to punish it, as could have been made in the eternal destruction of our guilty race. His sufferings thus became a *full equivalent*, a *substitute* for the penalty of the law, and laid a firm foundation for the forgiveness and salvation of all those who put their trust in him.

Dr. B. has some peculiar notions as to the reach and the efficacy of Christ's sufferings and death. They not only availed to make an atonement, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, but there was in them the power of an *example* — the example of a suffering God, — which was felt, and will be felt, in all worlds forever. "The essential element in the power of the cross is the power of God's example. Christ vindicates and establishes the law, and atones for sin, not merely by the transient infliction of a penalty upon him, but by the *moral force of the whole act*, in all its relations, and in all worlds, forever. No penalty inflicted on the lost could so reveal God's convictions as to holiness and sin, and so confirm the universe, as did this example." p. 190.

Throughout "the Concord of Ages," Dr. B. reiterates his objections to the fall of Adam, and the introduction of sin through his instrumentality. This doctrine *he certainly knows cannot be true*. "We can know, and that *infallibly*, that it is at war with the very nature of God; that he could not do what is ascribed to him without denying himself, — without violating every sensibility of his nature" (p. 177). We have heard men speak as confidently before, in opposition to what God has plainly revealed. In his "Statement of Reasons for not believing the Trinity," Prof. Norton tells us, that whatever else may be true, the doctrine of the Trinity *cannot be*; and that whatever else the passages quoted in proof of it may be supposed to mean, they *cannot teach or mean the Trinity*. The Universalist tells us the same, in regard to the doctrine of eternal punishment. And yet the faith of the Christian world is not shaken by such assertions. "The foundation of God standeth sure."

Thus rejecting what we conceive to be the doctrine of scripture as to the origin of human depravity, Dr. B. falls back, with the utmost assurance, on his favorite theory of preëxistence. He admits, indeed, that there is no direct proof of it in the Bible; but comforts himself with saying that there is no proof against it. To this it might be sufficient to reply, that there is no proof, in scripture, against a thousand other things, which no person, in his senses, can believe to be tr

But is it certain that there is no proof, in scripture, against the doctrine of preëxistence? The scriptures seem to us to teach that the spirit of man is *created*, when it comes into this world. So it was with Adam: God "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and he *became* a living soul;" implying that he was not a living soul before. God is said, by one of the prophets, not only to "stretch forth the heavens, and lay the foundations of the earth," but to "*form the spirit of man within him*" (Zech. 12 : 1).

The scriptures also teach, in direct opposition to Dr. Beecher's theory, that our first parents, at the time of their creation, were holy. They are said to have been created "in the image of God," and to have been made "up-right." Until they had eaten the forbidden fruit, not a word was said to them by their Creator, which indicated that they were, or ever had been, the objects of his displeasure.¹ So far from this, God communed with them, and blessed them, and pronounced them, and the whole creation, of which they were the head, *good — very good*.

The scriptures further teach, in opposition to the same theory, that mankind *have not sinned in a previous life*. From their intercourse with the heathen, or from some other source, the Jews, at a certain period, entertained the idea, that men were often punished, in this life, for sins committed in a former state. Accordingly, they inquired of our Saviour respecting the man who had been blind from his birth: "Master, who did sin, this man, or his parents, that he was born blind? Jesus answered: Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents, but that the works of God should be made manifest in him" (John 9 : 2, 3). Our Saviour here expressly contradicts the heathenish notion of a preëxistent state of sin. The apostle Paul does the same. For he says, that before Jacob and Esau had been born into this world, they "had done neither good nor evil" (Rom. 9 : 11). How could this be true, if both of them were old transgressors from another world?

The doctrine of preëxistence is refuted by yet another representation of the Bible. If we existed and sinned in a previous life, it would seem that we ought to be called to an account for those sins. Indeed, we *must* be called to an account for them, and that whether we are saved or lost. If saved, they must be called to mind, repented of, and forgiven, and the universe must see the amount of our indebtedness to sovereign grace. Or if we are found, at last, among the lost, an account must be taken of those sins, else the full demands of justice against us cannot be known. In either case, the sins of that previous life (if there be any such) must be called up and accounted for in the final day. And yet no mention is made, in the scriptures, of our liability to any such reckoning. On the contrary, the supposition of it is expressly precluded: "We must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things *done in his body*, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad" (2 Cor. 5 : 10).

¹ Dr. B. infers their original sinfulness from the fact that "they were naked, and were not ashamed," — as though they were, at this time, lost to all shame! It would seem from this view, that what is commonly called *their fall* was a benefit to them, giving them some sense of decency, if nothing more.

But we cannot pursue this argument further. It is mournful to see so much talent, and learning, and piety, and capacity for usefulness in the church of God, as are concentrated in Dr. Beecher, all devoted — we had almost said prostituted — to the inculcation of a dogma, which very few Christians on the earth have ever believed, or can believe. He acknowledges to some disappointment as to the result of his first publication. He is conscious, — perhaps painfully — that he stands almost alone. Still, he has faith in God; and has no doubt that the truth and the wisdom of his speculations will, ere long, be vindicated. To all this we unite, with him, in saying: “This will be as God pleases.”

Dr. B. has several chapters on what he calls “pious ignorance.” This, he says, the refuge under which the believers in Adam’s fall and its consequences have long sheltered themselves. “They cannot explain the connection between Adam’s sin and that of his posterity; and when attempts at explanation are made, scarcely any two agree together. And yet they all cling to the doctrine, under the impression that it is revealed, and must be true, whether they can understand it or not.” But is not Dr. B. chargeable with the same kind of “pious ignorance,” and in the same degree? Does he not believe a thousand things, as facts, the *quo modo* of which he cannot understand or explain? Let him tell us, if he can, *how* the three and the one are united in the Godhead; or *how* the Divine and the human are united in his own person? Or, how soul and body are united in his own body? Or, to come nearer to the subject in hand: If we all existed and sinned in a previous life, can Dr. B. tell us why our heavenly Father has taken from us all knowledge of such a state, and given us no intimations of it in his word? There are a multitude of things, in respect to which we all are, and must be, more or less ignorant in the present life. And this, certainly, should be a “pious ignorance,” if it exist at all.

It is due to Dr. Beecher to say, before we close, that the view he takes, as to the introduction of evil into the world, is not inconsistent necessarily, nor is it so in his own mind, with substantial orthodoxy, on most of the great points of evangelical theology. If we came into this world as demons, from a previous state of existence, and live here as incarnate demons, until by the grace of God we are renewed; then, certainly, we are *depraved creatures* — deeply, totally, naturally so; we need an almighty Saviour, and Sanctifier; need an atonement; need to be regenerated by the Holy Spirit; we need to be justified, and sanctified, and finally glorified; and all this through the merciful provisions of the gospel. And to those who despise and reject these provisions, there remaineth, there can remain, nothing better than “a fearful looking for of judgment, and of fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries.” All this stands connected with Dr. Beecher’s theory of depravity as naturally as with our own; and on all these great points of doctrine he is understood as holding, substantially, the orthodox faith.

And yet the course of argument which he has pursued (and this is the most objectionable feature of the case), has led him to assail and reproach the orthodox faith, as held by the great mass of evangelical Christians in all

ages, and has secured for him the thanks and the plaudits of Unitarians and Universalists, of liberalists and infidels; men with whom he has no sympathy, and who, on general subjects, have no sympathy with him. In order to make out his argument for preëxistence, he has been led to intensify and exaggerate the alleged absurdities of connecting our sin with that of Adam; and this, say our liberal religionists, is what we have always told you. "We have told you that your dogma about Adam was monstrously absurd; and now you have it from one of your own number." "This book," says one, "gives to orthodoxy the severest blow it has ever had. We find no fault with Dr. Beecher. We rejoice to see him pull away the foundation from the edifice of spiritual Babylon." Another recommends "to expend a large portion of the funds of the American Unitarian Association in circulating the Conflict of Ages." And yet not one of these men has any more confidence in Dr. Beecher's mode of introducing sin into the world, than they have in the commonly received doctrine; and they exult in what he has done, only as they think it will go to unsettle orthodoxy, and be a means of drawing unwary souls into their own delusions.

We conclude with bearing a renewed testimony to the talents, the learning, the sincerity, the piety, and the generally candid and Christian spirit displayed in this and the previous volume. We love and honor Dr. Beecher. We trust that he has "a heart *established with grace*;" and if so, he will not be fatally "driven about by diverse and strange doctrines."

††.

HISTORY OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS.¹

To compile the annals of a New England State is comparatively a simple task: but to write its history, one of much greater difficulty. So intimately connected were these colonies in the earlier part of their existence, and so much did the internal policy of each depend upon its shifting relations to its neighbors, that the thread of its story can never be kept unbroken. The historian is in constant danger, on the one hand, of loading his work with extraneous matter which will destroy its dramatic unity and interest, or on the other of leaving unexplained the most interesting phenomena of the colony's growth. Of none is this more truly the case than of Rhode Island. Peculiarly isolated as her position was throughout her colonial existence, — the very Ishmael, indeed, of New England, — the reader of her story yet finds himself obliged at the very outset to learn why such was her position. Founded by heretics and exiles, we cannot understand her without knowing by what law her founders were judged; and her history really commences in the churches of Massachusetts. To take up that history there, and follow it through the tangled meshes of theological controversy and of political

¹ History of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, by Samuel Greene Arnold. Vol. I. 1636—1700. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 346 and 348 Broadway. 1859.

strife during her long struggle not merely for the maintenance of novel principles but for very existence as an independent community, cannot have been an easy task. A most useful one it certainly is. Few nations have a record more instructive to men now living than this little fragment of earth. To borrow the language of one fully qualified to judge: "Had the territory of the state corresponded to the importance and singularity of the principles of its early existence, the world would have been filled with wonder at the phenomena of its history."¹

In the work which forms the subject of this Article, we have by far the most successful attempt yet made to accomplish this task; and, while we differ from many of the author's views, we must pay at the outset our heartiest testimony to the thoroughness of his research, and to the clear, concise, and faithful manner in which he has presented us with its results. The first volume only has yet been issued from the press. It extends from the settlement of the colony to the close of the seventeenth century. It opens with the fierce disputes between Roger Williams and the clergy of the Bay, which ended in his banishment. Then comes the story of the Island of Rhode Island, settled by another troop of exiles from Boston; then that of Warwick, so identical in its leading features with the preceding that we seem to be reading the same narrative over and over and over again. *Every one* of the four original towns comprising the colony was founded by men banished from Massachusetts.

Nor did their troubles end when their new homes were built in the wilderness. The half-century which followed was one perpetual struggle for those homes against the usurping claims of their neighbors. When we see Rhode Island on the map, we wonder not so much that its territory is small, as that it was ever able to maintain at all its place among the colonies. Not a foot of the mainland, not an island in its beautiful bay, that was not at some period during that half-century claimed with more or less of pertinacity by Connecticut, Plymouth, or Massachusetts. Its very existence was officially ignored. When Hartford, New Haven, and Aquiday (Rhode Island) addressed a joint letter to Massachusetts in regard to Indian affairs (says Winthrop): "We returned answer of our consent with them in all things propounded, only we refused to include those of Aquiday in our answer, *or to have any treaty with them.*" To the settlers of Warwick the same colony sent word that, if they did not see their misdeeds and repent, it would "look upon them as men prepared for slaughter;" and that this was no idle threat was shown immediately after by the attack made on them by Massachusetts troops, the destruction of their settlement, and their removal as prisoners to Boston. From every league formed by the other colonies for mutual assistance and defence, Rhode Island was jealously excluded. Even when, against her earnest remonstrance, her own territory had been made the battle-ground in King Philip's war, and the Indians, previously friendly to her, had been provoked into hostility, she was left undefended as soon as it suited the convenience of the United Colonies' troops to withdraw, and

¹ Bancroft's History of the United States, I. 380.

her oldest town given up to the horrors of a revenge which she herself had never provoked.

Without pursuing this subject further, it is easy to see that a writer, compelled by his subject to dwell upon these facts, may be pardoned if he sometimes loses the cool temper of the historian in the filial indignation of the Rhode Islander. We may rather wonder that he has been able to make for the other side so careful an apology as closes his first chapter; and can only regret that the same calm and dispassionate spirit had not blotted from his pages the sneers at "political priests," the sweeping assertions that "the all-pervading element of religious controversy had withered every generous sentiment, and dried up the fountain of Christian benevolence" in the hearts of the Puritans, and such sarcasms as that with which he ends his account of the death of Miantonomi:

"Unskilled in theological subtleties, he received all alike, with a noble charity which might be called Christian, did it not contrast so strangely with the cruelty towards their brethren of those who claimed the name, and asserted the prerogative of the 'Saints.' Perhaps it was the ignorance of this barbarian upon points of abstract belief, that made him so liberal a protector of heresy."

To judge fairly between the Puritans and the objects of their displeasure, we must forget much that has been said and thought since their time. We must remember that absolute freedom in religious matters, as a part of state policy, was an experiment then untried, and one from which the settlers of Massachusetts might well shrink. It is a sophism to argue that, because they fled from religious persecution in England, they were therefore bound to be entirely tolerant in their new homes. The very fact that men of a different creed had been unjust to them there, was an argument against allowing men of different faith to obtain a foothold here. Their cause has at times been much injured, indeed, by claiming for them views far in advance of what they really held. Had they preached toleration, or believed in it, they would have been grossly inconsistent; but such was not the case. It is true they crossed the ocean, encountered perils, underwent hardship, faced death, that they might follow in peace the dictates of their own conscience; but had this been all, the Pilgrims need never have sailed from Holland.¹ A far different and, in their eyes, a far higher aim possessed them. It was to found a Christian commonwealth, where religion, *their* religion, in the strictest sense of the word, should not be merely tolerated, but be the law of the land. The permission of heresy was as inconsistent with this purpose as the permission of crime. Orthodoxy to them was no

¹ A distinction is justly made by our author between the conduct of the Plymouth settlers, and those of Massachusetts Bay. The former, who had endured far more for their own conscience' sake, were in an equal degree more liberal to those who differed from them. But in the relations of the colonies as such, the policy of Plymouth was so constantly governed by its more powerful neighbor, that for our present purpose both may be treated as a single body, animated by the overruling spirit of the theocracy of the Bay.

barren formula, but the exact law of God, from which they neither dared swerve themselves nor permit their fellows to depart. In their ideal state this was the first condition not merely of its moral but of its political existence.

If they acted sternly upon this principle, it was because to them it was a deep and solemn reality. In their vision the black shores of New England were to become a kingdom of the Most High. To have suffered heresy to take root there, would have been to abandon the work entrusted to them, and to commit treason against his reign. We can see now how much there was in this of delusion ; but after all, they were only using mistaken means to accomplish what every good man, to the present day, and to the end of the world, must desire to see fulfilled : the enforcement among all men of what he believes to be wholly and singly right.

Their plans have failed because they were mistaken ; but yet they have not been without great and good results. It seems to be a part of God's providence that the errors of men should stand like scaffoldings around the slow-rising edifice of truth until it is not only perfect in its form, but solid upon its foundations. Thus the assumptions of the Papacy at a certain period were the means of repressing the tide of barbarianism, and preserving through an age of violence the sense of an overruling Law. In the same manner the iron rule of the Puritan churches no doubt helped to train and mould the sterling New England character. It is hard to guess how different that character might now have been, had the infant colonies been open to every vagary of religious sentiment. It is difficult even to intimate how much of the success attained in Rhode Island by the opposite principle of entire toleration, may have been due to the practical effect of that grim band of orthodox colonies around her, silently acting as a restraint upon its too luxuriant growth. It seems not only possible, but almost probable, that had the seed, which, planted there, has grown up into such a stately tree, been at first scattered broadcast over the whole land, we should have had from it at the present day nothing but a waste of barren or noxious stubble.

The last thought leads to another view of the subject, which cannot be entirely omitted, but over which we will pass as lightly as possible. We shall err greatly if we suppose that the principles of perfect religious freedom were presented by these, its first advocates, in all the simplicity and harmony in which they are now understood after two centuries of experiment. Their own notions, for the most part, were not only crude, and often inconsistent, but mixed up with much of which time has since shewn the absurdity, but upon which they insisted then with equal pertinacity. Thus we find that Roger Williams himself made his first issues with the clergy of the Bay upon points that appear to us very trivial ; nor indeed does the doctrine of absolute freedom in religious matters seem to have been clearly put forward and insisted on by him until after his expulsion from Massachusetts. It certainly formed no part of the charges formally made against him. In one case, at least, his views at that time seem to have been narrower than those of his opponents. His conscience took offence at the thought of communing with one who had been a member of the church of

England, and he would have had all such persons compelled to make public recantation before being admitted to the fellowship of the Puritan churches. It is hard in this to recognize the author of the Warwick letter, and the apostle of entire religious freedom. But there was a lapse of nearly twenty years between the time of his banishment and the writing of that letter; and if we carefully study his life and character, we shall find a great difference between the ardent young minister of Salem, his mind full of scholastic theology, and an almost morbid conscience stimulating his controversial powers to the extreme verge of logic, and the mature statesman of Providence Plantations, with wisdom learned from a long and painful experience, and a character ripened to a degree that, without diminishing its strength, brought out the true and deep heart of the man and the Christian. It is the highest praise of Roger Williams, that, among all his controversies, all his changes of opinion, — and they were not few, — we can trace from first to last this constant growth in beauty and harmony of personal character.

Some of the other founders of Rhode Island must have been even more "unsavory" than Williams to the earnest though narrow-minded Puritans. We need not go back to the unreadable controversies of the day, to be convinced that such a man as Samuel Gorton, that "most prodigious minter of exorbitant novelties," as they quaintly termed him, had other traits besides heresy to render him an uncomfortable neighbor; and indeed where the union of Church and State was so close as it then was in the Bay colonies, it is hard to say that what on the one hand was a mere religious error, was not on the other a political offence, and punished as such by the practice of all civilized nations. If we follow the Rhode Islanders to their new home, we shall find only too many developments of the same disputatious and uneasy character, under circumstances where no blame whatever can attach to the Puritans. When not engaged in repelling the assaults of their neighbors, they were reasonably certain to employ their leisure in quarrels among themselves. Four different and independent towns were founded by them before the colony contained inhabitants enough for one good-sized settlement; and it more than once happened that the fugitive from Massachusetts made but a short tarry with his brethren in exile before they in turn expelled him, to shift for himself elsewhere. Such, for instance, was the case with the same Samuel Gorton before mentioned, the founder of Warwick, whose banishment from Aquidneck, after a short refuge there, was emphasized by a judicial whipping. The whole of their early legislation shows an intense jealousy between the different towns. It was not until the charter of 1663 imposed upon them a more settled government, and at the same time conferred privileges which it was the interest of all to retain by a fulfilment of their conditions, that anything like a permanent union was effected. Some of their dissensions were of the most violent character, ending, if not in bloodshed, yet in withdrawals, banishments, and indictments for treason; others have to us, at this distance, a ludicrous aspect. The town of Warwick was so angry at the contents of a letter from the town of Newport, that they formally voted it "not fit to be put among the records of the town," and

bade "the clarke put it on a file where impertinent papers shall be kept for the future: to the end that those persons who have not learned in the school of good manners how to speak to men in the language of sobriety, if they be sought for may be there found!" Upon this remarkable file, afterwards mentioned in the town records by a title more profane than complimentary, went many other papers, and among them even a "pernitious letter" from Roger Williams himself.

In the very first year of the settlement of Providence occurred one of these serio-comic troubles which illustrates, not only the temper of the people, but also what was said in regard to the crudeness of the notions of religious freedom held by many of the first settlers, and the perplexities in which it involved them. For this reason we follow our author in copying Winthrop's account of it.

"At Providence also the devil was not idle. For whereas at their first coming thither Mr. Williams and the rest did make an order that no man should be molested for his conscience, now men's wives, and children, and servants, claiming liberty hereby to go to all religious meetings, though never so often, or though private, upon the week days; and because one Verin refused to let his wife go to Mr. Williams's so often as she was called for, they required to have him censured. But there stood up one Arnold, a witty man of their own company, and withstood it, telling them that when he consented to that order, he never intended it should extend to the breach of any ordinance of God, such as the subjection of wives to their husbands, etc., and gave divers solid reasons against it. Then one Greene replied, that if they should restrain their wives, etc., all the women in the country would cry out against them, etc. Arnold answered him thus: Did you pretend to leave the Massachusetts because you would not offend God to please men, and would you now break an ordinance and commandment of God to please women? Some were of opinion that if Verin would not suffer his wife to have her liberty, the church should dispose her to some other man who would use her better. Arnold told them that it was not the woman's desire to go so oft from home, but only Mr. Williams's and others'. In conclusion, when they would have censured Verin, Arnold told them that it was against their own order, for Verin did that he did out of conscience; and their order was that no man should be censured for his conscience!"

Mr. Verin, however, was "withheld from the liberty of voting" till he should repent.

But with all these qualifications of our author's views we may still join with him heartily in the chief result at which he arrives. In spite of the imperfect comprehension of their own principles by a large portion of the early settlers of Rhode Island; in spite of the unfortunate illustrations of their working too often found in her early history, the experience of more than two hundred years has proved that they were radically right. The Puritan theocracy has fulfilled its mission and passed away; but the "exorbitant novelty" which it expelled from its midst has become the accepted

rule of their descendants, and of the whole nation. Williams and his compeers have succeeded in the wish so beautifully characterized in the charter of 1693, "to hold forth a lively experiment, that a most flourishing civil state may stand and best be maintained with a full liberty in religious concerns." It must be remembered to their credit, also, that by them this doctrine was not merely held when they were a persecuted minority of another state, and abandoned as soon as powers of government were lodged in their own hands, as has too often been the case elsewhere. It has already been suggested that, at their first departure from Massachusetts, it had but very little prominence among their distinctive tenets. It developed with their growth as an independent colony, and seems to have been more clearly defined and firmly established in the minds of their leaders, in proportion as the temptations to forget or ignore it increased. Roger Williams was President of the colony under the Parliamentary charter, when he wrote that letter to the people of Warwick, to which allusion has already been made, and which, as an apt illustration of religious liberty and its limits, has perhaps never been surpassed:

"There goes many a ship to sea, with many hundred souls in one ship, whose weal and woe is common, and is a true picture of a commonwealth, or a human combination or society. It hath fallen out sometimes that both Papists and Protestants, Jews and Turks, may be embarked in one ship; upon which supposal I affirm that all the liberty of conscience that ever I pleaded for, turns upon these two hinges: that none of the Papists, Protestants, Jews, or Turks, be forced to come to the ship's prayers or worship, nor compelled from their particular prayers or worship, if they practise any. I further add, that I never denied, that notwithstanding this liberty, the commander of the ship ought to command the ship's course, yea, and also command that justice, peace, and sobriety be kept and practised, both among the seamen and all the passengers."

Still more significant, as the deliberate expression of the whole body, are the words with which they close their first code of laws, passed in 1647:

"These are the laws which concern all men, and these are the penalties for the transgression thereof, which by common consent are ratified and established throughout the whole colony; and otherwise than thus what is herein forbidden, *all men may walk as their consciences persuade them, every one in the name of his God*; and let the saints of the Most High walk in this colony without molestation, in the name of Jehovah, their God, for ever and ever."

These words deserve careful study, for they undoubtedly present us with the view of toleration taken by the clearest and most advanced minds of the infant colony, and accepted and acted upon by the rest. It could have been no accident that inserted the marked antithesis between "every one in the name of HIS God," and "the saints of the Most High in the name of Jehovah THEIR God." This indeed was toleration in its highest and truest sense, and not the mere indifference of men who, without religion themselves, were careless of its existence or absence in others. The

founders of Rhode Island, as a body, were as devotedly religious as the men of the Bay. The very first compact by which they incorporated themselves into a "Bodie Politick," promised also to "submit their lives, persons, and estates unto their Lord Jesus Christ, and to all those perfect and most absolute laws of his, given in his most holy word of truth, to be guided and governed thereby." Their fondest hope was to found a Christian community, and for themselves and their houses to "walk in the name of Jehovah their God." Yet with all this they were tolerant. They dared to make the experiment from which the Puritans had shrunk, and to welcome among them, with equal privileges, Papist and Protestant, Jew and Turk, each in the name of *his* God, trusting simply to the Almighty for the protection of his own truth. We shall look in vain through uninspired legislation for a nobler sentiment than that contained in this remarkable section.

In conclusion, we must speak more briefly than strict justice requires, of Mr. Arnold's positive merit as a historian. The amount of labor involved in his work can only be fully appreciated by one who has examined the sources from which it is derived. A great portion of the most valuable original authorities upon Rhode Island history still remain in manuscript, many of them accessible only in the archives of transatlantic governments. Of the printed works referring to the subject, the majority are by writers unfriendly to the colony and its founders, and require most careful and laborious scrutiny, not merely as to their opinions, but their facts. For his discharge of this, the first and fundamental duty of the historian, Mr. Arnold can hardly be too highly praised. Every page of the book attests the care with which it has been performed.¹ His account of Andros's administration may be cited as an example of the new light thrown upon New England history by his labors.

In the use of the materials thus gathered, he has been happy in finding the middle course between the two errors alluded to at the commencement of this Article. His style is always perspicuous, and except where his beloved Indians take possession of his pen, remarkably simple and unaffected. Space has not allowed us to animadvert upon his extreme partiality to Indian character, the only prepossession that seems able to color his view of actual facts, and to seduce him from a critical examination of his authorities. Roger Williams himself, with all his friendship for the savages, and the many benefits he received at their hands, would hardly have invested them with that halo of native nobility and "chivalric honor" in which our historian, at this safe distance, contemplates them; or have

¹ The only exceptions we can make to this remark relate to matters incidentally alluded to in the course of the narrative, and not falling directly within the field of the author's researches. We may mention as examples, the reference to the Stuarts as being Roman Catholics in 1660 (p. 274); to James as the reigning monarch in 1678 (p. 449); and to the invasion of Louis XIV. in 1692 (p. 527). These slips of the pen would undoubtedly not escape the author's vigilant eye in a second edition.

been led to justify their breach of treaties by such reasoning as that at the end of his sixth chapter.

That the best part of Rhode Island character has survived its early eccentricities, and come down to the present day, we need no better proof than the spirit of the book before us. In its sympathy with all that is good and just; in its manly indignation against oppression of every kind and meanness in every place; in its hopeful reliance on the high destinies of man, the tone of Mr. Arnold's work is worthy of all praise, and, with its other merits, will secure it a permanent place among the records of the American nation.

FLEURY'S ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY.¹

THE *Histoire Ecclesiastique* of Claude Fleury, confessor to Louis XV. was published in Paris in 1691. It contained twenty volumes, and brought the account of the church down to the year 1414. It was then continued, to the year 1595, by *Fabre*, in six additional volumes; to which *La Croix* added six volumes more. It is thus one of the most voluminous productions in the department of Ecclesiastical History.

A translation of the work was made by *Herbert*, and published at London, 1728, from which a selection has been made by John Henry Newman of Oxford, that comprises the history of the church from the year 381 to the year 456. The editor prefaces the work with an Essay upon Ecclesiastical Miracles, in which he maintains the continuance of supernatural powers in the ancient church, and asserts that "the view which he has taken of the primitive miracles is applicable in defence of the mediæval period also." The essay is valuable for the information which it contains; but is so saturated with the credulity of the Oxford Tractarians, as to be of little worth in respect to the principles and grounds of belief.

The merits of Fleury are such as to justify this circulation among English readers. In respect to purely narrative qualities, the historians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, both secular and sacred, compare favorably with those of the nineteenth. The problem of history with them was less recondite and philosophical. They aimed, principally, to give an easy and flowing account of events, without referring everything to the profounder causes and influences. As a consequence, the pictorial effect was greater. It is true that their narratives tend to prolixity, and their style is somewhat lacking in condensation, vividness, and energy. But, on the other hand, the connection of events is never lost for a moment, the reader finds it easy to follow the course of the narrative, and an interest is maintained by the very smoothness and fluency of the composition.

Fleury's history exhibits these characteristics in a good degree. He is a devout Roman Catholic, and writes like one, upon the points controverted between Protestants and Papists. But the most zealous Protestant finds it

¹ The Ecclesiastical History of M. L'Abbé Fleury, Translated, with Notes. Oxford: John Henry Parker. Rivingtons, London. 1842.

refreshing to pass from the hard, arid rationalism of some historians of his own communion, to the warm, though superstitious, devoutness of a son of the church. It is true that he misses the keen and searching glance of Protestant criticism, and the unvarying confidence which is placed in everything that is Catholic and ecclesiastical becomes tedious. But he feels that he is in contact with a mind that is neither atheistic nor pantheistic. But the chief value and interest in Fleury's narrative arises from the very full and pertinent citation from the immediate sources. Long and connected passages from the patristic writers are translated and skilfully woven into the fabric, so that the reader feels a double influence: that arising from the mind of the historian, and that issuing from the tomes of the ancient Fathers. The student of ecclesiastical history is in danger of neglecting the immediate sources. The field which he has to survey is so extensive, the time which he has to devote to the immense subject is so limited, and the general history together with the special histories and monographs, are so numerous, that he finds it difficult to reach the original documents. Now the effect of a perusal of a history like that of Fleury, is to bring him in contact with the very language and thoughts of the early writers themselves. For though it be a translated extract, still it certainly yields the flavor of the original Latin or Greek, far more than the condensed generalization of the philosophic historian does. And even when the historian recites, from the ancient writers, accounts of miracles and wonders, of saints and virgins, of monks and anchorites, with unquestioning confidence in their credibility, while yet the reader is certain that there must have been great self-delusion and exaggeration, still the *picture of the time* which is given is unquestionably life-like. A writer like Fleury, because of his simplicity and lack of a proper historical scepticism, often exhibits the very form and pressure of the age. He is the Herodotus, who never fabricates anything himself, but sets down upon his page everything that he sees and hears, and thereby presents to the reader the very liveliest picture of antiquity, even though it be not a veracious story in every particular.

The section of Fleury's history which the Oxford editor has selected, is exceedingly interesting. It commences with the second general council of Constantinople, in 381, when the great trinitarian controversy was winding up, and the final shadings were given to the Nicene delineation of this difficult subject. And it closes with the council of Chalcedon, in 451, when the doctrine of the two natures in the one person of Christ was carefully enunciated in opposition to the two errors of Nestorianism and Eutychianism. Midway between, occurred the Pelagian controversy. There was great mental activity within this period. The outward history is not so exciting as in the centuries that preceded and that followed; but the intellectual features are very striking. The great churchmen are thinking, and arguing, and preaching, and planning, and organizing with remarkable energy. The active portion of the lives of *Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, Gregory Nazianzen, Cyril, Chrysostom, Hilary, and Leo*, falls within this period, and fills it full of ideas and forces.

The biographic elements in Fleury's history impart no little charm and freshness to his voluminous labors. His analytical summary of the writings of the Fathers, puts the reader in possession of their thoughts and arguments to such an extent as to whet his appetite for a yet more minute knowledge of them. His descriptions of the scenes, amidst which important events occurred, are oftentimes very picturesque and effective. The following picture of the circumstances under which the œcumenical council of Chalcedon met, is a good illustration, and with it, we close our notice of a work which the reader of church history will find to be both agreeable and instructive. "The bishops having arrived at Chalcedon from Nice, and the emperor's great officers having crossed over from Constantinople, the council assembled in the church of St. Euphemia the Martyr, situated outside the city, near the sea-coast, being only two stadia, or two hundred and fifty paces distant from the Bosphorus. It was built on a gently-rising ground; and though its elevation was considerable, the ascent was so easy as to be scarcely perceived. It commanded a prospect of great beauty: beneath it, were fair tracts of meadow and cornfield, with trees of every foliage; above it, mountains clothed with woods; on one side you saw the sea playing calmly against the shore; on another, swelling with surge; in the foreground stood the city of Constantinople, which of itself was a magnificent spectacle. You first entered into a large open court, ornamented with pillars on every side; thence you passed to the basilica, which was almost as spacious, and similarly decorated with pillars, but roofed in. Beyond this was a circular building, running up to a dome, which was supported by columns, with a gallery running round it, for the people to pray and hear the service in. Under this dome, on the east side, stood the tomb of the saint, whose relics were enclosed in a silver shrine. Men perceived a fragrant perfume ever issuing from it, and it was held that many miracles had been wrought there. Sometimes the bishop of Constantinople came to visit it with the emperor, the magistrates, and all the people. On these occasions the bishop went within the chancel, and, through a small opening on the left side of the sepulchre, thrust in an iron rod, with a sponge at the end of it, which he drew back full of blood, and this blood he distributed to all the people; so that drops of it were carried to all parts of the world. Near the tomb of the saint hung a painting on cloth, executed by the hand of a great master, in which all the circumstances of her martyrdom were represented. Such was the church of St. Euphemia, near Chalcedon."

MONOD'S SAINT PAUL.¹

THESE discourses are marked by individuality. Monod's mind, like that of Guizot and Vinet, had more affinities with the elder than with the present Frenchman. It exhibits that union of thoughtfulness with clearness

¹ Saint Paul: Five Discourses by Adolphe Monod. Translated from the French, by Rev. J. H. Myers, D. D. Andover: Warren F. Draper.

and vivacity, which is seen in Pascal and Calvin, and also in the earlier French literature generally. Devoting his powers as he did, to the pulpit almost exclusively, and studying the popular mind in order that he might address it in the most effective manner, — at the same time careful not to sacrifice truth to mere popularity, — this French preacher is one of the best models of a Christian orator, even for the Englishman.

These five discourses portray the more prominent characteristics of the apostle Paul. The first describes the work which it was given him to do ; the second analyzes the pathetic, tearful quality of his Christianity ; the third relates his conversion in its psychological aspects ; the fourth is an exceedingly interesting and original picture of the peculiar characteristics, the strong points and the weaknesses, of his organization ; and the last is an inspiring delineation of him as an example for the preacher in all time, though with special reference to this.

This little volume we regard as a very valuable addition to what may be called the "Literature of the Apostle Paul." The number of books that have been composed upon St. Paul, is one of the many proofs of his greatness, both by nature and grace. But of them all, there is not a more vital and appreciating book than this of Monod. Original and suggestive thoughts are continually struck out upon collateral subjects, while yet the principal aim of the work is never lost sight of. The following extract is an illustration. "The labor of a writer is not to be measured by the number of pages which he has written. A great tragic actor, in modern times, has somewhere said (pardon this comparison, I have need of it to illustrate my thought), 'I am complimented for awakening in the mind a crowd of thoughts by one word, very simple in appearance ; my intonation seems to be the page of a book : it is because, in fact, that intonation is the result of a book of reflections.' A profound thought, because true, and which, on account of its being drawn from an order of facts fallen into deserved discredit, does not cast the less light on many things which escape the common eye ; for all kinds of human greatness touch upon one another at certain points. The same thing applies to such a stroke of Raphael's pencil, to such a stroke of the chisel of Michael Angelo, and to such an intonation of a Roscius ; an instant only is required to give it ; but years were required to prepare it. Let us speak only of the art of writing, which most closely resembles that labor on the part of our apostle which I am inviting you to remark. Every one of those fruitful words, that you admire in a great writer, is the product of a long series of thoughts and of experiences which he was obliged, by a double effort, first to gather from every side, and then to concentrate into a vital résumé. You say, as you read it, 'It is only a line ;' but it is because you see not, under that line, the infinite number of essays and of erasures that have preceded it. I am not speaking of essays and erasures which are made on paper, although it is right to make an estimate of those ; I speak of essays and erasures which are made in the inward man, in the mind, in the heart, in the conscience, by meditation, by reading, by watchings, by trials, by grief, by blood, by tears" (pp. 29, 30). The account of the *physique* of

the apostle, in its relations to eloquence (p. 115 seq.), will interest the preacher.

The translation is faithful and elegant; reproducing, in no ordinary degree, the finer and more intangible qualities in the style of a vivid and commanding orator.

RAWLINSON'S BAMPTON LECTURES.¹

THOSE who have read Mr. Rawlinson's admirable translation of Herodotus, in four large and beautiful volumes, published in London, in 1858—60, with copious notes, erudite historical essays, and accurate pictorial illustrations, will of necessity be eager to possess these Bampton Lectures. In these, the classical learning of Rev. George Rawlinson, the wonderful researches and palaeographic discoveries of Col. Sir Henry Rawlinson, Sir J. G. Wilkinson, Mr. Layard, and others, are all tersely and skilfully applied to the illustration of the HISTORICAL EVIDENCES OF THE TRUTH OF THE SCRIPTURE RECORDS, both of the Old and the New Testament. It is one of the most beautiful products of modern sacred learning.

The researches in Egypt and the East, of the last fifteen or twenty years, have added invaluable treasures to our former stock of external evidence to the historical accuracy of our scripture records; and this is the first attempt to arrange, condense, and exhibit them in a popular form. The attempt has been preëminently successful. But to use the lectures to advantage, one must have ready access to Rawlinson's Herodotus; for, the most important proofs and illustrations, which are fully given in the "Herodotus," are generally but briefly alluded to in the lectures and the notes which accompany them. The American edition of the lectures has this one great advantage over the English, that the notes are all translated by a competent hand; but we cannot say much for the American edition of the "Herodotus," as compared with the English.

To stimulate curiosity, we may mention, as new sources of evidence employed in these lectures, the signet cylinder or official seal of Chedorlaomer, king of Elam, the contemporary of Abraham (Gen. 14 : 1), first brought to England by Sir Robert Ker Porter, more than forty years ago (Ker Porter's Travels, vol. ii. p. 522—23, plate 79), but only recently deciphered and identified by Sir Henry Rawlinson (Rawlinson's Herodotus, vol. i. p. 535—36, 446, English edition); two or three striking portraits, and a quite copious autobiography of Sennacherib, the great king of Assyria and conqueror of Hezekiah, king of Judah (2 Kings 18 : 13—16), first found by Mr. La-

¹ The Historical Evidences of the Truth of the Scripture Records, stated anew, with Special Reference to the Doubts and Discoveries of Modern Times. In Eight Lectures, delivered in the Oxford University Pulpit, in the year 1859, on the Bampton Foundation. By George Rawlinson, M. A., late Fellow and Tutor of Exeter College, Editor of "The History of Herodotus," etc. From the London edition, with the Notes translated, by Rev. A. N. Arnold. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 12mo. pp. 454.

yard, in his excavations at Nineveh, but now transferred to the British Museum, and read by Sir Henry Rawlinson (Rawlinson's *Herodotus*, vol. i. p. 475—80); and a brief autobiography of Nebuchadnezzar, in which there seems to be a distinct allusion to his insanity or lycanthropy (*Dan.* 4 : 36); for, in the midst of his enumeration of the great works he had done, full of the boasting spirit censured by the prophet Daniel; as, for example, —“In Babylon, the city which is the delight of my eyes, and which I have glorified . . . in the great palace called the Wonder of Mankind . . . I cut off the floods of the water, and the foundations I protected . . . with pillars and beams plated with copper and strengthened with iron, I built up its gates . . . silver, and gold, and precious stones, whose names were almost unknown, I stored up inside, and placed there the treasure-house of my kingdom,” — he suddenly breaks off and says: “Four years (?) the seat of my kingdom in the city . . . did not rejoice [my] heart; in all my dominions I did not build a high place of power; the precious treasures of my kingdom I did not lay up; in Babylon, buildings for myself and the honor of my kingdom, I did not lay out; in the worship of Merodach my lord, the joy of my breast (?), in Babylon, the city of his sovereignty and the seat of my empire, I did not sing his praises (?), and I did not furnish his altars, nor did I clear out the canals,” etc. (The “Standard Inscription,” Rawlinson's *Herodotus*, vol. ii. p. 585—87.) In the famous “Behistun Inscriptions,” we have an autobiography of Darius Hystaspes, the patron of Ezra, the restorer of the Jewish nationality after the great captivity (*Ezra* 5 : 5. 6 : 1—15. Rawlinson's *Herodotus*, vol. ii. 590—616).

The great work of antiquarian research, in this direction, is yet only in its beginning; but already it puts to shame the anti-scriptural myth-makers of the generation which is now passing away.

STIER'S WORDS OF JESUS.¹

THE American edition of Stier's Words of Jesus is an exact reprint of the English, evidently from the same plates. The English edition is in nine volumes; the American, in five — each of the first four containing two of the English edition. The first four volumes of the American edition are to embrace the Words or Discourses of Jesus to the time of his ascension. The fifth volume (the ninth of the English edition) is a recent addition to the author's work. It contains the Words of the Risen Saviour, — the Words addressed, from heaven, to the apostles Paul, Peter, and John; and also the Epistle of James expounded, in thirty-two discourses. The whole is already published in this country, except the fourth volume, which is shortly to appear.

¹ The Words of the Lord Jesus. By Rudolf Stier, Doctor of Theology, Chief Pastor and Superintendent of Schkeuditz. Translated from the Second Revised and Enlarged German edition. By the Rev. William B. Pope, London. New edition. Philadelphia: Smith, English and Co. New York: Sheldon and Co. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 8vo. 1859-60.

The author was, for some time, a Professor in the Missionary Institution at Bâle, but for many years has been a practical preacher. Besides the present work, he has published several others: The Discourses of the Apostles, in two volumes; Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews; also, to the Ephesians, and Corinthians. He has likewise written on the Psalms and Isaiah. His course of study, as well as his warm Christian sympathies with the teachings of Christ, have given him an eminent fitness "to unfold the meaning and harmony of the Word made flesh."

The author's mode of treatment is not what is called the strictly scientific, dealing only with the form but neglecting the spirit: "In these pages there is not the smallest paragraph which simply ministers food to our critical curiosity. Nothing seems to us more unnatural than a certain *dead, dry* handling of the word of life, — never speaking from the heart to the heart."¹ Though the work is not a commentary, in giving the mere naked meaning of the words; it is richer than any commentary ever can be, in setting forth the spirit and breadth of our Lord's discourses, and in revealing the rich veins of thought which they contain. "I have not neglected commentaries, . . . but I have with still more diligence, for now about thirty years, sought out, collected, and put to the most living use in my own heart and ministry, the immediate emanations of the living word." "The great and fundamental deficiency of nearly all learned exegesis, with which mine must forever differ, is its misapprehension of the *depth and fulness of meaning*, . . . which necessarily belongs to every word of the Spirit."

While the work is not controversial in form, its spirit and teachings are everywhere in opposition to the Rationalism so prevalent in the country, where it was produced.

Full as these volumes are (and by some they will be regarded as too voluminous), the author feels that "they are but hints, after all, which are now offered; with all their fulness, they are nothing more. For the author is deeply conscious that, upon no one single word has he done more than very partially draw out that fulness of meaning which is vaster than the ocean and deeper than the abyss." "I know that to interpret to the world the words of the Lord Jesus, is the loftiest task of human teaching or writing."

These several quotations from the author's Preface, indicate the views and spirit with which he entered upon the great work of expounding the Discourses of the Saviour. The views thus stated are happily illustrated in the work itself. The volumes are a rich storehouse of religious truth, always quickening and suggestive; and the preacher who shall make them a study, will discover a new richness and depth of meaning in the Words of Jesus; and will find his own mind more warmly interested in his great work of preaching the gospel.

¹ Preface.

LIFE OF BISHOP WILSON.¹

Energy of character, simplicity of purpose, moral courage, unfeigned humility, a devoted attachment to the Bible, a firm but charitable spirit, a fervid missionary zeal, habits of untiring industry and of persevering prayer, characterized the subject of this Memoir. His oddities added an interest to his daily life. He sometimes fell into errors; but he has given the best apology for them in the memorable words: "I have made ten thousand mistakes, but I have preached five thousand sermons." In fact he had preached five thousand eight hundred and six sermons, and addresses partaking of the character of sermons. Many of these discourses he delivered eleven and twelve times, and many oftener still. It is not strange, that a man who said and did so many things, should let some things escape him, which it were well to leave unsaid or undone. He was habitually about his Master's business. He sacrificed to it many of the pleasantries of life. Mr. Basil Woodd, one of his friends, "who was fond of a little quiet talk," made this complaint of him: "When I go to see Mr. Wilson, before I have well settled myself in the chair, and got into conversation, I hear him say, 'Good bye, dear Basil Woodd; here is your hat, and here is your umbrella.'" Bishop Wilson acted on the principle of Mr. Cecil, his predecessor at Bedford Row: "If a minister is always *to be had*, he is good for nothing."

We have been interested in reading Bishop Wilson's comments on the character and works of our own countrymen. He writes: "'Uncle Tom's Cabin' I have read and wept over. The genius, talent at description, choice of scenes, contrasts, are all admirable. The religion is not clear; the conversations are enthusiastic; the character of Cassy ought to have been suppressed." Again he writes: "I have read straight through 'Dred.' It is admirable; equal, I think, to Uncle Tom. I look upon Dred's character as a fine conception of the fanaticism engendered by Scripture phrases in an oppressed and powerful mind."

Of course, the most important part of this Memoir is the narrative of Bishop Wilson's residence in India. Here he was a consistent, faithful, intrepid missionary of the cross. Here he died, full of years and full of honors. Allan Webb, apostrophizing the lifeless body of the Bishop, exclaimed: "A brave and noble soldier; a wise, bold leader. I esteem it the greatest privilege of my life to have known and loved him."

¹ The Life of Daniel Wilson, D. D., Bishop of Calcutta and Metropolitan of India. By Josiah Bateman, M. A., Rector of North Gray, Kent; his son-in-law and first Chaplain. With portraits, map, and illustrations. Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 59 Washington Street. New York: Sheldon and Company. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1860. pp. 760. 8vo.

THE DIVINE HUMAN IN THE SCRIPTURES.¹

This volume contains many important suggestions on the Internal Evidence of the Bible, on the probability of miraculous interpositions in support of it, and on the importance of a profound and familiar acquaintance with the written word, in order to appreciate the entire argument in its favor. Its main object is to prove, that the very language of the Bible is divine. "This one may hold without being driven to that extreme view of verbal inspiration, which regards the sacred penmen as mere amanuenses, writing words and painting figures dictated to them by a power and an intelligence acting in a manner wholly extraneous to the laws of their own spirits, except so far as those laws are merely physical or mechanical" (pp. 27, 28).

Many who believe that the inspiration of the Bible is plenary, deny that it is verbal. But they do not mean by the "verbal inspiration" which they deny, what Professor Lewis means by the "verbal inspiration" which he defends. A dispute between him and them would relate, chiefly, to the use of terms. They will cordially adopt his assertion, that "the very language of scripture is specially and most efficiently designed for our moral and spiritual instruction" (p. 382).

- The present volume is designed as an Introduction to a forthcoming work on the Figurative Language of the Scriptures. It would be unseemly, therefore, to comment at length on the portico, before we have seen the entire edifice which it is to adorn. It is enough to say, that the volume is characterized by a spirituality of conception and an affluence of language, leading us to anticipate that the ensuing work will be one of rare interest.

DAWSON'S ARCHAIA.²

THE apparent conflict between geology and revelation has led many biblical and scientific scholars to direct their attention to the subject, of late years. The author entered upon this investigation primarily for his own private information; but has now published the results as "affording the best answer he can give to the numerous questions addressed to him in his capacity of a teacher of geology."³ The work does not aim "to establish a scheme of reconciliation between geology and the Bible. It is the result of a series of exegetical studies of the first chapter of Genesis, in connection with the numerous incidental references to nature and creation in other

¹ *The Divine Human in the Scriptures.* By Tayler Lewis, Union College. New York: Carter and Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1860. pp. 400. 18mo.

² *Archæia; or Studies of the Cosmogony and Natural History of the Hebrew Scriptures.* By J. W. Dawson, LL. D., F. G. S., Principal of McGill College, Author of "*Acadian Geology*," etc. Montreal: B. Dawson and Son. London: Sampson Low, Son, and Co. 1860. 12mo. pp. 400.

³ Preface.

parts of the holy scriptures.”¹ For the geologist it presents “a digest of the cosmical doctrines to be found in the Hebrew scriptures,” interpreted from the present position of geological science; and it shows the student of the Bible how “the scriptural cosmogony presents itself to a working naturalist,” in view of “the mass of facts and principles accumulated by modern science.”

The views of the writer are broad and Christian. He weighs fairly the records of nature and revelation. He would not erect a barrier “between faith and reason,” neither “excluding from nature the idea of creative power,” nor “from religion the noble cosmogony of the Bible. His utmost hopes will be realized if he can secure the approbation of those higher minds, in which the love of God is united with the study of his works; and aid, in some small degree, in redeeming the subject from the narrow views which are, unhappily, too prevalent.”¹

The author is familiar with the whole range of his subject, and has grasped it vigorously. The discussions are conducted with fairness and ability, and written in a clear and pleasant style.

The chapters on the Days of Creation, and on the Unity and Antiquity of Man, are very full, and present broad and well-digested views of the subjects. The last chapter, entitled Comparisons and Conclusions, which is also quite full, treats of the Correspondences between the teachings of nature and those of revelation on the subject of the creation.

The student of the Bible, who wishes to understand the difficulties which have suggested themselves in connection with the biblical account of the creation, and the general method of meeting them, will find this a valuable volume.

THE GREAT PYRAMID.²

From the earliest times, the object for which the great pyramids of Egypt were built, has been doubtful. The traveller who stands by the side of the vast structure at Gizeh, and feels that it is the oldest and most imposing monument in the world, still asks: “Why was it built?” But when, through a narrow and toilsome passage, he makes his way into the interior, and finds himself in the King’s Chamber, lined with highly-polished Thebaic marble, or porphyry, and in the centre of the chamber a sarcophagus of one piece of the same marble, he yields pretty readily to the conclusion that the structure was intended as a sepulchre of kings. This has been the view of most writers who have described the pyramids. This was the view of Strabo and Diodorus Siculus; and with it the general opinion has coincided. Different opinions, however, have at various times prevailed to some extent. The scientific men who accompanied the French expedition to Egypt, at the begin-

¹ Preface.

² The Great Pyramid: Why was it built, and Who built it? By John Taylor, author of “Junius Identified,” etc. London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts. 1859. 12mo., pp. 314.

ning of this century, after measuring the three largest pyramids, "came to the conclusion that not only were they founded on certain geometrical principles, but that they were intended to perpetuate the memory of the standard by which they were constructed." This opinion, however, was not permanent.

Our author's views are wholly at variance with the common belief. He believes that the pyramids were constructed "that they might serve as a record and memorial, to the end of time, of the measure of the earth; and secondly, form a standard of measures of length, capacity, and weight, to which all nations might appeal, as to a common authority."¹ In illustration of his views, and as an explanation why the height of the Great Pyramid sustains such a relation to the length of one of its sides, he says: [The founders] "had ascertained its [the earth's] circumference, and were now desirous of leaving behind them a record of that circumference as correct and imperishable as it was possible for them to construct. They assumed the earth to be a perfect sphere; and as they knew that the radius of a circle must bear a certain proportion to its circumference, they then built a pyramid of such a height, in proportion to its base, that its perpendicular would be equal to the radius of a circle equal in circumference to the perimetre of the base."² "How the thought occurred to them we cannot tell; but a more proper monument for this purpose could not have been devised, than a vast pyramid with a square base, the vertical height of which pyramid should be the radius of a sphere in its circumference equal to that base. It was impossible to build a hemisphere of so large a size. In the form of a pyramid, all those truths might be declared which they had taken so much pains to learn;" and "the ascertained measure of a degree of the earth's circumference might be engraven upon its [the pyramid's] surface, in large and deeply-incised characters." Then permanent provision might be made "for communicating, from generation to generation, to the latest posterity, those facts and that explanatory knowledge which they desired to impart."³

With reference to the King's Chamber inside of the pyramid, and the object for which the so-called sarcophagus, or king's monument, was placed there, and the great pains taken to secure a proper ventilation for all time, by means of air channels, the author says: "What could be the reason that this chamber, containing the king's monument, should have had so much pains bestowed on it, and that an apartment with no other furniture in it than an empty porphyry Coffin [the sarcophagus], should have been ventilated as perfectly as if it were intended for the abode of a human being?"⁴ "It is not likely that the chamber was designed for the reception of a dead body, for ventilation was in that respect unnecessary." "The only conclusion to which we can come is, that the Coffin called the King's Monument was itself the object for which all this care and foresight were taken. That this Coffin was designed to be kept safe in its cell, incapable of being re-

¹ p. 224.² p. 19.³ p. 20.⁴ p. 117.

moved if it were discovered, and made as secure from injury in the lapse of ages, as porphyry, in a well-ventilated room, might reasonably be supposed to be."¹

From these and other circumstances, together with the evident care taken in the position of the Coffin, — it being exactly in the meridian north and south, and equidistant from all sides of the room, except that it is twice as far from the east side as from the west, — it is inferred that this porphyry Coffin was placed here from some other object than as a resting-place for the dead; that object the author thinks was that it might serve as a *measure of capacity*. No one previous to him seems to have imagined that the *interior* of this Coffin was designed to be a standard of *measures of capacity*, though the French savans thought they had discovered a *measure of length* from its *exterior* length.

He then proceeds to compare this, as a measure of capacity, with other standards, and finds a remarkable harmony between them. The Hebrews must have acknowledged it as "the standard of all their measures of capacity, or it could not have happened that the contents of the pyramid Coffin would have been equal to *four chomers of wheat*." The same harmony is found in regard to the Greek and Roman measures, and so down to the English measure, "as our *peck* of wheat is contained one hundred and twenty-eight times in that Coffin."

Moreover, the author makes this Coffin a *measure of weight*, on the principle that measures of *weight* are often founded on measures of *capacity*, as where we say that a cubic inch of water weighs so much.

Our author has great confidence that such were the objects for which the pyramids were built. "We know," says he, "by their [those who have described the pyramids] united testimony, as much of the purpose for which the pyramids were constructed, as we should probably have done had one of the chambers in the Great Pyramid been found to contain, in some secret recess, a detail of the undertaking, and of the motives which led to it."²

With regard to the builders of the Great Pyramid, the author thinks that Noah was the probable originator of it, and that the sons of Joktan, of the race of Shem, were the probable builders.

We have simply presented the general views of the author, and have no space for a critical examination of them. They are certainly ingenious and candid, and worthy of consideration; and the book throughout shows much research, and a skilful use of materials, from the author's point of view.

Mr. Taylor is the author of "Junius Identified;" and when that mysterious personage shall be fully revealed to the world, we shall look with new confidence upon the present interpretation of the Great Pyramid.

¹ p. 118.

² pp. 189, 200.

THE UNDERGRADUATE.¹

A new Quarterly, called the *Undergraduate*, has made its appearance since our last Number was published. Its name indicates its origin and general object. It is conducted by associations in the different Colleges, every College being invited to form an association and to contribute Articles. The compilation of the Articles thus furnished, as well as the immediate superintendence of the work, is in charge of the association in Yale College, where it is published. While it will be wholly managed by undergraduates, and much of the matter be supplied by them, it seeks contributions from graduates, and eminent scholars who have completed their professional course.

The general objects of the *Undergraduate*, as stated in the Prospectus, are, "to enlist the active talent of young men in American, and as far as possible, in Foreign Universities, in the discussion of questions, and the communication of intelligence, of common interest to students;" "to record the history, promote the intellectual improvement, elevate the moral aims, liberalize the views, and unite the sympathies of Academical, Collegiate, and Professional students."

In its range of discussion it is to embrace "all subjects of general interest to undergraduates, Faculties, and the friends of liberal education." Its matter will consist of Essays and News Articles; the latter to give information in regard to the general condition and prospects of the Colleges, "the courses of study," "local customs," "religious condition," "literary societies," and whatever may be of value to students and instructors; the former to present considerations "upon the laws of study, prescribed and miscellaneous duties, moral, social, and physical training, early mistakes and irregularities, the causes of error and the means of reform," it being expected that Professional students will furnish most of the Articles on these latter subjects.

The general appearance of the first Number promises well for the future character and success of the work. While it is not free from faults, and contains some expressions and sentiments that ought to have been excluded from its pages, its tone and character, in the main, are honorable to the enterprise that projected it, and to the scholarship of those who have contributed its Articles. Most of the contributions are well written, and of permanent interest; some are specimens of fine taste and finished scholarship. As a whole, it is greatly in advance of the usual publications issued by undergraduates. Its tone, its literary character, its aims are higher than anything before from similar sources; and its influence, too, if it shall be wisely managed, will be salutary upon the young men in our Colleges, in creating a closer bond between them, in calling their attention, in a way most likely to benefit them, to their defects, their mistakes, proper methods of study,

¹ The *Undergraduate*: Conducted by an Association of Collegiate and Professional Students in the United States and Europe. January, 1860.

the true objects to be aimed at in their course, and the best way to secure them.

We think it a great mistake for College students to devote to miscellaneous reading, or to writing, the time necessary for the most thorough preparation of their appropriate studies; the College curriculum, in its widest range and severest exactions, is the first thing to be mastered; a neglect here is a loss which cannot be easily repaired. But in all our Colleges, there are young men of vigorous minds, who by proper economy of time, can, during their course, furnish at least one valuable Article, and in doing it, benefit themselves and others. If the work shall be conducted on this principle, and with the same energy, and readiness to take counsel, that have brought it to its present honorable position, and with a constant watchfulness against admitting to its pages all crudities, unsound or lax sentiments, it will prove a new and valuable means of good in our literary institutions. Thus conducted, we give it our best wishes and our hearty coöperation.

THE HISTORICAL BOOKS OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES. — Judges, Ruth, I. and II. Samuel, I. and II. Kings, I. and II. Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther. With a Critical and Explanatory Commentary. By the Rev. Robert Jamieson, D. D., Minister of St. Paul's Parish, Glasgow, Scotland. Philadelphia: William S. and Alfred Martien, No. 606 Chestnut street. 1860. pp. 360. 18 mo.

We seldom peruse a volume in which so great an amount of matter is compressed into so small a compass, as we find in the present work. The columns are arranged for convenient reference, and are richly freighted with judicious remark. It is not an immaculate commentary, but is a Manual well fitted for frequent and rapid consultation. In addition to the more elaborate expositions of the Bible, the student needs such Manuals of easy reference, as the present work of Dr. Jamieson.

THE PURITANS: or, The Church, Court, and Parliament of England, during the reigns of Edward VI. and Queen Elizabeth. By Samuel Hopkins. In three volumes. Vol. II. Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 59 Washington street. New York: Sheldon and Company. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1860. pp. 539. 8vo.

The mechanical execution of the second volume, like that of the first, of Hopkins's History, is very imposing. The style of this, as of the previous volume, is racy, vigorous, animating. It requires some painstaking to discriminate between the veritable *history*, and the dramatic *representation*; but a vigilant reader is often surprised at the minute accuracy of the narrative, and the punctilious care to make the general impression of it truthful and wholesome.

LECTURES ON THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. By George P. Marsh. New York : Charles Scribner, Grand street. London : Sampson Low, Son, and Company. 1860. pp. 697. 8vo.

This volume attests its author's great familiarity with the structure and sources of the English language. It is also a monument of his extensive learning in other departments of literature and science. It is admirably fitted to awaken an interest in the history and the character of our mother tongue. It is written in a neat, and sometimes powerful style; and will richly repay the labor which our clerical students may expend upon it.

THE WORKS OF NATHANAEL EMMONS, D. D., Third Pastor of the Church in Franklin, Mass., with a Memoir of his Life. Edited by Jacob Ide, D. D. Vol. III. Boston : Congregational Board of Publication, 23 Chauncy street. 1860. pp. 843. 8vo.

The second and third volumes of Emmons's writings have now been published, in excellent style, by the Congregational Board of Publication. These two volumes contain his "System of Theology," and form, of themselves, a complete work. It is very uncommon to find so unique and compact a system, embodied in a series of discourses; to find so close and so full a connection between the Christian doctrines and the Christian duties explained in one hundred and seven distinct sermons. The possibility of expressing so many profound thoughts, in so perspicuous a style, and in the form of discourses addressed to a country parish, illustrates the excellence of this homiletic form, its fitness to suggest truth to the intellect and to impress it on the heart. We are in danger of overlooking the dignity of the sermon.

ENGLISH INTELLIGENCE.

THE "Transactions of the London Philological Society" has reached its ninth volume. The society was formed in 1842, and has embraced among its members some of the most honored names in literature and science. Among these are sir William Hamilton, bishops Bloomfield and Thirlwall, Dr. Lee, Dr. Whewell, Lord Macaulay, Dr. Thomas Arnold, George Grote, Cardinal Wiseman, Archdeacon Hare, R. G. Latham, Prof. H. H. Wilson, Rev. Charles Merivale, Dr. Donaldson, Prof. Key, Rev. R. Garnett, etc. The Articles in these volumes of Transactions embrace a wide range of subjects, though all of them relate, more or less directly, to the subject of philology. The following are specimens of the topics treated : Traces of Egyptian Origin in the Alphabets of Greece and Rome ; Elements of Language ; Greek and English Versification ; Anglo-Saxon termination *ing* ; Language and Dialects of the British Islands ; English Orthography ; Plato's Number ; Greek Hexameters ; Greek Middle Verb ; Vowel Assimilation ; False Ety-

mologies; Greek Accentuation; Written Language of China; Tamuli Language; Position and Tactics of the Contending Fleets in the Battle of Salamis; Natural Sounds, etc.

The subjects are generally treated with marked ability; and the volumes will be a valuable addition to any library.

The English Cyclopædia of Biography, conducted by Charles Knight, was completed in 1858. It is in six quarto volumes, the whole embracing over three thousand pages. Each page contains an unusual amount of matter, the six volumes being equal, in amount, to forty volumes of the French "*Biographie Universelle*," and one third more than Rose's *Biographical Dictionary*. No work of the kind will claim to be complete; but we have seen no English Biographical Dictionary that is so full, and meets so well the general objects of such a work. The value of the work is greatly increased by the introduction of the names of living persons. It contains more than eight hundred such names. The work is published at the low price of 3£.

Three new volumes have recently been added to the *Bibliotheca Classica*, edited by Prof. Long: the third and concluding volume of Euripides, by F. A. Paley; the first volume of Sophocles (containing *Œdipus Tyrannus*, *Œdipus Colonus*, and *Antigone*), by Rev. F. H. M. Blaydes; and the first volume of Demosthenes (comprising the *Olynthiac Orations*, the *Philippics*, the *De Corona*, and several shorter compositions). The series of the *Bibliotheca Classica* with English Notes, and suitable Introductions, now contains sixteen volumes. The work still retains its high and scholarly character. Volumes are in progress on Plato (*Gorgias*, *Phædrus*, and *Symposium*), Virgil (vol. ii, *Æneid*), Tacitus, and Hesiod.

The want of reliable information respecting the more recent state and progress of Ceylon, has been very fully and satisfactorily supplied by the work of Sir James Emerson Tennett, two volumes, 8vo. It contains an account of the island, physical, historical, and topographical, with notices of its natural history, antiquities, and productions. It is also illustrated with maps, plans, and drawings; and the whole execution is in the best style. It contains a great amount of original research, and everywhere gives evidence of most faithful labor. The consideration of the subject of Christianity, in the island, is not embraced to any extent, as that is treated, by the author, in another work, entitled "*Christianity in Ceylon*." The third edition of the work before us was called for in less than two months after the first appeared.

"The Transmission of Ancient Books to Modern Times," in one 12mo. volume, by Isaac Taylor, is a useful treatise, both for the biblical and the classical scholar. There is here, in a compact form, what we have previously sought for in many independent sources. The work consists of two parts: "*The Transmission of Ancient Books*," and "*The Process of Historical Proof*." As the "*certainty of history and the truth of religion*" are inti-

mately connected with the faithful transmission of ancient books, the materials for forming a judgment on this subject become important. Such materials the author here furnishes.

The volume accordingly embraces the "date of ancient books as inferred from quotations of contemporary writers; ancient methods of writing; materials on which books were written; instruments of writing, and inks; changes in forms of letters; copyists, and the principal centres of the copying business; the diffusion and preservation of the copies;" also, "a concise account of the means by which the genuineness of ancient literature generally, and the authenticity of historical works especially, are ascertained;" with some "remarks upon the relative strength of the evidence usually adduced in behalf of the holy scriptures."

Messrs. Longman and Co., have in press a new Latin-English Dictionary, by Rev. J. T. White, and Rev. J. E. Riddle, of Oxford. It is founded on the *Larger Dictionary of Freund*, revised by himself, he having supplied to the authors many corrections of his own Dictionary, with various additions, made while preparing a new edition for the press. It is also to contain a great amount of entirely new matter, derived from other sources. Care is to be taken to arrange the meanings of words on correct principles. Etymology, too, is to receive special attention, as one of the most valuable means of determining the meanings of words. The work will contain some thousands of words and meanings more than can be found in any Latin-English Dictionary yet published.

From our knowledge of the qualifications of the gentlemen engaged upon the work, and the facilities at their command, as well as the amount of labor spent upon it, we are confident that this new Latin Dictionary will be much superior to any similar work.

We had intended to notice several other English books, but are prevented for want of space. Among these are the excellent *Commentary of Gerlach on the Pentateuch*, republished in this country by Smith, English and Co.; "*Earthly and Heavenly Things*," by Rev. James Grierson, D. D.; "*Studies on Pascal*," by Vinet; "*Christianity in the First Century*," by Charles Hoffmann, — these three published by Messrs. T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh.

SYLLABUS OF DR. N. W. TAYLOR'S TREATISE UPON MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT.

As the sole object of this Article is to bring Dr. Taylor's views within convenient reach of those who, for any reason, do not learn them from the treatise itself, a *syllabus* of the argument is now added, that the reader may the more readily perceive the relation of its various parts, and of the whole to the final conclusion.

(The figures on the left, refer to the page of the Treatise.)

VOL. I.

1, 7. Preliminary.

The various existing forms of moral government.

Man knows what a perfect moral government is.

Definition :

A perfect moral government is the influence of the authority, or of the rightful authority, of a moral governor, on moral beings, designed so to control their action as to secure the great end of action on their part, through the medium of law.

I. Is an influence on *moral beings*.

II. Implies a *moral governor*.

III. Is designed to secure the *great end of action*.

This is to secure the highest well-being, and to prevent the highest misery of all.

10 IV. Is the influence of *authority*.

Authority is the influence of that right to command which imposes an obligation to obey.

16 V. Is administered through the *medium of law*.

Definition of law :

The law of a perfect moral government is the promulgated will of the moral governor, as a decisive rule of action to his subjects, requiring benevolence on their part as the best kind of action, and as the sum of obedience, forbidding selfishness on their part as the worst kind of action, and the sum of disobedience, expressing his preference of the action required to its opposite, all things considered, his satisfaction with obedience and with nothing but obedience on the part of subjects, and his highest approbation of obedience and highest disapprobation of disobedience ; and including the appropriate sanctions of the moral governor's authority.

(1) Must be *promulgated*, and is *decisive*.

18 (2) Requires benevolence as the *best* and forbids selfishness as the *worst* kind of action. Proved :

(a) By their influence on *other* sentient beings than the agent.

19 (a²) Because both are *supreme* and *voluntary*.

- 23 (b²) Both are *intelligent*.
- 24 (c²) Both are *morally free*.
- 26 (d²) Both are *permanent*.
- 28 (e²) Both are *predominant*.
- 30 (b) By their relation to the agent himself.
This appears :
(a¹) From the tendency of the objects of action in each case.
(a²) Benevolence seeks an object fitted to give the highest happiness.
- 31 This is shown by an appeal to human consciousness, and from the nature of *good, value, etc.*
- 32 (b¹) Selfishness seeks an object fitted to secure the highest misery.
This is shown in like manner as (a²).
(b²) Because each is intelligent action.
(c²) Because each is the agent's own action.
(d²) Because each is free action.
- 36, 46 (e²) Because each is predominant action.
- 47 (3) Requires benevolence as the *sum* of obedience, and forbids selfishness as the *sum* of disobedience.
- 52 (a) One of these is the only action possible to moral beings in all the circumstances of their existence.
- 62 (b) These alone are right or wrong. This appears :
63 (a¹) From the established meanings of the words *right* and *wrong*.
- 66 (b¹) From the nature of subordinate action — the only other kind possible.
- 69 (4) Must express a preference of the action required, *all things considered*.
- 71 (5) The lawgiver can be satisfied with obedience and *nothing but obedience*. This appears because the law is an expression of his will, and requires the best action, and because obedience alone can sustain the authority of the governor.
- 78 (6) Must express the lawgiver's *highest* approbation of obedience, and *highest* disapprobation of disobedience.
- 82 (7) It *involves sanctions*. This appears because the authority of the governor depends upon the proof of his benevolence; such proof is specially demanded in the form of the manifestation of proper feelings toward right and wrong moral action; such manifestation can only be made by legal sanctions.
- 95 Definition of legal sanctions :

The sanctions of the law of a perfect moral government, consist in that natural good promised to obedience, and in that natural evil threatened to disobedience by the moral governor, which establish or ratify his authority as the decisive or necessary proof of it, by manifesting his benevolence in the form of his highest approbation of obe-

dience, and his highest disapprobation of disobedience, and which for this purpose include the highest possible degree of natural good in each case of obedience, and the highest possible degree of natural evil in each case of disobedience.

(a) They *ratify* the authority of the governor, and thus *sanction* his right to rule.

96 (b) They consist, exclusively, in *natural good and evil*.

98 (c) They are the *decisive* proof of authority.

99 (d) They are decisive proof, by manifesting the highest approbation of obedience, and the highest disapprobation of disobedience.

At this point of the argument, the presumption against the promulgation of such sanctions is removed, and a presumption in its favor established.

106 (e) They are the *necessary* proof of authority.

(a¹) They are necessary in *some* respects or under *some* relation.

This appears :

(a²) From the import of the phrase "legal sanctions."

107 (b¹) From the nature of the law of a perfect moral government.

(a³) Such a law requires an expression toward obedience and disobedience, fully proved to be sincere.

110 (b²) It must be an authoritative rule of action.

111 (c¹) Law without sanctions, is not law; but only advice.

(c²) From the fact that a law without sanctions is a decisive proof that the lawgiver is unable or unwilling to execute them.

112 (a⁴) From the fact that conformity and non-conformity to a law without sanctions, equally disprove and subvert authority.

114 (b³) Legal sanctions are necessary, as the necessary proof of his *benevolence*.

116 (a⁵) Such proof cannot be given by mere professions of proper feelings toward right and wrong.

119 (b⁴) Nor in certain other supposable ways.

(a⁶) Not by securing a greater amount of obedience without legal sanctions than with them.

122 (b⁵) Nor by promising reward to obedience but threatening no penalty to disobedience.

At this point in the argument, we see why attempts to prove the benevolence of God from the light of nature have so often failed.

127 (c³) They are necessary as proofs of his *highest* approbation of obedience, and *highest* disapprobation of disobedience; because,

128 (a⁷) Natural good and evil cannot become legal sanctions in certain other supposed modes:

(a⁸) Not as the mere dictate of individual kindness or unkindness;

- 129 (b⁴) Nor as moral discipline ;
- 130 (c⁴) Nor as the payment of a debt from the governor to the subject ;
- 131 (d⁴) Nor as the payment of a debt from the subject to the governor ;
- 131 (e⁴) Nor as mere motives ;
- 135 (f⁴) Nor because they are, abstractly, right ;
- 138 (g⁴) Nor as the dictate of *justice* as distinct from benevolence.
- 139 (b⁵) The nature of legal sanctions requires this.
- (c⁵) It is utterly insupportable and inconceivable that natural good and evil can become legal sanctions in any other way ; for,
- 139 (a⁶) When employed in the manner advocated, they are the most significant and appropriate expressions of these feelings of the lawgiver, for which reason he is bound to employ them.
- 139 (b⁶) If the supposition be admitted, then they must become legal sanctions either by showing no feeling in regard to obedience or disobedience, or by showing a less degree than the highest.
- (a⁶) It cannot be the former, from the nature of things.
- 141 (b⁶) It cannot be the latter ; for,
- (a⁶) A benevolent being will always entertain and express the *highest* degree of these feelings.
- 143 (b⁶) A deficiency of expression in the sanctions cannot be made up in other ways, even though the possibility be admitted of securing a greater amount of right moral action and consequent happiness, in the case supposed ; for,
- 144 (a⁷) The governor could furnish no proof, to his subjects, that such results would occur ;
- (b⁷) The probabilities would be strongly against their occurrence ; and,
- (c⁷) By the omission, the governor would disprove his benevolence and subvert his authority.
- 144 (c⁸) Moreover, if the best conceivable results should follow the supposed lower expression in the sanctions of law, it would still be impossible to prove the perfect benevolence of the lawgiver.
- (d⁸) Finally, in the case supposed, no evidence would be given that the lawgiver would annex the highest sanctions to his law, even though the greatest good required it.
- 147 (d⁸) The truth of the proposition (c³) further appears from the view which men entertain of the supreme law of the state.

- VOL. II. Distinction between the supreme law and various subordinate
 367 regulations, *malum in se* and *malum prohibitum*. The penalty
 387 attached to former, alone a legal sanction. The penalty at-
 tached to latter, only an inducement. Death — the supreme
 evil to man — the only proper penalty of former, and the only
 penal sanction in human law.

Thus is the proposition (e) established.

- VOL. I. At this point in the argument, it is shown that Christianity is
 153 not a selfish system, and that those who deny the sanctions ad-
 155 vocated, cannot prove the benevolence of God.

(f) The legal sanctions of a perfect moral government
 include the highest degree of good and evil.

- 160 The reward includes the highest possible good; still admits of
 degrees; is continued only while obedience continues.

- 164 The penalty includes the highest possible evil; by no other
 can the *highest* abhorrence be shown; by not inflicting it, the
 lawgiver shows that he esteems transgression a less evil than
 the infliction.

Objections :

- 167 (1) Since reward ceases with obedience, penalty should cease
 with disobedience.
 175 (2) Should all rebel, benevolence would forbid their endless
 punishment.
 177 (3) Incredible and impossible that benevolence would adopt
 a moral government involving the penalty of eternal
 death.

THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA,
No. LXVII.
AND
BIBLICAL REPOSITORY,
No. CXIX.

JULY, 1860.

ARTICLE I.

THE MISSIONARY SPIRIT OF THE PSALMS AND PROPHETS.

BY PROF. E. P. BARROWS, ANDOVER.

To some it may seem strange that a missionary spirit should be spoken of as belonging to the Old Testament. They may have accustomed themselves to think of such a spirit as peculiar to the new dispensation of the gospel, in contrast with the stern exclusiveness of the Mosaic economy. In one sense this is true. If a missionary spirit be understood as including a regularly organized plan for the conversion of all nations, this is an idea first developed in the New Testament. No one of the ancient prophets ever received from God a command to go and preach the institutions of Moses, or even the fundamental doctrines of revealed religion, to all nations. Christ himself, who came as the Saviour of the world, confined his labors mainly to his own countrymen. It was only in an incidental way that he bestowed his benefactions upon those who were not Israelites. When, early in his ministry, he sent out his twelve apostles to preach, his commission was : " Go not into the way of the Gentiles, and into any city of the Samaritans enter ye not. But go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel." ¹ It

¹ Matt. 10 : 5, 6.

was not till after he had completed the work of making expiation for the sins of men, and was about to ascend to heaven, that he gave his disciples the broad commission : "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature."¹

But while all this is true, we must never forget that the original covenant with Abraham had respect to the salvation of all nations. Though made with him and his seed after him, its end was to bless all families of the earth : "In thee shall all families of the earth be blessed ;"² "Seeing that Abraham shall surely become a great and mighty nation, and all the nations of the earth shall be blessed in him ;"³ "In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed."⁴ Although God, for a season, "suffered all nations," outside of Abraham's posterity, "to walk in their own ways,"⁵ it was still with reference to their final recovery and salvation. His plan was, first, to bring one family into covenant with himself, and, having multiplied it to a great nation, to manifest to that nation, by a series of stupendous miracles, his unity and infinite perfections, and subject it, for many successive centuries, to a system of laws and institutions of his own appointment ; and that, too, under a remarkable providential guidance in connection with a series of prophets directly commissioned by him to rebuke the people for their sins and instruct them respecting his will. Having in this manner moulded one nation into the knowledge of himself, and thus prepared the way for a universal dispensation, he revealed to that nation the gospel of Christ, that it might be propagated thence, as from a common centre, over all the earth. The Mosaic economy, then, though itself exclusive, was the divine foundation for a nobler dispensation, which should know no distinction between the nations of mankind. It was a *partial*, preparatory to a *universal*, dispensation. So far, therefore, as the benevolent design of God is concerned, all objections drawn from the exclusive character of the Mo-

¹ Mark 16 : 15.² Gen. 12 : 3.³ Gen. 18 : 18.⁴ Gen. 22 : 18.⁵ Acts 14 : 16.

saic institutions fall to the ground. It remains for the objector to show how a universal religion, like Christianity, could have been wisely and successfully introduced without a previous work of preparation; and, if he cannot do this, what better method of preparation could have been pursued than that devised by the wisdom of God.

The attitude of the Mosaic economy towards the Gentile nations was indeed severe, but it was the severity of love and good will. It had for its object, not their destruction, but a speedier preparation of the way for the advent of Christ, in whom the promise: "In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed," was to find its fulfilment. Here the words of a well-known author are in place. In his argument to show that "a kindly sentiment *towards the human family at large*" pervades the writings of Moses, and of the poets and prophets of succeeding times, he says: "SEPARATION, it is true, was the fundamental principle of the Jewish polity; but then it was separation on the ground *only* of those corruptions and enormities that prevailed in the surrounding countries. The sole intention of the national seclusion was to preserve in the world the prime elements of morals and religion. And to secure this intention, and to secure it in the actual condition of mankind at the time, an extraordinary line of policy, in particular cases, as well as unique institutions — civil and religious, were indispensable. This race of true worshippers, planted, as it were, on the confines of mighty and splendid idolatries, must needs assume a front of defiance and of universal reprobation. But then this reprobation had regard to *nothing* but the errors and the vices of idolatry; consequently it was always true that, whoever among the nations, afar off or near, would renounce his delusions and "cleave unto the God of Israel," was welcomed to the bosom of the state."¹ It was not till the last period of the Jewish theocracy, when, having accomplished the work assigned to it by God, it was on the decline — in

¹ Fanaticism, by Isaac Taylor, Sect. IX. See, for a striking illustration of this last assertion, 1 K. 8: 41—43; Isa. 56: 3—8.

the language of inspiration, had "waxed old," and was "ready to vanish away,"¹ — and when the light of inspiration had been, for several centuries, withdrawn from its teachers and rulers, save as it existed in the records of the past, that the fanatical spirit which breathed hatred and contempt towards all other nations, attained to such a rank and poisonous growth in the bosom of the Jewish commonwealth.

The final end, then, to which the old dispensation looked, was the salvation, not of one isolated nation, but of the whole human family. If we can find, in the writings of the Old Testament, longing anticipations of this end, then we find in them the true missionary spirit. Now, in perfect harmony with the high result to which the old dispensation looked, are two very noticeable facts, respecting these writings. *First*; we find, scattered throughout their pages, allusions, more or less clear, to the glorious consummation which the Abrahamic and Mosaic covenants had in view. *Secondly*; these allusions increase in number and definiteness, as has been observed by several writers,² after the period when the Mosaic theocracy, having passed its zenith of power and splendor, was now in a state of decay. While the institutions of Moses were in their primal vigor, accomplishing the very work appointed to them by God their author, it was not necessary that the minds of the covenant people should be, to any great extent, directed towards the future. The struggles and triumphs proposed to them were emphatically those of their own divinely constituted state, in its conflict with the surrounding heathen nations. To them the great animating idea was the full realization of the Mosaic institutions as an all-pervading power, in the very form in which God had given them. But the theocracy, with all its divine splendor, was only a temporary arrangement destined to give place to a more perfect dispensation. From its very nature and office, it could not be always advancing. Always preparing the way for the high end to which it was subservient, it might be; but not always increasing in outward power

¹ Heb. 8: 13.

² See, among others, Alexander, Introduction to Isaiah's later prophecies.

and glory. Everything temporary must reach its culminating point, as did this theocracy under David and Solomon: under David, in vigor and conquering power; under Solomon, in wealth and peaceful splendor. From the days of these two monarchs, it was destined to decline, till in the fulness of time, its great Author should fold it up, as a worn out garment, and lay it aside forever. This was a hard truth to an Israelite, perhaps the hardest of all truths. The institutions of Moses, with their glorious history in the past, which he had received from the fathers as his peculiar patrimony, mingled themselves with his very being, and he clung to them as to life itself. That they should fall into decay and pass away never to return, was a thought which he could not endure. He was always hoping and praying for a renewal of the ancient glory of Israel. But this, *in its outward visible form*, he was never to witness; but rather the increasing humiliation of his nation before the surrounding heathen powers.

It was precisely at this juncture in the history of the covenant people, that the prophets were commissioned to open to their countrymen the glorious future that awaited their afflicted and tempest-tossed Zion. David had received the promise: "Thine house and thy kingdom shall be established forever before thee; thy throne shall be established forever."¹ David and Solomon had understood this promise as including that of universal dominion over the human family, and had foretold this in prophetic song.² But it was in the dark and turbulent age of Ahaz and his successors, when the visible glory of the theocracy was steadily passing into an eclipse which soon became total, that Isaiah and his compeers were inspired to portray the glory of "the last days," in those glowing descriptions which remain, to the present hour, the comfort and solace of God's people. These have always respect to the introduction of the gentile nations into God's church, and the extension of the true religion, in this way, over all the earth. As a single example,

¹ 2 Sam. 7: 16.

² See, among other Psalms, 2 and 72.

we may take that bright portraiture which has found a place in the writings of two contemporary prophets :

“ And in the last days it shall come to pass that the mountain of the LORD’s house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and it shall be exalted above the hills; and peoples¹ shall flow unto it.² And many nations shall come, and say, Come, and let us go up to the mountain of the LORD, and to the house of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths: for the law shall go forth of Zion, and the word of the LORD from Jerusalem. And he shall judge among many peoples, and rebuke strong nations afar off; and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more. But they shall sit every man under his vine and under his fig-tree; and none shall make them afraid: for the mouth of the LORD of hosts hath spoken it.”³

But here we are met with various objections.

1. It is said that what is anticipated in this and many other kindred passages, is the extension, not of a spiritual religion, like Christianity, but of *Judaism*, over all the earth — a dream that was never to be realized. To this we answer, that the true religion is, for substance, that which was possessed by the Jews to whom this promise was made — the very same religion which we now possess; for Christianity is not the substitution of a new religion for the old, but simply the old religion embodied in a new and more spiritual form. We must carefully distinguish between the substance of revealed religion and its accidents; between the unchangeable living being herself, that has descended from heaven to man, and the changeable costume which, by God’s appointment, she wears in different ages. God never had but one church in the world, and that church never had but one religion. The piety of Abraham and Joseph, under the simple Abrahamic covenant, was not different from that of David and Isaiah, under the superadded Mosaic economy. Nor was the

¹ Throughout the present Article we find it necessary to adopt for the Hebrew עַמִּים the less usual English form, *peoples*, to indicate clearly the reference of the word, not to men collectively, but to the various nations of the earth.

² Isaiah says: “all nations shall flow unto it.”

³ Isa. 2: 2—4; Micah 4: 1—4.

religion of these Old Testament saints another than that of John the Baptist, who lived, as it were, between the two economies ; or than that of Peter and Paul, who lived under the full light and glory of the gospel dispensation. The faith of those who shall be found living upon the earth when the last trumpet shall sound, will be the same as that which made Abel's offering acceptable to God.

But while religion herself remains in all ages the same, the forms in which she is clothed may vary, to meet the varying wants of different eras in the world's history. In the institutions of Moses, religion was the same living spirit that had vivified the simple rites of the patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. But, for the accomplishment of high ends, she had been embodied by Jehovah in a splendid theocracy, with its august priesthood, its numerous sacrifices and oblations, its solemn assemblies, its distinctions of clean and unclean, its days, and months, and years. These constituted the new habiliments in which the old religion was to exert her vital energies, until, in the fulness of time, she should drop this magnificent but cumbersome attire, and be clothed upon with her last and most perfect earthly form. We say, her last and most perfect form, in respect to visible organization. For as to that *tertium quid* which some have imagined — an economy to be hereafter introduced, distinct from both Judaism and the present dispensation of Christianity, but analogous to the former in having Jerusalem for its central point, we do not believe that the prophecies of the Old Testament, soberly interpreted, furnish any solid ground for such an hypothesis.¹

But why, it may be asked, was not the spiritual dispensation of Christianity set forth in its own simple majesty ? The answer is, that men were not prepared for such a representation. It was necessary that the future dispensation, instead of being described in plain terms, should be symbolized to the apprehension of the Hebrews, by images taken from objects with which they were familiar. This principle our

¹ See below, our remarks on Zech. 14 : 16—21.

Lord and his apostles distinctly avowed in their teachings : " Unto you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of God ; but to others in parables." ¹ " I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now." ² " I have fed you with milk, and not with meat ; for hitherto ye were not able to bear it, neither yet now are ye able." ³ God, therefore, wisely withheld a premature disclosure of the future dispensation of Christianity in its naked simplicity and spirituality. Such a disclosure must, so far as we are able to judge, have been followed by much error and misapprehension, and must have had, moreover, the effect of bringing the existing dispensation into dishonor, before the world was prepared to receive anything better in its stead.

In accordance with this simple principle, a large class of images employed by the prophets of the Old Testament in predicting the future extension and prosperity of the church, finds a natural and easy solution. The subject-matter is the triumph of the true religion, the same as that revealed to " Moses and the prophets," but a triumph to be realized under the simple and spiritual dispensation of Christianity. The *drapery* is borrowed from the economy under which the prophets lived. The bright visions of the future which they describe in such glowing terms, are the revelations of God's Spirit ; but they are cast in the mould of the old economy. Whoever denies this principle in the interpretation of the prophets of the Old Testament, will find himself involved in inextricable difficulties.⁴

2. Another objection urged against a large class of these prophecies is, that *their spirit is foreign to that of Christianity*. This applies especially to such Messianic predictions as those contained in the second, and hundred and tenth Psalms, and kindred passages in the prophetic writings, in which the Messiah is represented as breaking his enemies with a rod of iron, striking through kings in the day of his wrath, filling the

¹ Luke 8 : 10 ; and the parallel passages. ² John 16 : 12. ³ 1 Cor. 3 : 2.

⁴ The substance of the above remarks, under the head of Objection 1, is condensed from the author's Article in the *Biblical Repository* for 1847, entitled " Christianity foretold under the Symbols of Judaism," pp. 415—418.

places with dead bodies, wounding the heads over many countries, trampling the people in his fury, and sprinkling his garments with their blood. Thus of the second Psalm De Wette says : " According to these [the Christian ideas], the Messiah is no conqueror of nations, wielding the iron sceptre : ' his kingdom is not of this world.' " ¹ And of the hundred and tenth Psalm he says : " To us Christians the Messianic interpretation of the Psalm cannot be of much account, since the Messiah is throughout represented as a theocratic ruler, nay even as a warrior." ² This objection deserves a careful examination. To answer that, in an abundance of other passages, the kingdom of the Messiah is represented as one of righteousness and peace, though true, could hardly be considered as an adequate reply. To affirm that all these descriptions are to be understood of purely spiritual victories, to be gained through the truth in the hearts of God's enemies, would be foreign alike to their obvious import, and to the representations which the prophetic portions of the New Testament give of the progress of Christ's kingdom, and its final triumph in the world. We must seek for some comprehensive view which shall combine into one harmonious whole the various representations of both the Old and the New Testament on this subject.

This view we find in the scriptural doctrine that Christ is not only the *head of the church*,³ as a spiritual body organized upon spiritual principles, but also *head over all things to the church*,⁴ having all things without her pale, as well as in it, put under his feet, and administering them for her welfare.

God has, from the beginning, carried forward his kingdom in this world, in a *two-fold line of administration* : the providential, or outward line ; and the spiritual, or inward. These

¹ De Wette, Kommentar über die Psalmen, in loco.

² Kommentar, in loco.

³ Eph. 5 : 23.

⁴ Eph. 1 : 22. The original reads : κεφαλὴν ὑπὲρ πάντα τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, *head over all things for the church*, the "all things" being those just before named : " And hath put all things under his feet." Its true parallel is found in the declaration of Christ himself : " All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth." Matt. 28 : 18.

two lines run constantly parallel with each other; their mutual action and reaction is perpetual; and they constitute, together, one grand whole, yet so that the providential is always subordinated to the spiritual.

To the *outward or providential line* belong all those mighty outward movements, some of them miraculous, but many more, to our apprehension at least, effected in a natural way, which have accompanied the progress of God's church all along her course to the present hour. As examples, we may name: the wonderful providence by which the posterity of Abraham were transplanted from Canaan into Egypt; their deliverance thence by a series of stupendous miracles; their guidance through the wilderness of Arabia, and settlement in the land of Canaan; the oft-repeated outward interpositions of God in their behalf; their conquest by Nebuchadnezzar, and removal to Babylon, as a chastisement for their sins; their release from captivity by Cyrus; their successive subjection to the great monarchies of the world that succeeded the Chaldean empire; the state of the world in respect to both civil and religious matters at the time of Christ's advent; and (not to enumerate any further, though we might easily bring the catalogue down to the present day) the overthrow of the Jewish polity civil and ecclesiastical, by the Romans. In a word, it is manifest, to use the words of a living author, that "the world is governed in the interest of Christianity."¹ Whether historians and politicians will see it or not, it is plain that for the church of God empires have risen and fallen, and battles been lost and won; that all the endlessly complicated movements of society are controlled and shaped by the invisible hand of God for her good; that every discovery in the arts and sciences is appointed to minister as a handmaid to her welfare; and that all her enemies, who dig pits for her feet, are but preparing their own grave, into which God in due time will plunge them.

To the *inward or spiritual line* belongs the work of regen-

¹ Nature and the Supernatural, Chap. XIII.

eration and sanctification in the hearts of men. It is that kingdom of God which "cometh not with observation," but is within the soul of every true believer.¹ It includes all the truths and ordinances of revealed religion as quickened and made effectual by the ever present power of God's Spirit. It is of this glorious spiritual line of administration that the prophets speak, in such passages as the following: "Fear not, O Jacob, my servant; and thou, Jesurun, whom I have chosen. For I will pour water upon him that is thirsty, and floods upon the dry ground: I will pour my Spirit upon thy seed, and my blessing upon thine offspring. And they shall spring up as among the grass, as willows by the water-courses. One shall say, I am the LORD's; and another shall call himself by the name of Jacob; and another shall subscribe with his hand unto the LORD, and surname himself by the name of Israel."² "After those days, saith the LORD, I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts; and will be their God, and they shall be my people. And they shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying, Know the LORD: for they shall all know me from the least of them unto the greatest of them, saith the LORD: for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more."³ "Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean: from all your filthiness, and from all your idols, will I cleanse you. A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you: and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh. And I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments, and do them."⁴ In the New Testament, it appears in meridian brightness in the pentecostal effusion of the Holy Spirit. In our day we see it in every true revival of God's work; nay more, in every soul that has "the kingdom of heaven" established within it.

Now it is manifest that both these lines, the providential

¹ Luke 17: 20, 21.

² Isa. 44: 2—5.

³ Jer. 31: 33, 34.

⁴ Ezek. 36: 25—27. See further Joel 2: 28—32 (where both lines of administration are exhibited in connection with each other); Zech. 12: 10—14.

and the spiritual, are committed by the Father to our Lord Jesus Christ. So much is necessarily implied in his words : " All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. Go ye therefore and teach all nations, . . . and, lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." ¹ " All power in heaven and in earth " includes power over all the forces that are at work without the church, as well as within it, whether they be visible or invisible. Accordingly the scriptures affirm that God has set Christ " at his own right hand in the heavenly places, far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come ; and hath put all things under his feet, and given him to be head over all things to the church." ² Christ could not have given his disciples the promise : " Lo ! I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world," unless he had been able to sustain them to the end of the world, in all emergencies ; which, again, implies that all things, without the pale of his church, as well as within it, are put under his feet.

Around this great principle, the universality of Christ's dominion, without as well as within his church, all the prophecies of the Old Testament, that have respect to his kingly office, gather and arrange themselves in harmonious order. They describe him, in the plenitude of his office, as " King of kings, and Lord of lords ;" as both the spiritual head of his people, and head over all things for his people. Sometimes the one, sometimes the other aspect of his kingdom is brought to view ; sometimes both are exhibited in blended glory and brightness. The second Psalm has to do chiefly with his enemies — with the kings and rulers of the earth that have set themselves in array against him and the Father. It cannot, then, be other than minatory in its tone. Of them it must say : " Thou shalt break them with a rod of iron ; thou shalt dash them in pieces like a potter's vessel," ³ for this is the very fate that awaits them and their followers, at his almighty hand. It is not by leading his dis-

¹ Matt. 28 : 18—20.² Eph. 1 : 20—22.³ Ps. 2 : 9.

ciples to the field in person, nor by committing to their hands the sword to be wielded in his name (according to the idea of the Romish church), that he breaks the nations like a potter's vessel. It is by his providential rule over them. Under the Mosaic economy it pleased God to put his church into the form of *a divine state*; a state exercising, by his appointment, all the functions of religion, yet still a true state, and, as such, entrusted with the sword. Joshua and David had a literal sword to wield in behalf of God's people. But when the Lord Jesus took his church out of the state, and constituted her a purely spiritual body, to be administered by spiritual instrumentalities, he left the sword forever behind. So far as his headship over her, as an organic body, is concerned, his "kingdom is not of this world."¹ He allows none of his servants to employ carnal weapons in her behalf.² But he has not, in this, vacated his headship over all things in heaven and earth for her welfare. He not only rules his kingdom, which is not of this world, by his word and Spirit, but he rules the kingdoms of this world, also, by his providence. To the ministers of his church he gives no rod of iron, but he wields it himself for the overthrow of his and their enemies.³ When De Wette says: "The Messiah is no conqueror of nations, wielding the iron sceptre: 'his kingdom is not of this world,'" he confounds his proper headship over the church, as a spiritual body, to be administered by spiritual instrumentalities, with his headship over all things for the church. What Pilate was concerned to know, was the nature of that kingdom which Christ came to establish on

¹ John 18: 36.² 2 Cor. 10: 4.

³ In Rev. 2: 26, 27, the Saviour, appropriating to himself the words of the Psalmist above quoted, says: "He that overcometh and keepeth my works unto the end, to him will I give power over the nations: and he shall rule them with a rod of iron; as the vessels of a potter shall they be broken to shivers, even as I received of my Father." But he rules the nations in the sense of triumphing over them in Christ his head, not in that of conquering them by carnal weapons. In an analogous way Christ says: "To him that overcometh will I grant to sit with me in my throne, even as I also overcame, and am set down with my Father in his throne," Rev. 3: 21. The faithful believer, who has overcome the world through faith, sits with Christ on his throne, not as sharing with him the government of the universe, but as exalted in and through him above all his enemies.

earth, in its relations to his Roman master. The answer of Jesus was framed accordingly. Of the reign of Christ over all things, as exalted to the right hand of God, not a word was said to Pilate. Of this he had spoken to the Sanhedrim, as was proper, in explicit terms,¹ and it is in this character that the Psalms and Prophets describe him. In a parable expressly designed to set forth our Lord as appointed to receive of the Father a kingdom, he says: "But those mine enemies, which would not that I should reign over them, bring hither, and slay them before me."² What is this but breaking his enemies with a rod of iron? The fulfilment of this awful prophecy (if not its exhaustive, at least its germinant fulfilment) we have in the overthrow and destruction of the Jews by the Romans. Here we see both how Christ wields the iron sceptre, and for what end. By his mighty judgments he destroys the incorrigible enemies of his people, that he may thus prepare the way for the spread of his gospel through the whole earth. Precisely the same view is given of Christ in the Book of Revelation.³

The way is now prepared to consider the missionary spirit of the Psalms and Prophets, in its true, divine splendor. The seers of the Old Testament are continually looking forward with holy joy to the day when all nations shall be brought into the fold of God, and shall be blessed under the dominion of him and his Messiah. Fed by the spirit of inspiration, their faith and love are continually overleaping the narrow boundaries of the Mosaic economy, and running to and fro through the whole earth, crying with a loud voice: "Let the people praise thee, O God; let all the people praise thee."⁴ Living at a period of the world's history when darkness covered the earth, and thick darkness the nations, they yet see, far off in the distant future, the whole earth radiant with the glory of God, and shout, in holy exultation: "The earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the wa-

¹ Matt. 26 : 63. 64.

² See Rev. 14 : 14—20; 19 : 11—21.

³ Luke 19 : 27.

⁴ Ps. 67 : 3, 5.

ters cover the sea.”¹ In the fulness of their yearning desire for the salvation of the Gentiles, they intercede with God in their behalf, day and night, and call upon all who love him to do the same. “For Zion’s sake will I not hold my peace, and for Jerusalem’s sake will I not rest, until the righteousness thereof go forth as brightness, and the salvation thereof as a lamp that burneth. And the Gentiles shall see thy righteousness, and all kings thy glory.”² “Ye that are Jehovah’s remembrancers (הַמְזַכְּרִים אֶת־יְהוָה), keep not silence, and give him no rest, till he establish, and till he make Jerusalem a praise in the earth.”³ In such passages as these we have the very substance of the missionary spirit. Christ’s missionary servants who go forth at the present day, in obedience to his command, that they may carry the gospel to the Gentiles, can find no higher forms in which to express their aspirations and desires.

The remainder of this Article will be devoted to an illustration of the missionary spirit of the Psalms and Prophets, as exhibited in certain striking portions of them. For convenience of arrangement, we begin with the latter.

I. PASSAGES FROM THE PROPHETS.

Passing by such familiar examples as those contained in Isa. 2: 2—4, and ch. xi. throughout, we will first consider that wonderful passage, Isa. 25: 6—12, which for depth, grandeur, and comprehensiveness of meaning, is not surpassed by anything in the Old Testament that pertains to the glory of the last days. Its connection deserves a moment’s attention. In accordance with the general law of such promises, it follows a prediction of the mighty judgments of God by which the oppressors of his people have been humbled, and it naturally returns, towards the close of the chapter, to the same theme; since the way for the enlargement of Zion is prepared by the overthrow of her enemies. Then follows, in the twenty-sixth chapter, the song of Zion in view of God’s mighty interpositions in her behalf. Let us now consider the passage in regular order.

¹ Isa. 11: 9.

² Isa. 62: 1, 2.

³ Isa. 62: 6, 7.

V. 6. And in this mountain shall the Lord of hosts make unto all the peoples a feast of fat things, a feast of wines on the lees ; of fat things full of marrow, of wines on the lees well refined.

The introductory word *and* connects the promised feast with the overthrow of the "strangers," who have oppressed God's people. He first brings them low, and then spreads a feast on Mount Zion for all the nations ; for *this mountain* is no other than Zion, "the mountain of the Lord's house," the central point of the Jewish theocracy, which God chose as his earthly dwelling-place ; for Zion, in the wide sense, included Moriah, and thus the temple, as well as the palace of the kings. By the inspired penmen Zion was exalted from its original geographical sense to be the representative of that divine state of which it was the centre, and of which the Christian church is the true heir. It is historically true that from Jerusalem the gospel of Christ went forth to bless all nations, and in this sense the feast was spread for them on Mount Zion. But the expression "in this mountain," has a far deeper and grander import. It teaches us that the feast which God makes for the world is made in the church, and is furnished to the nations through her instrumentality. The feast is made *unto all the peoples* (לְכָל־הָעַמִּים), that is, for all the nations of men, in accordance with the terms of the original covenant : "in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed."¹ The prophet describes the feast by two articles which represent the choicest viands and drinks : *fat things full of marrow*, and *wines on the lees well refined*. By standing on the lees, wines acquire a richer flavor. Hence "wines on the lees well refined," are the richest and purest wines. Here, as often elsewhere, the blessings of salvation are set forth under the similitude of a feast prepared by God himself. Compare Isa. 55 : 1, 2. Prov. 9 : 2—5. Matt. 22 : 2—10.

V. 7. And he shall swallow up, in this mountain, the face of the veil that is cast over all the peoples, and the covering that is spread over all the nations.

¹ Gen. 22 : 18.

The alliteration of the original may be preserved by a slight change in the version, thus: "And he shall swallow up, in this mountain, the face of the veil that veils all the peoples, and the covering that covers all the nations."¹ *The face of the veil* seems to be only a mode of describing the veil itself, as having an extended *face*, that is, surface. The veil and the covering are here symbols of the spiritual darkness and wretchedness that cover all nations upon whom the light of revealed religion does not shine. Compare Isa. 9:2. 60:2, 3. Acts 26:18. 2 Cor. 4:3—6. All this is to be done *in this mountain*—Zion, as above explained.

V. 8. He has swallowed up death forever: and the Lord Jehovah shall wipe away tears from all faces, and the reproach of his people shall he take away from all the earth: for Jehovah hath spoken.

The Perfect: *He has swallowed up*, is the so-called "prophetic Perfect," and might be rendered, as in our version, by the Future. *To swallow up death forever*, is to abolish it forever; to *wipe away tears from all faces*, is to remove all sorrow; to *take away the reproach of his people from all the earth*, is to make them honorable throughout all the earth. These words are applied, in the New Testament, to the final glory and blessedness of the saints in heaven: "So when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory."²

¹ וְהָיָה וְהָיָה, and וְהָיָה וְהָיָה. The word וְהָיָה, in the sense of *web* or *covering*, occurs no where else in the Hebrew except here, and perhaps Isa. 30:1. But this meaning is supported by the analogy of וְהָיָה, *web of a weaver*, Judges 16:13, 14. The commentators illustrate both words from the Arabic

نَسَمَ, *Texuit pannum*; نَسَمَ, *strata, super quibus peraguntur proces*;

نَسَمَ, *intexta auro vestis*: etc. See Freytag. This may be admitted as probable; though perhaps the signification may be derived from the Hebrew root נָסַח, *to pour out*, in the sense of *spreading abroad*. Compare the Talmudic נִסְכָּא, *ornamentum fusile, aureum vel argenteum muliebre*; then, *lamina auri vel argenti fusa, ex qua fit moneta*. Buxtorf, p. 1356.

² Κατέσθλη ὁ θάνατος εἰς νῆκος: Though the apostle does not here follow the version of the Seventy, which reads: κατέσθλην ὁ θάνατος ἰσχύσας, *death prevailing*

Of the inhabitants of the New Jerusalem it is said: "God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes."¹ That this is mere accommodation, we can hardly believe. Beyond a doubt, the description of the present verse applies to the millennial age of the church in the zenith of its glory. But that its depth and comprehension of meaning can be exhausted by any state of blessedness that awaits God's people this side of the resurrection, may well be considered impossible. It seems more consonant to the analogy of prophetic representation to suppose that the prophet sees the future glory of the earthly Zion painted, as has been said, on the background of eternity; that when her coming blessedness is revealed to his eye, he sees it in connection with its heavenly consummation, so that the entire history of God's church, here and hereafter, stands revealed to his prophetic vision as one grand whole.

V. 9. And it shall be said in that day, Lo, this is our God; we have waited for him, and he shall save us: this is Jehovah; we have waited for him: let us exult and be glad in his salvation.

The joyful exclamation of God's ransomed people, in view of their great deliverance and enlargement. It needs no illustration.²

V. 10. For on this mountain shall the hand of Jehovah rest, and Moab shall be trodden down under him, as straw is trodden down in a dunghill (or, in the waters of a dunghill).

The hand of Jehovah, resting on Mount Zion, is at once his punitive and his saving hand. It destroys the enemies of

has swallowed up (a thoroughly false rendering), he yet agrees with them in rendering, as they often do in other passages, מַצָּחֵם by *eis nikos*, in accordance with the Aramaean usage of the word. We need not depart, however, from the common Hebrew usage, since the writers of the New Testament, in their quotations, are satisfied with the essential meaning. See on this point the very pertinent remarks of Prof. Alexander, Commentary in loco.

¹ Rev. 21: 4.

² The words: מַצָּחֵם לֵב יְיָ, have been rendered: *we have waited for him that he might save us*. This, though grammatically allowable, is not necessary; as the prophet means to represent the salvation which God has brought to his people as one that shall be perpetuated forever.

his people, but brings salvation to them. *Moab*, as one of the chief among the enemies of God's people in the prophet's day, stands here to represent all their enemies. The prophecy was fulfilled long ago upon him, but this is only the earnest of a higher fulfilment upon all who inherit Moab's spirit and walk in Moab's ways. For other examples of this representative use of particular nations, see Isa. 11 : 14. 63 : 1. Joel 3 : 4, 19. Amos 9 : 12. Obad. 18—21. Most commentators take the suffix in *תחתיו*, reflexively, *under himself*; that is, in his own place or land. Compare Ex. 10 : 23. 16 : 29. 2 Sam. 2 : 23. The textual reading, *בְּיַם בְּדִנְיָה*, *in the waters of a dunghill*, is to be preferred, on critical grounds, to the Masoretic, *בְּיַם בְּדִנְיָה*, *in a dunghill*. Either way it expresses, by a strong figure, the utter degradation and destruction of Moab.

Vs. 11, 12. And he shall spread forth his hands in the midst thereof, as the swimmer spreadeth forth his hands to swim : and he shall bring down his pride, together with the plots of his hands. And the fortress of thy high walls he hath laid low, he hath brought down, he hath prostrated to the earth, to the dust.

What is the subject of the verb *וַיִּפְרֹשׂ*, *and he shall spread forth*, has long been a question. Many refer it to Moab, in connection with the textual reading : *in the waters of a dunghill*. Moab shall spread forth his hands in the midst of it—this filthy pool—in the vain effort to escape.¹ But the more ancient interpretation refers the verb to Jehovah : *And he [Jehovah] shall spread forth his hands in the midst of him [Moab]* ; that is, as a mighty spoiler.² Like a strong swimmer, who thrusts

¹ Heb. *בְּיַם בְּדִנְיָה*. The objection from the masc. sing. suffix can be of no great weight with one who considers how often this is used in references to impersonal objects without regard to their grammatical gender.

² So the Targum : *וַיִּפְרֹשׂ מַחַת גְּבוּרָתוֹ בְּיַמֵּיהֶן כְּמַאדְמַעְרִים לְיָמָא לְמַעַם*, *and he shall spread forth the stroke of his might in the midst of them, as a swimmer spreadeth forth to swim*. In adopting this interpretation, the limitation of the comparison indicated by Vitringa must be carefully observed ; that God is not here compared to a swimmer swimming in the land of Moab, as in some sea or river ; but that the comparison has respect only to the motion of a swimmer's hands. Vitringa in *Jesaiam*, in loco. As to the objection drawn from the *unusual character* of the figure, that is a two-edged sword which cuts against both interpretations alike, while the latter has certainly the advantage on the score of dignity.

out his hands on either side, he shall reach forth his hands on all sides to lay waste Moab and his possessions. This is favored by the fact that the verbs immediately following refer to Jehovah as their subject. *Together with the plots of his hands* (עִם עֲרֵבוֹת יָדָיו); that is, along with all his devices against God's people. In the words: *the fortress of thy high walls*, or, as Alexander translates, *the fortress of the high fort of thy walls* (מִבְצָר מְשֻׁבָּב הַמְּצֻדָה), the address is directed to Moab; and the depth of his humiliation is represented by an accumulation of words all expressive of a complete overthrow.

In the above three verses which describe the utter and final destruction of Moab, we have not, as Henderson supposes, a new subject, but only the other side of the picture. The overthrow of Zion's enemies, and her enlargement, go hand in hand, as parts of one process. This shows how futile is the objection urged against the Messianic interpretation of the second Psalm, and other like prophetic descriptions, that it represents the Messiah as *destroying* instead of *converting* the nations. It is the kings and rulers of the earth, and their followers, who are banded against him, that he breaks with a rod of iron, as he here breaks Moab in pieces, that he may prepare the way for making, for all nations, "a feast of fat things, a feast of wines on the lees; a feast of fat things full of marrow, of wines on the lees well refined." The plan of prophecy, which thus exhibits, in immediate connection, the mighty judgments of God upon the wicked, and the extension of his kingdom among all nations, is in perfect harmony with the course of his moral government at the present day, as in all past ages. Every great calamity which comes upon the ungodly, either within or without the pale of his visible church, is sure to forward, in its final issue, the cause of true religion. So it has always been in the past; so it will ever be in the future, till "the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the glory of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea."¹ Amen. The Lord hasten that blessed day!

¹ Hab. 2: 14.

We will now direct our attention to another passage from this same "evangelical prophet" — the sixtieth chapter of his prophecies. Without going into an exposition of this chapter, in detail, we shall content ourselves with indicating the general idea that pervades it throughout, and gives it unity. This is, that Zion (the subject indicated in the preceding chapter, ver. 20) shall become the central object of love and attraction to the whole world, and that all nations shall come to her, bringing their wealth with them, and shall render to her a willing obedience. This era of her enlargement is preceded by a period of deep darkness and corruption, to the description of which the fifty-ninth chapter is mainly devoted, and which is brought to an end by God's interposition in her behalf in the way of terrible judgments upon the wicked, who are represented as being within her enclosure, as well as without. Seeing that there is no man to stand up in behalf of truth and righteousness, Jehovah takes the work into his own hands. He puts on the garments of vengeance, and clothes himself with zeal, as with a cloak : he renders fury to his adversaries, recompense to his enemies : to the islands he repays recompense."¹ The result is, that men "fear the name of the Lord from the west, and his glory from the rising of the sun."² There follows a promise of the advent of the Redeemer to Zion, with a statement of his immutable covenant with Zion and her seed forever.³ Then the prophet, overlooking all the long ages of darkness from his day onward, fixes his eye on the final triumph of Zion, in accordance with the terms of this everlasting covenant. The gentiles come to her light, and kings to the brightness of her rising ; the abundance of the sea is converted to her, and the wealth of the gentiles ; the camels and dromedaries of Midian and Ephah cover her ; the people of Sheba bring gold and incense ; the rams of Nebaioth minister to her ; the multitudes flock to her as clouds, and as doves to their windows ; the ships of Tarshish bring her children from afar, their silver and their gold with them ; her gates stand open continually, that kings may bring to her the wealth of the gentiles ; all

¹ Chap. 59 : 16—18.² Chap. 59 : 19.³ Chap. 59 : 20, 21.

nations and kingdoms that will not serve her perish utterly and forever ; the sons of them that afflicted her bow themselves at the soles of her feet ; and she is made an eternal excellency, the joy of many generations.

Now there is a low and earthly way of interpreting all this, in accordance with "the letter," which "killeth." It suited Jewish carnality and pride exactly to understand the present and other kindred passages, of the worldly victories which they were to gain over the nations, under the Messiah, with all the worldly power, and wealth, and glory that should follow in their train. But God has better things in reserve for the world, in harmony with the better interpretation of the prophecy. The true heir of these promises is the Christian church. She is not another than the ancient Jewish church, but, as the apostle expressly shows,¹ the same church under a new dispensation ; not a new olive-tree, but the old olive-tree with the gentiles grafted into her.² The promise, then, of the present chapter is, that all nations of the world shall become the willing subjects of Christ, and devote themselves, and all that they possess, to the advancement of his kingdom. In whatever ignorance it may have pleased God to leave his ancient people in respect to the *manner* in which this result should be accomplished — namely, by a change of dispensation — *the result itself* stood before their eyes in its divine glory, and was the object of their earnest aspirations and prayers. This was the true missionary spirit.

It would be easy to adduce other like passages from Isaiah ; but passing by these, we will consider two or three that occur in the Minor Prophets.

The second chapter of Zephaniah predicts the overthrow of the surrounding enemies of God's people : the Philistines, Moabites, Ammonites, Ethiopians, and Assyrians. Embedded in these threatenings, we find the following remarkable words : "Jehovah shall be terrible to them [the enemies of his people, who "have reproached and magnified themselves against the people of the Lord of hosts"]³ for he shall fam-

¹ Rom. 4 : 10—25 ; Gal. 3 : 7—9, 26—29 ; Eph. 2 : 22.

² Rom. 11 : 17—24.

³ v. 10.

ish all the gods of the earth ; and all the islands of the nations shall worship him, every one from his place.”¹ In concise but most explicit terms, he foretells, *first*, the annihilation of idol-worship over all the earth, and that by a very expressive term : *he shall famish, cause to pine away* (רָחַץ) *all the gods of the earth*. Deserted by their former worshippers, and their altars left empty of offerings, they shall perish, as it were, by inanition. This is precisely the process by which idolatry was destroyed in the old Roman empire, and must be destroyed everywhere. As it has its seat in the minds of men, it cannot be abolished by mere outward force and authority.² The gods of the heathen must be, to carry out the figure, *starved to death* by the failure of their entire revenue of gifts and offerings. *Secondly*, he predicts the conversion of “all the isles of the nations” (כָּל אֲדַת הַיָּם) — an expression originally denoting the islands and coasts of the Mediterranean, but here used to represent the nations generally — to the worship of Jehovah, *every one from his place*. This is a clear intimation that the worship of God — his visible public worship — shall no longer be confined to one metropolis, as under the Jewish dispensation, but shall be extended over all the world. We may compare our Lord’s words to the woman of Samaria : “Woman, believe me, the hour cometh, when ye shall neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem, worship the Father. . . . when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth : for the Father seeketh such to worship him.”³

In close relation to the above, as it respects character, stands another passage, which we find in Malachi. Rebuking the Jewish priests for their niggardly spirit, Jehovah assures them that he desires no such offerings as they bring to him. Higher and nobler worship awaits him among the

¹ v. 11.

² In vain did the Roman emperors seek, by cruel persecutions, to restore the worship of the gods to its ancient dignity and splendor. The only result was a spasmodic semblance of resuscitation, like that which galvanism produces upon a recent corpse. Idolatry was dying out of the souls of men, and the idol-gods must die with it.

³ John 4 : 21—23.

heathen nations : " For from the rising of the sun even unto the going down of the same, my name shall be great among the gentiles ; and in every place incense shall be offered unto my name, and a pure offering : for my name shall be great among the heathen, saith the Lord of hosts." ¹ According to the Mosaic ritual, incense and oblations were restricted to the sanctuary. There was but one place where they could be legitimately offered, and that through the medium of the Levitical priests. But now all these restrictions are to be done away. The gentiles, converted to the worship of the true God, are to offer to him in every place, as his priests, incense and a pure offering. The incense and offerings of the Mosaic economy are manifestly taken as *symbols* of the " spiritual sacrifices, acceptable to God by Jesus Christ," which this " holy priesthood" among the gentiles is, everywhere, to offer up.² Such is the interpretation which the New Testament has put upon this and kindred passages. How far the ancient prophets saw respecting the abolition of the old dispensation, and the introduction, in its stead, of one that knows no distinction between Jews and Gentiles, we cannot say. But this they did understand : that, in every place, the Gentiles should render acceptable worship to God.

The way is now prepared for considering the celebrated passage in Zechariah, 14 : 16—21, which, although intensely Jewish in its costume, is yet perfectly explicit in respect to the conversion of all nations to the worship of Jehovah. After describing the judgments of God upon the nations that have fought against Jerusalem, the prophet goes on to say :

And it shall come to pass, that every one that is left of all the nations which came against Jerusalem, shall even go up from year to year to worship the King, the LORD of hosts, and to keep the feast of tabernacles. And it shall be, that whoso will not come up, of all the families of the earth, unto Jerusalem to worship the King, the LORD of hosts, even upon them shall be no rain. And if the family of Egypt go not up, and come not, that have no rain ; there shall be the plague, wherewith the LORD will smite the heathen that come not up to keep the feast of tabernacles. This shall

¹ Chap. 1 : 11.

² 1 Pet. 2 : 5.

be the punishment of Egypt, and the punishment of all nations that come not up to keep the feast of tabernacles. In that day shall there be upon the bells of the horses, HOLINESS UNTO THE LORD; and the pots in the LORD's house shall be like the bowls before the altar. Yea, every pot in Jerusalem and in Judah shall be holiness unto the LORD of hosts; and all they that sacrifice shall come and take of them, and seethe therein: and in that day there shall be no more the Canaanite in the house of the LORD of hosts.

The care which the prophet takes to include "all the families of the earth" in this ordinance, is very noticeable. Whatever nation refuses to observe it, shall be punished with the absence of rain. But, recollecting that Egypt is always without rain, he appoints the plague as the punishment of that nation. In all our inquiries respecting the interpretation of this remarkable prophecy, we must constantly bear in mind that it is one homogeneous whole. If the beginning is to be understood literally, so is the end; if the end must be taken symbolically, so must the beginning. In the light of this principle, let us examine the concluding portion of it. When "all the families of the earth" come up to Jerusalem annually, to keep the feast of tabernacles, the number of those who sacrifice will be immensely great. The holy vessels connected with the temple and altar will be wholly inadequate for the service. A special provision is therefore made for the offerers. Not only "shall the pots in the Lord's house be like the vessels before the altar," that is, consecrated to holy uses, but "every pot in Judah and Jerusalem shall be holiness unto the LORD of hosts," that it may be used by those who bring sacrifices. The sacrifices to which reference is here made, are the free-will peace-offerings of the people. Of these the fat, with certain other prescribed portions, was burned on the altar; another portion was given to the priests, and then the offerer and his friends feasted on the remainder.¹ Precisely in the same way, we find those who offered sacrifices boiling the flesh in caldrons and pots, in the days of Eli.² Henderson, who adheres to the literal interpre-

¹ See the law for peace-offerings in the third and seventh chapters of Leviticus.

² 1 Sam. 2: 13—16.

tation of the prophecy, attempts to escape the fatal objection from the presence of sacrifices, by rendering: "all who slaughter shall come." But this is inadmissible; for:

First, the word employed by the prophet is the regular scriptural term (זֶבֶחַ). Its common signification is that of sacrificing. It is to be taken in the general sense of *killing, slaughtering*, only where the context requires it; as, for example, in Deut. 12: 21. But here the context is wholly against such a sense, for:

Secondly, Jerusalem, at that time, has its temple and its altar. "The pots in the Lord's house shall be like the bowls before the altar" (בְּמִזְבְּחֵי לִקְנֵי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ).¹ But where the temple and the altar are found, there sacrifices are found also.

Thirdly, the vessels used to boil the flesh of the victims are holy, "like the bowls before the altar." This naturally points to a sacrificial use to be made of them, which required holy vessels.

Fourthly, the Jews to whom Zechariah addressed this prophecy, must naturally have understood the word in question, of sacrifices (we mean, of course, in its proper grammatical sense), since these were always connected with their great feasts, not only as public sacrifices ordained by the law, but as private free-will offerings. The public sacrifices connected with the feast of tabernacles, may be seen in Lev. 23: 36. It was the custom of pious Jews, on their annual visit to the sanctuary, to bring private free-will offerings to Jehovah. See 1 Sam. 1: 3, 21. It is of such sacrifices that the passage before us plainly speaks.

But all sacrifices are done away by the perfect sacrifice of Christ (Heb. 10: 10—18). It remains that we understand these words, and the whole prophecy of which they are a part, *symbolically*, of the spiritual services of believers, under the new dispensation, which were adumbrated by those of the Mo-

¹ מִזְרֶק, properly, *sprinkling-bowl*, from זָרַק, *to sprinkle*, is a *sacrificial bowl* from which the blood of the sacrifices was sprinkled. Consequently it is one of the vessels enumerated as belonging to the brazen altar on which sacrifices were offered. Ex. 38: 3; Numb. 4: 14; etc. Being of the larger class of bowls, it is once used figuratively of a winebibber's bowl. Amos 6: 6.

saic ritual.' In other words, the future reception of the true religion by all nations is foretold, under the symbols of the Mosaic economy, with its ritual, its yearly feasts, and its central place of worship. For this principle of interpretation we have the authority of the New Testament. Did the laws of Moses prescribe a literal priesthood with literal sacrifices? Believers, under the new dispensation, are, as a spiritual priesthood, to "present their bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God."¹ Did the Mosaic economy have a central metropolis — a literal Zion, to which all the people resorted at stated times? Believers in Christ have come to the spiritual ^a mount Zion," which this symbolized, and have become citizens of the "new Jerusalem," with its "innumerable company of angels," and its "spirits of just men made perfect."²

II. PASSAGES FROM THE PSALMS.

We shall not here pause to consider such Messianic Psalms as the second and seventy-second, in which the universality of Christ's reign is expressly foretold. The principles upon which they are to be interpreted have been sufficiently indicated in the preceding discussion. Passing them by, therefore, we shall direct the reader's attention to some missionary gems, in the Book of Psalms, that have attracted less attention on the part of commentators.

We begin with a portion of the twenty-second Psalm, in which the sufferer, who is admitted by all evangelical interpreters to be the Messiah (whether immediately and simply,

¹ Rom 12: 1; 1 Pet. 2: 5.

² Heb. 12: 22—24. In the same symbolic way are we obliged to interpret Ezekiel's vision of the city and temple, chaps. 40—48. Henderson admits that its altar and sacrifices constitute a fatal objection to its being understood literally of anything that is to happen under the Christian dispensation. He would understand it simply of "the restoration of the temple and the temple-worship after the return from Babylon." Commentary on Zech. 14: 16—18; and on Ezek. in loco. But if this be all, then the hopes legitimately awakened by this magnificent vision were never realized. And what then about the river that flowed out eastward from under the threshold of this literal temple? That, he tells us, is to be understood *symbolically*. The expositor who is thus compelled to jump from the literal to the symbolic in interpreting one and the same vision, must have a false hypothesis to support.

or in an indirect and typical way, we shall not now stop to inquire), in anticipation of the great deliverance which he is to receive, says :

From thee¹ shall be my praise in the great assembly: my vows I will pay in the presence of them that fear him. The meek shall eat and be satiated; they shall praise Jehovah who seek him: let your heart live forever! All the ends of the earth shall remember² and turn to Jehovah; and all the families of the nations shall bow down before him. For the kingdom is Jehovah's, and he ruleth among the nations. All the fat of the earth³ eat and worship: there bow down before him all those going down to the dust,⁴ and [he who] cannot save alive his soul.⁵ A seed shall serve him: it shall be reckoned to Jehovah for the generation.⁶ They shall come and declare his righteousness; to the people that shall be born that he hath wrought [it]. Va. 26—32.

The whole costume of this passage is thoroughly Jewish, and must be interpreted from the religious and social usages of the theocracy. The festivities of the Jews were preëminently *sacrificial* in their character, being accompanied by *peace-offerings*, on the flesh of which, as remarked above, the offerer and his friends feasted.⁷ The occasions of these sacrificial feasts were various. Private persons in distress vowed to Jehovah thank-offerings (which were a form of peace-offer-

¹ מִמֶּנִּי, *from thee*; that is, as the ground: thy wonderful works towards me shall furnish the occasion and material for it. So the commentators generally.

² Shall remember God whom they have forgotten. Ps. 9: 18 (17).

³ בְּלִי-חַיִּים-אֲדָרָן, here representing the rich and noble.

⁴ בְּלִי-חַיִּים-אֲדָרָן, *those who are doomed to descend into the dust of death.*

⁵ וְגִשְׁתָּ לֹא חַיִּים, rightly taken by the commentators as a relative clause = וְגִשְׁתָּ לֹא חַיִּים, *and he who has no power to save his soul alive.* They who must descend to the dust of death and who cannot save alive their soul, taken together, constitute the antithesis of the *fat of the earth*. They are the poor and weak who have no earthly deliverer. Thus the Messiah includes all classes and conditions of men among those who are to eat of the feast which he makes for them.

⁶ That is, the generation of his true worshippers. This simple and literal rendering of the words: וְגִשְׁתָּ לֹא חַיִּים, we prefer, with Delitzsch, to that proposed by many: *It shall be related of Jehovah to the [next] generation.* It is the seed of those who are spiritually born in Zion. See below on Ps. 87.

⁷ For the law of peace-offerings, see Leviticus, chap. 7. The prohibition to eat any of the flesh of a thank-offering after the first, and of a votive offering, after the second day, in itself implied that the offerer's friends were to share the flesh with him.

ings); and, when delivered, they paid their vows, and called their friends to share the feast with them. Even the harlot whom Solomon introduces, says to the young man, by way of informing him what dainty cheer is to be found in her house: "Peace-offerings are upon me; this day have I paid my vows."¹ When kings offered peace-offerings, on the occasion of great solemnities, they made a feast for the assembled multitude. So David, when he transferred the ark to Zion;² and Solomon, at the dedication of the temple.³ On this latter occasion Solomon offered, as peace-offerings, twenty-two thousand oxen, and a hundred and twenty thousand sheep, and made a feast, for all Israel, of fourteen days' continuance. Herein he was an illustrious type of the Messiah, who appears in the present Psalm, paying his vows before "the great assembly," in the form of peace-offerings, wherewith he spreads a sacrificial feast for all the families of the nations, and for men of all conditions. Rich and poor, strong and weak together, come from all the ends of the earth; they eat and bow down before him, acknowledging him as their Lord; and of them is constituted a spiritual seed that shall be perpetuated forever. What more explicit declaration could we ask that the salvation that proceeds from Zion shall bless all nations? This is the very feast made for all nations on Mount Zion, which we have already considered; and it is represented, moreover, as following in the train of the Messiah's humiliation and triumph over all his foes.⁴

We shall next consider the ninety-sixth Psalm:

Sing unto Jehovah a new song: sing unto Jehovah, all the earth. Sing unto Jehovah; bless his name: proclaim ye, from day to day, the glad tidings of his salvation.⁵ Declare ye among the nations his glory; among all the peoples⁶ his wonders.⁷ For great is Jehovah, and greatly to

¹ Prov. 7: 14.

² 2 Sam. 6: 17—19.

³ 1 Kings 8: 62—66.

⁴ Entirely similar, though not so explicit in its statements, is the representation at the close of the sixty-ninth Psalm.

⁵ בְּצִיר מַיִם לַיּוֹם וּבְצִיר זֶהוּ.

⁶ בְּכָל-הָעַמִּים. It is the nations of the Gentiles themselves that are addressed here and in v. 10; as much as to say: "Ye Gentiles declare among yourselves his glory."

⁷ בְּכָל-הָאֲרָצוֹת, his wonderful works.

be praised: he is to be feared above all gods. For all the gods of the peoples are idols; but Jehovah made the heavens. Honor and majesty are before him: strength and beauty in his sanctuary. Give to Jehovah, ye families of the peoples, give to Jehovah glory and strength. Give to Jehovah the glory of his name; take an offering, and come to his courts. Worship Jehovah in the beauty of holiness:¹ tremble ye before him,² all the earth. Say ye among the nations, Jehovah reigneth: also the world shall be established: it shall not be moved:³ he shall judge the peoples in uprightness. Let the heavens rejoice, and let the earth be glad: let the sea roar and its fulness. Let the field exult, and all that is in it: then shall all the trees of the forest shout for joy⁴—before Jehovah; for he cometh; for he cometh to judge the earth: he shall judge the world in righteousness, and the peoples in truth."

Let the reader notice the kindly and hopeful attitude which this noble Psalm takes towards all the nations of the earth. It does not call upon God to crush and destroy them; but upon them to praise God and rejoice in his righteous government. This is the language of faith and love. The Pharisee of our Lord's day, devoured with pride and self-righteousness, accustomed to think and speak of his heathen neighbors, who were also his oppressors, only as "vessels of wrath fitted to destruction," and anticipating with malignant satisfaction the time when the Messiah of his imagination should lead him forth to victory over them;

¹ בְּהַדְרֵת-קֹדֶשׁ, *in ornament of holiness*. Originally the phrase seems to have denoted the festive apparel worn by God's worshippers in token of reverence. Compare what is said of the priestly garments: "holy garments for glory and for beauty," Ex. 28: 2. Then it came to be used figuratively, as here, of the inward beauty of holiness which this splendid apparel symbolized.

² חִיְלֵי מַעֲבָדָיו. The plural form of the verb refers to the different nations who inhabit the earth.

³ The reference here is to the stability of the moral and providential world, as administered by its righteous and almighty Lord, as the connection shows. This, however, is truly represented by the stability of the natural world (Ps. 93: 1), since both proceed from the same infinite power and holiness, and both constitute parts of one glorious whole.

⁴ It is precisely in those passages where the righteous government of God over his rational creatures is the theme, that the sacred writers call with the most earnestness upon all his inanimate works to praise him. See Isa. 35: 1, 2; 44: 23; 55: 12; Ps. 148. The chorus will not be complete till the unconscious praise of nature is added to the conscious praise of men: "All thy works shall praise thee, O LORD; and thy saints shall bless thee," Ps. 145: 10.

this Pharisee could not have composed such a missionary hymn as the present; nay more, he could not have sung it, till he had first thoroughly perverted its meaning, by turning it into the channel of his own narrow bigotry and worldliness.

But a kindly and hopeful spirit in respect to the heathen world is not all that this Psalm contains. It was written under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Its wishes and aspirations are therefore pledges of the actual good in reserve for the Gentiles. The prayers and hopes which God puts into it, God will fulfil in "the last days."

Another thoroughly missionary Psalm is the sixty-seventh. In its general spirit it agrees, remarkably, with the one just considered; but goes beyond it in the clearness of its anticipations in respect to the conversion of the Gentiles.

V. 1.¹ To the chief musician. Upon stringed instruments. A psalm: a song.² God be gracious to us and bless us; cause his face to shine upon us. Selah.

He begins with prayer for the covenant people to whom he belonged; that is, for the Israelitish nation, which then embosomed "the Israel of God," which is perpetuated in the Christian church. From them salvation must proceed to the Gentile nations, and their prosperity prepares the way for the conversion of the world. The blessing here invoked upon Israel is an abbreviation of the form in which the priests were directed to bless the people.³

V. 2. That thy way may be known upon earth; thy salvation among all nations.

The blessing which the Psalmist has asked for Israel, is not for Israel's sake alone, but for that of all the families of the earth, who are, through Israel, to be brought to the saving knowledge of God. *Thy way*, in the present connection, de-

¹ In the Hebrew this constitutes two verses, the title making a separate verse, so that v. 2 of our version corresponds with v. 3 of the original, and so throughout the Psalm.

² שִׁיר מְזִמֹּר, a Psalm which is also a song. The title *Song* denotes its joyful character, as one in which praise predominates.

³ Numb. 6: 24—26.

notes, not the way which God prescribes to men, but his own way; that is, his wonderful dealings with men by which he manifests his glorious character. The Psalmist then rises to the joyful anticipation of the day when all nations shall know and praise Jehovah as their God:

V. 3. Let the peoples¹ praise thee, O God; let the peoples praise thee, all of them.

Some prefer to render the verse in the Future, thus: "The peoples shall praise thee, O God: the peoples shall praise thee, all of them;" and so, also, the two following verses. Between the two forms, however, there is, in such a case as this, no essential difference; since the prayer, indited by the Spirit of prophecy, contains in itself the promise, and the promise contains the prayer. Taken either way, the missionary spirit breathes through the verse, in its highest and noblest form.²

V. 4. Let the nations be glad and shout for joy: for thou shalt judge the peoples in uprightness; and the nations on the earth shalt thou guide. Selah.

God breaks, with a rod of iron, the kings and rulers of the earth, that are arrayed against him, with all their followers. Thus he prepares the way to guide the nations of the world, not to destruction but to salvation, through the knowledge of his Son Jesus Christ. They are therefore called upon to

¹ עַמִּים, not *people* in the indefinite collective sense of the English word, but *populi, nations*.

² There lies before us the autograph of that beautiful letter written by the Rev. William Goodell of Constantinople to his brother on the occasion of the death of their father, and first published in the Ohio Observer of Nov. 9, 1843. Speaking of his father's early habits and character, he says: "The little farm he once possessed, if it were not all *ploughed* over, was I am confident almost every foot of it *prayed* over." . . . "He was full of the millennium and of the missionary spirit long before the existence of the *Missionary Herald*, or of the American Board, or of the Panoplist even, and even before the Connecticut Missionary Society sent their missionaries away off to the distant regions of Ohio; praying daily for both Jews and Gentiles, saying with the Psalmist: 'Let the people praise thee, O God; let the people praise thee, all of them.'" The good man could find no words more appropriate to express the yearnings of his soul for the salvation of the world. No missionary at the present day, in his prayers for the heathen, can rise above their divine fulness and depth of meaning.

rejoice in his righteous government, which has for its end the salvation, not of Israel alone, but of all the families of the earth. Therefore he adds, again :

V. 5. Let the peoples praise thee, O God : let the peoples praise thee, all of them.

The repetition expresses the intensity of the Psalmist's feelings.

Vs. 6, 7. The earth hath given her increase : God shall bless us, even our God. God shall bless us, and all the ends of the earth shall fear him.

In the words : "The earth hath given her increase" (נָתַתָּה אֶרֶץ יְבוּלָהּ), which cannot be lawfully rendered in the Future, as in our version), some suppose an allusion to the recent ingathering of a bountiful harvest, which is taken as an earnest and a symbol of the spiritual harvest of all nations, which shall hereafter be reaped, through God's blessing upon Zion. Thus the Psalm closes with the explicit prediction that "all the ends of the earth shall fear God."

We shall bring this Article to a close by the exposition of one more short missionary Psalm, the eighty-seventh, which is unique in its kind, setting forth the future conversion of the Gentiles under the idea that Zion shall be the future birth-place of all the nations of the earth. Of the various suppositions in respect to the occasion of this Psalm, the common one, which connects it with the deliverance of Jerusalem from Sennacherib in the days of Hezekiah is the most probable. On this occasion "many brought gifts unto the Lord to Jerusalem, and presents to Hezekiah king of Judah ; so that he was magnified in the sight of all nations from henceforth."¹ This tribute of honor from the Gentile nations, might well be considered as the first sheaf of a glorious ingathering reserved for the future. See Hengstenberg, introduction to Ps. lxxxvii. The sacred writers always regard present interpositions of God in behalf

¹ 2 Chron. 32 : 23.

of Zion as earnest and pledges of her final triumph over all her foes.

V. 1. By the sons of Korah. A psalm: a song. His foundation¹ [is] in the holy mountains.²

His foundation is the foundation of Jehovah; that is, the city founded under his direction, and which he acknowledges as his own in a special sense. This abrupt introduction is in harmony with the highly impassioned and lyric character of the Psalm.

V. 2. Jehovah loveth the gates of Zion more than all the dwellings of Jacob.

His love for Zion has been manifested in choosing her, above all the other cities of Judah, as his dwelling-place. Compare 1 Chron. 22:1. 2 Chron. 3:1. Ps. 68:16. 78:68, 69.

V. 3. Glorious things are spoken of thee,¹ O thou city of God. Selah.

The *glorious things* are those mentioned in the following verses: the enrolment of all the nations as citizens of Zion, with all the enlargement, peace, and glory implied in such an enrolment. These glorious promises belong, not to the geographical Zion, but to the spiritual Zion, of which Jeru-

¹ יְסֻדָּתוֹ. Some propose to render: *his founded* [city], on the ground that יְסֻדָּה nowhere else occurs as a noun. But this is exactly balanced by the fact that יְסֻדָּה nowhere else occurs as a participle, instead of which we find יָסַד, Isa. 28:16; and מָצַד, 1 Kings 7:10; Cant. 5:15. Both renderings, however, come to the same idea.

² בְּהַרְרֵי-קֹשֶׁט. The plural refers, as it would seem, to the several heights embraced within the walls of Jerusalem considered as a whole.

³ נִקְבְּרוּ מִדְּבָרֶיךָ. De Wette takes נִקְבְּרוּ adverbially. Delitzsch would explain the construction after the analogy of passive verbs with the subject in the accusative, and often with a neglect of gender and number—נִקְבְּרוּ מִדְּבָרֶיךָ = נִקְבְּרוּ מִדְּבָרֶיךָ, *one has spoken glorious things*. See Rödiger's Gesenius's Heb. Gram. § 143. אַחֲרֵי מִדְּבָרֶיךָ may denote the object concerning which; e. g. *And I will speak of thy testimonies* (אַחֲרֵי מִדְּבָרֶיךָ) before kings, Ps. 119:46; *Speak no more to me concerning this matter* (אַחֲרֵי מִדְּבָרֶיךָ), Deut. 3:26; and this is more appropriate than the rendering proposed by some: *glorious things are spoken in thee*.

saalem was, in the Psalmist's day, the visible earthly metropolis, but which has, now, the whole earth for her dwelling-place.

V. 4. I will mention Rahab and Babylon to them that know me (or, as them that know me): behold Philistia, and Tyre, with Cush; this was born there.

הַזִּכִּיר means, in some passages, simply *to mention*, as in 1 Sam. 4:18; in others, *to mention with honor, to celebrate*, as in Isa. 12:4. 63:7. The latter is its signification here. *Rahab* stands, as in Ps. 89:11 (10), for *Egypt*, apparently with reference to the signification of the word רָהַב, *raging, pride, insolence*; possibly with direct allusion to Isaiah's words concerning Egypt: רָהַב הֵם שָׁבָה, *insolence, they are inaction*;¹ i. e. while they boast much, they do nothing. The rendering of לִירְדֵי depends on the question, who is the speaker? The expositors generally understand Jehovah: *I will mention as them that know me.*² This view commends itself from the weightiness of the thought thus expressed; and, considering the abrupt and dramatic character of the Psalm, there is no objection to it. Otherwise, we might understand the Psalmist as speaking, and render: *I will mention Rahab and Babylon to my acquaintances.*³ A real parallelism would then be Luke 15:6, 9, "He calleth together his friends and neighbors, saying unto them, Rejoice with me," etc. In either case, the thing mentioned concerning Egypt and Babylon is that they have been born in Zion, which is to be supplied from the second clause of the verse: "behold Philistia and Tyre, with Cush (here, Ethiopia); this was born there." As he points out these three nations, he says of each: "this was born there; that is, this nation; for he is representing the nations as becoming citizens of Zion.

¹ Isa. 30:7.

² For the use of לִי they compare Ps. 7:14 (13): הַחֲסִי לִי יִשְׂרָאֵל, *he shall make his arrows burning*; Ex. 21:2: יֵצֵא לִי חָפְזִי, *he shall go out as free*.

³ Compare, for this signification of the participle, Job 19:13; 42:11.

V. 5. And of Zion¹ it shall be said, This and that man² were born in her: and the Highest shall establish her.

The Psalmist now sees the nations born in Zion as individuals, אִישׁ וְאִישׁ; literally, *man and man*; that is, one man after another,³ till the whole multitude of them throng her gates. Thus by the accession of "a great multitude, which no man can number, of all nations, and kindreds, and peoples, and tongues,"⁴ the Highest establishes Zion, and makes her "a praise in the earth."

V. 6. Jehovah shall count, in writing down the peoples,⁵ This was born there. Selah.

Jehovah now makes a registry of the nations, saying of each, as it is entered on the list, This was born there. It is its birth in Zion that entitles it to a place on the roll of her citizens.

V. 7. As well the singers as the players on instruments⁶ [are there]. All my springs are in thee.

Jerusalem has now become the metropolis of the world, the home of all the families of the earth. God has established her in permanent prosperity, making her walls salvation, and her gates praise.⁶ She must therefore resound, from day to day, with the voice of holy song. The first clause of the verse is elliptical, and is variously filled out by the interpreters. Some connect the two clauses thus: "As well the singers as the players on instruments [shall say], All my springs are in thee." But the method of our version is as

¹ יְרוּשָׁלַיִם. The לְ here, as often, denotes *reference*. Compare Gen. 20: 13. Some, however, render: *and to Zion*, on the ground that she is virtually, if not formally, addressed.

² The English version: *this and that man*, is liable to be misunderstood as meaning, *this and that man out of a multitude*. Whereas the Hebrew rather denotes a constant succession of individuals till all are included; so that it comes near to the idea of *every man*.

³ Rev. 7: 9.

⁴ עַמִּים, *populos, the different nations*.

⁵ מְסַפֵּר, according to Gesenius, the Participle Kal of מִסַּר with a meaning borrowed from מִסַּר, *a pipe or flute*. Others make it a noun of the Pilel form from מִסַּר, and render it *dancers*.

⁶ Isa. 60: 18.

natural, and as poetic, as any that has been proposed. The words: *all my springs are in thee*, are addressed to Zion. God himself dwells in her. In her he has opened "the wells of salvation" for his people, out of which they draw living water, from age to age.¹

How, now, are the nations of the earth born in Zion? Not by her becoming the literal metropolis of the whole world, and, in this character, receiving all nations as her obedient subjects and citizens, according to the gross manner in which some interpret the prophecy of Isaiah and Micah, and that of Zechariah, which have been above considered;² but spiritually, by their receiving the law of Jehovah, which goes forth out of Zion, in the person of Jesus Christ his Son; and his word, which proceeds from Jerusalem, in the form of "the glorious gospel of the blessed God." The whole is well summed up by Calvin, thus: "Nor is the word *born* inappropriately employed to express the fact that the Egyptians, Chaldeans, and such like, shall be the flock of God's people. Although Zion was not the place of their natural birth, but they were to be grafted into the body of the holy people by adoption; yet, as the way we enter the church is a second birth, this form of expression is used with great propriety. The condition upon which Christ espouses the faithful to himself, is that they should forget their own people and their father's house,³ and that, being formed into new creatures and born again, of incorruptible seed, they should begin to be the children of God, as well as of the church.⁴ But we have higher authority than that of this prince of commentators. The apostle Paul, in his Epistle to the Ephesians, describes the introduction of the Gentiles, through Christ, into "the commonwealth of Israel, in terms so explicit that his words may well be taken as the best illustration of the present Psalm. Before the advent of Christ, they were "aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise." But now, in Christ Jesus, the Gentiles, who were "once far off, are made

¹ Isa. 12: 3.² Isa. 2: 2—4; Micah 4: 1—4; Zech. 14: 16—21.³ Ps. 45: 11 (10).⁴ Commentary on Psalms, in loco.

nigh" — nigh to the commonwealth of Israel, that is, brought into it. For Christ "is our peace" — the author of peace between Jews and Gentiles. He "hath made both one, and hath broken down the middle wall of partition" between them; "having abolished, in his flesh, the enmity, the law of commandments in ordinances;" that is, having, by the sacrifice of his flesh on the cross, abolished the Jewish system of ordinances, which constituted "the enmity," or ground of separation between Jews and Gentiles, so as "to make, in himself, of twain one new man," — one new spiritual body, which knows no distinction of Jew or Gentile; so that the Gentiles are "no more strangers and foreigners, but fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household of God."¹

ARTICLE II.

THE NATURE OF EVANGELICAL FAITH.

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MOST of the readers of the *Bibliotheca* have probably become familiar, through an American reprint, with a series of sermons upon the Mission of the Comforter, preached before the University of Cambridge, in March 1840, by the late Archdeacon Hare. It is not, perhaps, so well known that a little more than a year previous to the delivery of these discourses, their learned author gave, in the same place, a course of sermons upon the Nature, Province, and Power of Faith, which he was called upon to publish, and which were issued from the press the following year, in an expanded

¹ Eph. 2:11—22. The Apostle occupies a higher position than the Psalmist; for he sees not only the ingathering of the Gentiles into God's church, but also the manner of its accomplishment, viz. by the breaking down through Christ of "the middle wall of partition" between Jews and Gentiles.

form, and under the general title of *The Victory of Faith*. These discourses have all the distinguishing excellences of the later series : the same breadth of view, subtlety and vigor of thought, appositeness and brilliancy of illustration, and fervent love of spiritual truth. Some passages are rich in examples of fine philosophical analysis, lucidly exhibiting the nature and province of faith. Others make us feel its power, stirring the soul like a trumpet ; as, for example, that in which, after the manner of the eleventh chapter of Hebrews, the names and deeds of a long catalogue of heroes of the Christian faith are cited. The work is one peculiarly fitted to attract and benefit youthful yet cultivated minds, when beginning earnestly to reflect upon the nature and value of spiritual religion — minds such as are to be found in all our colleges and higher seminaries, evincing, as it does, in the best way, the reasonableness of faith, by showing its necessity in man's natural life, its harmony with the other parts of his being, its power as a practical principle, its influence among the leading historic nations, and its victorious might when it rests in the person and atonement of Jesus Christ. We hope that some one of our publishers, to whom the friends of religion are already largely indebted for the republication of many sterling foreign works, will place this volume more easily within reach than it now is, of the many who would prize it. In the present Essay we would offer a few thoughts, chiefly suggested by these discourses, upon one aspect of their general theme.

Faith is often defined to be belief upon the ground of testimony. By belief is meant a conviction or judgment of the understanding, an intellectual assent to certain propositions which are received as true, not upon grounds of reason, but upon testimony. Religious faith is said to be a belief in religious truth founded upon the testimony of God, particularly as given in his inspired word ; saving faith is the assent of the intellect, upon such testimony, to whatever is the contents of this testimony ; right affections are supposed to depend upon such intellectual conviction of the truth, and to be its necessary effect. What men need is

light. Let their views of truth and duty be made clear, and their affections and wills will move in harmony with such apprehensions. Let the way of righteousness be made apparent, let the understanding be convinced of the superior claims of goodness, let it open its eyes to the great objects of faith, in their majesty and authority and attractiveness, and such belief will be unto righteousness. It fulfils the condition upon which God justifies the ungodly. It will be the root of a holy life. Right and answering affections and good works will follow in its train, as the tides follow the moon.

Those addicted to intellectual pursuits are especially prone to such a conception of faith. The cultivation of the understanding occupies much of their attention. It is natural to value most, not what is most useful, but what is most used; studious men are likely, unless on their guard, to attach a disproportionate importance to the understanding, to the rank it holds among the powers of the mind; to the truths it elicits, and the processes by which it acts. They are, in a measure, withdrawn from practical life. The even tenor of their lives is comparatively undisturbed by the din and strife of the fiercer passions, and the more turbulent hosts of evil. The desire to measure and weigh and estimate all subjects of thought by the standards and scales of the understanding, becomes almost a passion. There is a stronger desire to be able to give a reason for faith, than to have faith; or rather, it is supposed that the having faith is simply dependent upon being able to give a reason which satisfies the understanding; or, if so narrow a view as this be not taken, if a moral element is at least thought of, the intellectual ingredient of faith is still put first; it is deemed the chief element, that which secures and characterizes all the rest. The effort is, before all and above all things else, fully to satisfy the demands of the understanding; and it is expected that, when this is accomplished, the work will be done; the soul will have gained the heights of faith, it can rest secure that it believes unto righteousness.

Substantially the same notion often creeps into the thinking of those who recognize the necessity of the enlighten-

ment of the Holy Spirit in order to a true and living faith. His work is supposed to be, not that of inclining the heart to do the will of God, — to act faithfully up to the light received; and thus, by the way of obedience, to be led on to knowledge — but, primarily, that of instruction. If he moves the will, it is simply by playing upon the understanding. The cause of the moral result is the perception of truth; the belief of the intellect, through the Spirit's agency, may be deemed necessary to set this cause in motion. Others, again, affirm that, by the agency of the Spirit, not only the intellect is quickened and illumined, but the emotional nature is made sensitive to all virtuous appeals, and the will is inclined to consent to that which is seen and felt to be right and good. Saving faith, however, is still simply an act of the understanding — “but belief, and nothing more,” — although, since it has its seat in a mind, all whose moral mechanism has been, as it were, reconstructed, it invariably produces, by an organic necessity, right affections and a holy life.¹

Before attempting to controvert this idea of faith, we would invite attention to a few preliminary remarks.

1. In the first place, it is to be noticed that the faith which we wish to consider is that faith which the scriptures affirm to be unto righteousness; the faith which is divinely appointed to be the condition of the soul's justification and salvation. We make this remark, however, simply for the sake of definiteness in our inquiry, and not for the sake of removing what is termed evangelical or saving faith out of the analogy of faith in general. For this analogy, we believe, if it were necessary, might easily be shown to be opposed to the notion of faith which has been stated. That is, as archdeacon Hare has remarked: “even when we speak of faith as manifested in our intercourse with our neighbors — when we talk of putting faith in one another — the moral action of the will is a stronger element in that faith than the

¹ See Dr. Chalmers's *Institutes of Theology*, Part II. Chap. VI. and *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. XIII. pp. 513, 514.

judicial exercise of the understanding.”¹ But this question need not concern us. The question is not, whether the word *faith* is properly used by the writers of the New Testament, but simply, what notion they attach to it, what meaning they employ it to convey. This must be settled by their use of it. They constantly make faith the condition of salvation. This faith is often affirmed, by men who undertake to interpret the voice of scripture, to have its seat and origin in the understanding. There is much latitude in the expression of this interpretation : some seem to regard faith as exclusively an operation of the intellect ; nothing more is necessary to salvation than such an assent of the mind to the testimony of the Bible. Others say, that there must be holy affections in heart, and a consistent life, if there is true faith. But these last are looked upon as the natural effects of faith — not part of it and essential to it, but its necessary or certain results, in the heart and life. The question is, whether this is the idea of faith evidently in the minds of those who have prescribed, with the authority of God, faith as the indispensable condition of salvation.

2. Again, we would remark, it is conceded that there is an intellectual element in faith ; and it may also be allowed, that, as matter of experience, and in the order of time, this intellectual element is primary. As far, at least, as concerns the faith demanded in the Bible, it may be fully admitted, that nothing can be believed but what is known. By this is not meant that nothing can be believed but what is understood or fully comprehended. Mysteries, or truths which transcend the finite reason, may be known, and are properly objects of faith. What is meant is, that in saving faith there is found, as an ingredient, an intellectual apprehension of its object. The Romish church teaches that it is enough, in order to salvation, to put faith in the church ; there may be entire ignorance of the doctrines of the church. But if the church holds the truth of the scripture, and if the individual member believes in the church, he has an implicit faith in all that the

¹ Victory of Faith, p. 18. See also Bishop Berkeley's *Min. Phil. Di. VII. § 13*, and Bishop Barrow's *Complete Works*, Vol. II. p. 98.

church believes. For the mass of men, it is said, this implicit faith is all that is possible. Now, as against this view, it is affirmed that the faith which is required in the scriptures, cannot consist with ignorance of its object. It implies knowledge, in which knowledge there is an act of the understanding. And this is plain from the nature of the case. There cannot be any exercise of the affections and will except in some kind of connection with the understanding; nor any assent of the understanding without something which is assented to: an intellectual apprehension of the truth. It is plain, also, from the powers and effects attributed to faith, which imply the presence and agency of truth. How can a blind assent to, we know not what, sanctify the heart, give peace to the conscience, produce good works, and give maturity to Christian character? Faith, too, it is expressly affirmed, comes by hearing, or report, by instruction, by attention to the truth. The gospel is adapted to the entire man. Those who would banish the intellect from its necessary functions in the religious life, are as foolish as those who would seek to kindle a fire without fuel.

In the order of time, moreover, the action of the intellect may be said to precede the full belief of the heart. There must be, for example, a certain kind of intellectual perception and recognition of Christ and his work before that which is moral and spiritual.

It is at this point, especially, that confusion has come into the discussions and opinions of men upon the nature of faith. Because the intellectual condition of faith thus has priority, in time, to that element which is moral, the former has been assumed to be the *cause* of the latter. Antecedence in time, it has well been said, has been confounded with antecedence in causation;¹ and so those, especially, who are inclined to view all subjects rather in their speculative than in their practical aspects, have been led to regard knowledge as the chief and formative ingredient in faith, and to make this their chief care.

¹ See *Victory of Faith*, p. 41.

3. Once more, we would remark, it is conceded that faith is a simple and single act of the soul. Those who would restrict the definition of faith to an operation and act of the understanding, make much account of the simplicity which it introduces into the subject. The attempt, it is said, to include in an act of faith an exercise of the affections and will, as well as of the understanding, introduces confusion. We crowd into what we must regard as a simple act of the mind, elements which destroy its unity, and which, in such a relation, are incongruous.

This last statement, that the ingredients, knowledge and trust, are inconsistent one with the other, we must regard as gratuitous and unfounded ; at least, no attempt has been made to prove it. And if it should be made to appear that the word *faith*, in the teachings of Christ and his apostles, covers both ideas, of assent and confidence, we should not hesitate which to sacrifice, simplicity or truth ; at least, we should be inclined to suspect that our psychology may not as yet have become infallible. Still, we freely concede that the demand for simplicity in our conception of faith is a natural and pressing one ; one, we also believe, authorized by the scriptures and by Christian experience. But this simplicity is not that of bare, bald oneness, but of unity. Faith is a single act, not because it is restricted to one department of the mind, but because it is an act of the whole mind, and of that mind in the unity of its personal life. It is one, as the person who believes is one. It is one, as being a total act of the soul ; and so, while it is single, it has a variety and fulness of contents. For the sake of accurately observing the history of our mental processes, of analyzing them, and of gaining clear conceptions of their modes and uses, we classify the various operations of the mind. To different classes of exercises we give different names, and treat them as distinct departments or powers. Unless we are on our guard, the names come, in our apprehension of them, to stand for independent, substantive things, bound together, like separate fagots tied up in one bundle.

With this conception of the mind, it is impossible to see

how faith can be at once in the understanding and the will, — at once knowledge and trust. But the truth is, that there is one, indivisible, individual, personal spirit, which thinks, and feels, and chooses. Man was made a living soul. Analyze a seed: you find a stem, a leaf or a pair of leaves, and nourishment for their growth. And is this all? Then were there no movement, nor verdure, nor beauty, nor fragrance, nor fruit. There is in all, the life: you have the understanding, the sensibilities, and the power of choice; and is this all? Then were there no continuous, personal, spiritual, and responsible life. Then is the living soul, the deathless spirit, which reveals itself, now in the processes of the understanding, now in the emotions and resolves of the heart, and now in all, together, wielding them as it will, in coincident activity — the personal, living spirit, which was made to love, at once, with all the mind and with all the heart; and no less, but rather, as the root of this, to believe, at once, with the understanding and the will. It is because faith is thus central that, while it is susceptible of analysis, it is nevertheless single as a power, and simple as an act. It is because it is thus central that, when the Author of man's being would redeem him from the disorder of his powers, thrown into direct confusion and anarchy by sin, he pronounced, as the healing, harmonizing word — BELIEVE.

And this brings us to the consideration of some of the evidence which the scriptures afford, that they include, in the idea of faith, as properly pertaining to it, as essential to it, an act of the will, as well as of the understanding.

The language of the apostle Paul, in Rom. 10:10, is a direct proof of this. The apostle is speaking of saving faith. The faith which justifies, he affirms, is with the heart: *with the heart man believeth unto righteousness*. The word *heart* is often used, in the Bible, to denote the whole man — the person. It is the seat of life. It gives character to all that proceeds from it; thought, feeling, desire, are attributed to it. As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he. Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, as well as evil passions and evil deeds.

Faith is attributed to the heart, in this sense of the word : it springs from that which gives life, character, activity, and progress to the soul. True faith is from the heart.

The same thing is indicated, also, when we look at the word which we render, and from which we derive, our word *faith*. Its primary idea is, holding fast ; and, as applied to acts of the mind, trusting, confiding, relying ; and this sense the proposition, connected with it, often settles as its meaning in the New Testament. Of like import is the corresponding Hebrew word ; which, indeed, is almost always rendered, in our version, by the specific word *trust*. To the same effect are the phrases by which the act of faith is described ; it is expressed by the terms, “ coming to Christ ; looking to Him ; receiving Him ; eating the flesh of the Son of Man, and drinking His blood ; trusting in Him ; and being fully persuaded of his truth and faithfulness.”

Notice, also, the powers and effects attributed to faith : it is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. It is a firm reliance upon the truth and faithfulness of God. It is the victory that overcometh the world. Through it is remission of sins, justification, sanctification, spiritual light, spiritual and eternal life, access to God, adoption, the inheritance of the promises. Without it, it is impossible to please God. Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin. It works by love. It unites the soul to Christ, as branches are united to the vine. It is an evidence of regeneration. By it Christ dwells in the heart. By it saints live, stand, walk, obtain a good report, overcome the world, resist and conquer the devil, are delivered from sin, are made joint-heirs with Christ.

Even when faith is spoken of as knowledge, the moral element still predominates. The knowledge which the scriptures commend, and which they identify with faith, includes, in its very essence, an ardent purity of the affections. It is “ a loving, adoring, and ever-growing recognition ” of the infinite and inexhaustible perfections of God.

Let it be further noticed, that the great object of faith is a person. Faith is receiving Christ : *To as many as received him,*

gave he power to become the sons of God ; even to them that believe on his name. Here personal trust in Christ is what is meant by faith, and no other idea can be substituted. No belief in abstract facts, no mere operation of the intellect, can be expressed by the words "receiving Christ." They imply a spiritual perception of his excellence and glory ; a love for his moral perfection, a sense of the guilt and ill desert of sin, of need of pardon, purification, entire renewal, of a knowledge of the Lord Jesus Christ as an almighty, an all-sufficient, an infinitely-gracious Saviour, and a willingness to submit to him in obedience to all his commands. Saving faith has to do immediately and directly with the Lord Jesus Christ. A mind in the exercise of such faith, concentrates its regards upon him ; the understanding, affections, will — all are drawn forth, in lively exercise, in one whole act of acceptance.

It is a good evidence that we have a true idea of any subject if we find that the idea is *light-giving* ; that it illumines parts and relations of the subject otherwise obscure.

The appreciation of faith as rather moral than intellectual, as having for its chief and formative element an exercise of the affections and will rather than of the understanding, will afford this sign of its truth. It shows us :

1. In the first place, why the influences of the Holy Spirit are made so much account of, in the Bible, in the production of faith. Faith is the gift of God. It is the work of the Spirit. He produces, nourishes, and maintains it. It is founded upon the witness of the Spirit, with and by the truth. Now that which is the work of the Spirit, in the souls of men, we should expect would be spiritual. The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance ; in which enumeration, every word denotes that which is moral. So in the description of the wisdom which he bestows, every quality ascribed to it is moral. It is set forth as pure, peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy.¹ If, now, we restrict the notion of the faith which the Spirit

¹ See James 1 : 5 and 3 : 15, 17, and The Victory of Faith, p. 20.

begets, to a mere assent of the understanding to truths which it receives upon testimony, simply intellectually apprehended, we are in a sphere into which we have no reason to suppose the Spirit's ordinary and immediate operations extend ; and we are at a loss to understand why his peculiar and special agency is of such momentous consequence. The laws of the understanding are unchangeable ; and, upon all subjects properly before them, in which the heart is free from wrong bias and prejudice, men's intellects work correctly. As matter of fact, thousands of men are intellectually convinced of the truth and divine authority of the Christian religion, whose lives show that their hearts are strangers to its power. It is said that they do not have a convincing apprehension of what they profess to believe. This is true ; but why do they not realize this ? The *evidence is clear*. Why, when men are told of the truth, and justice, and love of God, and believe in these things with the understanding, is there no attractiveness, no constraining power, over them, of these august, and authoritative, and living verities ? And what is it to appreciate moral and spiritual things ? Can it be merely to perceive them with the mind ? Can it be merely that assent of the mind which is founded upon an intellectual apprehension of their existence ? That to which faith assents is their holy and sacred qualities, their divine authority, loveliness, and perfection. Assent to qualities such as these, *moral and spiritual*, must be of the heart, a moral and spiritual act : *whosoever loveth, says the apostle, knoweth God. With the heart man believeth unto righteousness*. In order to faith, there must be, to the mind, some demonstration of the spiritual ; and to this the understanding is, of itself, incompetent. It would be incompetent even if there were not so much bad teaching in the world ; if men's intellects, through the conception of their hearts, had not become bewildered in the mazes of error. In order to be seen, known, appreciated, the truth must be loved. So long as the heart is wrong, all the learning and knowledge of the highest archangel might be poured into the human understanding, until it was filled

and flooded, and there would be no faith. Something more than reasoning, even though the reasoner be the Spirit of Truth, is necessary to communicate divine knowledge, to open the eyes to the divinity of truth, to the unspeakable preciousness and majesty of him who is the Truth. "I have seen a God by reason," writes one of the most eminent Puritan divines, "and men were amazed at God thus apprehended; *but I have seen God Himself and been ravished to behold Him.*"¹ If faith be simply an exercise of the understanding, why this vast difference between knowing things by reason, and by faith or the spirit of faith? If the agency of the Spirit, in the production of faith, be necessary simply because there is so much ignorance, and error, and bad teaching in the world that men's minds are bewildered; because he can reason with a power and cogency beyond that of the human teacher, why should this agency be absolutely and alike necessary to the production of faith in *every* human soul? Why are, often, those who have sat, all their lengthened lives, under the teachings of the sanctuary, as really destitute of a genuine faith — a faith which overcomes the world, a faith unto righteousness — as are the most degraded Bushmen? Why to all men, the refined as well as the uncultivated, the learned as well as the ignorant, the masters in Israel as well as the publicans and sinners, must it be said, alike: *Except ye be born again, ye cannot see the kingdom of God; ye must be born again; whosoever believeth, is born of God?*

But if faith is with the heart—a submission of the will to the will of God, a personal trust in the redemptive act of his Son—then must it be spiritual in its very essence, and the appropriate fruit of the Spirit. For it is with the heart that men *sin*. And when sin has thus once gained a lodgement at the very seat and centre of personal life, it cannot be dislodged but by the *renewal* of the *heart*, by a change in the man; so that the affections and the will, once sold under sin, may become free to love and choose the truth. Such a change, no amount of light in the understanding can, of itself, beget; nor any more dispense with its necessity.

¹ Shepard's Works, Vol. III. p. 439.

II. In view of the truth which has been set forth — that faith depends more upon the will than upon the understanding — we see, secondly, why a genuine faith is so often the possession of the poor and unlearned, while the learned and cultivated are destitute of it. If the grounds of faith were the decision of the understanding, the results of a balancing and weighing of arguments, a sifting of testimony, then the best judges as to human legislation, would be the best as to the divine : those most skilled in earthly wisdom, would be most competent to appreciate the heavenly. Faith would increase in proportion to the expansion of the understanding. He who is most conversant with human science, would most easily apprehend the things of God. The philosopher would attain to faith more easily than the peasant. Among men of science we should find a readier apprehension, a fuller reception, of the divinity and atonement of Christ, than among those whose intellects are less keen and disciplined. Whereas the fact, it has with truth been said, is “very often exactly the reverse : the philosopher, beguiled by the phantoms of his understanding, finds it difficult, if not impossible, to raise his spirit beyond the moral teacher, the man Jesus ; while the poor and humble acknowledge and adore him as their ever-present Saviour and God.”¹

III. Again, if faith be a property of the heart rather than of the understanding, we see how it is that men are accountable for their faith. It is a work of the will, an act of that within us to which responsibility immediately attaches. So far as it involves an exercise of the understanding, there is not entire freedom from accountability ; for in every intellectual operation there is personal agency. Though men cannot make truth, nor alter the laws of evidence, they can attend to that evidence with a simple, single-hearted desire to know the truth ; and for all that is otherwise, in forming their opinions, they are accountable.

But the real ground of the faith which the gospel requires, is not simply nor chiefly that apprehension of truth to which the understanding, of itself, is competent. Whosoever be-

¹ *Victory of Faith*, p. 27.

lieveth that Jesus is the Son of God, hath the witness in himself. Faith is founded, not upon the belief or testimony of those about us; not because the mind can state the historical and rational grounds of its belief, important as are these in their place, but because it sees the excellence and feels the authority and power of truth; because, with and by the truth, there is the witness of the Spirit. If the mind within whose reach this truth is placed, does not discern its true character, if it has not this evidence, the difficulty lies deeper than its understanding. It is responsible for not believing. Hence the gospel enjoins faith upon all who hear its call. If faith were founded upon the testimony of the church, none could be under obligation to believe, to whom that testimony should not be afforded. If it were founded on historical testimony, it could not be required of those who have not the time and ability to examine and appreciate that evidence. But since it rests upon the divine character of the truth, the obligation to believe is universal. If there is not convincing evidence, evidence which forms a sufficient and ample basis for an unwavering faith, it is because sin blinds the mind, because the heart is wrong.

IV. Finally, we see that all faith which is not moral and practical, is wanting in the essential characteristic of the faith required in the gospel. If faith is of the heart, it must influence the life. There are the fountains of life. As a man believeth, in his heart, so is he. Hence we find so often, in the scriptures, obedience, works, made the condition of salvation; while it is affirmed, with unqualified distinctness, that by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified. It is faith *only* which justifies, which is the condition upon which we become one with Christ, in all the benefits and triumphs of his redemption. Yet faith can never exist *alone*, no more than the sun can climb the azure vault of the sky, and shine in his meridian splendor, and not pour his light upon all that he beholds. Faith brings Christ into the soul; and this light of the knowledge of the glory of God chases away its darkness, and purifies every fountain of feeling, and makes it fruitful as the garden of the Lord.

ARTICLE III.

BOARDMAN'S HIGHER CHRISTIAN LIFE.¹

BY REV. JACOB J. ABBOTT, UXBRIDGE, MASS.

WE have, here, a work on Christian experience. Though not yet two years old, it has attained a popularity and influence of no ordinary extent. Of its author we know little, except what we have learned from the book before us.

The SUBJECT treated, if it be Christian experience in general, or the higher stages of it, that growth in grace by which the riper fruits of piety are reached, is one both of unspeakable interest and importance. The Christian world will never be tired of reading of this description. To no human benefactors will they make more grateful acknowledgments than to the Baxters, the Doddridges, the Flavels, the Bunyans, the Edwardses, and the Alexanders. Is the author of "The Higher Christian Life" worthy of a place in the church among those greater lights and benefactors? In other words: is "The Higher Christian Life" worthy to take its place by the side of Doddridge's *Rise and Progress*, Taylor's *Holy Living and Dying*, Pike's *Cases of Conscience*, Edwards on *Religious Affections*, the Alexanders (father and son) on *Religious Experience and Consolation* addressed to the *Suffering People of God*, James's *Christian Professor and Christian Progress*, and other standard works of that class? So much, and more, has been claimed for this treatise. Having given it a somewhat careful examination, we will proceed to state, as clearly and as fairly as we can, the results of our investigation.

And we remark, at the outset, that the book is a difficult one to analyze satisfactorily, for reasons that will appear as

¹ The Higher Christian Life, by Rev. W. E. Boardman. "That ye may be filled with all the fulness of God." Boston: Henry Hoyt; New York; D. Appleton and Co. 1859. pp. 330. 12mo.

we proceed. The treatise is, professedly, and in the printing, divided into three Parts — "The Higher Christian Life: What it is; How attained; Progress and Power." But these three Parts, with some verbal changes, might be bound up in any other order, and the book would read quite as well. Indeed there would be something gained by putting the third Part first; for, in that only, and nearly at the end of it, do you find the definition that entirely relieves your suspense as to the author's theory — the one idea under which his mind is laboring.

In a word, the book has no method at all; no development, no progress, no "lucidus ordo." We are not sure it would suffer (with trifling qualifications) by arranging its eighteen chapters in any order different from the present, even if that were by chance.

But to the treatise. What is the subject treated? What does the writer mean by the "higher life?" and by "second conversion?" as its equivalent, or the stepping-stone to it? Precisely what he does mean, we will not attempt to say; because it is not said *intelligibly* in the book, and cannot be inferred from the book. On the contrary, it can be inferred, most certainly, from the book, that he had no well-defined idea, in his own mind, on the subject (see p. 57).

One thing, however, is made clear. By the phrase "higher life," to denote that higher experience which he thinks it the privilege and duty of all Christians to reach, he has no reference whatever to the comparatively matured results of a *progressive sanctification*. *Growth in grace*, as that is commonly understood by Christians, is entirely aside from his theory. Accordingly, "second conversion" is not an epoch in a Christian's experience, at which there is a return, by bitter repentance, from backsliding; or at which, by a more powerful baptism of the Holy Ghost and a clearer faith, there is a sudden rising up to a higher terrace upon the holy mount (p. 48).

Some critic has objected to the phraseology "second conversion," when the number of epochs, more or less marked, in the process of sanctification, is *indefinite*; and one might

just as well speak of the third, or fourth, or twentieth, or fiftieth. No, not with Mr. Boardman's theory: there can only be the *second* after the *first*.

The theory relates to the MEANS of *Christian sanctification*. And the theory, as to the *means*, is that by a simple and single act of *faith*¹ we obtain sanctification, just as we, at first, obtained justification. It is the work of an *instant*, so far as the use of means for that end is concerned, precisely as justification is. We first receive Christ, by faith, for justification. That is our first conversion. The thing secured by it—justification—is *complete*, eternal: there is no more condemnation. But this is only a half salvation. By and by we begin to feel our need of holiness. And there are two ways pursued, he says, to obtain this. Most, in their blindness, seek it painfully, and slowly, and very unsuccessfully, by works, by strivings. Here and there one learns the true way, and takes Christ, at once and forever, for *sanctification*. This is the second conversion. Here is his own explanation: "practically always perhaps, and theologically often, we separate between the two, in our views and efforts, to secure them to ourselves, until we are experimentally taught better. We have one process for acceptance with God, that is faith; and another for progress in holiness, that is works. After having found acceptance in Jesus by faith, we think to go on to perfection by strugglings and resolves, by fastings and prayers, not knowing the better way of taking Christ for our sanctification, just as we have already taken him for our justification." Again: "There is a *second experience*, distinct from the first—sometimes years after the first—and as distinctly marked, both as to time and circumstances and character, as the first—a *second conversion*, as it is often called." Again: "Surely salvation is no more free, in the first draught of the waters of life, than in the second and deeper. Christ is no more freely offered in the faith of his atonement, than in the assurance of his personal presence and sanctifying power. . . If we are content to

¹ A peculiar kind of faith, to which we shall by and by call attention.

take him as a half-way Saviour — a deliverer from condemnation, merely; but refuse to look to him as a present Saviour from sin, it is our own fault. He is a free Saviour. And, to all who trust him, he gives free salvation. To all and to each" (pp. 52, 47, 76).

"But," it will be asked, "does he not, after all, hold the common view on this subject? Christians all believe that sanctification is the work of *faith*: that the victory which overcomes the world is our faith. They all hold that the renewal and purification of our sinful nature is, from first to last, the work of God; and that *faith* connects us with the source of life and power in God; that the life which we now live in the flesh, we live by the faith of the Son of God. So that it may be as truly affirmed of sanctification, as of justification, that it is all of faith — by grace — and glorying is excluded. Does not Mr. Boardman, in these quotations, hold up, in substance, the same view? And if so, what serious objections can be offered to his teachings on the subject?"

So we hoped when we had read no further, though his forms of expression, on almost every page, were peculiar and suspicious; and though the air and tone told us all along, unmistakably, that the author was almost beside himself under the inspiration of a new and extraordinary discovery, which he was endeavoring to make known. We hoped he was only combating the *self-righteousness*, of which there is, everywhere, in the church, so much, and which is such a foe to grace.

At this point we will state what, to our surprise and grief, we finally found to be the real theory of the book. It is this: that sanctification is by *faith alone, without the INSTRUMENTALITY of God's truth. This is the one idea of the work*; the rare *discovery* that is to be so fruitful of good to the church in these latter days. There is nowhere in the volume a recognition of the fact that the truth, as revealed in the holy scriptures, is the means of sanctification. He wholly ignores the Bible on this subject. More than this: he puts faith in *opposition* to the use of means. "As the sum of all, let it be settled as a truth never to be doubted, that for

salvation, in any stage or degree, Jesus alone is the way, and faith alone is the means." "One thing may be safely affirmed of both alike — those converted again, and those now converted for the first time — that, in *every case, trust in Jesus was the sole condition of the work wrought in them*" (pp. 112, 113). Referring to the three classes into which, he says, those are divided who hold his peculiar views of sanctification, he says: "It may be added, that in the one essential doctrine of the way of sanctification, as by faith and not by works, they all agree, of course, if they agree in its practical reception in the experience in question." . . . "All agree in the facts of the experience. . . . And all agree in the doctrine of sanctification by faith; because, in every case, that is the great principle received, experimentally, in place of sanctification by works. And all agree that this experimental reception of Christ for sanctification is instantaneous, because it could not be otherwise" (pp. 56, 57). And in answer to the question: *What is attained?* etc., he says: "Nothing but a sense of unholiness, and a full consciousness that all efforts, and resolutions, and strugglings, and cries, for holiness of heart, are just as vain as the attempts of a leopard or an Ethiopian to bathe white in any waters. This, with a sense of absolute dependence upon Christ for holiness of heart and life, just as for the forgiveness of sin, is the sum and substance of the soul's attainment." "Then what follows? Then follows the work, according to our faith" (pp. 58, 59). Again: after giving an example of a person who had been striving for sanctification in the ordinary way, but had finally learned of the second conversion: "This traces, in lines clear and distinct, on our chart, one of the by-ways [of error]: that of *works for others as a means of sanctifying ourselves.*"

One quotation more, on this point. "Suppose comforts fail, light grows dim, clouds arise, the heart becomes laggard, courage sinks, joys fall into the sear and yellow leaf, or begin to — what then? Fly to means? No: fly to Christ — Christ is all we want. . . . Suppose you were in a church or hall at night. The lights were dim. Hardly light enough to make the darkness visible. And suppose you should see

the sexton busy, working away at the burners, trying to enlarge their apertures of escape for the gas, to increase the light; and all the while, you know, that the gas is partially shut off, in the pipe connecting with the main, and that is the reason of its faintness in the jets. You will go to him saying Man! man! let the jets alone. Go turn on the gas from the main. Then let him do it, and instantly the room is full of light. Every burner *does its duty*. Ten to one he will have to go round to each burner and reduce the light, to keep it within bounds" (pp. 174, 325). Strange he did not see that this illustration makes directly against himself and for the scriptural view of sanctification, by the truth. What is the man doing who is working away at the burners? This is the Christian who is trying to increase the light of piety in his soul by a simple effort of the will, without looking for a supply to any source beyond his own heart: either the word or the Spirit. And what does he do when he turns on the gas from the main? Does he not use some *means* for it? Does he not turn a screw? And then does not the gas come from the "main," through *pipes*, to the burners? And are not these channels of conveyance the *truth* as it is in Jesus, through which the virtues of Christ come into the soul? If he had taken *water-works*, instead of gas-works, to show how the living influence is supplied to the soul, he would have come nearer to the scriptural figures.

Before advancing to other points, we wish to fix very special attention to *this one* — his theory as to the *means* of sanctification — to wit: that it is derived *immediately* from Christ, by *faith*, and not *mediately*, through the *scriptures*, appropriating *them* by faith, and finding Christ in them, and through them bringing him into the soul. He quotes no such scriptures as these: "Sanctify them through thy truth; thy word is truth;" and John 15:3. 2 Pet. 1:4. He has very little to do with the scriptures, any way; it is all *theory*, supported by what he calls experience. He draws largely from the experiences of men; very little from the inspired oracles of truth, and then with a strange perversion or misapplication. For example: he quotes these words of the

Saviour, "If ye keep my commandment, ye shall abide in my love," and twists them into his theory, by making that the *condition of retaining* what had been secured by faith, and not as the *means of obtaining* a sanctifying connection with Jesus, and of continual supplies of his Spirit and grace (p. 327).

This *theory* as to the *means* of sanctification, by Christ alone, received immediately by faith, in opposition to the view that it is by the Spirit of Christ working in us through the truth, is the one idea of the book, to which all else is intended to be subservient. And we have no hesitation in pronouncing it contrary to the dictates of reason, and the teachings of scripture.

But it will be asked, again: "Does he not, nevertheless, hold the *substance* of the scriptural doctrine? In saying that we receive Christ, *by faith*, for sanctification, does he not recognize the *instrumentality* of the scriptures? For, what can faith terminate upon, as its object, but the *truth* as it is in Jesus — the record God has given of his Son?" We held on to this charitable hope a long time, in reading his book, notwithstanding all that seemed to the contrary; but were compelled, finally, to abandon it.

And with this thought we will proceed to his idea of Christian faith. Near the end of the volume (p. 289), we have his definition of faith, given in language that cannot be misunderstood. It is as follows: "And now how is it that this transmutation is made? What is that power, better than the philosopher's stone or the lamp of Aladdin, which works this wondrous change? We have seen, already, that it is faith. Faith, which is the assured hope of a home eternal in the heavens, and also an assured knowledge of the presence and power of Jesus to deliver us from the dominion as well as the penalty of sin, and keep us, by the power of God, through faith, unto salvation. The very crowning thing, which completes the fulness of this faith, is the apprehension, not so much of the certainty of final salvation, as of the joyful confidence of the presence of Jesus, as a present Saviour from sin, and a present captain of salvation, to direct us and

sustain us in every conflict with Satan, and in every effort to extend the kingdom of God in the world. And this is *the very gist* of the experience sought to be illustrated and urged in these pages."

Now we ask, is that *evangelical* faith at all? And have we any warrant for exercising such a faith? The amount of it is, that we are to believe something *about ourselves*: it is an assured hope of heaven; an assured knowledge of the presence of Jesus in his saving power! We had read with astonishment, in the early part of the work, what he quoted, with an apparent endorsement, from a monk, who was directing Luther how to be saved. Said the monk: "The commandment of God is, that we believe *our own sins* are forgiven" (p. 25). Where do we find a warrant for so believing, and calling it saving faith? What kind of a faith would that be for impenitent men? believing that their own sins are forgiven, an assured hope of heaven, an assured knowledge of the saving presence of Jesus! Would it not be, what a great many are doing, believing a lie, that they might be damned?

We hear too much of such direction, given to the sinner, and to the Christian: "You must believe that *your sins* are forgiven." "You must have no doubt about your own state and prospects." What is the object of Christian faith? Is it not "the glorious gospel of the blessed God?" Is it not the salvation of Christ, the "good tidings" revealed in his word? Can anything be a proper object of justifying or sanctifying faith, but what God has recorded in his word?

I may believe in the provisions of grace, as set before me in the gospel; I may believe that Christ is an all-sufficient Saviour; and that all the blessings offered in the new covenant are offered to *me*, and will be mine if I accept them; that Jesus Christ loved me and gave himself for me, and that if I place my sole reliance upon him, I shall find rest to my soul; and I may believe that he is able and willing to do for me exceeding abundantly, above all that I can ask or think. All that, and much more, I can believe, because God has revealed it. But I cannot, in the same sense, believe

anything concerning my interest in Christ and my title to eternal life, because I do not find it in the Bible. I may be such a believer as to have *evidence* that I have passed from death unto life, and may thus have strong consolation in the gospel. But this hope that springs up amid the fruits of a renewed heart, must not be mistaken for the *faith* itself, that works by love, and purifies the heart, and overcomes the world.

Let us now pass on to that which is obtained in "second conversion." And here we forewarn the reader that we have got to the end of the author's self-consistency, and shall henceforth wander about, in fogs thicker than those of the Grand Bank. What does he mean by the higher life, reached through the gate of second conversion? Does he mean that we obtain instantaneous and entire sanctification? He seems to *teach* that, in some parts of the book; though in other places he disclaims it.

"Whether the question relates to justification or sanctification, the answer is the same. The way of freedom from sin is the very same as the way of freedom from condemnation. Faith in the purifying presence of Jesus brings the witness of the Spirit with our spirits, that Jesus is our sanctification; that the power and dominion of sin is broken; that we are free, just as faith in the atoning merit of the blood and obedience of Christ for us, brings the witness of the Spirit that we are now no longer under condemnation of sin, but freely and fully justified in Jesus."

"Christ offers himself to be the bridegroom of the soul. He offers to endow his bride with all the riches of his own inheritance in the heirship of his Father. Taking him as our Bridegroom, and giving ourselves to him as the bride espouses her husband, with him we have all he has, as well as all he is" (pp. 94, 119). That looks like coming into immediate possession of the full benefits of Christ's mediation, so far as it is *possible* for God to bestow them upon us in this sublunary abode.

Take another passage. "They have learned (those who have experienced the second conversion, in distinction from

Christians who have not learned the better way) that there is deliverance now, here in this life, through faith in Jesus. While the others sigh and groan in their bondage, as if there was no deliverance this side the grave." "They have learned experimentally, they know, that Jesus Christ our Lord, through faith in his name, does actually deliver the trusting soul from the cruel bondage of its chains under sin, now in this present time; while the others have learned, not that Jesus does deliver, but that their own resolutions, in Jesus' name, do not deliver them; and not knowing that Jesus can do it, they turn, with a sigh, toward death, as their deliverer from the power of this death, as if death was the sanctifier or the sanctification of the children of God" (p. 267).

A favorite expression with the author is "full trust and full salvation;" and he tells us, in the Preface, that this would have been his "next" choice as the title of the book. "Trust," he observes, "is perhaps the only other word that conveys the original meaning of faith. And as faith is the all-inclusive condition of salvation, *full trust* expresses the sole condition of *full salvation*, which it is the design of this volume to illustrate." Expressions like the following occur numerously: "The experience is a reality. Jesus is freely offered as our sanctification as well as our justification. Faith, full trust in him, will bring full salvation, with him, to the soul." "Christ all-sufficient—faith all-inclusive." "From that day onward, until now, he has rejoiced in full salvation, through full trust in Jesus."

If, now, one has *full salvation*, what more can he desire for himself? Does not this include entire sanctification? If the power and dominion of sin are broken, so that we are free, are we not sanctified wholly, in soul, body, and spirit? And yet he teaches that those very persons who have "conquered an abiding peace," and who enjoy the "full salvation," are yet full of all the uncleanness of sin. How can the two ideas be reconciled? Is it by the *imputation*, to the believer, of Christ's personal holiness? There are some passages that look like this. For example: "he [one who had just passed through the second birth] had his eyes opened to

see his utter unholiness, and to see that Christ must answer wholly for him, and clothe him altogether with his own [Christ's own] righteousness." "She [another case] became perplexed, really distressed, with the question: What shall I tell them? Shall I tell them I have experienced entire sanctification? I never felt my unholiness more, or so much. . . . I never saw my imperfection so clearly, or felt it so deeply. I see Christ a perfect Saviour, and he is mine, and all I want; but I am a perfect sinner, needing a perfect Saviour indeed." And he concludes the account of her with the words: "she has the *liberty* as well as the *fulness* of the blessings of the gospel" (pp. 69, 72, 73). In another part of the book, we find an explanation that looks very much like antinomianism. "In every case," viz. when the second conversion is about to take place, "hungering and thirsting for true holiness is induced; and, after varied strugglings, the issue, in all alike, is that of finding, in Christ, the end of the law for sanctification" (p. 42).

Now, after such teaching as to the *fulness* of the salvation received, instantly, upon the exercise of "full trust" for that purpose, it would be surprising to see the proof made out, from the same book, that the author is quite orthodox on the subject of progressive sanctification. Yet we have statements like the following: "There is a radical difference between the pardon of sins and the purging of sins. Pardon is instantaneously entire; but cleansing from sin is a process of indefinite length. . . . In the first, the work of Christ is already done the instant the soul believes; while in the second, the work of Christ remains yet to be done, in the future, after the soul believes." And he speaks, elsewhere, of the acceptance of Christ as the soul's sanctification, being the "*entrance*, merely, upon the true and only way of being made holy" (pp. 116, 60, etc.). Let those who have a fondness for such puzzles, endeavor to reconcile these statements with those, more numerous ones, which affirm that immediately, upon second conversion, "the power and dominion of sin are broken;" that, taking Jesus as our bridegroom, "we have all he has, and all he is;" and that those

who have done it, "have learned experimentally, they know, that Jesus Christ our Lord, through faith in his name, does actually deliver the trusting soul from the cruel bondage of its chains under sin, now in this present time;" and that those who have spent "a whole life-time [after the first conversion] before learning that faith is the victory that overcometh, may at last [like an example cited] learn the great secret of the gospel as the way of salvation from sin, and have a peaceful, yea a gorgeous, sunset of it" (p. 200).

The inquiry will naturally arise: What affinity has the theory of the higher life with modern perfectionism? That question our author considers at length (pp. 55—63). He divides those who hold to the second conversion into three classes: Lutherans (in which class he himself is found), Wesleyans, and Oberlinians. Admitting that there are some shades of difference (and pointing these out), that "both Wesleyans and Oberlinians differ from Lutherans in the use of terms, and in the theology of the experience described, but [he says] aside from this, in all that is essential to the experience itself, all are agreed." "It is worthy of special note that their differences are altogether those of opinion, not at all of fact. All are agreed as to the essential facts of the experience in question. The shades of difference in the manner of narrating are not at all essential. All agree, especially in the one great matter, that the experience is that of the way of sanctification by faith; that of really practically receiving Jesus for sanctification by faith, as, before, he had been received as the sacrifice for sins. This may be variously expressed, but this is the marrow and substance of the whole matter, in every case, and with every class. Again: all agree as to the fact that this practical, experimental apprehension of Christ is instantaneous in every case." "All agree in the facts of the experience, because the facts themselves are in harmony, in all cases. And all agree in the doctrine of sanctification by faith, because, in every case, that is the great principle received, experimentally, in place of sanctification by works" (pp. 41, 55, 57). That will suffice on this point.

Thus far we have confined ourselves to the *doctrine* of the

book before us, with the endeavor of showing what the theory which it puts forth is. It is time that we pay some attention to the *proofs*, that he may see how such a theory is supported. And here we come to what is the most remarkable thing about the whole production. His proofs are drawn principally from real life. And so far as we have the means of verifying them, there is not one of them that stands upon the ground of historical truth. A hard accusation, we admit; but let us see.

He tells us, in the Preface, that by "second conversion" "it is not intended to convey the idea of a second regeneration; but that expressed, by President Edwards, in the term 'remarkable conversions,' which is the title of his account of several remarkable cases of higher life attained after conversion." Now the title of Edwards's treatise is not "Remarkable Conversions," but "Surprising Conversions." And its sole object is to give an account of the wonderful work of grace in Northampton, by which so many hundreds were born into the kingdom of God. He says not a single word about "cases of higher life attained after conversion," except in a sentence of five lines, in which he speaks incidentally of the refreshing the church had received from the revival.

The first example taken from real life, and which, like "The Young Irishman," in the "Pastor's Sketches," is the masterpiece of the whole work, developed at length, and often afterwards referred to, is the experience of Luther. "What! Martin Luther a perfectionist!" We will show you. After sketching his history, giving the narrative of his first conversion, his entering upon the duties of professor and preacher, he comes at length to the scene upon "Pilate's staircase," where his second conversion took place. He draws his narrative from D'Aubigné's History, as certain references and quotations show. He says: "Luther had not yet learned to take the Lord Jesus for his sanctification. He had one process for the forgiveness of sins, that of faith; and another for the pursuit of holiness, that of works. He believed in Jesus, and trusted that, for the sake of Jesus, who had died and risen again for his justification, his sins were all

freely forgiven. But he longed for a holy heart and a holy life, and sought them by *means*, not by *faith*. The truth that Jesus is *all* to the sinner, that in Jesus he has all if he takes him for all, he had not yet perceived. Christ a propitiation, he accepted; but Christ a sanctification, he rejected. Strange that, having Christ and believing in him, and having in him the fountain of holiness, indeed our own holiness, just as really and fully as he is our sacrifice for sin, we should go about to work out," etc. Now for the great discovery while climbing Pilate's stair-case on his knees. "As Luther crept, painfully, from stone to stone, upward, suddenly he heard, as he thought, a voice of thunder in the depths of his heart: 'The just shall live by faith!' These words had often, before, told him that the just are made alive by faith; but now they thundered through his soul the truth that even so the just shall *live* (be kept alive) by faith. . . . By faith, their hearts and lives shall be made holy" (pp. 30, 31).

Turn, now, to D'Aubigné himself, and what will be your surprise to see that he is totally misrepresented; that he has no specific reference at all to sanctification, but to justification; that he relates only, on the stair-case at Rome, Luther obtained a clearer view, than ever before, of the doctrine of justification in the scripture, there suggested to him: "The just shall live by faith." He says: "We have seen how he had, at first, submitted to all the vain practices which the church enjoins, in order to purchase the remission of sins." Then follows the account of the scene upon the stair-case. Appended immediately to which is the historian's remark: "It is frequently necessary that a truth should be repeatedly presented to our minds, in order to produce its due effect. Luther had often studied the Epistle to the Romans, and yet never had justification by faith, as there taught, appeared so clear to him."¹

But we have not quite done with the example. Mr. Boardman, after exclaiming, a while, over Luther's discovery of the means of sanctification, quotes Luther's own language, as

¹ D'Aubigné, I. 170, 171 — Carter's edition.

found in D'Aubigné, to show its instantaneous and powerful effect upon his mind : " Then I felt myself born again, as a new man ; and I entered, by an open door, into the very paradise of God. From that hour I saw the precious and holy scriptures with new eyes. I went through the whole Bible ; I collected a multitude of passages which taught me what the work of God was. Truly this text of St. Paul was, to me, the very gate of heaven." That is the whole of the quotation, as given by Mr. Boardman. It fits very well into his theory, and seems to speak much for it. But look again into D'Aubigné, and supply the rest of Luther's words. The sentence *next preceding* the one with which Mr. Boardman's quotation begins is : " But when, by the Spirit of God, I understood these words — when I learnt how the justification of the sinner proceeds from God's mere mercy by the way of faith — then I felt myself born again, as a new man," etc.

He had been speaking of the trouble and torment of conscience he had suffered, and how he could not endure the expression : " the righteous justice of God." Why did not the author of the Higher Life begin his quotation a little further back, so as to let Luther say, for himself, what he had found which gave birth to such joys ? And why does he *omit* a sentence next to the last one of his quotation, in which Luther reverts to his previous hatred of the expression : " the righteousness of God," and says : " I began, from that time, to value and to love it, as the sweetest and most consolatory truth ? " ¹ Ah ! that would have spoiled the whole. Luther would have been lost as the champion of this new method of sanctification. What shall we say to such an expedient for getting the patronage of great names in support of an *ism*, in direct opposition to the general belief of the church ! What would Luther say to it, if he could speak for himself ? — a doctrine that he never, in his life, thought of, and one most abhorrent to his cherished belief ! We will not try to characterize it. We will use no epithets. We confess that when we discovered what was done, our moral nature felt a

¹ D'Aubigné, I. 171, 172. Cf. Higher Life, 31.

shock similar to that we experience when the tidings come to us of the fall, by heinous transgression, of some prominent one in the church that had stood high in our confidence.

Thus the Higher Life starts off; a good and strong start, as is felt. For, the next chapter begins: "The experience of Luther has been given at length, because the great reformer stands in the forefront of Protestantism, a true and noble type of the real, ripe, whole-souled Christian. . . . It is entitled to great weight as an example."

The next one summoned, in his long list of confessors (whose name is, for any one who can avail himself of it, a tower of strength), is the historian of Luther, D'Aubigné himself. The same use and *abuse* is made of him. And then follow, scattered all along through the book, witnesses almost innumerable (*homines illustres, et homines novi, et feminæ, ad libitum*). The most precious names in the theological and Christian world, names embalmed in the church, and that can never perish, are brought up and made to bear testimony in favor of second conversion. Frederick Monod, Charles Rien, Richard Baxter, Jonathan Edwards, Mrs. Edwards, McCheyne, James Brainerd Taylor, Dr. Payson, Legh Richmond, Felix Neff, and a multitude of others, whose experiences have fallen under his own observaion, or with which he has in some way become acquainted, are made to confirm, from their own wonderful experience, his theory. He says of Dr. Payson, that he "was a polished and powerful shaft in the hands of God. Hundreds were saved by his ministry; but much of his strength was wasted, in what he saw, afterwards, to have been vain strugglings. Had he known to trust in Jesus for his own soul's sanctification and for all fitness to herald the Saviour to others, not only would he have been saved what he himself said was wasted; but his life might have been spared long to the church, and his success, great as it was, increased vastly in its measure" (p. 286). And in another place he quotes, as relating to this new experience, an exclamation of his, uttered upon his death-bed: "O, had I only known, what I now know, twenty years ago!" If you

will take the pains to turn to the Life of Dr. Payson, you will see that there is no foundation for that representation of his change of views on the subject of Christian sanctification. The views he held during the years of his ministry and usefulness, he held to the last. It is true he had a wonderful experience in the closing days of his life. But it was only a more complete absorption of his will in the will of God, a more vigorous faith, and a sweeter communion with God. Less than four weeks before his death, he said: "Christians need not be discouraged at the slow progress they make, and the little success which attends their efforts; for they may be assured that every exertion is noticed, and will be rewarded by their heavenly Father." And to a young convert he said: "You will have to go through many conflicts and trials; you must be put in the furnace, and tempted, and tried, in order to show you what is in your heart. Sometimes it will seem as if Satan had you in his power, and that the more you struggle and pray against sin, the more it prevails against you."¹ Why did he not point out to that convert the way he had newly discovered of avoiding all those struggles, by taking Christ for sanctification? Because he had discovered nothing new on the subject. *Experience* had taught him (what he knew before, in theory), that he could be happy in God while deprived of outward good, and while suffering great bodily distress. This resulted from a more hearty submission of his will. That is what he had learned in the school of experience. But his system of theology remained precisely as it had always been: not a doctrine was changed.

So much for the proof promised from this quarter, when he says: "Take a few examples of the higher life, or full trust and full salvation. First, Martin Luther." And, as a climax of the absurdity and ridiculousness of building up his demonstration out of standard orthodox testimonies, he crowns the pyramid with the Assembly's Catechism! "Cases of it [the experience in question] have always oc-

¹ Memoir by Cummings — Tract Society edition, pp. 466, 467.

curred in every great awakening ; and solitary instances, in the furnace of affliction. . . . Such cases have generally received the convenient name "second conversion;" but in the standards, as in the Westminster Assembly's Confession, it is called "the full assurance of grace and salvation," and elsewhere, "the full assurance of faith," while, in hymns, it is often named "full salvation" (p. 57). The professed quotation, "the full assurance of grace and salvation," is not found, in those words, in either the Confession or the Catechism of the assembly of divines.¹ That which comes the nearest to it, of the consonance of which with the doctrine of the higher life the reader will judge, is found in answer to the eightieth question of the Larger Catechism: "Such as truly believe in Christ, and endeavor to walk in all good conscience before him, may, without extraordinary revelation, by faith grounded upon the truth of God's promises, and by the Spirit enabling them to discern in themselves those graces to which the promises are made, and bearing witness with their spirits that they are the children of God, be infallibly assured that they are in the estate of grace, and shall persevere therein unto salvation." In the Shorter Catechism it is: "assurance of God's love." And the explanation given, in their Confession of Faith is: "This infallible assurance doth not so belong to the essence of faith, but that a true believer may wait long, and conflict with many difficulties before he be partaker of it; yet, being enabled by the Spirit to know the things which are freely given him of God, he may, without extraordinary revelation, in the right use of ordinary means, attain thereunto."

From the way in which the testimonies of men are handled, it can be readily inferred how those of the holy scriptures would be handled also. Peter's case is, of course, the standard one. Referring to what our Saviour said to him, of his being sifted by Satan, of his afterwards being converted and strengthening his brethren, he adds: Satan did

¹ The quotation *may* have been made from the *Index* of "the Standards," published by the Presbyterian Board, where we find "Assurance of grace and salvation."

have the apostle, and did sift him, too. . . . By and by, on the day of Pentecost, the time came for the apostle's second conversion" (p. 110). Now, who does not know that the conversion of Peter referred to by Christ, was his being restored from his sudden *fall* and apparent apostasy; and that this virtually took place, probably, when he "remembered," and "went out and wept bitterly;" and that his *formal* restoration was at the sea of Galilee; at all events, that the conversion (whatever or whenever it was) took place before the baptism of Pentecost?

But notice the further use he makes of the pentecostal scene. "The Holy Spirit (the promise of the Father) was received by the Son, and shed down upon him [Peter] and his fellow disciples. Fire-crowns sat upon their heads, and with other tongues they spake of the wonderful works of God. These tongues of fire and tongues of eloquence were, however, only the outside symbols and the outspoken manifestations of the glorious work wrought in their hearts" (p. 110). What a confounding of two things which are entirely distinct in their nature, and between which the scriptures carefully distinguish! viz. miraculous gifts, and a sanctifying work upon the heart. "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass;" and so of "prophecy;" the *gift* of the inward experience being not necessarily identical at all.

But to proceed to the awakening that followed the preaching. "A great work was wrought on that day. . . . Many were then, for the first time, convinced of their sins and converted to God. Many more, who had already been converted under the preaching of John the Baptist, and of Jesus himself, and of the twelve, and the seventy, were converted anew. . . . And one thing may be safely affirmed of both alike — those converted again, and those now first converted — that in *every case trust in Jesus was the sole condition of the work wrought in them*. The apostle Peter did not say to the one: Believe in the Lord Jesus and ye shall be converted; and to the other: Watch, pray, struggle, read, fast, work, and you

shall be sanctified. But to one and all he said : Repent and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, and ye shall receive the Holy Ghost" (pp. 112, 113). Now, why did he not quote Peter's language as it is : "Repent and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost." Why did he leave out "for the remission of sins?" Was it for the same reason that he omitted what was essential to the thought in the quotation from Luther?

"The apostle Paul," he says, "lived" in this full salvation "himself, and commended it and commanded it to others." "The apostles and primitive Christians generally enjoyed it from the day of pentecost onward" (p. 45). As exceptions, he refers to the Galatians. And he has a few pages, in the usual style of that class of writers, on Christians passing out of the seventh chapter of Romans into the eighth chapter, where "the dead body" of sin being "dropped," they are "now linked to the living Saviour as their deliverer from present corruption, and from all the power of sin" (pp. 265—268).

Such, in substance, is the *Higher Christian Life*, by Rev. W. E. Boardman. We are aware that he, or a defender of his system, may take the same book and convict us of unfairness. For we have already given some examples of the contradictions it contains. There are others. Passages may be cited from it which seem, taken out of their connection, quite orthodox, on the use of *means* for sanctification. Whatever there is of this, however (and there is, comparatively, not very much), is in a direction entirely contrary to the theory, and to the great drift, of the work.

A few thoughts, in conclusion, upon the *popularity* and *influence* of the book. If we may believe the publisher's statements, there has been great demand for it. Indeed, it is heard of in all quarters : you will rarely find a religious person who has not either read it, or at least who does not know something about it. It has been republished in Great Brit-

ain. It is, unquestionably, one of *the* books that sell, and make their authors and publishers rich. If, then, the work is such as has been described, what reasons can be assigned for the great favor with which it has been received by the Christian public? We would suggest the following :

1. Its style ; and principally the fact that it is of the narrative, rather than the directly *didactic*, style ; or, rather, that the didactic is so constantly relieved by the narrative style. What professes to be narrations of personal life will always interest most readers. And what professes to be *heart-experience*, in the things of Christ, the struggles and victories, the sorrows and joys, of men pressing into the kingdom of God, will have an especial interest for *Christian readers*. Besides, the style has the merit of being somewhat *lively*, and *fresh*, and *cheerful*, and *hopeful*. If, however, we look at the *literary* qualities of the style, we shall find it to be as far from *classic* as can well be imagined. It shows a great want of true literary taste and culture. It is *inelegant* : " The poor African woman lived in a cabin on an alley, all alone, without chick or child, kith or kin." " Persecution crucified the disciple of the crucified Jesus to the world " (pp. 239, 249). He has a great fondness for paronomasia and for dichotomizing ; either of which, when carried to excess, is a puerility. He is fond of using nouns as adjectives : " angel-messenger," " serpent-rod," " fire-crowns," " boy-prophet," " thought-circulation," " planter-merchant," " crucible-discipline," " bridegroom-deliverer." It is often *fulsome* : " The fire in his veins burned on, steadily and surely consuming the vital forces of his manly frame ; but the fever of his spirit was all allayed by the copious and cooling draughts given him from the gushing fountains of the waters of life flowing from the smitten Rock." " A life which, life-long, is a living sacrifice to God, unceasingly sending up the smoke of its incense from the glowing fire in the heart, kindled, and fauned, and fed by the Holy One of Israel ; and yet with no particular Damascus Road or Bethel-scene to mark it, from first to last " (p. 204, 206). There is a feature of the style that might be called, in modern newspaper phrase,

hifalutin: "And the sown seed knows the spring-time, and snuffs the sunshine and showers, bursting its prison shell," etc. "The memoir of another merchant of eminence, . . . gave him to see as within reach even of the care-pressed and toil-worn business man, amongst boxes and bales, customers and notes to meet, and paper to be discounted, sharpers to unmask and risks to encounter, a life both of joy and peace in Jesus" (pp. 212, 134). Take the following specimen, for which we have been able to find no term for its classification: "The missionary spirit was poured into the heart of an obscure cobbler upon his bench; and, as he cut the leather into shape, and pounded it upon his lap-stone into solidity, and drew the waxed ends, sticking together soles for his customers, he was cutting out, compacting, and stitching together thoughts which were destined to shoe the feet of thousands upon thousands with the preparation of the gospel of peace, to go to the outer bounds of the earth with the glad tidings of a crucified Saviour" (pp. 226, 227). It is easy to see how such qualities of style would be fascinating to multitudes of illiterate persons, and give them high notions of the *smartness* of the writer.

2. *Its pretension*. This undoubtedly has had no little to do in creating its popularity. The multitude will gape after the knowing ones. Quack doctors would not set all the world to running after them, if they were as modest as men in general. But as they assume to know more than all the learned profession, and surround themselves with such a halo of mystery, there are comparatively few whose sober conservative common sense can so control this natural credulity and love of the marvellous, as not to be taken captive. Here, we think, is one of the chief elements of power in this book. The author knows it all. He looks down from his position of pure light towards us, poor things! all enveloped in the mists of ignorance, and talks to us, and counsels us, and encourages us, in such a way as to leave no doubt that he has the pity of a father and the authority of a prophet. His theory claims to be a new and grand discovery, the time having now come for this morning-star of the millennium to rise.

We are not stating it too strongly. He says : " Great periods have been marked by great revivals, and great revivals have been characterized by the developments, each one of some great truth made prominent and powerful, in its application to the experience and life of the church. The great truths, which now have their unchangeable position in the faith and formulas of the church, have been born into the world one by one, and one by one have taken their positions, in orderly array, in the great family of truths. Like children, they have come, crying, into the world ; and, like warriors in battle, each has had its own way to fight." After referring to some of these, he comes to his own, and says : " The question may have arisen already : Why — if it is true, that the experimental apprehension of the principle of sanctification by faith is the privilege of all — why has the fact not had greater prominence in the past ? Why have eighteen centuries been allowed to roll away before it is brought distinctly and prominently before the mind of the church ? The answer is, that until now, the time has never come for it. Now is the time." And, ten pages further on, he says : " The present, the *now* present, would seem to be a round in the heaven-ward stretching ladder, near to the top. One step more, or two at most, so it seems at least to us poor short-sighted mortals, and the summit will be gained " (pp. 213, 215, 225).

In keeping with all this, has been the extravagance in advertising the work. The publisher's Circular, sent throughout the land, announcing the forth-coming book, says : " I anticipate for this work a large and continuous sale. . . . The book will take its place amongst the standard productions of the times, and can hardly fail of meeting a wide circulation." In a religious weekly, close by an advertisement of Sand's sarsaparilla, we find this, as a part of its advertisement : " a book full of inspiration, and written with enthusiasm and strength. A richer legacy to the church and the world could not well be found than in this comprehensive treatise on the growth of religion in the soul." Add to all this the voluntary puffing from ministers and others, and that warm commendation and recommendation of it that ap-

peared, a few months ago, from the pen of a distinguished theological professor; and add, moreover, the adroit manner in which the author has attached to his doctrine the most powerful names in Christendom: Luther, Edwards, Baxter, James Brainerd Taylor, Payson; and who can wonder that the book has been admired and sought after?

3. It is a fascinating *ism*. The short road to holiness it points out: one that leaves to the left the seventh chapter of Romans, avoiding all the conflicts with remains of a carnal nature, and all griefs and sorrows over indwelling sin, and coming out, at once, into the eighth of Romans, where is nought but the rose of Sharon and the lily of the valleys — “Why! this is the way; let us find it.”

4. The *subject*: the higher Christian life. The want is felt, in our churches, of a higher life. Christians are not satisfied with their low attainments, and their bondage under sin. They feel that they are living both beneath their duty and their privilege, that there is some better thing provided for them. An excellent minister of the gospel wrote us, a few months ago, that he had just read the *Higher Life* with great interest, and he hoped, profit. That he had never felt satisfied with the type of his Christian experience. That is a feeling with which most Christians, certainly, sympathize. And, it seems to us that a book on Christian sanctification, written from the point of *union to Christ*, showing how, by faith, we are one with Christ so as, in our *legal* relations, to have the benefits of his atoning sacrifice and propitiation for sin; and are vitally united to him in spirit, have received such an ingrafting into him, set forth in the fifteenth of John and sixth of Romans, as to be made partakers of his life, and to draw from his Spirit the whole life and power of godliness, is a real desideratum in our Christian literature. Such a work, properly written, would be, to thousands, what the author of the *Higher Life* hoped his would prove to be. In his words: “they would rejoice in anything defining to them distinctly the relations of this blessed Christian life to further Christian progress, and to all Christian duty. And moreover, they would be thankful to God for a book which they could

safely put into the hands of others, hopeful of good, fearless of evil; one they could heartily commend as unfolding the fulness of the blessings of the gospel, without feeling under the necessity of cautioning and warning against false theories, wrong terms, or evil tendencies" (p. 18).

What, now, must be the *influence of such* a book, and of such popularity? We doubt not some will be profited by it, as a spiritual Christian may, now and then, be profited under a Unitarian sermon. An orthodox sense will be put upon much of its heterodoxy; and there is in it not a little of excellent truth. Some of the sketches are not without merit: as, for example, "The Shakeress," "Gov. Duncan," "The Hon. Judge and the poor African woman," "The Miner of Potosi," "Oriental Prince and his Captive."

Still, the principal influence of the book cannot but be most unhappy. It so totally misleads the mind, on the whole subject of evangelical experience. The idea here held out is, that, after going through the struggle of a "second conversion," we may then dismiss trouble about our own hearts and rejoice in the full blessings of a present deliverance.¹

¹ Perhaps we ought in justice to the author, as throwing some light upon his inconsistencies, to allude to his theory of sanctification itself as an actual *process* and *accomplishment*. This is only *incidentally* touched in the book, and that for the sake of showing a point of divergence from the Oberlinian doctrine of Perfection. Our review has confined itself to the one subject the author professedly has in hand — the *means* of Christian sanctification. (*Condition* might be a more appropriate term than *means*, or "Principle," as he has it.) This is an instantaneous reception of Christ for sanctification, a faith not *usually* associated with the faith by which he is first received for justification, but an after experience, a "second conversion."

Now on the point as to what is "obtained" in second conversion, how can the author *seem* to teach that we obtain instantaneous and entire sanctification, and yet maintain that "unholiness" still remains, and only the "entrance" of a "process" of sanctification is reached? that "cleansing from sin is a process of indefinite length"? His idea appears to be this: that, while *our* work is done, Christ's is just begun. "The transfer and the trust of the soul, for the whole work of sanctification by the Holy Spirit, is but the first effectual step in the work." But that is the whole step taken in "second conversion."

He does not profess to have *matured*, or given much time to this part of his theory of sanctification; for he considers it more a matter of curious speculation than of practical importance. "Lutherans [he is a *Lutheran* on this subject] have discussed the experience less as a thing distinct, and therefore have known

He speaks of the second conversion as almost perfectly analogous to the first conversion, in conviction, unwilling-

it less, and named it less distinctively, than either Wesleyans or Oberlinians." And yet his notion is, as a thing essential to his whole doctrine, that Christ in some unrevealed way, without any of our coöperation, gradually assimilates the soul to himself by forming it in his own image. Nothing can be more fanciful, or more contrary to scriptural teaching, yet it is sufficiently apparent that he makes that fancy a *sine qua non* to his general theory. "This [a full consciousness that all efforts and resolutions, and strugglings and cries for holiness of heart, are just as vain as the attempts of an Ethiopian to bathe white in any waters] with a sense of absolute dependence upon Christ for holiness of heart and life, just as for the forgiveness of sin, is the sum and substance of the soul's attainment" in second conversion. It is simply "a confidence *that he will do it*, [the italics are his own in all our quotations] according to the plan of God.

"Then what follows? Then follows the work, according to our faith. By faith the soul is now placed in the hands of Christ, as clay in the hands of the potter; and by faith Christ is received by the soul as the potter to mould it at his own sovereign will. . . . By faith the soul now is opened as a mirror to the Master, . . . the Master's image is taken. . . . By faith the soul is put into the hands of Christ, like paper into the hands of the printer, to be unfolded and softened and printed, with all the glorious things of God" (pp. 61, 59, 60).

The *work*, then, is in the future. Though out of our hands — transferred to Christ, to be executed "at his own sovereign will," "according to the [secret] plan of God" — the work yet remains to be done. We are yet in "utter unholiness." "In the first [conversion] the work of Christ is already done the instant the soul believes, while in the second, the work of Christ remains yet to be done in the future after the soul believes" (p. 116). Now if this is so, how can he speak as he does of the victory *already* obtained by all those who have experienced the "second conversion," and of their present unmixed joy and triumph? For, on the supposition of their having *arrived* at the goal of sinless perfection — of angelic purity itself — he could not speak in fuller terms of the value and blessedness of the attainment. Such a believer "has full salvation." "Faith, full trust in him, will bring full salvation with him to the soul." "From that day onward until now he has rejoiced in full salvation, through full trust in Jesus" "She has the *liberty* as well as the *fulness* of the blessings of the gospel." We have "the witness of the Spirit . . . that the power and dominion of sin is broken, that we are free." "They have learned that there is deliverance now here in this life through faith in Jesus. . . . They have learned experimentally, they know, that Jesus Christ our Lord, through faith in his name, does actually deliver the trusting soul from the cruel bondage of its chains under sin, now in this present time." "The chain is broken by the power of Christ. We are freed from the dead body of sin. We are linked to the living Saviour as our deliverer from present corruption, and from all the power of sin. The dead body is dropped."

How can he speak in such terms, if "as to holiness of heart" there is "nothing but a sense of vileness," and the universal confession is: "I never saw my imperfection so clearly, or felt it so deeply?"

There is, of course, much inconsistency with himself. But his general idea

ness to receive the light, vain attempts and fruitless struggles, temptations of the adversary, etc. In another place, he speaks of the experience as "within sure and easy reach of all who will make it a point." The tendency of his doctrine of sanctification must, therefore, be to remove from the church all that kind of experience which relates to brokenness of heart, the lowliness and meekness that think better of others than one's self, mortification of the earthly members, self-reproach, watchfulness, striving for victory, "glorying in infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon us, taking pleasure in reproaches, necessities, persecutions, distresses for Christ's sake, that when weak we may be strong." The tendency is to conceit and spiritual pride. He has afforded us an example exactly in point. He says: "a scene occurred, one morning, in far-famed Old South Boston chapel. At the close of the meeting, . . . two of the

seems to be that what we have (in second conversion) is a proper *equivalent* for a completed sanctification. We have made the "transfer" to Christ; we may, therefore, in the full confidence that he will carry on the work to its completion, dismiss trouble about our present imperfect state. We may act and feel and rejoice and triumph just as if the work was already consummated. We have "conquered an abiding peace, and gained the full salvation"

Or we may conceive of the matter in another way (the book authorizes this view also). Christ's personal holiness (imputed) is an equivalent—more than an equivalent—for our own "unholiness." "Exactly what is attained in this experience? Christ, Christ in all his fulness, Christ objectively and subjectively received. That is all. And that is enough." "Taking him as our bridegroom, . . . with him we have all he has, as well as all he is." "He had his eyes opened to see his utter unholiness, and to see that Christ must answer wholly for him, and clothe him altogether with his own (Christ's own) righteousness." "Having Christ, . . . and having in him the fountain of holiness, indeed our own holiness, just as really and fully as he is our own sacrifice for sin" (pp. 58, 119, 69, 30).

Exactly here (in that *equivalent*) we find what is to our mind the special pernicious tendency of the book. Not only are *means* dispensed with, because it is perfectly needless, as well as useless, to "watch, pray, struggle, read, fast, work," in order to "be sanctified;" but a most deplorable spiritual state is induced. This book itself is an illustration of what we mean. You would not suspect from it, so at least it strikes us, that the author had on his mind so much as the *remembrance* even of the "fear and trembling" with which God commands Christians to work out their salvation. There is a lightness and flippancy, a want of true evangelical unction, and of the sweet savor of a penitential spirit, most painful to those serious, sober, solemn, watchful, wrestling Christians, who have only experienced the first conversion, and who "know no better" way than—abiding in Christ—to "labor to enter into that rest," and "give diligence to make their calling and election sure."

venerable men always occupying the front seats, with their ear-trumpets upturned to catch every word, arose and greeted each other. One placed his trumpet to his ear, and turned up its broad mouth toward his stooping white-headed companion. The other, bending down and almost burying his face in the open mouth of the trumpet, with a slow, loud, wailing utterance, said: 'Well, brother, we have been long — meditating — thinking — trying — to find out how — this divine life — could be best promoted — in the soul — and — we shall get it yet! yes, we shall find it yet!' 'O yes, yes! we shall — we shall!' was the answer. . . . In that same assembly, a moment before its breaking up, a fair-haired youth arose and said: 'Dear brethren, help me to praise God! I have found the way! Jesus is the way! He is mine, and I am his! He is complete, and I am complete in him?' Here were the venerable fathers, feeling after the better way, and here was the child in it already, happy and satisfied" (pp. 310, 311). This represents what we take to be the legitimate tendency of the doctrine. It puts the "child," the "fair-haired youth," in advance of the "venerable fathers" of the church and the ministry.

Upon the whole, we would say, as a self-evident truth, the more the book is circulated, the less sanctification there will be in the world, and the further off will be the millennium.

ARTICLE IV.

SCRIPTURAL EVIDENCE OF THE DEITY OF CHRIST.

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It is a question of our Saviour's asking, and therefore of some importance: What think ye of Christ? Whose son is he? The scriptures tell us, in reply, that he is both the son

of David and the Lord of David; both the son of man, and the only-begotten Son of God. It is well known that there exists, in the New Testament, a wide diversity of representation in regard to the person and character of our Lord. Hence a large majority of the Christian church, in all ages, have been led, in supposed accordance with the scriptures, to ascribe to the person of Christ a two-fold nature, the human and the divine. That Christ had an existence previous to his human birth, and that he possessed a nature higher than our own, is evident from those passages which speak of his various manifestations under the old dispensation (John 12: 41. 1 Cor. 10: 4 (9). 1 Pet. 1: 11); of his existence before Abraham (John 8: 58); and before the world was (John 17: 5, 24); before all created things (John 1: 3. Col. 1: 15, 17. 1 Cor. 8: 6); even with God, in the beginning (John 1: 1). Of like import, also, are those numerous passages which affirm that he came (into the world) from God, from the Father, from above, from heaven, "where he was before;" that, with us, he partook of flesh and blood; that he was made flesh; that he came in the flesh; was manifested in the flesh; was made in the likeness of men; made like unto his brethren; and was sent in the likeness of sinful flesh; that he was born of a woman; and was according to the flesh (in contrast with his higher nature) a descendant of David and the Jewish fathers.¹ All these passages, with others which are supposed to ascribe to Christ the distinctive titles, attributes, and works of Deity, either expressly assert or fairly imply this two-fold nature, and are wholly meaningless and absurd on any other supposition. Even De Wette (on John 17: 5) thus remarks: "Two ideas are here combined: that of the *λόγος ἄσαρκος* and that of the *λόγος ἐνσαρκος*, who, after his incarnation, his sufferings and death, is exalted to divine honor; as also there are, in general, two views presented of Christ, which yet are never wholly separated, namely, the theosophic-speculative, descending view, according to which he is God incar-

¹ See John 8: 42; 13: 3; 16: 27, 28; 3: 13, 31; 6: 38, 51, 62; 1: 14, 15; Eph. 4: 9, 10; 1 Cor. 15: 47; Heb. 2: 14, 17; 5: 7; 1 John 4: 2; 2 John 1: 7; 1 Tim. 3: 16; Rom. 8: 3; Phil. 2: 7; Gal. 4: 4; Rom. 1: 3; 9: 5, et al.

nate ; and the historico-religious, ascending, according to which he is man deified."

Among those passages which plainly teach the preëxistence and divinity of Christ, the prologue of John's Gospel stands preëminent; and to this, we would now direct our attention. In considering these verses, we have a special advantage, inasmuch as they are confessedly unattended with glosses and various readings. The construction, also, is simple, and the words are capable of but one rendering: that, namely, which is given in our English version — "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God, etc. Some persons, however, have regarded the Logos (Word) not as a hypostasis or person, but rather as a personification particularly of the divine *wisdom* or *reason*, and refer, in illustration, to similar personifications in Prov. viii. and in the apocryphal Sirach and Wisdom of Solomon. To this view there are many weighty objections: 1. The term Logos, though frequently signifying *reason*, in the classics, does not occur, in this sense, in the New Testament (De Wette, Meyer). 2. Such rhetorical or poetical personifications, appropriate enough in the proverbs of the wise man, or in the book of "wisdom," are yet wholly foreign to the plain and simple style of the New Testament, and especially of the Gospels. 3. If the beloved disciple had seen fit to personify any of the divine attributes or qualities, he would, more naturally, have chosen for this purpose the *love* of God, as manifested in the gift and the person of his Son; while such a personification and apotheosis of wisdom would, manifestly, have favored that Gnosticism which he is, commonly and rightly, supposed to have combated in his writings. 4. Something more is needed, of the Logos, than a mere rhetorical figure, in order satisfactorily to explain those passages, particularly numerous in this Gospel, which explicitly teach the ante-mundane existence of Christ. 5. If we have a personification of wisdom (or of power) before us, it is exceedingly awkward and wholly irrelevant, and cannot be carried out with any congruency or harmony with the context. To substitute wisdom as a personified attribute, in the place of the Logos, especially in

vs. 1, 4, 10—12, 14, would, if it resulted in anything besides absurdity and nonsense, yield a system of doctrines not at all Johannean, nor accordant with the analogies of scripture.¹ Hence all the more distinguished commentators on this Gospel, at the present day, assign to the Logos of John a hypostatic personality.

We now return to an explanation of the text: "In the beginning was the Word" (cf. 1 John 1:1). The phrase "in the beginning," has commonly been explained by a reference to the first verse of Genesis; but though the same words occur, yet their meaning is very different. This phrase must always be interpreted by its adjuncts, as a simple reference to Acts 11:15 will abundantly show. In our verse the phrase, thus explained, signifies *from eternity* (comp. 17:5, 24). Our reasons for this view are the following: 1. John does not here assert that, in the beginning the Logos emanated from the Father, or was begotten, or was created, or that he began to be (not even *ἐγένετο* is used), but that he *was*. This form of the verb is also employed in the kindred expression, 1 John 1:1, and in the formula: "who is, and who *was*, and who is to come" (Rev. 1:4), where it denotes the past eternity of Jehovah. 2. Not only was the Logos in the beginning, but he was in the beginning *with God*, and therefore co-eternal with Him. God was never *ἄλογος*, never without the Word. Had it been stated, in Gen. 1:1, that the heavens and the earth were, in the beginning, with God, we should, most naturally at least, have inferred that they existed from eternity. 3. When, to all this, the thought of the third clause is added, that the Logos was God, we cannot, from the point of view of a Christian theism, doubt that the Logos is eternal. Wholly inapplicable, therefore, to Christ, in his Logos-nature, is the Arian phrase: *ἦν ποτε*

¹ The Holy Spirit, as the revealer of divine truth and the enlightener of man's understanding, might, more appropriately than the Son, be designated as *wisdom*. Thus Theophilus, bishop of Antioch, A. D. 170—180, speaks of the three days preceding the creation of the heavenly luminaries as "types of the Triad of God and his Word and his *Wisdom*." This, by the way, is the first recorded mention of the divine *Trinity*.

ὅτε οὐκ ἦν—"there was a period when he was not." 4. The Logos is not a created being. Christ, as the Logos, was not begotten even; for this idea of generation, though predicable of the Son, cannot properly be predicated of the Logos. It was only by making the Son identical with the Logos, that men began to speak of the "eternal generation" of the Word. That the Logos was not a created being, we learn in the third verse: "all things were made by him, and without him was not anything made that was made." If all things were made by him, and not one created thing was made without him; then, manifestly, he is either self-created, which is an absurdity; or is, himself, uncreated; and, if uncreated, then eternal. In Rev. 22:13. 1:17. 2:8 (1:8?), Christ calls himself the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last—epithets which are used, elsewhere, to denote the eternity of Jehovah. Paul, in Col. 1:17, affirms that Christ is before all things; and this priority has reference, not to rank, but to time (so Meyer, De Wette, and others). The tense of the verb, here, denotes a permanent state, and hence includes the past with the present.

There are two passages, however, which show, as some suppose, that Christ is a created being; but which, on the contrary, entirely harmonize with the texts already adduced. These are Col. 1:15 and Rev. 3:14, where Christ is called the first-born of every creature, and the beginning of the creation of God. These words, we allow, do not, in themselves, forbid the idea that Christ himself is included in "the creation." Hence "the first-born of every creature," has been regarded, by some, as equivalent to *first-created*. But this view is neither supported by the context, nor by the "analogy of faith." The text before us (Col. 1:15) has, as we suppose, special reference to the λόγος ἐνσαρκος, the θεάνθρωπος of Origen, the incarnate Word, the God-man. As such, he is called the image of God, the first-born (not first-created) of every creature. The term *first-born* not only indicates a priority as to time, but also very frequently conveys the idea of superiority or excellence (comp. Ex. 4:22. Ps. 89:27. Rom. 8:29); an idea derived from the primogenitureship of

Jewish antiquity. As Christ, in the first clause of the verse, is called the image of God, the thought of his supereminence over all created things (ver. 18), would naturally follow. This leads the apostle, also, in the next verse, to make such particular mention of the thrones, dominions, principalities, and powers of heaven and earth, all of which were created by Christ and for Him. With this idea, however, there may be connected the kindred one of Christ's *ante-mundane* existence (so Meyer, Olshausen, comp. ver. 17). And this leads us to the principal objection which the context furnishes against reckoning Christ with created beings: "for in him [as the condition or ground] all things were created that are in heaven and that are in earth, visible and invisible . . . all things were created by him and for him. And he is before all things, and in him all things subsist (vs. 16, 17). If Christ, therefore, be the Creator, upholder, and end, of *all* created things, in heaven and earth, visible and invisible, then is he, himself, uncreated and eternal.

This passage will serve to explain the kindred expression, in Rev. 3:14, "the beginning of the creation of God. After what has been said above, we need only remark that ἀρχή, both in classic and in scripture Greek, has a much wider signification than our word *beginning*. It is often used actively and concretely, and thus denotes origin, magistracy, rulers, etc. (comp. Luke 12:11. Eph. 1:21. Col. 2:10.) In the plural, it is generally rendered principalities (potentates) in our version. This word is employed in the significant phrase "the *beginning* and the end," as the designation of the eternal and unchangeable One. Here it may signify the head or lord of creation (Rev. 1:5), or the cause or ground; or, it may be regarded as equivalent to the "first born of every creature." De Wette, in comparing this passage with Col. 1:15, 16, remarks: "Christ, according to the representation of the Apocalypticist, stands at the head of the whole creation, and is the Cause, Ground, and End of the same."

Certainly the Greek language affords fitter terms and phrases to express the idea that Christ was the first created being than the ambiguous ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κτίσεως τοῦ θεοῦ, if such

was the idea intended to be conveyed. Besides, the unsuitableness of this thought to the connection, must be apparent to every mind.

We pass, now, to consider the second clause : the Logos was with God (cf. 1 John 1 : 2). Hence, says the Arian at once, the Logos cannot be the same as God. This reasoning, though plausible, is too hasty, and does not rest on a sufficiently broad foundation. A simple glance at the next clause is sufficient to make us circumspect and cautious. Each proposition, here, must be explained in the light of the other ; and the more obscure one, by that which is less so. We must not, therefore, make the distinction between the Logos and God so broad and absolute, as to intrench on the substantial verity of the statement which immediately follows. The meaning of the clause before us turns, mainly, upon the force of the preposition *with* ; but this is left by the apostle undefined. We suppose that *πρὸς*, here, indicates a closer relation than *παρά* or *μετά* (see, however, *παρὰ σοί*, 17 : 5), and denotes the most intimate internal union. We are not, probably, to conceive of this relation or union in a sensuous manner, as any outward personal fellowship. Nothing, we think, is more abhorrent to right reason than the Arian anthropomorphic conception of a created finite being associated in personal fellowship with the infinite and omnipresent Spirit as his counsellor or assistant. Many, with Schleiermacher, have assigned to the preposition, here, the force of *in* ; the Logos was in God. So our Saviour frequently represents himself as in the Father, and the Father in him. Some such conception as this lay at the basis of the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* of the early Fathers ; i. e. the unspoken word ; and thus the immanent thought or reason of God. For ourselves, without desiring to remove the distinction between the Logos and God, which is certainly implied in the text, we should wish to make *πρὸς τὸν Θεόν* express, or at least not to preclude, the essential oneness of the Logos with God, and thus his consubstantiality with the Father. It were easy to explain this clause in entire harmony with Sabellianism, provided that this attractive theory could only answer the fair

demands of the Christian economy. Instead, however, of doing this, it makes the plainest and soberest representations of the New Testament a pretence and a solemn farce. Adopting, therefore, the language of the creeds, we must, while not dividing the substance, be careful also not to confound the Persons. *In medio tutissimus ibis*, although this middle course, as Chrysostom long since well represented, is not without its difficulties (see Hagenbach's *History of Doctrines*, vol. I. p. 272).

We come, now, to the final clause of the verse: "the Logos was God." Some persons, in proving the divinity of Christ, do not lay very much stress upon the simple fact that he is called God; since this term, as they suppose, is sometimes applied to created and inferior beings. We join issue with such, and affirm that nowhere, in the New Testament, do the inspired writers, in sober earnestness and with implicit faith, ascribe the name of God to any created being. We deny, moreover, that the term *God* (or *Jehovah*, Deut. 19:17) is distinctively and absolutely applied to any priests, judges, or kings, even in the Old Testament. In the few instances where אֱלֹהִים is rendered "judges," in our version (Ex. 21:6. 22:8. etc.), the Septuagint rightly gives a literal translation of the Hebrew: *before God*; and, in one instance, very properly: *to the tribunal of God*. All biblical scholars allow that the name *God*, in the Old Testament, is never bestowed upon any *single* individual; and the most any one can affirm is, that it was bestowed only relatively upon that body of men who, in their official capacity, stood as the representatives of Jehovah-God on earth. But however this may be, we have, at present, only to do with the *usus loquendi* of the New Testament.

Certain commentators have, likewise, asserted that the Logos cannot be the supreme God, since Θεός, in this clause, is without the article. We know, indeed, that Philo, and, after him, Origen, made a broad distinction between ὁ Θεός and Θεός; reducing the latter to a mere δεύτερος Θεός, a secondary god. To this, however, we reply, that the alleged distinction confessedly does not hold, in the New Tes-

ment ; and that, to interpret the writings of John by the theories of the Platonizing Jew, would be well nigh as bad as the "reading of inspired truth through heathen glasses." One has but to glance at vs. 6, 13, 18, of this very chapter, to be convinced that *Θεός*, in a similar construction, designates the invisible and absolute God. The absence of the article, in our clause, simply shows that *Θεός*, in its present position, must be taken as the predicate. Possibly, also, as some have thought, it may point out the Deity as substance, and not as subject ; though even this distinction is not founded on New Testament usage. Winer, however, in his *Idioms of the New Testament*, still asserts that the article could not have been omitted if John would designate the *Logos* as *ὁ Θεός* (the supreme God) ; because, in this connection, the simple *Θεός* was ambiguous. It would seem, then, that after all there is a difference between *Θεός* and *ὁ Θεός*, in New Testament usage. The learned writer, however, does not, for the best of reasons, refer to any examples in which this difference is indicated ; and to imagine such a distinction, in the clause before us, is, to say the least, simply begging the question. We need only to remark, further, that the acknowledged usage of the New Testament will not permit us to render *Θεός* a *god* ; or to make it equivalent to *Seios*, *divine*.¹ Influenced by these established results, many impugnors of the divinity of Christ have been compelled to allow that the *Logos* stands in such intimate relation to God, that he may be called God. But even this is not enough. The *Logos* not only *may* be called God ; not only is he called God ; but the apostle declares that the *Logos* was God, even that God by whom all things were made.

¹ Lücke, the learned and able commentator on John's writings, in his comments on this passage, arrives at substantially the same results which we have above indicated. But having reached them, he throws them all away in view of "the impossibility of conceiving of a double personality in Christ." He regards the scripture representation of the *Logos* as "only a temporary form of thought," and says : "We are allowed to distinguish the sense in which John understood those expressions from that in which Christ used them." With such a view of the scriptures, we should think it hardly worth the while for a man to expend in their investigation so much of learning and labor.

Having thus considered the grammatical difficulties, we come, now, to the theological objections. The principal objection urged against the regarding of the Logos as the supreme God is this, that it annihilates all difference between the Logos and God, and thus makes the Son one and the same with the Father. We are here willing to confess our ignorance, and acknowledge that *we* do not know whether *all* distinction is thus removed or not. We fully believe, however, that a distinction, in some respects, still remains; while, at the same time, we rejoice to know that, in some other respects, the Logos and the infinite God *are* one and the same!

Objections are not, commonly, all on one side of a question; and *we* have some very weighty ones against that Arian view, which makes the Logos, though the Creator of all things, yet himself merely a *δεύτερος Θεός*, an inferior Deity, and a created being. Here are palpable inconsistencies, which need no refutation. Such an intermediate demigod, between God and the world, has no existence in the scriptures, and can have no place in a Christian theology or a sound philosophy. Gnosticism, indeed, asserts that the demiurgus or world-creator is not the supreme God, but a subordinate, inferior being; while the New Testament, on the other hand, declares that he who built all things is God (Heb. 3:3,4).

We would here also remark, in reference to John's characterizing of the Logos, that nothing is said of the emanation or generation, or derived existence of the Logos, and nothing of his dependence on, or subordination to, the Father. These are the unwarranted concessions of some who, while professedly holding to the absolute equality of the Son with the Father, have yet denied it in words. Many of the early Fathers maintained that the Son existed, from all eternity, in the substance of the Father, and was begotten of that substance; so that, in the language of the Nicene creed, he was "very God of very God," an expression well nigh unintelligible, and savoring more of paganism than of Christian theism. To affirm that the Logos existed, from all eternity, in the

substance of the Father, and was of that substance, may be well enough ; but if by the “ generation of the Logos,” any have meant to deny his absolute *aseitas* or self-existence and independence, then we must, in view of John’s representation of the Logos, wholly dissent from that opinion. Not here, certainly, do we learn that the Father is the fountain and original of the whole Deity, or that he communicated his own divine essence to the Son. The Logos of John is no *κτίσμα*, nor *ποίημα*, nor *γέννημα* even ; but the *αὐτόθεος*, the eternal and self-existent God.

But what has all this, which thus far has been said of the Logos, to do with the divinity of *Christ* ? In reply to this question, the apostle, in ver. 14, tells us that the Logos became flesh and dwelt among us, etc. This, of course, cannot signify that the Logos was changed into flesh ; but it means that he entered into the sphere of humanity, took upon himself our human nature, and thus became “ the Son of man.” In vs. 10, 11, John has already spoken of the coming of the Logos into the world, and unto his own ; and elsewhere he often speaks of Christ’s coming from above, from heaven, and from the Father ; and, still more definitely, of his coming *in the flesh* (1 John 4 : 2. 2 John 7). The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews asserts that Christ partook of flesh and blood ; and Paul affirms that Christ was manifested in the flesh, was made in the likeness of men, and was sent in the likeness of sinful flesh (Heb. 2 : 14, 17. 1 Tim. 3 : 16. Phil. 2 : 7. Rom. 8 : 3). These parallel passages, together with the context itself (he dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory, etc.), make it evident that John is here speaking of the Logos, as incarnate, in the person of Christ. It will be perceived, moreover, that no explanation is given of this mysterious union of natures in the Redeemer. No one, therefore, can justly demand of us to explain the *modus existendi* of the Logos, either with the Father, or in the person of Jesus. Had such an explanation been possible, or profitable, John the *theologian* would doubtless have performed the task for us.

The apostle, in this fourteenth verse, speaks, for the first time, of Christ as the only-begotten of (lit. from) the Father,

a phrase synonymous with "the Son of God." This title — Son of God — is used, in the New Testament, with considerable latitude of meaning; but, as applied distinctively to Christ, and in contrast with "the Son of man," it has special reference to his divine nature. Neander, in his *Life of Christ*, p. 96, says: "the two titles — Son of God, and Son of man — bear evidently a reciprocal relation to each other; and we conclude that, as Christ used the one to designate his human personality, so he employed the other to point out his divine; and that, as he attached a sense far more profound than was common to the former title; so he ascribed a deeper meaning than was usual to the latter." That the epithet in question has this deeper meaning, is evident from such passages as these: "No one hath seen God at any time; the *only begotten* Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him. No man knoweth the Son, but the Father. He that hath seen me [the Son], hath seen the Father. I and my Father are one. . . . Who was born of the seed of David, according to the flesh; but powerfully exhibited as the Son of God, according to the Spirit of holiness; i. e. as to his spiritual or higher nature. For to which of the angels said he, at any time: thou art my son, this day have I begotten thee" (John 1:18. 10:30. 14:9. Matt. 11:27. Rom. 1:4. Heb. 1:5)? From John 5:18. 10:30—39. 19:7. Luke 22:71, we may learn how the Jews regarded as blasphemous his distinctive claim to divine sonship: Thou, being a man, say they, makest thyself God, and equal with God; nor does our Saviour, anywhere, indicate that they misrepresented his meaning; but he rather confirms the charge which they brought against him. The title "Son of God" must, of course, be taken as metaphorical or figurative. It has commonly, however, been regarded too much *more humano*, in a sensuous anthropomorphic manner, both by those who have maintained, and those who have opposed, the supreme divinity of Christ. In scripture use, the term *son*, as every biblical student well knows, denotes participation, resemblance or likeness, etc. So Christ, as the Son of man, was a partaker of our flesh and blood, and of our entire hu-

manity; and, as the Son of God, he possessed the entire nature and attributes of Deity. Hence the Logos may be called the Son of God, though when thus designated, special reference is had, as we suppose, to his mediatorial and redemptive work. The only-begotten of the Father, whose glory was beheld by the disciples and the world, was the *λόγος σ Fleischgewordenes*, the incarnate Word.

We now propose to notice some other passages, in which Christ is commonly supposed to be called God. We shall not go through any lengthened processes of interpretation; but content ourselves, in general, with simply stating the results which are demanded or allowed by a just philology and sound criticism.

John 20 : 28. "Thomas answered and said unto him [Christ], my Lord and my God"! This was not an exclamation of surprise, but an address to Jesus, by Thomas, to whom Christ was *powerfully* exhibited as the Son of God, by his resurrection from the dead, Rom. 1 : 4. Do we wonder, then, that under these circumstances Thomas should call him his Lord and his God? But would not the fact that the meek and lowly Saviour commended Thomas for his faith, be still more wonderful if he was not, in truth, what Thomas declared him to be?¹

Acts 20 : 28. . . "to feed the church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood." Comp. 1 John 3 : 16 Vulgate. The reading *τοῦ Θεοῦ* is found in the ancient Vatican manuscript, and in the Syriac and Vulgate versions, and is defended by several able critics; principally, however, on the ground of its accordance with New Testament usage (the expression "church of God," occurring eleven times in Paul's epistles, while the phrase "church of the Lord," does not elsewhere occur). The authority of the manuscripts, however, seems to favor this latter reading, and hence we cannot regard this text as decisive on the point in question. It is further alleged, in favor of *τοῦ κυρίου*, that the familiar formula would more easily be exchanged for the unusual one,

¹ *Agnovit Christus utique repulsurus, si falso dictus fuisset Deus.* Erasmus, as quoted by Meyer.

than the reverse. But to this we might reply that τοῦ κυρίου may have been substituted for τοῦ Θεοῦ, through dread or dislike of monophysitism, although even κυρίου, as Olshausen remarks, "commonly expresses the divine nature of Christ."¹

Rom. 9:5. "Whose are the fathers, and of whom, according to the flesh, Christ came, who is God over all, blessed forever." Innumerable conjectures and expedients have been resorted to, in the interpretation of this text, in order to evade its manifest ascription of supreme divinity to Christ. Most of those interpreters who disbelieve his divinity, make the latter clause an independent sentence, and refer the whole, as a doxology, to God the Father: "God, who is over all, be praised forever." But against this rendering there are insuperable objections: 1. There is no transition-particle, to indicate a change of subject, and the clause is connected with the preceding one in the closest manner possible (ὁ ὧν = ὃς ἐστίν). 2. We should naturally expect, as an antithesis to κατὰ σάρκα (according to the flesh) some reference to the higher nature of Christ (comp. 1:3, 4). 3. Especially necessary is this reference here, since it is the rejection of Christ, Heaven's last and greatest gift to the Jews, which so overwhelms the apostle's soul with anguish that he himself would be willing to be anathema from Christ, provided this could secure their conversion. 4. According to the proposed rendering, however, Christ is not only not exalted, but is, as De Wette allows, almost wholly cast into the shade. 5. The ascription, therefore, of supreme dominion and eter-

¹ Even where the "one God the Father" is distinguished from the "one Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Cor. 8:6), the latter, nevertheless, seems to be placed on the side of Deity. The Father is called the "one God," not as contrasted with the Lord Jesus, but with the "gods many" of heathenism, and in like manner the "one Lord" is antithetic to the "lords many." The apostle here does not deny Lordship to the Father nor Deity to the Son. For these "gods many" and "lords many" are the "gods so-called" of the heathen, and are the objects of their religious (idolatrous) worship. But for us Christians, the apostle would say, there is but one God and one Lord, from whom and by whom are all things and to whom alone worship is due. These remarks will serve to explain our Saviour's words (John 17:3): "This is life eternal, to know thee, the only true God and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." Well may De Wette confess that this passage furnishes no proof against the divinity of Christ.

nal blessedness to God the Father, is not pertinent to the context, but directly opposes the scope of the passage; and no valid reason can be assigned or conceived for its occurrence in this connection. 6. Granting the appositeness of such a doxology, the construction of the passage will not well admit of this interpretation. The use of the participle is strange, and the position of *εὐλογητός* wholly unprecedented (see below).

The rendering adopted by De Wette, in his *Heilige Schrift*: “. . . from whom Christ descended according to the flesh, who is over all. God be praised forever,” is the only one, apart from that above given, which is deserving of any notice. Here, indeed, we have the needed antithesis to *κατὰ σάρκα*, and Christ is not entirely thrown into the shade. But against this rendering, it is justly objected: 1. That to close the sentence with *πάντων* is altogether abrupt and arbitrary. 2. The doxology to the Father has no sufficient ground in the context, and no immediate connection with it whatever. 3. *Θεός*, as the subject of the sentence, should here have the article. 4. The predicate *εὐλογητός* (blessed), both in the Septuagint and elsewhere in the New Testament, always precedes the subject, and should do so here, in case a doxology were intended.¹ De Wette, in his comments on this text, professes not to be fully satisfied either with his own or any other rendering, and regards a new reading as a desideratum. Of course, his only objection to the received reading is founded in a dogmatic interest. “If this passage,” says Knapp, in his *Christian Theology*, p. 137, “were read in an unprejudiced manner, it would undoubtedly be referred, by every one, to Christ.” Usteri, Tholuck, Olshausen, and other modern interpreters, together with all the Fathers, likewise accord with this interpretation. Nor is the sentiment here advanced by the apostle, at all contradictory to his

¹ This construction occurs over thirty times in the Septuagint. The reading in Ps. 67:20, as compared with the Hebrew, is manifestly corrupt. How easy for the apostle, if he wished to ascribe a doxology to God the Father, to have avoided all ambiguity by simply writing: *εὐλογητός ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων θεὸς* or *εὐλογητός ὁ θεὸς ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων*, κ. τ. λ.

views elsewhere expressed. He represents Christ as existing before all things, the author and sustainer of the universe, and often speaks of him as the Lord from heaven, the Lord of glory, and the Lord of all (comp. John 3 : 31). Elsewhere, indeed, he does not term Christ blessed, but John tells us that the redeemed, in heaven, cry with a loud voice : Worthy is the Lamb, that was slain, to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honor, and glory, and *blesting*, forever and ever (Rev. 5 : 12, 13 ; see, also, Matt. 21 : 9). In the passages yet to be examined, we shall become still further acquainted with Paul's Christological views.

1 Tim. 3 : 16. " And confessedly great is the mystery of godliness : God was manifested in the flesh, justified in spirit," etc. It is disputed, here, whether the genuine *a prima manu* reading is $\Theta\varsigma$ i. e. $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ (the horizontal line above indicating abbreviation), or $\theta\varsigma$ (who — referring to Christ understood), or θ (which — referring to mystery). In the Vulgate and in the Latin Fathers generally, *quod* (which) is found. Only four or five Greek manuscripts now exhibit $\theta\varsigma$, while over a hundred and seventy manuscripts (and among these, are some of the older ones) have $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$. *Manuscript* authority, then, is almost wholly in favor of the genuineness of the received reading.¹ This reading is also found in most of the Greek Fathers ; and, wherever $\theta\varsigma$ occurs, it is simply explicative on the part of the writer. The several predicates in our verse certainly require a definite subject ; and none is more appropriate, in this connection, than $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$. It is, indeed, objected that some of the succeeding clauses will not well agree with $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ as the subject. But in this respect, $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ stands on the same ground as the Logos in John 1 : 14 ; and

¹ The manuscripts A and C, which are frequently cited as favoring the reading $\theta\varsigma$ now have $\Theta\varsigma$, i. e. $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$. But it is alleged from the character of the horizontal and transverse strokes, and from the color of the ink, that this was not the original *a prima manu* reading, but the work of a subsequent corrector. Allowing, however, that these lines in their present shape and appearance were not from the original copyist, it still remains to be proved that they have not been *retouched* or restored. For a full discussion of the genuineness of this text, see an able and interesting Article by Dr. Henderson in the *Biblical Repository*, Vol. II. p. 1 seq.

in either verse the idea of the *incarnate* Logos, or *manifested* God, which is implied in the first clause, necessarily attaches itself to the succeeding ones. More surprising is the omission of the article here; though, if these clauses are taken, as is commonly supposed, from some Christian hymn, it will not appear so strange. In 2 Cor. 5:19. Gal. 2:6. 6:7. 1 Thess. 2:5, Θεός as the subject of a proposition, likewise occurs, without the article. The reading δς, as the more difficult one, is preferred by some, in accordance with the canon of Griesbach: *Difficilior et obscurior lectio anteponenda est ei in qua omnia tam plana sunt et extricata ut librarius quisque facile intelligere ea potuerit.*¹ But to regard this hermeneutical rule as absolute, would be perfectly absurd. Just as though a copyist could not, through indistinctness in hearing, or carelessness in observing, blunder into a more difficult reading! What should we think, were our proof-readers to adopt the above rule for their own convenience? But even if δς were considered the genuine reading, the idea, it appears to us, would remain substantially the same. The reference, manifestly, must be to Christ, in his Logos, or divine nature.²

Heb. 1:8. "But unto the Son He saith, Thy throne, O God, is forever and ever." This verse is quoted from Ps. xlv.; and though some dispute its Messianic character, yet our author evidently regarded it as having reference to Christ: how else could he say, while reasoning with the Jews, πρὸς δὲ τὸν υἱόν?

But whatever may have been its original reference, the appellation ὁ Θεός is here expressly given to Christ. So, in vs. 10—12, the words primarily addressed to Jehovah, are

¹ The acknowledged difficulties of the proposed reading are these: 1. that there is no substantive in the context to which δς can relate as its antecedent; and 2. that δς of itself does not include both the demonstrative and relative, or in other words, does not mean: he who.

² Prof. Stuart, in speaking of this text, says: "Whoever attentively studies John 17:20—26; 1 John 1:3; 2:5; 4:15, 16, and other passages of like tenor, will see that 'God might be manifest' in the person of Christ without the necessary implication of the proper divinity of the Saviour." This may perhaps be true, but the passages adduced are not parallel to the one before us, and the assertion: "God was manifest in the person of Christ," by no means exhausts the meaning of the scripture affirmation that "God was manifested in the flesh."

applied directly to Christ ; and he is represented as the infinite Creator and the unchangeable One. That the Son, who has just been called *ὁ Θεός*, should himself have a *Θεός* (ver. 9), is entirely accordant with the two-fold view of Christ which is elsewhere presented.

1 John 5 : 20. " And we are in him who is true, even in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God and eternal life." The reasons for referring these epithets to Christ, are the following : 1. *οὗτος* (this) more naturally refers to Christ as its immediate antecedent. It sometimes, indeed, relates to a more remote noun, when this is conceived of as the principal subject. There is no reason, however, why the Son of God may not be regarded as the principal subject here. 2. John seems, in a manner, to identify *τὸν ἀληθινόν* with Christ, in the clause : We are in him that is true, even in his Son, Jesus Christ. 3. Life and eternal life are repeatedly used, in John's writings, almost as synonyms for Christ. On the other hand, it is alleged that the title " True God " is, elsewhere, exclusively attributed to God the Father. But is not Christ, in John's writings, the Truth as well as the Life ? And could not he say of the Logos, the Life of men, and, as incarnate, full of grace and *truth*, This is the true God and eternal life ? 4. The reference of this epithet, *the true*, for the third time in this verse, to God the *Father*, would be, as De Wette acknowledges, extremely tautological. If, therefore, this clause must be referred to God the Father, then, with Andrews Norton, we must concede that the apostle John was a very unskilful writer.

Titus 2 : 13. " Looking for the blessed hope and appearing of the glory (or, the glorious appearing) of the great God, even our Saviour Jesus Christ." Such is the rendering which is allowed, or, as many eminent linguists think, demanded by the idiomatic usage of the Greek article.¹ Another and still stronger reason for referring *μεγάλου Θεοῦ* (great God) to Christ, is this, that *ἐπιφάνεια* (appearing, manifestation) is

¹ The idiom referred to is this : when two nouns are connected by *καί*, the first having the article and the second destitute of it, the latter noun, especially if it be an *attributive*, is simply explanatory of the former.

elsewhere never predicated of the invisible God the Father; for it is to be observed that both subjects, in our text, stand similarly related to this ἐπιφάνειαν. And, indeed, it is generally conceded that Christ alone is to appear, but that he will come in the glory of his Father, as also in his own. Even according to this view, the great God and our Saviour are so far identified that the glory of the one is the glory of the other (comp. 2 Cor. 4 : 6). To our interpretation it is objected that Paul's Christological views would not allow him to designate Christ as the great God. Usteri, on the other hand, avers that "God the Father did not need the exalting and laudatory epithet μέγας : this rather refers to Christ." How easy for the apostle to have prevented all ambiguity by simply prefixing the article to σωτήρος ἡμῶν, as is usually the case.

Several other texts, likewise, partake of this ambiguity — Eph. 5 : 5, "the kingdom of Christ, even God" (the first noun having the article, while the second is without it). So in ver. 20, "God and Father," i. e. God, who is the Father. 2 Thess. 1 : 12, "according to the grace of our God and Lord Jesus Christ." 2 Pet. 1 : 1, "righteousness of our God and Saviour, Jesus Christ (so in the margin of our English version). De Wette inserts *our* before Saviour; but, compare the same construction in ver. 11, and 3 : 18 — "our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ." Jude 4, "denying the only Sovereign, even our Lord Jesus Christ (comp. 2 Pet. 2 : 1; elsewhere δεσπότην, *sovereign*, refers to God). And this leads us to notice another source of ambiguity. Many attributives which should, properly, distinguish God from all other beings, are likewise applied, unqualifiedly, to Christ; and the interpreter, in consequence, is sometimes at a loss to know whether they are to be referred to the one or to the other. For example : God is called our Sovereign and Lord; and Christ, also, is our Sovereign and Lord. God is our Saviour; and Christ is our Saviour. God is our judge; and Christ our judge. God is the first and the last; and Christ is the first and the last. God is all in all; and Christ is all in all. Can there be, for us, Lords many, and Judges many, and Sa-

viours many? Other forms of ambiguity occur, especially where the terms Christ and God or Jehovah seem to be used interchangeably or synonymously. In Rev. 22 : 6, the Lord God, who sent his angel, appears, from ver. 16, to have been the Lord Jesus : " I, Jesus, have sent mine angel," etc. From Heb. 3 : 3, 4, the inference seems to be unavoidable that Christ is called God, who hath built all things. Why else, it is asked, have we the undisputed and irrelevant truisms of ver. 4? For instances in which Jehovah and Christ are used as convertible terms, comp. Eph. 4 : 8 with Ps. 68 : 18. Rom. 14 : 10, 11 with Isa. 45 : 23. Mark 1 : 2, 3 with Mal. 3 : 1. Isa. 40 : 3. Heb. 1 : 10 with Ps. 102 : 25. John 12 : 41 with Isa. 6 : 1—3. 1 Cor. 10 : 4, 9 with Ex. 17 : 2, 7, etc.

In view, now, of all these acknowledged ambiguities, we are forced to remark that, if the sacred writers did not hold and intend to teach the substantial equality of the Son with the Father, then they have been, as it appears to us, far too careless and negligent in their use of language. Is not God immeasurably exalted above all his creatures, and separated from them, in nature and in state, by an infinite chasm, an impassable gulf? And in reference to what other being, than Christ, is there, in the Bible, the smallest room for doubt whether such an one be a finite, dependent creature, or the uncreated, and eternal One? If Christ were merely a created being, would the scriptures have furnished the least ground for doubt in regard to *Him*?

We turn, now, to a class of passages in which equality with God is attributed to Christ.

Phil. 2 : 6, "who, being in the form of God, thought not the being equal with God a robbery; but he emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, becoming in the likeness of men, and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." As this deeply interesting passage has been variously interpreted, we have aimed to give it a closely literal rendering. The "being in the form of God," must refer to the outward appearing and manifestation of the preëxistent Christ. In John 17 : 5, Christ speaks of the glory which he had with

the Father before the world was. This glory, which he had in common with the Father, was his *manifested* divine glory. Thus he was in the form of God, i. e. he had the manifested glory of God, or was manifested as God. In like manner, when he assumed the form of a servant, he appeared, or was manifested, as a servant. Some compare this "form" of God to the "image" of God, the "express image" of his substance, and the "effulgence" or "reflection" of his glory (Col. 1 : 15. 2 Cor. 4 : 4. Heb. 1 : 3); but we think these epithets are used, rather, of the mediatorial Logos or the historical Christ. But if Christ was truly in the form of God, must there not have been, in him, some substantial ground and basis for that manifestation? This fact the apostle recognizes, and hence affirms that Christ was equal with God, and that he regarded this divine equality as his natural, inherent right, and proper possession. "He thought it not robbery to be equal with God." If Christ, however, be merely a created being, then is he, as all will concede, infinitely inferior to God. Does the apostle, then, declare that an infinitely inferior being is equal to the supreme and eternal God? And can such a being, "meek and *lowly* in heart," claim to be equal with Jehovah? But some have asked, how was it any proof of Christ's humility and self-forgetfulness that he did not regard the being equal with God as a robbery? We answer: the *higher* the position he occupied, the greater his stoop of condescension; and the fact that he was *conscious* of his independent, exalted position, greatly enhances, at least to our human views and feelings, his wonderful condescension. In this was manifested both the humility and the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, who, *though he was rich*, yet for our sakes became poor (2 Cor. 8 : 9). It is, first, in verse seven that Paul expressly speaks of that humility and self-sacrificing love of Christ which he would have his Philippian brethren imitate (see vs. 4, 5). There is, therefore, no necessity of departing from the proper meaning of ἀρπαγμός (robbery), and rendering the clause, as many do: He did not consider the being equal with God as a thing which he must seize for himself, or as an object of solicitous desire; thus

making ἀρπαγμός = *praeda*, or rather *res arripienda*. Even according to this rendering, the manifested equality with God is something which Christ could have obtained (or retained), had this been compatible with his design of saving men. But the apostle affirms that "he emptied himself," namely, by taking the form of a servant, and becoming in the likeness of men. In assuming the servant-form, he divested himself of the form of God, and thus, for our sakes, became poor. In himself, he was still equal with God, although this equality was not fully manifested. In view, now, of what Christ divested himself, when he partook of flesh and blood, we may easily understand how he, though the equal of the Father, could yet say, in the days of his humiliation and sufferings, "the days of his flesh:" my Father is greater than I. And being found in fashion as a man he humbled himself [by] becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross.¹ One would think it quite needless to inquire when Jesus was found in fashion as a man; but, according to De Wette, it was not until he had submitted to baptism, and entered upon his public career! Previous to this, i. e. in his youth and early manhood, he was in the form of God; or, in other words, the divine glory dwelt in him *potentially*, and he had not assumed the form of a servant, nor become in the likeness of men! But did not Christ have the divine glory *potentially*, in himself, during his strictly historic career? Nay, was not that glory much more fully manifested by his wonderful miracles than in his pre-historic life? We will not, however, enter upon a serious refutation of this view; but simply state, in justice to De Wette, that even he would not deny the *possibility* that Paul may have regarded the Logos as the true subject of the personality of Christ.²

¹ Nomen ipsum crucis absit non modo a corpore civium Romanorum sed etiam a cogitatione, oculis, auribus. — Cicero pro Rab. C. V. Crudelissimum teterri-
mumque supplicium. Servitutis extremum summumque supplicium . . . Faci-
nus est vinciri civem Romanum, scelus verberari, prope parricidium necari, quid
dicam in crucem tolli? — Cic. in Verr. VI. 64, 66.

² From a certain book-notice in one of our denominational Reviews we learn
that "it is quite too bad that the Deity of Christ should be demonstrated by
means of a text so well known to be wholly turned from its real meaning as this

John 5:23. "That all men should honor the Son even as they honor the Father." Our Saviour here claims equal homage with the Father on the ground of his oneness with him. In justification of his alleged profanation of the Sabbath, he says (ver. 17): my Father worketh hitherto, and I work. The Jews take offence at this declaration, and accuse him of making himself equal with God (comp. 10:33. 19:7). He proceeds, however, to confirm his previous statement. Such is his inseparable and essential oneness with the Father, that he can do nothing of himself; but, what things the Father doeth, the same doeth the Son likewise. The Son hath power to raise the dead, to quicken whom he will, and even to pronounce the eternal awards of men; for the Father hath given him all power in heaven and earth (Matt. 28:18), and hath committed all judgment into his hands, because he is *the Son of man*, or the *incarnate* Word. If Christ were merely a created being, is it probable that all power and all judgment—omnipotence and omniscience itself, would or could have been committed unto him? and with this intent, that all men should honor him even as they honor the infinite God? Does not our Saviour, then, instead of disproving and repelling the accusation of the Jews, rather confirm and establish the truth of their charge?

Wetstein and others, however, have compared this relation of the Son to the Father, to that of a prime minister to his monarch; so that the Son, as an ambassador from Heaven, may justly demand the homage which is due to the Father. But does an earthly ambassador wield all the power of his king, and do all the works which the king doeth? Does he aver: All things which the king hath are mine? Does he,

It certainly ought to be understood that the literal words of our English version of the Bible were not used by Jesus or the apostles, and that King James's translators could lay no valid claims to plenary inspiration." As some of us, however, are still quite ignorant of that which elsewhere appears to be "so well known," we think it "quite too bad" that the critic has not attempted to enlighten us by an exegesis of the passage. Would he venture to adopt as his "improved version": he thought not of the robbery of being equal with God? Meyer, perhaps the ablest New Testament commentator living, defends the view which is presented in our English version. We think "it is quite too bad" that *he* should be so far behind the age in sacred philology and biblical criticism.

in fact, claim equal honor with his king? Does he ever affirm: He that hath seen me, hath seen the king? Does he venture to assume the title *his majesty*, or allow others to bestow it on him? Such an ambitious minister would doubtless be very suddenly removed, not only from his office, but most probably from the land of the living? But whatever may be the fact concerning earthly ambassadors, we trust that Jehovah can have no prime minister, among created beings, who will venture to assume an equality of power and glory with the King eternal, immortal, and invisible.

John 10:30. "I and my Father are one." This is a kindred passage with the one just examined. The unity of the Son and the Father, here spoken of, is not only that of will but of power; for the Saviour refers to it in confirmation of the asserted security of his sheep while in his hands. But must there not be some substantial basis for a unity like this? Such, again, was the understanding of the Jews; for they accuse him of blasphemy, of arrogating to himself divine equality, and of making himself God. Instead of indignantly repelling the charge, he proceeds to justify his assertion, and finally rests his claims upon their faith, on the simple fact that he doeth the works which the Father doeth. This explanation was not, of course, very satisfactory to the Jews, and "they again sought to take him."

In John 16:15, Christ declares: "All things whatsoever (*πάντα ὅσα*) the Father hath are mine"; and, in the immediate context, he says: "the Spirit of truth, the Paraclete, whom *I* will send, shall glorify me, for he shall take of mine and shall shew it unto you." Do such assertions as these well befit the lips of any finite, inferior being? Paul, instructed by this Spirit of truth, asserts (according to the *Textus Receptus*) that in Christ are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge;¹ and that in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead (or the Divine essence) bodily; and thus,

¹ The scriptures repeatedly attribute the knowledge of all things to Christ, and yet he himself says: Of that day and hour knoweth no one, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the Father, Mark 13:32; comp. Matt. 24:36. Some have predicated this ignorance of the *man* Jesus, of whom it is said that

having all fulness in himself, he filleth all in all (Col. 2 : 3, 9. Eph. 1 : 23. 4 : 10). He likewise speaks of Christ as all-powerful, as being able to subdue all things unto himself, and as upholding all things by his powerful word (Phil. 3 : 21. Heb. 1 : 3). In Rev. 22 : 1, 3, Christ is represented as possessing one and the same throne with the Father—the throne of God and of the Lamb; and often, elsewhere, as sitting at the right hand of God, or of power. Thus does the exalted Messiah share alike, with the Father, in divine glory and universal dominion.

In this connection, also, we may notice the baptismal formula, since the Son seems, here, to be placed on an equality with the Father. It will be observed that the command is not, to be baptized unto the name of God and of Christ; but unto the related names of the Father, and the Son, while the term God does not occur. These reciprocal and inseparable names do, of themselves, indicate an essential union and equality. It will be acknowledged, moreover, that the Father and the Spirit are each, in some way, intimately and peculiarly connected with Deity, and thus the abstract probability would be that the middle term (the Son) is similarly related. We are baptized unto each name alike, and therefore would seem to sustain to each a similar relation. Hence the formula, in itself, apparently favors the divine equality of the Father, Son, and Spirit. It is, indeed, said that, elsewhere, we have the phrase “baptized unto Moses, and unto Paul,” etc. ;

he grew in *wisdom* and stature. Olshausen refers it to the *κένωσις* of the Lord in his position of humiliation, Phil. 2 : 6. Others have thought that Jesus here speaks as a *prophet*, and thus as not empowered to *declare* the precise day and hour; comp. Acts 1 : 7. The event here spoken of refers, most probably, to the destruction of Jerusalem, and therewith of the Jewish dispensation. As now our Lord revealed the general fact that it should happen within the lifetime of his generation, and moreover stated what should first occur, we cannot suppose that he was *absolutely* ignorant of the time when he himself, “the Son of man,” should come. To suppose otherwise would be, according to Athanasius, just as if any one should accurately describe to a traveller, who wished to visit a certain city, what should happen to him on the way, what lay before the city, etc., and yet should not know where the city itself was! How, he asks, could he who made the ages (Heb. 1 : 2) be ignorant of the end of the ages? See Möhler’s “*Athanasius der Grosse*,” S. 263.

and yet these are not divine beings. True: but the name of Moses was not associated with that of Jehovah, in a permanent formula of faith. And as for Paul, what would he think of a baptismal formula, running thus: "Unto the name of the Father, and of the apostle to the Gentiles, and of the Holy Ghost?" Can we think the name of *any* subordinate, finite creature congruous or becoming, in such a position? To be baptized unto the Father — what is it, but to make, by open profession, an entire surrender of ourselves unto him, evermore to yield him obedience, love, trust, homage, worship? So, also, are we baptized unto the Son, and unto the Spirit, making the same surrender, yielding the same allegiance and service. Each of these "names" is alike the author and procuring cause of our salvation; and we are baptized unto one no more than unto another. Thus these names are indissolubly and forever united: the Father, the Son, and the Spirit — the of whom, and through whom, and to whom, are all things; thus forming one complete and homogeneous whole, forever separated from earth and men and angels, the triune God, our Father and Saviour and Sanctifier (comp. 2 Cor. 13:14. 1 Cor. 12:4—6. Eph. 4:4—6). We are Trinitarians, therefore; for unto the name of the Trinity were we baptized — the name of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. The truth contained in this standing formula for all ages, constitutes not only the foundation, but the body and substance of the Christian religion. To introduce into such a formula, with the name of the infinite God, the name of a divine influence, and, between these, the name of a dependent, accountable creature, and then to be *baptized* unto these — would be, as it appears to us, no less repugnant to right reason than adverse to the teachings of Scripture.¹

¹ The passage concerning the three heavenly witnesses (1 John 5:7), though occurring in the Vulgate and three or four modern Greek manuscripts, and supposed to be quoted or referred to by Tertullian and Cyprian, is yet not found in any Greek manuscript written before the fifteenth century, which circumstance we deem a sufficient reason for *doubting* its genuineness, or at least for not regarding it *at present* as an authoritative proof text. See Davidson's *Bib. Criticism*, Vol. II. p. 403 seq.

We have already adverted to certain texts in which the creation and preservation of the world is ascribed to Christ; but it may be well to group them together here. John (1:3) affirms that all things were made by the Logos, and that no created thing was made without him; and, in ver. 10, he says that the world was made by him. Had the apostle affirmed that all things were made by Jehovah or God (as in Heb. 2:10), none would contend that *διὰ* denoted merely the instrumental cause.¹ Only in Heb. 1:2 (in Eph. 3:9, the words "by Jesus Christ," are not genuine) do we read that God created the worlds, or ages, by his Son. Even here the writer would not deny that Christ was the efficient cause of creation; for, in v. 10, he says: "And thou, Lord, in the beginning, didst lay the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the works of thy hands," etc. These words, quoted from Ps. cii., where the reference must be to Jehovah, are here directly applied to Christ; and, consequently, efficient causation must be ascribed to him (see, also, ver. 3). Besides, what room can there be in a Christian monotheistic system of doctrines for an instrumental, secondary, created Creator?

Paul, in Col. 1:16, 17, asserts that in Christ (as the cause or ground) were all things created, both celestial and terrestrial, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers; all things were created by him and *for him*. And he is before all things, and by him all things consist (comp. 1 Cor. 8:6). But Jehovah says: "I am the Lord that maketh all things, that stretcheth forth the heavens alone, that spreadeth abroad the earth by myself" (Isa. 44:24). Unless, therefore, we hold, with the Gnostics, that the demiurgus is a subordinate, inferior being, must we not maintain that the eternal power and Godhead of the Son are clearly discerned by the things which he

¹ Even if Christ were regarded merely as the *instrumental* creator, this fact alone would not prove his inferiority. "For the person," says Knapp, "through whom I accomplish anything, so far from being necessarily inferior to myself, may be equal or even greater. I may, for example, secure a favor to any one from the king, through the influence of the *minister*." Christian Theology, p. 168.

has made? Who can suppose a created being to be the author, sustainer, and end of all this vast creation?

Not more clearly, to our mind, does the work of creation prove the divinity of Christ, than does the power and act of forgiveness of sins. It is manifest that Christ, by his own authority, and in his own name, granted pardon to the sinner; and hence the accusation of the Jews: 'This man blasphemeth—who can forgive sins, but God alone (Mark 2: 7)? The declaration of Jehovah is: "I, even I, am he that blotteth out thy transgressions for my own sake" (Isa. 43: 25); and yet the penitent sinner is forgiven, not only by the Saviour, but for his sake. No truth, we imagine, is plainer in the New Testament, than that we are redeemed, pardoned, and saved, by Christ and for the sake of Christ. But what created being sustains that relation to God, or has that merit, or can make that atonement, or work out that righteousness, which shall furnish the ground or reason why God should forgive and save the guilty? Can it be that we are absolutely indebted to any created being for the gospel and its free salvation?

Christ is, emphatically, both the Lord and the Saviour of the New Testament.¹ To be a Saviour of sinners, however, he must have power on earth to forgive sins, to renew the mind, and sanctify the heart. But how great a work to save *one* lost soul from sin and death! The created universe, combined, were insufficient for the mighty task. It needs an all-sufficient, an almighty Saviour. No person, when weighed down with the dreadful burden of guilt, feels that any created arm can save him. And well might such an one despair of all hope, if the Saviour, to whom he is directed to look for forgiveness, and in whom he must trust for salvation, is, like himself, a weak, dependent, accountable creature, whom God, if he chooses, can annihilate forever.

¹ Prof. Stuart states as the result of his investigation of the usage of *κύριος* (Lord), "that in nearly all (about 240) of the 246 instances in which *κύριος* is used by Paul to designate Christ or God, independently of quotations from the Old Testament, it is applied to the designation of Christ." See *Bib. Repository*, 1831, p. 770. The Epistle to the Hebrews is here included among Paul's writings.

Listen to the bold words of Luther on this point. "If Christ does not abide the true and essential God, begotten of the Father from eternity, and Creator of all created things, we are lost. For, what would the sufferings and death of Jesus Christ avail us, if he were a mere man, like thee and me? He could not have vanquished Satan, sin, and death. We need a Saviour who is truly God, and raised above sin, death, the devil, and hell. It matters little that the Arians exclaim: 'Christ is the noblest, the most exalted, of creatures.' They think, in this way to recommend their shameful error, so that the people may not detect it. But if they strike at the faith, though in the least thing, it is all over with us. If they rob Christ of his divinity, we are past all deliverance from the judgment and wrath of God." Assuredly, nothing is more certain than that a sinner, when convinced of his sins and lost condition, feels the need of an almighty Saviour. Hence it is that many persons who had previously denied the Lord that bought them, have when convinced of their sins by the Holy Ghost, learned for the first time to call Jesus Lord. And thus it is that, in an emphatic sense, no man can call Jesus Lord, but by the Holy Ghost. We believe, therefore, that the divinity of Christ is a doctrine into which every man is converted, when converted by the Spirit of God. The theology of every newly-regenerate soul is briefly this: "I am a great sinner; but I have a great, an almighty Saviour." When thus the Spirit, at the time of his conversion, has taken of the things of Jesus and shown them unto him, how firm is his belief in the Saviour's eternal power and Godhead, and how enlarged and rapturous are his views of the fulness there is in Christ! No speculative difficulties can disturb his faith; for he knows in whom he has believed. Hence, also, no unconverted person — no man who is destitute of an experimental knowledge of the Saviour's divine power and grace, can preach, as Paul did, the unsearchable riches of Christ, or as Bunyan *does*, in his "Come and welcome to Jesus Christ," and his "Jerusalem Sinner saved."

The New Testament, further, represents Christ as an object of divine worship and of prayer. He whom all the an-

gels in heaven are commanded to worship, and to whom, or at whose name (τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πάντων ὄνομα), every knee in the universe shall bow (Phil. 2 : 10. comp. Rom. 14 : 11), must be the object, not only of external homage, but of spiritual worship.

So the apostles and early disciples worshipped Christ, not only while on earth, but after his ascension (Matt. 14 : 33, 28. 9 : 17. Luke 24 : 52). The sacred writers, in their doxologies, repeatedly ascribe to Christ glory and dominion everlasting¹ (Rev. 1 : 6. 2 Tim. 4 : 18. Heb. 13 : 21. 1 Pet. 4 : 11. 2 Pet. 3 : 18). And the song of the redeemed in heaven is: "Worthy is the Lamb, that was slain, to receive power and riches and wisdom and strength and honor and glory and blessing. Blessing and honor and glory and power be unto him that sitteth upon the throne and unto the Lamb forever

¹ The prophecies relating to Christ declare that his throne endureth forever and ever, that his dominion is an everlasting dominion which shall not pass away, and his kingdom one which shall not be destroyed, that he shall reign over the house of Jacob forever, and of his kingdom there shall be no end. And from the passages above quoted, we learn that the redeemed on earth and in heaven ascribe to Christ honor, power, dominion, and glory forever and ever. Only in 1 Cor. 15 : 24, 28, do we read that the Son shall finally deliver up the kingdom to God the Father, and himself become subject unto Him. This passage, standing alone in the scriptures, is by far the most difficult one to harmonize with the fact of Christ's supreme divinity. Indeed, if the Son were here regarded as wholly identical with the Logos, we should feel obliged to yield the point in question. But the idea that the Logos, as such, is finally to become subject to the Father, cannot be entertained for a moment. The reference in these verses is manifestly to Christ as the Messiah or Mediator. When this mediatorial king shall have put all enemies under his feet (vs. 25), then the work of mediation will necessarily cease, and thus the kingdom of Christ will *ipso facto* become the kingdom of God, i. e. the Eternal Divinity will henceforth rule without a mediator. Whatever else the "subjection" spoken of may refer to, we cannot suppose that Christ will ever cease to possess that divine glory which he had with the Father before the world was, or that the saints in heaven will ever cease to ascribe glory, honor, and power to the Lamb that was slain. Indeed, the heaven of Paul and of the primitive disciples consists in their "being ever with the Lord," 2 Cor. 5 : 8 ; 1 Thess. 4 : 17 ; Phil. 1 : 23. Marcellus of Ancyra supposed, after the manner of Sabellius, that the Logos would finally return to his original state, i. e. would cast aside the human envelop and become merged in God as he was "in the beginning." But what would become of the divine σὰρξ (the flesh) he could not tell. We shall come, he says, to the knowledge of this only when we see face to face! See Neander, Ch. Hist., Vol. II. p. 757.

and ever.”¹ Thus do the redeemed and angelic spirits worship Christ as equal with God, and thus do they honor the Son even as they honor the Father. But has the great Jehovah revoked his own word and given his glory to another? Or have these saints forgotten the divine command: Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve?

The apostles and early Christians, also, directed their supplications to Christ. Some, even now, with Origen in olden time, hesitate to address the Saviour in prayer; but, once his disciples were known as “callers upon Christ;” and this too, before the name “Christians” was given them. “To call on the name of Jehovah,” is a frequent formula in the Old Testament, denoting the worship of God. In 1 Cor. 1:2, Paul addresses all those who call upon the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, in every place (comp. 2 Tim. 2:22). Ananias, in addressing Jesus, says: “and here he [Saul] hath authority from the chief priests to bind all who call upon thy name (Acts 9:14 [17]). After Ananias was convinced of the genuineness of Saul’s conversion, he says to him: “arise and be baptized, and wash away thy sins, calling on the name of the Lord (Acts 22:16). And when Saul first began to preach Christ as the Son of God, his astonished hearers said: “is not this he who, in Jerusalem, destroyed them that call on this name?” (Acts 9:21. comp. 22:19.) The same Lord who appeared to Saul, on his way to Damascus, and of whom he inquired, “What wilt thou have me to do,” subsequently several times appeared in his behalf, and stood by him, to minister counsel and strength (Acts 22:17, 18. 23:11. 18:9. 2 Tim. 4:17). The Lord, whom the apostle “besought thrice” (2 Cor. 12:8), was Christ, as verse 9 plainly shows (the words translated “strength” and “power,” being, in the original, the same — *δύναμις*). And both Paul and Peter declare, that whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord (i. e. Jesus: so De Wette, Meyer, and others), shall be saved (Acts 2:21. Rom. 10:12, 13. comp. vs. 9, 14 and

¹ Thus no *trinitarian* formula, says De Wette. Much less, however, is it “*unitarian*,” for the former will embrace it, but the latter, alas, cannot.

Joel 2:32). In the choice of an apostle, the disciples prayed and said: "Thou, Lord, who knowest the hearts of all men" (Acts 1:24. cf. vs. 21, 2. John 21:17. 2:24, 25. Rev. 2:23. 1 Cor. 4:5). The proto-martyr Stephen, making invocation with his dying breath (Acts 7:59), said: "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit; and, kneeling down he cried, with a loud voice: "Lord, lay not this sin to their charge." But how is it, that this eminent Christian martyr, when filled with the Holy Ghost, and his eyes fastened on the very vision of God, should commend his departing spirit to Christ, and implore of him forgiveness for his murderers? The apostles, furthermore, make all their protestations, and perform all their miracles, in the name of Christ. More than a score of times do they entreat, for their brethren, "grace, mercy, and peace, from the Lord Jesus Christ," even as from God the Father. In several passages, Christ is directly addressed in conjunction with the Father (2 Thess. 2:16, 17. 1 Thess. 3:11, 12. comp. 2 Tim. 4:22). And thus the New Testament itself closes with prayer to Christ, and with supplication for his grace (Rev. 22:20, 21). In heaven, also, the representatives of redeemed and glorified humanity, *fall down before the Lamb*, having every one of them harps and golden bowls full of incense; which, as the apostle tells us, are the *prayers* of the saints (Rev. 5:8).

Nor does our Saviour, anywhere, forbid his disciples to pray to him; but, on the contrary, rather encourages them so to do. When (in John 16:23) he says: "in that day ye shall ask me nothing," the meaning is, that they, hereafter, should be so fully instructed by the Spirit, that they would not need, through ignorance of anything, to make further inquiries of him (comp. vs. 19, 30). The two verbs rendered *ask*, in our verse, are different in the original. But in John 14:13, 14, Christ tells his disciples: "whatsoever ye shall ask, in my name, that will *I* do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son. If ye shall ask anything in my name, *I* will do it." Here, Christ is the answerer of prayers offered in his name, or on his account. Allied to this is the promise in Matt. 18:20, "where two or three are met together in

my name, there am I, in the midst of them." See, also, 28 : 20. Can we wonder, then, that the apostles, after the great outpouring of the Spirit, felt Christ to be specially near them, and constantly looked up to him for his guidance and support ?

It is thus a remarkable fact, that our Saviour never refused any homage or honors, excepting when they were offered to him, as Neander observes, from erroneous views.¹ It was not Jesus, but the angel whom Jesus sent, who forbade John to worship him (Rev. 19 : 10. 22 : 8, 9, 16). We have already seen that Christ claimed for himself divine perfections and honors, and that he allowed others, without rebuke, to put him in the place of God, and to address him as their Lord and their God. How is it, now, that the Saviour does not, at once, disabuse their minds of error, or repel the false charge of blasphemy ? Why, with the holy horror of an apostle, does he not rend his garments, and cry out : *Sirs, why do ye these things ? I am a man, like yourselves ; turn ye away from me and worship the living God* (Acts 10 : 26. 14 : 14). Unless Christ be truly divine, we do not see how the well-known testimony of the sceptic Lessing can be easily refuted : " If Christ," says he, " is not the true God, the Mohammedan religion is indisputably far better than the Christian ; and Mohammed himself was, incomparably, a greater and more honorable man than Jesus Christ ; for he was more truth-telling, more circumspect in what he said,

¹ See Neander's *Life of Christ*, p. 97. In a foot note he refers to Luke 11 : 27 and 18 : 19. The latter text reads thus : " Why callest thou me good ? None is good, save one, that is God." The young ruler regarding Jesus as a mere man, a merely human teacher, yet bestowed upon him the epithet *good*. The Saviour, wishing to rebuke the ruler's self-righteousness (" What lack I yet ?"), tells him that absolute goodness belongs alone to God. Man's best works are all stained and imperfect. He thus raises the young man's thoughts above the earth, and turns them away from all human goodness to heaven and to God, the only good and the source of all goodness. " Jesus," says Ullmann, " does not deny that he is good, but only refuses to be called so in the style of pompous ceremony. . . . He declines the title ' Good Master,' as it was misused by pharisaical pride. . . . He speaks as a man on the level with his inquirer," etc. See *German Selections*, p. 414. Our Saviour, also, disallowed the repeated testimony of the demoniacs to his divine sonship.

and more zealous for the honor of the one and only God, than Christ was ; who, if he did not exactly give himself out for God, yet at least said a hundred two-meaning things, to lead simple people to think so ; while Mohammed could never be charged with a single instance of double-dealing in this way."

We would speak with becoming reverence and cautiousness on this point ; but we are forced to acknowledge our inability to discover any preëminent humility or modesty in the Saviour, if he were merely a dependent, accountable creature, like ourselves. Nor do we know of anything which can free the early Christians, the apostles, the martyrs, and the angels and saints of heaven, from the charge and guilt of idolatry, save the fact of the divinity of Christ.

We find, therefore, additional evidence of the deity of Christ, in the character of the views and feelings which the apostles and primitive disciples cherished concerning him. Christ said to his disciples, what no mere creature could well say : " without me, ye can do nothing." And this absolute dependence on Christ is recognized and confessed, in every page, and almost every verse, of the Acts and the Epistles. Though the Bible pronounces him cursed that trusteth in man, or maketh flesh his arm ; yet the apostles show, in their writings, that they placed their whole reliance upon Christ, and looked to him for all temporal and spiritual blessings. They speak of their dependence upon Christ ; of doing all things through Christ strengthening them ; of cleaving to Christ ; of having fellowship with Christ ; of belonging to Christ ; of trusting in Christ ; of being found in Christ ; and of counting all things as loss for Christ. They speak of Christ as their life, their joy, their glory, their peace, their righteousness, and their hope ; of his being formed within them ; living in them ; dwelling in them ; of their obeying him, and loving him, and serving him, and living for him ; and of their desiring to depart and be forever with him, who is the temple, and light, and glory of the heavenly world. It would be difficult, even for a disciple of Zinzendorf, to express greater love and attachment to Christ, or to extol and

laud him more highly than the inspired writers have done in the New Testament. They make Christ the burden of their preaching, the central object of the Bible and of religion, to whom the ancient sacrifices and prophecies had reference, and around whom are clustered all the promises of the gospel and all the hopes of the believer. But can it be, that all the scriptures, all our preaching, all our religion, all our hopes of forgiveness and heaven, all our trust and our joys, and the deepest affections of our hearts converge in, and centre around, any created, finite being? Can it be, that the fact and design of creation, that the providences of God in history, that the plan of redemption, the solemn ordinances of the gospel, the resurrection of the dead, the joys of heaven, and all the interests of a deathless soul for time and eternity, are thus connected with the person of a dependent, accountable, and perishable creature?

It is, therefore, our firm belief that, if the doctrine of Christ's divinity be taken out of the scriptures, we have no gospel left; for thus do we rob it of its peculiar character and power, its living substance, and its essential glory. When this doctrine falls, it must carry with it the whole series of the doctrines of grace; for they all are linked together, in one great circle of living truth. Were it entirely a disconnected dogma, and merely a matter of speculative interest, we would not contend for it a single moment. But we hold it to be a fundamental and vitally-important doctrine, precious to the Christian's heart, and a never-failing support in the dying hour. Believing also, with Pascal, that in Christ (as God-man) all contradictions are reconciled, we have been accustomed to regard the incarnation and redemption of Christ as God's own theodicy, and indeed the only satisfactory and unanswerable vindication of the ways of God to men. This doctrine has ever been peculiarly dear to the saints of God, since it has been the source of all their dearest hopes and joys. Hear, on this point, the testimony of the

¹ "We need," says Athanasius, "a Redeemer who is our Lord by nature, in order that we may not by redemption again become the slaves of an idol." Christ as *Emmanuel* is such a Redeemer as lost sinners need.

elder Edwards, "that moral Newton and that second Paul: " "Once, as I rode out into the woods for my health, in 1737, having alighted from my horse in a retired place, as my manner commonly has been, to walk for divine contemplation and prayer, I had a view that, for me, was extraordinary, of the glory of the Son of God, as mediator between God and man. The person of Christ appeared ineffably excellent—with an excellency great enough to swallow up all thought and conception; which continued, as near as I can judge, about an hour; which kept me, a greater part of the time, in a flood of tears and weeping aloud. I felt an ardency of soul to be (what I know not otherwise how to express) emptied and annihilated: to be in the dust, and to be full of Christ alone." He also says: "I have many times had a sense of the glory of the third person in the Trinity, in his office of Sanctifier: in his holy operations, communicating divine life and light to the soul." And again: "God has appeared glorious to me, on account of the Trinity. It has made me have exalting views of God, that he subsists in three persons—Father, Son, and Holy Ghost." Certainly no Christian, when deeply impressed with a sense of the divine mercy, could forbear to ascribe glory to God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, to whom he feels indebted for the great salvation. And heaven itself would be spoiled of its joys, if there he could not unite in saying: Blessing, and honor, and glory, and power be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb, forever and ever (Rev. 5: 12, 13. 7: 10. 1: 5, 6). So long, therefore, as we believe in the Bible, and hope for the heaven of the Bible, so long must we maintain the doctrine of the divinity of Christ. If it cannot be defended on Athanasian ground, then it can be on some other. We are not so particular as to the way and manner in which it is explained, since the *modus* has not been revealed. But the fact itself is most plainly revealed. Even the doctrine of the divine unity is not more clearly set forth in the scriptures. And yet we are told that the doctrines of the Trinity and of the divinity of the Logos had their origin in the Platonic philosophy, and have come down to us, not

in the Bible, but in the misty speculations of the Fathers and schoolmen, and in the creeds and liturgies of the churches.¹ To this remarkably profound view (we will not say, of the scriptures, but) of human nature and Christian history, we subjoin the following opposing statement of Neander. "If this idea of the Logos was not placed in connection with Christianity by the authority of an apostolic type of doctrine, but must be considered as merely the product of a fusion of Platonism or of the Alexandrian-Jewish theology with the Christian doctrine; its wide diffusion of which, church fathers of the most opposite tendencies bear witness, could hardly be accounted for. If it could so commend itself to the teachers with whom the Platonic element of culture predominated, still the others, by whom everything derived from that quarter was suspected, must, for this very reason, have been prejudiced against it. As the defenders of the doctrine of Christ's divinity, in the beginning of the second century, could appeal, in evidence of the fact that this was the ancient doctrine of the church, to the oldest church teachers, and to the ancient Christian hymns; so this evidence is, in fact, confirmed by the report of Pliny,"² etc. It is certainly true that some of the early Fathers made use of the Platonic philosophy to explain the scripture doctrine of the Logos; and it is to this source, probably, that the Nicene creed is indebted for its emanation theory. But neither the Platonic

¹ We are happy in this connection to record the fact that history makes mention of one individual, at least, who did not derive his faith in the deity of Christ from the creeds! We refer to Hilary of Poitiers in Gaul, the able defender of Trinitarianism (died A. D. 368). Of him Neander thus speaks: "Now for the first time he heard of the Nicene creed, and found in it the doctrine of the unity of essence in the Father and Son, which he had before this ascertained to be the true doctrine from the study of the New Testament, and had received into his Christian experience, without being aware that the faith which he bore in his heart had been laid down in the form of a creed."—Ch. Hist. II. p. 896.

² See his Church History, Vol. I. p. 575. In the above extract, Neander refers to a fragment preserved by Eusebius, which reads thus: "All the psalms and hymns of the brethren, written from the beginning by the faithful, celebrate the praises of Christ, the Word of God, and attribute divinity to him." The well-known testimony of Pliny (A. D. 110) is: "that they [the Christians] were accustomed on a stated day to meet before light and to sing with one another a hymn to Christ as God." Comp. with this, Eph. 5: 19 (Col. 3: 16).

nor any other transient "philosophy," was ever of much advantage to the pure doctrines of the Bible. Platonism vitiated the Christology of Justin Martyr, and led Origen quite to the verge of semi-Arianism. For Arianism, and not Trinitarianism, was the legitimate offspring and outgrowth of Platonism. That theory which sees, in the Logos, a secondary god, a subordinate and dependent being, and yet the creator of the worlds, is wholly allied to the teachings of the Neo-Platonic and Gnostic philosophies.

It is also quite improbable that all who have believed in the divinity of Christ, have received this doctrine passively, as an hereditary faith, or have embraced it blindly, without investigation and reflection. It has often been charged with grossest absurdities and contradictions; but we may, surely, claim to know, quite as well as our opponents, how absurd and impossible it is. We know there are speculative difficulties connected with it, which we cannot solve. But is the doctrine of the divine unity, or any other of the divine attributes, thoroughly understood, or easily comprehensible, to a finite mind? We have been wont to suppose that the little word *God* covers up the profoundest mysteries. And well it may; for, if the created universe is full of mysteries, how much more incomprehensible to us must be the eternal Author! But do we think of denying the existence of a God, simply on account of these speculative difficulties? Neither, then, can we deny the fact of the divinity of Christ, since the proof of it is far too formidable; and the denial of it, so long as we cleave to the Bible, would only involve us in deeper mysteries. We, therefore, deem it safe for the spiritually-instructed believer to investigate the nature and grounds of this doctrine, and even to speculate on its chiefest difficulties, especially if he has first learned how difficult it is for a finite mind, by searching, to find out God.

But whatever may have been the origin and history of this doctrine, our readers will bear us witness that, thus far, we have mainly appealed "to the law and the testimony." And yet we seem scarcely to have glanced at this argument; since, in our view, it is spread out all over the inspired word, and

lies inwrought in its entire texture and substance.¹ Evidence enough, however, has been adduced, from the New Testament, to show that we have, in its pages, ample foundation and proof of the doctrine of the deity of Christ.

It is objected, however, that certain things are, in the New Testament, affirmed of Christians which, if taken absolutely, would also prove them divine. They are said, for example, to know all things, to possess all things, to do all things, to be filled with all the fulness of God, and to be partakers of the divine nature. But a slight examination of the passages where these expressions occur, will show us that they are so far defined and limited by their context, that no misapprehension could arise therefrom, even were we ignorant of the finite nature of man. It will, moreover, be acknowledged that some few, and not unimportant, things are said of Christ, in the scriptures, which are not and cannot be said of any human being. And here we would ask, if there does not lie, on the very face of the New Testament, manifest difference enough, in character, between the only begotten Son of God and ourselves, to indicate the possible necessity of attributing a higher meaning to these declarations concerning Christ? Certainly if the predicates referring to the Logos and Christ are not to be explained in accordance with the known or obviously revealed character of the subject, then we may go on, with the same principle, and prove from the Bible, that we are gods, or that God is like ourselves. A mere earthly naturalism or rationalism can, of course, see nothing more in Jesus of Nazareth than a man of the same nature and similarly begotten as ourselves; perhaps, also, a stern teacher of truth, a bold upbraider of unrighteousness, a Jewish Socrates it may be, though it has been well suggested that "if he were no more than a Socrates, then a Socrates he was not." Such naturalism, however, is, by its own nature and confession, wholly disqualified to be a fair interpreter of a revelation which is supernatural and divine.

¹ Σκοπὸς τοίνυν καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ἁγίας γραφῆς εἶναι, ὅτι τε αὐτὸς θεὸς ᾤν, καὶ θεοὶ ὅσους δι' ἡμᾶς σάρκα λαβόν, ἀνδρῶτος γέγονε. — Athanasius.

It was not our purpose, in this brief treatise, to consider fully all those passages which are supposed, by some, to disprove the supreme divinity of Christ. If, however, in the person of Christ, the divine and human natures were united, then the arguments which go to prove his inequality with God while in the "days of his flesh," do not at all disprove the fact of his supreme and eternal divinity, any more than the arguments proving man to be a frail and dying creature, disprove the fact of his deathless nature and immortality. We hold, therefore, that the fact of Christ's real divinity and real humanity furnishes the only possible and consistent explanation of the seemingly contradictory representations of the being and character of our Lord. This two-fold character of Christ, and this alone, will satisfactorily explain how, as man and mediator, he can be represented as increasing in wisdom and stature, as wanting in perfect knowledge and goodness (?), as being inferior and subject to the Father, and, finally, as giving up the kingdom which he came to establish ; while, in respect to his more proper, original, and divine nature, he is, at the same time, and by the same scriptures, declared to be God, God over all, the author and sustainer of the universe, by whom and for whom all things were created, the Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, the King of kings and Lord of lords, and thus our Lord, and Saviour, and final Judge, to whom belongeth glory and dominion forever and ever. Amen.

ARTICLE V.

THE THEOLOGY OF SOPHOCLES.

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IN the museum of the Lateran at Rome, there is a statue — discovered within the last quarter of a century among the ruins of ancient Anxur — whose faultless symmetry of form and harmony of expression suggest to the uninstructed beholder the thought, that it must be some Greek artist's ideal of perfect manly beauty, executed in the best period of Grecian art, and preserved, by a kind Providence, for the instruction of an age whose prerogative it is to collect and interpret the wisdom of the ancients. But by its resemblance to all the known likenesses, that have come down to us from antiquity, it is proved to be a portrait statue of the master who carried Greek tragedy, which is the culmination of Greek poetry, to its highest perfection. Not only the general features, and the outshining soul, bespeak this most favored of the sons of the muses; but the smallest details of dress and manner are highly characteristic. While wisdom sits enthroned on the brow, and eloquence on the lips; while every limb seems to have been shaped according to the nicest laws of proportion, and rhythm regulates every attitude and movement, the mouth seems formed for the utterance of musical harmonies; the drapery, displaying rather than veiling the fine structure of the body, images the transparent purity and refinement of his style; and the light fillet, which confines the natural and graceful tresses of this, in common with all the other statues of the poet, indicates the almost uninterrupted series of triumphs which crowned his long and prosperous life.¹

With these plastic representations, the descriptions of ancient writers fully accord. Literature and art agree in repre-

¹ See an appreciative and graphic description of this statue in Braun's *Ruins and Museums of Rome*. See also Müller's *Anc. Art with Welcker's Additions*, London, 1852, p. 598.

senting Sophocles as one of the most gifted and fortunate of mortals, the favorite, alike, of men and gods. Born of wealthy parents, in the most beautiful of the suburbs of Athens; educated under the best masters of gymnastics and music in that harmonious system of culture which aimed to develop a healthy mind in a healthy body; endowed with every gift of nature, and adorned with every grace of art, when the Greeks were assembled in Salamis to celebrate their victory over the barbarian hosts of Xerxes, in the sixteenth year of his age, he was chosen, among all the children and youth of Athens, naked and lyre in hand, to lead the chorus, in dance and song, around the trophy. Triumphant over the acknowledged master of tragedy at his first appearance on the stage, at the age of twenty-five; carrying off the first prize, in more than twenty of his pieces; the second, in many more, and never falling into the third rank; raised to the highest honors, civil and military, as the reward of his genius, and never, for a moment, losing the favor of the capricious multitude; enjoying the friendship of all the great and good, at Athens; the intimate friend of Herodotus; receiving his first prize at the hands of Cimon and his colleagues; himself the colleague of Pericles and Thucydides; admired by the lyric poets; envied by the tragic; and spared even by the comic Aristophanes;¹ outliving as well as outshining not only his older, but also his younger rival, and, at the age of ninety, turning a charge of dotage into the most magnificent of all his triumphs, by simply reading, before his judges, one of the choral songs of a recently-written tragedy; and, dying at length, at a sacred festival, a death as enviable, and almost as remarkable, as that of his own *Œdipus*; he deserved, as few mortals have ever deserved, the felicitations that were pronounced upon him, from the stage, by a contemporary comic poet:

Μάκαρ Σοφοκλέης, ὃς πολλὸν χρόνον βιούς
 Ἀπέθανεν, εὐδαίμων ἀνὴρ καὶ δεξιός,
 Πολλὰς ποιήσας καὶ καλὰς τραγωδίας.
 Καλῶς δ' ἔτελεύτησ' οὐδὲν ὑπομείνας κακόν.²

¹ Cf. *Frogs*, 76 seqq.

² From the *Μοῦσαι* of Phrynichus.

And he was not more happy in his person and life, than he was in the circumstances in which his lot was cast. It was his good fortune to come upon the stage of active life just in season to take a leading part in celebrating the triumphs of united Greece over the wealth and power of Persia, and to leave it a little while before Athens succumbed to Sparta, in that deplorable strife of parties and nations, in which the Grecian states exhausted their resources and paved the way for their common subjugation to the yoke of Macedonia; and, if we may credit some anonymous ancient memoirs, and the traditions preserved by Pausanias,¹ the din of war and battle was hushed, a moment, at his death and burial: Dionysius, the father-god of tragedy, having twice appeared in vision to the Spartan general Lysander, and commanded him to allow the interment of the poet's body in the family tomb outside the walls of Athens. He saw the astonishing growth of Athenian power after the Persian wars, the forsaken and ruined city rebuilt with far more than its previous splendor, the *Ἄστυ* and the Piræus fortified by strong walls, the Agora surrounded by porticos and public edifices, the Acropolis crowned with temples and statues of the gods, Athens acquiring the *hegemony*, by sea and land, and bringing all the nations under the more powerful sway of her literature and art; and as, from year to year, the Dionysiac festivals drew together crowds, not only of citizens, but of strangers, from every part of Greece, to admire the magnificence of the city, and to enjoy the splendid entertainments of the theatre, Sophocles, more than any other man, was the host in this feast of reason, "the observed of all observers."

The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* had, long since, been written, and the poems of the mythic and the epic cycle were complete. Anacreon and Pindar had already sung; the poets of the lyre had already perfected that infinite variety and richness of metre and music which has never been equalled by any other people. Aeschylus had transformed the car of Theseus into the fixed and amply furnished stage, the troop of itine-

¹ Cf. Paus. I. 21, 2.

rant players into the chorus of accomplished actors and singers, the goat-song of satyrs into the regular drama, which had taken its place among the established institutions of the state and aspired to the honor not only of amusing but instructing the people. It remained for Sophocles — and for this his well-balanced mind was admirably adapted, — to combine and harmonize the several elements of dialogue and song, action and scenic representation, and carry tragedy to its highest perfection. It was that happy period in the national existence when wealth had superseded the primitive rudeness, but had not yet passed over into luxury ; when tyranny had given place to liberty, and liberty had not degenerated into licentiousness ; when blind tradition or dogmatic prescription no longer ruled with absolute sway, and yet unbridled speculation had not loosened the bonds of morality and religion. The despotism of the *τύραννοι* had been abolished ; the despotism of the *δῆμος* was not yet established. The age of ignorance and barbarism had passed away ; the age of the sophists and rhetoricians had not yet fully come. The retiring shadows of the former still lingered upon Aeschylus ; the false and artificial lights of the latter already dazzled and misled Euripides ; Sophocles dwelt in the sun-light of the golden age of Athenian government, literature, and religion. Aeschylus, like some ancient prophet or oracle-declaring priest, ascended the *tripod*, and, in strains of awful sublimity, proclaimed the laws of God and the destinies of men, pointed criminals to the everlasting *Erinyes*, that were sure to overtake them ; and arraigned heroes and demigods before the tribunal of divine justice. Euripides seated himself in the *chair* of the philosopher, and, interspersing his dialogues with discussions, reasoned, refined, doubted, sometimes almost scoffed, and perpetually mingled the myths of the ancients with the declamations of the sophists and the speculations of the schools. Sophocles walked the *stage* as if it were, emphatically, his own ; sung in the orchestra, as if music and verse were the language of his birth ; and represented the past, the present, and the future, the providence and government of God,

and the character and destiny of men, idealized but not distorted or discolored, just as they were mirrored in the pure and tranquil depths of his own harmonious nature. Aeschylus, as we said in a former Article, was the theological poet of ancient Greece. Euripides may be characterized as the philosophical and rhetorical poet. Sophocles was, emphatically, the *dramatic* poet, whose home was in the theatre; and who, from that central and elevated position, in the midst of the city, on the sunny side of the Acropolis, looking up to the temples of the gods, and around on all the diversified scenes of nature and pursuits of men, saw them all canopied by the blue sky, and bathed in the bright sunlight of Athens. We must not expect, then, to find the theology of Sophocles so strongly marked in its character, nor so ubiquitous in its presence, as that of Aeschylus; nor, perhaps, in some respects, so faithful a transmission of the universal and primeval traditions of our race; but it may, for that very reason, furnish a fairer representation of the average sentiments of the Athenian people.

Only seven out of more than a hundred tragedies which the ancients ascribed to Sophocles, have come down to us. But among those, fortunately and by a very natural law of preservation, are the very tragedies which were most admired by his contemporaries. Of these seven, all but one (the *Trachiniae*), cluster about those fruitful themes of ancient epic and tragic verse, Thebes and Troy; three (*Philoctetes*, *Ajax*, and *Electra*) attaching themselves to the latter, and three (*Oedipus Tyrannus*, *Oedipus at Colonus*, and *Antigone*) centring in the former. The *scenes* of the tragedies, however, conduct us, not only to Thebes (*Oedipus* and *Antigone*) and Troy (*Ajax*), but to Lemnos (*Philoctetes*), Trachis near Thermopylae (*Trachiniae*), Argos (*Electra*), and Athens (*Oedipus at Colonus*) — the chief cities of historical Greece. As the perfection of his plots is among the chief excellences of Sophocles, we shall pursue a different method from that adopted in our former Article, and, instead of a classified synopsis of doctrines, we shall present our readers with a brief analysis of each tragedy. There will be less of logical

unity in this method, but, we trust, more of variety and interest. Besides, this difference of treatment is due to the difference between the authors. The Theology of Aeschylus is uttered more fully in words and single passages, while that of Sophocles is acted out in the characters and the plots.

The Trachiniae.

The scene of this drama is laid in Trachis, near Thermopylae, and there is a distinct allusion (632 seq.) to Thermopylae as the place of meeting for the Amphictyonic Council. It derives its name from the fact that the chorus consists of Trachinian women. The subject is the Death of Hercules; and the Dying Hercules would be a more characteristic title. Schlegel pronounces it so inferior to the other pieces of Sophocles, that he *wishes* he could believe it spurious; and "many critics have remarked, that the introductory soliloquy by Deianira, without any motive, is very unlike the prologues of Sophocles." The Scene opens with the wife of Hercules (Deianira) soliloquizing on her unhappy lot as having been wooed by the frightful, hateful river-god, Achelous, and since she has been won by Hercules, doomed to perpetual loneliness and anxiety, while her lord is involved by the Fates in endless labors; and, though now his allotted labors are all performed, she is peculiarly distressed by his absence for fifteen months, during which, she, an exile at Trachis, has received from him no intelligence. The soliloquy begins with an anachronous allusion to the famous maxim¹ of Solon: "Call no man happy before his death," in which the poet intends, perhaps, to shadow forth the tragic end of Hercules, but which his wife alludes to only by way of contrast with the palpably *unhappy* life which she has led from her birth, and is likely to lead till she rests in her grave. An attendant maid suggests that she relieve her anxiety by sending a messenger in quest of Hercules. Hylus, her son, opportunely presents himself, and, after some

¹ λόγος ἀρχαῖος ἀνδρῶν, γ. 1.

conversation with his mother, departs to seek his absent father. The first chorus invokes the aid of the Sun-god (*Helius*) in discovering the abode of the hero, approves the sympathy and fidelity of his half-widowed wife, and yet reproves her for not reposing more confidence in the overruling providence of the all-controlling king, the son of Kronus (ὁ πάντα κραίνων βασιλεὺς Κρονίδας, 127), who does not intend unmixed good for mortals, and yet never forsakes his children :

ἐπεὶ τίς ᾧδε τέκνουσι
Ζῆν' ἄβουλον εἶδεν; (139-40.)

Spangled night, with sable sway,
Frowns not on the world for aye;
Sorrow wounds not — golden store
Doth not bless to change no more;
Joy and wo in turns succeed:
Hearts, in turn, must bound and bleed.
Lady, on my counsels dwell:
Trust that all may yet be well;
When, oh when, did lofty Jove
Reckless of his children prove ?¹

Deianira responds by assigning as a special cause of her anxiety, an old tablet (παλαιὸν δέλτον ἐγγεγραμμένην,² 157), which Hercules put into her hands at his last departure (quite unlike his wont on former occasions), in which was inscribed his destiny (εἰμαρμένα) as revealed to him by the Oracle at Dodona, and his last will and testament (ξυνθήματα) in case he should not return at the end of fifteen months, for that was to be the crisis of his fate, when he must either die, or thereafter live an untroubled life; and that time had already expired. While she is yet speaking,

¹ Dale's version, which we follow chiefly in the choruses; though we shall make use of Francklin and Potter, when they seem to be more true to the sense and spirit of the original. It will be seen that these last lines do not include all men as the children of the universal Father, but refer exclusively to the *natural children* of Jove, born of mortal women, like Hercules.

² Cf. 685: χαλεπὴς ὁπως δύσινκτον ἐκ δέλτου γραφήν; also 1169. These passages illustrate Sophocles's idea as to the early existence of alphabetic writing. It is not a mere unconscious anachronism; for he *details* the form and manner.

a crowned messenger appears, and announces that Alcides lives and conquers, that he is bringing out of the battle the first-fruits for the gods of the country (*ἀπαρχὰς θεοῖσι τοῖς ἐγχωρίοις*, 183), and will soon return home in triumph. Deianira renders thanks to Zeus, who dwells in Oetas, unshorn meads for this welcome, though late news, and calls on the Trachinian maidens to join with her in celebrating the unexpected intelligence. A brief choral song follows — a general paean to Apollo, Artemis, and Dionysus. A train of captives is now seen approaching, sent forward by the conquering hero to attest his victory, and herald his speedy return; though, for the present, he remains on the extreme northern promontory of Euboea, to erect altars, consecrate a grove (*τέλη ἔγκαρπα*,¹ 238), and offer purifying sacrifices (*ἀγνὰ δύματα*, 287) to paternal Jove. The sight of the captives awakens the compassion of Deianira, and excites her fears, lest, as an *offset* to her present great prosperity, similar calamities may come upon her; and she prays to *Ζεὺς Τροπαῖος* (303), the giver of victory and the averter of calamity, that she may die, rather than live to see such a day; thus foreshadowing her own actual doom. Among the captives, one of noble mien and patient spirit, excites her special pity; and she inquires, who the stranger is. The messenger, who would fain conceal the hero's moral infirmities, affects ignorance, but is at length compelled by a spectator, who has heard the whole story from him in the *Agora*, to disclose the fact, that she is the daughter of Eurytus, king of Oechalia, and that a passion for her was the sole cause of the long delay of Hercules, and the sole motive for the slaying of Eurytus, and the destruction of Oechalia. Grieved but not maddened by these facts, the unhappy but still loving wife puts the best construction on her husband's unfaithfulness. Love rules in her own breast; love lords it over the immortal gods: why then should she not be indulgent towards her husband, if he has fallen beneath the power

¹ In doubtful readings, we, for the most part, follow Wunder; though the verses are cited as numbered in the Leipsic edition.

of this disease (τῇδε τῇ νόσῳ, 445), and still more towards the innocent victim of his passion. This is not the first time that the son of Jove, like Jove himself, has been thus overcome :

Hath not Hercules

Of other consorts been the only lord,
Yea, and of many : and did one receive,
At least from me, harsh words or keen reproach ?
Nor shall *she* meet them ; though for her his breast
Glows with impassioned love. . . .
Nor will we court a voluntary ill,
Contending with the gods.

The chorus, which follows, celebrates the matchless might of Aphrodite, alluding cautiously to her triumphs over the three gods who divide the sovereignty of the world — Zeus, Poseidon, and Hades (Pluto), and dwelling at length on the strife of the river-god (Achelous) and the son of Jove (Hercules) for the hand of Deianira.

That princess now reappears from the palace, with bleeding but submissive heart, bewailing chiefly the almost certain loss of her husband's affections, yet relating to the Trachinian maidens the means which she proposes to use in order, if possible, to retain them. In obedience to the instructions of the dying Centaur — slain by Hercules for undue liberties with his bride on their bridal tour — she had carefully preserved, in a brazen vase, the clotted blood from the arrow's point — of which the Centaur said :

Forever shall it bind to thine
The soul of Hercules, that ne'er his love
Shall burn to others as it burns to thee — ¹

And now she has moistened (ἐβαψα, 580)² or anointed (ἐχρίον, 676) with it a tunic, which she proposes to send, by the

¹ It is not difficult to see the Sardonian grin with which the Centaur thus "paltered with words in a double sense," deceiving the woman, as Satan did Eve, when he said : "Ye shall be as gods, *knowing good and evil*." Hercules never lived to love another woman, after putting on the fatal robe.

² *Ἐβαψα* is not only interpreted by its synonym (ἐχρίον) here ; but the process of applying the poison is explained at length in vss. 690-9. It was applied to the

returning messenger, to her absent lord. Encouraged by the approval of the choir, she sends it, with a charge that none be suffered to put it on but himself, and that he should let no light of sun or fire fall upon it; till, in accordance with her vow, on the day of sacrifice,

He should stand forth and to the gods display
A new adorer clad in new attire.—(611–12).

With that blindness which is one of the most tragic elements in the character and destiny of men, the chorus now exult in the near prospect of Hercules's return. Meanwhile, however, Deianira has made a discovery, which has thrilled her with horror and fearful forebodings. The lock of wool with which she applied the poison to the robe, thrown upon the ground, in the sunshine, had crumbled to pieces like sawdust; and, from the spot on which it fell, clotted foam bubbled up, as when new wine of the vintage is poured upon the ground (700 seq.). And now, wise only when it is too late, she marvels that she did not see that the dying centaur could bear no good will to his slayer; and she has only this consolation, that if Hercules shall thus lose his life, she is resolved to die with him.

While she is thus speaking, Hyllus her son returns from Euboea, and tells the tragic story, how Hercules, while sacrificing to his father Jove, at the Cenaeon promontory, received the deadly robe (*θανάσιμον πέπλον*, 760) at the hands of the messenger; arrayed himself in it, slew the victims—twelve unblemished (*έντελεῖς*, 762) bulls, the firstlings of the spoil (*λείας άπαρχήν*, 763), together with a hundred smaller cattle from the common herd; and, exulting, poured forth his prayers, till the sacrificial flame kindled the dormant virus,

tunic with a lock of wool. *Έβαψα* is plainly used here as a generic word, equivalent to *wet*, or *moistened*, and the more specific word *έχριον*, 676, *έχρισα*, 691, is repeatedly used to explain the process. Compare the *βαπτισμοὺς . . . χαλκίῳ καὶ κλινῶν*, Mark 7 : 4, where the application must have been made in a similar way. Sophocles uses the word frequently of the sword stained with blood, and in Ajax, 30, uses *βαίνειν* in the same way : *νεοβόαντ' εἴφει*; cf. 95 : *έβαψας έγχος εἰς πρὸς Ἀργείων στρατῶ*.

when the sweat started from his body, the robe clung as if it had been glued to his sides and every limb, and anguish shot through all his bones. Frantic with pain, he hurled the unsuspecting messenger from the precipice upon the wave-encompassed rocks, dashed himself upon the ground, and made the rocks and woods ring with his cries of agony. Then borne, helpless and distracted, by his son and attendants, he was placed on board a ship, and they would soon see him, living or dead, brought to his home.

Such were thy counsels, mother, such thy deeds
To my poor father; for which traitorous acts
May penal justice and the avenging Fury¹
Meet recompense award thee. Thus I pray,
If it be lawful — lawful it *must* be,
Since every law towards me thyself hast spurned,
And slain the best and bravest of mankind,
One on whose like thou ne'er shalt look again.—(809 seq.)

Without a word in reply, the wretched woman, cursed by her own son as the cause of death to her husband, steals away to put in execution her threat against her own life; while the choir break forth in lamentations, and reflections on the true meaning of the oracle and its now hastening fulfilment:

Behold, dear virgins, with what fatal speed
The ancient oracle of heaven
Hastes, to its dread fulfilment driven : —
“When the revolving months,” so Fate decreed,
“Had crowned the twelfth long year,
Rest from his toils severe
The son of Jove should win;” firm to its end
Doth the sure presage tend :
Who wakes to life and light no more,
His earthly toils are closed — his earthly bondage o’er.—(823 seq.)

At the close of the chorus, a nurse comes forth from the house and announces the death of Deianira by her own hand.

¹ Πελίππος Διὶν Ἐπιβόης γε (810-11). This dreadful prayer is softened by the filial limitation: *if it is right, ei δέ μιν γε*.

Another choral song ensues, in which the singers know not which to deplore most — the past, or the evils that are yet to come :

To feel or fear is equal pain.

Borne by attendants, Hercules now comes upon the stage, racked with pain, murmuring at Jove for the ill return he has received for his altars and sacrifices, invoking death to relieve his pangs, imprecating vengeance on her head, whom he supposes to be the guilty cause ; and dwelling, with bitter and prolonged emphasis, on the contrast between his past heroic achievements and his present helpless and suffering state :

Yet remember how, with torn and wasted frame,
I pine, devoted with this dark, dark curse ;¹
I, who a mother of the noblest, vaunt !
I, who in heaven was styled the son of Jove ! (1105-8)

Hyllus, who has learned the innocence of his unhappy mother, ventures a word in her defence ; which, at first, rouses the hero almost to frenzy. But when he hears the sad story of her death, and learns how she had been misled by the artful centaur, he sees at once that his doom is sealed, and resigns himself to his fate. He now exacts from his son a promise, under dreadful penalties, that he will convey his body, already more dead than alive, to the brow of Aeta, dear to Jove,² and there build a funeral pyre, place him upon it, and, *without a tear*, set it on fire and consume him to ashes. He further extorts from his son a promise to marry the captive maiden, the daughter of Eurytus, the love of whom had been the cause of his present calamity — a promise which the son gives only in implicit obedience to the *command* of

¹ Τυφλῆς ὀφ' ἄτης, under that blind bewildering *Ate*, who once bewildered Zeus himself, according to Homer (Il. 19, 95), and for it was cast out of heaven, and who, according to the tragic poets, leads poor blind mortals to ruin by first leading them to sin.

² Cf. above 200, 436, 754, et passim. We see everywhere among the Greeks the same disposition to worship in *groves and high places*, which so often led the Israelites into the idolatrous practices of their heathen neighbors.

his father, and to avoid his curse, leaving the responsibility with him :

Hyl. And would my father teach an impious deed ?

Herc. It is not impious if it be my pleasure.

Hyl. And canst thou, then, with *justice*, thus command me ?

Herc. I can ; and call the gods to prove my truth.

Hyl. Then I will do it, nor resist thee more,

Appealing to the gods, thy will constrained me :

I cannot err, if I obey my father. (1245-53.)

The passage involves, it will be seen, the question of the higher and the lower law — a question which is often raised in the Greek tragedies, and which, between the gentle Hyllus and the mighty Hercules, seems to be decided against the higher,¹ but which we shall see meeting with quite another solution from the uncompromising and high-souled Antigone.

Now Hercules has only one more favor to ask, and that is, to hasten the funeral pyre, since :

This is my rest from ills, this my last end.

Hyllus reluctantly consents, distinctly laying all the blame on the gods :

Ascribe the injustice to the gods ;

They gave him being — bear the name

Of fathers, yet can view his pangs unmoved.—(1261 seq.)

And the drama ends with this brief moral, from the chorus :

Ye have beheld the mighty fall,

Beheld these recent woes, unnumbered, strange ;

But all were wrought by Jove.

Οὐδέν τούτων ὄτι μὴ Ζεὺς.

The filial love and obedience of Hyllus commend him to

¹ Hyllus yields his own convictions of right to the *authority* of his father. His first answer is, that he would rather die than marry her who was the occasion of his mother's death and his father's calamity, a deed which none would do, who was not smitten as with a plague by the *avenging Deities* : *δοῦναι μὴ ξ' ἀλαστοῦ-ρην ποσὶ*. 1237.

our regard. He was a pattern son ; but he was more pious towards his father, and more gentle even towards his erring mother, than he was reverential to the gods or obedient to the dictates of his own conscience. The woman's love and charity of Deianira, her conjugal fidelity and submission to the will of her unfaithful lord, and the speechless agony with which she goes away to find her last consolation, and her best vindication in death, reflect the essential features of many a *tragedy in real life*. But we sorrow over the darkness of the age which knew no better remedy than suicide for heavy calamities ; while we deplore the blindness of human nature, which not unfrequently brings ruin on itself in the very endeavor to shun the ills of life. The choral songs, in this piece, are not of the highest order of poetical or moral excellence, though they breathe the simplicity and purity befitting virgins.

The leading character of the drama is the least perfect, and attaches to himself the smallest measure of our sympathy. The physical hero¹ of a barbarous age, battling incessantly with wild beasts and savage men, he has all the faults of Samson, and many more, without all his virtues or extenuating circumstances. He was anything but a Nazarite in regard to wine and strong drink. If the lying messenger may not be believed when he represents him as expelled, in a state of intoxication, from the banquet of Eurytus, the manner in which the story is received, to say nothing of the inebriated Hercules of other dramas,² shows that the story was not, in itself, incredible. One Delilah at a time was not enough for Hercules ; though, in that respect, he was no worse than his father. With all his weaknesses and imperfections, the son of Manoah was superior, morally and religiously, to the son of Jove ; and though there are not a few circumstances of grandeur attending his tragical end, yet the apotheosis of Hercules, on Mt. Oeta, can scarcely be com-

¹ Compare his lamentation over his wasted muscles (1090 seq.) with that of Milo, for whom Cicero expresses so much contempt. De Senec. ix. 27.

² Cf. Eur. Alc. 799, seq.

pared, in moral sublimity, with the self-sacrificing and triumphant death of Samson, at Gaza, who slew more of his enemies and the enemies of his country and his God, in his death, than he slew in his life.

But neither his relationship to Jove, nor his numerous sacrifices, can save him from the retribution due to his sins; and, in the righteous providence of the supreme, the injured wife is made the unintentional instrument of that retribution: her robbed and wounded affections the medium through which that retribution is visited on his head. The retributive government of the Most High, his universal providence, and his particular care over his children (though they are children by natural or rather *unnatural* generation, and not by creation, still less by spiritual regeneration), the inspiration and divine authority of oracles, the acceptableness of vows and bloody sacrifices, and the divine appointment of afflictions to all of mortal race, especially to all who are raised up to be great public benefactors, are among the theological lessons, which seem to be involved in the plot of the *Trachiniae*, or directly inculcated in the dialogue.

Perhaps the myth of Hercules may contain an unconscious prophecy; gross indeed, darkened by ignorance, and defiled by sin, but still a prophecy, of a yet higher truth and a still deeper mystery: The son of Jove could be made perfect only through suffering; he could find life only in death, rest only by passing through life-long labors and a tragical end. While he dwelt on earth, he was an exile and a wanderer, often a sufferer and a servant; and it was only through the purifying power of suffering that he reached his apotheosis. If the *Logos* is the light of every man that cometh into the world, why may we not refer to him all the truth and goodness there is in the heroes and sages of the ancient heathen world, as well as in the prophets and kings of Israel; and see in the former, as well as in the latter, types and forerunners of the Messiah, whose office it was to awaken ideas and felt wants, which could be realized only in him who was "the Desire of all nations!"

Philoctetes.

The Philoctetes has one point of close contact with the Trachiniae, and also one point of close resemblance. For setting fire to the funeral pile on Mt. Oeta — a service which Hyllus shrunk, at last, from performing in person — Philoctetes was rewarded with the possession of the bow and arrows of Hercules. On the way to the siege of Troy, he lands, with the other Grecian warriors, on the island of Chrysa, to offer sacrifices to the god of the island, and there receives a deadly wound from the bite of a serpent, the guardian of the sacred enclosure; and the Greeks, disturbed in their sacrifices by his cries of anguish, and moved also by the offensive odor of the wound, convey him to an uninhabited portion of the isle of Lemnos, and there leave him to perish or to support himself, as he can, by his famous arrows. In the tenth year of the war, taught at length by the prophecies of Calchas and Helenus, that Troy cannot be taken without the arrows of Hercules, they send Ulysses and Neoptolemus to bring them, with their present owner, to the camp. Ulysses would fain take the bow and arrows by fraud, and then carry off the archer himself by force. Neoptolemus falls in, for a time, with the plan of the inventful Ulysses; but, after he has got possession of the arrows, he relents, refuses to succeed by such base means, and actually restores the arrows to their rightful owner; when Hercules appears, reconciles Philoctetes to the plan, and sends him voluntarily to aid in completing the siege of Troy. The arrows of Hercules, and the reappearance of that hero on the stage, are the point of contact of which we spoke.

The point of resemblance is the intolerable physical suffering, to which the principal character is subject, and the paroxysms of which are exhibited on the stage. But here the resemblance ceases with the mere external suffering. The spirit of the sufferers is entirely different: Hercules longs for death, and demands the coöperation of his friends in hastening his fiery apotheosis. Philoctetes clings to life,

though forsaken of all his friends (and even after he has been robbed of his faithful bow), and drags out an existence of ten long years, nursing all the while an incurable wound, obtaining a precarious subsistence by shooting the birds that chanced to come near his den, and then crawling, with extreme pain and difficulty, to the spot where they fell.

Besides the sympathy we feel for the patient toil and suffering of Philoctetes, and the painful interest which attaches to his Crusoe-like struggle to prolong life, the chief charm of the piece is the fine ethical contrast between the artful and unscrupulous son of Laertes, who holds and practises the jesuitical doctrine that the end sanctifies the means ; and the frank, brave, and generous son of Achilles, who scorns lying, hates all disguise, and though he attempts, for a time, to walk in the crooked ways of his comrade, ere long breaks the shackles and acts out his own noble nature. This nice discrimination of character, like that which distinguishes the modern drama and romance, and the Shakspearean perfection of the plot, without sacrificing, however, one iota of the simplicity so characteristic of Grecian tragedy, have made this a favorite play with most modern readers.

We cannot dwell on the opening scene, in which Ulysses unfolds the web of artifice and falsehood by which he proposes to inveigle the unhappy wretch of his arrows ; and then, with the ingenuity of the arch tempter, plies Neoptolemus with arguments and motives, *once for a brief portion of a day*, to be false to himself and to that father who hated falsehood as the gates of hell (Hom. Il. 9, 312), and aid him in the execution of the plot. The reply of Neoptolemus is worthy of his parentage, and worthy of immortal remembrance among the noblest utterances of human lips :

If but to hear such words offends mine ear,
Son of Laertes, how I loathe the actions!
I stand prepared to seize the man by force,
But not by falsehood ; on one foot sustained,
'Twere strange if he could match one manly might.
Yet know, O prince, I deem it nobler, far,
To fail with honor, than succeed by baseness.

But the artless youth is no match for the man of wiles, and soon yields to the tempter's sophistries and the tyrant's plea — alleged necessity. Ulysses goes away, offering the prayer :

May Hermes, god of wiles, be now our guide,
And conquering Pallas, queen of rampired towns,
Whose favoring presence evermore preserves me ; (184-5.)

while Neoptolemus labors to justify himself and reconcile the choir, by the "flattering unction," that Philoctetes is but suffering the just punishment of his impiety.

Philoctetes is now seen dragging his wounded foot towards his solitary cave amid the rocks and trees, and shrieking for anguish. He welcomes the Grecian costume, in which they are clad, and anxiously inquires their errand. Neoptolemus tells him the story, partly true and partly false, in which he had been instructed by Ulysses, interweaving with it not a little of the history of the war, and the fortunes of the heroes, and eliciting from Philoctetes comments on the character of those heroes, together with the touching tale of his own misfortunes. The death of Ajax and Antilochus calls forth complaints from a heart oppressed by its own griefs, and almost despairing of divine justice :

Ah, whither, whither must I look, since these
Have perished, and the vile Ulysses lives ; (428-30.)

while, on the other hand, the safety of Thersites provokes the more rebellious comment :

Aye, fit he should ; for nothing vile is lost ;
Such the gods visit with peculiar care.
How shall I judge, or how extol the gods,
Proved by the actions I would praise, unjust ! (446 seq.)

And these remarks receive the partial assent of Neoptolemus, though in less impious language :

War never sweeps away
The vile and worthless, but destroys the good.

As Neoptolemus, at length, rises to depart, professedly to his own land, offended by the injustice of Ulysses and the Atridae brothers, Philoctetes importunes him by his sorrows, and adjures him by Jove, the suppliant's aid (*πρὸς αὐτοῦ Ζηνὸς ἱκεσίου*, 484), to take him with him. This prayer is seconded by the chorus, who bid him beware of the *Nemesis* of the gods (518), if he refuse. With seeming reluctance, the request is, at length, granted, and Philoctetes retires to take a last farewell of his home that is not a home (*ἄουκον ἐσοίῃσιν*, 534). As he returns, bringing the herb that soothes his wound, and the much-coveted irresistible arms of Hercules, he is seized by sudden and dreadful paroxysms of pain in his foot, during which he entrusts the arms to the care of Neoptolemus, adjuring him, by the gods, not to yield them to any other hands, and charging him also to propitiate envy (*τὸν Φθόνον δὲ πρόσκυσσον*,¹ 776) ; that is, to deprecate the *jealousy* of the gods, lest those arms should become a source of many woes to him, as they had been to their former possessors ; as if the possession of so great a prize were a good fortune so superhuman, as might well excite the jealousy of heaven. After a succession of pangs so unwonted that they seem to the sufferer ominous of impending evil, he finds relief, at length, in sleep, and the chorus sing a brief and beautiful ode to Sleep as the sorrow-soothing, life-blessing (*εὐαίων*), healing (*παιών*) power (827).

While *he* sleeps, the conflict begins in the breast of his captor ; and when he awakes, and the time comes for action, the son of Achilles is paralyzed. The wretched man is now entirely at his mercy. The way is clear to take him on board the ship by fraud and then by force convey him to Troy. But he cannot do the base deed :

All must be ill,
When man the bias of his soul² forsakes,
And does a deed unseemly. —(902-3.)

¹ Cf. Aesch. Prom. 935 : *οἱ προσκυνούντες τὴν Ἀδράστειαν σοφοί* ; and Ps. 2, 12 : *Kiss the son, lest he be angry*, etc. The Greek word means worship, *kiss the hand to*, etc.

² *τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν*, 902.

Great Jove direct me ! shall I twice be proved
A villain : first, concealing sacred truth ;
Then, uttering words of falsehood ?—(908-9.)

Truth and honor at length prevail. He frankly reveals to the exile the purpose of the voyage, and urges him by every motive of duty and interest, of patriotism and piety, to go with free consent, and help to finish the siege of Troy. But resentment for his wrongs is too deep. He refuses, demands back his bow, paints in lively colors the baseness of the fraud that has been practised upon him ; and, as if he had nothing to expect from human justice or divine compassion, calls on the rocks and trees to witness the wrong and sympathize with him in his calamities.

Unable to withstand the appeal, the generous son of Achilles is about to restore the bow to its rightful owner, when the master of the plot rushes in, from his concealment, and forbids the surrender, pleading the divine will in justification of his course :

It is Jove,
Yes, Jove, supreme controller of the land ;
Jove thus hath willed, and I but do his will. — (989-90.)

"Detested wretch," answers Philoctetes, pleading at once his own cause and the character of the gods :

Detested wretch ! what falsehood dost thou frame !
The gods alleging ; thou dost tax the gods
With lies, to gloss thine own dissembling guile ! — (991-2.)

And in the dialogue which ensues, he gives vent to his sense of justice, and his religious faith, in the following strain of mingled sarcasms, arguments, and curses :

How can ye serve the gods in prayer ? how slay
The votive victims, if I share your bark !
How pour libations due ? Such was the plea
On which ye first expelled me. Curses on ye !
Ye who have wronged me thus, yourselves shall meet
An equal doom, if Heaven cares aught for justice.
I know, I know it does ; for, never else
Would ye have voyaged for a wretch like me,
Had not a goad from heaven itself constrained you.—(1032 seq.)

Ulysses bids him welcome to remain. The arms of Hercules are all they want. With them, perchance, himself can gain the prize, which Heaven intended for Philoctetes, but which he rejects. Neoptolemus waives his decision till the ship is ready, and they have offered prayers and vows to the gods (1077), in the hope that time and divine power will yet change the purpose of Philoctetes.

Meanwhile the conflict is fearful in the mind of the exile, aggravated by occasional spasms of physical pain, and expressed, now in argument with the chorus, now in pathetic apostrophes to the crags and caverns, wild beasts and birds. The chorus, loyal at once to their earthly and their heavenly lords,¹ argue thus :

The doom, the doom of Heaven²—no treacherous scheme,
Framed by my hand, hath wrought thee this!—(1116.)

One moment, he bids them go and leave him to his fate. The next, he adds :

Go not, I pray, by Jove, who adds the curse.
Μὴ, πρὸς ἀπαίου³ Διὸς, ἐλθῆς, ἱκετεύω.—(1182.)

Resolved at length, he asks but one boon, a sword or an axe, that he may put an end to his life, and go to his father in Hades (1210).⁴

Ulysses and Neoptolemus now reappear on the stage, in impassioned dialogue : the latter intent on restoring the bow to its owner ; the former remonstrating with him, arguing the *inexpediency* of his course, and threatening him with the vengeance of the Greeks ; to which the latter replies, in a high tone of ethical philosophy, not always found in public men, or even in ethical systems, that justice is better (stronger) than expediency ; and that, with justice on his side, he fears

¹ The chorus consists of the sailors in the ship of Ulysses and Neoptolemus.

² πόντος δαμόνων, 1116.

³ Compare what is said of the goddesses, *Aræ*, in the Article on the Theology of Aeschylus, Bib. Sac. April 1859, p. 370 ; also below on Electra, 111.

⁴ Compare the expression "gathered to his fathers," so often applied to patriarchs and pious kings in the history of the Old Testament.

not his threats. The Greek is worthy to be placed on record, and to be written in the heart of every scholar :

Ἄλλ' εἰ δίκαια, τῶν σοφῶν κρείσσωπάδε.—(1246.)

Ἐν τῷ δικαίῳ τὸν σὸν οὐ παρβῶ φόβον.—(1251.)¹

Then, turning to Philoctetes, and finding him more resolved than ever not to go willingly to Troy, he gives him the bow. Ulysses rushes in to prevent, threatens to recover it by force ; and is threatened, in turn, with the drawn bow in the hand of its owner. But Neoptolemus lays his hand upon him, and intreats him, by the gods, to forbear. The hero's heart now opened by generous treatment, Neoptolemus again plies him with arguments : tells him (invoking Jove, the god and guardian of oaths (*Ζῆνα ὄρκιον*),² to witness his unsullied truth) that he is now suffering the penalty of divine providence (*ἐκ θεῶν τύχης*, 1326), for treading with rash foot on hallowed ground ; and he never can be cured till, of his own free will, borne to Troy, he is healed by the sons of Esculapius ; in proof of which he cites the prophecy of Helenus, the best of prophets (*ἀριστόμαντις*, 1338). Philoctetes is much moved, hesitates for a season, but at length refuses to submit to such dishonor, and calls on Neoptolemus to fulfil his pledge and conduct him home. Neoptolemus, finding argument unavailing, consents ; and, bidding the exile lean on his shoulder, is already on his way to the ship, when, in an emergency worthy the interposition of a god, *dignus vindice nodus*, Hercules appears from his celestial seat (*οὐρανίας ἔδρας προλιπών*, 1414), bringing the mandate of Jove, revealing to him the speedy fall of Troy, bidding him bring the spoils to *his* pyre ; and charging him, last of all and most of all, to be ever pious towards the gods :

Once more must Troy be taken by my arms ;
And O remember, when her lofty towers

¹ Compare Shakspeare Henry VI: "Thrice is he armed, who hath his quarrel just."

And Jul. Caes.: "There is no terror, Cassius, in thy threats," etc.

² Cf. 1289, where he swears by "the Sacred Majesty of Most High Zeus,"—*ἀγνὸν Ζηνὸς ὑψίστου σέβας*.

Are laid in ruins, to revere the gods.
 Second to this all else great Jove esteems.
 True piety alone defies the grave ;¹
 Let mortals live or die, this blooms forever.—(1440-4.)

He yields immediately to the voice of the god. A few words of farewell to his rocky home, and of prayer for a safe voyage, and they set out forthwith for the shore, whither great Destiny impels him, and the advice of friends, and the all-conquering deity, who brought it to pass.

Ἐνθ' ἡ μεγάλη μοῖρα κομίζει,
 Γνώμη τε φίλων, χῶ πανδαμάτωρ
 Δαίμων ὃς ταῦτ' ἐπέκρανε.

In the former part of this tragedy, the ethical element prevails over the theological. The right and the expedient are set over against each other. Duty and interest, truth and sophistry, strive for the mastery. Gratitude and resentment, desire of revenge and love of society, fear of pain and love of life, struggle for the ascendancy. The human heart is laid open, and its springs of motive, action, and passion, are laid bare, with a skill not unworthy of our own Shakspeare.

But as the drama draws towards a close, religious motives assert their native supremacy. The divine plans and purposes move on steadily and irresistibly towards their accomplishment. The light of prophecy shines on the future ; and at length heaven opens, and the son of Jove descends in person to disclose the will of the gods, and to make willing the appointed human instrument. May *we* not see, here, in the light of revelation, what was imperfectly revealed to the consciousness of the poet or his audience, a dim foreshadowing of these great truths of Christian theology? God has foreordained whatever comes to pass. Yet even these foreordained events can be accomplished only through appointed instrumentalities. Those instrumentalities may be despised and rejected by men ; but, in due time, they will be brought out, though it be from the deepest obscurity, and

¹ Οὐ γὰρ ἡδύβεια συνδύσκει βροτοῖς.

exalted to the highest honor. They may be unwilling; but they shall be made willing, in the day of God's power. They may appear too feeble to achieve the appointed work; but they shall be mighty, through God. And, if need be, God himself will interpose by prophecy, and oracles, and messengers from heaven. Men have always believed in revelations, of some kind or other, from God; and though these have been but dim shadows, they foretell a substantial reality; if you pronounce them all counterfeits, they imply the genuine coin. And wherever you find the *pure metal* bearing this oft-counterfeited form and image, the presumption is, that it is the genuine coin. When you find that which purports to be a revelation from God for *all mankind*, which meets not only the general expectation of a revelation, but answers to all the highest aspirations, the purest intuitions, and the deepest longings of the *race*, there is certainly a strong presumption that it came down from heaven.

Ajax.

In Ajax, Ulysses is again a prominent actor, exhibiting the same character as in Philoctetes, the tragic Ulysses being generally an exaggeration, if not also a misrepresentation of the leading traits in the much-scheming hero of the *Odyssey* and *Iliad*. Here, as in the *Odyssey*, he is under the special guidance¹ and guardianship of Athena, who appears on the stage not, like Hercules in Philoctetes, to reveal the future and bring the drama to a magnificent close; but at the beginning of the piece, conversing familiarly with her favorite like another, though a wiser and more powerful, self; acquainting him with facts which no mortal eye had seen; interpreting to him the mysterious conduct of Ajax, and instructing him in those arts and wiles, of which he was himself, already, the acknowledged master — in strict accordance with the scriptural doctrine, "to him that hath, shall be given, and he shall have more abundantly." It is a point

¹ Cf. 35: σὴ κυβερνᾶμαι χερί.

which has been much disputed among critics, whether Athena is seen by the bodily eye, or only by the mind of Ulysses; Hermann, Lobeck, and some others, maintaining the former opinion, but the latter being the prevailing sentiment among scholars. There is great weight in the names on the other side; still this latter is the most obvious interpretation of the language of Ajax :

ὦ Φοῖβέ γμ' Ἀθήνας, φιλότατ' ἔμοι θεῶν,
ὧς εὐμαδὲς σου, κἂν ἄποπτος ᾗς, ὅμως
Φώνημ' ἀκούω, καὶ ξυναρπάξω φρενὶ.
O, accents of Minerva, to my soul
Dearest of powers immortal, how mine ear
Thy welcome voice perceives, and with my mind
I grasp the sounds, though thou art viewless still.

However that may be, it is admitted on both sides, that the goddess is seen by the audience, sustained aloft by stage-machinery; and she carries on an extended dialogue with Ulysses, and a briefer one with the frenzied Ajax.

The scene is before the tent of Ajax, on the plain of Troy. The time is shortly after the death of Achilles, whose arms, awarded to Ulysses by the Atridae brothers, have incensed Ajax to madness; and, in a fit of frenzy, blinded and made sport of by Athena, he turns his hands against the unoffending flocks, mistaking them for the Greeks; and, after dealing dreadful slaughter among them, he drives home the rest in triumph as captives, selecting two rams as Agamemnon and Ulysses, whom he reserves for further torture and a more ignominious death. Athena glories in these frantic deeds, as all the result of her agency :

I urged him still, and lured to evil toils
The man, misled by frenzy's impulse wild :¹

She invites Ulysses to look on his fallen rival and enjoy that

¹ This frenzy is designated by various names, as *μανίδων νόσος* here, 59; *δαιμόνιος νόσος*, 186; and *ἔκταν οὐρανίαν*, 196: and these *maddening paroxysms*, this *plague from the gods*, this *judicial blindness from heaven* involves him in *ἔρηκη κακὴ*, in *evil toils*. Compare the "evil net," Eccl. 9: 12. Tecmessa adds below (953), that Athena does it all for the sake of Ulysses.

sweetest of all laughs, a laugh over a fallen foe (79); a sentiment not much in the spirit of the golden rule, though uttered by the daughter of Jove and the goddess of wisdom. He looks on, while the goddess plays with her victim and mocks him in his madness, winding up with the triumphant exclamation :

Thou seest, Ulysses, Heaven's resistless might !

He is moved, first, to pity, at seeing even his enemy thus yoked up with fatal blindness (*ἄτη κακῇ*, 123) ; and then he is led to reflect, that such might easily become his own lot :

I see that we, who live, are nothing more
Than a vain image and a fleeting shade.¹

To which she adds this moral lesson, suggested by the life and fall of Ajax :

This, then observing, dare not thou to breathe
High words of swollen pride against the gods ;
Nor boast presumptuous, if in martial deeds,
Or treasured wealth, thou pass thy fellow man.
A day o'erthrows, a day to light restores
All mortal things; and still the heavenly powers
Regard the lowly, while they loathe the proud.—(127 seq.)

We understand, better, the reason for this warning, and the moral of the whole drama, when, towards its close (760 seq.), we learn, indirectly, from the mouth of the prophet Calchas, that Ajax, though of mortal race, has entertained thoughts not becoming a mortal. When he set out for the Trojan war, his father had given him this parting counsel :

Seek, my son, in fight
To conquer, but still conquer through the gods.

But he made this arrogant and impious reply :

Father, with heavenly aid a coward's hand
May grasp the prize of conquest; I confide
To win such trophies e'en without the gods. — (767 seq.)

¹ Εἶδεν' ἡ κοῖφην σκιδν, (126). Cf. Aesch. Prom. 447; Job 8, 9; Eccl. 8, 13; Ps. 144, 4, et passim.

Again when, in the midst of the fight, Athena incited him, in common with the others, to battle against the enemy, he replied in language dreadful and not to be spoken (*δεινὸν ἄρ-ῥητόν τ' ἔπος*, 773):

O, queen! to other Argives lend thine aid;
No hostile might shall break where Ajax stands.

And now she laughs at his calamity, because he has despised her reproof.

While the frenzy still remains upon the unhappy Ajax, and none but Ulysses, under the teaching of Athena, understands fully what he has done, or why he has done it, the chorus (consisting of sailors, who followed him from Salamis), mourn over his madness, and impute it to a stroke from Jove (*πληγῇ Διὸς*, 137), or Artemis, or Enyalios (Mars), for some neglected sacrifice; at any rate, some plague from the gods (*Θεία νόσος*, 186) — for surely he could not have done such a deed in his own right mind — and they pray that Zeus and Phoebus will avert the spread of the evil report. Tecmessa, the captive concubine of Ajax, now joins with them in their lamentation over his fall, recounts to them what she knows of the events of that dreadful night, and represents him as uttering dreadful words, taught him by some *δαίμων*, and no man (243).

Meanwhile Ajax recovers from his paroxysm and awakes to the sudden consciousness that he is the sport of angry gods and the scoffing of unfriendly men. He prays for darkness and the shades of Erebus to receive him, for these are indeed his brightest light (*ὦν σκότος, ἐμὸν φάος κ. τ. λ.*, 394, etc.). He calls on his comrades to slay him, and intimates his purpose to take his own life, justifying that purpose by such arguments as these:

It shames a man to seek protracted life,
Who sees no limit to encircling woes.
I count the man most worthless, who would feed
His wavering soul with vain delusive hope:
To live with glory, or with glory die,
Befits the noble. — (473 seq.)

Tecmessa entreats him, in pity to her woes, and in love to their son,¹ and conjures him by *Zeὺς ἐφέστιος*, the guardian of domestic ties, not to take his life. Ajax, not yet fully cured of his impiety, declares that he owes no reverence to the gods (590). After breathing out hatred to his enemies and impiety towards the gods for a time, he *seems* to be somewhat softened by the words of his wife and the sight of his son, and professes his intention to seek the baths of the seashore, that he may wash away his pollution (*λύμαθ' ἀγνίσας ἐμέ*, 655) and escape the weighty anger of the goddess, the gorgon-faced invincible daughter of Zeus (656, cf. 450); and on his way thither he will hide, where none but Night and Pluto will ever see it more, the hated sword, which he received from Hector at the close of their single combat, and which, from that day to the last fatal night, has been his constant curse. Moreover, he will yield obedience to the powers that be; and, as change is the law of nature (a law which the poet beautifully illustrates through his lips, 670 seq.), so he will, henceforth, change his whole course:

Henceforth we'll pay meet reverence to the gods,
And learn submission to the sons of Atreus. — (666-7.)²

And the chorus break forth into a song, accompanied by the dance, at the marvellous change and happy reconciliation.

It is only a feint, however, to escape observation and find opportunity to execute his fixed and fatal purpose. Instructed by the prophet Calchas, his brother Teucer sends a message to prevent Ajax from leaving the house. But the messenger arrives too late. He has already gone out. Tecmessa and the choir, half distracted, seek him in every direction, but find him already fallen on his sword. The choir lay the blame on Ulysses and the sons of Atreus. But the submissive and pious Tecmessa responds:

¹ The passage resembles in pathos the parting address of Andromache to Hector, Hom. Il. 6, 407, seq.

² The same association of duty to God and to civil rulers, as occurs often in the scriptures, cf. 1 Pet. 2 : 17.

It had not fallen thus, but Heaven decreed.

Οὐκ ἂν τὰδ' ἔσθη τῇδε, μὴ θεῶν μέτα.—(950.)

'T was by the gods he perished, not by them.

Θεοῖς τέθνηκεν οὗτος, οὐ κείνουσιν, οὐ.—(970.)

And she consoles herself with the assurance that his death, though sad to her and sweet to his enemies, was yet more joyous to himself :

The death

He prayed for, wished for, now hath closed his woes.

Contrary to the usual law of the Greek drama, the suicide takes place on the stage, while the wife and the choir are seeking in vain to find him; and it exhibits some characteristic, some instructive features. Ajax has now but one favor to ask of Jove: and that is, that he will send Teucer to give him due burial, that his body may not be a prey to dogs and birds. He next invokes infernal Hermes, guide of souls (*πομπαῖον Ἑρμῆν χθόνιον*, 833), to put him well to sleep by a speedy and easy death. Much of his dying breath is poured out in prayers and curses on the heads of his enemies :

I next invoke to aid me those dread powers,
Forever virgins, and of mortal wrongs
Forever conscious: swift in keen pursuit,
The awful Furies,¹ to attest my doom,
By the base sons of Atreus basely slain,
And plunge the traitors in an equal fate.
As they behold my blood by mine own hand
Poured forth, so be their best-loved children's hands
Imbrued in theirs — thus self-destroyers too.
Come, ye avenging Furies, swift and stern,
Quaff their warm blood, nor spare the peopled host.
Ἴτ', ὦ ταχεῖαι ποινιμοί τ' Ἑρινύες,
Γένεσθε, μὴ φείδεσθε, πανδήμου στρατοῦ. — (843, 4.)

Then, imploring the Sun to bear the tidings to his aged father and mother, he welcomes death, bids farewell to earthly scenes, and dies with these words on his lips :

¹ αἰεὶ δ' ὁρώσας πάντα τὰν βροτοῖς πᾶσιν
σεμνὰς Ἑρινὺς τανύποδας. — (836, 7.)

The rest will I say to those below in Hades.

Τὰ δ' ἄλλ' ἐν ᾿Αΐδου τοῖς κάτω μυθήσομαι.¹

The lamentation of Teucer over the dead body, is worthy of notice as expressive of his full belief in an overruling Providence, in *contrast* with the scepticism which is implied as more or less prevailing in the minds of others.

Did not the Furies forge that slaughtering sword,²
And hell's dread monarch, ruthless artist, frame
That belt ?² These things, I deem, and all the events
Befalling mortal man, are by the gods
Always assigned. *To these, whose mind dissents ?*
Let him enjoy his thoughts : But these are mine.—(1034 seq.)

Herein, doubtless, the poet expresses his own believing, and at the same time tolerant, spirit; and both in opposition to a spirit which he saw widely prevalent around him. The higher classes were inclined to scepticism, while the masses at Athens were believing, but intolerant of any departure from the religion of the state. Sophocles has a settled faith in the providence and government of the gods; but is willing that others should enjoy, with equal freedom, their own religious opinions.

After the death of Ajax, which is the natural catastrophe of the drama, the piece is still prolonged through some four hundred verses (from one quarter to one third of the whole), in a strife between Teucer on the one hand, and the sons of Atreus on the other, touching the burial of the body; which is finally terminated in favor of his burial, by the intervention of Ulysses, who is too politic to sanction any gratuitous or unprofitable crime. Menelaus charges Ajax with treason, and

¹ The reader will not fail to observe how the expectation of a conscious existence after death is constantly implied, as in Aeschylus, so in Sophocles. Philoctetes wishes to go and see his departed father; and here Ajax expects soon to converse with the inhabitants of the unseen world.

² The sword which Hector gave Ajax, and the belt which Ajax gave Hector; the former of which Ajax plunged into his own breast, and the latter bound Hector to the car of Achilles, 1027 seqq., cf. Hom. Il. 7, 363. See also 665, where Ajax himself, in view of the same fact, says: ἐχθρῶν ἔδωκα δῶρα κ' οὐκ ἀνθρώποις.

argues at some length the necessity, to the state, and to the maintenance of law and order, that he should be made an example. Teucer denies, in the first place, that Ajax was ever subject to the Atridae, and then pleads the higher law of Heaven :

Conscious of right,

The soul may proudly soar.

Men. Is it, then, right

To grace with honor the base wretch who slew me ?

Teuc. Slew thee ! O, wondrous ! slain, and yet alive ?

Men. The gods preserved my life ; in his intent I died.

Teuc. Thou dare not, then, despise the gods,

Thus by the gods preserved. — (1125 seq.)

As Menelaus retires, and Teucer, with the wife and child, hasten to effect the interment, Agamemnon appears to enter his imperial prohibition, repeats his brother's reasoning, and heaps threats and abuses on the head of Teucer ; and Ulysses interposes to plead, not so much the cause of Ajax and Teucer, as the welfare of the army, the honor of the commander, and the eternal laws of Heaven :

Thus to degrade the chief, would shame thyself.

Not him alone, but *Heaven's eternal laws*,

Wouldst thou contemn. Unjust it is to wrong

The brave in death, though most abhorred in life.—(1343 seq.)

Ulysses prevails. Teucer thanks him, though still imprecating dire curses on the head of the sons of Atreus from the revered fathers of Olympus, unforgetting *Erinys*, and unfailing (literally, fulfilling) *Dike* :

Τοιγάρ σφ' Ὀλύμπου τοῦδ' ὁ πρεσβέων πατήρ,

Μνήμων τ' Ἑρινὺς, καὶ τελεσφόρος Δίκη

Κακοὺς κακῶς φθείρειαν,¹ κ. τ. λ. — (1389 seq.)

¹ *Evilly destroy those evil men.* Cf. Mat. 21, 41 : *κακοὺς κακῶς ἀπολέσει αὐτοὺς.* This formula, so frequent in classical and sacred Greek, is not mere *paronomasia*, but an apt expression of the great law of *justice* and *fitness*. Campbell well renders it : he will bring those wretches to a wretched death.

Preparations are made for the burial; the hollow trench (κοίλην κάπετον), the ablution of holy water (λουτρῶν ὁσίων), the arms which cover the body, and which are to be buried with it; and the scene closes, where all earthly scenes, sooner or later, close upon all of mortal race, with those honors which friends pay to friends gathered around their graves. The voice of nature, which is the voice of God, has taught men, in all ages and nations however rude, to render certain offices, rights, duties, dues,¹ to their departed friends; and these have almost always been such as not only to honor their memories, but such as imply, more or less clearly, a belief in their continued existence after death, with the same essential nature and character, if not also with the same identical wants, and in the very same pursuits, as during the present life.

The Greeks and Romans deemed these rites essential to the repose of the soul; nay, to its very entrance into the world of spirits. Hence the burial of the dead was esteemed the most sacred duty of surviving friends. The stranger even was pronounced inhuman, who would not throw earth upon a dead body, which he might chance to find unburied; and, though it was the keenest vengeance which an enemy could inflict upon a fallen foe, not to suffer him to be buried; yet for an *enemy* to carry this vengeance too far, were to provoke the vengeance of Heaven. When Paul preached the doctrine of the resurrection on Mars' Hill, the Athenians mocked. Yet in their own view there was a mysterious connection between the burial of the body and the repose of the soul; and in this idea, as well as in the care with which they, in common with all nations, preserved the entire body or the ashes of the dead, we see an "unconscious prophecy" of the resurrection. Do no evil to the dead (1154); speak no evil of the departed, for they are with the gods, and under their special protection: these sentiments are written, everywhere, in Greek literature; in the laws of legislators, in the maxims of philosophers, in the writings of

¹ Τὰ δίκαια, νομιζόμενα, προσήκοντα, κτερίζόμενα, funera justa, etc., are among the expressions used by the Greeks and Romans to denote these dues.

scholars, and in the hearts of the people. The Iliad of Homer and the Ajax of Sophocles could not come to an end till the minds of the readers or hearers were put to rest respecting the burial of those whose right of interment had been called in question. And this question is the central point and subject matter of that drama of Sophocles (*Antigone*), which won for him the highest honors in the gift of the Athenian people.

Certain criminals, who had been put to death by the state, were deprived of the right of burial, as an additional punishment. Suicide did not incur this dreaded penalty, though sometimes the *hand*, which had done the deed, was cut off and buried by itself, as it were, in unconsecrated ground. Indeed, the frequency of suicide is one of the striking features of the Greek drama,¹ and a marked characteristic of Grecian and Roman as compared with Christian civilization. If not more frequent among the masses, it was less condemned, nay more approved, in the higher classes. It was not only celebrated by poets, but justified by moralists,² and it was expected of heroes, if they could not live honorably, to die honorably by their own hand. Christianity inspires its genuine disciples with a higher appreciation of the sacredness of life, a deeper reverence for the authority of God, a more awful dread of appearing, unbidden, before his judgment seat; and, above all, a more submissive, humble, cheerful, childlike trust in the all-wise, all-good providence of a heavenly Father.

Defective as are the morality and the theology of Ajax — burlesque as it almost seems to be, on heroism and on divinity — still it teaches, forcibly, one great lesson, which is most sedulously inculcated in the scriptures: and that is, the helplessness, the littleness, the nothingness of great men, when they set themselves in opposition to the laws and government of God; and the folly of wise men, when they imag-

¹ There are suicides in more than half the extant dramas of Sophocles, and in some of them repeated instances.

² Even Plato's authority was claimed for, as well as against, suicide by different disciples, though it seems to us to be clear and decisive against it.

ine they can be anything, or do anything, independent of the blessing of Heaven. Nothing, short of the arrogant self-conceit and daring impiety of Ajax, could have reconciled the taste or the moral feelings of an Athenian audience, or of modern readers, to see him tossed about in the hands, and blown about by the breath, of Athena, like the feeblest prey in the paws of a sporting lion.

Electra.

The four remaining tragedies are all upon those fruitful themes of tragic interest, the houses of Pelops and of Labdacus. And here we come upon ground occupied in common by the three masters of Greek tragedy. The Choëphoroe of Aeschylus, the *Electra* of Sophocles, and the *Electra* of Euripides, are all on the same subject: the vengeance of Heaven on Clytemnestra and Aegistheus, for the murder of Agamemnon, of which Orestes was the appointed instrument, and for which Electra had waited, till impatience had changed almost to despair. Their different methods of treating the same high theme, afford a fine opportunity for comparing these great masters.

Euripides, partly from the necessity of avoiding the track of his predecessors, and partly from faults inherent in his nature, has failed in his *Electra*. There are not wanting, in it, lofty sentiments and single passages of great power. But, on the whole, he has almost burlesqued this grandest of tragic themes by his unbecoming trivialities. Aeschylus, by introducing the tomb of Agamemnon on the stage, and carrying the purposed vengeance into speedy execution, has given a sublime exhibition of the irresistible decree of destiny and the overwhelming march of divine justice; though in the scarcely less grand portrait which he has drawn of Clytemnestra, justifying her murderous deed and claiming to be, herself, also the executioner of justice, as well as in the appearance of the Furies to Orestes, and the bewildering madness which comes over him, he represents Loxias and the Furies, wisdom and vengeance, as, for the time, in conflict. Sophocles transfers

the conflict to the breast of mortals, where joy and grief, hope and despair, faith and scepticism, false security and fearful forebodings, in alternate billows, go over the soul, while divine justice moves on tardily and stealthily, but surely to the infliction of the penalty, which meets the harmonious approval of Heaven, earth, and the powers beneath. "Aeschylus makes the Furies, so to speak, personifications of an impulse which wreaks itself upon the violator of natural order, whether he is engaged on the side of justice or not — of a blind power, which, like the fiery furnace in scripture, burns the ministers of the highest authority. Sophocles places the whole plot in the hands of Divine Intelligence, leaves the Furies but a very subordinate part, and does not imagine that any atonement is demanded, from Orestes, for a deed which the god has justified."¹ The punishment of the wicked is delayed, in Sophocles, till faith and hope have almost expired in the bosom of Electra, but agreeably to the solution of this mystery of divine providence in Plutarch's admirable treatise,² this delay is only that they may be deceived with false hopes of impunity, and that in the very moment of their seeming triumph, justice may overtake them, in a form and manner more befitting their crimes. The conception is bolder in Aeschylus, the poetry grander, and the theology more awful in its sublimity; but Sophocles surpasses his rival in the harmony and beauty of his religious sentiments, not less than he does in the dramatic interest which he excites by his marvellous succession of contrasts, his power in delineating character and the varied workings of the passions, and his skilful management of all the details of the plot.

The scene opens with a dialogue between Orestes, Agamemnon's son, and the old servant who snatched him, in infancy, from the hands of his murderers, and bore him to an asylum in foreign lands, and who now, after pointing out to him the objects of chief interest in the plain of Argos, brings him to the palace of his fathers; and *thus* strikes the key-note to the whole piece:

¹ Woolsey's Preface to the *Electra* of Sophocles.

² *De Sera Numinis Vindicta*.

This is the home of Pelops's race, defiled
 With frequent murders; on thy father's death,
 From thy true sister's hand receiving thee,
 I bore thee hence — preserved thee — trained thee up
 To man, avenger of thy father's blood. — (10 seq.)

Orestes, in reply, details his own plan for *surprising*, and thus destroying, the murderers of his father, in obedience to the command of the oracle, and in righteous retribution for the *treachery* with which Agamemnon was slain :

When to the Pythian oracle I came,
 A suppliant, asking how I should exact
 Just retribution for my father's blood,
 Phoebus, as thou shalt hear, this answer gave :
 That I, devoid of arms or martial host,
 Should strike, by stratagem, the righteous blow. — (32 seq.)

The audience are thus put in possession of a clew to the mazes of the plot, through which poor Electra is left to wander without any such guidance or support. While Orestes offers prayers to the gods of his country and his sires for success in the work, which, sent by the gods, he comes to accomplish, as a purifier (*καθαρτής*, 70) of his father's house, Electra is heard moaning within the palace; and, as they retire to do, *first*, the will of Loxias (*μηδὲν πρόσθεν ἢ τὰ Δοξίου*, 82), and to offer libations and garlands of hair on the tomb of Agamemnon, she comes upon the stage, gives vent to her sorrows, like the hapless nightingale; and, in the following dreadful imprecation, invokes the avenging powers :

Ye dark abodes of Dis and Proserpine,
 Thou Hermes, guide to hell, thou awful Curse,
 And ye dread Furies, offspring of the gods,¹
 Who on the basely-murdered look,
 On those who mount, by stealth, the unhallowed couch :
 Come, aid me, and avenge the blood
 Of my beloved sire,
 And give my absent brother to mine arms.
 Alone no longer can I bear the weight
 Of this o'erwhelming woe. — (110-120.)

¹ πόντι' Ἀρά, σμεναι τε δαῶν παῖδες Ἐρινύες.

A choral dialogue ensues, between Electra and the chorus of noble women ; in which they express their sympathy and strive to comfort her, among other consolations, with the assurance that a god of justice still reigns, and will, sooner or later, punish the wicked :

Still in yon starry heaven supreme,
Jove, all-beholding, all-directing, dwells.
To him commit thy vengeance. — (174 seq.)

At the same time, a graphic picture is drawn of the crime, as if it were a frightful living form, begotten of Fraud, brought forth by Lust, and originated by some unknown dreadful power:

Δόλος ἦν ὁ φράσας, ἔρος ὁ κτείνας,
Δεινὰν δεινῶς προφυντεύσαντες
Μορφὰν, εἴτ' οὖν θεὸς εἶτε βροτῶν
Ἦν ὁ ταῦτα πράσσων. — (197–200.)

These lines will strongly remind the reader of the scriptures, of the passage in the epistle to James (1 : 13—17), in which the apostle gives a similar *genesis* of Sin ; but distinctly answers, in the negative, the question in regard to the divine authorship of sin, which the heathen poet leaves unanswered.

Meanwhile, Electra complains, Aegisthus sits on the throne of her father and insults the gods with libations at the hearth which he has sprinkled with that father's blood ; Clytemnestra shares his bed and joins with him in celebrating, with dance and offerings to the gods, the anniversary of the murder ; while *she* is compelled to dwell beneath the same roof with the murderers, waiting in vain the return of Orestes.

Chrysothemis now comes forth, from the palace, with funeral offerings to the dead, and reproves her sister for not submitting, like herself, to the ruling powers and the necessities of their lot. Electra replies, with great severity, charging her with weakness, and falseness to her father's name. Chrysothemis endeavors to soften her asperity by disclosing the severities which Aegisthus threatens to visit upon her (Electra), when he returns home. The audience know that

Aegisthus is to return home only to fall, himself, beneath the avenging stroke of Orestes, and they enjoy the contrast. But Electra knows it not. Still threats only brace her to resist the tyrant; only provoke her to the utterance of bitter scorn for her sister's cowardice. Failing to subdue her sister, Chrysothemis says, she will go on her errand:

Elec. What errand? Whither dost thou bear those off'rings?

Chry. My mother sends me, at my father's tomb

To make the due libation.

Elec. What! to him

Of all mankind her most detested foe?

Chry. And whom she murdered, since thou'lt have me say so.

Elec. By whom persuaded? Who hath counselled this?

Chry. From some nocturnal vision, as I deem. — (405–10.)

Chrysothemis relates the vision. It is rumored, that she saw Agamemnon again before her, returned to the light of life; that he took, again, his ancient sceptre, the sceptre of Aegisthus now, and planted it in the earth, and there sprung from it a blooming branch which overshadowed all the land of Mycenae.¹ Electra sees, in the vision, the shadow of the returning Orestes, and begs her sister not to offer the hateful libations² of her mother, but cast them to the winds, and lay upon the tomb, instead, a lock of hair from the head of each of the sisters, and the belt of Electra; and then, kneeling down beside it, pray for the *avenging interposition* of their *father from below*,³ and the coming of their long-expected brother. Chrysothemis consents, and goes away to execute

¹ In Aeschylus, it will be remembered, Clytemnestra has a dream of the same purport, but the sign is different. She dreamed that she gave her breast to a dragon in the cradle of her son, and suckled it with her blood. This diversity of form with identity of substance illustrates the manner in which the poets felt at liberty to deal with the fables of the Greek mythology.

² *δυσμενεῖς χοάς*, 440. These offerings are spoken of below, 447, as *λυτήρια τοῦ φόνου*, intended to ransom or expiate the murder. Cf. 1490, where Electra says that to give the body of Aegisthus to the dogs and birds were the only adequate *λυτήριον τῶν πάλαι κακῶν*.

³ In 459, 60, Electra declares her full belief that Agamemnon was concerned in sending the ill-boding dream to Clytemnestra.

the plan. The choral song, which succeeds, is full of confident predictions of speedy vengeance :

If true prophetic skill be mine,
If aught of wisdom's ray divine ;
Soon shall avenging justice, here,
Her own dread harbinger appear ;
With hand of might and threatening brow
She cannot, will not, linger now ;
But soon, my daughter, shall pursue
The track of guilt, and punish too. — (472 seq.)

The Antistrophe repeats the same idea in other words :

With many a foot of matchless speed,
With many a hand of deadly deed,
Erinyes, veiled in ambush now,
With brazen tread, shall track the foe. — (488 seq.)

And the Epode concludes with a reference to the guilt of Pelops in slaying Myrtilus, and the woes which have ever since followed his devoted race :

Since Myrtilus, in ocean deep,
Was headlong hurled to death's cold sleep,
Hurled from his radiant car of gold,
With insult fierce and uncontrolled,
Nor woe hath passed, nor dire disgrace
Unfelt by this devoted race !¹ — (508 seq.)

Clytemnestra, herself, now comes upon the stage ; and, in a conversation with Electra, justifies her act, as in Aeschylus, though with less daring ; representing it as done in righteous retaliation for the sacrifice of her daughter Iphigenia. Electra, in reply, explains the dire necessity of that sacrifice, as a satisfaction to the hunting-goddess Artemis, offended at the slaying of a stag in her sacred grove ; and though beginning with the deference due to the relation, yet her indigna-

¹ The language of this chorus (475—515) is strong and impassioned. The epithets are singularly apt and expressive. Observe, for instance, the *πρόμαρτος* *Dike* ; the *πολύπους*, *καλκόπους*, *πολύχειρ* *Erinyes*, and the description of the *unhallowed*, incestuous strugglings of a murderous marriage (*ἄλεκτρ' ἄνυμφα μαιφόνων γάμον ἀμιλλήμαδ'*) attacking those whom it ought not.

tion kindles as she speaks, and she ends with renouncing all filial regard for a mother who has not only stained her hands with a husband's blood, but shamelessly published the motive by taking a murderous paramour to that husband's bed. Clytemnestra imprecates the vengeance of Artemis, her tutelary goddess, on the unnatural daughter, and then (having begged of Electra to desist from such *ill-omened* words, at least while she brings her offerings to the gods, a favor which Electra willingly grants in the confidence that offerings made by such blood-stained hands can only provoke the displeasure of Heaven), she pours forth prayers to tutelary Phoebus, that he will confirm or avert the doubtful import of her dream, according as it is propitious or adverse; concluding with this beautiful tribute to the divine omniscience :

What still remains unsaid, though I be mute,
Is known, I deem, to thee, a potent god :¹
Nought can be hidden from the race of Jove.² — [657 seq.)

At this moment, and as the blinded Clytemnestra thinks, in answer to her prayers, the old servant enters, announcing, according to the preconcerted plan of deception, the death of Orestes. While he sets forth, in lively detail, the narrative of Orestes, overthrown in the chariot-race and slain on the very eve of a splendid triumph — a detail fitted to work powerfully on the sympathies of friends and foes — Electra gives herself up for lost, the chorus lament the utter extinction of the house of Pelops ; and Clytemnestra, though touched by a momentary pang of maternal sorrow, yet drinks in the tale with ill-concealed satisfaction, and, on the whole, concludes, the doom he met became him well. To which Electra answers :

Hear, thou avenger of the recent dead,
Hear, Nemesis.
Ἄκουε, Νέμεσι τοῦ θανάτου ἀπτίως. — (292.)

While Clytemnestra, with her fears all lulled preparatory to

¹ δαίμων' ὄντ'.

² τοὺς ἐκ Διὸς

the approaching catastrophe, goes within the palace to reward the old servant for his good news, thus with her own hand admitting and welcoming the avenger, Electra remains deploring the destruction of all her hopes, and the chorus half reprove and half minister to her despair, in such strains as these :

Where are the vengeful bolts of Jove,
Or where the beaming sun,
If, deeds like these beholding, still
Such deeds they calmly hide ? —(828 seq.)

As Electra thus despairs and refuses to be comforted, Chrysothemis returns from the tomb of Agamemnon, rejoicing in the assurance that Orestes has already come, as is proved by the libations of fresh-flowing milk, the garland of flowers, and the locks of fresh-cut hair which she found upon the tomb, and which could have proceeded from no other source. But so far from gladdening the despairing heart of her sister, her own heart falls from the heights of hope and joy to the depths of sorrow and despair, at the positive assurance, derived from an eye-witness, that Orestes is no more. Yet gathering courage from despair, Electra resolves, herself, to execute the stroke of vengeance, and invites, but invites in vain, the coöperation of the timid and passive Chrysothemis, who hears unmoved, or moved only to pity, her sister's mad appeals to a sense of duty to the dead, and the desire of undying fame; while that sister, in turn, steeled by adversity and despair, casts off the remonstrances of sisterly affection seconded by the counsel of the choir, and resolves to do the deed alone. And in the succeeding chorus, even the choir, carried away by sympathy with such heroism and such misfortunes, cannot withhold their approval of her love of honor and her fear of Jove.

Waging, with guilt, eternal war,
That on thine *honored name* might rest
A double meed — approved by far
At once the wisest daughter and the best.

. in every law divine
Which blooms with holiest awe above,
A steadfast piety was thine,
The love of honor and the fear of Jove. —(1085 seq.)

At the same time, they express their confidence, that :

. if Themis reigns on high,
And Jove's blue lightnings rend the sky,
Ere long shall vengeance crush the guilty pair.

To complete the pathetic scene, Orestes now enters in disguise with an attendant bearing the urn which purports to contain the ashes of the deceased brother. Electra takes the urn in her hands, and, in a strain of unaffected pathos scarcely to be equalled in the whole range of elegiac literature, mourns the sole, sad relic of all they loved and all they hoped on earth. The scene is too much for Orestes. Despite of his plans for concealment, he is constrained to make himself known to his sister, whom he convinces of his identity by showing his father's seal; and then a scene of joy succeeds, which contrasts powerfully with the previous mourning, and which finds utterance, not in the cold iambics of the usual dialogue, but in the strophe, antistrophe, and epode of choral songs from the lips of the rejoicing brother and sister. This untimely rejoicing is prolonged till the old servant, who has been keeping watch within the palace, comes out and reproves them and summons them to immediate action. Orestes yields his hearty assent, saying, as he enters :

. let us speed
Within, adoring my paternal gods,
All, who within this vestibule abide. — (1374, 5.)

Justice now delays no longer. The plot hastens to its consummation. Electra beseeches Apollo whom she has often served with *such as she had* (ἀφ' ὧν ἔχοιμι), and now entreats with *such as she has* (ἐξ ὧν ἔχω, 1379), that he will be a helper in these righteous measures, and thus show men what penalties the gods award to impiety. The chorus see, and summon others to see, the avenging Orestes enter the palace,

guided by Hermes, the god of stealth, and followed by the Furies, those hounds of retribution, from whose pursuit there is no escape (*ἄφυκτοι κύνες*). And soon, from within, are heard the shrieks and cries for mercy of the dying Clytemnestra. And her death is celebrated by the chorus: now the *curses* are fulfilled; the dead live again; the long-slain shed the blood of their slayers.

Meanwhile Aegisthus, who has heard, in the street, the tidings of Orestes's death, comes home exulting, and mocks Electra by demanding of her the details of such welcome news. Electra, whose office it is to cherish his false security till he falls into the hands of Orestes, "palters with him in a double sense,"¹ describing the fate of *Clytemnestra* in language which he understands of *Orestes*. He commands to open the gates, and let all Argos and Mycenae see the blasting of their hopes in Agamemnon's son; and, blinded to the last, he draws near to the supposed body of Orestes saying:

O Jove, a sight I view that well hath chanced,—(1466 seq.)
 If thus to speak be lawful — but my words,
 If *Nemesis* be present, I recall.

Nemesis was indeed present, and heard his indecent joy at the supposed death of a near relative, and returned, at once, the poisoned chalice to his own lips. The veil is removed; he sees the lifeless body of *Clytemnestra*! and soon falls, himself, beneath the avenging stroke of him, at whose fancied death he came exulting, on the same fatal spot on which he had slain the unsuspecting Agamemnon.

Contrary to the plot of both the other masters, but with that correctness of taste which almost never errs, Sophocles has made the death of Clytemnestra precede that of Aegisthus; thus letting the mother fall beneath the first uncalculating stroke of her children's vengeance, while the more cool and deliberate slaying of Aegisthus forms the closing scene, on which the mind dwells with unmixed satisfaction.

¹ The reader will excuse the repetition of this form of expression. It expresses better than any other language a frequent characteristic of the tragic style.

The Electra furnishes the best example, in the Greek drama, of that perfect adaptation of punishment to crime, which is called "poetic justice." Of course, this nice adjustment is not often seen, in the distribution of rewards and punishments in real life. Yet there are not wanting examples, both in secular and sacred history,¹ which suffice to show that the *principle*, which so commends itself to the aesthetic and the moral nature of man, is recognized in the providence and government of God, and so constitute a presumptive argument from analogy, answering to the intuitive convictions of the human soul, that this principle will be fully carried out in the retributions of the life to come.

The same tragedy which develops the doctrine of retributive justice, in a manner so congenial to the aesthetic and the ethical nature of man, contains also a distinct recognition of another principle deeply rooted in the human soul: the principle of expiatory and vicarious sacrifices of one human being as a substitute and a satisfaction for the sins of others.

Artemis is offended by the slaying of a stag in her sacred grove, or rather by some boastful words uttered by Agamemnon when he slew it (569). Adverse winds detain the Grecian fleet, in port at Aulis, and they can neither set sail for Troy, nor return home, till they have propitiated the goddess. This propitiation, as they are instructed by the voice of oracle or seer, can be effected only by the sacrifice of Agamemnon's daughter, as a compensation (*ἀντίσταθμον*, 571) for the slain stag. The father resisted and, for a time, refused to offer the sacrifice. But there was no other means of escape (*λύσις*, 573) from the anger of the goddess and the winds that imprisoned them in the harbor. At length, though much against his will (*βιασθεὶς πολλά*), he yielded. The unwilling victim was brought and sacrificed.² The angry goddess was appeased; the ad-

¹ Herodotus's history of the Persian wars, and, indeed, his whole history, is a great prose drama, written to illustrate the same *moral* as that of the book of Esther and the history of the Old Testament generally. That moral, stated generally, is *Providence*, and specifically it is the doctrine of a divine *Nemesis* in human affairs.

² According to Euripides (Iph. in Taur.) and some other authorities, Iphige-

verse winds became favorable, and the host set sail for Troy. The mother treasured up in her memory the dreadful sacrifice, and, many years after, alleged this rending of her affections in justification of her crimes. She argues that Agamemnon had no right to offer *her* daughter to make satisfaction for the Greeks (*Ἀργείων χάριν τίνων*, 534), nor instead of Menelaus his brother (*ἀντ' ἀδελφοῦ Μενέλεω*, 537), on whose account the voyage was undertaken. The pure-minded, earnest Electra justifies her father on the ground of unavoidable necessity, and casts the blame, if blame there be, on the goddess, who demanded the sacrifice, saying: Ask the huntress Artemis, as a satisfaction for what (*τίνος ποιῆς*, 564) she restrained the favoring winds at Aulis? Reason about the justice of it as we may, men have never been able to get rid of the idea of expiatory and vicarious sacrifice. History, Grecian, Roman, and barbarian, is full of it. In one form or another, it pervades or underlies all religions, be they Pagan, Mohammedan, Jewish, or Christian. And the law of *vicarious* sacrifice is almost universal in *nature*. Throughout the mineral, vegetable and animal kingdoms, the higher organizations and forms of life are nourished by the destruction or decay of the lower. Life springs from death, and the nation is saved, the race is rescued and reclaimed, the species is propagated, multiplied and improved, by the sacrifice of the individual. *The corn of wheat must fall into the ground and die, before it can bear much fruit.* But it is only in the gospel of Christ that we see the great propitiatory sacrifice for a sinful race provided by the *holy love* of the universal Father, made by the *willing* and *joyful obedience* of the Son of Man; who is, at the same time, the Son of God; and accepted, with admiring and adoring gratitude, by believing souls, as a *necessary* "*satisfaction* for the ethical nature of both God and man."

nia was rescued by the goddess herself, when on the point of being sacrificed, and conveyed in a cloud to Tauris, where she became the priestess of Artemis; while a stag (or, as others say, some other victim) was offered in her stead, thus bearing a striking resemblance to the sacrifice of Isaac as related in the book of Genesis. But Sophocles makes Electra say in so many words that Agamemnon sacrificed her (*ἔδυσεν αὐτήν*, 576).

ARTICLE VI.

THE APOSTLE PAUL, A WITNESS FOR THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS.

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WE propose to prove by the testimony of the Apostle Paul — by testimony which all admit to be his — that the apostles who attended Jesus during his life, bore witness to his resurrection very soon after that event is alleged to have occurred. The resurrection of Christ is the great miracle of Christianity, by which the divine mission of its founder is demonstrated.¹ Once establish this fact by irrefragable proof, and the other miracles of scripture are easy of credence; nay, they seem to be demanded. Such a transaction cannot stand by itself. There must go before it supernatural preparations. It is not a stray and solitary boulder cast upon the earth, but the key-stone of a mighty arch. Grant the Saviour's resurrection, and the Old Testament dispensation, with its series of divine interpositions, can be easily defended. Christianity, as a historical religion, is placed high above the reach of successful assault.

The attacks which have been made upon the genuineness of the books which compose the New Testament canon, have imposed the necessity of a new line of defence. Pantheism leaves no room for a miracle. Under that scheme of philosophy there is no personal Being whose will can interrupt the uniform course of nature; and hence the miracle is utterly precluded. The devotee of pantheism, when he comes on the ground of historical inquiry, is obliged by his creed to deny the supernatural, in the proper sense of that term, wherever it appears; and to find a naturalistic solution of the phenomena on which belief in the supernatural has been founded. Strauss, starting with his Hegelian premises,

¹ See Romans 1:4, et al.

endeavored to eliminate the supernatural from the gospel histories, by turning the miracles into myths emanating by degrees from the imagination of the early church, as it brooded over the Master's life and tragic fate, and unconsciously wove into his career events to correspond with the Old Testament description of the Messiah. Strauss had little to say of the book of Acts, which purports to be the production of a contemporary; and still less of the apostolic epistles. Even on the authorship of the gospels, and of the fourth gospel in particular, he was vacillating. He, therefore, left the greater part of his destructive work to be done by others. A systematic theory concerning the origin of Christianity and the New Testament writings, was imperatively required in order to carry out and support the speculations of Strauss. This has been attempted by the abler and more thoroughly learned men of the Tübingen school, of whom Baur stands at the head. It is no part of our present plan, to describe at length the views of this formidable antagonist of revealed religion. We simply need to say, that, while he does not scruple to impugn the credibility of the book of Acts, and even charges the author with intentional untruth — thus forsaking the mythical theory for the older infidelity, the rationalismus vulgaris — he fully admits the genuineness of the four Pauline epistles, — the Epistle to the Romans, that to the Galatians, and the two Epistles to the Corinthians. These, according to Baur, were written by Paul, and exhibit Christianity according to his conception of it, in contrast with the Judaizing ideas of Peter and the church at Jerusalem.

It is our belief that in these writings, whose genuineness is not disputed by the Tübingen sceptics — the Apocalypse and a part of Matthew should be added to complete the list — there is contained abundant and irrefutable proof of the supernatural facts of Christianity; that, on the basis of these Pauline epistles, the mythical hypothesis can be shown to be impossible and without foundation; and when it is once discovered that nothing is gained by casting the historical books and so many of the Epistles out of the canon, but that

the supernatural origin of Christianity remains untouched, the attempt is very likely to be abandoned.

In this Article we undertake to show that the apostles, Peter, James, and the others, testified at once to the resurrection of Christ, and that hence the supposition of a slowly growing myth is absurd; and this we shall do from certain statements in these Pauline epistles.

Before we pursue our special topic, however, we desire to offer a few remarks on the conversion of the Apostle Paul, and the bearing of this event on Christian evidences. Baur and Zeller do not scruple to pronounce the narrative in Acts unhistorical, and to make its motive the desire of Luke to place Paul on a level with Peter, and to give the former a full and legitimate title to the apostolic office. This notion is a part of the offensive and untenable theory concerning the design of the entire book, and is mere conjecture. The narrative, however, has always been exposed to sceptical objections of another kind. It is possible to say, and it has often been said, that the transaction was in the excited soul of the traveller to Damascus, and that the light and voice from heaven were only subjectively real. Instances are not wanting of sudden conversion, of a revolution of opinion and feeling, accomplished apparently in a moment, though in fact it had long been prepared for. In numerous cases, optical wonders have attended the change, which, though seemingly real, are known to be the product of imagination. Not to recall the lives of the Roman Catholic saints, all who have read the conversion of Col. Gardiner, will remember that he beheld, as he supposed, the face and person of Jesus. The infuriated Saul, it is said, had begun to be agitated by misgivings. Recollections of Gamaliel and his moderate teachings, of Stephen and his uplifted face and dying prayer, haunted him. At length, while on the journey to Damascus, his doubts became convictions, and a terrible distress of conscience ensued. Having in mind what he had heard of the exaltation and glory of Christ, he felt its truth. On a sudden, the sky is overcast; perhaps a thunderbolt falls near him, and the lightning flashes on his pathway. In his terror

and mental disturbance, the remonstrance of his conscience seems to him a cry from heaven, and he stands out no longer. That the grand life of Paul should spring from an illusion of this nature; that his clear understanding should be to that degree confused and bewildered, we cannot for a moment believe. Yet there are many so willing to avoid the miracle, that they grasp at this solution and find it plausible. Now the observation we have to make is this: the supposition of conscientious misgivings in the mind of Saul prior to his conversion, on which this ingenious theory is built, has no support from scripture, but is expressly contradicted. The idea that he was troubled by such misgivings has arisen from a wrong interpretation of the expression: *σκληρόν σοι πρὸς κέντρα λατίζειν*, "it is hard for thee to kick against the pricks." This expression in Acts 9 : 5, together with the beginning of the next verse: *Τρέμων τε καὶ θαμβῶν εἶπε· κύριε, τί με θέλεις ποιῆσαι; καὶ ὁ κύριος πρὸς αὐτόν*, is acknowledged on all hands to be no part of the original text. In Paul's own account of the scene, however, in Acts 26 : 14, the words "it is hard for thee to kick against the pricks," do occur. But they do not, as used by the Saviour, refer to any struggles of conscience which Saul had experienced. The sense may be: 'it is vain for thee to withstand me, to set yourself against my power.' So, in substance, De Wette explains the phrase. Meyer gives this paraphrase: "it is a perilous beginning for thee, that thou should'st (as my persecutor) contend against my will." Whatever the precise meaning may be, it is certain that there is no allusion to any mental experience of Saul. We have his explicit and reiterated assertion that there was in his mind, no doubt, no wavering, no qualms of conscience. "I verily thought with myself that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth" (Acts 26 : 9). "Who was before a blasphemer, and a persecutor and injurious: but I obtained mercy *because I did it ignorantly in unbelief*." He speaks of his transition from enmity to Christ to submission as if it were effected suddenly, with no intermediate steps, by no gradual process. "But I certify you, brethren, that the

gospel which was preached of me is not after man: for I neither received it of man, neither was I taught it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ. For ye have heard of my conversation in time past in the Jews' religion, how that beyond measure I persecuted the church of God, and wasted it; and profited in the Jews' religion above many my equals in mine own nation, being more exceedingly zealous of the traditions of my fathers. But when it pleased God, who separated me from my mother's womb, and called me by his grace, to reveal his Son in me, that I might preach him among the heathen; immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood: neither went I up to Jerusalem to them which were apostles before me: but I went into Arabia, and returned again unto Damascus" (Gal. 1: 11—17).

We have every reason to believe that Paul's career as a persecutor of the church, was marked by the single-hearted, fiery energy which characterized the man. He did not halt, he did not doubt, until his steps were arrested on the road to Damascus. Before that, he was fully satisfied with himself, confident that he was serving God, convinced that Jesus was an impostor, and that his followers ought to be put to death. If this be so, the psychological solution of that remarkable change in the character of Saul, falls to the ground; and his conversion continues, a powerful argument for the supernatural origin of Christianity.

We proceed, now, to the proper subject of the present Article. In the first place, we call the attention of our readers to the *importance attached, by the apostle Paul, to the fact of the Saviour's resurrection.* In his judgment, as in ours, it was the grand, cardinal truth by which the claims of Christ were verified. Of the significance of this truth, he was fully aware. He knew and felt that everything hung upon it. It was not something to be lightly admitted. Give up that fact, and his own work in life was founded in illusion. In showing that such was his view of the Saviour's resurrection, we are restricted now to passages in the four epistles whose genuineness is unattacked; but these pro-

vide us with abundant evidence in support of our position. We refer the reader, at once, to the most emphatic and conclusive of these passages. Paul says (1 Cor. 15:14, 15) where he is arguing for the general resurrection, against sceptical objections: "*And if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God; because we have testified of God that he raised up Christ.*" We adduce this passage to prove how clearly conscious Paul was, of the supreme importance of the resurrection of Christ. It lay at the foundation of his preaching and of his converts' faith, in the sense that both were vain without it. Moreover, if that great fact were disproved, he and his fellow-apostles were convicted of bearing false witness, and deserved to be regarded as liars. The resurrection of Jesus was the one, indisputable fact which formed the sole warrant for his proclamation, and their acceptance, of the gospel. He soberly affirms that the denial of this fundamental truth is equivalent to charging the apostolic witnesses with intentional falsehood. It is plain that the understanding of Paul was alive to the infinite significance of the fact in question. He did not accept this truth incautiously and hold it without reflection. On the contrary, he saw how much was involved in it. "The resurrection of Jesus," he says in effect, "is the premise on which the entire superstructure of Christianity reposes: my preaching is built upon it, and so is your faith; if we are not certain of that fact, we are certain of nothing; if we are mistaken there, we are false everywhere."

We turn now to another memorable passage (1 Cor. 15:3—9), in which Paul marshals in order the *proofs* of the resurrection of Jesus. The style of the passage, the manner in which reference is made to the testimony of numerous living witnesses, demonstrate that the apostle, so far from being credulous in regard to the resurrection, had considered that event with the sober, deliberate, judicial temper of an inquirer for truth. "For I delivered to you," he says, "first of all, that which I also received: how that Christ died for our sins, according to the scriptures; and that he was seen of Cephas; then of the

twelve ; after that, he was seen of above five hundred brethren at once ; of whom the greater part remain unto this present ; but some are fallen asleep. After that, he was seen of James ; then, of all the apostles. And, last of all, he was seen of me, also, as of one born out of due time." We say nothing, here, of the *contents* of the passage, and of the weight to be attached to the array of evidence here presented ; we simply call attention to the writer's mood of mind in relation to the subject. Who can doubt that the apostle regarded the Saviour's resurrection as an event of the highest moment ? that he felt the necessity of arguments and proofs to establish it ? that, in his investigations of the history of Jesus, he would give to this event the most earnest attention ? In respect to other circumstances in the Lord's history, which are not of so great moment, he might be less curious ; but upon this grand consummation, this victory over death, this crowning sign of Messiahship, the apostle was intensely inquisitive, as every one must confess, who candidly examines the verses just quoted.

We advance, now, to the second link in our argument : *Paul's intercourse with Peter and the other apostles at Jerusalem, was such, that had they not testified to the resurrection of Jesus, he could not have believed in that fact ; much less have referred to them as eye-witnesses.* Suppose that the other apostles knew nothing of the Lord's resurrection, and were silent on the subject in their preaching ; is it conceivable that Paul could have conversed with them without being made aware of the circumstance ? Is it possible that he had conferences with John and Peter and James, and yet did not discover that they were wholly ignorant of the leading fact on which his faith in the gospel rested ? Nay, is it possible to think that he conferred with them at all without allusion to this grand and engrossing topic of his ministry ? Could he, in his preaching, have made foremost an historical fact of which they knew and said nothing, and the radical difference not come out in conversations and interviews with them ? And after such conferences and interviews, could he continue to

refer to them as eye-witnesses of the risen Lord, if they did not claim to be such? We need not multiply these inquiries. The inference is irresistible that if Paul was, to any considerable extent, conversant with the other apostles, it must be true that they were in the habit of testifying to the Saviour's resurrection. Now we have, in the epistle to the Galatians, a narrative from his own pen, of his visits to Jerusalem. Having described his conversion, he says: "then, *after three years*, I went up to Jerusalem to see Peter, and abode with him fifteen days. But other of the apostles saw I none save James, the Lord's brother. Now the things which I write unto you, behold, before God, I lie not" (Gal. 1: 18—20). Again, he says (Gal. 2: 1): "Then, fourteen years after, I went up, again, to Jerusalem with Barnabas, and took Titus with me also;" and after describing his controversy with the judaizing Christians, he adds (v. 9): "And when James, Cephas, and John, who seemed to be pillars, perceived the grace that was given unto me, they gave to me and Barnabas the right hand of fellowship, that we should go unto the heathen, and they unto the circumcision. Only they would that we should remember the poor; the same which I also was forward to do." Then follows a mention of his controversy with Peter, at Antioch; the occasion of which was not a difference of principle, but a timid yielding, on the side of Peter, to the demand of the Judaizers. We have quoted only those parts of the passage which are essential to the end we have in view. A second journey of Paul to Jerusalem, intermediate between the two here recorded, is mentioned by Luke (Acts 11: 12); but of this we are not permitted to take notice, nor shall we pause to seek for the reason of the silence of Paul upon this second visit, in the passage before us.

Our first work shall be to fix the date of that first visit, when the apostle abode fifteen days with Peter. It was three years after Paul's conversion. According to Usher, Pearson, Hug, and Olshausen, this occurred A. D. 35. According to Eichhorn and De Wette, it took place in the year 37 or 38. The authorities first named, with the exception

of Hug, date the alleged ascension of Christ at the year 33. Meyer, the prince of living commentators, agrees with them in dating the conversion at the year 35; but he fixes the date of the ascension at 31. (Meyer's *Apostelgeschichte*, Einl. § 4.) Let the interval be made as long as any chronologist — even Wieseler, who would make it ten years — may desire; our argument, as we believe, is not shaken. But we cannot be accused of unfairness if, in agreement with Meyer, we make this interval four years. Add to these four years the three which intervened between the conversion and the first visit, and we reach the conclusion *that seven years after the alleged resurrection of Jesus, Paul spent a fortnight in company with Peter at Jerusalem.* In enumerating the witnesses to the resurrection (1 Cor. 15: 5), the apostle says that the risen Jesus “*was seen of Cephas.*” It was Cephas with whom, so short a time after the final separation of the Saviour from his followers, Paul spent fifteen days. Is it credible that, during this protracted visit, Peter had nothing to say of the risen Saviour? that the subject was not broached? Or, admitting that it was broached, that Paul went away, knowing that Peter had no knowledge of the miracle, to spend his life in asserting its reality, and in appealing to Peter as an eye-witness?

We pass, now, to the next visit which Paul notices in the passage cited above: “Then, fourteen years after, I went up, again, to Jerusalem.” Fourteen years after what? With Jerome, Luther, Le Clerc, Lightfoot, Bengel, Meyer, and the most of the critics, we take the *terminus a quo* to be the first journey; so that this subsequent visit was seventeen years after the conversion, or twenty-one years after the date assigned for the Saviour's ascension. In this interview, the Apostle to the Gentiles had a conference with James, Peter, and John, the pillars of the church at Jerusalem, on the points of difference in doctrine and practice between the Jewish Christians and the disciples of Paul, and on the peculiarities of Paul's preaching. But there is not, in Paul's narrative, a hint that whereas he preached the resurrection of Jesus, they did not. No such mighty and radical difference in the two types of doc-

trine was developed. It is absurd to suppose that such a difference could have existed and been ignored in that conference. He must be an audacious sceptic indeed, who can think that Paul would have given the right hand of fellowship to men who disbelieved in the Lord's resurrection — the fact without which his preaching and his disciples' faith were pronounced by him to be vain. It appears to us that the force of moral and circumstantial evidence, in favor of the proposition that, at the time of this visit, John, James, and Peter were preachers of the resurrection of Jesus, is, to a candid mind, irresistible.

Our argument, briefly stated, is this: such was the intercourse of Paul with the original disciples, that no difference between him and them, on the great fact in question, could have existed, without being published and proclaimed by him, even if — which is not credible — his own faith could have subsisted in the absence of their testimony and in the face of their disbelief. If he believed in the resurrection and preached it, then they did; and this very soon after the event was declared to have occurred.

To show that the apostles claimed to be eye-witnesses of the risen Lord, is the main end which we have aimed at. For if this be reached, if the foregoing points be justly taken, the case for Christianity is virtually won. It would be necessary, however, in order to complete the argument, to make it evident that, *in this belief, thus immediately proclaimed, the apostles were not deceived.* It is not contended that they were wilful impostors. Nor is it supposed that they were duped by others. Unless they were self-deceived, their testimony is to be credited. The mythical theory endeavors to make out an unconscious, involuntary, self-deception on the part of all of them. But the admission that the testimony was given *so soon as we know it actually was given*, cuts up the mythical hypothesis by the roots. That a myth of this sort could originate spontaneously, among the apostles themselves, in so very brief a time, seems incredible to one who is conversant with the nature of a myth and the conditions

requisite for its growth. But *the want of time* is not the only circumstance fatal to the notion of a myth. That the crucifixion of Jesus *must* have thrown the disciples into the despondency and bewilderment which the gospel histories attribute to them; that a grand event is historically required to account for the marvellous change which transformed them into fearless and enthusiastic preachers of Christ, confident in their faith, and going forth, at the hazard of life, to combat and conquer the world; that to him who denies the miracle, the enlightened, bold, joyous spirit suddenly gained by the apostles, as well as the rise and progress of the Christian church, are an insoluble enigma; so that the contrast in their position, at the Master's death and after his alleged reappearance, necessitates the supposition of a mighty occurrence to effect it; just as, when we see Napoleon a captive on an island in mid ocean, whom we lately saw the dictator of Europe, we are confounded until we hear of Waterloo: these are considerations whose force cannot be broken. They fall in with their express testimony; and in a mind not predisposed to disbelieve in a miracle however it may be supported by evidence, they produce conviction.

As we have alluded to the Tübingen critics, we will not omit to state the hypothesis which they advance to explain the apostles' united testimony to the resurrection of Jesus. For they agree with us that the apostles *believed* in it. Both Strauss and Baur feel it to be necessary to admit a *faith* of this kind in the disciples in order to explain the revolution of feeling which we have just mentioned, as well as to account for the rise of the church. Baur, in his "Christenthum," — the work which contains a summary of all his theories — contents himself with hinting that this faith was 'psychological' in its origin, as opposed to a conviction founded on fact.¹ Strauss, holding the same view, attempts to solve the problem of its origin. It is a strange tissue of conjectures which he offers us. The apostles had believed in the Messiahship of Jesus; by his death they were cast down, and their faith in him as Messiah, for the time,

¹ Vide "Das Christenthum," S. 39.

destroyed; thence arose the psychological necessity for combining with their former view the notion of a suffering and dying Messiah; this they found, though by a wrong interpretation, in Isaiah liii.; but if thus slain, he must still live and have entered into his messianic glory: out of this condition of glory, how could he refrain from giving to his disciples some knowledge of himself? And how could they, in the warmth of their joy over their insight into prophecy, help regarding these new emotions as an enlightenment proceeding from him, — yea, “*as his discourse with them?*” Finally, how natural that these feelings should, in certain individuals, especially women, rise into seeming visions; by others, on the contrary, even by entire assemblies, be taken as something objective, visible and audible. Sometimes, perhaps, the sight of an unknown person made the impression of being a revelation or reappearance of Christ, — a height of pious enthusiasm not without example: but if Christ had entered into the highest blessedness, he could not have left his body in the grave; and there was the Old Testament passage: “Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, neither shalt thou suffer thy holy one to see corruption;” there was also the promise of long life to the smitten servant of Jehovah, in Isaiah liii.; and so their previous faith that “Christ abideth forever,” the disciples retain by ascribing to him, — death, to be sure, but likewise a reawakening from the dead. But here a difficulty arises. How could they suppose Christ to have risen, and believe this two days after his interment while his body was in the tomb where it had been laid, as they could easily see by looking? But ‘criticism’ can quickly cut this knot. Strauss simply discredits the evangelists, who make the risen Jesus seen for the first time by the apostles in Jerusalem, and puts his first interview, or imaginary interview, with them in Galilee, where they could not go to the tomb and undeceive themselves. By doing this, and by denying the truth of Luke’s account of the Pentecost, the time when the apostles began to proclaim the Lord’s resurrection, is a little postponed. Still, it is a very, very short

¹ See “Das Leben Jesu,” B. II. S. 636 et seq.

time for a myth of this nature to be hatched. The materials for it are pitifully scanty. The holy enthusiasm of the terrified and scattered band of disciples, who "mourned and wept," is kindled in a wonderfully quick and mysterious manner. One or two passages in the Old Testament were enough; enough to revolutionize their conception of the Messiah, and to bring them, by a short process, to imagine him to have risen from the dead and to have had repeated conversations with them. With no intermediate event to occasion the change of feeling, an assembly of five hundred could be gathered, and wrought up to such a pitch of "holy enthusiasm" as to behold Christ among them, although he was not there! To be sure, the gospels speak of incredulity, on the part of some, and of the way in which Jesus removed it; but *criticism* can put all this to the account of later tradition and fable; *criticism* can cut up the narratives, and accept only of what favors its own end. And so, on this delusion of fancy, they organized the Christian church and made Christendom! Do speculations like these of Strauss deserve to be ranked among historical investigations? His theory requires us to suppose that the same disciples who believed Jesus to be the Messiah, and *asked for no miracles*, suddenly gained such a conception of the Messiah that they must needs ascribe to him a profusion of miracles which he never wrought!

Though restricted, in this discussion, to a narrow field of evidence, from a desire to accommodate ourselves to the concessions of adversaries, and to take them on their own ground, we have found, unless we deceive ourselves, even in this contracted space, a sufficient defence for historical Christianity and the miraculous dispensation of the New Testament. For when it is granted that John, Peter, James, and the others declared the Lord's resurrection to be a fact within their knowledge, the case is surrendered by most enlightened unbelievers at the present day. It is felt that the principal question is, whether they really gave the testimony which the Christian church has ascribed to them; or whether the gospel history, in its miraculous parts, is a myth of a much later growth.

Before we conclude, we digress, for a moment, for the purpose of exposing the untruth of Baur's theory concerning the origin of the canon and of Christianity in its mature form. Everything, in his view, turns on the difference between the two types of doctrine : that of the Judaizers, with whom he ranks the apostles at Jerusalem, and the more free system of Paul. According to Baur, the book of Acts and various other books contained in the New Testament, were composed to reconcile or smooth over this difference. It is necessary for him to make out that the Judaizers, of whom Paul so often complains, were emissaries or friends of the Jerusalem church, sent out to oppose him ; and that the apostle to the gentiles was at irreconcilable variance with Peter, James, and John. Now it is remarkable that this most important passage in Galatians ii., on which Baur builds so much — this locus classicus on the subject — demonstrates the very opposite of what he would establish by it. Paul expressly affirms (ver. 9), that Peter, James, and John, after inquiry and consideration, gave to him and Barnabas *the right hand of fellowship*, stipulating that in their mission among the gentiles they should remember the poor Christians at Jerusalem, and gather contributions for their relief. He distinctly says that his controversy with Peter, at Antioch, did not grow out of any difference of doctrine — their doctrine was the same — but out of an infidelity, on the part of Peter, to his own convictions and avowals. It is true that the tergiversation of Peter is said to have been occasioned by the coming of certain persons “from James,” in deference to whom he separated himself from the gentiles ; but there is no more reason to think that they *were sent* to do this mischief, than that Peter himself came on the same errand. The cause of the visit of these Jerusalem Christians to Antioch, at that time, is entirely unknown ; but the context proves that there was no hostility in the mind of James, to Paul and his doctrine. The statements of this passage, we contend, demonstrate that no radical difference, such as Baur requires for his theory, existed. They demonstrate that James and his associates were in fellowship with Paul, instead of withstanding him as

a heretic. And this established, the fine theory of the Tübingen critics topples to the ground, being left without a foundation. It is to us a remarkable illustration of the shifts to which a theorist will resort, when pressed by a difficulty, that Baur tries to cast doubts on the sincerity of this solemn act of fellowship, and to make it of no account.

ARTICLE VII.

THE MODERN GREEK LANGUAGE.

BY PROF. JAMES R. BOISE, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

THE researches of philologists have, within a few years, taken a much wider range than formerly. The mere mechanism of the two most cultivated languages of antiquity, however important this may be, is no longer the sole, or even the chief object of study with the classical scholar of the present day. The nations who spoke those languages, in all their wonderful history, as they progressed from barbarism to the foremost place in ancient civilization, and their connection with all contemporary nations are now a prominent object of study.

We would by no means disparage the nice but limited scholarship of a former age, when eminent men spent a life-time in the investigation of the minute test points in the Greek metres; just as a celebrated astronomer of this country has spent years (no doubt profitably) in correcting an error of one-tenth of a second in the predicted place of an asteroid which is invisible to the naked eye.¹ These minute investigations are a necessary part of all sciences, whose grand and benign results would otherwise be unattainable.

¹ Cf. *Tables of Victoria*, by F. Brunnnow, published by the University of Michigan, 1859.

But we deem it unfortunate for any one to become so far absorbed in the separate details of a science as to forget its outlines and application. So we think the philologists of the present day have acted wisely in entering into a wider field of investigation; in making the languages of Greece and Rome, not the chief end of our studies, but rather the ushers to introduce us to the most cultivated people of antiquity. But in devoting increased attention to the history and archaeology of the Greeks and Romans, we have been led quite naturally to inquire what were their affinities, not only to each other, but also to the contemporary and antecedent nations of the earth. The carrying out of this inquiry has added a new and important department to modern science: one which promises not less interest than the wonderful discoveries of modern times in the world of matter. Ethnology as now studied, founded on the comparison of different languages, rests on a surer basis than ever before, and promises results of the highest scientific value. If the material world, in its wonderful history, excites the deepest interest in the minds of scholars, much more may the races of intelligent and immortal beings, who have lived on the earth—in whom the Creator of all worlds has shown so deep an interest—demand our attentive study.

It is natural that, in searching out the affinities of the Latin and Greek languages with the other known languages of antiquity, increased attention should be given to the development and history of these tongues themselves. All traces of the languages spoken in Italy before the Roman period have been carefully examined and are still studied with enthusiastic interest by many scholars. So too the Greek language in its earliest historic developments has been studied from a new point of view; and has been traced through the long period of its decline down to the present day; and now the learned world, rousing as if from a dream, seems to have just discovered the fact that the Greek, which has so long been called a dead language, is still alive, being inspired with a vitality as genuine as when Homer first waked the echoes of his never-dying song. The world

seems surprised to learn that the great body of those words which once "fulminated over Greece and shook the throne of Macedon," are still heard on every hill-side and in every valley of the ancient Hellas. The discovery is exciting new and increasing interest every day, and is destined, we doubt not, to exert an important influence on philology. As in the days of Cicero, Athens will very likely again become the favorite resort of scholars from all parts of the civilized world. The Greek language will thus be studied under greater advantages and more successfully than ever before in modern times. Every one appreciates the advantage, in acquiring a modern language, of residing among the people by whom it is spoken. A similar advantage is gained in the acquisition of Greek by residing at Athens: and, as the influence of the University of Otho becomes more marked, in reviving a purer and more classic diction among the scholars of Greece, and in diffusing its influences among the more cultivated classes of society, the advantages for the study of this ancient language will be proportionately increased.

The scholars of Germany are taking a deeper interest than formerly in modern Greek, and are beginning to appreciate more fully the important bearing which it may have on the study of philology. An essay appeared in 1857, in the *Philologus*, from the pen of the celebrated linguist, Pott, on "Ancient Greek in Modern Calabria."¹ Since everything which this distinguished scholar says on this subject will be taken as authority, we quote the following:

"How important," he writes, "that we have at length a scientific treatise on the different modes of speech in the Greek language of the present day; especially with this object, that from the present diversities we may obtain conclusions respecting ancient differences of dialect. This undertaking in the right hands would be of the highest importance to the general science of language, and especially to Greek philology." Until something more complete

¹ Altgriechisch in heutigen Calabrien.

appears, the student of language may find much valuable information in the *Grammatik der griechischen Vulgarsprache in historischer Entwicklung* von Professor Dr. F. W. A. Mullach (Berlin, Dümmlers Verlagsbuchh, 1856). It will at least be apparent from the study of this last named work, that the so-called Modern Greek is not a new and separate language, but is no more nor less than the *κοινή διάλεκτος* or *γλῶσσα*, which existed in connection with the cultivated language of books; which, however, in the course of time and under various external influences, lost many of its original peculiarities and engrafted upon itself many foreign elements. Even a knowledge of these facts would be no unimportant acquisition to the Hellenist.

It is natural that the learned Greeks of the present day should enter with zeal into these studies. They have bestowed much labor, not only in searching out the traces of the Greek language beyond the borders of Greece, in lands where the Greek population has been gradually losing ground, and where they have always been regarded as foreigners; but also in collecting and bringing to light the numerous words which still exist in the spoken language, and which have never before found any place in a lexicon. This task has been undertaken by several periodicals, but especially by the *Νέα Πανδώρα*, a scientific journal which has been published at Athens since the year 1850. The researches published in this journal exhibit great thoroughness, and an acquaintance with the entire field of Greek philological science, especially ancient Greek lexicography. An Article appeared not long ago in the *Pandora*, on the remains of the Greek language in Southern Italy, especially in Apulia. The substance of this article was afterwards presented in the German periodical, *Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen*. Bd. 24, 1858. It should be read in connection with the essay of Professor Pott, and is the more valuable, as it comes from the pen of a learned Greek residing in Southern Italy.

A short Article on the modern Greek language appeared in the *Neue Jarbücher für Philologie and Paedagogik*, in Nov.

1859. Several of the above statements are taken from this Article, and we append also some interesting etymological and other observations, from the same source.

**Ασπρος* signifies, in modern Greek, *white*. Coray derives it from the ancient Greek *ἄσπιλος*, *without spot, clean*, since this is the essential character of the color *white*. From *ἄσπιλος*, by dropping the *ι*, and by the not unusual commutation of *ρ* for *λ*, arose *ἄσπρος*. The modern language has nearly lost the ancient word *λευκός*, and retains it only in the derivative *λευκαίνω*. Similar changes have been made in other terms denoting color. For *μέλας*, the modern language has only *μαῦρος* (ancient Gr. *ἄμαυρός*, *dim, without light*); it, however, retains the ancient words *πράσινος*, *κόκκινος*, *κίτρινος*.

**Ἀρρώστέω* and *ἀσθενέω* are now used only in the sense of *νοσέω*, *to be sick*. The noun *ἀσθένεια*, *illness*, is more frequent than *ἀσθενέω*. In the corresponding adjective sense, several words are used: as the ancient *ἀσθενής* and *ἀσθενικός*; also, *ἰσθηνισμένος* (as if from a verb, *ἀσθενίζω*) and *φιλάσθενος*.

Τώρα (*τῇ ὥρᾳ*), *now*. In a similar manner, in the ancient language, *σήμερον* (or *τήμερον*) was formed from *τῇ ἡμέρᾳ*, and *σήμερος* (or *τῆτες*) from *τὸ ἔτος*.

**Ἄλογον* is the modern word for *horse*; and in this sense it was used as early as the twelfth century; while *ἵππος* is retained only in compounds and the derivative verb *ἵππεύω*. All animals, in opposition to man, the *λογικὸν ζῶον*, are *ἄλογα ζῶα*. The horse is least of all animals *ἄλογον*; and thus the name might be explained *κατ' ἀντίφρασιν* (so, *lucus a non lucendo*).¹ Gottfried Hermann suggested that *ἄλογον* might be used to denote the horse in distinction from his rider (a *λογικὸν ζῶον*).

**Ψωμίον*, a diminutive from *ψωμός*, *a morsel, bite, mouthful* (Italian, *boccone*; Spanish, *boccada*), signifies, in modern Greek, *bread*. In the N. Test. language, *ψωμίον* means *a piece of bread* (Gospel of John 13:26): and in the verb *ψωμίζω*, *to feed*, the special idea of *bread* is often prominent

¹ This does not appear to us very conclusive. We should rather regard the application of the term *ἄλογον* exclusively to the horse, as one of those caprices of language which do not admit of any logical explanation.

(Rom. 12:20) ; ἄρτος, in modern Greek, is used only to denote the bread of the sacrament.¹

Ὀψάριον (ψάριον), dimin. from ὄψον, which now means *fish*, shows also, as in the case of ἄλογον, that the specific meaning often takes the place of the generic. Even in the N. Test. ὀψάριον occurs in the new meaning; perhaps, however, only in the writings of John, while the other evangelists and apostles generally use the old word ἰχθύς; an indication that the writings of John contain, preëminently, the language of the common people; and may, consequently, throw much light on the syntactical and lexical connections of the modern with the ancient Greek.

Ζαβός denotes, in modern Greek, *foolish, bereft of reason*; ζάβα, ζάβια, *a buckle, a clasp*; ζαβίον (τζαμπίον, τσαμπίον), *a bunch of grapes*. Probably the root of all these words is found in the ancient Greek ὑβός (*crooked, hump-backed*, cf. Lat. gibbus, gibber), and ὕβος (*a crook, a hump*), with the intensive prefix ζα. In a similar manner, ἀγκύλη denotes, in ancient Greek, *anything bent*; and ἀγκύλος is predicated of character, *wily, cunning*. The prefix ζα occurs also in modern Greek: e. g. ζαβάλλης, ζάβαλος, *an unfortunate fellow* (from ζα-βάλλω; unless, indeed, it is a corruption of διάβολος); ζαμπούνης, *asthmatical, sickly*, and ζαμπουνεύω, *to be asthmatical or sickly* (from ζα-ἄμπνοια, ἀναπνοή; cf. Ital. zampogna, *a shepherd's pipe*); ζάφτω, *to beat severely, to cudgel* (from ζα-ἄπτω); ζαλαπατέω, *to trample upon, to kick* (from ζα-λακπατέω); ζαβλακόνομαι, *to be sick* (from ζα-βλακώω, βλάζω, allied to βλάξ); ζαρόνω (ζαρόω), *to fold together, to wrinkle* (from ζα-ρύω, ἐρύω).

Ποδιυκόν is now used instead of the ancient word εὐδιασμός, or καλὸς οἶκός, *a favorable omen, a good sign*. It is probably related to the ancient word εὐοδία, from which the

¹ Several years ago, on the morning after our arrival in Athens, we entered a Café and called for καφὲς καὶ ἄρτον, without being aware of the important change in the signification of this latter word. We shall not soon forget the look of surprise which the waiter cast on us, as we made this demand. He hesitated a moment, and then brought a *hot roll*; — not a *holy wafer*, as we have since learned we ordered.

modern language has formed *κατενόδιον* (*καταβόδιον*), a *journey*. The common people often use the pleonastic expression *καλὸν κατενόδιον* (I wish you) a *pleasant journey!* *Bon voyage!* They use also the adj. *καλοκαταβόδ(ι)αστος*, spoken of one who has returned safely from a journey.

Κιβούριον signifies, in modern Greek, a *coffin*, a *grave*. It belongs to that class of words which seem to be of foreign origin, and which may yet be from a genuine Greek root. It is commonly derived from the Turkish *kibûr* (Arab. *kabûr*, Slav. *kifûr*). The meaning of the ancient word *κιβώριον* may be deemed too remote to admit of a connection with *κιβώριον*; but it may still be associated with *κιβωτός*, a *box*, a *chest*; also with *κυβή*, *κύβας* (a *coffin*). This supposition is still further strengthened by the remark of Kumas, in his modern Greek translation of the ancient Greek lexicon by Riemer (Vienna, 1826), that *κίββα* was used, by the Boeotians for *κυβή*.¹

Ἀπανδέχω, *ἀπαντέχω*, in modern Greek *to expect*, *to await*, is manifestly from the ancient word *ἀπεκδέχομαι*. In modern Greek ballads, *ἀπαντυχαίνω* also occurs in the same sense. The modern language uses also *τυχαίνω* (a variation of the ancient word *τυγχάνω*), in the sense *to be*, *become*, *succeed*, *attain*, *hit*.

Βράδυ, *βράδι* (from the ancient *βραδύς* *slow*, *late*), signifies, in modern Greek, *the evening* (*βραδὺν μέρος τῆς ἡμέρας*). The opposite of this is *τὸ ταχύ, ἡ ταχυνή* (from *ταχύς*), *the morning*. In a similar way, the ancient Greeks used *ὄψέ*, particularly in connection with *τῆς ὥρας*, *τῆς ἡμέρας*, κ. τ. λ. So also, *ὄψιζω* (*to go*, or *come*, or *do anything late at evening*). In like manner, Diogenes Laertius uses *βραδέως τῆς ἡμέρας*; from this expression may be explained the modern word *βραδειάζω* (*βραδειάζει*, *evening is setting in*). The use of the Latin word *serus* is similar. Livy uses the expression *serum diei*; and Suetonius, *serum* alone, meaning *the evening*. Hence also, in the Middle Ages (cf. Ducange, *Glossarium med. et*

¹ The fact also that the modern Greeks make no distinction in sound between *v* and *i* renders it quite credible that the latter may have been substituted for the former.

inf. latinitatis) sera, scrum, serale (*the evening*); whence the Ital. la sera; and the Fr. soir.

Ἀκόμη (ἀκόμι, ἀκόμα) signifies, in modern Greek, *yet, still*. It is evidently derived from the ancient word ἀκμή, which occurs, in the same sense, in Anacreon's ode εἰς χελιδόνα.

Δύσσμος, δύσσμον, a *sweet-smelling herb, mint*, is evidently formed, by apocope, from the ancient word ἡδύσσμος, -ον. For a similar apocope, cf. in ancient Greek, ἀμαυρός and μαυρός; in modern Greek, λιάζω and λιακός for ἡλιάζω and ἡλιακός; σπήτιον (σπίτιον) for ὀσπήτιον (hospitium). So the Italians say, vangelio for evangelio; straniero for straniero. The ancient word μασχάλη becomes, in modern Greek, by prosthesis, ἀμασχάλη.

Βασιλεύω is spoken, in modern Greek, singularly enough, of the setting of the sun, moon, and stars; while the ancient idea of the word was, more naturally, that of the rising of the sun or other heavenly bodies. In so far as it is predicated of the sun (βασιλεύει ὁ ἥλιος, ὁ ἥλιος ἐβασίλευσεν), Coray explains this singular usage thus: Since at the time of vespers, after the setting of the sun, the following words are sung in the churches: ὁ κύριος ἐβασίλευσεν, εὐπρεπέϊαν ἐνεδεύσατο κ. τ. λ.; therefore the common people, from the mere coincidence, have predicated the word βασιλεύω of the setting of the sun; and have also formed from it a derivative noun, βασιλευμα, *sun-set*. Besides this word, the modern Greeks use βουτέω, βουτίζω (anc. word βυθίζω) of the setting of the sun; also the nouns βούτημα, βούτισμα.

The above examples rather show the diversities of the ancient and modern tongues, than their resemblances. The latter are so numerous and striking, as scarcely to require any illustration. For those, however, who have never seen any modern Greek, a specimen or two may be interesting. The following is the commencement of a modern Greek translation of a book, which is very familiar in our language:

Ὁδεύων διὰ τῆς ἐρήμου τοῦ κόσμου τούτου ἐφθασα, εἰς τόπον τινά, ὅπου ἦτο σπήλαιον· ὑπνώσας δὲ ἐντὸς αὐτοῦ ἐνυπνιάσθην. Εἶδον κατ' ὄναρ ὅτι ἄνθρωπός τις ῥακευδύτης ἵστατο ἐπὶ τινος δέσεως, ἐστραμμένον ἔχων τὸ πρόσωπον ἀπὸ τοῦ οἴκου του, κρα-

τῶν βιβλίων ἀνὰ χεῖρας, καὶ μέγα ἔχων φορτίον ἐπὶ τῶν ὤμων του.

No person acquainted with ancient Greek, will find any difficulty in translating this sentence. The title of the book (which was published at Athens in 1854, and was intended for the common people quite as much as for the learned), reads thus : *Ἡ πρόοδος τοῦ χριστιανοῦ ἀποδημούντος ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα*. Not a word occurs in this title which would not have been just as intelligible in the time of Paul as now.

In a modern Greek translation of the Old Testament, published by the British and Foreign Bible Society, the first verse of the first Psalm reads thus :

Μακάριος ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὅστις δὲν ἐπεριπάτησεν εἰς τὴν συμβουλὴν τῶν ἀσεβῶν καὶ εἰς τὸν δρόμον τῶν ἁμαρτωλῶν δὲν ἐστάθη, καὶ εἰς καθέδραν χλευαστῶν δὲν ἐκάθισεν.

The most peculiar word in the above sentence is the negative δέν, evidently an abbreviation of οὐδέν, which, in ancient Greek, was sometimes used as an emphatic form of οὐ. The only thing peculiar in the construction, is the use of εἰς with the accusative, instead of ἐν with the dative. The use of the Aorist tense, in the statement of a general truth, was common in the ancient Greek ; and the same tense is here used in the Septuagint version :

The following possesses a national interest :

Γεωργίῳ Οὐασυγκτῶνι,
ἥρωι, στρατηγῷ, πολιτῇ, ἰδρυτῇ νέας ἐλευθερίας εὐνόμου,
ἢ Σόλωνος, Θεμιστοκλέους, Περικλέους πατρίς
τῆς ἀρχαίας ἐλευθερίας μήτηρ,
τὸν ἀρχαῖον τοῦτον λίθον,
τιμῆς καὶ δαυμασμοῦ τεκμήριον,
ἐκ τοῦ
Παρθενῶνος.

We need scarcely add that the above is the inscription on the block of marble, which the Greek government forwarded as its contribution towards the Washington monument.

It is a remarkable providence, while all the other lan-

guages of Europe have undergone so great changes since the commencement of the Christian era, that the one in which the oracles of our holy religion are recorded by inspired writers, should have been preserved so perfectly and with so few changes. May we not reasonably hope, that the more attentive study of this language, under the increased facilities of the present day, will add greatly to our knowledge of the sacred scriptures? We should be devoutly thankful if the only unfailing light which we possess, in this dark world, is made to shine more brightly.

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

C. L. MICHELET'S HISTORY OF MANKIND, in its Development, from the Year 1775 to the most Recent Times. In 2 vols. Berlin: 1855-60.¹

WE may regard the above-named work as the record of a thoughtful man's views of society and its prospects, gathered from the careful observation and study of the events of the most important period of political history. Though born at the beginning of the present century, he has seen the working of all those changes which date from the era of the American revolution. The author is not a politician, nor an active participant in public affairs; but an academic man and a philosopher. His construction of history is on the Hegelian principle, which has done so much to improve history, and something to impair its simplicity. This method when it is highly speculative, and uses facts only to illustrate theories, is but little better than romance; but when it begins with facts and then merely connects them in a philosophical manner, giving them unity and proportion, it gives to history one of its highest charms. Those writers who have passed through the severe logical discipline of the Hegelian school, and afterwards use that discipline mainly to give form and order to the chaos of facts, are among the best historians of the age. Michelet stands midway between this latter class and those who, like Hegel their master, rather impose a system upon history, than find it

¹ Die Geschichte der Menschheit in ihrem Entwicklungsgange seit dem Jahre 1775, bis auf die neuesten Zeiten von Carl Ludwig Michelet.

in history. A firm believer in progress, and friend of constitutional liberty from philosophical convictions, he finds, in the period of history which he has chosen to represent, namely the revolutionary period, a guaranty that society will never cease in its struggles, till its rational liberty shall be achieved. His philosophy appears only at intervals, taking occasional observations, as it were, and then telling the meaning of the great events that are taking place. Not the least instructive portions of the work are those which explain the causes of the failure, or partial success, of the efforts made to liberate society from the social evils under which it suffers. These reverses are made to teach important lessons. Indeed, it would appear that mankind at large, as well as individuals, learn more from their mistakes, than from anything else. The good and the evil, in all the fermentations of society, are carefully and nicely discriminated according to the author's view; and, in many instances, there is nothing further to be desired except that greater prominence should be given to Christian influence in producing rational liberty.

After contrasting the modern Christian with the ancient pagan civilization, the author sketches the progress of society, in respect to human rights, from the period of the Reformation to that of the French revolution. The Protestant reformation, which began with liberating men from human authority in matters of religion, unhappily ended with a state religion, which made the rights of citizenship depend on the acceptance of certain formularies of faith. One head of the church, the bishop of Rome, was indeed set aside; but another, the monarch of each state, was put in his place. Upon this new system, attacks were made by the deists in England, by the atheists in France, and by the rationalists in Germany. Frederic the Great of Prussia, Catherine II. of Russia, and Joseph II. of Austria, at the head of three of the great powers of Europe, were disciples of the new philosophy, and made strenuous efforts to introduce it into the spirit of their government. Still they ruled as monarchs. The good of the people was not to come from the people themselves, but from their paternal rulers. The social order of the Middle Ages was to pass away, but monarchies were to be consolidated. Thus the three great powers finally swallowed up Poland, because it did not enter into their views of promoting civilization. But all this only aroused the public mind, in Christian Europe, to more earnest thought. The fate of Poland led to ideas of reform, reaching far beyond that which had been contemplated by the three crowned heads. If the divine right exercised by Louis XIV. made men thoughtful of human rights, which were one day to be recognized, the fiendish orgies of the regency which followed the demise of that despot, and the misrule of the two next reigns, entirely destroyed the respect which had been paid to royalty, and united the great body of the people in the purpose to look after their own interests. The divine right of kings no longer existed even as a superstition; and since that time no monarch has sat firmly on the throne of France, who has not, in some form or other, *obtained leave of the people to rule over them.* For

this principle, that the people are the source of all political power, it is that the nations of southern Europe have been struggling since the beginning of the present century. While the example of France is most influential in crumbling to atoms the old systems of government, that of America is doing most towards bringing before the civilized world those forms of government that, at the same time, secure both liberty and order.

The author views all the phases of the history of the age in the light of political and religious freedom ; and writes with great coolness on the most exciting topics, and analyzes what he has in hand as carefully and minutely as a chemist does in his laboratory. It is this feature of his work that is the most attractive as well as the most instructive.

In the great and continued struggle between the absolute monarchies of the east of Europe and the constitutional monarchies of the west, Prussia has often held an ambiguous position. England, France, and the German states along the Rhine have, by their increasing influence on the subject of popular representation, often excited the fears of the Austrian and Russian cabinets. Prussia has, at times, been seen yielding to the advancing ideas of the age ; and, in her more generous moods, has imprudently made promises to her subjects which she has not fulfilled. She has been too often entangled in the net of Austrian diplomacy, and induced to put an interpretation upon the pledges given by her sovereign, which leave a stain upon the word and honor of royalty. The provincial assemblies met with high expectation, and a stone was given them instead of bread. That the tergiversation of William IV. should all be laid bare and published in Berlin, by a philosopher who so fearlessly claims the right to speak the truth, is somewhat surprising.

Nearly all the great political movements of Europe, for three quarters of a century, have proceeded from France as their common centre. The successive periods of her history, therefore, very naturally form the divisions of a more general history of the political state of the continental powers. The first period, according to the arrangement of the author, is that in which the old order of things in the west of Europe was completely demolished, and the doctrine of legitimacy trampled in the dust, the period from 1789 to 1813. The second is that of the reaction which followed, the restoration of the Bourbons by foreign powers, during which a weak and lame legitimacy had a fair opportunity to show its incompetency to rule a nation so full of new ideas of society as the French of the present century have ever been, from 1813 to 1830. The third and last period, reaching to the present, is distinguished for the reassertion of the doctrine that all political power, the royal and the imperial, no less than the representative, *comes from the people*, and is held only during their good pleasure. This is, in fact, the great principle, for which the nations of southern Europe are now contending. The form of government which the people shall choose, is a secondary consideration. The first point to be settled is, whether they are to have any government at all, of their own choice. Are rulers to hold their place in the

name of the people, or in the abused name of God? Are they to be looked upon as men, and as public functionaries, or as the representatives of Divinity, seeking the good of their subjects only by way of gracious condescension? In short, does government descend upon the people, or does it ascend from them? These are the vital questions which the present generation has undertaken, in earnest, to settle, on a popular basis. Thus the writer, though a calm, philosophical historian, advances from the beginning, step by step, towards the all-absorbing political topics of the present day. A clearer and better survey, in bold outline, of the progress of revolutionary tendencies, in our age, it will not be easy to find. With this imperfect notice, we must take leave of the work, as we are obliged to resist the temptation which, in the present case, to us as Americans, is very strong, to enter into a discussion of subjects foreign to the purposes of a theological review.

H. HETTNER'S LITERARY HISTORY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.
In Three Parts. Part First, 1856; Part Second, 1860.¹

THE eighteenth century may be regarded as the century of rationalism, that term being used in its widest sense, including the scepticism of England and France as well as of Germany. It is true that the deism of England commenced in the seventeenth century, and the rationalism of the Germans extended into the nineteenth; but the sceptical philosophy, in its full strength, belonged to the eighteenth century. Its power, before that period, was not great; and since then, it has been broken. To represent this great and wide-spread intellectual movement, in different countries, in the whole domain of science and literature, is the object of the author. His aim is rather philosophical than aesthetical or bibliographical. The writers of philosophical and scientific works, not only come first in order, on account of their influence over works of the imagination and taste, but occupy more space than is allotted to the poets. Indeed, it is the history of thought, originating in philosophical ideas, and spreading over the whole field of literature, that the author undertakes to give. Those who look for brilliant chapters, description of works of genius, for bits of antiquarian information, or for spicy anecdotes, will lay down the book in disappointment; but those who desire to see a philosophical view of the whole subject, comprehensive, learned and well digested, will feel thankful that the work has fallen into such competent hands. There is but one drawback, and that is, the thorough scepticism of the author. While most men look back with pity upon an age which, while it was doing the necessary work of freeing Europe from the incubus of hypocrisy and superstition, in its undue zeal and haste, threw away Christianity at the same time with the abuses of a corrupt

¹ *Literaturgeschichte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts von Hermann Hettner, in drie Theilen.*

church, this writer, full of admiration for his heroes, represents freethinking as the peculiar glory of modern times. There is, however, so much sincerity and fairness in his portraiture of men and systems, and so sound and philosophical a judgment on most points, that the well-informed reader has little to do but to shake his head at certain passages, and, at the final summing up, insert or omit the word "not," as the case may require.

The three leading nations of modern culture, England, France, and Germany, while originating ideas for the rest of Europe, act and react, most powerfully, upon each other. The work of inquiry or speculation, started and carried to a certain point in one country, is taken up by another where the first left it, and advanced another stage; and then a third takes hold of it and gives it a new development or makes a new application of it. It sometimes happens that a new path, opened by an individual, is followed out by persons of kindred spirit in another country, sooner than in his own. But passing over cases of individual priority, we may affirm that the note of the freethinker was first sounded in England; and that France joined half a century later; and Germany, at a later period still. Deism, in England, had its rise, growth, and decay between 1660 and 1770. The infidelity of France commenced near the close of Louis XIV.'s reign, and extended through the period of the revolution. In Germany, rationalism began in the theological faculty, with Semler, about the middle of the last century, and continued till near the middle of the present. The author, accordingly, divides his work into three parts, devoting the first volume to the literature of England; the second, to that of France; and the third, not yet published, to that of Germany. Though the author treats of the literature of the eighteenth century in general: yet, as he founds his whole work on philosophical ideas, and traces these through all their windings in the literary productions of the age, it is that feature of his book rendered prominent by containing a history of opinions, which is the most novel, interesting, and instructive.

In reading the volume relating to England, we naturally compare it with our compendiums and other works on the history of English literature. But it has so few features in common with any of them, that it appears more in the light of contrast than of resemblance. The part which is principal with him, is subsidiary with all the English writers, Hallam himself not excepted. More than half the volume finds a parallel rather in Lechler's excellent *History of English Deism*,¹ than in any other recent production. But the latter goes more into detail, and is written more in a theological spirit.

The influence of both Newton and Locke, though they themselves were decidedly Christian, is represented as being indirectly favorable to scepticism: that of the former by establishing the doctrine that nature is governed by laws, which later physicists, in many instances, extend so far as to make them take the place of a personal Deity; the latter, by denying *intuitive ideas*, thus cutting off the passage from the natural to the supernatural world.

¹ Geschichte des englischen Deismus von S. V. Lechler Stuttgart, 1841.

There may be some truth in the statement, that the disciples of Locke, both in England and France, following out, to their last results, the tendencies of some of his teachings, rather than adhering to his opinions, failed to reconcile those results with Christianity. But when the student of natural philosophy sees in nature an eternal order without an ordaining Power, he may be scientific, and even Newtonian, in ascertaining the uniformity and universality of the laws of nature, and yet find nothing either in modern science or in any of the principles laid down by Newton, furnishing even the shadow of proof that the existing order of nature is without beginning or end. So much is true, that all men of science are greatly indebted to Newton; and that some of these men have, by the boldest of all speculations, adopted the *hypothesis* of materialism. The deists of England were, many of them, undoubtedly, men of considerable talent. Few of them, however, were men of profound science, and none of them were sound historical critics or biblical scholars, compared with the present standard of criticism and scholarship. Their objections to Christianity, drawn from history or the Bible, are, at present, regarded as so trivial that no great scholar will take the trouble to refute them. Nine-tenths of the present theologians of Germany regard them in this light. Indeed, Lechler wrote the history of English deism for the express purpose of furnishing a sort of antiquarian information for those who wished to understand the English apologists for Christianity. In the highest walks of learning, deism is now a matter of history rather than of belief; and the deistical writers are regarded as comparatively harmless. They are read, as Celsus and Lucian are, for the light they throw on the spirit of the times, not for any effect which they can produce upon our convictions.

In the first period, according to the author's division, including the last thirty years before the English Revolution, after a full account of Newton, the feeble beginning of deism, by Herbert, Rochester, and Blount, is briefly described; after which, the influence of Spinoza and Bayle, upon the English, is pointed out. Then the political writers, Hobbs, Filmer, and Sidney, and the poets, from Milton to Wycherley and Congreve, occupy a larger space. In the second period, from the accession of William of Orange to the death of George I. in 1727, the history of the discussions on constitutional liberty is followed by an elaborate account of the influence of Locke upon the whole freethinking world, making him largely accountable for the peculiar philosophy of the eighteenth century. While the parallel between Newton and Locke holds in respect to similarity of method, in the physics of the one and the metaphysics of the other, there is a great difference in respect to the perpetuity of their respective doctrines. Newton's method will never be questioned; but, that Locke viewed mind too much after the analogy of matter, and overlooked some of the peculiarities of the former, is now the general belief of the philosophic world. It is a little remarkable that a German should falter somewhat, as our author does, in making this statement. Still he is too well informed and too candid to deny the ideal ten-

dency of modern philosophy, of which he seems anxious to inspire a salutary dread.

Collins was the first to turn the philosophy of Locke, as a weapon, against Christianity. But he was, himself, no great philosopher. His "*Discourse of Freethinking*," like one of a similar title in recent times, is a bold, flip-pant production. Toland was a much abler man, a controversialist whom Leibnitz did not disdain to encounter. He passed, by successive steps, through all the phases of unbelief, beginning with a faith in the scriptures rationalistically interpreted, proceeding to an exaltation of the reason above the scriptures; then, to the arraignment of it against the scriptures; till at last he plunged completely into the abyss of pantheism. In all this, how true a mirror he is of many of the transformations that are now taking place in the minds of enlightened young men! His "*Pantheisticon*" is worthy of Strauss or Feuerbach. Here we find "the worship of genius," "the religion of the future," and the symposia of philosophers and poets, of which the modern pantheists are so fond.

Shaftsbury and Mandeville, as moralists, wrote works of similar tendency; and the revived freemasonry of the times was little else than an engine in the service of deism. Passing over the poets and essayists of this period, from Pope to Swift, we come to the last period, embracing twenty years before and twenty years after the middle of the last century.

After treating of the writers on government and political economy, among whom Bolingbroke is classed, the author resumes the thread of discourse relating to deism, and represents Tindal, Morgan, and Chubb as naturalists, holding to the identity of Christianity and natural religion. Of course Christianity, by them, is brought down to the level of natural religion. The remainder of the volume contains a pretty full account of the principal writers of the age, whether in prose or poetry.

Turning his attention, in the second volume, to France, the author, in pursuing his general theme, passes into a different sphere. The French mind is unlike the English. The state of society in the two countries was wholly different. The French monarchy, during and after the time of Louis XIV., was a crushing despotism. The ecclesiastical establishment, the chief pillar of the throne, was no less oppressive. Anything that promised to undermine either the one or the other, was embraced with eagerness. The constitutional liberty of England, and the freedom of thought in matters of religion, which prevailed there, were objects of envy to the French people. Civil troubles, growing out of an order of things that was deemed sacred, prepared the people for the doctrines of "illumination." Scepticism, which was limited to a small part of society in England, and which was fairly met and overcome, in the numerous defences of Christianity which it called forth, swept over all classes of society in France, and overturned the church and the state simultaneously. The English were the originators, but the French were the propagators, of the antichristian sentiments of the age. The latter, by their light poetry, satire, and wit; by popular treatises, dictionaries, and encyclopedias; by history, travels, corre-

spendence, and tracts on science, diffused their ideas far more widely than the former. And, as the French was the current language of courts and of literature, in all the world, it was through the medium of French authors that the views of the French were diffused throughout Europe.

In point of practical importance, or rather of influence upon society, the French literature of this period deserves particular attention; though it has no great depth, originality, or splendor. Few authors of the sceptical school of literature will hereafter be known, except by historians and antiquarians.

In the first book, covering the period of the last years of Louis XIV., the regency of the duke of Orleans, and the ministry of cardinal Fleury, the author presents a history of the origin of this new species of literature in France; in the second, a description of it in its flourishing period, from Voltaire to Rousseau; in the third, an account of its power and influence on mankind in all countries and in all ranks of society. The author lays out his chief strength upon the second book, which occupies nearly three-fourths of the volume. Perhaps no writer has given better evidence of an exhaustive study of the works of Voltaire, and of those which relate to him. After admitting that he is neither a profound nor a systematic thinker, yet, on account of his great influence as a writer, the author gives a most elaborate and discriminating view of all his religious, moral, and philosophical opinions, and of the various changes which his mind underwent in respect to them. This chapter will be prized by every true scholar.

The chief fault of Voltaire, both in philosophy and religion, was his fanatical opposition to Christianity. He did not satisfy himself with his hostility to the Catholic religion, or to the Christian church; but he set himself, equally, in opposition to the primitive Christianity of the Bible: *écrasez l'infame* was a word spoken in earnest, and indicated the settled purpose of his life. The weapons he used, in this life-long warfare against Christianity, were borrowed, almost exclusively, from the deistical writers of England. The history of revelation, as recorded in the Bible, he put upon the same level with the various systems of pagan mythology. The lofty and pure spirit of the scriptures were overlooked. The power of Christianity for good, both to the individual and to society was ignorantly denied. It was violently torn from its harmonies with the whole history of mankind, and contradictions, purely imaginary, were forced upon it. It was, without a previous study of its nature, with suitable means and a candid spirit, subjected to coarse ribaldry, sarcasm, and wit.

But Voltaire was no atheist. He was a determined and firm believer in a personal God; not, however, to satisfy any longings of the heart, of which he seemed to be destitute, but to answer the cool demands of the intellect. He believed, indeavourtly, in a God, with whom men have little to do. Taking an intermediate position, between the Christian philosopher, who believes in a self-revealing Divinity, and the materialist, who believes only in nature, without an intelligent author, Voltaire uses his best endeavors to prove the existence of God. He employs all the arguments with which

men are so familiar, from effect to cause. Whatever exists has the ground of its being either in itself or in something else : if in itself, then it is God ; if in something else, then that other thing is God. This is his favorite argument. Therefore he sums all up in a word : *Vous existez, donc il y a un Dieu.* He even says : *Si Dieu n'existait pas, il faudrait l'inventer ; mais toute la nature nous crie, qu'il existe.*

He was a strenuous defender of the doctrine of final causes. To say, as the materialists do, that the eye is not made for sight, or for anything else ; but that men discovering, by accident, that it is good for that purpose, use it accordingly, is as absurd as to say that a watch is not made to keep time. Indeed, we may affirm, that within and around us there is no such thing as nature ; all is art. Nature has reason to complain of her name as distinguishing her from art.

In all the earlier part of his life, Voltaire was a devoted "optimist," believing, with Bolingbroke and Pope, that all "partial ill is universal good." For the last twenty or thirty years of his life, he believed not in seeming, but in real, evil. Though he could not on philosophical principles, account for the existence of evil, the fact, he said, was too palpable to be denied. This sober conviction, this darker view of the actual condition of mankind, which seems to have been brought on by the reflections to which the earthquake of Lisbon gave rise in 1755, finally gave vent to itself in a keen satire against the theory of optimism, in the tale of an unfortunate person, who, true to this faith, was forever exclaiming, in all honesty and sincerity, at every new stroke of calamity : *Tout est pour le mieux dans le meilleur des mondes possibles.*

Strong as Voltaire was in his belief in a supreme Being, he had no great confidence in our knowledge of what God is. Just as little did he confide in any knowledge we may profess to have of the nature of our own minds. At times he doubted the immateriality and future existence of the soul ; but more frequently, the moral argument gained the ascendancy over the physiological, and forced him to believe in a future retribution. In his view of mental philosophy, he was a strict follower of Locke, whose system he had carefully studied during his sojourn in England. Denying altogether the existence of innate ideas, and maintaining strenuously that the mind is wholly dependent on the impressions of sense for its ideas, he was troubled to account for the liberty of the will, if he conceded that this faculty also was dependent on impressions from without. A late French writer, Bersot, in his *Philosophy of Voltaire*, makes him an advocate of free will. Forländer, in his *History of English and French Ethics and Politics*, represents him as a fatalist. Hettner has demonstrated that, in the first part of his life, he held the former position ; in the last part, the latter.

It is a little singular, that while Locke, in refuting the doctrine of innate ideas, denied the universality and uniformity of moral distinctions, Voltaire maintained, in opposition to his master, an original moral faculty, and the immutable nature of its distinctions. He says, positively : "In this particular I differ from Locke, and agree with the great Newton, who says *natura*

est semper sibi consona," that is, that the conscience is everywhere essentially the same.

The chapter on materialism, as maintained by Diderot and his numerous followers, is interesting as furnishing an almost perfect parallel to the new German materialism, of which an account was given in a former number of this journal. Starting with Newton's principle of gravitation, and the laws of motion, the materialists diverged from the track of that philosopher, when they came to the point of the origin of motion, or what is now called the relation of force to matter. Newton maintained that motion in matter is always to be referred to a spiritual cause. Diderot affirmed that the force which resides in matter, and which forms a part of its nature, is itself the ultimate cause of all motion. Neither the French school of materialism, nor the German, has ever been able to prove that it was not necessary for an Almighty hand to set the world in motion, or for an Almighty power to act continuously on and through matter, to produce the results contemplated by Infinite Wisdom. The materialist merely affirms, what he cannot prove, that there is no matter without force, and no force without matter. By what experiment or observation does he ascertain that there is no force without matter? If he admits the possibility of any form of existence, in the whole universe, which his senses do not recognize, he must admit the possibility of a spiritual form, for anything that his senses can show to the contrary. So much for the demonstrative character of materialism. Which hypothesis best explains a universe full of the most admirable contrivances — man, with his wonderful instincts; history, with its system of moral forces and laws of indefinite progress; and Christianity, as it actually exists and influences mankind; that of a blind fate, or that of an infinitely intelligent Spirit? When men pretend, by means of modern science, to demonstrate the truth of atheism, the pretension will be likely to go for what it is worth.

The most original character presented in this volume is Rousseau. He is, at the same time, the child and the foe of the new illumination. His opposition to the state and the church sprang from other causes than those which influenced Voltaire. Enthusiastically attached to what is simple and natural, he opposed the existing order of society because it was artificial and oppressive, as he supposed, to every true child of nature. He had more heart than intellect, and entertained ravishing ideas of God and nature. His breast glowed with an enthusiasm for his ideal, to which Voltaire was a total stranger. He could not withhold his admiration from Christ and his gospel; though, from its limited influence, he could not view it as so important to mankind as natural religion, which is universal. The single aim of all his writings is to render men purely natural; to make them the guileless children of nature in the midst of society. He did not oppose culture or refinement; but what was unnatural, what was injuriously artificial in civilized life. His writings are a perfect medley of wisdom and folly, equally abounding in important and true principles and in errors and extravagances. He directed his attention to education, government, and religion. The excellences and the defects of the method practised by the Pestaloz-

zians and Philanthropists, in education, are traceable to his teachings. He was the most original and influential writer of the last century, on this subject. His ideas of government are too wild to need comment. As his *Émilie ou de l'Éducation* was, for his age, the gospel of education, to use the words of Goethe, so was his *Contrat Social* the gospel of freedom in the whirling eddies of the French revolution. His arguments against materialism, which spring from a deeper source than those of Voltaire, coming from the whole soul, and not merely from the cold, calculating intellect, cannot be noticed here. We have already exceeded our just limits, although the poets, essayists, novelists, and the writers on government, have been passed over in silence. The topics which have been discussed were selected partly because they are characteristic of the book, and partly because they are germane to the subjects which fall within the range of theological science.

HISTORY OF THE LITERATURE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, FROM 1789 TO 1795. By Schmidt. Weissenfels, Pragne, 1859.¹

THIS volume is a suitable companion to the second volume of Hettner's work noticed above. It not only takes up the story where he dropped it, but is in the highest degree a special history. The literature of the period is wholly political, not consisting of works of permanent value written with the art and pride of authorship, but of pamphlets, newspaper articles, fugitive and theatrical pieces, and songs prepared for special occasions, as the readiest means of influencing the people. As literary productions they are hardly worthy of preservation. They are valuable only as a part of history, furnishing an insight into the state of popular feeling during that extraordinary period, not otherwise to be obtained. It gives a side view of the whole revolutionary movement, presenting the same general picture in a new and interesting light. We know not that this subject has ever been so thoroughly studied and so completely represented before.

In beginning with the *Telemaque* of Fenelon, the author would seem to go far back in seeking for the first revolutionary ideas. Yet there he finds the first utterance of ideas, which, however they might have been in Fenelon's mind, were distinctively revolutionary in the minds of a later generation. He quotes the following words, pointed out by Chateaubriand, as the earliest passage expressing, as if by prophecy, the idea of the revolution: *Il voit tomber un roi despotique, dont la tête sanglante, secouée par les cheveux, est montrée en spectacle au peuple qu'il opprimait.* He elsewhere says that government is a contract between ruler and people; and if the king violates the contract, the people are no longer bound to obey him. Montesquieu, in his *Esprit des Loix*, contributed vastly more towards the formation of a sentiment which demanded a revolution. Diderot and the other Encyclopedists gave the boldest and clearest utterance to such a sentiment. What could

¹ Geschichte der französischen Revolutions-Literatur.

not be effected by grave discussion, was accomplished by the inexhaustible wit and brilliant raillery of Voltaire. Towards constructing a new order of things, Rousseau did what Voltaire did for destroying the old. Beaumarchais's *Figaro* brought the vices and political sins of the great upon the stage and destroyed their credit with the people. Sièyes's pamphlet entitled, *Qu'est-ce que le Tiers État?* threw a fire-brand into the combustible materials of the nation. That and Rousseau's *Contract Social* formed for the time the people's articles of faith. On the very title-page of that pamphlet, the author furnished the answer: "What is the Third Estate? It is everything." He then proceeds to say: "What has it been hitherto? Nothing. What does it now demand? To be something." The press had never yet become the organ of public opinion, as it is at present. The Third Estate had not participated in public affairs. Of its vast numbers, few belonged to the reading classes. Men had not yet begun to write for the multitude. Mirabeau, at once, saw the use that might be made of the press in circulating popular tracts, and in a system of journalism. For the masses of the people who could not read, — and they were inconceivably great at that time — the stage was afterwards resorted to, and political ideas were presented in a dramatic form, and shouted to the multitude by such men as Talma. Against the orders of the Government, Mirabeau, with bold defiance, continued to publish his *Journal des États-généraux*, spreading before the people the doings of the National Assembly. Such a regular issue of political information was as unprecedented then as it is universal now. His example was followed by others, and this first journal was soon eclipsed by the *Annales Françaises* and the *Moniteur*. He who could say to the King's minister: "Go, tell your master", — as if he were an outside man, — who, when the Assembly proposed an address to the king, beginning with the words: "The Assembly lays at your Majesty's feet," could say: "Majesty has no feet," with a voice and manner that were no less remarkable than his language, was evidently the man for the Tribune, rather than for the editor's table. Besides this and numerous other journals and pamphlets, — at one time nearly a hundred in a week, and usually two or three a day, — were issued for and by the Clubs, which were so eagerly read and discussed that the *Cafés* were converted into so many tribunes. It was at one of these Clubs that the pamphlet was prepared which proposed the storming of the Bastille. In this it is said, in allusion to the report that the king was to interfere with the Assembly: "He who shall venture to touch the liberties of the deputies will have the hand of the people upon him."

The most spirited and polished writer for the journals at this period of the Revolution was the classical, genial, and yet fantastical and unfortunate Desmoulins. He it was who, on the night before the storming of the Bastille, mounted the table in the Palais-Royal, the chief place of concourse, and carried all before him as he uttered these words: "Friends, shall we die like hares hunted down; like sheep dragged to the place of slaughter, bleating for mercy where there is no mercy; nothing but the sharpened knife? The hour is come, the decisive hour for France and for all mankind,

in which there shall be a reckoning between the oppressed and the oppressor, and the watchword shall be, 'Speedy death or deliverance.' Welcome the hour. For us there is but one fitting cry: 'To arms! Let all Paris, all France, as with the voice of the whirlwind, resound with the cry, to arms.' The press was now the ruling power. Successful speeches, brief and pointed, like the above, were printed and placarded. Songs, like the *Ça ira* and the later *Marseillaise*, went like lightning through the land, and this whole species of literature, if we may so call it, took the place of the grave, philosophical discussions of earlier days. The philosophers had either disappeared from the stage, or sunk in the public estimation. Now followed the supremacy of demagogues; and of the demagogues of the press, Marat was the most unscrupulous, fiendish, and influential. His *Ami du Peuple*, now the leading party organ, was addressed to the prejudices and passions of the multitude. By his example of successful scurrility, other journalists were induced to descend below their natural level in order to strengthen their hold upon the lower classes of the people. Next to Marat in abusive language was Carra, editor of the *Annales Patriotique*. Desmoulins, editor of the *Revolutions de France et de Brabant*, had more elevation in his wit, and more historical solidity in what he wrote. Du Pan's *Moniteur* is distinguished from the other journals by the comparative sobriety and calmness of its tone.

The chief dramatic poet of the Revolution was Chénier, whose *Charles IX.* called forth the great powers of Talma, the tragedian. This play, on account of its graphic portraiture of tyranny and priestcraft, was long a favorite with the Parisian people. Next in rank was the comic poet, Collot d'Herbois.

The fiercest literary contest during this whole period was that which raged between the Catholic clergy and the revolutionists through the whole year of 1791. The priests accommodated themselves to circumstances until they were required to swear to the articles imposed upon them by the National Assembly, which the majority, under the instruction of their superiors, refused to do. There was now a flood of pamphlets written and widely circulated, on both sides. The priests employed colporteurs to carry them from house to house. The example was followed in the provinces, producing everywhere divisions and feuds of the most alarming character. The revolutionary party were not outdone in this direct appeal to the populace. The wits and most spirited young writers of the party employed all their powers to counteract and destroy the effect of those efforts. A torrent of ridicule was poured upon the priests and upon their religion. Men with stentorian voices and of skill in declamation were selected and sent into the streets to rehearse what others had written, to listening multitudes. In these pieces, often in the form of a dialogue, the wealth, luxury, avarice, and vices of the clergy were set forth, with many a recital of questionable and ludicrous scenes between monks and nuns, bishops and mistresses. The speakers often mounted out-of-door stages, such as are common at the annual fairs, attracting general attention by their violent or comical action.

The foes of the clergy, feeling assured that ridicule was the most effectual means of destroying the respect which had so long been associated with the sacred character of the church and its functionaries, resorted to caricatures to illustrate their subjects and to reach the dullest mind by glaring pictures addressed to the sense. Priests in grotesque forms, with all the pomp of clerical robes and marks of dignity, were usually presented in ambiguous relations with nuns and disreputable women. Such caricatures were suspended on the quays, along the Boulevards, and in all the places of resort, till the public taste was perfectly vitiated, and all respect for decency, not to say, veneration for sacred things, was lost.

From the beginning of the Revolution to Mirabeau's death, April 1792, the literature of the journals was the engine of greatest power in directing the popular will. From that time onward the literature of the Clubs was the predominant power. The Jacobins were at that time a moderate party, not wishing to break with the King. The Cordeliers were the most violently revolutionary of all the Clubs. Most of the journals were under their direction. But what now gave them the greatest influence was the circumstance that they had invented the device of issuing formal decrees, and posting them in public places. The delay of the King in signing the act respecting the clergy, and his attending mass administered by a priest who refused to take the oath, was the occasion of the first proclamation of this Club, directed against the shadow of the Bourbon power that was still remaining. It was therein declared that the first functionary of the nation and the first subject of the laws of the National Assembly, had perjured himself in violating the constitutional laws which he had sworn to maintain. The ill-boding flight of the King was the astounding result of this proclamation. The same Club put up the following placard: "Strayed from the Tuilleries, a fat swine. Any person, finding the same, and returning him to his place, shall receive a suitable reward." The article of greatest political importance was the *Adresse aux Français*, placarded by Du Châtelet. It was attributed to La Fayette, under whom Châtelet served as an adjutant in America: but was written, as is now known, by Thomas Paine. It was the terse logic of the statement in respect to the present legal relations of the King to the nation, that gave it such force.

The practice of issuing decrees, previously considered by the clubs, led to another great change—that of preparing articles for the press by the joint labors of the club. What appeared in print was no longer the opinions of individuals. It was not Marat, Desmoulins, Gorsas, Carra, Frinon, Royou, or Prudhomme that wrote, but the party in their collective capacity. This organized action, which gave a new aspect to things, was itself the result of a movement now become too general and too wide-spread to be directed by individuals. Intellectually, the revolution was already accomplished. The physical act only was wanting; and for this the instruments, Robespierre, Danton, and Marat were at hand.

The period of the Revolution divides the classic poetry of France from the modern romantic poetry, somewhat as the Middle Ages separate the antique

culture from the modern. Only curious scholars will trouble themselves with studying such descriptive poets as Saint-Lambert, Delille, Roucher, and Fontanes. Lebrun's Pindarics are better. André Chénier, brother of the dramatist, is honored, by Victor Hugo, Lamartine, and others, as the founder of their new romantic school. No other single piece, written during this period, can compare with Rouget de l'Isle's *Marseillaise*.

So long as the work of the revolutionists was merely destructive, the different elements among them could be kept together; but as soon as the monarchy was overthrown, the conservative and the violent men necessarily separated from each other. The former, the Girondists, and the latter, the Jacobins, were now arrayed in deadly hostility to each other; and it was a war of extermination. It began with the press. On the side of the Girondists, Brissot was the literary champion. His *Patriote Français* was undoubtedly the ablest polemical journal of the French revolution. While others used hard words, he used hard arguments. His passions served only to give fire and sublimity to his eloquence. Even Louis XVI., when he received his sentence, remarked: "I thought Brissot would save me." Brissot was supported by other journals, conducted with great ability, such as Condorset's *Cronique de Paris*, Souvet's *Sentinelle*, and Gorsas's *Courier des Départements*. His bitterest and fiercest Jacobin opponents were Robespierre, Desmoulins, and Marat. Each party excelled, in its own way. In their sharp encounters, the Girondists were always triumphant in argument, in the view of all intelligent and high-minded men; but, unfortunately for them, of such judges very few were now to be found. The people, demoralized and imbruted, were too much in sympathy with the Jacobins. There was truth in what Danton said to the Girondists: "You have the advantage of us in knowledge, but not in daring and revolutionary power." This became quite apparent in the National Convention, where power prevailed over the right, and the persons of Girondist deputies, as well as journalists, were in danger (a state of civilization not without its parallels elsewhere). Here the last battle was fought, the Girondist leaders, for the most part, relinquishing their journals, and bravely standing up in the convention and maintaining a lofty and heroic attitude, till the last remains of the party, twenty-one in number, passed through the blood-thirsty crowd, singing the *Marseillaise* as they went to meet their fate on the scaffold.

During all this period, the theatres resounded with nothing but party politics. Nearly all the pieces were directed against kings, nobles, and priests, the different theatres varying, in tone, according to the sentiment of the parties which they represented, and the times in which the pieces were respectively written.

The scenes of the revolution, from the fall of the Girondists to the death of Robespierre, were little adapted to encourage any species of literature. Under that intellectual party, the political press reached the summit of its power. Never had the people of France been so given to reading as at that

time. During the period between the supremacy of Robespierre and that of Napoleon, the press rose again to power, and was effectually used against the Jacobins and in support of order.

In the foregoing sketch, enough has been given, we trust, to indicate the character of the book named at the head of this article. Only a part of the topics could be selected, and those touched upon but lightly.

MOODS AND TENSES OF THE GREEK VERB.¹

THE treatise which Mr. Goodwin has furnished on the Greek moods and tenses, was much needed. There is no part of the Greek grammar where the student finds himself more perplexed than in regard to the right use of these. The more general and simple usage is understood ; but beyond this, the feeling has been quite prevalent in our institutions of learning, that the system is like the oriental hieroglyphics, the key to which has not yet been found.

The use of the tenses present fewer difficulties than that of the moods. There is comparatively little obscurity in the tenses of the Indicative ; and yet many a student stumbles over the use of an Imperfect, where he sees no distinction between it and the Aorist ; or finds himself embarrassed in showing why the Aorist often occurs where he would have expected the Pluperfect ; or does not see why the Pluperfect or Future Perfect is of so infrequent occurrence ; or how the relations which would seem to require the frequent use of these tenses, are indicated without them.

But there is still greater difficulty in comprehending the use of the tenses not in the Indicative. The Imperative Present, Perfect, and Aorist, has each its own force ; the Present, Perfect, Future, and Aorist Optative, are each different. — But the moods themselves present greater difficulties than the tenses. The Indicative is easily mastered ; but when is the Subjunctive, and when the Optative, to be used ? There are general principles here which the diligent student soon makes his own ; while there are so many usages, apparently subject to no law, outside of these general principles, that but few of the students in our schools and colleges will readily point out the reason which governs the writer in the use of them. A college officer remarked, a few years since, that, at the time he entered upon his duties in the college, if all the Greek Subjunctives had been changed into Optatives, and the Optatives into Subjunctives, he would have detected no difference in the meaning. And one needs only to ask close questions on this subject, in any of our institutions, to learn that the deficiencies here are very great. There is nothing like the facility in explaining the use of moods in Greek that there is in Latin. The distinction between apparently similar but really different expressions, or expressions that present the thought from a different point of view, too often escape notice. So, too, cases supposed as possible,

¹ Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb. By W. W. Goodwin, Ph. D. Cambridge : Sever and Francis, 1860. 12mo. pp. 311.

and mere suppositions, are confounded ; and also general truths and single or particular acts. But when the student has made himself master of the subject, he finds an appreciable difference between such expressions as the following : ἡρώτησεν αὐτὸν μὴ ποιεῖν ταῦτα and ποιεῖσαι ταῦτα ; οὕτως ποιοῖεν and ποιεῖσαι ; ἔλεγον ὅτι τεθνήκοι and τέθνηκε ; ἔαν λέγῃ τοῦτο and λέξῃ , or εἰ λέγοι τοῦτο and εἰ λέξαι ; τοῦτο ἔπαρε ἵνα μὴ διδολῇ δίκην and δολῇ ; and so many other expressions and formulas, which are too often regarded as being of the same purport.

This difficult subject Mr. Goodwin has treated very ably, and has brought it within a more definite and tangible form than we have before seen it. The principles or rules are stated with great clearness, and are fully illustrated by pertinent examples. The careful study of the work will extricate the student from the mazes in which he usually finds himself on this subject ; his written exercises will soon be made to conform more closely to good classical usage ; and the author studied will be better understood — the precise shape of the thought often turning on the use of a particular mood or tense.

The book is in a very attractive form, and is printed with unusual accuracy. The few typographical errors we have detected, are not important ones.

H. REUCHLIN'S HISTORY OF ITALY, from the Establishment of the reigning Dynasties to the Present Time. In two Parts. Part First, 1859. Part Second, first division, 1860.¹

In examining the above-named work we recognize, at once, the able and skilful historian of the Port-Royalists, and biographer of Pascal. We find the same thoroughness and completeness of investigation, the same massive strength and vigor of intellect, and the same sound judgment and love of truth which distinguish his former productions. These small volumes form the third and fourth parts of Bredermann's Political History of the most Recent Times, mentioned in a former number, in connection with von Rochau's recent History of France. We hardly know which most to admire, the labor spent in examining and sifting the vast amount of Italian and foreign documents, which occupied the author many years — a part of which were passed in Italy — or the historical fidelity and candor with which he has weighed the authority of conflicting accounts given by different classes of writers. Whatever difference of opinion there may be in respect to the views of the author, no one will accuse him of being superficial in his knowledge or flippant in his judgments. After giving a clear statement of the condition of Italy as it was before, during, and immediately after the French

¹ Geschichte Italiens von Gründung der regierenden Dynasten bis zur Gegenwart von Hermann Reuchlin, in Zweie Theilen. Erster Theil, Leipzig, 1859. Zweiter Theil, erste Abtheilung, 1860.

Revolution, he takes up its history at the restoration of the old order of things on the overthrow of the Napoleon dynasty, and carries the narration forward, in Part first, to the revolution of 1848. Part second gives the history of that revolution; and will, probably, in the unfinished division of it, include the revolution of 1859. His German sympathies do not blind him to the true character of the Austrian rule in Italy; nor, on the other hand, does he overlook the rashness and feebleness of those premature efforts of the Italian insurgents which, ten years ago, prejudiced their cause in the estimation even of the friends of liberty abroad. He intimates that, as the Italians have, at last, done justice to themselves and to their character, he will not fail to do the same, when he shall mark the glorious part of their history. The story is too long a one for us to enter upon at all; and we will only add that the work of Reuchlin forms a complete supplement to Leo's admirable History of Italy.

S. ABEL'S FALL OF THE KINGDOM OF THE LONGOBARDS IN ITALY.
Göttingen, 1859.¹

THE author here presents an essay of special interest to the professed historian. It is an attempt to throw new light upon a very obscure period of Italian and German history. The decline of the Greek power in Italy; the beginning of the territorial possessions of the bishops of Rome; the renewal of the Western Roman empire by a pretended transfer of it, by the papal authority, to Pepin and Charlemagne: these points are all involved in the subject of this historical essay. The materials for a new and more complete history of this period are now furnished by the *Monumenta Germanica Historica*, edited by Pertz. We only regret that the young author, who gives evidence of possessing such superior qualifications, and who has really made such a valuable though limited contribution to our knowledge, has not given us a much more extended work. It is to be hoped that, having made so good a beginning, this critical historian will proceed, in his peculiar line of investigation, and reduce to greater certainty the history of the period which he seems to have chosen for his studies.

W. BESSEL ON THE LIFE OF ULFILAS and the Conversion of the Goths to Christianity. Göttingen, 1860.¹

THE work of Professor Waitz, on the same subject is surpassed by this. He himself put into the hands of Mr. Bessel, additional authorities which he received after his own work was published. All that is now known of the life, character, doctrines, and influence of the man, whose translation of the scriptures is nearly the only remaining monument of the Gothic language, can be found in this small but highly elaborate volume.

¹ Der Untergang der Langobardenreiches in Italien von Dr. Sigurd Abel.

² Ueben das Leben des Ulfilas und die Bekehrung der Gothen zum christenthum.

M'COSH ON THE INTUITIONS.¹

THE present work of Dr. M'Cosh is a contribution throughout to Metaphysics, as he defines the term: "The science which inquires into the original and intuitive convictions of the mind with a view of generalizing and expressing them, and also of determining what are the objects revealed by them" (p. 320). This science admits, therefore, in his view, of only one method of investigation. He objects to the method of Critical Analysis, introduced by Kant and adopted by Sir William Hamilton, and claims to keep closely to the Inductive Method.

The work is divided into three Parts. The First Part is devoted to a general view of the nature of the Intuitive Convictions of the mind. The points on which most stress is laid are these: The Intuitions are innate, in the sense that the mind has them according to its original constitution. But the mind does not have them directly before the consciousness, in their abstract form. It has them in their spontaneous form, when in contact with some object, and afterwards, by Abstraction and Generalization, comes to hold them as ideas, principles, and axioms.

These three aspects of the Intuitions our author claims to distinguish, and to express together for the first time. The Intuitions may be regarded, first, as Regulative Principles, that is, Laws in the mind belonging to it as such: secondly, as Spontaneous Convictions arising when individual objects are presented to it: thirdly, as framed into abstract statements or general formulas. From a confusion of these aspects, it is shown that the errors of philosophers have mainly arisen. Metaphysicians have applied language to the Intuitions in general, which is true of them only in one aspect, and have thus drawn inferences wide of the truth. Dr. M'Cosh holds it all-important that the intuitions, which assume the forms of abstract truths, should be carefully generalized and expressed, so as to include only what the Particular Intuition will warrant or demand.

The Second Part of the work gives the results of a Particular Examination of the Intuitions. They are here classed as Primitive Cognitions, Primitive Beliefs, Primitive Judgments, and Moral Convictions. It is the author's favorite thought and his fundamental position, that the mind in its first exercises acquires, not impressions, notions, or appearances, but knowledge, knowledge of objects. The mind is conscious at once of both Body and Spirit.

The Primitive cognitions of Body and of Self are held to guarantee the reality of both. But in taking this position, Dr. M'Cosh stands up for the trustworthiness of Original, not necessarily of Acquired Perceptions; for a

¹ The Intuitions of the Mind Inductively Investigated. By the Rev. James M'Cosh, LL. D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Queen's College, Belfast, author of "The Method of the Divine Government Physical and Moral," and joint author of "Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation." New York Carter and Brothers 1860. pp. 504. 8vo.

reality corresponding to the Perceptions as distinguished from Sensations and Feelings. And for a reality corresponding to each Sense as distinguished from its fellow Senses, and not for the same kind of reality for all the Senses.

The mind knows Body and Self in the concrete, but whenever the processes of Abstraction and Generalization are properly conducted with reference to existing objects whether of Body or Self, they yield Intuitions in the abstract form, which are enumerated as follows— of Being, Substance, Mode, Quality, Property, Essence, Personality, Extension, Number, Motion, Power. Each of these terms is particularly examined. They all represent realities. But the author carefully guards against Realism, by saying that they represent, not independently existing realities; realities, but not distinct from the individual objects, in which only they exist.

The Primitive Beliefs, as distinguished from Primitive Cognitions, are described as having reference to all those objects which are not now, or which cannot be directly before the mind. They refer to that which is distant or which cannot be fully known. Yet the Beliefs have their basis in the cognitions. Knowledge must be the starting point of Faith, though Faith transcends knowledge. The objects intuitively disclosed as realities, believed though not fully known, are Space, Time, and the Infinite. These we cannot conceive in the sense of image, as without bounds, but neither can we conceive, in the sense of believe, them to have bounds. They are realities of Intuition in the form of Faith.

The Primitive Judgments are formed from the Cognitions and Beliefs in the act of comparison; comparing with each other any objects known or believed, we intuitively perceive necessary relations, and the mind affirms these relations to be realities. Such relations are classified in this treatise as those of Identity, the Whole and its Parts, Space, Time, Quantity, Resemblance, Active Property, and Cause and Effect. These relations, and especially the last, are thoroughly discussed.

Dr. McCosh distinguishes next between the Appetences, the Will, and the Conscience. The Intuitions which come to the light of consciousness in the exercise of these powers, he styles Moral Convictions.

In the Third Part of the work, the Intuitions in their relations to the sciences pass in review. The science of the sciences, Metaphysics, is divided into two departments— Gnosiology, which “seeks to find what are our original powers,” and Ontology, which seeks “to determine what we know of things by these powers.” Under the first, the author takes up such themes as The Origin of Ideas, The Limits of Knowledge, Intuition and Experience, and The Kind of Necessity attaching to our primary convictions. Under the second, he seeks to adjust the problems of Idealism, Scepticism, and The Conditioned and Unconditioned.

This part of the book closes with an application of the whole discussion to the various sciences, and especially to the science of Theology.

We call attention to a few special points, always of prime interest, which are barely alluded to in the above outline.

The explanation given in this treatise of Causation is curious and interesting in itself and in its applications. The Intuition regarding it, which the author would express in this form — "Everything which begins to be must have a cause," — is involved in the Primary Cognitions of Body and Self. We know them both at once as Substances exercising potency." He objects to the enumerations of the Primary Qualities of Matter, given by Hamilton and philosophers generally, as deficient, because they do not include Active Property or Power. Body, in the words of an American philosopher, not recognized in this treatise, is "*Space filling Force*," and both it and self are known intuitively, as substances having power. A Cause always implies Substance with Active Properties capable, in the proper conditions, of producing changes.

Every *regression*, therefore, in the exercise of the Causal Judgment, carries us back to some substance, and the mind stops, when it finds a substance having power capable of producing the given effects. With this view, Dr. M'Cosh sees no necessity, in the Theoretic Argument, for the objection of an endless series of causes. For the mind finds in God a substance, having power to produce the universe of effects, and it stops at that point. It sees no evidence that He who is all-powerful is an effect, and asks for no Cause back of His Existence.

Dr. M'Cosh holds that the reign of Causation is universal in the Free Will as well as in Matter. He affirms that this must be, from the fact of Divine Foreknowledge, from the fact that the statisticians are able to predict voluntary acts, as the number of thefts and murders, and from the intuitive belief that causation is universal.

But in immediate connection with these statements, we find him emphasizing the most unequivocal definitions of the Freedom of the Will — in the sense of its having the power of contrary choice. "The Distinguishing quality of the will is choice or rejection" (p. 285). "The Will is Free. In saying so, I mean to assert not merely that it is free to act as it pleases.

. . . . I claim for it an anterior and a higher power, a power in the mind to choose, and when it chooses, a consciousness that it might choose otherwise" (p. 308). We might expect that the author would say also, as he does, that "sin is a quality of voluntary acts. It always resides in some mental affection or act in which there is the exercise of free will" (p. 301).

The range of discussion in this book is very wide and stimulating throughout. The position of the author in regard to the Limits of Religious Thought — the Intuitional Theology, and to the doctrine of Moral Good as related to Happiness, will, we think, be grateful and refreshing to the great majority of thoughtful Christian scholars. The tone of the book is eminently sober, reverent, rational and believing. The whole region of the Metaphysics seems, as it is, a region of realities, where all men are living; it is the region of their common Intuitions.

Dr. M'Cosh had given, in his previous works, both the evidence of his ability to write a book of this thorough character and the promise of its coming. The points which may be considered peculiar, or peculiarly

emphatic with him, were declared, and many of them unfolded in "The Method of the Divine Government." In the fourth edition of that book the Appendix contained almost a full outline of the present volume. Some of the points now noticed, are treated in the first work more extensively than in the present one. All his publications show a discriminating and appreciative knowledge of the best writers in the History of Philosophy, at least in the old world, down to the present data. But with a modesty, circumspection, and acuteness of observation, befitting the Method of Induction, he has added a substantial and valuable contribution to this department of Thought. †.

BAIRD'S ELOHIM REVEALED.¹

THE author of this volume maintains, that all men actually sinned in Adam; and he rejects the theory that men are treated *as if they had*, while in fact they *have not*, committed iniquity in their progenitor. He maintains, that the second Adam bore the very penalty of the law; that in the legal penalty threatened to the sinner remorse is not necessarily included, neither is the eternity of pain necessarily included, nor is temporal death; that this penalty is *the wrath* of God, and this wrath may be inflicted, as it was on Christ, without remorse, and without an eternity of duration, and it may be inflicted, as on mere spirits, angels, without temporal death. Dr. Baird has the candor to concede, that President Edwards adopted such theories of the will, of sin, and of virtue, as are inconsistent with the *Old Type* of Calvinism, and involve the main principles of the *New*. We honor the truth-loving spirit which prompts this concession. Dr. Baird has quoted many passages from the Old Calvinists which favor his own theories. He might have quoted many more which oppose the same theories. These writers were inconsistent with themselves; and often when a theologian has cited their words in corroboration of one philosophical view, he might, with equal fairness, adduce an equal number of their words in corroboration of the opposite philosophical view.

We are happy to see this volume of Dr. Baird. We care not to criticise, now, either its theories or its language. It indicates an independent mind, and a spirit of inquiry after the truth. It freely condemns President Edwards, and other prominent divines of New England. It ascribes to them various modes of statement which they never adopted; but is rather more accurate in its representations, than are many other treatises which have assailed those sturdy theologians.

¹ The Elohim Revealed in the Creation and Redemption of Man. By Samuel I Baird, D.D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Woodbury, N.J. Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston. 1860. pp. 688. 8vo.

DR. LAMSON ON THE CHURCH OF THE FIRST THREE CENTURIES.¹

THIS volume, which deserves a fuller notice than our present limits will allow, is devoted chiefly to the works of Justin Martyr, of Clement of Alexandria, of Origen, of Arius, of Eusebius; to the Hymnology of the Ancient Church, to the Artistic Representations of the Trinity, and to the Festivals of the Ancient Christians. The main burden of this learned work is to show, "that the modern doctrine of the Trinity is not found in any document or relic belonging to the church of the first three centuries. Letters, art, usage, theology, worship, creed, hymn, chant, doxology, ascription, commemorative rite, and festive observance, so far as any remains or any record of them are preserved, coming down from early times, are, as regards this doctrine, an absolute blank. They testify, so far as they testify at all, to the supremacy of the Father, the only true God; and to the inferior and derived nature of the Son. There is nowhere among these remains a co-equal Trinity. The cross is there; Christ is there as the Good Shepherd; the Father's hand placing a crown, or victor's wreath, on his head: but no undivided Three,—co-equal, infinite, self-existent, and eternal. This was a conception to which the age had not arrived. It was of later origin" (pp. 341, 342).

Dr. Lamson himself, we think, ought to concede, that the preceding paragraph is rather too highly colored; for he says elsewhere: "There is not an opinion so extravagant, that an advocate for it may not be found among the old Fathers of the church" (p. 217). These Fathers did affirm and deny so many things contradictory to each other; some true and some false; that it would be a wonder if none of these inventive and imaginative men gave not the slightest intimation of a doctrine which has been so devoutly maintained by so many learned writers in more recent times.

Dr. Lamson does not deny, that various "expressions in use among Trinitarians of the present day, occur in the writings of the Fathers of the second, third, and fourth centuries;" but he contends that these expressions were used by those early Fathers with a meaning essentially different from that adopted in modern creeds. He says: "Take the terms 'one' or the 'same.' Nothing is susceptible of clearer proof, than that the Fathers, when they speak of the Son as of one or the same nature with God, refer, not to a numerical, but only to a specific sameness. All they meant was, that the Son partook of one and the same specific nature with the Father,—that is, a divine: just as two individuals of our race partake of one and the same specific nature,—that is, a human; divine begetting divine, as

¹ The Church of the First Three Centuries: or Notices of the Lives and Opinions of some of the Early Fathers, with special reference to the Doctrine of the Trinity; illustrating its late origin and gradual formation. By Alvan Lamson, D. D. Boston: Walker, Wise and Company, 245 Washington Street. 1860. pp. 352. 8vo.

human begets human. They never regarded them as constituting numerically one Being. Modern Trinitarians use the term as referring to a numerical identity. Of this the Fathers never dreamed. They found no difficulty in calling the Son 'God'; for, according to the prevailing views of the age, the term did not necessarily imply self-existence. The Son was God, as they explained it in virtue of his birth, his derivation from the Father; the divine nature being transmitted. So Justin Martyr, speaking of the Son, says, 'Who, since he is the first-begotten Logos of God, is God.'

Another term employed in connection with the Trinity, and the use of which tends to mislead, is *hypostasis*, understood by the moderns in the theological sense of *person* as distinguished from *substance*, but uniformly, by the old Fathers, in the sense of essence. Thus, when they call the Father and the Son two *hypostases*, they mean two in essences; that is, constituting two real beings.

Again: the creed of Nice tells us that the Son is *consubstantial*, of the same substance, with the Father. But this term was used by the Fathers, not in its modern sense, but in the old Platonic signification, to express, as we have said, specific sameness of nature, sameness of kind, similarity, likeness. The Son was of like nature with the Father, not numerically the same Being. So the Fathers of Nice, as Eusebius in his letter to his people tells us, understood the term. So it was used by the council of Chalcedon, if their language has any consistency; and so Athanasius himself, in his earlier writings, distinctly explains it, taking the examples of a man and a dog. One man, he tells us, is consubstantial with another, and so is one dog; but a dog and a man are not consubstantial.

The epithet 'eternal,' sometimes applied to the Son, was ambiguous; meaning, as the Fathers sometimes used it, simply *before the world was*, or having no reference to any specific time. Whenever, in speaking of the Son, they used it in its strict sense, it was in reference to a notion generally entertained by them, that the Son had, from all eternity, a sort of potential existence in the Father, that is, as an attribute; his Logos, Reason, or Wisdom, which, by a voluntary act of the Father, was converted into a real being and became his instrument in forming the world" (pp. 275, 276).

We think that the main error of Dr. Lamsou, in this extract as in other parts of his volume, is in his attempt to make out for the early Fathers a more self-consistent scheme than they actually held. As some orthodox divines ascribe to these Fathers a more symmetrical affirmation of the truth than they ever made, so the Unitarian divines often ascribe to them a more uniform denial of the truth than they ever intended to utter.

PROF. HACKETT'S NOTES ON PHILEMON.¹

THIS volume displays the usual care and exactness of its author. It con-

¹ Notes on the Greek Text of the Epistle of Paul to Philemon, as the Basis of a Revision of the Common English Version; and a revised version, with notes. pp. 90. 18mo.

tains a neat and elegant Revised Version of the Epistle to Philemon, with perspicuous and learned annotations on the Greek Text, and with judicious comments on King James's English Translation. The Preface to the volume, and the Introduction to the Epistle, are valuable. We have examined the entire work with delight, and, we trust, not without profit. If all the Versions and the Philological Notes, to be published by the American Bible Union, shall equal the present volume, that association will confer an inestimable benefit on the churches. Prof. Hackett says in his Preface. "There is much misapprehension still, I imagine, respecting the precise nature of the enterprise, in the interest of which this volume has been prepared. The object is not to supersede, but revise the current Version of the English Scriptures. A new translation of the original text, and a revision of the translation of that text, are very different things; and yet, different as they are, are confounded by many persons who would not be unfriendly to what is attempted, if they would keep in mind this important distinction. It is not proposed to discard the present version; to cast away its manifold advantages; to introduce rash and doubtful innovations; to substitute a cumbrous Latinized style for the simple, nervous, idiomatic English, which brings the familiar Version so home to the hearts of the people; but simply to do upon the work of our translators what they did upon that of their predecessors; to survey it afresh in the light of knowledge which has been gained during the more than two centuries since they passed away; to make such changes, and such only, as the general verdict of the best scholarship of the age has pronounced to be due to truth and fidelity; to make these changes in a style of delicate harmony with the present language of the English Bible; to confirm its accuracy, where it is correct, against false or unsupported interpretations, as well as to amend it where it is confessedly incorrect; and thus, in a word, carry forward from our position, if we might, the labors of the revisers (for such they were) of James's age, as they carried forward the labors of the generations before them."

DR. OWEN'S COMMENTARIES ON LUKE AND JOHN.¹

WE congratulate the industrious author of these volumes, on their completion, and on the success which has attended them. They are characterized by sound sense and healthful feeling. They avoid, on the one hand, that mystical style which is a sign of a superficial and a conceited mind; and, on the other hand, that naturalizing tendency which denudes the

¹ A Commentary, Critical, Expository, and Practical, on the Gospel of Luke, for the use of Ministers, Theological Students, Private Christians, Bible Classes, and Sabbath Schools. pp. 400. 12mo.

A Commentary, Critical, Expository, and Practical, on the Gospel of John, for the use of Ministers, Theological Students, Private Christians, Bible Classes, and Sabbath Schools. New York: Leavitt and Allen. pp. 502. 12mo.

Gospels, of their essential meaning. We are glad to notice, that Dr. Owen intends to add a Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles, to the three volumes which he has already published elucidating the New Testament.

TWO WORKS OF PROFESSOR TYLER.

REV. WILLIAM S. TYLER, D. D., Professor of Greek in Amherst College, has published two volumes, one of which ought to have been noticed in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* at an earlier day. The first is entitled: "Memoir of Rev. Henry Lobdell, M. D., late Missionary of the American Board at Mosul: including the early history of the Assyrian Mission. Published by the American Tract Society, Boston."

This is a thrilling volume. Dr. Lobdell was a remarkable man, and the story of his thoughts and deeds tends to rouse within us a spirit of scholarly and Christian enterprise.

The other volume from the unwearied pen of Professor Tyler, is entitled "Plato's *Apology* and *Crito*; with Notes." New York: D. Appleton and Company.

The present edition of these two immortal works has been prepared with conscientious, faithful labor. The text, says the editor, is "in the main, an exact reprint of Stallbaum's third edition, 1846. The few exceptions are specified in the notes, and the reasons given for the choice of a different reading. The notes of Stallbaum are so felicitous, especially in the illustration of Plato's peculiar idioms and constructions, that any one who has read them bears the results almost unconsciously with him in all his subsequent readings of the same author. Wherever I have consciously borrowed from him, I have given him credit in the notes. I have also had before me the editions of Bekker, Fischer, Forster, Heindorf, Ast, Schleiermacher, Buttmann, Nüsslin, Elberling, etc., together with versions in German, French, and English, too numerous to mention; and have used them whenever they could be of use, though most of them have been of very little service."

WEBSTER'S AND WORCESTER'S QUARTO DICTIONARIES OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

Each of these Dictionaries is an honor to our country. Each has its own distinctive merits, and its own distinctive faults. There are, also, certain excellences and certain defects common to both of them. To compile a dictionary which is invulnerable to criticism, would be a super-human work. To compile a dictionary which, on the whole, deserves commendation, is an exploit which will of itself insure the fame of its author.

Each of these dictionaries occasionally overlooks the principle: "*Regula est quae rem, quae est, breviter enarrat; non ut ex regula jus sumatur, sed ex jure, quod est, regula fiat.*" Mr. Cobbett in his *English Grammar* says:

"One grain of reasoning is worth whole tons of memory." It is *memory*, however, and not *reasoning*, which determines the purity of language. We believe with Dr. Campbell, that the criterion of a pure English style is not past use but *present* use; not merely present but *reputable*; not merely reputable but *general*, the usage adopted by "a great number, if not the majority of celebrated authors." We think that each of these dictionaries fails, in not discriminating with more exactness and uniformity the *antiquated* from the *current* use of terms; the *vulgar* from the *respectable*; the *provincial* and *individual* from the *general* and *prevailing*. Even Herbert, in his remote age, rebuked the prurient desire for new words.

"Let foreign nations of their language boast,
What fine variety each tongue affords,
I like our language, as our men and coast,
Who cannot dress it well, want wit not words."

We must have some new terms and new modes of spelling and pronouncing old terms; but the door of innovation should be closed so far, that nothing but improvement can come through. While both of the dictionaries named above, have enriched our knowledge of the pure English undefiled, both of them have sanctioned innovations which a lexicographer should not notice, except to condemn.

We regard the labors of Dr. Worcester as especially valuable in securing the accurate orthography and orthoepy of the language. It is difficult to appreciate the immensity of his toil in comparing the different lexicographers with each other, noting their diverse methods of pronunciation, summarily presenting them to the reader, and indicating their comparative merit.

We regard the labors of Dr. Webster and his coadjutor Dr. Goodrich, as especially valuable in the fulness and the preciseness of their definitions, in the subtlety and perspicuity with which they have distinguished the words usually deemed synonymous.

We think that each of the two dictionaries is, in some degree, a complement to the other. The student who can obtain either of them is to be congratulated, while he who cannot obtain both is to be pitied.

DISQUISITIONS AND NOTES ON THE GOSPELS. MATTHEW. By John H. Morrison. Boston: Walker, Wise, and Company, 245 Washington Street, 1860; pp. 538, 12mo.

THIS volume is written in a neat and elegant style. Its author is evidently a man of delicate sensibilities and fine culture. He has expressed many thoughts with rare felicity. He has given truly philosophical replies to the objections against the miraculous conception of Christ, against the miracles of the New Testament, and against demoniacal possessions. We

have never read a commentary written by a Unitarian divine, which contains so many spiritual thoughts and devout expressions, combined with so few objectionable theories or allusions. We cannot resist the belief that the scholar who is able to write the first seven pages (450 — 456) of the section on the Agony of Gethsemane, will yet see reasons for modifying the eighth page (457) which proceeds, we imagine, from a misapprehension of the true doctrine of the atonement.

A VINDICATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NEW ENGLAND CHURCHES: AND THE CHURCHES' QUARREL ESPOUSED: OR A REPLY TO CERTAIN PROPOSALS. By John Wise, A. M., Pastor of a Church in Ipswich. Fourth Edition. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication; 23 Chauncy Street, 1860; pp. 245, 12mo.

THE trenchant pen of John Wise has left upon our literature certain marks which will not soon be effaced. He was a man of no ordinary learning, and of true genius. His writings deserve a careful study. The Congregational Board of Publication have done a noble service in presenting to the world a new edition of these treatises.

THE CONFESSIONS OF AUGUSTINE: EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY WILLIAM G. T. SKEDD. Andover: Warren F. Draper, 1860; pp. 417, 16mo.

THIS is a beautiful edition of a precious work. The Confessions of Augustine are so honest, that we easily become enthusiastic in their praise. The depth of his piety, the boldness of his imagination, the profoundness of his genius, his extravagant conceptions, his very straining and stretching of philosophical and biblical statements, have all a certain charm which ensures for his works an enduring popularity. Men love to watch the influence of a positive and dominant will. The Bishop of Hippo is admired even by those who smile at his wayward reasonings and illogical conceits. He should be read with philosophical discrimination, and with the remembrance that expressions, which were seemly in his day, are not to be imitated in our day, and theories which appeared sober once, must appear puerile now.

MR. CHARLES SCRIBNER, Grand Street, New York, has recently published the following works:

“Forty Years’ familiar Letters of James W. Alexander, D. D., constituting, with the notes, a Memoir of his life. Edited by the surviving correspondent, John Hall, D. D., in two volumes.”

We have read these volumes with interest. We are surprised, however, to find them no more scientific in their character and allusions. The author

of the Letters, a literary and an amiable man, yet betrays many prejudices, which ought not to have been publicly exposed. He would have shrunk, more than his most fastidious friends can recoil, from the present publication of certain paragraphs, which he wrote in great haste, and in the confidence of friendship.

Sermons, by Addison Alexander, D. D. Vols. I. and II. pp. 414, 425. 12mo. The Discourses of Dr. Alexander disclose his familiarity with the scriptures, and his free command of his mother tongue. They are not divided and subdivided according to the more common standard of pulpit eloquence. They are, however, more rhetorical than logical in their method of presenting truth. Many of his statements fail in precision, while they are strong, emphatic, and impressive.—This notice of Dr. Alexander's Sermons prompts us to recall the attention of our readers to his "Essays on the Primitive Church Offices," published by Mr. Scribner in 1851. We regard this volume as one of the ablest which Dr. Addison Alexander has given to the world. Many of its reasonings are irrefragable.

To the House of Gould and Lincoln, 59 Washington Street, Boston, the public are indebted for many works of great scientific interest. They have recently published a new and revised edition of "Christ in History, by Rev. Robert Turnbull, D. D.", a popular and useful work: also a new and enlarged edition of Professor Hackett's "Illustrations of Scripture," a book which ought to be in the library of every clergyman: likewise the two following volumes of practical interest:

"Morning Hours in Patmos: The Opening Vision of the Apocalypse, and Christ's Epistles to the Seven Churches of Asia. By A. C. Thompson, Author of the 'The Better Land,' 'Gathered Lillies,' etc. pp. 268, 12mo.

"The Signet Ring, and other Gems. From the Dutch of the Rev. J. Liefde." pp. 362, 16mo.

MESSIEURS CROSBY, NICHOLS AND COMPANY have published, in a very elegant form, the first volume of "Hours with the Evangelists, by J. Nichols, D. D." pp. 405, 12mo. We shall welcome, with much interest, the appearance of the second volume of this thoughtful work. Dr. Nichols was one of the most scientific of the Unitarian divines. Wherever we agree with his doctrine, we are especially pleased with the considerateness and appositeness of his diction.

MESSIEURS ROBERT CARTER AND BROTHERS, 530 Broadway, New York, have recently published the following works:

"The Province of Reason: a Criticism of the Bampton Lecture on 'The Limits of Religious Thought,' by John Young, LL. D., Edin., author of 'The Christ of History,' etc. pp. 305. The author of this volume is well known in this country. The present treatise will augment his reputation. It is thorough and masterly.

"Lectures on the Epistles of Paul to the Thessalonians, by John Lillie, D. D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Kingston, N. Y." pp. 585, 8vo. This volume consists of Expository discourses, designed for popular use. It suggests the value of exegetical sermons, and will aid in introducing into the American pulpit a larger proportion of biblical comment.

THE enterprising House of Carlton and Porter, No. 200 Mulberry Street, New York, have published during the present year, a Royal octavo edition of the Holy Bible, in which edition "all the proper names are pronounced, and a copious and original selection of references, and numerous marginal readings are given: together with Introductions to each Book, and numerous Tables and Maps." The edition is neat and accurate. The same House have also published the following works:

"A Commentary on the Gospels of Matthew and Mark, intended for popular use. By D. D. Whedon, D. D." pp. 422, 12mo. This Commentary is prepared with much painstaking, and is a valuable addition to our exegetical literature.

"Early Methodism within the bounds of the Old Genesee Conference, from 1788 to 1828. By George Peck, D. D." pp. 512, 12mo. An interesting work.

"The Homilist: A Series of Sermons for Preachers and Laymen. Original and Selected. By Erwin House, A. M." pp. 496, 12mo.

"The Life of Jacob Gruber. By W. P. Strickland." pp. 384, 12mo.

"History of the Great Reformation in England, Ireland, Scotland, Germany, France, and Italy. By Rev. Thomas Carter." pp. 372, 12mo.

"The Story of a Pocket Bible. A Book for all classes of readers." pp. 412, 12mo.

"The Life of the Rev. Adam Clarke, LL. D., F. A. S., M. R. I. A., etc., etc. By J. W. Etheridge, M. A., Doctor in Philosophy, of the University of Heidelberg, and Member of the Asiatic Society of Paris." pp. 487, 12mo.

"The Christian Lawyer, being a portraiture of the Life and Character of William George Baker." pp. 320, 12mo.

"Autobiography of Dan Young, A New England preacher of the olden time. Edited by W. P. Strickland." pp. 380, 12mo.

"Sketches of New England Divines. By Rev. D. Sherman." pp. 443, 12mo. We are reluctantly compelled to omit a notice, already prepared, of this volume. It contains here and there an erroneous statement, but is, in the main, interesting and instructive.

Messrs. Smith, English & Co., Philadelphia, have published "Science in Theology: Sermons preached in St. Mary's, Oxford, before the University." By Adam S. Farrar, A. M., etc., Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford, etc. 12mo. pp. 250. The themes discussed are treated with great ability, and in a style of unusual neatness and finish. The volume will be a valuable addition to every Pastor's library.

THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA,
No. LXVIII.
AND
BIBLICAL REPOSITORY
No. CXX.

OCTOBER, 1860.

ARTICLE I.

THE RELIGION OF GEOLOGY.¹

EVERY important discovery in art, science, or theology, is met with incredulity, and often persecution, by the world; and the unfortunate discoverers are exposed to ridicule and penury, if not, like Galileo, to imprisonment. Some have learned wisdom by experience, and have refused to announce to the world important truths they have subsequently discovered. Those who have sought to illustrate the text and doctrines of our most holy Bible from the fields of science, have too often been met by the smile of derision, or the spirit of denunciation. But when discoveries have been finally appreciated, the public have seized upon them enthusiastically, as if there had never been any odium connected with their propounding. So the church is beginning, more and more, to appreciate the value of science as auxiliary to interpretation, and theologians cannot now pass through the curriculum of study, without devoting much attention to the connection between science and religion.

Yet there are three classes of opinions upon this sub-

¹ The Religion of Geology and its connected sciences. By Edward Hitchcock, D. D., LL. D., Late President of Amherst College and Professor of Natural Theology and Geology. A New Edition, with an Additional Lecture, giving a summary of the author's present views of the whole subject. Boston: Phillips, Sampson and Company. 1859.

ject in the community. The first and most numerous embrace those who receive the Bible as a book inspired to teach the absolute essence of scientific as well as religious truth; who regard the language of inspiration as strictly scientific; and who therefore denounce all attempts to modify the interpretation of the Bible by science as infidel. Some of this class have entered upon a crusade, as it were, against geologists; inundating the religious world with invincible books, pamphlets, and articles in quarterlies. None of them are practically acquainted with geology, but they have read geological works, chiefly with a view to their refutation; and, therefore, have imperfect and one-sided views of the phenomena. Hence their *revised* theories, to explain these phenomena, are very crude. For example: some of them are shrewd enough to see that, if they allow that the accumulations of gravel and pebbles lying upon the surface of the earth were deposited by water, they must admit the conclusions of geologists as to the great length of time required for the formation of all the stratified rocks. Therefore they assign to them an igneous origin; that is, that they were thrown up from beneath the surface, like lava from volcanoes.

Another writer, apparently more advanced, is willing to admit that the earth was once in a state of igneous fusion; for, says he, there are proofs that the surface was once soft. It was so yielding that birds walked upon it; their tracks remaining to this day to attest it. In other words, these wonderful animals — huge birds, reptiles, and batrachians, as well as small insects — walked over this ocean of plastic lava without injury to the integuments of their feet, reared their young, and lived, for ages, upon this fiery furnace!

The same writer is willing to go a step further. Having proved the former fusion of the earth by the argument of the ichnites, he argues that the diameter of the earth must have been much greater than at present, in consequence of its expansion by heat. On account of this increase in bulk, the revolution of the earth upon its axis must have occupied a longer time than it does now. Hence, as there is a controversy respecting the length of the demiurgic days, some call-

ing them ordinary days, others long periods, this view presents a day intermediate in length between the others, which may be adopted as a compromise between them, adequate to explain all the difficulties. Men who hold these views are astonished that no one attempts to answer their arguments!

Some of this class exhibit a charitable spirit towards the innovators, which is truly commendable. They entreat them to reconsider their views, if they would save their souls. In the preface to the new edition, Professor Hitchcock publishes a letter sent to him by an English clergyman of this class, exhorting him to repentance. Says he: "I am loath to publish anything [against your views] without first addressing a few lines to you, entreating you, for your soul's sake, and for the sake of the eternal welfare of others, to reconsider, with earnest prayer to God, the assertions you have made. I cannot but behold you in the fearfully perilous circumstances of having made yourself an antagonist to God. I know he is marvellously long suffering; and a perusal of your book has impressed the thought more strongly than ever on my soul, how patient and forbearing God is; for I must, in honesty tell you, that I never before read a work which so presumptuously calls his word in question, or treats it with such contempt. I am sure you are not aware of this. I give you full credit for not knowing what you are about."

The second class of opinions embraces those who either reject the authority of Christianity entirely, as sceptics and atheists; or those who deny the authority of the Pentateuch. They are not at all troubled to find difficulties in the Mosaic history, or at any of the apparent discrepancies between science and revelation. The author of the *Religion of Geology* had been told that his views would be quite acceptable to this class. Hence a critique upon this work, which appeared in a dozen weekly issues of the *Boston Investigator*, was the most gratifying of all the notices of his book which he had seen. The critic had so great a spite against the author, that he would fly, at once, from a review of the work itself to a personal assault. Thus he says: "In my last letter, I exhibited you as an archangel ruined, not a goblin

damned. I informed you that I had not left you. True to my word and the cause of truth, I am come again. I hear you say: 'Give me credit for honest and good intentions.' I cannot, I will not do it.

"I regard you, in reference to the future, the same as would an impartial and independent historian that of Talleyrand, had he been writing his history in his day, after he had, as you have, well nigh run his career. He would have given him all credit as a shrewd, talented, able, and successful financier, uniting foresight with amazing tact and unblushing impudence; but as a man, one of absolute selfishness and hypocrisy. Always able, always successful, the historian would have given demonstration of the truth of his delineation and narration, by a series of facts, which would have forced conviction. I am writing your history," etc.

This extract shows with how great loathing and abhorrence the views of this book are received by infidels. How strange it must seem to an author to receive such earnest attacks from such opposite sources! In these cases, one of the parties must surely be mistaken in its bearing; and the author suggests that, till they can settle this question, he shall rest quietly. "Like an acid and an alkali, in chemistry, the two attacks neutralize each other, and leave me unharmed."

The third class of writers believe fully in the inspiration of every part of the Bible, and in the truth of the leading principles of science; and that these two records are not discrepant, but mutually illustrate and confirm each other. Such is the ground taken by the Religion of Geology. In the midst of vituperative attacks, it must have been a source of consolation to its author, that he has also received, from more enlightened quarters, words of encouragement and expressions of thanks for the relief afforded, by these reasonings, to minds struggling long in the midst of doubt.¹

¹ The book has been the occasion of good in another way. We learn that the suggestion in the Preface to the Religion of Geology, that professorships of natural theology in connection with the natural sciences should be united with our theological seminaries, led the Rev. Dr. Lyon, of Columbus, Mississippi, to make efforts to have one endowed at Columbia, South Carolina. Hon. John

There is a false notion prevalent respecting the science of geology. Its principles are thought to be unsettled and constantly changing: it is supposed that the science is made up of conflicting hypotheses, and that there is no agreement among its standard writers. This opinion may arise, partly from the fact that many hypotheses have been put forth in the name of geology, which are generally condemned; and partly because geological discussions are mainly confined to the comparatively unimportant theories yet unsettled. The doctrines fully established, are those which bear directly upon religion. And they are as well settled as the theory of the earth's diurnal and annual motions in astronomy, or the doctrine of definite proportions in chemistry. The most important of these principles are the following: the whole accessible crust of the globe has undergone entire, and oftentimes repeated, metamorphoses since the rocks were created; enormous erosions have taken place upon the earth since it was consolidated; existing continents, by slow vertical movements, have been below the ocean several times; processes are now going on, around us, capable of producing nearly all the known varieties of rock, with the aid of water and heat; water and heat have been the grand agents of all geological changes; the whole globe has once been in a state of igneous fusion; there was a time when no animals or plants existed on the earth; several distinct economies of life, or groups of animals and plants, have occupied the surface, each adapted to the altered condition of things; these ancient races have been unlike one another, and, with a few exceptions, in the highest formations, unlike those now alive, the resemblance between living and fossil types becoming more unlike as we descend; some ten or twelve miles thickness of fossiliferous rocks were deposited previous to the creation of man, who was among the last of the animals that have appeared upon the globe; and, finally, amid all the di-

Perkins, of Mississippi, gave \$30,000 as an endowment, and the professorship will shortly be filled, and the experiment tried. We hope the example may be followed by other liberal minded men of means, until all our theological seminaries are supplied with such professorships.

versities of organic structure, and change of species, genera, and families, in different formations, the features of one great system of life can be seen running through the whole series, linking all past minor systems together and to the existing races, and showing the one grand plan of creation, as it lay originally in the Divine Mind.

We proceed to state the positions advanced in the last edition of the Religion of Geology, under six general divisions : I. The arguments drawn from science to prove the existence of God. II. The modifications required, by geology, of the interpretation of those parts of the Bible relating to the past and future history of the earth. III. Arguments from geology, for the divine benevolence. IV. Miraculous and special providence. V. Fallen condition of the world, as illustrated by science. VI. The new and enlarged views, afforded by science, of the divine plans.

I. *The Existence of God.* Geology furnishes a new phase of the argument for the existence of the deity from design. That argument assumes a beginning to the existing system of nature, organic and inorganic. Though geology cannot prove the original creation of matter out of nothing, it does show that there was a beginning to the present economy of life. It shows that matter has been moulded into ten thousand forms, so exquisite, with such wise and wonderful adaptations, that only an infinite Deity could have done it ; especially since the still more wonderful powers of life, and instinct, and intellect, have been added to organism. Without injury to theism, we may give up, to the atheist, his eternal matter and its laws ; for, not till he has endowed those laws with all the attributes of deity, could he people that world with living beings.

In the modifications of matter, then, which constitute the chief beauty and glory of the world, do we find full proof of a creating Deity ; and in the wise and exact adaptation of one thing to another, and especially in the modifications of structure to adapt animals and plants to a changing world, we see evidence of a personal Deity. For a blind, unintelligent force, like law, could not have made such alterations

in the successive races, and made them wisely. Geology, then, in the very argument by which it proves the existence of God, shows the absurdity of pantheism, as well as every other form of atheism.

Let us examine, now, the hinge upon which all our arguments for the existence of the Deity depend, the *beginning of things*. The eternity of the world, and the eternal and necessary development of all things, from one another, are the foundation of the atheistic system, and it becomes us to look well to our positions here. Many minds are sincerely disposed to doubt the force of all arguments, furnished by abstract reasoning, to reply to this question, viz. from the world's contingency, and from the absurdity of supposing an infinite series of finite beings.

Matter, says the atheist, is eternal, and all its changes proceed in cycles, which never had a beginning, and will never have an end. Even though you prove that the earth has passed through a series of changes, from liquid fire to a condition fit for the residence of successive tribes of organisms, this series is only one of a vast number of similar cycles. Man existed before the present system; but he and all his works were consumed by fiery agencies. Matter, after the destruction of life, has certain tendencies to produce organisms; which, in their turn, give place to higher forms of life, until man appears again, preceded by thousands of generations of his less perfect ancestors.

Now the most important and fundamental principle, upon which this argument depends, is this (and it is a principle that we are all disposed to adopt, without perceiving its disastrous tendencies): germs and tendencies to form worlds and organic races, may have existed in matter previous to the existence of life and organisms. Hume says: "for aught we can know *à priori*, matter may contain the source or spring of order originally within itself, as well as mind does: and there is no more difficulty in conceiving that the several elements, from an internal, unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite arrangements, than to conceive that their ideas, in the great universal mind, from a like in-

ternal, unknown cause, fall into that arrangement." If we admit that the highest exertions of matter, in any form, can produce the feeblest organism, we cannot stand before the atheist an instant, and we destroy the prime distinctions which constitute the framework of the natural sciences. For if matter can produce the feeblest organism, that organism can reproduce its like; and it is an easy if not inevitable inference to say, then, that these organisms can give birth to others higher on the scale, even though it be only infinitesimally higher. There will be a gradual rise in the scale; and there will be no stopping-place until man is developed from the highest of the inferior animals. This is the hypothesis of *creation by law*.

To defend this hypothesis, atheism makes a confident appeal to geology. For that science teaches that, since animals and plants first appeared on the globe, there has been a marked upward progress in the races that have succeeded one another. In the lowest Silurian, invertebrate animals and flowerless marine plants alone appear. In the upper Silurian, a few fishes, the lowest vertebrate animals, are found. But not till we rise into the Devonian, is there even a trace of reptiles, nor do birds appear at all, till we ascend to the Jurassic series; and these perhaps, as their tracks indicate, with characters somewhat peculiar. Nor do the Mammalia show themselves, a few marsupials excepted, till we reach the Tertiary; nor were the human race introduced till a late period in the Alluvial formation. The plants show a similar progress from the less to the more perfect; while a corresponding improvement was going on in the inorganic world. What do these facts indicate, but this gradual development?

The hypothesis fails in several essential points. While there has been progress in the organic, because the same is true of the inorganic, world, there is not the slightest evidence of any gradual change of one species, or genus, or family, into another; but each species of fossil animal or plant is just as distinct from every other, as in existing nature; whereas, if this hypothesis were true, we ought to find endless interme-

diat varieties. Moreover, the species, in one formation, ought to pass insensibly into those of the formation above ; whereas there is often not even a similarity. Again, there is sometimes a retrogradation of the races, from the more to the less perfect, as we ascend in the formations. Some of the ancient fishes were of a higher grade than their successors : so was it with the reptiles, and with the cephalopod mollusks, which retrograded from the compound to the simple.

If the most powerful species of mollusk or articulate animal could not produce the lowest organism among the vertebrates, which is inferior to it, much more, *à fortiori*, matter could not, by its utmost exertions, produce the feeblest organism. Matter has not, and cannot produce, life ; nor even such a collocation of particles as will form a lifeless organism. Creative power is the only cause to which science can refer as the cause. Upon this point, geology is more biblical than many metaphysicians.

Thus we see that the advance has been by creative acts, not by infinitesimal development. Let us now examine the hypothesis of the eternal series.

Preliminary principles : 1. Our argument does not require that we shall show that the matter of the world has been created out of nothing by the Deity, if we can only prove that matter has undergone such modifications as Deity alone could accomplish ; that is, that the great cycles of nature have been *interrupted* in their natural course.

2. If we can prove that any of the great systems of organic life on the globe, or in any one zoological district, had a beginning ; or, in other words, that there was a time when they did not exist, we show an exigency to have existed, demanding a being of infinite power, wisdom, and benevolence, to create and adapt to circumstances such races of creatures. If their structure and adaptation do not demand a Deity, neither would the production of matter require his agency.

3. If we can show that any important genera or species of animals or plants did not once exist ; their creation demands a Deity, and proves that the whole organic system upon the globe had a beginning. For, such is the connec-

tion and mutual influence of the different races, that a single new species could not be introduced without disturbing the harmony of the whole, and producing, thus, the ruin of the whole, unless Infinite Wisdom should interpose to prevent such a result. And to create one animal, or plant, demands the same infinite attributes as to create a whole race.

4. If we can prove the extinction of even one species of organic beings, and much more of many species, we show a tendency to ruin in the system of organic life, of which they form a part, and consequently a beginning to the same; since any system tending to decay cannot be eternal. The disappearance of even one species, on this principle, would disturb the harmony of the whole, and tend to its entire extinction.

Arguments : A. Geology shows that there was a time when the whole globe was in a state of fusion from heat; and, of course, destitute of organic life. Some power besides matter, or law, is requisite to prepare this ball of fire for inhabitants, and then to produce the different races.

B. Since the introduction of life upon the earth, there have been several distinct groups or economies of animals and plants, which have successively appeared and passed away. Not less than six of these groups have been so distinct from one another, that no species is common to any two of them. The creation of these successive races is such an interruption in the cycle, that it can be explained only by the interposition of an infinite Deity.

C. All agree that man was not created till after the tertiary period; and, judging from chronological records, about six thousand years ago. The most perfect being of all the creatures enters suddenly upon the arena of life, with no antecedents to connect him with previous existences, either physically or mentally. The creation of man is the greatest event in the earth's history. If this does not require an interruption of the cycle of ages, surely nothing else can.

D. Since the commencement of the Alluvial period, several animals have become extinct: for example the mastodon, the dodo, and the gigantic birds of New Zealand. Now, as already explained, so many examples of the disap-

pearance of species, shows a tendency to ruin in the system, and consequently a beginning to it; since no such system of decay can be eternal. The present economy of life, then, had a beginning; which is, also proved by the absence of the relics of existing animals, in the formations beneath the Tertiary.

E. Astronomical argument: Certain comets are retarded in their motions through space. This proves the existence of some rarefied substance, in space, which, is of necessity, a resisting medium. The solar system, therefore, cannot have existed always; for, if this had existed from eternity, even the planets would, ere this, have emptied themselves into the sun.

Conclusions: 1. The first four arguments prove a beginning to organic life; the fifth, a beginning to the solar system.

2. To produce organic life, the interposition of Deity is required. Therefore

3. The world has not existed in an eternal series of cycles.

4. To create animals and regulate the motions of the universe, as much requires an infinite Deity, as the creation of matter out of nothing.

5. Hence it is not necessary, for our argument, to prove the creation of matter. We are not, however, without some proof of the origination of matter from the will of the Deity.

II. *Interpretation of those parts of the Bible relating to the physical history of the earth.* Geology throws light upon the scriptural statements respecting the *age of the world, its cosmogony or mode of formation, the Noachian deluge, the introduction of suffering and death, and its final destruction by fire.*

Much has been written, of late, concerning cosmogony. As Professor Hitchcock treats this subject from the scientific side, and as he suggests some new views, such as are required by science, we shall enlarge upon this subject, and quote several passages from the new Lecture. He says:

"1. *The Bible does not fix the time when the world was created.*

"It says that in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. And surely this does not fix the time of the event, but shows only that some time or other these heavens and this earth began to be; that is, they were not eternal, as many heathen philosophers supposed; there was a time when God had not made the earth, nor the fields, nor the highest parts of the dust of the world — that is, the elements. It has, indeed, been usually understood that the beginning spoken of by Moses is so connected with the six days' work, that we must regard it as coëval with the first of those days, and, if those be regarded as literal days, and the chronology of man as reaching back only about six thousand years, the beginning must have nearly the same age. But it can never be proved that the days were not separated from the beginning by an indefinite interval. If so, that interval may have been incalculably long — long enough to satisfy all the demands of geology.

"2. *The Bible does fix the time when man first appeared on the globe.*

"The Bible distinctly represents man as the last animal created; and, since no other species of men had been previously placed on the earth, we may reasonably presume that the place assigned him on the Mosaic roll of creation may be regarded as chronologically exact. Now, the scriptures carry forward a series of chronological dates, commencing with man, to the time of Christ, and thus link the time of his creation with the history of the race.

"It is quite probable that the chronological date of the cattle, and creeping things, and beasts of the earth, created on the sixth day, was intended to be fixed. For geology shows that those which were man's contemporaries were far more abundant and varied than all that had before appeared. But some did appear much earlier; and how was it possible for the sacred writer to give the time when all of them appeared, unless he had appended a table of dates? But more on this subject under a subsequent head.

"3. *The Bible represents the creation as the special result of Jehovah's efficiency, to the exclusion of every other cause.*

"Doubtless the writer had specially in mind the gods of the heathen supposed by them to be the authors of the universe. But the language applies equally well to any other agency, such, for instance, as a law of nature, which has been supposed capable of the creation of organic races. All is excluded as a creative power save Jehovah's fiat.

"Geology teaches the same lesson. It finds the successive races in the different formations to have come in by groups, at once, so as divine creating power can alone explain. If law had done it, as some contend, we ought to find all the gaps filled up by uninterrupted series. Here is another interesting coincidence between the natural and the revealed record.

"4. *The Bible represents God as employing instrumentalities in the work of creation.*

"He commanded the earth to bring forth grass, and herb yielding seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit, on the third day, and the waters every living thing that moveth, on the fifth. His own efficiency was, indeed, the

power that enabled the soil and the waters to execute their commission. Still they were instruments; nor can we say how long or how extensively they were employed. If we inquire of the geological records, their testimony is, that immense periods were consumed in the preparation, by natural operations, of the earth, the water, and the air, for their inhabitants.

"5. *The Bible teaches us that the creation was a gradual work, completed by successive exhibitions of divine power, with intervals of repose.* How long the intervals were will depend upon the meaning which we attach to the word *day*. But, if it were only twenty-four hours, the acts of creation would still be successive, and the work progressive.

"Here, too, geology corresponds closely with the scriptures. It distinctly shows us epochs of creative action with long intervals of repose. The intervals are, indeed, of vast duration, and the creative interventions, probably, more numerous than those mentioned in Genesis. But the fact of successive creations, not their number, is the chief lesson taught us by the two records. And it is one of great interest, because, *a priori*, we should conclude that all organic beings would be commanded into existence by one instantaneous fiat of Jehovah.

"6. *The Bible describes the emergence of the land from the waters before the creation of animals and plants.* And so does geology. It tells us, indeed, of very many such vertical movements of continents. Yet, to men in general, even in our day, this geological doctrine is regarded as very doubtful. How strange, if Moses were uninspired, that he should bring it out so distinctly!

"7. *The Bible does not describe a chaos, in the popular acceptance of that term.* It declares, indeed, that the earth was without form and void; which means, as the commentators say, invisible, or waste, and unfurnished; invisible, because covered by water; unfurnished, because destitute of animals and plants. But the common notion of a chaos is, that it consists of "a confused assemblage of elements," not governed by the same chemical and electrical laws as now prevail. Now, geology shows clearly that the matter of the globe has never been free from the same laws that now govern it; for we have abundant products, in the hypozoic rocks, of the supposed chaotic period, and they all show the controlling power of the laws of chemistry and crystallography, in the production of the most beautiful gems and other crystalline forms. Geology and the Bible, then, agree, in spite of bad translations and the fancies of heathen philosophers, in excluding chaos from the works of God.

"8. *By comparing geology and the Bible, we learn that the earth had a very early revolution on its axis in twenty-four hours.*

"On the first day, immediately following the sublime mandate, *Let there be light, and there was light*, we find God dividing the light from the darkness, and he called the light day, and the darkness he called night. This has seemed strange to commentators, because the sun and moon were not created till the fourth day. And yet it would seem difficult to avoid the conclusion that there was thus early some movement of the earth or the

heavens producing an alternation of day and night. If we turn to geology, we shall find that it was in fact the same diurnal revolution of the earth which now takes place, and occupying the same period too. For we find the earth flattened at the poles, exactly to the amount, according to Laplace, which would be the result of the revolution of a fluid globe in twenty-four hours. And geology makes it almost certain that the earth was in that condition, from intense heat, at a very early period. After it became solid, no such effect, to much extent, would result from a revolution on its axis. We may, with confidence therefore, infer that the earth's revolution in twenty-four hours began as early as the time when it was in a molten state. If the revolution had been more rapid then than now, the poles would have been more flattened than they are; if less rapid, the oblateness would have been less. The revolution, therefore, must have occupied neither more nor less than twenty-four hours.

"This is an interesting coincidence between geology and revelation. But it is fatal to an opinion that has been quite popular, and still plays an important part in some theories, viz., that before the fourth day the standard of measurement for the day, and therefore its length, must have been quite different from what they were afterwards. This is the grand argument on which some rely to prove the days of creation to have been long periods.¹ Alas for the theorist! the facts of science show that it has no foundation.

"9. *My next position is, that the Mosaic account of the creation admits of an indefinite period between the beginning and the first demiurgic day.*

"The first verse merely asserts the creation of matter at some unknown epoch. The second verse describes its condition as without form and void, covered with water and with darkness. Then commences a description of the first day's work; the Spirit of God brooding over the face of the waters, and the evolution of light. But who can tell how long it may have continued in a waste and unfurnished condition? or who can say but previous to the chaotic state it may have been again and again reduced to order, and have even been the seat of several economies of life — of all those changes, organic and inorganic, which geology discloses? It is no very unusual thing in scripture for events, and even centuries, to be dropped out between two consecutive verses, and those linked together as if in immediate succession, which, in fact, were widely separated. It may be so here; and the chaotic condition described in verse second may not have been the waste and unfurnished states the earth had experienced earlier; but only that condition immediately preceding the creation described in the six days' work. This would be the view adopted by those who will admit the six demiurgic days to be only common days of twenty-four hours. They would place all the fossil animals and plants in that vast undefined interval which may have existed between the beginning and the first day, while the six days' work was limited to the existing races. Yet even those who suppose the days to have been long periods, admit of this long, indefinite interval between the first and second verses. (See *Bibliotheca Sacra*, vol. xiv. p. 92.)

¹ See the "Six Days of Creation," by Professor Taylor Lewis.

"But, if the sacred narrative does not fix the epoch of the creation of matter; if an interval of indefinite length may have preceded the six days' work; if those six days may have been natural days, what more do we need, especially when we add the other points of coincidence which I have described, — what more, I inquire, do we need, to bring the geological into full harmony with the biblical record? It is sufficient, answer Dr. Chalmers, Dr. J. Pye Smith, Dr. Buckland, Dr. Harris, Dr. King, Professor Sedgwick, and many others. It may have been perfectly adequate in 1814, answers Hugh Miller, but was found in 1839 to be no longer so, on account of new discoveries in geology. One was, that, in the geological history of the earth, immediately preceding the appearance of the existing races, there is no evidence of the occurrence of a period of death and darkness; but, on the contrary, the tertiary passes into the alluvial, and the earlier alluvial into the historic period, quietly and without disorder. The other discovery is, that some of the animals and plants of tertiary days have been continued to the present time, and still live. Is it not evident, then, that the six days' work must have reached back much farther than six thousand years?

"These statements of Hugh Miller have been widely received as settling the question as to the date of the six days' work, and showing the inadequacy of the theory of Dr. Chalmers and others to reconcile Genesis and geology. But, with all due deference to his eminent ability and sagacity, I cannot regard his objections as insuperable.¹ Are we sure that the waste and desolate state of the globe immediately preceded the work of the first day? or may it have lain far back among the ages of the indefinite period intervening between the beginning and the first day? or was there not, in most northern countries, a time of disorder and ruin as great as that referred to in scripture, during the drift period, and even during a considerable portion of the alluvial or modified drift period? Most geologists believe that during the drift period northern countries generally were below the ocean, and swept over by northern oceanic currents loaded with icebergs. I have adduced facts to show that the United States were two thousand feet below the waters at that time; and Professor Ramsey has shown the same in respect to Wales, and, of course, all England. What greater disturbance than this, according to scripture, preceded man's creation?

"And as to many of the tertiary and earlier alluvial species being found among the present races, what is there in scripture to forbid the supposition that they may have been permitted to live on from the earlier into the

¹ "I have ventured in this lecture, on two points, to call in question the correctness of Hugh Miller's views. But I hope it will not hence be thought that I differ from him in the leading principles of his *Testimony of the Rocks*; for I cordially embrace them; especially his theory of the days of creation; and regard this work as a most valuable addition to the religion of geology. I object only to some of the illustrations of his arguments."

historic period? Or why may not God have recreated the same species in some cases, as he assuredly would do, if there were no reason to alter the type, and as he seems to have done in different localities among existing species? Certain it is that, when I adopted this mode of reconciling the records some forty years ago, I was acquainted with some of the facts which Mr. Miller speaks of as recent discoveries; and they did not seem sufficient to invalidate the theory; nor do they now.

"There is, however, another difficulty in respect to this theory not mentioned by Miller, but stated with great force by Professor Silliman, a quarter of a century since, which has always perplexed me more than any other. Any one who reads the Mosaic account without prejudice, cannot but get the impression that, though brief, it does embrace the whole history of creation, organic and inorganic, from the production of matter to the formation of man. It begins with a period when an uninhabited ocean covers the surface, and then, ere life is introduced, light breaks in upon the darkness, and the land emerges. All this corresponds to the immensely long processes which geology shows the earth to have gone through. But how improbable that a continent should be upheaved and rendered habitable in one or two literal days! And then, the work of the fourth day, the creation or appointment of the sun, and moon, and stars to their circuits, comes in naturally if we take this broad view, and imagine ourselves far back in the history of the universe; but how apparently out of place in a creation limited to six literal days!

"It is the pressure of this difficulty that has led many able men to seek an expansion of the demiurgic week by regarding the days as either figuratively or symbolically long periods. I am not sure that this is necessary to a satisfactory vindication of the Bible, or that the Chalmesian theory is insufficient. Yet I incline to the opinion that the time has come when we may advance a few steps towards a better understanding of the nature of the demiurgic days.

"Ever since I began to read the Mosaic account with reference to geology, more than forty years ago, two facts have been more and more strongly impressed upon my mind in respect to the days. One is, that Moses understood them, and meant his hearers to understand them, as literal days. The other is, that they are in reality, or stand as the representatives of, something quite different. The earth's submergence during the first day, and emergence on the third, if we can judge from geological changes of analogous character, could have been no twenty-four or even seventy-two hour processes, but rather requiring untold ages. So geology teaches us that all the great classes of plants were introduced only after immense intervals, whereas Moses brings them all in upon a single day.

We give, next, the substance of the symbolical theory, as it is drawn out in the South Danvers Lecture.

10. We may understand the days as symbolically repre-

senting indefinite periods. A symbol is the representative of something else. The word is taken, in all respects, in its literal signification ; yet it has a higher meaning. Moses probably understood, and meant his readers should understand, the days of creation as literal days : but they actually symbolize higher periods : just as days, weeks, and times, are used in prophëcy (which often has a symbolic form), for years.

The great advantage of this view of the subject, over that which makes the days a figurative representation of long periods, is that hereby we can take the scriptural statement in its plain literal sense ; yet those literal days may be stretched, by symbolism, over the widest periods which geology shows to have separated the divine creative acts. It is no error, if a man chooses to understand these six days of creation as literal days ; nor any error for the geologist to make them symbolic of vast periods.

11. The biblical account of creation may be regarded as a succession of pictures, with existing nature on the foreground. Ever since this pictorial method was suggested by Dr. Knapp, in 1789, it has been a favorite mode of representation among authors, the most brilliant of which was made by Hugh Miller. But, three errors have generally pervaded these representations : The first is, that the six pictures in Genesis embrace every geological change the earth has undergone ; secondly, that they are given in true chronological order ; and, thirdly, that in the life-pictures, the plants and animals now found fossil — not the existing species — occupy the foreground. Inextricable confusion and discrepancy have resulted from the mixture of such elements. But admit that the sacred writer intended to give only certain prominent scenes in creation — its most important *memorabilia* — and not always in true chronological order, and that existing animals and plants were the models before him, the fossil species coming in on the background only by implication, and all the pictures become luminous, beautiful, and harmonious.

12. By such a mode of description, the sacred writer was not bound to give, and indeed could not give always, the

true chronological order of creation. To make this evident, we subjoin a table, prepared by the author, exhibiting, in

	MAN.	MAN.
6 Day.	Mammals	FULL FAUNA AND FLORA. Alluvium.
	and Land Reptiles.	MOLLUSCA. ARTICULATA. MAMMALS. DICOTYLEDONS. Tertiary.
5 Day.	Birds.	RADIATA. MOLLUSCA. Chalk.
	Sea Animals.	BIRDS. REPTILES. Oölite.
		Reptiles. Trias.
4 Day.	Sun, Moon, and Stars created.	Saurian Reptiles. Permian.
		Dicotyledons. ACROGENS. Carboniferous.
		Batrachians. FISHES. Monocotyledons. Devonian.
3 Day.	Plants of all sorts. Land emerges.	Fishes.
2 Day.	Atmosphere created.	Articulata. Radiata. Mollusca. Algae. Silurian and Cambrian.
1 Day.	Light, Darkness and Ocean.	Mostly Ocean. Azoic.
.		Igneous Fluidity.

parallel columns, the principal events, as they are revealed by the sacred penman and by geology.

The right-hand column gives a fair view of the order of creation, as developed by geology, the names of the several classes of animal and vegetable life being given where they first appear, and their greatest development by small capitals. The left-hand column gives the principal results of the six days' work, according to scripture, and where there seems to be no doubt of parallelism, they are placed opposite to events in the geological record. An examination of this table leads to several important conclusions :

a. We learn that some events, found in one column, do not occur in the other. The igneous fluidity of the earth is one of the best established conclusions of geology, but it is not named in the Bible. The introduction of numerous groups of animals and plants at different periods, is another settled fact in geology; but the scriptures name only one creation of the great classes. On the other hand, the creation of the atmosphere, on the second day, and of the sun, moon, and stars, upon the fourth, have no counterpart in the geological record.

b. There are several rather striking coincidences between the two records, as to the order of events, and the kinds of organisms introduced. Both show us, in early times, the continents beneath the ocean, and subsequently lifted out of it. Birds and sea-animals are introduced on the fifth day, which may reasonably correspond to oölitic times, when birds and reptiles appeared, in large numbers, if we may depend upon the tracks of the former as proof. Land-reptiles and mammals, or quadrupeds do not appear till the sixth day, which may well be regarded as synchronous with the tertiary series, when, according to geology, they were first fully developed. Man, too, in both records, is represented as the last animal created : a coincidence of great interest.

c. There also exist several diversities in the two records, as to the nature and order of events. They are not to be regarded as discrepancies; for they are so different, in nature, as to be incapable of being compared. Thus, the creation of the atmosphere is represented as occupying the whole of the demiurgic day. But geology has no record of such an

event, and therefore no comparison can be instituted. The same is true of the creation of the sun and moon, on the fourth day. It does seem remarkable, however, that these luminaries should be represented as created, not until after the vegetable world, on the third day, if the writer had intended to present the true chronological order of events. No impostor would have been so short-sighted as to commit such a blunder; hence there must be some other reason for such an arrangement. Alike strange is it to find the creation of the atmosphere placed so much before that of the heavenly bodies, when these, as things now are, seem to be indispensable to atmospheric phenomena.

d. The most important conclusion drawn from this table, is, that the sacred writer did not and could not give the true chronological order of events. The different classes of animals and plants, according to the geological record, appeared at different periods, the same class often several times repeated, and with different degrees of development. Thus plants began with the lowest class, the Algae, and were not numerous in the Cambrian slates, the oldest of fossiliferous rocks. In the Devonian series, a few monocotyledonous plants appeared. In the Carboniferous, there was an immense development of acrogens or flowerless trees, and some dicotyledons. The latter, however, the most perfect of plants, were not fully developed till the Tertiary, and still more fully in Alluvium. Yet plants are all represented as having been created on the third day. How was it possible, then, to give the chronological date, or order of their creation, unless the sacred writer had gone into the scientific details thus alluded to? The same is true of the groups of animals, which, in the Bible, are more comprehensive and indefinite than those of science, because they are such as are in popular use. By the plan of the inspired writer, the time and order of their appearance could not be given; and therefore the discovery of any diversity, in this respect, between revelation and science, is no objection to the former, because it is not responsible for the time and order of events, but only for their truth. And if this is so in regard to the organic world, why may it not

be so in regard to the other events described? Moses wished to give a pictorial representation of some of the principal events in the work of creation, and therefore he conformed to the chronological order only so far as his leading object required. It would be natural for him to begin his pictures with the world in a chaotic state, buried by darkness and water, with the light just breaking in. According to ancient ideas, there was an ocean above as well as below; and this might have suggested the formation of the firmament on the second picture. It was natural, next, to bring up the submerged land, and adorn it with vegetation. This might awaken the thought of introducing the heavenly bodies. And now it might occur that everything was ready for the introduction of animals into the atmosphere and the waters; and, last of all, to let the most perfect of animals come in with man.

These may not be, and probably were not, the reasons why, as we suppose, Moses departed from a chronological arrangement of his six pictures; but they may show that there might be reasons for doing this. It has been, and still is, almost universally assumed, that Moses gives a connected and chronological history of creation; and then ingenuity has been taxed to the utmost, to accommodate the facts to such a supposition. But if we may reasonably suppose that he meant only to give certain leading and selected facts, conformed to a chronological order only so far as suited his purpose; just as one might select certain facts from the early history of the country, and show them, by pictures, arranged so as to produce the best effect without reference to dates, it relieves the sacred writer from all responsibility as to chronological order and scientific arrangement; and really does more to bring out the beauty of the Mosaic history of creation, and to bring it into harmony with science, than almost all other principles.

A few concluding remarks of considerable importance we present in the language of the lecture:

“(1.) *This theory of interpretation allows us to retain the literalities of the Mosaic account.*

“I cannot believe that any man of unbiassed judgment can read that ac-

count and not feel that Moses is writing a literal history. The objects about which he writes are all of them real existences, which were before him, and he seems to be giving an account of their creation in the simplest possible language. Now, to be told that he understood the word *day* to be a period of indefinite length, and meant his readers so to understand it, seems so discrepant to the whole character of the record, that it greatly troubles the honest inquirer. But the symbolical theory allows us to understand the account literally; at least, as much so as many prophecies. That is, we may take the terms in a literal sense until science shows us that they are insufficient, and then we are allowed to expand them as far as is necessary. It may be doubtful whether Moses had any idea beyond the literal sense, just as was probably sometimes the case with the prophets. Yet subsequent discoveries make a wide expansion of the term *day* quite natural. Moreover, by regarding the account as a literal one, and the days natural ones, the sanction of the Sabbath is preserved in all its force to those unacquainted with geology, and retained symbolically to those acquainted with it.

"(2.) *This theory gives the amplest scope to the demands of geological science.*

"If the literal day in the Mosaic account may symbolize one ten years long, it may one which is ten millions of years in length. Here, then, is a field wide enough for the amplest demands of geology; nor are we required to give the successive days the same length. So that we can find room for all the widely-different floras and faunas of the geological periods, with intervening revolutions.

"(3.) *This theory does not require us to force Moses into the strait-jacket of modern science; that is, to represent him as describing animals and plants according to modern scientific arrangements; cryptogamian plants, for instance, instead of "grass;" great reptiles instead of "great whales;" instead of creeping things, the "rapidly-multiplying creature;" instead of waters above and beneath the firmament, "nebulous vapors;" in short, to maintain, as one able writer has done, "that if one should seek to give a sketch in the fewest words of the Celestial Mechanism of La Place, the Cosmos of Humboldt, and the geology of the latest and best authorities, he would do it in the very language of Moses."* The grand objection to such opinions is, that if Moses used scientific language in these cases, he must have done it every where, and so must the whole Bible. But we know that in general its language is that of common life, often loose and indefinite in meaning, describing things as they appear, often, and not as they are in their true nature. In the times of Moses, language must have been very general and indefinite, and the views for which we contend require only that in speaking of the different classes of objects created, he gives merely the common, unscientific ideas, which then prevailed, concerning them. It is a great relief thus to be able to extricate the sacred writer from the trammels of modern systems.

“(4.) *It is far more natural to suppose the Mosaic life-pictures to be retrospective than prospective.* Suppose we wish to bring into three panoramic groups, as Hugh Miller and others have done, all the existing and fossil species. What is the most natural starting point? In other words, shall we place the fossil or the living species in the first part of the picture, leaving the others to come upon the back-ground as congeneric races? Look at the outline, which I have given a few pages back, of these three life-pictures, as they presented themselves to the eye of Moses, supposing his vision to reach downwards among the fossil species. Directly before him and around him he saw a living, moving fauna and flora more perfect than any which had gone before. Would it not be most natural to take these as the conspicuous figures, leaving the buried races to come in upon the back-ground? Or, even if the historian knew nothing of the existence of the fossil races, so linked are they to the living ones, that they might have been placed on the picture unperceived, to be discovered only by the keen eye of modern science, just as upon a photograph a magnifying glass brings to light many objects before unnoticed. How much more natural, I say, is all this, than to suppose the historian to have passed by the living species, and to have chosen his representatives of creation among some of the inferior developments of the fossil races! From such a stand-point he would be compelled, in order to bring the complete series upon the picture, to look both backwards and forwards, since, in nearly all cases, a few representatives of the different races have preceded their greatest development.

“(6.) *This theory relieves us from the most embarrassing geological objections which lie against other modes of interpreting the demiurgic days.*

“It does not, as they do, exclude the existing organic races, and thus compel us to admit that Moses describes only the fossil species. It does not compel us to place the creation of plants before the sun.

“But the most formidable geological objection to any view which expands the demiurgic days into long periods, is the statement in the second chapter of Genesis, which, as usually understood, teaches that it had not rained on the earth till the third day — a statement not very improbable if the days were of twenty-four hours, but incredible if they were each tens of thousands of years.

“A somewhat careful examination of this passage — more, however, by comparing its different parts with one another, and with other texts of Genesis, than by verbal criticism — has led me to the conclusion, that in several important respects it has been misunderstood. I do not believe that it was intended to give us dates at all, but only to show how God provided for the growth and cultivation of plants when he made them, whatever that time was. One thing essential was the production of rain; and, accordingly, Moses tells us how it was produced, *viz.*, by evaporation from the earth, which afterwards watered the ground; that is, doubtless, as the same process is now often repeated, by the condensation and descent of rain. Commen-

tators have fancied that they saw in this statement a different mode of watering the earth from what now prevails. But the vapor ascended, apparently, just as it now does ; and though we are not told how it descended, yet we know how that it is done now, and why should we seek any other mode ?

“ Thus one of the wants of the new vegetation was supplied : the other was a cultivator, and man was created for that service.

“ But must not the period of the ascent of the vapor have been the third day, since, according to the first chapter, that was the time of the introduction of plants ?

“ It may have been so ; but some considerations make it probable that the sacred writer had no reference whatever to dates in his account.

“ First, the accounts of the creation in the first and second chapters are so different, that I doubt whether we can safely refer from one to the other for dates. Thus, in the first chapter creation occupies six days, but in the second only one ; and this condensation of the work may be intended to prevent all chronological comparisons.

“ Again, though the panorama of creation shows plants upon the third picture, yet we have shown that they must have been created at many different and widely-separated epochs. Which of these are referred to in this case, we may not know. Why may it not have been the last, that is, the plants of Eden ? Indeed they are so coupled with man as their cultivator, that it must have been the living plants that are here meant. There is nothing in the context, as I can see, that forbids such a supposition.

“ I would add, moreover, that so coupled together in the account are man and these newly-created plants, that, if the latter must be referred to the third day of the first chapter, so must the creation of man — an additional fact, showing that, whatever else this passage was intended to teach, it was not chronological dates.

“ If this position be admitted, then the geological objection with which we started loses its force, because founded on a wrong interpretation. Hebrew scholars may contest my positions. I submit them with all deference to their candor.”

13. Geology and the Bible agree in representing physical evil as in the world before man. Geology shows that the same mixed system of suffering and enjoyment, of liability to painful accident and inevitable death, has always prevailed, as they now do. The Bible, too, intimates that death and other evils preceded man. Of what use were the threatening of death, if no example of it existed among animals ? Again, plants were created with seeds in them, and animals

made male and female, for the production of a succession of races, and such a system implies a correspondent system of death. The human family might have been specially preserved by the fruit of the tree of life, perhaps, from the common lot, till they had sinned, when they, too, must die. Again, the selection and fitting up of a spot eastward as the Garden of Eden as a place for man while holy, and his expulsion from it after he had sinned, implies that the world, generally, was, as now, a world of evil and suffering. It was made so from the beginning, because it would ultimately become a world of sin; and sin and death are inseparable.

14. Zoölogy and Geology throw doubt over the literal universality of the deluge of Noah. The many vertical movements of continents, taught by geology, afford a presumption in favor of the Noachian deluge. But the science also shows the absurdity of a wide-spread opinion, that the numerous marine shells and plants found fossil in the rocks were deposited by the deluge. For they extend through more than ten miles thickness of rocks, and are arranged in systematic order, and most of them have been changed into stone by a slow process, and to impute all this to a transient deluge of less than a year's duration, is to impute events to a totally inadequate cause.

The doubts about the flood's universality result, first, from the difficulty of covering the whole earth for so long a time with water: secondly, to find a place in an ark 450 feet long, 75 feet broad, and 45 feet high, for 1,658 species of quadrupeds, 6,000 species of birds, 642 species of reptiles and tortoises, and 120,000 species of insects; all of which have been shown by naturalists to exist. But the grand difficulty is, to collect them all in one spot, and then to disperse them again without a miracle; and if a miracle be introduced, all reasoning is nonsense. Moreover, if the regions inhabited by man, then probably quite limited, were covered, what was the use of drowning the rest of the world? The language of scripture, though at first view seeming strongly to teach a

literal universality, is, in many other cases, quite as strong, although we know that it does not imply universality; but is an example where universal terms are employed to designate only a great many. See Genesis 41: 57. Exodus 9: 25. 10: 15. Acts 2: 5. Colossians 1: 23, etc.

15. The Bible teaches that the earth will be, and geology that it may be, destroyed by fire, and its surface renovated. The Bible declares that the earth will be burnt up, and its elements melted, which would reduce it to a molten globe. Geology shows that the earth contains within itself all the elements necessary to bring about such a result. At the rate the internal heat increases, melted matter would be reached in less than one hundred miles. The proportion of the cooled to the melted matter, may be represented as the circumference of a circle twelve inches in diameter—the line being nine hundredths of an inch wide. It is clear, then, that if from any cause, natural or supernatural, such a crust in one part should be broken through and sink into the molten ocean below, all the rest might flounder and disappear, and a melted globe alone remain. Then would begin anew the formation of another crust, on which another economy of life might be established, and where might be the new heavens and new earth described in the scriptures, as the future residence of man glorified.

III. *Arguments for the Divine Benevolence.* Geology furnishes some new and peculiar arguments in proof of the general benevolence of the Deity. They are called *peculiar*, because some of them have been said to prove former penal inflictions upon the human race. We shall certainly hail with satisfaction any additional light upon this most fundamental doctrine.

Most of the geological proofs of this truth are derived from agencies whose immediate effects are destructive, and thus *prima facie* evidence of malevolence. Thus the soils, so essential to the existence of man, cannot be prepared and spread over the surface of the underlying rocks, without scenes of great desolation. Glaciers and icebergs have covered the country, crushing and tearing up the ledges;

and, subsequently, storms and inundations have prevailed, which, though involving men and animals in destruction, have developed additional capacities in the soil to sustain vegetable and, consequently, animal life. So the processes by which the various useful ores have been injected into the crevices of the rocks, so as to be accessible to man, have been carried through only by violent fractures and upheavings of the strata, and the fusion of some of the veins. How little like benevolence did it appear in the early history of the globe, when the ploughshare of ruin was driven through the earth's crust, its strata were bent, fractured, and dislocated; ridged up into mountains and sunk into valleys. Yet without this apparently ruinous process, man could never have got access but to a small part of the useful mineral materials of the earth; water would have become stagnant over a marshy surface, and the most beautiful scenery of the earth, the mountains and hills, so exquisitely related to each other, would never have existed. In other words, the natural evils were the means of producing natural good. Even the most fearful calamities to which we are subject have marks of benevolence in them—the phenomena of earthquakes and eruptions from volcanoes. They appear to be essential to the preservation of the balance of nature, and give vent to that great furnace of fire within the globe, which might otherwise rend its crust to atoms; and to save countless millions, how small the sacrifice of a few thousand lives!—an incidental effect, but not the object of volcanoes.

Of course the inquiry arises here, as elsewhere, why a Being of infinite perfections could not have secured the good without the evil. The author suggests that the most satisfactory reason for this mixed system, is the fact of the fallen condition of man; man's highest good demands a mixture of evil in the system, as a means of discipline.

Geology furnishes interesting proofs of what the author calls *prospective benevolence*. It is illustrated by the origin and distribution of coal and gold. Untold ages before the creation of man, processes for the formation of coal were in

operation, then, apparently, without design, but intended to provide for the wants of the future man. We might transport ourselves in imagination, and view the gigantic forests in those low lands, as of the United States, where mountain ridges may now rear their summits. We should see them submerged, or forming beds like peat, and interstratified with layers of sand, gravel, and limestone. We might wonder at the immense wastes, at the immense forests, inhabited by few animals of any kind, as the atmosphere is thoroughly impregnated with carbonic acid. But the forests passed away, the strata of alternate beds of vegetable matter and earthy materials, are elevated above the waters; erosion lays bare the edges, and man is introduced; and, after several thousand years, he discovers the use of this coal so long laid up for his benefit. The vast amount of the coal in this country is another significant fact. Not less than two hundred and twenty-five thousand square miles of our surface, equal to twenty-five such States as Massachusetts, are underlaid by beds of coal; and if the average thickness of these beds be only twelve feet, the whole amount of coal in our country cannot be less than five hundred cubic miles; and one cubic mile, at the rate we now use it, would last a thousand years; so that we may estimate the period when our coal will be exhausted at several hundred thousand years, unless its consumption should vastly increase. Not only do we see a striking proof of prospective benevolence, in thus providing for the means of comfort and civilization of future inhabitants, but also in the immense magnitude of this treasure, we may discern the intention of God as to the future population of our country, and the prominent part it is to take in the civilization and salvation of the world.

The illustration from the time and manner in which gold has been introduced into its present position, is even more peculiarly a mark of prospective benevolence, to the geologist's mind. Gold is found, either in veins in the older rocks, or in the sands and gravels of the most recent deposits derived from them, while it is scarcely found at all in the

Mesozoic and Tertiary, or the intermediate formations. Yet both the latest and the intermediate strata, are made of fragments derived from the older rocks. Why, then, should gold be absent from the intermediate series? The conclusion is irresistible, that it was not introduced into the older rocks until after the formation of the intermediate groups. Then the auriferous veins were introduced into the older rocks, so that, as they were denuded subsequently to the Tertiary, the gold was also worn away, and accumulated in the placers. In other words, this accumulation took place just before the introduction of man, as if it was intended solely for him. Of what use could gold have been to the iguanodons, otozours, or gigantic birds of the intermediate periods? they could use it neither for food, nor as a procurer of food; and they had no higher use for any article. But man uses it for important purposes of political and social economy.

IV. *Miraculous and Special Providence.*— 'The following is Dr. Hitchcock's definition of Miraculous Providence: "It is a superintendence over the world that interferes, when desirable, with the regular operations of nature, and brings about events, either in opposition to natural laws, or by giving them a less or greater power than usual. In either of these cases, the events cannot be explained by natural laws; they are above, or contrary to, nature, and, therefore, are called miracles, or prodigies."

Geology abounds with such interventions. The facts of all other sciences may be brought into ceaseless cycles, but geology shows a divine hand cutting asunder the chain at intervals, and commencing new series of operations.

We may imagine an observer to stand upon one of the nearest heavenly bodies, as the moon, and see the earth passing through its various stages of progress, and noting when a miracle is performed. He may see the world at first a globe of liquid fire; and the problem is, to fill it with forms of organic life. A crust is first formed, and then the observer sees that races of animals are crawling upon it, and

plants flourishing upon its surface. Though he cannot see the Deity as an agent locate these beings upon the earth, he sees that their creation is a miracle, not resolvable by the laws of nature. If the production of organisms, enough to fill the world, is not a miracle, there is no act that can be, and we might dismiss the term from the language.

But this observer soon discovers new forms of life among the primitive races, and by inspection discovers that the first set of beings have entirely disappeared, and that a fresher and more vigorous economy is introduced. Catastrophes may have destroyed the first, or else the changed condition of the climate, as the planet cooled. Again do the long ages roll on, and Earth rejoices in her crowded and happy population; but the divine decree, which limits the terms of economies, as well as of individual life, must be accomplished; and inundations, earthquakes, eruptions, or slow submergence terminate the second period of life; and then more complex forms are introduced by creation, with such an adaptation to circumstances as only Infinite wisdom can make. In like manner, at least six entire changes of life pass in review, and from twenty-five to thirty successive miraculous acts of creation.

The observer on the moon has witnessed the introduction of separate economies, each one, on the whole, superior to the preceding. He now sees an unusual preparation for the support of higher forms of organization; as a greater extent and richness of soil, a purer atmosphere, and the introduction of the metallic ores. The object of this preparation at length appears; one species so remarkable, that its creation may justly be regarded as the most striking of all the miracles of nature, as it is also of revelation. It is man: a being whose physical organization is the perfected antitype of all other animals; who subjects all others to his sway, and converts even the fiercest elements into servants. Man's creation, as taught by geology, rises up as a lofty monument of miraculous intervention in nature, beating back the waves of unbelief, and reflecting afar the divine wisdom and glory.

Hence we have an important addition to the articles of

Natural Religion; for, heretofore, miraculous intervention has been confined to Revealed Religion. This places miracles upon such a basis that we may confidently appeal to them to take away all improbability from the miracles of Christianity. The constancy and uniformity of nature have been the grand argument against them; and no human testimony, it is said, can prove a miracle in opposition to the will of all nature. Much labor has been spent in the vain attempt to answer this objection of Hume, upon his premises. And, in fact, from metaphysical reasoning, we cannot disprove this objection, without laying down several established fundamental principles, as the existence of a Deity. And, even then, it may be a question whether the reasoning is entirely satisfactory. But the miracles of geology destroy entirely the groundwork of the objection. Miracles are not contrary to experience, for how easy it is to read them from the leaves of nature's volume. We may call the miracles of scripture myths, but it is not so easy to dispose of the thousands of exhumed species of fossils. They testify that miraculous intervention has been a law of God's natural government from the beginning; and if we do not find miracles in the Christian dispensation, it is an exception to the general course of Providence. Thus the *very stones* cry out against unbelief.

Special Providence is also regarded by our author as a doctrine of Natural Religion. "I should define it," says he, "to be an event brought about apparently by natural laws, yet, in fact, the result of a special agency, on the part of the Deity, to meet a particular exigency, either by an original arrangement of natural laws, or by a modification of second causes, out of sight at the time." Thus he regards all special providences as *interpositions* of Deity, inferior in *degree* to miracles. Nor does he confine it, as some do, to phenomena fitted to arrest attention by their peculiar and striking adapt-*edness* to a *moral* design. He also defines a providence as the *event* happening, not the *act* of the Deity in producing the event.

Several special providences in the earth's history are

pointed out. For example, go back to that period in the history of the earth and the moon, when both of them were molten globes. Both have been cooled down so as to become solid. But the moon's surface presents only naked volcanic rocks, and is, therefore, unfit for organic life ; while the earth has been going through processes which have fitted it for successive races of higher and higher grades. The agencies of change have been wisely and exactly ordered to produce this difference. To control these operations, especially when the agencies have been at work so irregularly, has needed a guiding hand to meet every exigency.

A special providence is seen in the many careful preparations made for man's benefit. The results of prospective benevolence, in providing the vast stores of mineral fuel, the various metals, the marble and building stones, and the wonderful varieties of natural scenery, are all special providences ; for a special fiat was necessary thus to segregate these articles for this particular purpose.

A still more marked example of special providence is seen in the structure of the different races of animals and plants. So far as is known, these changes were all made to adapt organic races to the altered circumstances of the land, the waters, and the air. This shows that the Creator, after once arranging the laws of nature wisely, did not leave them to run on interminably, but stood by the great machine, and modified its action as was best. He so shaped and modified the moving forces, as to meet the exigencies of living beings.

The importance of this doctrine to religion need not be dwelt upon here. It is surely an unexpected encouragement to us to persevere in prayer ; for it teaches us that all events are guided by the hand of the Deity, not by blind law, and that, when necessary, either to answer some humble prayer, or accomplish some desirable purpose, he will alter the usual course of nature by second causes, out of sight, so as to bring about the special result.¹

¹ This subject is fully discussed by Prof. H. in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. XI. pp. 776—800.

V. Another important position of the author is that in connection with human history, *Geology presents strong pre-Adamic as well as post-Adamic evidence of the fallen condition of this world, and presumptive proof of the mediatorial work of Christ.*

Geology shows that the same organic and inorganic laws which now prevail, have been in operation on the globe from the earliest times, and, consequently, the same mixed system of enjoyment and suffering among animals. Accidents now may happen to all, and death is inevitable. So was it with the earliest trilobites and brachiopods of the Silurian age. Their numberless petrified relics show how unsparing death has been. Hence the idea which some have expressed, that suffering and death were introduced among the lower animals, only after the sin of our first parents, is erroneous.

The mixed system of good and evil under which we live, seems to be adapted for a state of probation for man. The evils are adapted to discipline the moral powers by trying their strength. But why has this mixed system prevailed from the dawn of earthly organic existence? Why should the inferior animals be made to suffer long before man's existence, because he would, by transgression, incur the divine displeasure? If God foresaw that man would sin, and that a probationary system was the best for sinners, infinite benevolence would adapt the world for a fallen being; and if it can be shown that animal existence is, upon the whole, a blessing, or if animals may exist in another world, and there receive some compensation, we can see why God, to give unity to the system, should from the first have mixed evil with good in the natural world. Thus, moreover, would he more impressively exhibit the evil of sin.

By comparing revelation and science, the conviction will be impressed upon us, that all the disorders and sufferings of the present world, and in its past history, point significantly to the cross. That solves the deepest mysteries of all time, before or after Adam. A world fallen yet redeemed, is the great truth engraved upon the earliest and deepest

foundations of the earth by her Creator and Redeemer. This is the profoundest lesson of paleontology.¹

VI. *Geology Presents us with New and Enlarged Views of the Divine Plans.* The plans of God have been developed gradually. The Mosaic dispensation was a revelation of plans not known to the patriarchs: the Christian dispensation is much in advance of the Mosaic, and modern science is permitted to extend the knowledge of the Christian in respect to God's works and laws in every direction. The telescope has opened an infinity in one direction and the microscope in another. Geology leads us into depths of duration alike beyond the imagination.

One of these plans is the *law of unity*. Unity of design is a striking characteristic of existing nature. Though there are diversities of form, aspect, and structure, yet we everywhere meet with the same original model on which all are constructed,—the organic and inorganic, the great and the small, the proximate and the remote, bound together by ten thousand relations and sympathies into one golden tissue of harmonies. This same thread of unity runs through all the successive economies of life that have successively appeared upon the earth. They were not several independent systems, but they form the parts of one great whole. For the laws of inorganic matter have never varied, nor have the laws of organisms, or the laws of zoölogy, botany, anatomy, and physiology. For the fossil animals and plants can be classified with existing species; and not only so, but certain links that are wanting between existing forms, are supplied from the fossil races. For example, in existing nature, there is a sudden transition between birds and reptiles: there are no animals having a type of structure intermediate between these two classes. But geology presents us with examples of beings forming this connecting link, among the *Lithichnozoa*, or the animals who made

¹ The author has developed this subject in a lecture entitled: *The Cross in Nature and Nature in the Cross*, which will appear in a subsequent number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*.

the tracks upon stone. One class of them have ornithic and lacertilian features combined.

Another important principle is the *law of change*. The law of constancy and uniformity in nature is subordinate to the higher law of change. Hitherto, the law of gravitation has generally been considered the highest of all laws, second only to the divine will, but our modern sciences show it to be subordinate to the law of change.

In the inorganic world change is the great conservative principle of the universe. If only mechanical forces operate, matter would be condensed into lifeless adamant. But chemical changes give mobility to the particles, and the segregating processes of affinity and cohesion begin the mighty cycle of change, which would be endless were the forces, as in gravity, exactly balanced. But they are not, and hence a particular system fails — requiring divine power to interpose and commence a new series. Thus the law of change is a higher power, coming in to modify and control for a time, the law of constancy. And herein is its special adaptation to our world; for it the endless variety needed by sentient creatures, and allows a permanency as enduring as Infinite Wisdom sees fit to ordain.

Change shows itself in the organic world by the introduction of modified forms of organization. It is seen as we examine in review the constituents of the different systems of life. Different families, genera, and species lie close together, and of such varied proportions, that we almost fancy them to belong to some other system. But we learn presently that they are only wise adaptations to a changing world, possessing strong links of connection with all other terrestrial beings.

When we thus regard these changes, not merely as connected with death, but as the precursors of renovated excellencies, and see that they are but a part of the wise plans of the Deity, we no longer view them as defects in nature, but essential features of a fallen world. We admire the perfect wisdom that has devised them, and anticipate joyfully the wonderful developments of this law yet to appear in eternity.

This topic has an important bearing upon revealed religion ; for it removes objections to a miraculous dispensation, and narrows the distinction between natural and revealed religion, giving to both the same origin.

Many interesting suggestions are given in the lecture upon the *vastness of the divine plans*. The mind is almost overwhelmed in considering the infinite spaces developed by astronomy, and the mighty duration of the earth as made known by geology. Chronology has no measuring line long enough to stretch over them, and imagination tires on her wing in attempting the daring flight. Yet to the mind of Jehovah they are perfectly distinct. We discover everywhere, in every change, his footsteps, his energizing and controlling power. Every new *tableau* in the opening series, gives a brighter display, till the harmonies become complete in man.

From the past we may derive a presumption as to the future. If in all past periods change has been the higher and controlling law of our world—the essential means of its preservation and of the happiness of sentient beings—we may presume that other changes are to succeed. And since we know of no example of the annihilation of a single particle of matter, but only of its metamorphosis, we can set no limits to the expanding series. Why may not change, through all eternity, be, as it has been and is now, an essential means of happiness to created natures?

Thus we stand upon the middle point of existence, as it were, and can look backwards and forwards, but cannot pierce to the beginning or end of the series. The extremities lie too deeply buried in the past and the future, to be seen by mortal vision. These views are ennobling. What Christian will hesitate to give up his soul to the liberalizing, purifying, and elevating influences of these grand disclosures? For having felt their interest and power on earth, he may surely hope that their deeper and more thorough study will form a part of the employments and enjoyments of heaven.

We close with the following inference from the whole subject, in the words of the author :

“From all that has been advanced we may safely say, that no other science, nay, perhaps not all the other sciences, touch religion at so many points as geology. And at what connecting point do we discover collision ? If upon a few of them some obscurity still rests, yet with nearly all how clear the harmony — how strong the mutual corroboration ! With how much stronger faith do we cling to the Bible when we find so many of its principles thus corroborated ! From many a science has the supposed viper come forth and fastened itself upon the hand of Christianity. But instead of falling down dead, as an unbelieving world expected, how calmly have they seen her shake off the beast and feel no harm ! Surely it is time that unbelievers, like the ancient heathen, should confess the divinity of the Bible, when they see how invulnerable it is to every assault. Surely it is time for the believer to cease fearing that any deadly influence will emanate from geology and fasten itself upon his faith, and learn to look upon this science only as an auxiliary and friend.”

ARTICLE II.

THE ABORIGINES OF INDIA.

HERODOTUS was the first to introduce India to the acquaintance of the western world. Following the report of Scylax, who at the instance of Darius had explored the river Indus, he enumerates at least four classes of men who had their abode about the mouth of that river.

1. Fishermen, who inhabited the marshes of the Indus, the description of whose habits and methods of fishing would apply, with equal accuracy, to the fishermen of Scinde to-day. 2. Pastoral tribes, called Padaeans. 3. People who ate no flesh, but lived upon vegetable diet, whom no one can fail to recognize. 4. Calatians. These classes he speaks of

in general, as having straight black hair, as "alike black and resembling the Egyptians."¹

This diversity among the inhabitants of India, thus vaguely alluded to by Scylax the Persian, and which has been noticed and more definitely stated by all travellers, from the time of Scylax and of Alexander to the present, finds its only historical solution in the sacred writings of the Hindus themselves. The authors of the earliest writings—the Vedic Hymns—who style themselves "Aryas" (honorable ones), and who constitute one of the oldest members of the great Arian or Indo-European family, did not, as is well known, probably originate in India. Having a birth-place, as we suppose, somewhere in the highlands of Asia, that "hive of all nations," they early left their ancestral seat to seek adventure or a less contracted dwelling-place in the wide world about them. They were a bold, spirited, and freedom-loving race. Others of their family had gone, before them, to the north and west; they turned to the south; and, crossing the snowy barriers of the Himalaya or Hindu Kush, gradually poured down along the many streams which find their origin among those lofty hills, until they found a more inviting resting-place in the sunny plains of the Panjab—the country of the five rivers.

If, however, we read aright their ancient hymns, offered either in praise of the gods, or as supplications to them, and which lucidly reflect the passing life, the varying feeling of these children of nature, they did not find these spacious tracts which opened so invitingly before them, wholly unpeopled.

We read in these hymns, of *Dasyus*, of *Asuras*, of *Rakshas*, of *Flesh-eaters*, etc.; all, terms evidently designating enemies to these new comers, who everywhere opposed their progress. And they indicate, usually at least, enemies from without their own ranks, and of different stock, as seen from their differences of speech, color, and faith; while the same opprobrious epithets are occasionally applied to Aryans, who

¹ *Thalia*, 98—102.

have apostatized from their original belief, or have become political foes. Of these different classes, the Dasyus are the most frequently named. The term "dasyu" meant, originally, "thief," "robber," and afterwards was applied to any enemy, although limited, ordinarily, to tribal or national foes. Their method of allusion to these Dasyus will be seen from the following extracts from the *Rig Veda*, Wilson's translation.

"Discriminate, O Indra, between the Aryas and those who are Dasyus: restraining those who perform no religious rites, compel them to submit to the performance of sacrifices."

"Indra, having attacked the Dasyus and the Simyus, slew them with his thunderbolts; the thunderer then divided the fields with his white-complexioned friends."

"Indra defends his Arya worshipper in all conflicts: in conflicts that confer heaven; he punished for man the neglecter of religious rites: he tore off the black skin."¹

"Indra has scattered the black-sprung servile hosts."

The diversity in religious faith and physical appearance, between the two classes is, in the above verses, clearly depicted. These Dasyus, moreover, were no despicable foes: they were numerous, and their civilization was not, apparently, very much behind that of the Arian invaders. This is seen in the following hymns:

"O Indra, overthrow, on the part of the Arya, all the servile races, everywhere abiding."

"He put to sleep, by delusion, with his destructive [weapons] thirty thousand of the servile [races]."

"Armed with the thunderbolt, and confident in his strength, he has gone on destroying the cities of the Dasyus"—"their hostile and undivine cities"—"their iron cities"—"a hundred stone-built cities."²

One curious hymn exists, which has been thus rendered by Wilson:³

"With the thunderbolt thou hast confounded the *voiceless*

¹ Rig Veda, Vol. I. pp. 137, 259. Vol. II. pp. 35, 258.

² Ibid. Vol. I. p. 266; Vol. II. p. 258; Vol. III. p. 180.

³ Ibid. Vol. III. p. 276.

Dasyus, thou hast destroyed, in battle, the speech-bereft foes."

Thus rendered, "voiceless" would undoubtedly refer to the uncouth and apparently inarticulate speech of the barbarians. Max Müller, however, would read, instead of "*anasas*" (voice-less), "*a-nasas*" (nose-less), and make it refer to the flat noses of these Dasyus, which would find a counterpart in many of the wild Indian tribes of this day.¹ Wilson, however, condemns Müller's reading.

We find a few hymns, also, which indicate, as we have said, that some foes were of the Aryan household :

"Indra destroyed enemies, both Dasa and Arya enemies."

For hymns against Flesh-eaters, we take two verses from Müller :

"May he burn and hiss like an oblation in the fire! Put your everlasting hatred upon the villain who hates the Brahman, who eats flesh, and whose look is abominable."

"Indra and Soma, hurl the evil doer into the pit, into unfathomed darkness! May your strength be full of wrath to hold out, that no one may come out again."²

In the *Brahmanas*, later commentaries upon the *Veda*, and which represent the succeeding stage of Arian immigration, we find, according to Müller,³ still more distinct allusions to races of men separate from the Arian stock, who are mentioned under the name of *Nishadas*, and as having their abode at one time in the forest, at another in villages of their own.

Passing from the Vedic age to that of *Manu* and the *Epic Poems*, allusions to various wild tribes are still more frequently met with; but allusions no less obscure, and often self-contradictory.

Valmiki, in his great epic, the *Ramayana*, has sung the victory of Rama, the incarnate Vishnu, over the foul fiend Ravana, whose dwelling was in Ceylon, and to rid whom from the earth, Vishnu, at the instance of Brahma, had descended to this lower world. According to the majority of modern critics, the poet intends by this great song, in which

¹ Bunsen, Phil. of Hist. Vol. I. p. 346.

² Müller in Bunsen, Vol. I. p. 345.

³ Ibid. p. 346.

apes, bears, and vultures play so conspicuous a part, as the allies and guides of Rama, to symbolize the subjection of some southern people to northern conquerors; or perhaps the conquest of Ceylon by the tribes of the continent; and, by apes and bears, it is conceived, are intended the uncouth, uncivilized denizens of the Dekhan. However much of historic truth may lie concealed beneath this strange conceit (and we see that Barthelemy St. Hilaire — whose essays on Buddhism and Hindu philosophy have placed him in one of the first ranks of Oriental scholars — wholly discards the theory¹), mention is certainly made, throughout the epic, of various scattered classes of barbarians.

And so again in the *Mahabharata*, which is not so much a single epic as a collection of ancient legends incorporated into one work, “Dasyus” are referred to as comprising a number of frontier tribes; while in one passage it is implied that “the Brahmans of that age regarded the Dasyus as owing allegiance to Brahmanical institutions.”²

Manu also, in his chapter on “mixed classes,” dwells at length upon the different tribes existing in his day, all of whom he regarded in common with some earlier writers, as having been, originally, of one of the four castes. Thus he says:

“Three castes, the Brahman, the Kshatriya, and the Vaisya, are twice born; the fourth, the Sudra, is once born; and there is no fifth.”³

Accordingly he treats all classes not falling, in his time, within the pale of the four castes, as either mixed classes, arising from intermarriage between different castes, or degraded offspring of one of the three “twice-born.” Thus he enumerates twelve classes who were once Kshatriyas, but who “have gradually sunk to the state of Sudras, from the extinction of sacred rites, and from having no communication with Brahmans.” And so in the following verse:

“Those tribes which are outside of the classes produced from the mouth, arms, thighs, and feet, whether they speak

¹ Jour. des Savants, July 1859.

² Muir's Orig. Sanskrit Texts, p. 179.

³ Manu, X. 4.

the language of the Mlechhas (barbarians) or of the Aryas, are called *Dasyus*.”¹

By tribes that are “outside,” he probably intended such as had voluntarily lost caste by neglect of the religious rites of the Brahmans. While it would be allotting too great an antiquity to Brahmanical institutions to admit the truth of Manu’s theory of their origin, we see that he at least recognized the existence of classes of men called Dasyus, which name had been employed to represent those who were of un-Arian extraction, by the earliest writers.

We have hitherto found but slight reference to the physical appearance of these rude people. In the *Puranas*, however, which, though representing the latest period of Hindu literature, unquestionably contain many fragments of ancient history, we do find such reference, while in some, and probably later passages, lists of tribes are furnished, corresponding quite nearly to the names of tribes now existing. In the legend of *Vena*, a prince whose name occurs even in various hymns of the *Rig Veda*, and whose story, found in the *Mahabharata*, is repeated in several *Puranas*, is a passage which is worth our notice. We give it as found in the *Vishnu Purana*, though adopting the version of Muir :²

“Vena was a proud prince, who on his exaltation to the throne ventured to give out the proclamation: ‘Men must not sacrifice, or offer oblations, or give gifts. Who else but myself is the enjoyer of sacrifices? I am always the lord of oblations.’”

On account of this impious declaration, which he persisted in, in spite of the expostulations of the jealous priests, he was slain by them in their anger, “with blades of sacrificial grass purified by hymns.” After his death, the kingdom was infested by robbers, as, Vena dying childless, no king could be appointed. In their despair, the wise men at last thought of an expedient: they rubbed the thigh of Vena to produce a son. The legend then says:

“From his thigh, when rubbed, there sprang a man like

¹ Manu, X. 43—45.

² Wilson’s Vishnu Purana, p. 98.

a charred log, with flattened face, and very short. 'What shall I do?' said the man, in distress, to the Brahmans. They said to him, 'sit down' (nishida); and he became, in consequence, a Nishada. There sprang, afterwards, from this man, Nishadas, dwelling in the Vindhya mountains, notorious for their wicked deeds. By this means, the sin of the king was expelled; the Nishadas were thus produced, originating in the sin of Vena." By rubbing his right hand, a holy king was then born.

Wilson, in a note to this passage, adds:

"The *Matsya Purana* says there were born outcasts or barbarous races, Mlechhas, black as collyrium. The *Bhagavata Purana* describes an individual of dwarfish stature, with short arms and legs, of a complexion as black as a crow, with a projecting chin, broad flat nose, red eyes, and tawny hair; whose descendants were mountaineers and foresters. The *Padma Purana* has a similar description, adding to the dwarfish stature and black complexion, a wide mouth, large ears, and a protuberant belly." Whether this is an exaggerated description of these wild tribes, we may see in the sequel.

The process by which the Aryans gained control over India, was clearly a slow one. The tide of immigration was evidently affected by the physical characteristics of the country traversed. Supposing that they entered India by the north-west, they must first have encountered the Indus. And so in their earliest hymns, that river is referred to as the boundary of their location. Following the course of that stream, which they probably did only at an early date, they appear again to have turned upon their track, avoiding the broad table-land of Mewar, and filing around to the north and east, until they came upon the Ganges and its tributaries. Here they halted; and here, again, we find the two rivers, Sarasvati and Drishadvati, by a double inversion "the Caggar and Sursooti of our barbarous maps," given as the sacred limit. Manu calls the country between these two rivers, "*Brahmavarta*, because frequented by gods;"¹ refer-

¹ II. 17.

ring, probably, to its sacredness, as the ancient seat of his fathers.

When again resuming their journey, they followed the general course of the Ganges to the south-east. Their habitat, in Manu's day, is given by him when he includes the whole region between the Himalaya and Vindhya mountains, and the two seas, as "*Ariavarta*, or inhabited by respectable men;" and all outside of that as "the land of the *Mlechhas*, or those that speak barbarously."¹

At his day then, variously estimated at from 900 to 500 B. C., the Aryans had certainly not crossed the Vindhya range. When they did cross, it was only at its eastern and western extremities, keeping almost exclusively to the sea side of the Ghat ranges.

Now by looking over Lassen's map of ancient India, we shall be able to detect at every stage the presence of *nishadas*, or those wild tribes who ever disputed the right of way. What, we now ask, would be the natural consequence of such a meeting of these two races of men, as we find hinted at in their sacred books? We should suppose that the more cultivated and powerful of the two would either exterminate the weaker and less refined, or would incorporate them into their own body, or drive them into regions where they could still maintain their independence. But the extermination of a race so nearly a match for the conquerors, would seem an unlikely occurrence, and particularly so when we consider that these conquerors did not so much court war, as engage in it from the necessity of their position. We have left then the two latter contingencies, and both these have, we conceive, been realized in Indian history.

But further: we find no evidence, either from oral tradition or written legend, of any warlike incursion of the Aryan race upon the peoples south of Hindostan, inhabiting the highlands of the Dekhan. As far as Aryans have settled there in the lapse of centuries, it has been only as peaceful colonists. What then, should we anticipate, would be the possible result of *such* a contact? Should we not, if the natu-

¹ II. 22, 23.

rally inferior race had been forced to succumb to the superior intelligence and energy of the colonists, expect still to find that the weaker race, while acknowledging the rule of the mightier, would present a more unbroken front, in speech, in customs and religious faith, to the aggressions of the conqueror, than had their northern brethren? Such at least, we again conceive, has been the fact in South Indian history.

It is the more especial object of this Essay to bring to view, as far as we may be able, the present political, social, and religious condition of these various tribes, which, by anticipation and for convenience of nomenclature, we may term aboriginal. A faithful sketch of the several religious beliefs which characterize them would be a valuable chapter in the religious history of mankind. Attention has been but lately called to these tribes, and they yet await a historian. Notices of them which we offer, have been gathered from all sources, mainly from the journals of the several Asiatic societies and the records of travellers.

We present, as an introduction, a brief sketch of the physical geography of India, that we may see at a glance, the natural abode of untamed tribes, and to afford us a thread which we may follow in our survey.

The general peninsula of India is divided into three well marked regions, by the two great mountain ranges which traverse it from East to West. On the north we have the Himalaya range, "the land of snow," stretching, in an almost unbroken line, north-west and south-east, for a distance of eighteen hundred miles, shutting in India from Tibet upon the north. Properly, however, this great chain of mountains which has aided so materially in creating and shaping the mythology of the people, hems in the great peninsula upon the east also; leaving but a single opening into its plains by land. The proper chain of the Himalaya is bounded on the east by the Brahmaputra, and on the west by the Indus; which two rivers, commencing almost literally in an inosculation north of the snowy chain, pass, the one to the east and south, entering the Bay of Bengal by the Ganges which it meets, and the other, to the west and south, into the Persian

Gulf, receiving on its way various tributaries from the Panjab.

The Himalaya range itself constitutes the first great division of India. For it is not a single line of hills, but is formed by a number of parallel ranges, which, occasionally intersected by cross sections, give us the mountain districts of Nepal, Bhotan, etc.

Passing from the Himalayas to the plains below, we meet with no marked elevation until we cross the valley of the Ganges, when we are confronted with another range of hills, less elevated than the Himalayas, but of no little importance in the geography of the peninsula, being the source of numberless tributaries of the Ganges, and forming a natural barrier between the main body of the continent and the peninsula proper. These are the Vindhya mountains. Commencing at Gujerat, they pass, in a north-easterly direction, toward the eastern terminus of the Himalaya. Fortified at their origin by a parallel range of hills, the Satpura mountains, they slope gradually into the basin of the Ganges, leaving comparatively free communication between the plains of Bengal and the southern country.

Hindustan proper, comprising all the region between the Himalaya and Vindhya mountains, is itself divided into two unequal portions by another lesser range of hills, the Aravali, which, commencing at the western terminus of the Vindhya, run almost at right angles to that range, though inclining slightly toward the east, and separate the valley of the Indus from that of the Ganges. Enclosed between the Aravali and Vindhya ranges, is Mewar, the table-land of Hindostan, passing, by gentle descent, into the basin of the Ganges.

The third main division of India is the Dekhan, so called from the Sanskrit "*dakshin*," or "south" (literally, "right"), comprised between the Vindhya mountains and the southern sea. The Dekhan is not only fortified on the north, it is also flanked, on either side, by the chains of Ghats, which, ranging southerly, unite towards the end of the peninsula. They are so termed from their "ghat" or "step-like" formation, the result of volcanic action. The western Ghats being

much higher than the eastern, there is formed the table-land of the Dekhan, facing toward the Bay of Bengal.

We must again call attention to the admirable fitness of these grand mountain-chains to the necessities of a people whom we have referred to as a race hard-pressed but still unsubdued.

We pass, now, to a consideration of those tribes of India which are clearly distinct from the Aryan or Brahman race, and may still be met with, especially in the elevated regions of that country. We commence at the northern or Himalayan region.

The physical geography of the Himalaya is peculiar. Stretching, as we have seen, from the great bend of the Indus to the great bend of the Brahmaputra, this range is intersected by various streams, which originate in the table-land of Tibet and find an outlet through the Indus, Ganges, or Brahmaputra. The great mountain-peaks, which for altitude stand unrivalled, are not in the main line of the chain, but have, as it were, stepped aside, standing at right-angles to the south of the range, and allowing a passage for the streams from the north, which they also supply with numberless feeders on their way. By these intersections the whole range is divided into three principal districts: First from the Indus comes the Sutlej river, so famous in Anglo-Indian military history, which bounds the Panjab on the east, and forms the main branch of the Indus.

Next in importance, toward the east, is the Kali or Gogra, which, passing south to join the Ganges, shuts in, between itself and the Sutlej, what is known as the districts of Kumaon and Garwhal. Finally, the Tishta separates Nepal from Bhotan on the east with the exception of the little territory of Sikkim, which is pressed in between them.

But, aside from the cross-sections of the chain, there are divisions in the other direction, which give it its marked peculiarity. The mean breadth of the Himalaya is given, by Johnston, as 150 miles; but this must, we think, be erroneous, since Mr. B. H. Hodgson, to whom we are indebted for our first real acquaintance with the configuration of the

range, gives it as only ninety miles; and has been followed, in this, by others.¹

This breadth of ninety miles he subdivides into three distinct climatic sections, of thirty miles each. In ascending, we come, first, upon a region extending to a height of four thousand feet above the level of the sea. Next follows a section extending from four to ten thousand feet above the sea; and the third reaches from ten thousand feet to about sixteen thousand, the average height of the chain. The two upper regions are simple, admitting of no subdivisions; but not so the lower. This comprises a three-fold tract of country: First, upon entering the hills, you reach a tract called Tarai. This is "an open waste, encumbered, rather than clothed, with grass." It is infested with a direful malaria, arising from its numerous swamps. Immediately above this, is a region of forest, called Bhaver, or Saul Forest. This is as dry as the region below was wet; but not less abounding in malaria. The third division is that of the Dhuns, or sandstone ranges, low hills running parallel with the general chain, and alike noxious in its climate with the two lower divisions. This general outline is true, in detail, only of the central portion of the range; but its traces are evident throughout.

These three grand divisions of the chain, differing in altitude, differ also in the fauna and flora which characterize them. This we should anticipate; but the fact of most interest, and which is hardly so well exemplified elsewhere, is, that what is true here of the lower order of the animal kingdom, is no less true of the highest: these three regions are also the abode of three classes of men, no one of which can venture into the domain of the other two, without serious detriment.

It is these three classes of men that first claim our notice. We begin our survey where the Sutlej pierces the range, in order to avoid commencing with tribes at either extremity, which we might suppose would be affected by contact with

¹ Jour. Asiat. Soc. of Bengal, Aug. 1849.

adjoining people, and shall follow along the range, first towards the east, and again westward.

Of the class of people which inhabit the uppermost region of the Himalaya, along its whole extent, we need say nothing, as they are acknowledged to be of pure Tibetan extraction. They are termed Bhotiyas or Bhots. Bhote is, indeed, the proper name of Tibet, and is seen in the name itself — *Ti-bet*. Many of the Bhots of Kumaon trace their descent directly back to Tibet, while their location, immediately upon the southern boundary of that country, their personal appearance, language, religion, customs, and traditions, all unite in confirming their Tatar origin.

But, passing from these regions of snow to the lower divisions of the range, we at once find ourselves in a different ethnological latitude. In the middle division there are two classes of people prevalent, a Hindu and an un-Hindu race. The general distinction between the two is obvious, and yet their commingling has caused a confusion which embarrasses minute inquiry. That the Hindu, by which we intend the Brahminic or Aryan race, should be found here, is not at all surprising. Apart from their natural spread, as seeking new fields for conquest or for trade, religious feeling has sensibly drawn them towards these heights. The Himalaya, as we have mentioned, has ever been a prominent feature in the Hindu myth. Its wild recesses and imposing peaks, which must early have arrested their attention, have always been favorite haunts of the gods and goddesses ; and their lives are full of allusions to the grand features of these mountains. We cannot wonder, then, that they should have assumed a sacredness in the eye of a holy religionist, which should court a closer intimacy. Accordingly we meet here the well-known features, customs, and faith of the dwellers on the plains, and with these, as the superior, the aborigines have frequently sought and gained connection. There are, however, still remaining, a few tribes roaming through the woods in a savage state, which will well represent the original denizens of the mountain valleys.

Such are the *Rawats* or *Rajis*. They dwell in the secluded forests, in the eastern part of the districts ; and, although reduced, according to Mr. Traill,¹ to some twenty families, still adhere pertinaciously to the customs of their ancestors. Such also are the *Doms*, now outcasts and hewers of wood and drawers of water for other tribes ; but probably a branch lopped off long since from the Rawat stock, degenerate in customs, in character, and in physical type, approximating the Negro in their curly, crisp hair, and black complexion.

The religion of these tribes is, as so generally among the aborigines of India, a purely nature religion. Every remarkable mountain, cave, forest, peak, fountain, and rock has its presiding demon and spirit, which are so revered by the people that a luckless geologist brought down upon his head the maledictions of the people, and barely escaped with his life, for having innocently broken off the nose of one of these rock demons, in a scientific ramble. To these spirits frequent sacrifices are offered, and various ceremonies are performed, in small temples often found, and which are frequented to the almost entire neglect of the Hindu temples found in the district.

The presence of temples is a rare occurrence among these rude tribes ; and must in this case, we conceive, be attributed to the presence of the influential residents of the plain, whom they may have imitated in this, as they have in other things. That such should be the case, will not appear strange, when we remember that the Brahmans have not disdained to borrow even from their uncivilized neighbors. The well-stocked Hindu Pantheon was no early production ; but has grown up almost within the historical era. The known introduction of many portions of this aboriginal faith, and the unquestioned fact that a vast number of the legends, dogmas, and religious rites, now deemed orthodox, never could have arisen by any natural development from the Vedic faith, since inconsistency, in every part of the present religious system, is glaringly present, force us to believe that, in entering India, the Aryan found already domiciled a religious faith having firm

¹ *Asiat. Researches*, xvi. 137.

hold on the affections or superstitions of the people, and which, as he could not break it up, he incorporated into his own system, with sagacious policy but with sad detriment to the consistency of his own belief. It is for this reason that an analysis of the *current* religious faith has proved, and must ever prove, so perplexing.

But to return to these hill-tribes: a belief in all sorts of ghosts is common among them. Demons, elves, goblins, all come in for a share of their worship. There are ghosts of murdered men, ghosts of children, ghosts of cruel men, and ghosts of bachelors! These last, termed *Tolas* (our "Will-o'-the-wisp"), are supposed to be contemned by all other classes of ghosts, who shun their society and force them to lead a mournful existence in wild and solitary places. One scarcely finds a village that has not a demon, which often afflicts men, women, children, and cattle. The ghosts of children are in reality mere optical delusions, or shadows, so frequent in mountainous countries. These shadows, so gloomily and silently sweeping along the mountain sides, are to these superstitious savages mysterious personalities, and are worshipped by them under the endlessly changing forms which they present.

But the bulk of the population in these two provinces of Kumaon and Garwhal is made up of *Khasiyas*. There is much conflict of opinion as to whence these people originated. Mr. Hodgson thinks them to be, in common with most of the Himalayan aborigines, of ancient Tibetan extraction, but to have become altered by intimate union with Hindu immigrants; and that being now the dominant race, they have taken special pains to conceal their rude origin.¹ Capt. Strachey however, well known by his geological surveys of the Himalaya, believes them to be of pure Hindu extraction.² At present few traces, either lingual or physical, of savage origin appear. They are however of interest, as being the most important of these hill tribes, and as having, almost beyond a doubt, gained mention by Manu and the

¹ Jour. As. Soc. Bengal, Vol. XVII., Part 1, 1848.

² Report of Brit. Assoc. 1851. p. 94.

Vishnu Purana, which so far confirms their aboriginal descent.

The *Vishnu Purana* classes them among "ferocious and uncivilized races."¹ Manu specifies them as among those Kshatriyas "who have gradually sunk to the state of Sudras from the extinction of sacred rites, and from having no communication with Brahmans."²

Passing over the Kali, from Kumaon to Nepal, we come upon several tribes of no special interest, and whose origin is alike doubtful. They are the *Sunwars*, the *Gurungs*, the *Magars*, the *Jareya*, and the *Newar*. Their Tibetan origin is probable, and they are certainly not more than half Hindu in customs and religion.

Along with these, however, are found tribes of peculiar interest, from their entire isolation from all others. They are the *Chepang* and *Kusunda*. We quote Mr. Hodgson :

"Amid the dense forests of the central region of Nepal, to the westward of the great valley, dwell, in scanty numbers and nearly in a state of nature, two broken tribes, having no apparent affinity with the civilized races of that country, and seeming like the fragments of an earlier population. They toil not, neither do they spin; they pay no taxes, acknowledge no allegiances; but, living entirely upon wild fruits and the produce of the chase, are wont to say that the rajah is lord of the cultivated country, as they are of the unredeemed waste. They have bows and arrows, of which the iron arrow-heads are procured from their neighbors, but almost no other implement of civilization; and it is in the very skilful snaring of the beasts of the field and the fowls of the air, that all their little intelligence is manifested.

"Boughs, torn from trees and laid dexterously together, constitute their only houses, the sites of which they are perpetually shifting, according to the exigencies or fancies of the hour. In short, they are altogether, as near what is usually called the state of nature, as anything in human shape can well be. They are not noxious, but helpless; not vicious,

¹ V. P. p. 195.

² Manu. 10 : 43.

but aimless, both morally and intellectually ; so that no one could, without distress, behold their careless, unconscious inaptitude.

“ Compared with the mountaineers, among whom they are found, the Chepangs are a slight but not actually deformed race, though their large bellies and thin legs indicate strongly the precarious amount and innutritious quality of their food. In height, they are scarcely below the standard of the tribes around them ; who, however, are notoriously short of stature, but in color, they are very decidedly darker, or of a nigrescent brown.”

As to their origin, Mr. Hodgson, at first, deemed them to be fragments of an aboriginal population, allied to the “ Tamulian ” race, by which he intends the general aboriginal class of central and southern India ; but, he says, “ upon turning to the lingual test, I found that with the southern aborigines there was not a vestige of connection ; whilst, to my surprise, I must confess, I discovered in the Lhopas (Tibetans) of Bhutan, the unquestionable origin and stock of the far-removed, and physically very differently-characterized Chepangs.”

Leaving the *Murmis* and *Kiratas*, two tribes little known, we meet two others, *Limbus* and *Lepchas*, the latter the more numerous and sketched for us by Dr. Hooker, in his “ Himalayan Journals.”

The *Limbus* abound most in East Nepal. “ They are Buddhists ; and, although not divided into castes, belong to several tribes.” Buddhist however by name, they are not necessarily so in practice. Latham, in his “ Ethnology of India,” gives, from an account of Capt. Sherwill, a glimpse of a Limbu festival. We quote the former :

“ All the men, women, and children, amounting to about twenty, were drunk. And they were hospitable. At the house of the principal man of the neighborhood, some thirty men and women were sitting on the ground, drinking hot *chee*. Some beat drums. In the middle a young girl, highly excited, in a fantastic dress fringed with the teeth of beasts, the beaks and spurs of birds, the claws of bears, and

cocks' tail-feathers, was dancing. Her action was slow and monotonous at first; then, livelier and more rapid; then, hurried and irregular; then, frenzied and uncontrollable. The noise, too, increased; the humming or singing became a shout; the drums beat louder and more discordantly. There was a fire in the middle of the circle; the poor girl dashed into it and, with her naked feet sent the burning ashes over the floor. Then a propensity to mischief set in. She would pull down the frames upon which the domestic utensils were hung; she would burn down the house. The next morning she was as quiet and demure as any decent little Limbu could be."¹

The Lepcha is found most in the little district of Sikkim, between Nepal and Bhotan. He is of marked Mongolian features, and allied also by language to that race. Dr. Hooker gives a very favorable view of him:

"He is timid, peaceful, and no brawler. He is in morals far superior to his Tibet and Bhotan neighbors, polyandry being unknown and polygamy rare. In diet, they are gross feeders; rice, however, forming their chief sustenance. Pork is a staple dish; and they also eat elephant and all kinds of animal food." This in entire contrast to Hindu or Mohammedan custom.

"Marriages are contracted in childhood, and the wife purchased by money, or by services rendered to the future father-in-law.

"The Lepchas profess no religion, though acknowledging the existence of good and bad spirits. To the good they pay no heed. 'Why should we?' they say: 'the good spirits do us no harm; the evil spirits who dwell in every rock, grove, and mountain are constantly at mischief, and to them we must pray, for they hurt us.' Every tribe has a priest-doctor; he neither knows nor attempts to practise the healing art, but is a pure exorcist; all bodily ailments being deemed the operation of devils; who are cast out by prayers and invocations. Still they acknowledge the Lamas to be

¹ *Ethnology of India*, p. 23.

very holy men, and were the latter only moderately active, they would soon convert all the Lepchas."¹

In the course of his travels, Dr. Hooker met with an incident which well illustrates their superstitious feelings. He was attended by Lepcha guides and a Lama priest. Proposing to cross a lake, the Lama had provided a little bark boat and some juniper incense. Setting fire to the incense on the bark, he sent the boat far across the lake, whose surface was soon covered with a thick cloud of smoke.

"Taking a rupee from me, the priest then waved his arm aloft, and pretended to throw the money into the water, singing snatches of prayers in Tibetan, and at times shrieking at the top of his voice to the Dryad who claims these woods and waters as his own. There was neither beast, bird, nor insect to be seen, and the scenery was as impressive to me as the effect of the simple service was upon my people, who prayed with redoubled power, and hung more rags upon the bushes.

"This invocation of the gods of the woods and waters, forms no part of Lama worship; but the Lepchas are but half Buddhists: in their hearts they dread the demons of the grove, the lake, the snowy mountain and the torrent, and the crafty Lama takes advantage of this."²

We have thus far confined our inquiries to the central of the three Himalayan regions. Descending now to the lowermost, the region of swamp and forest, we come upon several tribes not so closely allied to the Tatar race as those immediately above them, presenting some affinities to the scattered hill tribes of Hindostan. Three of these races have been made the subject of a valuable monograph by Mr. B. H. Hodgson, to whose discoveries of Buddhist sacred books oriental scholars have been so much indebted.³

These are the *Kocch*, *Bodo*, and *Dhimal* tribes, inhabiting a portion of this sub-Himalayan tract upon the borders of Nepal and Bhotan. We shall confine our remarks to the Bodo and Dhimal, who are much like the Kocch, and of

¹ Hooker. *Himalayan Journals*. Vol. I. Chap. 5. ² *Idem*. Vol. I. Chap. 16.

³ *Jour. Asiat. Soc. Bengal*. Vol. XVIII., part 2, 1849.

whom we have the fullest account. The Kocch are, however, probably the most numerous, estimated by Hodgson at not less than 800,000 souls. The Bodo he numbers at from 150,000 to 200,000, the Dhimals, who are fast dwindling away, at only 15,000.

The two latter races are wandering cultivators of the wilds, never remaining in one place over six years. "They have no buffaloes, few cows, no sheep, a good many goats, abundance of swine and poultry, some pigeons and ducks." No trade is sought, scarcely any needed. Each one lives upon the produce of his own farm. Each is his own currier, weaver, and barber, or else each for his neighbor. They have no servants nor slaves. "Though they have no idea of a common tie of blood, yet there are no divers clans, septa, or tribes among them, nor yet any castes; so that all Bodo and all Dhimals are equal—absolutely so in right or law—wonderfully so in fact. Nor is this the dead level of abject want. On the contrary, the Bodo and Dhimal are exceedingly well fed, and very comfortably clothed and housed."

Marriage, as we have seen in other tribes, is more a contract than a rite, dissoluble at will of either party, the lover paying for his bride by money, or labor for his future father-in-law. Chastity is marked: no infanticides, human sacrifices, sati, nor bar to re-marriage. They *bury* their dead: after three days of uncleanness, a feast is prepared. "When ready and the friends are assembled, before sitting down they all repair once more to the grave, when the nearest of kin to the deceased, taking an individual's usual portion of food and drink, solemnly presents it to the dead, with these words:

"Take and eat: heretofore you have eaten and drank with us; you can do so no more: you were one of us; you can be so no longer: we come no more to you; come you not to us."

"Then they eat, drink, and make merry as though they were never to die." They may and do eat all meats, and drink beer, but never spirits.

The religion is distinguished by the absence of everything

that is shocking, ridiculous, or incommodious. They have no sect of priests, any one may become one who chooses, and no dress nor special favor marks them. They worship the host of heaven and 'the powers that be' on earth. As elsewhere, so here, diseases are deemed to be from devils; the exorcist is the doctor. They appear to have a vague perception of the moral character of the divinities which they worship, as an oath binds them, while we may, perhaps, even trace these various powers to a single source; and yet they are said to have no terms for God, soul, heaven, hell, sin, piety, prayer, or repentance. All the elements are worshipped, but preëminently the rivers, upon which they are so dependent. They have also their household, or national gods, worshipped by each family, and once a year by the whole village, at the dwelling of one member of the tribes, each taking his turn, year by year.

They have no temples nor idols. Though they believe in witchcraft and the evil eye, they discard all ghosts, sorcery, or omens. The rites consist of offerings, sacrifices, and prayers, so that they have the act of prayer if not the name. They invoke protection for man, beast, and crop. They offer fruits and flowers, and sacrifice animals, — sacrifice being deemed of the greatest worth. They have four festivals yearly, the last devoted to the household gods, the other three to the elemental gods and the interests of agriculture.

In his travels in the forest, Mr. Hodgson happened upon a company engaged in one of the latter, called the Bamboo Festival. Thirteen men in a circle held each a bamboo pole. Within the circle were three men. One danced to a song sung. The priest would mutter an incantation, and all would give the chorus. The third in the circle was an attendant who would now and then sprinkle with holy water another, the principal actor, called Deoda, or "possessed." "When we first discerned him," says Mr. H., "he was sitting on the ground, panting and rolling his eyes so significantly that I at once conjectured his function. Shortly after, the rite still proceeding, the Deoda got up, entered the circle and commenced dancing with the rest, but more wildly.

He held a short staff in his hand with which, from time to time, he struck the poles one by one, lowering it as he struck. The chief dancer with an odd-shaped instrument waxed more and more vehement in his dance; the inspired grew more and more maniacal; the music more and more rapid; the incantation more and more solemn and earnest; till at last, amid a general lowering of the heads of the decked bamboos, so that they met and formed a canopy over him, the Deoda went off in an affected fit, and the ceremony closed without any revelation, a circumstance which must be ascribed to the presence of the sceptical strangers."

The manners of these tribes are pleasing; modest, but cheerful. Their character is full of amiable qualities. They are intelligent, docile, frank, honest, and truthful, steady and industrious after their way, but not so good workers when placed in novel or trying positions.

We have now reached the Eastern limit of what Mr. Hodgson would term the Indo-Tartar tribes, formed by the river Dhansri, a tributary of the Brahmaputra. Between the Dhansri and the great bend of the latter river are several tribes, such as the *Daphlas*, *Akas*, *Bors*, *Abors*, *Mishmis*, and *Singphos*, inhabiting the middle region of the Himalaya, but which we merely name, as little known. But among other tribes of Asam are some which are more worthy of detailed notice.

Such are the *Mikirs*, of the district of Nowgong. They number in all about 10,000, dwelling in the plains as well as on the hills. Their dialect differs much from that of surrounding tribes, allied to the Naga, if to any. They worship sun and moon, rivers, large stones and trees, and sacrifice to them hogs, goats, and fowls. They sacrifice also if an epidemic appears: if that avails nothing, they forsake their homes for the dense forest. They have no priests. Marriage is a contract; polygamy unknown. They burn their dead, and bury the ashes.¹

South of them are the *Kasias*, whose country is noted for its "cromlechs."

¹ Butler. Travels in Assam. Chap. 8.

To the west of the latter are the *Garos* or *Garrows*. They have a surly look, but are of a mild disposition; the women "the ugliest ever beheld." They eat everything—dogs, frogs, snakes, and the blood of all animals. Marriage, as usual among these tribes, is free, but they have one custom, probably more agreeable to some parties than to others: if the parents of the lady do not consent to her marriage, they are beaten by the other party until they do.

The dead are burnt. They are in general pagans in religion, worshipping the elements, and sacrificing animals upon an altar, though by contact with Hindus, paying some homage to Siva.¹

In the east of Asam are the *Kukis*. There are Old Kukis, and New Kukis. They have one noticeable and peculiar custom—that of smoke-drying the bodies of their deceased chiefs. Their notions on religious matters are vague. They have no images nor temples. When one dies, the soul, if of a good man, is led with a song of triumph to the gods, ever after to live at ease: the sinner is to be impaled or cast into a deep burning gulf, or plunged in boiling water. The Kukis aver that they came from the South.²

Better known than most of these tribes are the *Nagas*, an extensive vocabulary of whose language has been furnished us by Mr. Brown, a Baptist missionary.³ They inhabit the extensive mountain range upon the eastern boundary of Asam, and separating it from the northern parts of Burmah. Mr. Brown says that their language has a close affinity to the Burmese; to the Bhotan; to the Tibetan; and especially that of the Miris and Abors, who inhabit the mountains between Asam and Tibet. The difference between this language and several of the Tatar dialects is scarcely greater than that existing between different dialects of the Nagas themselves.

Major Butler, who spent some time among them, thinks that they have no idea of a future state of rewards and pun-

¹ *Asiat. Researches*, Vol. III. p. 17. ² Butler. *Travels in Assam*. Chap. VI.

³ *Jour. Am. Orient. Soc.* Vol. II. p. 155.

ishments. They believe, however, in good spirits and bad, and offer them sacrifices of cows, dogs, cocks, and liquor. He specifies a number of strange customs; among others the following: When the body of a deceased man of respectability is buried, the men in war-clothes dance about the grave and say —

“What spirit has come and killed our friend? Where have you fled to? Come, let us see you, how powerful you are. If we could see you, we would spear you and kill you with these spears!” And so with like speeches and with war-whoops they curse the spirits and beat the earth with their spears. If a man falls sick, they offer the spirit the entrails of a fowl. If very sick, the fowl is let loose in the jungle as an offering to the living spirit. Omens are often taken on any special occasion.¹

We have followed the tribes of the Sub-Himalaya from the Sutlej to the eastern boundary of India: we are ready now to turn upon our steps and follow the Himalaya westward from the same river.

There is nothing, however, which can detain us between the Sutlej and the Indus. The tribes are but little known, and, as far as known, are not different from those inhabiting the like regions to the east of the Sutlej. In religion, the most marked feature is, that as Mohammed rather than Buddha has been felt as master in these western Himalayan regions, so we find the Mussulman element encroaching upon a primitive faith, when in the east we have found Lamaism dominant. We cannot make the Indus the Ethnological boundary of India on the west, any more than we can affirm the Brahmaputra to be the eastern limit. Beyond the Indus are tribes clearly connected with strictly Indian races, both Brahman and aboriginal.

The first of the latter class is the *Kafir* family. They dwell upon the southern slope of the Hindukush, within an extent of territory about two degrees from east to west, and a less distance north and south. Their mere name

¹ Butler. *Travels in Assam*, Chap. IX.

gives us their history; for "Kafir" is "Infidel" on a Moham-medan's tongue, which name indicates the outside pressure to which they have been subjected, and the fact that they have successfully resisted that pressure. Their inaccessible position has probably served most to secure to them and preserve this title of Kafir, which they themselves use, and the same unsparing warfare between Mussulman and infidel is still waged in these hills. The Mussulman is ever endeavoring to enslave the Kafir: the Kafir constantly imprecates curses from his gods upon the Mussulman.

It was Elphinstone who first brought us notice of this interesting people, and little has been added since his day, save a chapter or two by Burnes.

Their chief god is called by some, Imra, by others, Dagon. "They have also numerous idols, which they say represent great men of former days, who intercede with God in favor of the worshipper. Their idols are of stone or wood, and always represent men and women, sometimes mounted, sometimes on foot." By being specially hospitable when living, any man may at death be deified and worshipped equally with the other gods. Consequently, the gods are not few, and differ in different localities. They know Siva or Mahadeva by name, but all eat beef. Furthermore they sprinkle their idols with blood, and even the blood of cows.

They sacrifice cows and goats to the supreme deity, particularly at a great festival which lasts for ten days, in the beginning of April. Fire also is requisite at every religious ceremony. At a sacrifice to Imra, "a fire was kindled before a stone post, said to be the emblem of Mahadeva: through the fire, flour, butter, and water were thrown upon the stone: at length an animal was sacrificed and the blood thrown through the fire upon the stone: part of the flesh was burned, and part eaten by the assistants, who were numerous and who accompanied the priest in various prayers and devout gesticulations. Though using fire so much, they hold it in no peculiar reverence.

They have hereditary priests, but these have little influence. There are also among them persons who procure

inspiration from superior beings by holding their heads over the smoke of the sacrifice; but these are not specially revered.

The husband pays a dowry for his wife. Polygamy is allowed, adultery common.

"They neither burn nor bury their dead, but place the body in a box, arrayed in a fine dress, which consists of goat-skins or Cashgar woollens: they then remove it to the summit of a hill near the village, when it is placed on the ground, but never interred." Every funeral concludes with an entertainment, and an annual feast is given in memory of the deceased, while food is exposed for the manes.

They detest fish, but hold no other animal impure, eating anything, though chiefly cheese, butter, and milk. Although exasperated to fury by the persecutions of Mohammedans, so that no Mohammedan can safely enter their country, yet they are a harmless, affectionate, and kind-hearted people, merry, playful, fond of laughter, and although passionate, easily appeased.¹

The origin of this strange people is obscure: their language closely connects them with the Arian family; but their religion and social customs, so peculiar; whence come they?

Leaving Kafiristan, and with it all Himalayan regions, we pass southward. Cabûl and Afghanistan are thoroughly Mohammedan: the Hindu element which may exist in the people of these countries it is difficult to eliminate. In Beluchistan, however, is found a class of people called *Brahui*, which call for a passing notice.

Pottinger, in his great work on Beluchistan, speaks of them as clearly distinct from the Biluchis proper. So much do they differ, he says, "that it is impossible to mistake a man of one class for a member of the other. The Brahuis, instead of the tall figure, long visage, and raised features of their fellow countrymen, have short, thick bones, with round faces and flat lineaments:—numbers of them have brown

¹ Elphinstone, Cabûl, Vol. II. App. Burnes, Cabûl, Chap. IX.

hair and beards.”¹ They are a hardy race of mountaineers, wandering constantly in search of fresh pasturage for their flocks: more peaceful and industrious than the Biluchis, but courageous and of a noble disposition. In religion, they are Mussulmen.

But it was not their physical appearance which first attracted the attention of scientific men, so much as their language. Lassen’s notice was first called to it by a brief published vocabulary. Since him, Latham, and, more recently, Caldwell, have examined it with the same striking result. It has been found, that, while the language as a whole is one with the Biluchi, there are many grammatical forms and a few vocables which ally it at once with dialects of India, and not Northern India or Hindostan, but the Dekhan. A clear statement has been given by Mr. Caldwell, which sets the matter beyond dispute. This fact, so interesting, we shall again call attention to.

It is to the hills, as we have before said, that we must look for remnants of a conquered race. We have found them in the Himalaya: let us now seek them in the parallel range of the Vindhya, and in the coast chains of Ghats. We take our stand first at the western terminus of the Vindhya range, at the point where the Tapti and Nerbudda rivers enter the Persian Gulf.

From the formation of the British factory at Surat, the attention of the merchants was attracted to a class of men who infested the adjoining country and injured their trade. They were called *Bhils*. In 1824, Major Gen. Sir John Malcolm, to whom India is so much indebted, collected what he could learn respecting this people and presented it to the Royal Asiatic Society. It is from this paper, and also from a later one by Captain Hunter, that we mainly derive our information.²

The central location of the Bhils is Khandeish, on the southern slope of the Satpura hills. They spread southward

¹ Pottinger. *Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde*, Chap. IV.

² *Transactions of Roy. Asiat. Soc.* Vol. I. p. 65. *Jour. R. A. S.* 1844, p. 176.

however as far as Pûnah, and are found to the north in the province of Malwa.

The Bhils are divided into two classes: the village or cultivating (who are the watchmen), and the wild or mountain Bhils. They generally, however, preserve the same usages and the same form of religion. The hill tribes have ever been noted for their predatory habits; they not only frequently attack the villages of the plains, but they claim and enforce the right of levying a tax upon all who pass through their territory, and woe to the luckless traveller who resists! Lutfullah, the Mohammedan gentleman, whose curious autobiography has lately been edited by Mr. E. B. Eastwick, gives an interesting account of an enforced residence among these freebooters, and of their savage life and character.¹

The religion of the Bhils is distinct from Brahmanism, although not unaffected by it. They worship Siva. They worship also the "goddess of small pox," a fact common in South India. They have, however, no temples, except a consecrated spot under some particular tree. They have idols. "They often make small mud figures of horses, which they range around an idol, to whom they promise a fine charger, if he will hear their petition; and it is not unusual to put the image upon one of these figures. In many of their legends the principal event depends on the assistance or advice of an enchanted horse."

"They keep all feasts, Hindu and Mohammedan, with equal zeal; and the most solemn form of oath is that of mixing salt, cowdung and jowaree, and lifting up the mixture. If a Bhil perjures himself by this oath, he is deemed execrable, and abandoned by his caste."

"There is among them a class of priests or 'medicine men' who are supposed, through the influence of the hill gods, to be endowed with the hereditary gift of inspiration. Their powers are, however, dormant until excited by music. Accordingly, musicians who sing the praises of the gods are ever at hand to render assistance." When the recitation of

¹ Autob. Chap. IV.

these songs has kindled the spark of spiritual fire, they begin to dance with frantic gesture, and loosening their hair, toss and whirl it around their heads, whilst their whole frame becomes agitated, as if under the influence of strong convulsions. In this state of phrenzy they give utterance to oracles which are attentively listened to by those who come to consult them. If a novice does not show a soul alive to the charms of music he is at once discharged from candidateship to priesthood.

Marriages are contracted by the parents of the parties. A widow may re-marry. They *bury* their dead. They are excessively fond of liquor, and eat all meats, though the mountain Bhils show signs of poor diet. These Bhils, after all, have a few redeeming traits. They are loyal to their chiefs, never betraying them: they are loyal to their word, oddly so; "if an offender is seized, he not only confesses his fault, but any others he may have committed; and details his adventures with the utmost *sang froid* and innocence, stating the names of his associates, be they friends or near relatives." He boldly avows his trade and stoutly defends himself by the words, "I am Mahadeva's thief."

Evidence that the Bhils once possessed far more than the land they now occupy, is found in the fact that every Rajput prince upon his accession to the throne has been from time immemorial obliged to have his forehead marked with blood from the thumb or toe of a Bhil, indicating a sort of nominal subjection to him.

To the north of the Bhils, upon the Aravali range, are the *Mirs*, of the Mairwara hills. They are like the Bhils in character, habits, and faith: although they have nominally embraced Mohammedanism, and aver that they are of pure Hindu lineage. The presence of Rajputs, who fled from the plains into the mountains at the approach of the Mohammedans accounts for the latter fact.

To the east of the *Mirs* are the *Minas*, in the districts of Ambir and Jaipur. These too, Mussulmen in faith, are not so in practice. "In some places they are still serfs of the soil; in others they hold lands, for the use of which they

pay heavy rents to the Hindu lords. Like all the aboriginal race, they claim to be the real proprietors of the land, and they remind one another of this right in the following distich :

“ ‘The Rajah is proprietor of his share :

“ ‘I am the proprietor of the land.’ ”¹

They also maintain the rite of marking the new Rajput prince with the bloody spot—in default of which ceremony their loyalty could not be depended upon.

Immediately to the west of the Bhils, between them and the sea, are the *Kulis*. These are fishermen, and from their having been early employed as menials by the foreign residents, their name, *Kulis* or *Coolies*, has been taken as the name of servants, commonly.

South of the Bhils are found many classes of degraded people, undoubtedly separate from the Hindu stock, while dwelling in the villages. Such are the low *Mhars*, which, though the offscouring of the population, have unquestionably given the name to the Mahratta country.

Dr. Wilson of Bombay has given us some interesting facts respecting a few wild tribes of the northern Konkan.

Waralis. This is a wandering tribe, having but few affinities to the Hindu family. To elicit information, Dr. W. propounded questions, a few of which with the answers we transcribe.”

“ Do any of you keep more wives than one ?

“ Re! Re! we can scarcely feed one; why should we think of more ? ”

“ How do you treat your children when they disobey your orders ? ”

“ We scold them.”

“ Do you never whip your children ? ” “ What! strike our own offspring? We never strike them ? ”

“ When your wives disobey your commands, how do you treat them ? ” “ We give them chastisement, less or more. How could we manage them without striking them ? ”

¹ Jour. Roy. As. Soc. Vol. XIII. p. 289.

"What God do you worship?" "We worship Waghia (the lord of tigers)."

"Has he any form?" "He is a shapeless stone smeared with red lead and ghee."

"How do you worship him?" "We give him chickens and goats, break cocoa-nuts on his head, and pour oil on him."

"What does your god give to you?" "He preserves us from tigers, gives us good crops, and keeps disease from us."

"Who inflicts pain on you?" "Waghia, when we don't worship him."

"Does he ever enter your bodies?" "Yes; he seizes us by the throat like a cat; he sticks to our bodies."

"Do you ever scold Waghia?" "To be sure we do. We say, 'You fellow, we have given you a chicken, a goat, and yet you strike us! What more do you want?'"

"Where do good people go after death?" "They go to Bhagavan (the self-existent)."

"Where is Bhagavan?" "We don't know where he is and where he is not."

Katodis or *Kathkuris*. These receive their name from the Kath-echu, which they gather from the *Acacia Catechu*. They are even more degraded than the Waralis, hanging upon the outskirts of villages of other tribes. They eat anything, from a rat to a serpent, except the brown-faced monkey, which they affirm to be possessed of a human soul.

They say, "God comes like the wind, and goes like the wind." They bury their dead. Their aged men are their priests, but they have few ceremonies. Before felling a single tree for the Catechu, they select one, constitute it a god, and solicit its favor.¹

The *Ramusis*, a people living now in a district between 17° and 20° north latitude, have found a historian in Capt. Alex. Mackintosh of the Madras army.² They attained a notoriety, not only from their ordinary predatory habits, but from their having been so successfully employed by the famous Sivaji, in his contests with the lords of the south, so

¹ J. R. A. S. 1842, p. 14.

² Origin and condition of the Ramoosies.

vividly portrayed by Elphinstone in his History of India. The Ramusis are considered to have come from the east or south-east of Hydrabad, in the ancient kingdom of Telinga, from the large admixture of Telugu in their speech. Their name means "Foresters." They are robbers, but among them, as so frequently in India, the proverb "set a thief to catch a thief" is literally carried out. Thieves themselves, they are the only reliable village watchmen. They are an extremely enterprising, hardy, active people, but covetous, rapacious, and treacherous. Perjury is deemed but a trifling offence. Their religion does not differ materially from that of the inhabitants of the Dekhan generally.

Still further to the South are the Nilagiri Hills (*nila*—blue : *giri*—hill). They lie between 11° and 12°, forming, it is often said, the nucleus of the eastern and western Ghats, and are well known to all foreigners for their affording such a delightful retreat from the oppressive heat of the plains.

An extended account of these hills and their inhabitants has been published by Captain Harkness, and a pleasing sketch has also been furnished by Rev. Mr. Dulles in his interesting little volume, *Life in India*.

At the base of the mountain and occupying also a belt of one or two thousand feet towards the summit, are two races called *Erulars* and *Curumbars*, nomade shepherds, the latter of whom are much dreaded by the other inhabitants.

Above these two tribes are the *Kôtas* or *Cohatars* (cow-killers). They are the craftsmen of the hills, and are the lowest of the low, feeders on carrion ; following, like vultures, in the track of a buffalo herd, waiting for a victim. They have no caste, and worship ideal gods of their own, of whom they have no images.

Still above these are the *Burghers*, more properly called *Badagas*. These are the most numerous, wealthy, and civilized class on the hills, but are not aboriginal there ; having migrated from the Canarese country within a known period. One custom, however, would seem to indicate that they have departed from their fathers' faith. They worship the sun, when they arise in the morning, and, "on entering the house in the

evening, they address the lamp, the visible emblem of their deity: "thou creator of this and of all worlds, the greatest of the great, who art with us, as well in the mountain as in the wilderness, who keepest the wreaths that adorn the head from fading, who guardest the foot from the thorn, god among a hundred, may we be prosperous!"

But the class of inhabitants which, though least numerous, has always attracted most attention, is the *Todas*. They are a tall, athletic race; and, from their physical appearance, have even been deemed a colony of Greeks. They are so much the reverse, in character, of the inhabitants of the plain, as to have become quite the favorites of Europeans. They are a simple, pastoral people, depending mostly upon their herds of buffaloes, loving peace, having no warlike weapons; and yet, by their quiet demeanor and peaceful disposition, commanding the respect and reverence of their ruder neighbors. They are a lively, "laughter-loving" race, having none of the cringing servility of the Hindu; but rather a confiding frankness, and modest but manly bearing, all in pleasing contrast to the people about them. They have temples to Truth, although, it must be confessed, not always conforming their practice to their faith.

The religion of these *Todas* is quite bare, but unique. They disbelieve transmigration, affirming that upon death the soul goes to the great country. They have what may be termed lactariums, dairy-houses, to which they attach a certain sacredness. They are small huts, scarcely allowing of ingress; divided into two compartments; the inner, the more holy; and yet containing nothing connected with worship, unless it be a roll of buffalo butter. Women are not allowed to enter this house; nor the men, at all times; the boys only having free access. A Brahman is refused admittance; and they despise his authority.

They have another class of sacred places, called *teriris*, among the hills. The priest appointed to them, must divest himself of his former sinful raiment, and lead a life of celibacy, although free to renounce his priesthood. He is holy: so holy, that no *Toda* dare approach or look upon him.

“ The teriri is of conical form, the thatch very neatly put on, and surmounted, at the top, with a stone about a foot in diameter. A bell, which is generally deposited in some niche within the temple, is the only object to which they pay any reverence. To this they pour out libations of milk, but only as to a sacred implement. They do not sacrifice or offer incense, or make any oblations to it, significant of its having, in their estimation, any latent or mystic properties. To each teriri is attached a herd of milch buffaloes, part of which are sacred. One among the sacred animals is the chief. Should it die, its calf, if a female one, succeeds to the office ; should it have no female calf, the bell before mentioned is attached to the neck of one of the other sacred ones, and, being allowed to remain so during that day, a legal succession is considered to be effected.”

This association of the herds with religious ceremonies, is particularly noticeable at their funerals : when one dies, a large company assembles in the neighborhood of one of these teriris, to which the relics of the departed are brought, wrapped in a mantle. The ceremony lasts several days. When the mantle is first spread out in the temple, the company, one by one, enter and spend a few moments in wailing. From fifteen to twenty buffaloes are then driven into an enclosure, and the men leap in after them. Then, joining hands, they dance wildly, round and round, until the buffaloes become excited to phrenzy. At a given signal, all rush upon the animals, and seek to fasten a bell to the neck of each. No stratagem is used, but they conquer them by sheer force of arm. Eight or nine men are often seen hanging on one, yelling with all their might, and doing all they can by beating the animal with clubs, to enrage it still more, and still further jeopardize the party. Three or four animals are thus attacked, and, the bell being attached to the neck of each, they are liberated, the successful combatants giving a shout of victory ; then, shouldering their clubs and joining their hands, they recommence the dance.

On the next morning, the relics are brought out and laid on the ground. After a variety of ceremonies, the whole

company addresses the buffaloes as "*dii animales*," beseeching them to intercede for blessings upon themselves and their property, "that their feet may escape the thorn, their heads the falling rock."

A young heifer is now slain, and its blood sprinkled over the mantle. The mantle is then removed to another spot, and after a general lamentation, the whole herd is slaughtered, each animal being brought so that its dying breath shall waft the relics as it passes ; and, after death, is placed so that its mouth and nostrils shall rest upon the mantle.

"The whole scene," says Capt. Harkness, describing one of these funerals, "was a wild one. The dance kept on ; the club men shouted as they brought forward a fresh victim ; in the centre of the relics were two silver-headed matrons, silently weeping ; around them were the slaughtered animals ; and among them, the crowd of mourners, males and females, young and old, sitting in pairs, face to face, 'with drooping foreheads meeting ;' the whole throng uniting in one universal moan, with which, as it rose and fell, was heard the wailing pipe, breathing in unison the solemn notes of grief and sorrow."

It is supposed that infanticide was once common among the Todas, but it is now unknown. Polyandry is frequent.

Passing northward from Madras, along the line of the eastern Ghats, we meet a number of aboriginal tribes, many sunk into the lowest degradation, hardly superior to the apes among whom they have their residence. Still going to the north, we come, finally, to the termination of the range, where it reaches out toward the eastern extremity of the Vindhya mountains, where it is met, also, by spurs from the hills which separate India from the Chinese frontier. In this extensive tract of country are several races which await our notice.

In the district of Ganjam are three tribes : to the north, the *Kols* ; to the south, the *Sours* ; and in the centre, the *Khonds*. Of the three we shall mention only the last, as we have fuller information respecting them than we have of any other

tribe of aborigines, through the reports of Capt. Macpherson, who was agent in these hills.¹

Of the three regions, Alpine, sub-Alpine, and Maritime, into which these eastern Ghats are naturally divided, the Alpine, or highest, is the special abode of the Khonds. They were, until brought into partial subjection by the British, wholly free and lawless, having intercourse only with the Zemindars of the middle region, with whom they contracted a sort of mutual alliance. They live by tillage; and since the British have gained their confidence, trade has assumed quite an honorable position.

It is, however, of their religion that we wish particularly to speak.

There are two sects among the Khonds: agreeing in some points, differing in others. All believe in one supreme being, self-existing, the source of good, and creator of the universe, of the inferior gods, and of man. His name is Boora Pennu, the god of light, or Bella Pennu, the sun-god. Boora Pennu, in the beginning, created a consort, Tari Pennu, the earth-goddess, and the source of evil. He then formed the earth. Finding Tari destitute of affection, so much so as even to refuse to scratch his back when requested kindly so to do, Boora determined to form man, who should love him, and also everything upon earth to delight man. He did so: the creation was free from moral and physical evil; men had free intercourse with God; lived on the spontaneous fruits of the earth, in peace and harmony. They went unclothed, unharmed by animals, with power to move through sea and air.

But Tari, bent on blasting this fair creation, "sowed the seeds of sin in mankind as in a ploughed field," and introduced, besides, all physical evil into the material creation. Boora Pennu at once applied antidotes, arresting and controlling physical evil, but leaving man free to be holy, or to sin. A few remained wholly sinless, and were at once deified; the rest transgressed, and upon them Boora let loose all evil,

¹ J. R. A. S. 1842, 1852.

ordaining death to be the penalty of sin. Earth itself was affected by the general curse : poisons and diseases spread ; man went clothed, was limited to earth, and sunk into abject degradation. War between Boora and Tari continued hotly ; mountains, whirlwinds, and meteors being the missiles used.

Here belief divides : one party claiming that Boora was victorious ; the other, that Tari conquered. Both call Boora the source of good ; but the latter party affirm that Tari inflicts what evil she pleases, and should be supplicated to refrain from that, and even to impart positive blessings.

Boora, his sect affirm, in order not to lose his work, and to return to men their purity, created three grades of gods : I. The judge of the dead, and those who should regulate the powers of nature in the service of man, among whom are the gods of the chase, war, rain, and boundaries. II. Deified holy men. III. Local deities, unlimited in number, who fill all nature, and naturally vary with different localities. Such are the gods of streams, tanks, fountains, forests, etc.

The Khonds affirm that man has four souls : I. A soul which may be restored to communion with Boora. II. A soul belonging to some special tribe, constantly re-born in that tribe, and that only. III. A soul which suffers for sin, and transmigrates, and may temporarily quit the body at the will of a god. IV. A soul which dies at the dissolution of the body.

The judge of the dead resides on a great rock beyond the sea, where the sun rises. To this rock the souls of men speed straight after death, and it is called the leaping-rock, from the desperate attempts necessary to gain a foothold upon it, in which many break their limbs and knock out their eyes, incurring a deformity attaching to them in the next birth. The good become like gods, have power of intercession, and are worshipped ; the bad are punished with all manner of diseases ; and, worse than all, with base moral qualities.

The chief crimes are : I. To refuse hospitality, or to abandon a guest. II. To break an oath or promise, or to deny a gift. III. To speak falsely, except to save a guest.

IV. To break a solemn pledge of friendship. V. To break an old law or custom. VI. To commit incest. VII. To contract debts, the payment of which is ruinous to a tribe, which is responsible for the engagements of all its members. VIII. To skulk in time of war. IX. To betray a public secret.

The chief virtues are: I. To kill a foe in public battle. II. To fall in public battle. III. To be a priest. IV. (among the sacrificing tribes) To be a victim to the earth-goddess.

At the fall, a priesthood was appointed to mediate between man and God; but it is an elective order, or rather a free class, any one entering it who thinks he has a call. The Khonds have no images nor temples. Their gods have the human form, but are of ethereal texture, dwelling in chinks of the earth, whence they emerge and flit about, at a height of about two cubits from the ground, seen only by the lower animals. They love, quarrel, marry, have children; and the minor gods grow old and die. They live on flesh. Each grade worships the one above it, while all worship Boora. All the individual gods are worshipped by the people, except the judge of the dead. The inferior gods are invariably honored with sacrifices, a hog being deemed the most sacred animal. Boora Pennu is also worshipped; but sacrifice to him is rare. At such times, the history of creation is recited at length.

Opposed to the sect of Boora is that of Tari, who give her the credit of man's elevation. They affirm that, in a feminine form, called Ambally Bylee, she revealed to men the arts of life, especially agriculture, to make the latter of which lucrative, she enjoined upon men the rite of human sacrifice.

This rite of human sacrifice, which has given the Khonds such an unenviable distinction, is performed by tribes at specified seasons; by communities and by individuals, upon any occasion which seems to demand it. The victims, called "Merias," are *always* purchased. They insist on this, and plead it in extenuation, when they commit the sacrifice, crying out: "We bought you with a price." They are obtained

from a class of men who traffic in them ; and who, when the supply fails, frequently sell their own children, while the Khonds will even sell to one another. A young child is preferred as a purchase. He is brought, blindfolded, to the village, and suffered there to roam at liberty, until needed. He is sacred ; all houses are open to him ; marriage with him is courted. He frequently grows up, marries, and has children ; who, in turn, must be victims. They rarely seek to escape. Once, however, as the people were preparing to immolate a youth, he said to the chief : " In suffering this death I become a god, and I do not resist my fate ; let me then partake, with you, in the joy of the festival." The chief assented ; and the young man called for a bowl, and drank, while the crowd contended fiercely for the dregs of a liquor so consecrated. He then danced and sung, and called for an axe, that he might once more join his companions, armed like a free man. An axe was handed him : he danced about ; and, of a sudden, clove the priest's skull in two, rushed across a foaming torrent, and down the Ghat, into the territory of a chief who refused to deliver him up to his infuriated pursuers.

For several days before the rite is performed, the people indulge in the most licentious riot. The victim is brought into the neighboring Meria grove, a sacred, haunted place, and anointed for the sacrifice. The acceptable spot for sacrifice is found during the night previous by probing the ground about the village, the first deep chink into which the stick passes being regarded as the spot chosen by the earth-goddess.

About noon of the third day, the orgies terminate, and the assemblage proceeds, with stunning shouts and pealing music, to consummate the sacrifice. A long and remarkable dialogue now ensues between two persons who impersonate the priest and the victim ; in which the victim, in turn, inveighs against his persecutors and supplicates for freedom, and the priest justifies the act. The victim finally says :

" I am dying ; I call upon all — upon those who bought me, on those whose food I have eaten, on those who are

strangers here, on all who will now share my flesh — let all curse the priest to the gods !”

A post is now fastened in the chosen spot ; around it four large posts are set up, and the victim placed in the middle. The priest takes a green branch, cleaves it in the centre, inserts into the cleft the victim’s neck or chest, and then, slightly wounding him with an axe, the whole vast crowd, shouting “ We bought you with a price,” fling themselves upon the body and strip the flesh from the bones, leaving untouched only the head and intestines.

Every village is represented at these great festivals, of which the above is a brief account, and the flesh which each village receives as its portion, is again subdivided ; so that the head of each family has a shred, which he may bury in his field, and thus ensure a plentiful crop. A year after the sacrifice, a hog is offered up, as if to remind Tari of the faithfulness of her followers. The disciples of Boora, it must be remembered, abhor this rite.

The custom has been partially suppressed ; but except in a few districts, says Lieut. Frye, “ the votaries of human sacrifices are, as yet, almost wholly unchecked in the observance of the rite, and virtually independent of European control.”¹

The custom of female infanticide also prevails, and, in some of the tribes of the sect of Boora to such an extent, that scarcely a female infant is spared. The numberless quarrels which arise from the looseness of the marriage tie, probably have given origin to this fearful custom.

To the west of Orissa, the country of the Khonds, is Gondwana, the country of the *Gonds*. This region would seem, from its position, to have been more exempt than any other from Aryan invasion. It lies along the southern side of the Vindhya mountains, which have ever proved a formidable barrier to the progress of the Sanskrit-speaking race.

North of the Khonds, and partly mingled with them, are the *Kols*, the best known of whom are the *Ho*. Still to the

¹ J. R. A. S. Vol. XVII.

north of the Ho, and extending quite into Central India are the *Sontals*, sometimes regarded as a division of the Kols, who have in late years specially attracted European attention. They incline to a simple form of religion, believing in witchcraft, and making much account of tigers, as in swearing upon their skin, etc. On the Rajmahal hills, and scattered everywhere in the hills of Eastern India, are many other tribes, also claiming to be classed as aboriginal. All these latter, however, we shall be precluded from dwelling upon by the limits of this essay. They have the same general characteristics which mark the tribes already treated of. For the same reason we can only refer, in passing, to several migratory tribes, found throughout the peninsula, who have been noticed by Balfour,¹ and also to the wild *Veddahs* of Ceylon, of whom Sir Emerson Tennent has given so full and interesting an account in his new work on that island.²

We have now concluded our survey of the hill tribes of India. It is these hill tribes that we have supposed to represent the remnants of an aboriginal race. They do so; and, in Northern India, they alone. In the Dekhan, however, we have surmised (owing to the fact that the Sanskrit-speaking race entered it not as conquerors, but as colonists), that there might be found dwellers in the plains, as well as on the hills, who would be radically different from the race which had gained the ascendancy. And such is the fact. Even among the Mahrati people, who, more than others of the Dekhan have succumbed to their rulers, we find traces of the presence of a faith wholly at variance with Brahmanism. Many of these have been collected and specified by Dr. Stevenson, in the Journals of the Royal Asiatic Society and its Bombay branch. But it is in the extreme south of the Dekhan, and among the Tamil-speaking population, that these differences appear the most marked. Leaving out of view various minor points of divergence from Brahmanism found among all classes, we wish to direct attention, in closing this survey, to one portion of the laboring classes of Tinnevely and Travancore.

¹ Edinb. Philos. Journal, Vol. XXXV., 1843. ² Ceylon. Part IX., Chap. 3.

We refer to the *Shanars*, the best account of whom has been furnished by Rev. Mr. Caldwell, in his little pamphlet entitled "The Shanars of Tinnevely." They are toddy-drawers, and, in pursuit of their business, are forced to lead a very laborious life.

Their religion is almost wholly a demon-worship, the worship of spirits as evil. These demons have, it is held, been thrust down from some higher existence, and now wreak their vengeance on unoffending man. They are the deities of all diseases.

A curious instance of native opinions respecting diseases, is found in the notions prevalent, in South India, respecting *cholera*. The natives say that small-pox was the sport of the goddess Ammâl; but that when the English came and introduced vaccination, and thus thwarted her designs, Ammâl, in revenge, sent *cholera*. They are loth to be vaccinated, through dread of arousing her displeasure. They speak of cholera only as "that disease." If a man die of it, they say simply "he is not," and never wail, as at other times; but go about their work.

These demons flit about, usually at a span's remove from the ground, never touching it, but alighting upon certain points, as spires, roofs and eaves of houses, dwelling in holes in the rocks or decayed trees. They are seen, at dark, whirling about the leaves and dust, and cross your track at every turn. Their residence being so uncertain, one may chance to build a house or dig a well in places to which they have a prior claim, and so incur their displeasure.

They accordingly have a class of priests, not a privileged sect, but open to all, who, as familiar with the haunts of these spirits, may warn of danger or avert the calamity consequent upon trespass. They have temples, though of no pretensions, usually mud sheds, or even bare walls. They have also idols, who represent the various demons. These demons they propitiate, by means of offerings and sacrifices of animals; in which we may, perhaps, see the idea of *substitution*.

A dance always accompanies the sacrifice; and a man is

chosen to officiate as priest, clad in appropriate garments. We extract the following graphic description from Mr. Caldwell's work above mentioned :

" When the preparations are completed, and the dance about to commence, the music is, at first, comparatively slow, and the dancer seems impassive and sullen ; and either he stands still, or moves about in gloomy silence. Gradually, as the music becomes quicker and louder, his excitement begins to rise. Sometimes, to help to work himself up into a phrenzy, he uses medicated draughts ; cuts and lacerates his flesh till the blood flows ; lashes himself with a huge whip ; presses a burning torch to his breast ; drinks the blood which flows from his wounds, or drinks the blood of the sacrifice, putting the throat of the decapitated goat to his mouth. Then, as if he had acquired a new life, he begins to brandish his staff of bells, and dance with a quick, but wild, unsteady step. Suddenly the *afflatus* descends. There is no mistaking that glare, or those frantic leaps. He snorts, he stares, he gyrates. The demon has now taken bodily possession of him ; and though he retains the power of utterance and of motion, both are under the demon's control, and his separate consciousness is in abeyance. The bystanders signalize the event by raising a long shout attended by a peculiar vibrating motion.

The devil-dancer is now worshipped as a present deity ; and every bystander consults him respecting his disease, his wants, the welfare of his absent relations, and the offerings which are to be made for the accomplishment of his wishes."

In the later Puranas we find allusions to this system of demonolatry ; and Mr. Caldwell thinks that the " sacrifice of Daksha," in the " Vaya Purana," given as a note, by Wilson in the Vishnu Purana, is but the mythical record of the adoption of these rites into the Brahmanical system.¹

It is quite foreign to the design of the present Article, to dwell at length upon the ethnical affinities of the several tribes which we have now considered. We cannot, however,

¹ Vishnu Purana, p. 61.

forbear presenting, in conclusion, a brief statement of the present position of this question.

Prof. Rask was the first to suggest a *Scythian* origin for the various un-Sanskritic dialects of India. His suggestion has been followed out, more in detail, by various subsequent scholars. Dr. Stevenson, in a series of articles in the *Royal Asiatic Journal*, sought to prove the identity of origin of all the aboriginal languages, including the foreign element in the northern vernaculars. Mr. Hodgson, to whom too much praise cannot be awarded for his enthusiastic labors, has found, he thinks, evidence of the essential unity of the sub-Himalayan, Indo-Chinese, and Eastern Indian dialects; and has confidently affirmed the connection between all Indian aborigines. He has sought, also, to add strength to his argument by evidence grounded upon physical similarities, in a passage which we cannot refrain from quoting.¹

“A practised eye will distinguish, at a glance, between the Arian and Tamulian style of features and form — a practised pen will readily make the distinction felt — but to perceive and to make others perceive, by pen or pencil, the physical traits that separate each group, or people of Arian or of Tamulian extraction, from each other group, would be a task indeed! In the Arian form (Hindu) there is height, symmetry, lightness, and flexibility. In the Arian face, an oval contour, with ample forehead, and moderate jaws and mouth; a round chin, perpendicular with the forehead; a regular set of distinct and fine features; a well-raised and unexpanded nose, with elliptic nares; a well-sized and finely opened eye, running directly across the face; no want of eyebrow, eyelash, or beard; and, lastly, a clear brunette complexion, often not darker than that of the most southern Europeans.

In the Tamulian form, on the contrary, there is less height, less symmetry, more dumpiness, and flesh. In the Tamulian face, a somewhat lozenge contour, caused by the large cheek bones; less perpendicularity in the features to the front, occasioned, not so much by defect of forehead or chin, as by

¹ Jour. As. Soc. Beng. July, 1849.

excess of jaws and mouth; a large proportion of face to head, and less roundness in the latter; a broader, flatter face, with features less symmetrical, but perhaps more expressive, at least of individuality; a shorter, wider nose, often clubbed at the end, and furnished with round nostrils; eyes less, and less fully opened, and less evenly crossing the face by their line of aperture; ears, larger; lips, thicker; beard, deficient; color, brunette, as in the last, but darker on the whole, and, as in it, very various."

Stevenson and Hodgson have been followed by Max Muller, in his "*Turanian Researches*," embodied in Bunsen's "*Philosophy of History*." He has taken up the labors of his predecessors, and sought to present their general result. He has accordingly, after a comparison of the Scythic languages with the aboriginal dialects of India, come to the conclusion that all the latter, which he styles "*Nishada*," are related to one another, and themselves, more to the *Ugric* branch of the Scythian family than to any other. This is his general position, although he, of course, recognizes the modification, in many separate dialects, from contact with other foreign tribes upon the frontier.

But the latest, and by far the most authoritative writer in his own province, is the Rev. R. Caldwell, who in his "*Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian or South Indian Family of Languages*," has thoroughly treated the several Dekhan languages, their mutual affinities, and their probable affiliations with the other dialects of India and those foreign to it. Through his investigation, he has been led to a result differing somewhat from that reached by his fellow laborers.

It is well known that the dialects of North India are regarded, by the most competent judges, as offshoots of the Sanskrit. They, however, differ from the Sanskrit. They differ, as the modern Romance languages do from the Latin, in being the result of a disintegration of the parent tongue, but more radically, in that they possess a prominent structural element, with which the Sanskrit has no affinity. Indeed, so marked is this element, that some observers have refused to acknowledge the Sanskrit origin of these tongues.

The question at once arises: Is this un-Sanskrit element, in the northern vernaculars, identical with the more prominent un-Sanskrit element in the dialects of the south? Stevenson, Hodgson, and Muller answer in the affirmative; Caldwell, in the negative. The latter contends urgently for the Scythian origin of what he terms the *Dravidian*, or South Indian languages; he is also fully persuaded of the Scythian origin of the un-Sanskrit portion of the northern vernaculars; but he affirms that the latter are no more closely allied to the Dravidian, than to some other branches of the great Scythic family; that, consequently, these must be arranged in this family, not as one dialect, but as sister dialects. His opinion he offers in these words:

“The differences which appear to exist between the Dravidian languages and the Scythian under-stratum of the northern vernaculars, induce me to incline to the supposition that the Dravidian idioms belong to an older period of the Scythian speech—the period of the predominance of the Ugro-Finnish languages in Central and Higher Asia, anterior to the westward migration of the Turks and Mongolians. If this supposition is correct, it seems to follow that the progenitors of the Scythian portion of the Sudras and mixed classes now inhabiting the northern and western provinces, must have made their way into India subsequently to the Dravidians; and also that they must have thrust out the Dravidians from the greater part of Northern India, before they were, in their turn, subdued by a new race of invaders.”¹

He also strongly denies that Mr. Hodgson's description of the Tamulian races will apply to the Dravidian people, and even affirms that, on purely physical evidence, they should be connected with the Arian race.

He enumerates nine Dravidian languages: Tamil, Telugu, Canarese, Malayâlam, Tulu, Toda, Kôta, Gônd, and Khond. To these he would add, as containing a Dravidian element, the Rajmahal, Uraon, and lastly Brahui of Beluchistan. He insists on the connection of the last with the Tamil and kin-

¹ Comp. Drav. Gram. p. 70.

dred tongues, and finds in its presence the indication of the course by which the Dravidians entered India.

The affiliation of the above mentioned languages may be considered as nearly settled. Mr. Hodgson's researches would also seem to connect together the various dialects of Eastern India, and refer them possibly to the nearest neighbors of the Scythian stock, while the un-Sanskrit portion of the northern dialects still awaits careful analysis.

We had hoped to mention the efforts of the East India Government and of missionary societies, to civilize and ehristianize these rude tribes. But the Article is even now, we fear, too long. Government has found that, among them, a kind word has been more potent than a hard blow; while missionaries of the gospel have found readier hearers among them, than where Brahmanism has benumbed the sensibility and steeled the heart.

ARTICLE III.

THE RESURRECTION AND ITS CONCOMITANTS.¹

BY REV. E. RUSSELL, D. D., EAST RANDOLPH.

THE discourse that fell from the lips of the great teacher of the Gentiles on Mars Hill at Athens, has never failed in power to excite thought and feeling in the human mind, and awaken discussion in every age. In the production of this effect, all the circumstances of time, place, the subject-matter of what was uttered, the character of the speaker and of those who listened, unite to secure. He stood in the midst of the city that was the "eye of Greece," and has been the

¹ *Authors to which reference has been had in the preparation of this Article — Anastasis, or the Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body, Rationally and*

school of the world. He spoke from the place, where the voice of the orator had so often —

“ Shook the arsenal and fulminated over Greece
To Macedon and Artaxerxes’ throne.”

He stood in the presence of an immense assembly, in the midst of Grecian temples, surrounded on every hand with the creations of Grecian art, and taste, and learning, and sketched, in bold and graphic outlines, the theme of redemption by Christ. The records of oratory supply nothing that is a parallel in dignity, and grandeur, and interest, with what was here uttered. Into this discourse, the grand features of essential truth were condensed; and the image had more power to stir emotion and thought, than all the wonders of Grecian architecture, statuary, or painting. The audience to which it was addressed, the place where it was delivered, and the massive truth which it embodies, conspire to make it a monument that will stand beautiful, attractive, and sublime long after the last fragments of the Parthenon shall have crumbled back to dust. The audience, the most cultivated and intelligent, doubtless, in the then known world, listened to the speaker with apparent attention and respect till the resurrection of the dead was affirmed. The assembly then became restive, the discourse itself was suspended, and a further hearing at the great forum of Attic eloquence, was denied. To an Athenian, the doctrine of a future state of existence was familiar. It was to him no new thing. The doctrine of re-

Scripturally considered, by George Bush, Professor of Hebrew, New York City University.

Eschatology, or the Scripture Doctrine of the coming of our Lord, the Judgment and the Resurrection, by Samuel Lee. Boston : J. E. Tilton & Co. 1859.

Resurrection of the same Body asserted from the traditions of the Heathen, the Ancient Jews, and the Primitive Church, with an answer to the objections brought against it. By Humphry Hody, D. D., Fellow of Wadham College, Oxford and London, 1694.

The Apologetics of the Athenian Philosopher, Athenagoras. 1. For the Christian Religion. 2. For the truth of the Resurrection, etc. By David Humphrys, B. A., of Trinity College, in Cambridge, London, 1714.

Landis, on the Resurrection of the Body, 1846.

Landis, on the Immortality of the Soul, 1859.

tribution was not for the first time, in the year of our Lord fifty-two, learned by him on Mars Hill. The Athenian believed and he had been taught to believe, from the days of Homer and Solomon, by all the poets, philosophers, and orators of his country, that there was a scene of future and endless happiness, or of misery in reserve for every man in that world, to which death would introduce him. But the doctrine of the resurrection of the body and of the reunion of soul and body in that future world, was, for the philosophical Athenian, too absurd to be believed, too irrational and strange to command a respectful hearing, or receive anything at his hands but mockery and contempt. In this feeling many, in every age of our world, have sympathized; and many who have not shared in this sympathy, have felt difficulties and doubts in reference to it by no means easy to be removed or relieved.

The church of Christ, with almost entire unanimity, has believed and taught that the conversion of the world is to be effected through the instrumentality of preaching, accompanied by the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven; that the Saviour will appear a second time, not "to seek and save the lost," but to raise the dead, of all the generations of earth, and bring the entire world to judgment; and that, with this second advent of Christ, which is to take place in some unknown period of the future, the world itself will end, and the scenes of an eternal and perfect retribution begin. The doctrines of an intermediate state, of a resurrection of the dead, a final judgment, and end of the world, are the themes which, together, constitute what is designated a Christian Eschatology, and are really so connected or involved with each other, that all must stand or fall together.

The resurrection of the dead, or the resurrection from the dead, is the point of attack, therefore, that has been most fiercely assailed. Both of these phrases occur, repeatedly, in the language of the New Testament. The resurrection of the body is peremptorily and perseveringly denied. It is affirmed that the phrase *ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν*, or *ἀνάστασις ἐκ νεκρῶν*, designates simply and only a future state of exist-

ence. The resurrection is declared to be an affair of every day occurrence. It takes place with every man at the instant of his death. As the globe, according to late estimates, is supposed to contain a population of some thirteen hundred millions, and as thirty-two millions die annually, and ninety or a hundred thousand daily, so some ninety or a hundred thousand pass daily to a resurrection state. At death, there is eliminated from these physical bodies, that have been transmitted to us from our first father, some subtle, ethereal, undefinable substance, in which the soul is enveloped while in its earthly tabernacle, so that soul and body enter, at once, on a changeless state of perfection and glory. We are not told exactly where, while in these physical structures, lie the germs of the body, that is to be thus eliminated — whether about the cranium, or above or below the diaphragm : we are assured, however, that they exist ; we are not informed by what microscopic power they become visible, or whether they can be made visible at all ; these germs exist, it is affirmed, in the bodies which we bear about with us, from day to day ; and the uninitiated, therefore, that cannot see, must walk by faith. It is further affirmed, that this resurrection body, that is eliminated at the death of every man, is developed by a natural law and not by the direct agency or power of God, as the scriptures unequivocally declare. There is, therefore, no intermediate state, no day of final judgment nor any end of the world, or termination of the present constitution of things in conformity with the uniform belief of the church of Christ in every age.

We have now stated the common and received doctrine in reference to the resurrection and its concomitants ; and the theories that have been avowed and urged in opposition to it. It will not be inappropriate, therefore, that we should state, in this connection, the grounds on which these theories are alleged to rest, and weigh their validity as arguments in opposition to the received doctrines. As we have intimated, it is the resurrection of the body that has been singled out and made the chief point of attack. On this have all the batteries of the enemy been opened. Hither have

all their missiles been hurled. They have rightly judged that, if this position could be effectually stormed and carried, the work of demolition along all the ramparts of revealed truth, would not long linger. Few doctrines, therefore, of the Christian scriptures, have encountered more objections than that of a resurrection from the dead. Against few, if any, have these objections been urged with more vigor, more learning, more of apparent thoughtfulness and respect, or more of a truly Athenian contempt. Natural science, in its every department, has been searched, and its results adduced (where they are supposed to have a disadvantageous bearing) to throw discredit on this doctrine of revelation. To these philosophical objections, as they have been designated, we now turn ; and, that no injustice may be done, we shall state them, for the most part, in the language which scepticism itself has sanctioned, if not rendered venerable.

1. This inquiry is submitted and alleged to be sufficient to settle the question of the resurrection of the body : How can the dead come forth from their graves, when they are not there ? The Saviour asserts that all that are in the graves shall hear his voice and come forth. 'The sea, it is said in the visions of Patmos, gave up¹ the dead which were in it ; and death and hell delivered up the dead which were in them ; and they were judged, every man according to their works. But it is affirmed that the body, as life departs, reverts to dust ; that it is dissolved into the original or simple elements of which it is composed, and that these elements again enter into combination with the oak, the pine on the mountain tops, the grass, the flowers of the field, and with the herds and the flocks that graze the plains and the mountain sides. Let it be affirmed, therefore, by whom it may, is the defiant interrogatory, how can bodies come forth from their graves, when they are not there ? The dead that sunk to sleep on the fields of Waterloo, the thousands of widows that have been burned on the funeral piles of their husbands, the four hundred millions (as it has been estimated) deposited in the catacombs of Egypt, and taken from thence in great numbers, and, in

¹ Rev. 20 : 13.

the form of dried mummies, used for the purposes of fuel in the dwellings of the natives, or for firing engines on their railways, must have vanished, it is said, beyond all power of recovery. How are the bodies of all these, and of all the generations that will have lived and died on the earth, to reappear in the twinkling of an eye, when they must have become blended with an infinitude of other organizations of beast and bird and fish and insect, "that which no eye can see, no glass can reach." How are the bodies of the dead thus to reappear, when different human bodies must have equal claims to the particles which compose them? How are the dead to come forth from their graves, after being reduced to ashes on a funeral pile, or consumed in the fires of a railway engine?

Now in regard to this objection it may be well to note that the Saviour does not affirm that all are in graves. His language is not that of a universal, but of a particular, proposition. All that are in their graves, shall hear his voice and come forth. In Rev. 20 : 13 the sea, and death and hell, delivered up the dead that were in them. The Saviour's language, therefore, does not imply that all are in their graves; but, that such as are, shall hear his voice and come forth : while the Christian scriptures, taken as a whole, as in the passages here cited, assert, in the most positive and unqualified form, that the dead of the entire race of man shall come forth to judgment. On the supposition, then, that the fifteen or sixteen original or simple elements, of which every human body is composed, are to be collected from the four winds of heaven, at the instant of the resurrection, is there in it anything more adapted to excite surprise or wonder, than that these same elements, every day of our lives, should come from these same four winds, and become bone, and muscle, and ligament, and texture in the bodies which we bear about with us, from day to day? On the supposition that it is so — which we neither affirm nor believe — will it be a development so peculiar or unique in this universe, as to forestall all inquiry by the contradiction which it involves, or the absurdity which it bears on its face? Is there not a process, that has been in unceasing action with each of us

from the instant that the phenomena of life began, as unique and wonderful as such a resurrection of the dead? If the particles of matter, if the fifteen original substances which enter into combination in forming the structure of these bodies, have been gathered from torrid climes, from beneath the poles, from the depths of ocean, from the banks of the Mississippi, the Danube, the Ganges, and the spicy islands of the sea, why may not the same original particles be collected again, should occasion require, and become united in that incorruptible, immortal, vigorous, and spiritual body, which the scriptures affirm will rise up from every grave, from the ocean and the land, at the sound of the archangel's trump? If a particle of magnetic matter will penetrate what we designate a solid; if light will make, for itself, a path through a composition of silex and alkali, and in a second of time wing its way through two hundred thousand miles of space; if the substance electricity will pass among the particles of a copper or an iron solid, under ocean and over all the plains of earth in a twinkling, and proclaim to a world what has transpired, who shall say what may or may not be done with such of the original particles of these physical bodies as may be requisite to form the incorruptible, immortal, and spiritual body of the resurrection? The natural world has limits for intellectual powers limited like our own; boundaries, beyond which no ken of earth will ever reach, whatever progress may yet be made in unfolding the phenomena of the material universe and its laws. To the human mind, there are certainly mysteries in the facts, in all the ultimate facts of physical science. Among men, few are found who have much to allege against them by way of objection, but the incorrigibles and incapables of our world. As to any very grave doubts, which such persons may either conceive or express, or thick clouds with which they may envelop their own vision or that of others, we apprehend that their effect upon the whole grand movement of the universe of God, will be a little like that of the barnacles on the ship's bottom, which do not greatly disturb the ship's course.

But we do not affirm that, at the instant of the resurrec-

tion, there will be any such collection of the original elements that will have composed these bodies, needed. The scriptures call the event which is to take place at that hour, a mystery. "Behold!" says Paul, "I show you a mystery: we shall not all sleep; but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump." Elsewhere, they describe it in this language: "who shall change our vile body, and fashion it like unto his glorious body, according to the working whereby he is able to subdue all things unto himself."¹ This same idea is again expressed by the same pen of inspiration in this form: "who shall fashion anew the body of our humiliation, that it may become of the like form of his glorious body, according to the energy whereby he is able to subdue all things unto himself." The scriptures, then, say that the change effected at the instant of the resurrection, is a mystery. It is, therefore, like every other ultimate fact or truth in the universe of God, whether it be in the world of matter or of mind. The scriptures further say, it is accomplished by the "working of God," "by the energy of God, whereby he is able to subdue all things unto himself." In other words, they assert that it is accomplished by the intervention of the direct agency and power of God.

The assertion, therefore, that the dead, at the resurrection, are represented as coming from where they are not, is a perversion of the language of inspiration, and the exhibition of a captiousness that ill becomes the theme itself, and the course of an honest inquiry.

To affirm further, that it is essential to the resurrection of the body that the original elements, of which it has been composed, should be collected from the four winds of heaven, is to assert what it is impossible to prove; since, if this be essential to a personal identity, there is not a human being on earth that has lived one, ten, or thirty years, who can make any pretensions to an identity of any kind, either personal or

¹ Phil. 3 : 21.

mental, if in fact there be such a distinction.¹ To affirm, again (in case it be essential to the resurrection of the body that the original substances of which "it has been composed," should be recombined), that there is no power which can accomplish it, is to forget the daily exhibitions of an agency, of a handiwork, of a power in the universe around us, that utterly baffles and confounds the most gifted intellect of earth.

If God be almighty, if he can create at all, if he can bring a single atom of matter from the abyss of nothingness into existence, it must certainly be difficult to set any limits to his power. If he had only to speak, and the confusion of chaos was hushed, and the world itself arose, in all its order and beauty and grandeur, then surely there is nothing impossible in the doctrine that all the millions that now, or shall hereafter, sleep in the dust of death, will spring to life again by the interposition of that same power which hung the earth on nothing in the empty space, kindled up the sun and the

¹ There is such a thing as organic identity in distinction from that of the mental or the vital principle, although resulting from the latter. The sameness of chemical composition and peculiarity of form and structure are the essential things that constitute organic identity. This organic identity consists in nothing else than sameness of chemical composition and peculiarity of form and structure. I pretend not, indeed, to describe how that specific and individual identity can be preserved amid the decompositions of the grave. But I do know that the specific characteristics of plants and animals are maintained in this world, under changes perhaps equally great; and when Jehovah declares that so it shall be in the resurrection of the dead, I joyfully acquiesce in the doctrine because I know that Infinite Power can accomplish that which Infinite Wisdom determines. (Dr. Hitchcock, *Bibliotheca*, April No. 1860.)

We suspect that all efforts to state in what either vegetable or animal identity consists will be a little like those of Locke in the same direction, not very clear or entirely satisfactory.

The same questions as in reference to the Athenian galley that was so often repaired as to leave not a vestige of the original materials of which it was constructed; and, in regard to the stockings that were so darned, will again be raised and agitated as long perhaps as that very grave one which once taxed all the resources of the Doctors of the Sorbonne, viz., whether the hog led the rope or the rope led the hog, when the animal itself was conducted to the market.

Identity, either mental, vital, or organic, in whatever it may consist, must be recognized by the mind, perceived, felt, and can hardly be removed, therefore, from the phenomena of our intuitions.

stars, and evoked songs of joy from all the angels of God.

If the world, with all its minute and complicated arrangements, its order, with what we designate its laws, with all the mechanism and grandeur of these heavens that are over our heads, could thus spring into being, and be upheld hitherto by the same power that created, as they must have been, then there is nothing which the Maker of heaven may not accomplish in the fulfilment of his designs. In view of the agency or power that is to be employed in the production of this matchless result, there is certainly in the doctrine itself, no absurdity, no impossibility, nothing that should provoke a question or raise a doubt. If the universe of mind, too, could wake at the touch of this same power; by this same power the spark of immortality be enkindled, and powers of thought and feeling spring into being, that are to burn and glow when suns and worlds shall have passed away; then, no man, at the bar of reason, can be justified who forecloses all argument on this subject with the declaration that the doctrine is itself contradictory, absurd, or impossible. Much less is there in it anything to provoke an Athenian mockery, or inspire contempt. If God, at the first, collected the materials and formed the original pair of each genus and of each species of animals now found on the face of the earth; or if he made them of nothing; if he thus formed the first pair of the human family, so that they came, in perfection, from his hands; if he fixed the conditions or the law by which the successive generations should rise and depart from the world; then, in that very act of creation, are all the wonders and all the mysteries — and no more — which are found in the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead.

To believe in the one and reject the other, is to wage a conflict with reason, and exalt and reverence absurdity.

2. But here another question is raised. What body, it is asked, is meant? What body of the man will be raised at the resurrection? Physiology and chemistry during the present century, have done much in the work of unfolding the principles and laws of our animal economy. As has been

already implied, chemistry by her processes of analysis, has resolved the composition of these earthly tabernacles into fifteen elementary substances, that have, as yet, never been decomposed, and are, therefore, in the language of the science, designated simple substances.¹ These substances are found in every mass of matter that is called man; and at death these substances, by decomposition, are thrown back into their original or simple elements. Death, therefore, is solely a physical change. It implies no mental or moral modification. It is the removal of the tent beneath which the occupant dwells. It is the taking down of the building in which infancy, childhood, and the youth of an existence has been passed, and the departure of the inhabitant to an invisible sphere. Now physiology has revealed to us the fact that these bodies in which we dwell are subject to a perpetual flux, to an unceasing composition and decomposition, to a perpetual decay and renovation. This process goes on, from the hardest bone in the system to the most slender texture: from the cartilagenous substance at the end of our fingers and toes, to the hair on the eyelash and the crowns of our heads. It has become a settled doctrine in physiology, that health depends on the ease or facility with which this process of decay and renovation of composition² and decomposition is accomplished; Liebig has shown that in case it be arrested, as it is by arsenic and all the metallic poisons, death is the inevitable result. As a consequence of this law of our physical economy, the particles of matter that in composition constitute these bodies, become often changed in the lapse of time. It is said, an entire change occurs once in seven years. It is, doubtless, much oftener that a complete renovation is effected. A man that has lived seventy years, therefore, according to the authorized supposition, will have changed ten times; so that not one particle of matter, in a

¹ See Liebig's, Stockhardt's *Chemistries*, Carpenter's *Physiology*. The substances are as follows: Oxygen, Hydrogen, Carbon, Nitrogen, Sulphur, Phosphorus, Chlorine, Lime, Potassium, Sodium, Iron, Magnesium, Manganese, Silicon and Fluorine. See also Hitchcock's *Anatomy and Physiology*, 1860.

² Liebig on *Metallic Poisons*.

bone or a muscle of his frame is the same with that of his boyhood or manhood, or even with that of the first waning years of his life. And on the supposition that this change is much more frequent, as it may be, the man of seventy years must have at least changed ten times and more, as the case may be. In view of these physiological facts, the question is asked: what body is meant, when it is said, The bodies of men shall be raised at the resurrection? Is it the body of infancy, of childhood, of manhood, or the body of seventy years? Is it the body itself that was committed to the grave? — the pale, worn, wasted, withered, decrepit, and possibly marred, mutilated, ghastly, mangled, and charred body, from which the soul took its exit from life? Is all the matter that has ever been connected with the body of the flesh to be raised? If so, then what masses, in the shape of men, will come up from the antediluvian world? Methuselah, and Noah, and Adam will indeed fill a large space in the world that is to come. Now, on the supposition that the objection here alleged is valid, and constitutes any difficulty at all on the subject before us, then, every person that has lived ten, twenty, or forty years on earth, ought to spurn and reject, at once and forever, the doctrine of his own personal identity. He may say, and ought to say, that he is not the same being that he was five, ten, or twenty years since, or at the period of his childhood; and, with Hume, affirm that he is not the same being that he was last month, or last year, and is, therefore, in no way responsible for any conduct of his past life. If the objection to which we now refer be valid, we may as well be in doubt, to-day, in reference to our personal identity, as to dream that we shall be at that coming period of our existence, when all the dead are to spring up, in a twinkling, from their graves. There is not a man on earth, whatever his age, and whatever the rapidity of this physical flux, this composition and decomposition, who does not know from intuition, that he is identically the same to-day, mentally and personally, with all this decay and renovation, that he was the first bright hour of his life, that has become chroni-

eled on his memory.¹ He knows it, and knows it as one of the revelations of consciousness. You may tell him of your chemistry and physiology as long as Vulcan was falling from heaven; you may look wise, as you discourse to him of nature and nature's laws; become grave and oracular as an Egyptian hierophant; yet the conviction that he is, to-day, one and the same being, mentally and personally, with that of his childhood's recollected dawn, is inseparable from his consciousness. This intuition or conviction, among men, is universal, immediate, and irresistible; and is therefore one of those primary truths, in reference to which no evidence, no human testimony, is ever required. To overlook and deny it, as some of our modern philosophers on the subject of the resurrection have done, is to outrage all the instincts and intuitions of the human mind and commit crime against humanity and against God. The fact of their own personal identity, men cannot disbelieve, if they would. In the same way, at the instant of the resurrection, will every being who shall have lived, of the race of man, be conscious of his own mental and personal identity, notwithstanding all the modifications and changes that will have passed on the body that is then incorruptible, immortal, spiritual, and fitted for the changeless abode of the undying tenant. Now, if any man is uncertain, or perplexed with doubts whether he be the same being that he was fifteen or twenty years since, when he drove a hard bargain, slandered a neighbor, or committed some act of shame, which has never and will never be effaced from the memory, then he will have some good reason to press this question, as it has been habitually urged, by way of an objection. Joseph's brethren, we suppose, were not initiated in modern discoveries. It seems that they had no doubt that they were the same beings in Egypt that they were in Canaan some twenty-five years before, when they put the victim of their hatred and revenge into the pit at Dothan, or sold him to the company of Ishmaelites for a slave. They had not learned this modern philosophy on the subject of the resurrection, and therefore be-

¹ Brown's Mental Philosophy, Chap. VIII.

lieved in their own personal identity. We should not be surprised if some years should yet elapse before the principles of this philosophy should become universal in their application. To-day the conviction, without any argument, and in spite of all that is subtle, plausible, or imposing in any objections that may be raised, is irresistible, immediate, and universal, that we are, both mentally and personally, the same with the earliest recollected period of our existence, and so the conviction must ever remain, amid all the changes of the earthly and spiritual tabernacles, the rush of suns, and the crash of worlds.

3. It is asked, again, what relation has the body that dies to the body of the resurrection? This inquiry or objection (for such it is designed to be) must be based on the assumption that, if there be a relation, we must be able to see it; and, further, if there be no relation, then there can be no resurrection. Now, it would not be at all strange, if there should be to the human mind, even now, many, yea very many, undiscovered relations, in every department of knowledge. Who would have thought, some few score years since, of the relation of the single quality of the elasticity of steam to all the great business operations of the world to-day? Did Dr. Johnson, probably, discover any particular relation between what issued, rather violently sometimes, from the spout of his tea-kettle and the present state of things on this nether sphere? Who would have thought, when the present century began, of the relation of the electric fire to the proclamation of events half round the earth, under ocean and over land, on couriers formed of the lightning's wing? Men once did not see the relation between the power that brings the falling apple or stone to the earth, and that which propels the spheres, moving ceaselessly to the chime of their own music. Every one, now, knows that relations did exist, though unrevealed to the centuries that elapsed before their discovery. The fact, therefore, that a relation is not perceived or become known to any *savant*, does not prove that none exists. No affirmative conclusion, therefore, can be drawn from such a negative premise. There must be a far

more searching induction, and the whole field must be made to give up absolutely all that it contains, of properties or relations, before such a conclusion can rise above contempt. If, on the other hand, it should be admitted that there is no relation between the body that dies and the body of the resurrection, it would not follow, as a matter of course, that there would be no resurrection of the dead. Antecedent to all experience, we should not be able to see the relation between the larva and the chrysalis, or between both of these states and the butterfly sporting his newly-spread pinions in the sunbeams. Antecedent to all experience, there is just as strong a presumption against the acorn's becoming the oak — the monarch which, for a century, breasts all the storms and hurricanes of the hills; the egg, from its nest in the elm, sending forth a messenger to wing its way on the bosom of the air, and pour its sweet songs on human ears; just as strong a presumption against what may be regarded as nothing more than a pebble (instead of an ostrich's egg), in the sands of the desert, becoming a thing of life and speed unmatched by the proudest war-horse and winds, as there is against the fact that all that are in the graves are yet to hear a voice and come forth from the dust with which the mortal part has been, perhaps for centuries, mingled. Antecedent to all experience, there is no process in the physical, intellectual, or moral world, which is not to men improbable and as absurd as the doctrine of the resurrection appeared to be to the Athenians. Creation itself, in all its thousand departments, is, antecedent to all experience, an improbability. Prior to the revelations of science, who could have been made to believe that the globe, on which we tread, wings its way as with the lightning's leap, some six hundred millions of miles in its annual course round the sun, as it does; and moves, all the while, balanced on nothing, too? Antecedent to all experience, is there not, in this way, a presumption to the human mind against every law, change, or mode of action in the universe of God?

And is the presumption against the resurrection of these bodies from the graves in which they will have slept for cen-

turies, any stronger than against every process, law, or mode of action which God adopts in the changes of the physical, intellectual, and moral worlds? If he has power to send this ball of earth six hundred millions of miles through the eternal void around us, every twelvemonth, has he not power to wake the millions of every generation that shall have sunk to sleep in its dust? Suppose that we cannot see any relation between the body that dies and the body that is to be raised in the retributive hour: what then? Does it prove anything at all, except that mankind always have been, and are likely to be, most profoundly ignorant? Who, antecedent to any experience, sees any *relation* between the egg, in its nest among the rocks of some Alpine peak, and the eagle that soars to the sun or plunges and screams through the air? If all the processes in which animal life is propagated on earth are, antecedent to human experience, so improbable, and yet God, in spite of what men call improbability, presumption against it, absurdity, adopts it and acts upon it, without the shadow of a change, as we know he does, who has any right to say that because he can now see no relation between the body that dies and that which is to rise again, that all the dead will not yet stand up in the original, and in the sense before explained — identical forms in which they sunk to their iron slumber? The fact that pope Urban VIII. and his cardinals did not see the relation of the earth to the sun, nor which of these bodies it is that moves in an orbit through the skies, did not exactly annihilate the doctrines of the Copernican system; did not prove that Galileo was a heretic, and that he ought to recant or be burned. All such reasoning is much after the manner of the philosopher of Padua, who affirmed that, as there were only seven metals, seven days in the week, and seven apertures in a man's head, so there could be but seven planets; and when forced to admit the visibility of the satellites of Jupiter by looking through a telescope, he still sagely and profoundly reasoned, that, as they were not visible to the naked eye, therefore they did not exist, and that it would be a mortal sin to believe that they did. From such a negative premise, therefore, as that on

which this objection is alleged to stand, no conclusive inference or even plausible argument can be drawn against the resurrection of the body. The fact that we do not now see relations, cannot prove that they do not exist. If so, all the wonders of modern science should be expunged and razed forever. For, once it would have been thought incredible that there was any relation between the power that brings the apple to the earth, and that which raises the tides of ocean, turns the ten thousand spindles of the palace of industry and toil, wheels the planet in its orbit, and propels the comet in its course. The objection itself, therefore, is and must be baseless, void.

4. Again, it is affirmed that the scriptures do not define the body of the resurrection, so as to impart to men any conception of it, or idea. They are, it is said, so indefinite, vague, or obscure, that nothing can be known, and therefore it is very questionable what they mean to assert when they employ language which is supposed to refer to it. But is there any ground for this objection? It is conceded that, in a physical inquiry, two and only two questions can be raised. In reference to a piece of carbonate of lime, for example, we may inquire: Of what is it composed? And when we are told it consists of oxygen, carbon, and lime, one of these questions is answered. But should we go further and inquire: What is carbon, oxygen, or the substance we designate lime, we reach a limit which has never been scaled. The philosopher lives not who can inform the world what the essence of carbon, of oxygen is, or what is the essence of any simple element of matter. The only reply which he can return here is, that they are simple elements, that they have never been decomposed, and that it is not known that they can be. There are limits to human knowledge and human inquiry which have never been passed — barriers which have never been and will never (whatever progress may yet be made in physical analysis) be scaled. There will — whatever analysis may yet accomplish — be simple elements, elements that will defy all decomposition. In this direction human inquiry ends, and the circumference of the circle that bounds human

knowledge is reached. The human being lives not, who can define or tell what is the essence of the smallest particle of matter which microscopic power brings within the reach of his vision. Now if all this be so, men know absolutely nothing of the fifteen or sixteen simple substances, of which these physical bodies are composed, that we bear about with us from day to day. They know the fact of their existence; but, in spite of all the revelations of science, they really know no more as to what they actually are, than an infant of a day.

The other inquiry that may be made, in reference to the carbonate of lime, is: How it affects other bodies, and how other bodies affect it? In prosecuting this investigation, the properties or qualities of the substance become revealed. And when, in every possible combination, I have ascertained how other bodies affect it, and how it affects other bodies; or, in other words, how it affects and is affected in every possible combination,¹ I have learned all that can be known in reference to it. Now, what is true in the case before us, is true of every physical inquiry that can be instituted under heaven. God, in describing or defining the spiritual body of the resurrection, has not told us what the substance itself, or the essence of this body is. He has said, it was not material: that "flesh and blood could not inherit the kingdom of God." But he has not defined or revealed what the substratum or essence of the spiritual body is, nor given us clew or hint for any discovery. All this is conceded. Nor has he revealed any more the essence, itself, of which these bodies of flesh and blood are composed. No torch of human discovery will ever enter this labyrinth. To human gaze it is forever closed. No searcher of nature's laws, however bold may have been his tread, will ever be able to tell what one of the fifteen original or simple substances is, in its nature or essence, which constitutes the bones, the muscles, the arteries, and blood, of his physical system. Now why should not men object to God's limiting

¹ Brown's Mental Philosophy, Vol. I., Physical Enquiry.

in this way — as he has done — the whole range of human thought, and to his “holding back,” here, “the face of his throne, and spreading a cloud upon it?” Why not urge objections here? And if not here, why complain because God has not revealed to us or defined the essence or substratum of the body of the resurrection? Why not complain, also, because he has not revealed or defined to us the substance, nature, or essence, of the tabernacles in which we live, or of matter in any of its thousand forms and combinations? If complaints or objections are pertinent in the one case, they must be also in the other. The truth is — it is as plain as the most palpable demonstration — that there is no ground for objection or difficulty here. God has done all that could be accomplished in the work of revealing or defining the body of the resurrection. To us, limited as we are in the powers with which we are invested, more could not be disclosed. If done, we could not, as we are, comprehend more. More than we now have, therefore, would be to us no revelation at all. God has distinctly defined the body of the resurrection. He has assured us, that it is spiritual, fitted, arranged, adapted for an abode of the immortal mind. He that has assured us that it is the body itself, not the soul, is thus fitted, made, or adapted. The soul is spirit, immortal, without a resurrection; needs none in order that its existence be continued; is not changed, in its nature, by death or by the resurrection. It is the body, therefore, that is raised a spiritual body, and not the soul of man, as has been asserted. It is the body of the dead that is raised incorruptible, indestructible, immortal, arrayed in power, in glory (in the case of the believer in Jesus), like the sun shining in his strength. In the work of describing the body of the resurrection, then, is it possible for the scriptures to accomplish more than they have done for the information of those who are yet to rush, in a twinkling, to the tribunal of the Son of man? Now if there be objections here, on the ground that the scriptures are indistinct or obscure, as is alleged, then we ought to object to the whole universe, of matter and of mind; for, all that we know, or can know, of the original

or simple elements of matter or of mind, is in the form of the qualities or properties revealed. And these, as we have seen, are never known, and never can (in any given case whatsoever) be, in perfection, known.

5. But, it is contended finally, by way of objection to the common or received doctrine of the resurrection, that there is a body or some third thing eliminated, at the death of every man, so that there will be no need of the resurrection of the body from the grave. The soul, as it leaves this dwelling of flesh and blood, wakes in a body that is neither spirit nor matter, but some third thing, upon which neither reason nor revelation has shed any light. In short, there is just as much evidence or proof that, at the death of every man, a kingdom, a throne, and sceptre of power will be eliminated; that *loci laeti et amoena vireta* will be eliminated, as that some third thing, which is neither matter nor spirit, will be evolved from the body the instant the breath departs and the process of dissolution begins. The scriptures, surely, give us no hints of any such transformation; and, on the theme itself, reason is dark as darkness itself. It is theory without proof, assumption without argument. It is a figment of the mind, a dream, and baseless as a night vision. The theory has been broached for the purpose of avoiding the conclusions in reference to the resurrection of the body from the grave, and the scenes of a coming judgment. On such grounds as this theory discloses, men are urged to reject the scripture doctrine of a resurrection of the body, the scenes of the final judgment, and to regard them as the myths and dreams of a pernicious superstition.

Such are the objections, that have recently been vigorously urged against the common or received doctrine of the resurrection. It has been our purpose to state them fully and fairly. The method of reasoning, that has been adopted by the opponents of the doctrine, is to submit their own hypothesis or theory, urge what they designate the philosophical objections or difficulties in the way of assent to the common faith, and then hew, and cut, and square, extend and contract, pervert and modify the passages of the word of God till they fit the Procrus-

tean bed of their hypothesis. It will be impossible, without exceeding the limits here allotted, to pass all these passages in a minute and critical review. We do not deem it necessary to do so for the settlement of the question. The whole subject, so far as the philology of the Christian scriptures is concerned, lies in a very narrow space. The term *ἀνάστασις*, the phrases *ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν* and *ἀνάστασις ἐκ νεκρῶν*, are the words on which the whole question hinges. The course that has been pursued by the opponents of the received doctrine of the resurrection, in determining the meaning of these phrases, is to infer something from the etymology of the word or words to which reference has been made, affirm what they ought to mean, quote the loose and rickety statements of Dr. Dwight in full, on the meaning of *ἀνάστασις*, and then blink the whole question of the *usus loquendi* of the language itself. There has not been a single principle, rule, or law of interpretation, fairly applied to the language of the scriptures on this subject, by either Prof. Bush or the Rev. Mr. Lee, in their treatises on eschatology. They are, throughout, examples of a perversion of all the rules or laws of interpretation, specimens of etymological sipping, of philological blinking and ignoring. Tacitus says of Galba,¹ “*omnium concensu, capax imperii, nisi imperasset.*” These authors might have been deemed, perhaps, sound and accomplished scholars, had they not written and given to the world their treatises on eschatology.

What, then, is the meaning or import of the term *ἀνάστασις* as used in the scriptures? Any good Greek lexicon will, of course, explain its etymology and some of its significations. It will say, it designates a *rising up*, a *rising up as from a fall*, a resurrection of the body, a *return to life*: “women received their dead raised to life again,” *ἐξ ἀναστάσεως*, Heb. 11:35. But the etymological sense, on which it is so convenient for the modern opponents of the doctrine of a resurrection to rely, does not by any means settle its *usus loquendi* and give its import. What did the Athenians, for example,

¹ History, Book I. Chap. 49.

in their market-place and on Mars Hill (Acts 17:32), understand to be the meaning of *ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν*, or of the resurrection of the dead? "And when they heard of the resurrection of the dead," it is said, "some mocked, and others said, we will hear thee again concerning this." Did they, for the first time, hear of a future state of existence, on Mars Hill, from the lips of Paul? Was this, to them, a strange doctrine, as they said of his teachings in the market-place? Was this the thing that roused the impatience of an audience the most intelligent and curious, not to say refined, perhaps, of the then known world? Was it this that stirred them to mockery? From the days of Homer, at least, had they not heard of a future state of existence? Was it not taught in his immortal verse, and thus incorporated into the whole texture and web-work of Grecian thought and feeling? Did not Pindar, in lyric strains, bold, grand, and sweet as the honey said to have been hived on his lips, teach the doctrines of a future existence and of future rewards and punishments?¹ Did not Hesiod, and Aeschylus, and Socrates, and Plato? Even their history reveals, in this respect, the power of their convictions. Near the close of the Peloponnesian war, or four hundred and six years before Christ, the Athenians won a great naval victory,² over the Lacedemonians and their confederates, at Arginusæ, in which seventy ships of war belonging to the enemy were captured, or sunk in the waters of the Aegean, and thirteen of their own, also, sunk or disabled. In consequence of a storm, that arose immediately after the action, the Athenian commanders were unable to rescue their dead and transmit them to their friends for the rites of burial. By the loss of these rites, it was supposed that the spirits of those who had thus fallen in battle would be compelled to wander, for a century or more, on the shores of the Styx, before they could be admitted to the happy fields or islands of the blessed. Of the ten Athenian commanders, that had charge of that sanguinary conflict, eight were condemned to death

¹ *Vide Olymp. II. Theroni Agrigentino curru victori. Plato's Phædo.*

² *Vide Lysias oration against Eratosthenes, one of the thirty tyrants of Athens. Xenophon. Hellen. L. I. Chap. 7, et. seq.*

for having neglected to rescue (as was alleged) the shipwrecked seamen after the storm, and collect the bodies of those that had been slain or drowned. Six of the eight were executed, and the remaining two banished, by the democracy of Athens, for not doing what was in the power (as was afterward admitted) of no human arm to accomplish. Was the doctrine of a future state of existence, then, either new or strange to an Athenian? Did the hearers of Paul, at this, become impatient and mock? Was it either new or strange, to those who then stood on Mars Hill, that men were to be judged in another world, and receive according to their works? So the Egyptians, from the days of Abraham, so the Greeks, so the Romans, so all the nations that dwelt along the shores of the Mediterranean, from the time the Israelites crossed the Jordan and received the lot of their inheritance, believed not only in a state of future existence, but also in future rewards and punishments. These doctrines are natural, congenial to the very instincts and convictions of the human mind. Their reasonableness is perceived along with the awful consciousness of sin, which pervades the race of man in every nation and age, and perceived, along with the appalling wrongs and outrages that are known to be perpetrated and never to be redressed on earth. Without question, this is the origin of that strong, universal conviction among the first nations of earth, of a judgment to come in that unseen state to which they felt themselves rushing.

What, then, did the assembly on Mars Hill understand by the phrase *ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν*, or resurrection of the dead? It was not any doctrine of Plato, of Pindar, or of Homer. If so, it could not have been new. It would not have been strange. The assembly itself would not have been broken up; and in mockery and contempt it would not have indulged. But one answer, under all the circumstances, can be given to this question. It was a return to life, the resurrection of the bodies of men, "at that day when the world is to be judged, in righteousness, by that Man whom God hath before ordained; whereof he hath given assurance unto all men, in that he hath raised him from the dead."

At Corinth, again, not sixty miles distant from the capital of Attica, where the same philosophy and the same learning were cultivated as at Athens, the doctrine was no less new and no less strange. It was no more satisfactory, but was alike repulsive to all their modes of thought and habits of feeling. As the doctrines of Christianity, at Corinth, had found a home in the bosoms of those who had been gathered into the fold of Christ, it was natural that opposition to the strictly revealed doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, should assume an aspect more determined, and enlist all the philosophy and learning, and all the wit and contempt, that could be summoned to the work of exploding a dogma, in the Corinthian view so absurd, and, to the Corinthian heart, so repulsive. The opposition without, it seems, was felt within the enclosure of the church itself; and these who had once received the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead as an article of their faith, and now admitted the fact of the resurrection of Christ, were borne away with the current, and like the scoffing throngs of the rabble, of the philosophers and learned men around them, affirmed that there was no resurrection of the dead. All this is assumed as the basis, or ground work of the discussion in 1 Cor. xv. There is no reasoning in a circle here, as has been asserted. There is no attempt made to prove the doctrine of a future state of existence. Dr. Dwight affirms that the doctrine of a future existence was denied at Corinth; and that Sadducean infidelity had found a lodgment there. For all this, he gives us assertion for proof, and declamation for argument. There is not one particle or scintilla of evidence, that the doctrine of a future state of existence was ever denied at Corinth, or had ever been seriously questioned up to the time that the epistles to the Corinthians were penned. On the contrary, everything in the history, in the philosophy, in the literature and the arts of the then capital of the Grecian world, proves that there was no question in reference to a scene of future existence. The reality of such a state of future existence, was in fact a part of the national feeling and belief, and had been, through all the centuries of their history. Hence the position that is stated

and argued in the 1 Cor. xv., from the beginning to the end of that clear and powerful discussion, and stated and argued in opposition to everything in conflict with it, is the doctrine of a resurrection of the dead. It was the doctrine of the resurrection of the body that was denied, and not that of a future state of existence, as has been so absurdly and pertinaciously affirmed. This view of the case is supported in every part of that sublime discussion, without change or modification. Now if Christ be preached, that he rose from the dead, *ὅτι ἐκ νεκρῶν ἐγήγερται*, "I have preached this doctrine," Paul, in effect, affirms; "others have preached it to you; you have received it; you admit that Christ has risen from the dead; the scriptures declared, centuries before his advent in the world, that he would both die, be buried, and rise again. He was seen of Cephas or Peter, after his resurrection; then, of the twelve; afterwards, of above five hundred brethren at once, of whom the greater part remain unto this present, but some are fallen asleep; then, of James; then of all the apostles; and, last of all, he was seen of me also, as one born out due time. You admit that Christ is risen from the dead: you cannot deny the proof, reject the evidence, or discard the testimony. You allow it to be preached to you, and you receive it as a fact that cannot be denied, as well you may. How say some among you, in the church of Christ at Corinth, then, that there is no resurrection, no general resurrection of the dead?" Such is the logic of this discourse: Paul reasoned from their own admissions in reference to the resurrection of Christ. This was appropriate. To those, to whom the argument was addressed, it must have been satisfactory. Its force, at least by them, must have been felt. It certainly was adapted to this end. There was no reasoning in a circle here, as has been so often affirmed. If Christ had been raised from the dead, then the dead, of course, of all the generations of earth, might be thus raised; yea, would be raised in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye. One event was as certain as the other. The power that effected the one, could as easily accomplish the other. If there was to be no resurrection of the dead, then Christ was not risen, as they admitted or believed that

he was. Their faith, on this supposition, was vain. They were unpardoned : they were yet in their sins ; all who had fallen asleep in Christ had perished ; all who had borne testimony to the resurrection of Christ, and preached a risen as well as a crucified Redeemer, were false witnesses of God, and the condition of believers in Jesus the most pitiable of the race of man. The premise of this argument, therefore, was what the Corinthians themselves believed, in reference to the resurrection of Christ. This they admitted, and yet denied the resurrection of the bodies of men ; and, by adopting the interrogative, put their denial in the most positive form. "How are the dead raised up, and with what bodies do they come ?" is the language of unbelief, not only in the first, but in every century of our era, on the subject before us. It is impossible, one might well suppose, not to see, here, what was denied at Corinth, and what, in fact, constitutes the subject of the sublime discussion in 1 Cor. xv. It was not the immortality of the soul, or the doctrine of a future state of existence directly ; but that of the resurrection of the bodies of men.

The mode of this denial, the form in which the objection is stated, and the reply to it by the great teacher of the Gentiles, settle forever the meaning of *ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν* in 1 Cor. 15: 12, 13, 21, 42. It is the body that is to be raised incorruptible, not the soul, of man. It is the body, the mortal part, that is to put on immortality ; the body, that was weak, that is to become "clothed in power ;" the body, dishonored and buried from the sight of men, that is to be arrayed in glory ; and the body, that is to become spiritual, as well as incorruptible and immortal. All the race of man that shall ever sleep in the dust of the earth, shall awake and live again. For, since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead ; for, as in Adam all die, even so, in Christ, shall all be made alive." As certain as is the event of death, to the race of man, so certain is the resurrection of all the dead of earth's generations.¹ We may safely chal-

¹ It is admitted that there may be Christians whose theoretical views of religious truth, are very defective. The minimum of knowledge, essential to any

lenge the production of an instance, in the whole field of Biblical philology, where the meaning of a word or phrase is so distinctly defined and so unmistakably clear and palpable as in the word *ἀνάστασις*, or the phrase *ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν* in 1 Cor. 15 : 12, 13, 21, 42. It implies a future state of existence, without any question. But its primary and distinctive meaning is the resurrection of the body, that reverts to dust at death. It implies, not only the immortality of the soul, which no Corinthian or Athenian denied, but also the future existence of the body itself. But still its *primary, distinctive* and *positive signification* is the resurrection of all the dead that will have slept, for centuries, in the dust of death. This was denied by Athenian, by Corinthian, and by some, too, who bore the name of Christ in a church gathered under the auspices of the apostle himself.

In this connection it may not be improper to state—what has been so distinctly affirmed, in 1 Cor. xv. in reference to the resurrection of the bodies of the righteous—that the wicked, also, will be raised, at the resurrection of the last day. “They will come forth,” says the Saviour, “unto the resurrection of damnation.”¹ “As, in Adam, all die; so, in Christ, shall all be made alive.” “And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth, shall awake: some, to everlasting life; and some, to shame and everlasting contempt.” “All, that are in the graves, shall hear his voice, and shall come forth.” “Fear him,” says the Saviour, “who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell.” And have hope to-

evangelical faith, it must ever be difficult to determine. But what kind of Christians must those have been at Corinth, who rejected from their articles of religious faith, not only the doctrine of the resurrection of the bodies of men from the grave, but also that of a future state of existence, which lies at the foundation of Christianity itself? If *ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν* in 1 Cor. 15 designates merely, as Dr. Dwight, Prof. Bush, and the Rev. Mr. Lee affirm, a state of future existence; then, there must have been French infidels in the Church at Corinth, who were addressed by Paul as Christians. Now, what kind of a Christian is he, who believes that death is an eternal sleep? Can anything reveal more distinctly the absurdity of the construction thus put upon *ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν* in 1 Cor. 15?

¹ John 5 : 29. 1 Cor. 15 : 22. Dan. 12 : 2. John 5 : 28. Matt. 10 : 28. Acts 24 : 15.

ward God which they themselves also allow, that there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and unjust." It is, therefore, as unequivocally and positively affirmed that the bodies of the wicked, or unjust, will be raised, as it is in the case of those of the righteous. But they will be raised for the accomplishment of a very different end. It will be done for no purposes of good, or of happiness, in respect to themselves. Body and soul, in their case, will be reunited, not for the purposes of bliss and endless glory, but for those of shame and everlasting contempt. They, too, will be raised from the dead incorruptible, immortal, and spiritual, in reference to the bodies with which they will be invested. But it will be that every sight may become appalling, every sound harsh discord, every taste bitter, odor offensive, and touch pain. It will be that every sense of these indestructible tabernacles may become the seat of an anguish that is never to end. They never, in the flesh, employed a single sense or power, a single faculty of body or of mind, in the service of their Maker; and it will be right, therefore, and the inevitable result of the laws of the physical, mental, and moral constitution under which they live, that they should reap the consequences of this abuse of all their powers, in the world to come; in other words, that they should be destroyed, both soul and body, amid those eternal retributions that await those who shall pass their lives without God and hope in the world.

The meaning of the term *ἀνάστασις*, or the phrase *ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν*, in the instances cited, cannot be mistaken. They do not signify a future state of existence, except by indirection. They imply it as a result or a consequence. But, primarily and distinctively, they connote or designate the resurrection, the living again, or resurrection, of the bodies of men that have been dissolved in the dust of death, and a reunion of soul and body, on the part of the dead, that is never to be sundered. It is impossible for us, here, to pass in review the whole forty-two passages, in the New Testament, where the word *ἀνάστασις* may be found, nor will it be necessary to do so for the purpose of settling the *usus loquendi*

of the term or the phrase to which we have referred. In every instance, with two exceptions, it designates a living again, a standing up, a coming forth from the grave, as in the case of Lazarus, of Christ and the saints that came out of their graves after his resurrection. It designates a coming back from the dead: "Women received their dead raised to life again," ἐξ ἀναστάσεως.¹ These exceptions are found in John 11:25 and in Luke 2:34.

In the first of these passages, Christ says to Martha: "I am the resurrection and the life;" which signifies, of course, that Christ himself—a sweet and blessed truth—is the sole ground or efficient cause of the resurrection, in every case; that it is by his power or his agency, alone, that it is to be effected. It is here a predicate of Christ, and affirms of him a power which, when the time for its manifestation shall have come, will invest him with a glory surpassing that, in view of which the angels of God once shouted, and the morning stars sung. It is in this sense, without any question, that the term is here used.

In the other case, the import of the word is different: "And Simeon blessed them, and said unto Mary, his mother, 'Behold! this child is set for the fall and rising again, εἰς ἀνάστασιν πολλῶν ἐν τῷ Ἰσραήλ.'" In the sense of rising again from the dead, it is not here employed; but is used to designate, in its appropriate and secondary application, a moral or spiritual resurrection—a resurrection from the death of sin. Indeed all the seeming exceptions do, in fact, but confirm and strengthen the primary and distinctive use, meaning, or signification of the phrase which is the subject of our inquiry.

In this connection it will not be inappropriate to refer to the noted passage, Matt. 22:31, 32, and to the parallel ones, Mark 12:18—27. Luke 20:27—38. In the first of these, Christ, in reply to the Sadducees, says: "But, as touching the resurrection of the dead, have ye not read that which was spoken unto you, by God, saying, 'I am the God of Abra-

¹ Heb. 11:35.

ham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob?' God is not a God of the dead, but of the living."¹ The Sadducees admitted the divine authority of the books of Moses. They began their separation from the Pharisees in the days of John Hyrcanus, by rejecting the mass of traditions to which the Pharisees adhered; by limiting themselves to the written word; and, as many suppose, from Josephus (Ant. bk. xii. c. 10), rejecting everything but the writings of Moses. The Saviour, therefore, conducted his argument with the Sadducees, on the basis of their own admissions. As they assented to the divine authority of the great Jewish lawgiver, an appeal to such an authority, in a case in which their feelings and interests were so deeply involved, must have sealed their lips in silence, if it failed of carrying conviction to their minds. It is important, also, to keep in view, here, what the Sadducees disbelieved, or rejected, in the common faith of their religious countrymen. They denied the resurrection of the dead; they denied the existence of angels, and affirmed that there was no such thing as a spirit; while the Pharisees, who were the religious teachers of the age, admitted the reality of each of these propositions. They were, therefore, the French infidels or materialists of their times. And if this is, of itself, a proof of aristocracy and preëminence in anything but sin, then the Sadducees may, in conformity with Mr. Lee's declaration, have constituted the aristocracy in wealth, in learning, and in influence, among the Jews. This is entirely a modern discovery; and its glory, we presume, Mr. Lee will be allowed to share alone. Now the fact is here obvious, at a glance, that the phrase *ἀναστάσεως τῶν νεκρῶν*, in this passage, is used in its common acceptation; and that it does not here, as has been oftentimes affirmed, designate a future state of existence, except by implication. This is proved, in the first place, from the articles, not of faith, but of disbelief, on the part of Sadducees, which were three in number. They did not believe in a resurrection; they did not believe in the existence

¹ 3 : 6, 15. At the time this declaration was made, Abraham had been dead 329 years, Isaac 224, and Jacob 198.

of angel, or the existence of spirit. It is, further, obvious that the phrase *ἀναστάσεως τῶν νεκρῶν* is used in its common or received acceptation, and means, here, a resurrection of the body; as, without bodies, the Sadducees themselves would not have deemed it very important, probably, whether the woman should have a husband or not; or the husbands themselves have wives, in the resurrection. This, as we conceive, must settle the question as to the meaning of the phrase *ἀναστάσεως τῶν νεκρῶν*, in Matt. 22 : 31, 32, the parallel ones, Mark 12 : 18—27. Luke 20 : 28—38, and Acts 23 : 8. In these passages the phrase does not designate a future state of existence, and could not do so without involving a tautology not found elsewhere in the Christian scriptures. Here, therefore, as in the forty out of the forty-two instances of the occurrence of the term or phrase in the New Testament, its primary, characteristic, and distinctive signification is the resurrection of the body from the dust of death.

Now the Saviour, as has been intimated, conducted his argument with the Sadducees on the basis of their own admissions. They denied the doctrine of a resurrection, of a future state of existence and its retributions; and yet admitted the divine authority of the teachings of Moses. The Saviour, therefore, avails himself of this admission, and quotes the declaration of God to Moses at the burning bush, and lays before them the sublime reality that Moses taught, and distinctly taught, the immortality of the soul of man, and all that was involved in an immortality of being. It may be said, that the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead is only indirectly proved, in the argument of Christ with the Sadducees. But if so, there is nothing in the fact of the method of proof being indirect, that invalidates the proof itself, or renders the demonstration, in the least degree, incomplete. The exact sciences, in instances not a few, resort to the method; and there is never a dream or a suspicion, on this account, of uncertainty or doubt, as to the result of its introduction. The Saviour, in his argument with these Jewish sceptics, asserting, to all intents and purposes, the truth of their own admissions, swept away all the foundations on which they

rested, and of course proved the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead with that of a future state of existence, in this overthrow of the Sadducean faith.

Now unless this term or phrase can be divested of its primary and distinctive import, the modern doctrines that the resurrection takes place at the death of every man, that there is no intermediate state, no general judgment, no end of the world or of the present order and constitution of things, fall, and fall beyond the power of any recovery, unless the scriptures are a fable, and inspiration itself a myth or a dream. On the contrary, if this be its signification, its true and only import, as its *usus loquendi* affirms, almost without change or modification, then there is yet to be a resurrection of the bodies of men : the sea, the caves of ocean, the grave-yards of earth, the valleys, the hill-sides, the rock-ribbed mountains and glens, are yet to give up their dead ; there is an intermediate state ; there is yet to come a righteous and general judgment ; and the scenes of this wretched world of sin, and suffering, and woe, are to have an end. The term *ἀνάστασις*, therefore, or the phrase *ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν*, does not mean, and cannot, without a perversion of all the laws of language, be made to designate, simply and only, the immortality of the soul, or a future state of existence, as has been affirmed and reiterated, again and again, by men who profess the profoundest regard for the scriptures of inspiration.

The Biblical history of the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, the scriptural proofs of the intermediate state, and the reasons or grounds for a future, general, and righteous judgment, with the objections with which these themes themselves have become recently so much overlaid, cannot be canvassed within the limits of this Article ; and must be left, therefore, for some future discussion.

ARTICLE IV.

DID THE ANCIENT HEBREWS BELIEVE IN THE DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY?

BY REV. S. TUSKA.

THE question whether the Hebrew scriptures contain the doctrine of immortality, has been repeatedly asked and variously answered. While some have roundly asserted that they *teach* this doctrine as clearly as they do the unity of God others (of whom bishop Warburton may be considered the exponent) have run to the other extreme, boldly maintaining that the Old Testament does not contain the least trace of a future state. Others, again, while assuming that the ancient Hebrews had no idea of a future existence of the soul, admit that this idea is indeed *alluded* to in Hebrew scripture, but that these allusions are so obscure that they must have been purposely contrived to conceal the *knowledge* of the doctrine from the Jewish people. (Comp. Whately, *Future State*, passim.) Still others there are, particularly among the rationalists of Germany, who declare that the idea of immortality is, indeed, clearly expressed in some portions of the Hebrew scriptures, but that these portions are, *for that very reason*, the production of a very late period in the history of the Jews — at a period when these had already learned the doctrine from a *foreign* source.

All these opinions, it will be seen, proceed on the supposition that the ancient Hebrews had *not* the doctrine in question *independent* of their Bible. While, therefore, the one party, in endeavoring to prove that the religion of the ancient Hebrews contained this fundamental principle of all religion, and was thus, in opposition to the view of Kant, a religion *indeed*, are anxious to prove that this principle was expressly *taught* them by their lawgiver and prophets; the other is very zealous in explaining away all such texts as do most clearly allude to the idea of immortality, in order to prove, by the very absence of this idea, the “divine legation” of the

Hebrew legislator. If, however, it can be proved that the ancient Israelites, *even if* the Bible does *not* expressly inculcate it, actually entertained the idea of a future state, neither of the above views need or even *can* be adopted. For, why *teach* a doctrine to a people among whom it is *already* confidently believed? Or why, on the other hand, rigidly exclude it from passages which plainly allude to it, when nothing would be more natural than that such passages should at once suggest the idea of immortality to the mind that has a knowledge of it independently of them.

But how shall this be proved? How can we, without making ourselves liable to the charge of exegetical wrenching and twisting, show that the ancient Hebrews actually believed in a future state? It is not by resorting to those Biblical passages where the idea in question is supposed to be revealed. These, though they tend to *confirm* the argument in the question under consideration, cannot of themselves be considered decisive. For when a man, in order to further a favorite hypothesis, has once persuaded himself that a certain idea is not contained in scripture, he will explain away any and every passage, no matter how clearly it alludes to that idea. And even if he cannot escape the conviction that the scriptures allude to that idea, as e. g. that of a future life, he will, nevertheless, assuming that the Hebrews were destitute of the knowledge of that idea, maintain that those allusions are so obscure as to be unintelligible to any except such as have obtained this idea elsewhere. An ignorant people, it is argued, which has no knowledge at all of a future state, could not derive this idea from a few, scanty, half-concealed allusions to the same; to impress such a people with so important an idea, the latter must needs be clearly expressed and repeatedly inculcated. If, however, it can be proved by other arguments, that the Israelites of old must have believed in the immortality of the soul, then the argument drawn from the exegetical interpretation of the relative passages in scripture will be of so much the more force, as it will not then, in determining the meaning of the text, be necessary to go over the disputed ground again, in order to settle the *general* ques-

tion as to the *existence* of the doctrine among those for whom the Bible was originally composed.

Let us, then, before examining the scriptural allusions to the doctrine of immortality, proceed at once to those arguments which will, of themselves, clearly show that this doctrine was as prevalent a belief among the ancient as among the modern Hebrews. This may be proved :

- I. From the universality of the belief ;
- II. From the residence of the Israelites among the Egyptians ;
- III. From the traditions derived from the patriarchs ;
- IV. From the prevalence of certain superstitions ; and,
- V. From the Hebrew conceptions of the soul.

I. First, then, the *universality* of the belief: God and immortality are the two great pillars on which rests the edifice of all religion. Remove either of them, and the entire structure falls into ruins. As there can be no religion without the belief in the existence of a Being to whom we are to pay religious homage ; so, no system or creed which discards the cardinal doctrine of a future state, can be a true religion. For, if I believe that with the dissolution of my body I cease to be a conscious personal being, then I may defy the Omnipotent himself ; since, by a single act of mine I could totally annihilate myself, and thus escape the retribution consequent upon deeds however atrocious and corrupt. We accordingly find that, wherever there is *religion*, the belief not only in a divine Being, but also in a future life, exists. These two ideas go hand in hand, accompanying the worshipper to the altar of religion. No nation, however ancient and uncultivated, of whom history has left any record, has been destitute of these two fundamental doctrines of religion. Whithersoever we turn our eyes, whether to the most enlightened nations of antiquity — the Egyptians, Persians, Hindus, Greeks, and Romans, or to the rudest and most savage tribes of Africa and America — everywhere the presentiment of a future life is cherished in the breast of all. Whether this sentiment spring from an instinctive consciousness of human dignity, or from some unaccountable longing for immortality,

this is certain, that the idea of a future state, corrupted and misrepresented though it may have been by popular superstition or false philosophy, has ever afforded consolation to the dying and friends of the dying, even where the mind was in the lowest stage of culture. Nay, more—and this is rather remarkable—the belief in the future existence of the soul is, among many nations, expressed with even more confidence than that in the existence of a God.¹

Shall we now exclude the ancient Hebrews from the knowledge of this *universal* belief? Shall the children of Israel, whom the Almighty delivered from the despotic sway of the Pharaohs, that they might be unto Him “a kingdom of priests and a holy nation,”—shall this *favoured* people of God form an exception to the rule? To deny that *they* had any idea of immortality, would be placing them lower in the scale of civilization than the most uncivilized nations of whom we have any record; nay, it would be making them incapable, almost, of either thought or feeling. But the children of Israel were not so rude and uncivilized after all. Though they have been commonly represented as a rude, low, ignorant, gross-minded people, as a host of demoralized slaves; yet, is this so far from the truth, as it would be if the future historian of our republic were to say the same of the people of these United States, because forsooth there are a great many enslaved, ignorant, demoralized negroes in the *south*, and not a few brutal fellows in the *north*, as well as in the south. For, a people of that description could never have been brought under such perfect control as was established by Moses; nor could they ever have been induced to accept a religion and code of laws so rational and wise as the Mosaic. There were, to be sure, among them a great many who had been for a long time, even from birth, subjected to the degrading fetters of Egyptian bondage. From such, no doubt, sometimes arose the cry for the “flesh-pots and onions of Egypt.”² But the great mass of the people was far from

¹ Schubert, *Geschichte d. Seele*, p. 372.

² These complaints are expressly attributed to the “mixed multitude” (Num. 11:4), or *rabble* that accompanied the Israelites in the exodus (Ex. 12:38). The former, no doubt, often incited the latter to rebel.

being literally a horde of slaves. Though subject to the tyrannic rule of the Pharaohs, they were personally free, forming a distinct body in the province of Goshen. Here they were engaged in pastoral and agricultural pursuits, the first and fundamental elements of civilization. Besides their division into twelve tribes, which were again subdivided into families and households, each division and subdivision having their respective heads or chiefs; the existence, among them, of a *council of "elders,"* with whom *conjointly* Moses was commanded to appear before Pharaoh,¹ in order to request him to make Israel free and independent; the regular order in which they marched and encamped during their journey in the wilderness; the numerous artists who took part in preparing the various works connected with the sacred tabernacle: all these indicate a high degree of political and social progress, such as could exist only among a people considerably advanced in civilization. Add to this the consideration that there was *not* among the Hebrews, as there was among other nations of antiquity, a caste of priests, who alone possessed the fountains of knowledge, and excluded the people from the light of true enlightenment; but that in *Israel* the sacerdotal order of priests and Levites was instituted to instruct the people in all the wisdom and teachings revealed by lawgiver and prophet, so that the knowledge of a few soon became the property of all;² and who will still maintain that the ancient Hebrews had no idea of a future state; that they were, in this respect, below not only their heathen contemporaries, but also the most ignorant tribes of the present day?

II. The improbability — nay, we are justified in saying *impossibility*, of the ancient Hebrews having been ignorant of the doctrine of immortality, is strongly corroborated by the circumstance that they dwelt several centuries in Egypt. The Egyptians, of whom the "the father of history"

¹ Exod. 3:16—18, comp. 4:29. See also, the article on the "Representative System of Moses" in this Periodical, Oct. 1858.

² Compare Umbreit in his Introduction to the *Proverbs of Solomon*, and Saalschütz, on the *Mosaic Law*, Chap. VIII, and X.

says they were the first who taught the doctrine of a future state, have left unmistakable records and monuments of the existence of this idea among them. A wall-painting in the temple of Isis, at Thebes, represents in symbols the last solemn judgment, according to their ideas. A brief description of this may serve to illustrate how skilfully the ancients expressed their ideas in emblematical delineations. "The dead is conducted, by the goddess Isis, to the supreme judge Osiris. A balance appears, in the tablature, which is accurately adjusted by two hieroglyphical personages, who are no doubt intended to symbolize the scrupulous exactness with which Osiris awards his sentence upon the arraigned mortals. On this scale of equal justice are weighed the good and evil qualities or actions of the deceased, and the result carefully noted down by Hermes or Thoth (the Egyptian Mercury), in the presence of Osiris. A priest and priestess intercede with Isis, in behalf of the anxious souls — a beautiful trait of pagan humanity! A lotus-flower, containing four mummy-like figures, composes a part of the scene, and is intended as the symbol of immortality.¹ No one has ever disputed the fact that the ancient Egyptians believed in a future state; and, as appears from the work of Röth,² they had this belief even before Jacob and his sons took up their residence in Egypt. Now, even though it be assumed that the Israelites had not, originally, the idea of a life hereafter, they certainly must have become acquainted with it in Egypt; where, as is often asserted, they learned so many other things.

And here it may not be out of place to consider a question which, though it cannot weaken the general argument, has yet an important bearing on our subject. It has been objected, that, if the Hebrews learned the doctrine in question from the Egyptians, they must also have learned that other doctrine so prevalent in Egypt, and subsequently so strongly inculcated by Pythagoras: the transmigration of souls;³ and if the

¹ "Descriptions and Antiquities of Egypt," quoted by Goss's *Heathen Religion*, p. 126.

² Röth *die ägypt. u. zoroastische Glaubenslehre. passim.*

³ Milman, in his *Notes on Gibbon* (chap. 15, note 57), states this as a reason for the silence of Moses on the doctrine of a future state.

Israelites had adopted this monstrous error, it would have been incumbent on the Hebrew legislator to eradicate a notion so contrary to the spirit of true religion. If then, it is argued, Moses did not, in any passage, guard against the erroneous conception of metempsychosis, it is very likely that the Hebrews did not derive from the Egyptians the idea of a future state at all. But to this it may be simply replied, that it is by no means certain that the belief in the transmigration of souls had, as yet, existed *anywhere* in the time of Moses; nay, there are many circumstances which go to show that *originally* the human mind was satisfied with the bare idea of a life hereafter, and that the doctrine of metempsychosis was foisted upon the people by the subsequent mystic speculations of a caste of priests. The prevalent belief, among the ancients, in the re-appearance of the spirits of the departed — which belief extends back to the remotest periods of antiquity —¹ and the practice of *necromancy*, while showing that the ancients in general believed in a personal, future existence of the soul, are wholly incompatible with the doctrine of metempsychosis. Besides, among the Egyptians, it is well known, the existence of the soul was intimately connected with the preservation of the mummy; and in India, from which country the priests introduced the doctrine of metempsychosis into Egypt, it was customary for the widow to burn herself with the body of her deceased husband, and bury their treasures with the dead, as they hoped to enjoy, in the next world, what they were delighted with in the present.² Now, all these notions and customs must needs preclude the idea of a transmigration of the soul into a body that is to exist here on earth, independent of all its former relations; while the continuance of these customs, in spite of the doctrines introduced by a class of mystic speculators, shows that originally the simple idea of a future life, on which the soul entered after the dissolution of the body,

¹ Xenophon *Cyrop.* VIII., c. 7. *Meiners Kritische Gesch. d. Religionen*, II., p. 786 seq.

² *Meiners*, l. c. II., p. 797.

was alone prevalent.¹ The priests of Egypt, no doubt, like the priestly caste in India, endeavored to supplant the popular idea of a dependence of the soul on the incorruptible mummy, by introducing the principle of a *transmigration* of the soul; but the former was too deeply rooted in the mind of the people to be eradicated by the subsequent teachings of a false philosophy.²

III. But though the Israelites must have learned the doctrine of a future state from the Egyptians, if they did not themselves already possess it; yet, it is hardly probable that the Hebrews in Egypt had *not* the idea independent of any foreign source. It is admitted, even by Warburton³ and Whately,⁴ who deny that the Hebrew *people* had any knowledge of immortality, that the *patriarchs* and *prophets* of Israel must have known it by direct revelation from Heaven. We may therefore justly assume that, among others, the patriarch *Jacob* was convinced of the existence of a future state. Now, supposing that the idea was then unknown, is it at all likely that Jacob would have withheld a doctrine so important from the knowledge of his twelve sons? And if *these* once had a knowledge of it, would they not, most naturally, communicate it to *their* offspring? This belief being thus early transmitted from father to son, could not, of course, have become *lost* among a people once possessed of the belief, and living amidst a people entertaining the same belief; for, as history has shown, the idea of a future state is so natural to the human mind, that it is the very last from which a nation, though sunk to the very lowest depth of barbarism, would consent to be divorced.

¹ In the same way it might be proved that *Pantheism* among the Hindus arose much later than the idea of Immortality.

² This will account for the contradiction of the two ideas — the continuance of the soul in the *incorruptible* mummy, and the transmigration of the soul after the *destruction* of the body. Hence, too, the custom of embalming the dead. That the Israelites themselves did not practise the art of embalming is evident from the fact, that of all the persons whose deaths are recorded in scripture, none were embalmed except Jacob and Joseph; and these were embalmed (in Egypt, of course), only because they were to be transported to Palestine. — See Winer, art. *Einbalsamiren*.

³ *Divine Legation of Moses*, Vol. V., p. 191. (Ed. London, 1811.)

⁴ *Future State*, Sect. I.

IV. But if there be, yet, any doubt as to the probable belief of the ancient Hebrews in the future existence of the soul, it will be entirely dispelled on considering a very popular notion which prevailed among them. It was commonly believed that the dead could, by some magic art, be conjured up and made to foretell the future. So deep-rooted was this superstitious belief among the people, that Moses, in order to eradicate it, found it necessary to affix the penalty of death to the act of necromancy.¹ Still, in spite of this, the severest penalty, the magic craft must have flourished long afterwards ; as king Saul found it necessary to put a stop to this idolatrous custom by actually causing all wizards and necromancers to be put to death (1 Sam. xxviii). And yet even Saul, when the Lord refused to answer him by prophet or by Urim and Thummim, is so strangely credulous that he resorts to the only remaining sorceress of the land, who still practised her art in secret, that she may raise for him the prophet Samuel. He even believes that he hears² the voice of Samuel, declaring his fatal doom: "To-morrow thou shalt be with me !" Whatever view we may take of this singular phenomenon — whether it be, as some suppose, that God, for some wise purpose, suffered the truth to be foretold by the execrable art of necromancy, or that the witch of Endor, with the skill of a ventriloquist, causing the voice to proceed from the spot where Saul supposed Samuel to stand, made a happy guess³ — this instance is sufficient to illustrate how deeply rooted this strange infatuation was among the people. Now, if it was generally believed that the departed

¹ Lev. xx., 27.

² Saul only *hears* Samuel, but does not see him. He only knows that it is Samuel from the *description* given of him by the witch of Endor. This representation in the text, seems to favor the view of the ancient Jewish Commentators, that the sorceress practised *ventriloquism* while pretending not to hear the voice herself.

³ That she should have *guessed* merely, and yet predicted a doom so fatal (when, for aught *she* knew, Saul might have remained alive), may be accounted for by the supposition that she *purposely* did so, in revenge for his having put to death those who practised necromancy ; thinking, that one who seriously consulted her and put so much faith in her art, would lose all courage on the battlefield, and die.

could rise from their graves and foretell the events of the future, does not this belief necessarily proceed on the anterior belief that the spirits of the departed *continue* to exist *personally conscious* of the future as well as the past? How else could we account for the practice of necromancy and the general desire to consult with the spirits of the dead?

Strange as it may seem, Warburton himself admits this conclusion; and that, too, in the very work in which he declares that the Jews had not even the idea of a future state, from the time of Moses down to the Babylonian captivity. In refuting the view of lord Bolingbroke, who thought that possibly Moses himself knew nothing about immortality, he says: "the prohibition of necromancy, or the invocation of the dead, *necessarily implies*, in the lawgiver who forbids it, as well as in the offender who uses it, *the knowledge of a future state.*"¹ The learned bishop does not, indeed, say that the *people* who superstitiously put faith in the deceitful art of the necromancer, must have had this knowledge; that would have been too glaring a contradiction of his other statements respecting *their* ignorance of a future state. But are not the *people* equally well implied in the above? Were not the "offenders" members of the people? And if the *practice* of the necromancy necessarily proceeded on the idea of a future existence of the soul, must not the people, who consulted the necromancer, desiring him to conjure up some deceased friend that they might converse with him, have been persuaded of the very same idea? The distinguished divine, in allowing the lawgiver and the offender to have had a knowledge of a future state, was not aware that his argument proved (for him, at least) too much, himself testifying, though *undesignedly*, to the *people's* having the same knowledge.

V. The idea of immortality is so intimately connected with the conception a man has of the nature of the *soul*, that by ascertaining the conceptions which a people form of the latter, we may readily infer their ideas respecting its future

¹ Divine Legation, Vol. V., Appendix, p. 205.

existence. The materialist, who supposes the soul to be nothing more than the product of the bodily mechanism put in motion — that it is the mere circulation of the blood — does not, nay *cannot*, believe in immortality. On the other hand, he who believes that the soul is something wholly distinct from, and antagonistic to, the body, and that the former only *departs* at the dissolution of the latter ; such a man, we might well presume, believes in the future existence of the soul apart and separate from its previous habitation of clay. Now, the ancient Hebrews, as is admitted even by the distinguished critic De Wette,¹ had as lofty and sublime a conception of the human soul, as is to be found among the most enlightened nations of our day. In the very first chapter of Genesis, they were taught that man was made in the *image of God*. They were, further, taught that man was made of the dust of the earth, and became a living soul, after the “breath of life” was breathed into his nostrils by the Creator (Gen. 2 : 7). Here, then, was a *dualism*. The Israelite, on reading such a passage, must have at once inferred that man was composed of two things totally distinct from each other, as the one was anterior (as well as *inferior*) to the other. What, now, did the ancient Israelite understand when he was told that man was made in the image of God ? Was it the lifeless body, that was made “after the likeness” of God ? Of course not. Was it the *living* body — the *body* vitalized by the “breath of life” — which reflected the image of the Lord ? This, too, could not have been the case. For the Lord, he is repeatedly admonished, has no form or shape whatever ; hence no material *body*, however gross or ethereal, can be said to be made “after the likeness” of God. God, then, being an *invisible, spiritual* Being, must have been reflected in that invisible, spiritual part of man — the *soul*. This was the image of God ; through this, man was made after *his* likeness. On hearing, therefore, such a passage as, “dust thou art, and to dust thou shalt return,” the Hebrews could not but refer this to the *body*, and not to the spiritual element in man, the image

¹ Biblische Dogmatik, p. 90.

of God. This, which was *not* made of the dust of the ground, must needs have another destiny. The dissolution of the body must have suggested to the early Hebrews the thought, afterward so clearly expressed by the author of Ecclesiastes (12:7), that while "the dust [the body] returns to the earth as it was, the *spirit* returns unto God, who gave it."

But, it is objected,¹ how could the ancient Hebrews have had any idea of immortality, when they knew not the essential distinction between matter and spirit; the idea of a substance devoid of form or matter, being entirely foreign to them and nowhere revealed in the Bible? Whatever has form is material, and consists of parts; and must therefore, like all matter, be dissolvable and perishable. How, then, could the man, who ascribed a certain form (no matter how vague) to the soul, believe in its endless existence? It is rather strange that a mind so acute and well-read as that of Bretschneider, should consider the absence of the idea of *immateriality* as positive proof for the non-existence of the idea of *immortality*. Admitting that to the philosopher the metaphysical idea of an *immaterial* substance is necessary to prove its immortality — even though Locke is of the opinion that it is *not* necessary² — we would simply reply to this objection that, in view of the arguments already presented, it can only convict the ancient Hebrew of an inconsistency, of which he was no doubt unconscious; but which did not, in the least, shake *his* confidence in a future state. The *fact* of his entertaining a certain idea, cannot be denied by proving his belief of a certain other idea, however erroneous and (to the strictly logical metaphysician) contradictory of the former. But if this objection is nevertheless designed to prove that the *Hebrews*, because they had no idea of immateriality, could not have had a knowledge of immortality, it would also prove that *all* mankind, the early *Christians* included, had not the idea of an immortal life. Thus the heathen philosophers, who expressly inculcated that the soul is immortal, ascribed

¹ Bretschneider Dogmatik, II., p. 363.

² Essay on the Human Understanding, pp. 349 and 362, seq.

to it the human form, and regarded it as a subtle ether; which, of course, is only a refined form of matter.¹ All the Platonists were of the opinion that the soul is endowed with a celestial body on its descent into the concrete body of flesh and blood; and that, on its departure from this earth, it retains the same celestial body.² Most of the Fathers, in the first ages of Christianity, though firmly convinced of the immortality of the soul, maintained that the privilege of living and acting *without* a body, belongs to God alone.³ Some of the Christian Fathers do, indeed, designate the soul by the term *spirit*. But this spirit they took to be a refined kind of body, such as aerial or ethereal.⁴ The Jewish sect of the Essenes also, according to Josephus, believed "that the bodies are perishable; but that the souls are immortal and everlasting, and come from *the most subtle ether* into connection with the body."⁵ If, now, we are to judge from our own conviction of the perishableness of whatever is not wholly immaterial, then we must deny to all these the belief in immortality; because from *our* point of view, the latter is incompatible with the belief that the soul is a body, however ethereal or celestial. Still, most of the ancients, to whom the metaphysical idea of a substance having neither form nor body was unknown, though convinced of the perishable nature of all gross matter, nevertheless regarded *some* things, particularly bodies of an ethereal nature, as indivisible, incorruptible, and even of the same nature as God himself. Now, in regard to the Israelites, even though they could not conceive of anything without investing it with some peculiar

¹ See Mosheim's Note to Cudworth's Intellectual System, Vol. III., p. 293. London edition.

² Cudworth, *ibid.* III., pp. 260 and 299.

³ *Ibid.* p. 319.

⁴ Mosheim on Cudworth (*ib.* p. 325). This is more fully illustrated in the case of Irenaeus (*ibid.* p. 327 seq.) The Christian Fathers, too, sometimes apply the term *incorporeal* to the soul. But this word is used by most of them, not in the metaphysical sense of our day, but only *comparatively*, as opposed to the *gross body*. *Ibid.* p. 353. Origen, in support of his theory that God alone can act without a body, cites the case of Samuel and Lazarus, whom scripture represents *with* bodies in the future state. *Ibid.* p. 319.

⁵ Bell. Jud. II., c. 8, § 2.

form — and indeed it is impossible for *any* man to form a *conception* of a thing without attaching to it some more or less defined form — they must, nevertheless, have known that the soul, whatever its real essence, is something *distinct* from the body surrendered to the grave. 'They knew, as well as we do, that this body is but a temporal habitation of clay, while the soul is the *breath of God*, "breathed into" man, to make him *like* unto God; that the former alone returns to the dust as it was, while that which is *not* body — the *spirit* — is imperishable, returning unto him who made man "in his image."¹

To suppose, therefore, that the ancient Hebrews, who believed that God is an invisible, eternal Being; who were taught that man was made in the image of God, the "Father of all spirits;" to suppose that a people possessed of such noble conceptions respecting God and man, had not the idea of immortality, is to place them, not only beneath the rank of all their heathen contemporaries, but also far below some of the most savage and ignorant tribes of the present day; nay, it is to make them discard an idea which they must have either received from their ancestors, or met with in the land of the Egyptians; nay more, such a supposition would make the people consult the wizard and the sorceress to raise for them those who had departed to another, a future state, though they had no idea of a future state at all! No, it would be impossible to account for so strange a phenomenon. For, while each one of the arguments above presented, taken by itself, renders it highly improbable that the ancient Hebrews had *not* the idea of immortality, the several arguments combined must needs produce the strongest conviction that the favored people of the Lord actually *had* that idea.²

¹ The ancient Rabbins, contrasting the microcosm of man with the macrocosm of God, have expressly enumerated the principal qualities in which the soul is *similar* to God. Their words, which may be of interest, are as follows: "As God fills the whole universe, so the soul fills the whole body; as God sees, but is himself invisible, so the soul; as God nourishes and supports the entire Universe, so the soul nourishes and supports the entire body; as God is pure, so is the soul." Talmud Berachoth, 10, a.

² The general belief in the existence of *angels* must have greatly contributed

II.

We are now prepared to answer the question, whether the Hebrew *scriptures* contain any allusions to the doctrine of a Future State; and whether these allusions are so clear as to be intelligible to the ancient Hebrews. If this is the case, then the latter not only *believed* in, but (contrary to the opinion of Whately¹) actually had a *knowledge* of a life hereafter. For if, as the learned Archbishop says, the testimony of Revelation is sufficient, in lieu of "rational" grounds, to produce a *conviction* of the truth in the mind of the *believer*, then the ancient Hebrews, as will soon appear, must have been firmly *convinced* of the doctrine in question. Now, in order to produce this conviction, the Bible need not, as many assume, *teach* and repeatedly inculcate the doctrine of Immortality,—for why do this when the doctrine is already too well known,—but simply *allude* to it. For even "slight incidental hints," says Whately himself,² "and oblique allusions have often more weight than distinct formal assertions."

Now, these allusions, in the very first and oldest book of the Bible, are so numerous and clear, that, in view of the arguments already presented, they furnish an additional *proof* that the ancient Hebrews had a knowledge of the doctrine. Take, for example, the oft-quoted instance of the translation of Enoch. A good man, walking in the fear of the Lord, disappears, "for," says the sacred historian, "God took him." Now, on reading such a passage, the mind naturally inquires: Why did God take so good a man away from the earth? Was it not in order to reward him? And if God did not reward him here on earth, he must have re-

to strengthen their belief in this idea. The conception of an angelic being, devoid of a body of flesh and blood, capable of appearing and vanishing in rapid succession, of flying to the uttermost parts of heaven and earth—the universe of the ancients—must have enabled unprejudiced minds to form at least some vague conception of their own future spiritual existence.

¹ Future State, Sec. I.; comp. his *Essays* (first series).

² Rhetoric, Part I., Chap. 2. § 4.

warded him in a sphere beyond this earth. But what *was* this reward? Surely not annihilation? The human mind has a natural horror of such a thought, and would rather consider it as a punishment than a reward. Besides, the most wicked man would, in that case, be able to "reward" himself at any suitable moment. No, if the good man Enoch was taken away by God, he must have been transferred to a higher, a *celestial* abode, there to reap the reward for his upright conduct on earth. This thought, no doubt, consoled the people for his early departure from his terrestrial home. So, too, Paul¹ understood the passage under consideration; and the ancient Chaldee version of Jonathan paraphrases it as follows: "For Enoch died and was transferred to heaven."

Bishop Warburton, in reference to this passage, admits that "Moses knew and believed the immortality of Enoch," but purposely obscured the fact from whence it might have been drawn.² Let the candid, unprejudiced inquirer say, if there is any obscurity in the narration. Is not the story of Enoch's translation told in as clear a manner as any other fact in the Bible? And can it be that the ancient Hebrews who, as we have already seen, were not altogether so ignorant and gross-minded as has been generally assumed, and, what is more to the point, actually had the idea of a future state, did not understand an allusion so clear? The pious Israelite who, under the Mosaic dispensation, saw himself rewarded with manifold blessings in *this* life, looked upon death as the *continuation* of a happy, though higher and spiritual, life. Says Herder: "The expressions 'God took him to himself,' 'God took him to his own dwelling-place,' became afterwards the expressive phrase to denote the fate in the other world of those who were the favored of God; and without doubt the notion was derived from this most ancient friend of God. . . . This translation of Enoch, instructive as it was, came at once to be also a matter of

¹ Hebrews 11 : 5.

² Divine Legation, Book V., Sec. 5.

peculiar interest, and full of hope, as prefiguring the like removal to himself of other friends of God."¹

From this conception of the blessed state of the friends of God in another world, early arose those beautiful expressions used to express the departure of the righteous from this world. נִאָסַף אֶל-עַמּוּ, "He was gathered unto his people," is the expressive phrase describing the death of the three great Patriarchs, and Moses and Aaron.² Some have supposed that this favorite expression means nothing more than the depositing of the dead body in the family tomb; but the connection in which it stands does not admit of such a supposition. Thus, Abraham "was gathered to his *people*," though buried beside the *solitary* tomb of his wife, Sarah (Gen. 25 : 8, 9). Moses and Aaron certainly were not buried in a "*family tomb*." Besides, the act of burial is generally described by a special phrase, and rendered wholly distinct from the being gathered to one's people. Thus we are told that Jacob "yielded up the ghost, and was gathered unto his people;" but it was not until "three score days and ten" of mourning had passed, that he was carried into the land of Canaan to be *buried* in the cave of Machpelah. Jacob himself rendered the distinction between the two ideas (the burial and the gathering) prominent, when shortly before his death he charged his sons, saying: "I am about to be *gathered* unto my *people*; *bury* me with my *fathers* (Abraham and Isaac) in the cave that is in the field of Ephron the Hittite" (Gen. 49 : 29, 31). Compare, also, Gen. 25 : 8, 9, and 35 : 29, where Abraham and Isaac are respectively said to be buried *after* they are gathered unto their people.³ It

¹ Spirit of Hebrew Poetry, Vol. I., pp. 177-8 (Eng. Trans.). Herder goes on to state (*Ibid.*) that this expression was so understood by the kindred nations of the east. "The Arabians have a multitude of fables representing the wise, the innocent, the lonely, the zealous, the prophetic, the persecuted and despised Idris (so they call Enoch), whom God received into heaven, and who dwells in Paradise."

² Gen. 25 : 8, 9; 35 : 29; 49 : 29-33. Num. 20 : 24. Deut. 32 : 50.

³ In his comment on the passage: "Thou shalt go to thy *fathers* in peace" (which God said to Abraham, Gen 15 : 15), Rashi, the most popular Jewish commentator, naively remarks that from these words we may learn that Terah (the father of Abraham), must have forsaken his idols and repented, so that there could be a union of spirits between him and Abraham in the other world.

is needless to dwell any longer on the meaning of this national, standing expression. Christian as well as Jewish commentators are united in their opinion, that this expression has reference to a gathering *beyond* the grave. Even Warburton¹ is "ready to allow that this phrase *originally* arose (whatever people employed it) from the notion of some common receptacle of souls;" adding, however, that it subsequently *lost* its meaning among the Hebrews; but the sense which was originally attached to this phrase could only have been lost among a people that had no *idea* of immortality. The Israelites, however, as has been shown, *did* have this idea; and, hence, must have continued to use those words in the same sense in which they were *originally* employed.

In the forty-seventh chapter of Genesis, also, there is an intimation of that conception, so common among the Oriental nations, which represents this life as a state of preparation for another. Jacob, being asked by Pharaoh his age, answers in a manner which at once reveals the long train of suffering through which he had passed, and for which he hoped to enter into a state of uninterrupted joy and endless bliss. "The years of my *pilgrimage*," says the aged patriarch, "are an hundred and thirty. Few and full of sorrow have been the days of my life; and they have not attained to the years of the life of my fathers in the days of *their pilgrimage*" (47: 9). Jacob here compares life to the state of a pilgrim, looking for a farther and better country. His reply to Pharaoh's question is the more pertinently expressed when we consider that he addressed it to a king of the *Egyptians*; who, as Diodorus (I. c. 51) tells us, regarded the present habitations of men as "inns" (*καταλύσεις*), in which they get ready for a state of immortality. Heraclitus, also, regarded the soul as having taken lodgings in the body like a stranger or guest.² The idea that man is a stranger on earth, looking for another home, runs through the later portions of scripture,³ and must have been very popular among

¹ *Ibid.* Bk. VI. Sec. 3.

² Schubert, *Gesch. d. Seele*, p. 369.

³ Comp. Psalms 39: 14; 119: 54. 1 Chron. 29: 15.

the Jews when the Rabbinical sages of the *Mishna*¹ made a practical application of the same in saying: "This world is like a vestibule to the future world; make thyself ready, therefore, in the vestibule, that thou mayest enter the *palace*." In the same sense the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews must have understood the passage under consideration, when speaking of the patriarchs, he says, that those who declare "that they were strangers and pilgrims on the earth," "*plainly* declare" that they are in quest of a "*better country*" (Heb. 11 : 13-16). It is rather strange that an orthodox divine of the Anglican church, as Bishop Warburton was, should, in the very teeth of this, maintain that the words of Jacob "express no such thing."²

These few passages from the *Pentateuch* are sufficient to show that the doctrine of immortality is contained in the *Bible* — the former being the oldest constituent part of the latter. They, at the same time, strongly corroborate the argument for the existence of the doctrine among the ancient Hebrews. The *Pentateuch* being read and expounded to the Hebrews ever since the time of its composition (Deut. 31 : 9-13), even unto this day, such allusions to a future state must have remained ever fresh in their minds, and greatly assured them of their belief. It would, therefore, not be necessary to examine the several passages, alluding in terms more or less clear to a future life, in the *other* books of the Hebrew scriptures. But as those who maintain that the Hebrews had no idea of immortality, assert that the Hebrew Bible not only does not allude to, but that some books, as the Psalms, Job, and Ecclesiastes, even *deny* or *doubt* the doctrine, it may be proper in this place inquire into the justness of this assertion respecting these very books. Before proceeding, however, to examine the several passages in question, we may be permitted, in passing, to remark, that if it be true that David, or Job, or the author of Ecclesiastes, denies or doubts the doctrine of immortality, this very denial or doubt is proof that the Hebrews, or

¹ Pirke Aboth ("Ethics of the Fathers") IV., 16.

² Divine Legation, Bk. VI. Sec. 3.

at least the great majority of them, *believed* in the doctrine. For who would ever think of denying a doctrine of which everybody is ignorant? What occasion is there for doubting the truth of belief, unless that belief is a very *popular* one? Those, therefore, who would, from the denial of a few, prove the disbelief or ignorance of the many, are so far from proving this, that their assertion, if true even, proves the contrary. Were there no *positive* evidence of the fact, that the *people* actually believed in a future state, the negation of the same by a *few* would be evidence enough, though negative in its nature.

But there is no book of the Old Testament that denies or even ignores the doctrine of a future state; and least of all is this true, as has been asserted of the Psalms, the books of Job and Ecclesiastes. In regard to the Psalms, a mere superficial reading of the 16th, 17th, 49th, and 73d will at once show that the inspired singers of them were fully convinced of a life hereafter. In his commentary to the 17th Psalm, De Wette says, that David, notwithstanding the heading, could not have been the author of it. And why? Because it *clearly expresses the hope of immortality*. Thus, a German critic is obliged to admit that the Psalm *does* allude to a future life, though, according to his theory, he must deprive David of the honor of having composed it. As if the inspired singer of Israel, who, when his little child was no more, consoled himself with the happy thought: "I will go to him, but he will not return to me" (2 Samuel 12 : 23), were incapable of entertaining so blissful a hope, though living in the midst of a people where this hope generally prevailed! The 49th Psalm even *proves* the doctrine of a future state by the most satisfactory of all arguments — the argument based on an Infinite, All-just Governor of the universe. It solves the great enigma of life — the prosperity of the wicked and the afflictions of the righteous in this world. This perplexing problem can only be solved by assuming a retribution *hereafter*; and such a solution is presented in this Psalm, as will appear from the following brief analysis of the same. The Psalmist opens with a solemn

call to all the inhabitants of the earth to listen to a lesson of divine wisdom. He observes that the wicked are mighty and rich (v. 7) even unto death, when they bequeath their power and wealth to their posterity (v. 10). Nay, they even die with the expectation that their name and works will continue to live. The Psalmist admits, indeed, that they cannot take their treasures along with themselves; but, then, the righteous too must die, and are unable to take with them the remnants of earthly prosperity, particularly as their terrestrial career was not attended with splendor at all (vs. 6-10). The just and the unjust, therefore, are, *in so far*, on an equal footing. When, then, shall the unjust be punished for their wickedness? After death, of course. They sink into the under-world (*Sheöl*) like stupid beasts (v. 14), possessing none of that wisdom which adorns the righteous in the future world (vs. 19, 20). The want of wisdom and light being here regarded as a punishment, it must be that the *fulfillment* thereof is a reward; and it must be in this that "the righteous will have dominion" over the wicked, as was already said in verse 14. Though the good man be persecuted all his days, and the wicked prosper even unto death, nevertheless, the Psalmist assures us, the former will triumph over the latter. Now, this triumph cannot take place as long as the wicked man *lives*; for he lives prosperous *to the end*. How, then, shall the righteous man triumph over him? Shall it be, as some suppose, by his *surviving* the wicked? Shall he, after seeing the latter prosper to the end of their days, console himself with a few years' prosperity for a life of misfortune? A poor consolation, indeed! Besides, what if the good man dies before the wicked, and that, too, as may often happen, at the hands of the latter? This triumph and dominion of the good, then, must needs begin in another world, just as the dismay and the misery of the wicked are represented by the Psalmist as commencing *after* death. While the latter, in the hour of dissolution, goes down like a senseless brute, bereft of all earthly riches and glory (v. 17), the former will be redeemed from the power of *Sheöl* (here the under-world of darkness and

shame); for the Lord will receive them into his own glorious presence. The thought which consoled the people at the early departure of Enoch of old, is also the consolation of the righteous in this Psalm.¹

But, it is said, there are several passages in the Psalms, which, if they do not point-blank deny, wholly ignore, the doctrine of immortality. Thus, Warburton² cites the following passages as plainly indicating that the Jewish people had no expectation of a future state: "In death there is no remembrance of thee; in the grave who shall give thee thanks" (Ps. 6 : 6)? "What profit is there in my blood when I go down into the pit? shall the dust praise thee? shall it declare thy truth" (Ps. 30 : 10)? "Wilt thou show wonders to the dead? shall the dead arise and praise thee? shall thy loving kindness be declared in the grave, or thy faithfulness in destruction? shall thy wonders be known in the dark, and thy righteousness in the land of forgetfulness" (Ps. 88 : 11-13)? Lastly, in the 115th Psalm (v. 17), "The dead praise not the Lord, neither they that go down into silence."

Now, who does not at once see that in all these the Psalmist contrasts death and the grave with life on earth? To conclude from such passages that the Hebrews had no idea of a future state, is as rash and unfair as it would be to infer from the many pious effusions of our day respecting the brevity of life, the silence of the tomb, the dark, lonesome habitations of the dead, that *we* are destitute of the knowledge of immortality. The Psalms containing these passages have been early incorporated with the Jewish liturgy, and some of these very passages are contained in the "order of burial" according to the Episcopalians. Shall we, therefore, be justified in saying that these, as well as

¹ In the analysis of this Psalm we have principally followed the thorough, critical exposition given by Dr. Saalschütz in his elaborate Article on *Immortality* (see Illgen's *Zeitschrift f. hist. Theologie*, 1837). In this able Article will be found a full exegesis of all the passages alluding to a future state both in the scriptures and apocryphal writings of the Hebrews. For many of the ideas contained in the present Article, we are also indebted to Saalschütz.

² *Ibid.* Bk. V. § 5.

the Jews, who have from times immemorial chanted those Psalms in their synagogues, have never had, nor have now, the knowledge of a future life?

It should be remembered that in all these passages the poet confines his thoughts to the corpse resting in the tomb. It is the *body of clay* which cannot declare the loving kindness and faithfulness of God. It is the *dust* that cannot praise the Lord. Are such utterances at all incompatible with the strongest convictions of immortality? Besides, where is it that the dead are said to be unable to do what the living perform on earth? It is in the dark, silent, solitary tomb. It is the *grave* where all things are forgotten. Warburton himself tells us in another part of his work,¹ that it is "the *grave*" which "is represented as the land of darkness, silence, and forgetfulness."

This, too, will account for those remarkable words of Hezekiah, when, in his song of thanksgiving for his wonderful recovery from sickness, forgetful of everything else in his exceeding joy at being still able to rule on earth, he exclaims: "The grave cannot praise thee, death cannot celebrate thee; they that go down into the pit do not hope for thy truth. *The living, the living*, he shall praise thee, as I do this day."² He who supposes that a man, in the vigor of life, recovering from a disease that had almost proved fatal, would be inspired with *different* sentiments, has mistaken human nature. When a man is ardently longing to make himself useful to the world around him, and while engaged in the prosecution of a noble undertaking, is stretched on the bed of sickness, would he not, like Hezekiah, pray for a continuance of his career on earth? "I will not die, but live," says the Psalmist, "that I may proclaim the works of the Lord." Man was born to make himself useful to his fellow creatures; and, in order to do so, it is his *duty* even to pray for *life*, until the heavenly Father deems it fit to remove him from his terrestrial sphere of usefulness.

In the Book of Job the passages which have been com-

¹ *Ibid.* Vol. V., p. 181. London edition 1811.

² Isaiah 38: 18, 19.

monly supposed to deny the doctrine of immortality, are more striking at first sight. But, before examining these, we cannot refrain from remarking, that it would be strange indeed, if a man who so repeatedly asserts his innocence, and maintains, in opposition to his friends, that prosperity does not by any means always accompany the virtuous in this life, but that the vicious are often more prosperous than the former; who, in spite of the heavy afflictions which leave him no hope of returning prosperity in this world, resigns himself to God and prays him to put an end to his sufferings here on earth, — it would be strange, indeed, if such a man, under such circumstances, did not console himself with the thought of a *future* justification.¹ What does Job refer to when he wishes that his sentiments “were graven with an iron stile, and lead in the rock forever” —

“I know that my Redeemer lives,
and in after-time will stand upon the dust;
and *after* this my skin is destroyed
and *without* my flesh shall I see God;
Whom I, for myself, shall see
and *my* eyes behold, and not another,
when my reins are consumed within me.”²

Can the hope of a future life be expressed in language more explicit? Does not Job here rejoice in the expectation of that *spiritual* contemplation of the divine glory, — a boon which even Moses desired, but could not obtain in this life, because no man can see God and live,³ which is reserved for the righteous in their future *celestial* abode?

The ablest interpreters of the book in question agree in the opinion that Job here expresses his hope of a future life; and yet it has been objected that he could not have had a knowledge of that life, because he himself, in several

¹ The question respecting the time when, and the author by whom, the book was written, is of little moment in the present consideration; still less the question as to whether Job was a real or fictitious person.

² 19: 25—27. We have followed, in this and in the following passages from Job, the excellent version of Dr. Conant.

³ Exod. 33: 20.

places, declares that there is no return from the dead. The passages referred to are the following :

"My days are swifter than a weaver's shuttle,
and consume away without hope.
Remember that my life is a breath ;
my eye shall not again see God.
The eye of him that seeth me shall behold me no more ;
thine eyes will seek me, but I shall be no more. — 7 : 6-8.

Again :

"Man, of woman born,
is of few days and full of trouble.
Like a flower he goes forth and is cut off ;
he fleeth as the shadow, and abideth not.

* * * *

For there is hope for the tree,
if it be cut down, that it will flourish again,
and that its sprout will not fail.
Though its root become old in the earth,
through the scent of water it will bud,
and put forth boughs like a sapling.
But man dies and wastes away ;
yea, man expires, and where is he ?
Waters fail from the pool,
and the stream decays and dries up :
so man lies down, and will not arise ;
till the heavens are no more, they will not awake
nor be roused from their sleep." — 14 : 1, *seq.*

Now, what is to be inferred from all this ? That Job denies the possibility of a future existence ? By no means. He merely gives up, in despair, all thought of enjoying once more the good things of *this earth*. He will no more be able to occupy the place of his former blessed condition. He must depart, and leave his place to be occupied by others. He himself tells us, in a similar strain, what he means by a return from the dead :

"The cloud consumes away and is gone ;
So he that goes down to the under-world, shall not come up.
He shall not return again to his house,
and his place shall know him no more." — 7 : 9, 10.

Job here plainly refers to a renewal of life *on earth*; and "What soul," says Herder,¹ "after death, has ever returned to enjoy the blessings of the earth?"

But why, it may be asked, if Job had a knowledge of a future state, did he not once for all silence his opponents (who insisted that no misfortune could overwhelm the righteous in this world) by showing them that his reward was reserved for a future existence? Would not this belief have been a constant solace in his present sufferings? But, in the language of Dr. Conant, in his Commentary to Job,² "a solace for present evils for some future good was not the thing which Job sought, or which his case required. It was a solution of the mystery of God's dealing with him, and with other righteous men in this world. Why should God treat, as he does his enemies, one who loves him, confides in him, and still seeks refuge and help in him (16:19)? This question (if the voice of suffering nature is not misrepresented) still rises in many a dark hour of inward conflict; and it calls for just the answer given to Job."³

Nor was the doctrine of a future state designed to refute the cavils of the three friends of Job. For, though the innocent man, such as Job is represented to be, feels confident that he will enjoy blessings hereafter, that will infinitely more than compensate for present afflictions, yet this hope does not *explain* the mysterious conduct of an ill-wise Governor. The design of the Book of Job, as is evident from the final interposition of the Omnipotent himself, is to vindicate the government of God on *higher* grounds.

In regard to the Book of Ecclesiastes, the charge of its denying the doctrine of immortality has sprung from a misunderstanding of the spirit and composition of the work. If we were to wrest single passages of this book from their context, and display them as the teachings of the royal preacher (if indeed Solomon be the author), we should shrink back with amazement. But take the book as a whole, and it throws the productions of the greatest minds into the shade.

¹ Spirit of Hebrew Poetry I., p. 172. Comp. Dr. Conant's Commentary *ad loc.*

² Chap. 19, end.

³ *Ibid.* Introduction to Job.

The inspired author puts himself into the position of a doubter, expatiating on the transitory condition of mankind; the vanity and vexation attending all human enjoyments, and the inequality of Providence in suffering the righteous to perish in their righteousness, and the wicked to glory in their wickedness. But he finds a remedy and consolation for all the vanities and vexations of spirit, for all the toils and perplexities which so partial a view of this world implies; and this remedy and consolation is a *just retribution hereafter*: "For," — such is the conclusion of the whole, — "for God shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret doing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil." (Eccl. 12 : 14.) That the sacred writer here refers to a *future*¹ judgment, is evident from the fact that he has several times remarked that in *this* world the moral government of God does not reach a stage of perfection, as the wicked often prosper, even unto death.² Now, who will gainsay that the doctrine of a future *retribution* must needs proceed on the underlying idea of a future existence? The former is impossible without the latter; and that the inspired author actually believed in this idea, he has expressly told us in the very same chapter, when, speaking of the last hours of life, he says: "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it."³ This verse clearly indicates the perishable nature of the body, and the imperishable nature of the soul, — an idea inevitably resulting from the Hebrew conception of man as taught in the very first chapter of Genesis.

Some critics, and among them is the learned Warburton,⁴ maintain that this passage (12 : 7) has no reference to the *personal* continuance of the soul, but to a mere re-absorp-

¹ The Chaldee Version, also, paraphrases the word *judgment* by "the day of great Judgment."

² Eccl. 3 : 16 ; 7 : 15 ; 8 : 10, 14 ; 9 : 2, 3, 11, 12.

³ Eccl. 12 : 7. The Targum paraphrases the latter half of this verse, thus : "Thy spiritual soul shall return in order to stand in judgment before God who gave it to thee." Ibn Ezra, in his comment to this verse, says : "Here we have an irrefutable answer against those who maintain that the soul is merely an *accidental property* of the body; for, if it were so, it could not be said to *return* to God."

⁴ See Divine Legation, Bk. V., Sec. 6, (p. 197 ed. 1811).

tion into the Divine mind; "that the author of *Ecclesiastes*, in other words, belonged to that class of pantheistic philosophers who believed that the soul is an emanation from the Divine Spirit; and after death is re-absorbed by the latter. But the main doctrine taught in *Ecclesiastes* being, as we have already seen, that of a future retribution, how could the soul, if swallowed up by the Infinite All, be rewarded or punished? How could there be any difference hereafter between the good and the bad, the wise and the foolish, if all are absorbed alike by *Pan*, the vague deity of Pantheism, and thus deprived of consciousness and personality? There could then be no such thing as a future *judgment* of the soul.

In the forced interpretation which Warburton here gives, we see into what narrow straits an erroneous system is driven, that would be consistent. In order to make out that the ancient Hebrews had no knowledge of a future state, the ingenious divine is bound to assume that a doctrine destructive of all morality and religion, a doctrine which has *never* found its way into Judaism, is advocated in the Holy Scriptures! Well has Lord Brougham said: "There is nothing so plain to which the influence of a preconceived opinion, or the desire of furthering a favorite hypothesis, will not blind men. . . . their blindness in such cases bears even a proportion to their learning and ingenuity."¹

Having thus shown that the books of Psalms, Job, and *Ecclesiastes*, far from doubting or calling in question the doctrine of immortality, even contain positive declarations of the same, can there still be any doubt as to the actual existence of that doctrine among the ancient Hebrews as well as in their scriptures? What other objections can be urged to the contrary? We have seen both history and revelation confirm our view that the ancient Hebrews actually *did* believe in a future state; while the objections based on either of these great, authentic sources have arisen from a misunderstanding of the facts of history, and a false interpretation of the text of scripture. There have been, indeed, other objections advanced to make it probable that the Israelites did not have, or *could* not have had, a knowledge of an

¹ Natural Theology, p. 168.

existence hereafter. But these are so futile, and have been so often refuted, that it would be superfluous to consider them again. One objection alone, it would seem, has not yet met with a satisfactory explanation, and, therefore, deserves a momentary consideration before we close. It is the absence, in the Pentateuch, of any allusion to *future* retribution in all cases where the Divine Legislator would enforce the observance of his laws. The simple fact that Moses predicts *temporal* rewards and punishments for the observance or non-observance of the law, is considered ample proof that the people had *no idea* of a future state; and Archbishop Whately has taken great pains to parade at full length each and every passage relating to retribution in *this* life. Now, it seems to us that too great stress has been laid on this objection. For, in view of the irrefutable arguments advanced to prove the actual existence of the doctrine among the ancient Hebrews, it cannot be regarded as an objection at all, but simply as a question: *Why* the Hebrew lawgiver did not avail himself of this popular belief, as all other ancient lawgivers did, in promising *future* rewards and punishments? Now, a proper understanding of the spirit of the Mosaic legislation, and the circumstances under which that legislation took place, will easily account for this. The principal aim of Moses was to form a *nation*, and give strength and solidity to that nation by the proper enforcement of moral and civil laws. He accordingly promises victory, peace, security from wild beasts, increase of population, in case of obedience to the laws; and threatens the people with war, famine, disease, dispersion over the whole earth, in case they violated the law. These, it is evident, are all *national* blessings and *national* curses; and though the lawgiver sometimes says, "Keep the commandments, that *thou* mayest live long and prosper," he does not, as some suppose, address the *individual*, but the nation; he does not so much refer to the longevity of the individual *citizen*, as to the life and prosperity of the *whole nation*. The welfare of the law-abiding citizen must needs promote that of the entire community. When, therefore, Moses predicts rewards or penalties, he always has an eye to Israel as a

whole, speaking in the capacity of a civil legislator solicitous for the preservation of the people in the land which they were to inherit. Who, now, would, under such circumstances, expect the inculcation of *celestial* rewards or *infernal* punishments? "These," says a profound scholar,¹ "apply only to the *individual*; for he alone, and not the *nation*, as a whole, inherits immortality." Besides, *future* rewards and punishments are but rarely adapted to influence men's conduct in *this* world. Even at the present day, when the doctrine of immortality is openly confessed by all sects, both Jewish and Christian, the preacher, according to the testimony of Whately himself,² finds it difficult to draw the minds of his hearers from the things of this life, and fix their attention on the retribution awaiting them beyond the grave. The people of our day still continue to be affected much more by wars, epidemics, and even *financial crises*. Human nature ever remains the same; and so the prospect of *present* weal or woe, something within the grasp of every one, has always proved a far safer means of securing the fidelity and obedience of the individual, than the greatest amount of *future* happiness or misery. Indeed, when we consider that most of the ancient lawgivers strangely intermingled future with present rewards and punishments,³ we cannot but admire the wisdom and energy of the *Hebrew* legislator, in rigidly omitting any allusion to future retribution, and trusting, by the aid of Providence, to secure universal obedience to the laws by such motives as would conduce to the welfare of the nation and the patriotism of the individual.⁴

¹ Saalschütz, das Mosaische Recht, chap. I.

² Essays (first series), pp. 73, 74, and Future State, pp. 18, 19.

³ The legislator of the Persians, for example, disposed of the punishments in hell with the same liberty and want of moderation with which he distributes corporal punishment in this life. Thus the Zend-Avesta threatens imprisonment of three hundred thousand years in the infernal regions for even insignificant crimes. — See Saalschütz, *ibid*.

⁴ The *existence* of the doctrine of immortality among the ancient Hebrews having been thus established, it will, no doubt, be interesting to learn the several phases which this doctrine has assumed among the Jews down to the present day. This we may be able to show in some future Article.

ARTICLE V.

COMPARATIVE PHONOLOGY: OR, THE PHONETIC SYSTEM
OF THE INDO-EUROPEAN LANGUAGES.

BY BENJAMIN W. DWIGHT, CLINTON, N. Y.

[Completed from Vol. XVII., from page 302].

2d. The phonetic force of the different Greek letters, in alphabetic order; or a synoptical view of the capacities of the Greek letters, for a variable manifestation of different equivalent sounds in the Sanskrit.

A. This represents the Sanskrit *a*, illustrations of which will be, of course, unnecessary.

It is sometimes euphonic, and so not a radical part of the stem of a word; as in ἀσπαίρω, to gasp, compared with σπαίρω. In ἀστέροπη (= ἀστηρ + ὄψ) lightning, (and also ἀστραπή) compared with στέροπη, we have, on the contrary, a full and contracted form of the same word, which might readily be mistaken, but for etymological reasons, for an instance of a *euphonic*. Like the Sanskrit *a*, the Greek *a* shaded off in kindred or derived forms, in different dialects, into almost all the other vowels: as *e*, Ionic ἔρσην for ἄρσην; *η*, Epic θώρηξ and σοφίη for θώραξ and σοφία; *ο*, Æolic στροτός for στρατός.

In the Doric dialect, *a* was almost as great a favorite in all consonantal forms, as in Sanskrit; and it abounded greatly also in the forms of the Æolic dialect. In the different dialectic forms of the genitive of ναῦς, a ship (Sansk. navas, Lat. navis), as Doric ναός, Ionic νηός and νεός and Attic νεώς, we see the radical vowel *a* represented by a variety of kindred vowels.

B. This is equivalent to the Sanskrit *b*, *bh*, *g*, *j*, and *v*.

(b) Specimens of this kind will be unnecessary.

(bh) bhar to carry, *βαστάζω*.

This aspirate is, however, most commonly represented by φ in Greek.

(g) gô, a cow, *βοῦς*; ¹ gâ, to go, *βαίνω* (pure stem *βα*); gurus heavy, *βαρύς*.

(j) jyâ, a bowstring, *βιός*, a bow.

(v) vrish, to irrigate, *βρέχω*.

The sound of the Greek *B* was softer than ours, more like indeed, as in the Modern Greek, our *v* than *b*; or, as in Spanish, medial between the two. Before *ρ*, it was substituted in the Æolic dialect for the ordinary aspirate, as in *βρόδον* for *ρόδον* and *βράκος* for *ράκος*. It was also epenthetically inserted before *ρ* after *μ*, as in *μεσημβρία*, for *μέση ἡμερα*; and *ἄμβροτος* for *ἄμροτος*.

It was interchangeable in the different dialects, with the following consonants:

(1) π; as in *βατεῖν* for *πατεῖν*, to tread. Before τ in verbal forms, according to the law of the harmonization of mutes in Greek (smooth with smooth, middle with middle, etc.), β is regularly changed to π, as in *τέτριπται* for *τέτριβται*. Compare the change of *b* to *p* in Latin before *s* and *t*, as in *scripsi* and *scriptum* from *scribo*.

(2) φ; as in *βρίγες* and *βρύγοι* compared with *φρύγες*. Cf. Lat. *fremo* and *βρέμω*; and *balaena*, a whale and *φάλαινα*.

(3) γ; as *γλήχων* for *βλήχων*, penny-royal. Compare, also, *βαρύς* and Lat. *gravis*; and also *βάλανος* an acorn and glans.

(4) δ; as *ὀδεός* (Doric) for *ὀβελός*, an obelisk.

(5) μ; as *βροτός* for *μροτός* by metathesis for *μορτός*, Sansk. *marttas* (mri, to die) Lat. *mortuus* (mori). Cf. *μύρμηξ* an ant, and Lat. *formica*; and also *μορμώ* a bugbear, and *formido*, fear.

Γ. This corresponds with the Sanskrit *g*, *h*, *j*, *k* (and *ch*), *gh*, and *ç*.

(g) *gaûs*, the earth (stem *gâ*), *γῆ*, Archaic *γαῖα*; *sthag*, to cover, *στέγω*, Lat. *tego*.

¹ Labials often represent gutturals in a cognate language, as a degenerate form of them, as in Æol. *πῖς*, who; Attic *πῖς*; Sansk. *kis*; Lat. *quis*.

(h) hanus, the jaw, γένυς, Lat. gena.

(j) jânu, the knee, γόνυ, Lat. genu ; jan to beget, γεννάω ; aj to drive, ἄγω ; yaj to sacrifice, to worship, ἄγιος.

(k) kan (cf. also chad and chand of same sense) to shine, γανάω.

(gh) ghas, to eat, γάνειον, an eating-house.

(ç) paç, to bind, πήγνυμι, stem παγ.

In the Greek itself it was interchangeable with β, δ, κ, λ. Thus for β, compare βλήχων and γλήχων ; for δ, γῆ and δᾶ (Doric) ; for κ, γνάπτω and κνάπτω ; and for λ, μόγισ and μόλυσ.

Δ. This is equivalent to the Sanskrit d, dh, j, and g.

(d) dakshas, right (as right-handed) δεξιός ; dvau, two, δύνω ; dam, to subdue, δαμάω.

(dh) dhâman, a house, δόμος.

(j) jiv, to live, δίαίτα.

(g) guh, to conceal, δύνω and δύνω, to get into, to put on. Cf. Lat. induo and exuo.

It is interchangeable in various dialects with different letters in Greek.

(1) In the Æolic dialect with β, as σάμβαλον for σάνδαλον.

(2) In the Doric, with γ, as γαῖα and γῆ, Doric δᾶ and also γᾶ. Cf. also δνόφος as a parallel form of γνόφος. So Δημήτηρ, Ceres, is formed from Γη + μήτηρ.

(3) In the Ionic, with ζ, as in Ζεύς and Δεύς ; with κ, as δαίω and καίω ; and with σ, as ὀδμή and ὀσμή.

(4) In the Attic dialect, with τ, as in δάπης and τάπης. It became also euphonicaly in the Attic in verbal forms σ, before τ and θ, as in ἐψεύσθην for ἐψεύδθην, and ἔρεισται for ἔρειδται ; as in Latin we find fissum for fidtum.

E. This represents the Sanskrit a, e, i, v.

(a.) api, to or towards, ἐπί ; ahis, a snake, ἔχis ; jarat an old man, γέρων (stem γεροντ) ; ana, in, ἐν and εἰς for ἐντς, (cf. Lat. in and with Sansk. antar among Lat. inter).

(e) êna, one, εἰς for ἐνς.

(i) pippali, pepper, πέπερι (Lat. piper).

(v) varman, an arming, *ἔρυμα* (Lat. arma) ; vam, to vomit, *ἐμέω*. Cf. vas to wish and *ἔκων* for *ἔκων*, Lat. invitus.

E is sometimes euphonic, as in *ἐλαχύν* small, Sansk. laghus, light. In *ἐκατόν* one hundred, the initial *ἐ* is not euphonic, but is an abbreviation of the numeral *εἰς* for *ἓν* one (= *ἓν* + *κατόν*. Cf. Lat. centum, Sansk. *ṣatam*). In the Æolic dialect, *ει* was exchanged for *η*, as *κῆνος* for *κείνος* and *κῆ* for *ἐκεῖ*.

Z. Its equivalents in Sanskrit are *d* and *y*.

(d) dam, to conquer (Lat. domo. Cf. dominus and damnum) *ζημία*, loss, damage. Cf. *δαμάω* to subdue.

(y) yu and yuj, to bind, or join together, *ζεύγνυμι* ; yava, barley, *ζέα* for *ζέα*.

Z does not represent in Greek the combination, as might be supposed, of *δς*, *τς*, and *θς*, etymologically, but of *δι* and *γι*. Thus *σχίζω* is for *σχίδιω* (stem *σχιδ*) ; *στιζω* fut. *στιξω* (stem *στιγ*) is for *στίγω* ; (cf. Lat. instigo, Germ. stechen, Eng. stick) ; and *μείζων* is for *μέγιων*. It is also sometimes equivalent when initial to the simple Sanskrit *y* ; as in *ζυγόν* (Lat. jugum) a yoke, and yuga equal ; and *ζεύγνυμι* to join (Lat. jungo) Sansk. yuj to bind. In a few cases *ζ* represents a contraction of *σδ* (not *δς*), as *Ἀθήναζε* for *Ἀθήνασδε*. Dionysius, who yet himself represents *ζ* as being pronounced as *δς*, says that it arose from *σδ*. In the Doric dialect, it was indeed so written, so that *Ζεύς* was in Doric *Σδεύς* ; but the analysis of its origin, as representing an earlier form *δι* or *γι*, is alike its true historical and phonetic analysis. *Z* early sank in sound into soft *s*, and was by Lucian substituted in some words for it, as in *ζμυκρός* for *σμυκρός* and *Ζμύρνα* for *Σμύρνα*.

Z was interchanged in Greek, when initial, by the Dorians, with *δ*, and, when medial, by the Tarentine Greeks with *σσ* ; as, with *δ*, in the Doric forms *δυγόν* and *δωμός* for *ζυγόν* and *ζωμός* ; and with *σσ* in the Tarentine form *λακτίσσω* for *λακτίζω*.

H. This is equivalent to the Sanskrit *a*. Thus the Sansk. *sâmi* half, Lat. semi, is in Greek *ἡμι* ; in which form the *η* represents the Sansk. long *â*, and the accompanying aspi-

rate represents the Sanskrit and Latin sibilant. So ἡδύς compares with Sansk. svadus, sweet, Lat. suavis; and ἥπαρ the liver, with Sansk. yakrit, Lat. jecur.

Θ. This is equivalent to the Sanskrit t, d, dh, and gh.

(t) tij, to put together, *τιγγάνω*, stem *τιγ*.

(d) duhitri, a daughter, *δύγατηρ*; dvar, a door, *θύρα*.

(dh) dhûma(s), smoke, *θυμός* (Lat. fumus); indh to burn, *αἶδω*; dhâ, to place, *τιθῆμι*, stem *θε*; ûdhar, a teat, *οὐδάρ*.

(gh) gharma, heat, *θερμός*. For a similar change of another guttural into a lingual, compare *τίς* with the Vedic *kis*, Lat. *quis*.

Θ was interchanged, in the different Greek dialects, with various letters: as σ, Doric *σάω* for *θάω* to see; φ, Æolic *φῆρ* for *θήρ*, a wild beast (cf. Lat. *fera*, German *thier*, Eng. deer); δ, *ψῦδος* poetic form of *ψεύδος*, a lie; the aspirate, as *δαμά* in Homer and Pindar for *ᾰ*.

I. This is equivalent to the Sanskrit a, e, and the half-vowel y.

(a) aqvas, a horse, *ἵππος*, Æolic *ἱκκος* for *ἱκφος*.

(e) vëtra, a reed (from *vê* to weave) *ἱτέα* for *φτεά*, Lat. *vitis*, Eng. *withe*.

(y) mahiyas comp. of mahat great (*μέγας*) comp. *μείζων* for *μέγιων*.

I was exchanged sometimes in Greek for ει, as in *εἶλη* compared with *ἔλη*, a band, and *ἱστία* (Ionic) compared with *ἑστία*, for *φεστία*, the hearth of a house (cf. Lat. *vesta*).

K. Its equivalents in Sanskrit are k, ç, ch, g, h.

(k) krî to distinguish, *κρίνω* (Lat. *cerno*, *cretus* and *crimen*); kapâlas, the skull, *κεφαλή*; kathinas, a bowl, *κάτανος*.

(ç) çangkhas, a shell *κόγχη*; çiras, the head, *κάρα*; çru to hear, *κλύω* (Lat. *inclutus* and *gloria*); daç to bite, *δάκνω*; daçau ten *δέκα*; diç to show *δείκνυμι* (Lat. *dico* and *digitus*); çad to fall, *κατά* down (Lat. *cado*, to fall and *caedo* to fell, or cut down).

(ch) cha, and, *κε* (and *τε*); chay, to go *κίω*.

(g) gaura, yellow, *κιρρός* (Lat. *gilvus*, German *gelb*, Eng. yellow).

(h) hal, to hollow, *κοῖλος* (Lat. *cœlum*, Germ. *hohl*, Eng.

hole, hollow and hell) ; hard and hridaya, the heart, *κῆρ* and *καρδία*.

K is interchangeable in Greek :

(1) with *π* ; as *Æolic* *κῶς* and *κότε*, *Attic* *πῶς* and *πότε*.

(2) with *τ* ; as *πόκα*, *Doric* form of *πότε*, and *τῆνος* *Doric* of *κεῖνος* :

(3) with *γ* and *χ* ; as in *κνάπτω* (*Old Attic*) to scratch and *γνάπτω* (*New Attic*), and *ρέγχω* to snore, *Attic* *ρέγκω*. So in the *Doric* *ἀτρεχές* occurs for *ἀτρεκές*, which in *Pindar* is *ἀτρεκής*.

L. This is equivalent to the *Sanskrit* *l*, *n*, *r*, *d*, and even to the half-vowel *y* by assimilation.

(l) *lih* (*Vedic* *rih*) to lick, *λείχω* (*German* *lechen*, *Eng.* *lick*) ; *sphal* to waver, *σφάλλω* (*Lat.* *fallo*).

(n) *anyas*, another, *ἄλλος* for *ἄλιος* (*Lat.* *alius*,¹ *ollus* and *ille* *Gothic* *alja*). In *Prâkrit*, as in *Greek*, the half-vowel *y* is assimilated, and the word is there *annas*.

(r) *rich*, to leave, *λείπω*, stem *λιπ* (*Lat.* *linquo*, stem *liq*). So, contrarily, *Sansk.* *lup* and *lump*, to break, is equivalent to *Lat.* *rumpo*, perf. *rupi* ; and *Sansk.* *ruch* to be bright, to the *Greek* *λευκός* bright, (*Lat.* *lux*, *luceo*, *illustris* etc).

(d) *dîpa* a lamp, *λάμπας* (where the root is also nasalized).

(y) *Vid.* *ἄλλος*, above ; and so *βάλλω* is for *βάλιω*.

L is interchangeable in different dialects with various letters ; as (1) in the *Doric*, with *ν*, where *ἡλθον* becomes *ἦνδον*. Compare double forms *πνεύμων* and *πλεύμων* ; and also the *Spanish* *nivel* and *French* *niveau*, as derived from *Lat.* *libella* (diminutive of *libra*) a level. (2) In the *Attic*, with *ρ*, as *ναύκραρος* for *ναύκλαρος*, the chief of a division of citizens. (3) In the *Æolic*, with *δ*, as *δαίφνη* and *λάφνη* the laurel. Compare in *Latin* *oleo* to smell and odor fragrance.

M. **M** is simply equivalent to *Sansk.* *m* and *sm*. As examples of *m*, see *samâ* together, *ἅμα* (*Lat.* *simul* and *similis*) and *samî* half, *ἥμι* (*Lat.* *semi*) : of *sm*, *smi*, to laugh, *μειδάω* (for *σμειδάω*). It is interchanged in the *Æolic* with

¹ From this same stem *alter* also is formed : (-ter being a comparative suffix, *Gr.*-τερος ; as also in the prepositions *inter*, *praeter*, *propter* and *subter*) ; and also *aliquis* (= *alius* + *quis*).

β and π , as $\delta\pi\pi\alpha$ for $\delta\mu\mu\alpha$ and $\beta\rho\sigma\acute{o}\varsigma$ for $\mu\rho\sigma\acute{o}\varsigma$; and in the Attic with ν , as $\nu\nu$ for $\mu\nu$ (cf. Lat. num and $\mu\acute{\omega}\nu$).

N. Its equivalents in Sanskrit are n and sn, jn, m and s.

(sn) snushâ, a daughter-in-law, $\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$ for $\sigma\nu\nu\sigma\acute{o}\varsigma$ (Lat. nurus); snu, to flow, $\nu\acute{\epsilon}\omega$ (for $\sigma\nu\acute{\epsilon}F\omega$) fut. $\nu\acute{\epsilon}\upsilon\sigma\omega$.

(jn) jnâ, to know, $\nu\acute{o}\acute{\epsilon}\omega$ for $\gamma\nu\acute{o}\acute{\epsilon}\omega$ (cf. $\gamma\nu\gamma\nu\acute{\omega}\sigma\kappa\omega$). Compare $\nu\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma$ the mind; Lat. nosco for gnosco; and Eng. know.

(m) M final in original forms is everywhere changed in Greek to ν : as in the person-endings, for the first person, of the imperfect active, and of the first and second aorists passive; the nominative case-ending of the 2d declension neuter (Greek $-\sigma\nu$, Sansk. $-\text{am}$, Lat. $-\text{um}$); and the accusative singular and genitive plural endings in ν ; in all of which respects, the Latin more nearly represents the original form than the Greek. Thus $\acute{\epsilon}\phi\epsilon\rho\sigma\nu$ is for $\acute{\epsilon}\phi\epsilon\rho\sigma\mu(\iota)$; $\acute{\rho}\acute{o}\sigma\nu$ (acc. of $\acute{\rho}\acute{o}\sigma\iota\varsigma$) is for $\acute{\rho}\acute{o}\sigma\iota\mu$ Sansk. patim; and $\pi\omicron\delta\acute{\omega}\nu$ is for $\pi\omicron\delta\acute{\omega}\mu$, Sansk. padâm.

(s) Final s in Sanskrit is often represented by ν in the Greek equivalent, as in the plural active suffix $-\mu\epsilon\nu$ (Doric $-\mu\epsilon\varsigma$) Sansk. $-\text{mas}$, Lat. $-\text{mus}$ for the first person of verbs; and so in the 2d and 3d person dual endings $-\tau\omicron\nu$ and $-\tau\eta\nu$ for Sansk. $-\text{thas}$ and $-\text{tas}$.

N is exchanged, especially in the Æolic dialect with λ and μ .

Ξ. The equivalents of this letter in Sanskrit are ksh and sh.

(ksh) akshas, an axle, $\acute{\alpha}\xi\omega\nu$ (Lat. axis).

(sh) shash, six, $\acute{\epsilon}\xi$ (Lat. sex).

For initial ξ the Dorians used sometimes $\sigma\kappa$, as $\sigma\kappa\acute{\iota}\phi\omicron\varsigma$ for $\xi\acute{\iota}\phi\omicron\varsigma$.

O. This represents the Sanskrit a, as dhâman, a house, $\delta\acute{o}\mu\omicron\varsigma$ (Lat. domus); akshas the eye, $\delta\kappa\omicron\varsigma$ and $\delta\sigma\sigma\epsilon$ for original $\delta\kappa\iota\epsilon$ (Lat. oculus); avis a sheep, $\delta\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ for $\omicron F\iota\varsigma$ (Lat. ovis.) Like α and ϵ , the letter $\omicron$ is sometimes euphonic, as in $\delta\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omega$ compared with $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omega$ (Lat. $-\text{cello}$, celer etc.); $\delta\acute{\delta}\acute{\upsilon}\rho\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$ with $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\rho\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$ (cf. $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\eta$ pain and $\delta\nu\varsigma$ hard Sansk. du to suffer pain); and $\delta\acute{\rho}\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega$ Sansk. rât Lat. rego.

O was interchanged in the Æolic dialect with α, ε, υ, ω ; and in the Doric with οι : as with

- (α) Æolic στρατός, for στρατός an army ;
 “ ὄνω for ἄνω upwards ;
- (ε) “ ἔδοντες for ὀδοντες the teeth ;
- (υ) “ ὕμοιος for ὀμοιος similar ;
- (ω) “ ὄρα for ὦρα a season :
- (οι) Doric ποία and Ionic ποίη for πόα grass.

O, sometimes called a movable o, is often substituted in derived forms for a radical vowel, as in λόγος from λέγω, στόλος from στέλλω, πόρος from περάω, τρόχος from τρέχω. Cf. in Latin socius from sequor, sodalis from sedeo, nodus from necto.

Π. The equivalents of π in Sanskrit are p, b, v, k.

(p) pitar a father πατήρ ; parâ farther παρά ; apa from, ἀπό (Lat. ab).

(b) budh and bundh, to know, to learn, πυνθάνομαι, stem πυνθ.

(v) varâhas, a boar, πόρκος (Lat. porcus and verres).

(k) kadâ, when, πότε ; kati, how many, πόσος Æol. κόσος.

Π is interchangeable in Greek with γ, as λαπαρός and λαγαρός, slack ; with κ, as πόσος and Ionic κοσός ; with τ, as πέντε and Æolic πέμπε ; and with β and φ as βάλλω and πάλλω (cf. Lat. pello, palpo and palpito) ; and σπόγγος, Attic σφόγγος, a sponge (cf. Lat. fungus).

P. This letter represents the Sanskrit r, dr, sr, bh, vr, ghr.

(r) urus, wide, εὐρύς ; ar to rise, ὄρνυμι Lat. orior.

(dr) draksha, a grape, ῥάξ (Lat. racemus, Fr. raisin, Eng. race and raisin).

(sr) sru, to pour forth, ῥέω for σρέFω.

(bh) bhanj, to break, ῥήγνυμι for Frήγνυμι (Lat. frango).

(vr) vri, to cover, ῥινός the rind.

(ghr) ghrân, the nose, ῥίς gen. ῥινός.

P is interchanged in the Æolic dialect with σ, as οὔτορ for οὔτος, μάρτυρ for μάρτυς ; and so Laconic τίρ for τίς and νεκύρ for νεκός. (Cf. Lat. arbor and arbos, honor and honos, and eram for esam, imperf. of sum). It was also prefixed sometimes in the Æolic dialect with β, to represent what was in

other dialects the aspirate, as *βρόδον* for *ρόδον*, *βρίξα* for *ρίξα*, etc.

In the Attic it was interchanged with λ, as *συγῆρός* for *συγῆλός*. Cf. in same way Lat. *lilium* a lily, with *λείριον*. It was also sometimes transposed by metathesis, as *κάρτος* for *κράτος*.

The letter r was called by the ancients the canine letter, as it is a continuous rolling r-sound that an angry snarling dog makes.

Σ. Σ is equivalent to ζ and s in Sanskrit.

(ζ) ζarkaga, candied sugar, *σάκχαρον*. (Lat. *saccharum*, Germ. *zucker*, Fr. *sucre*.)

(s) stabh to press together and stambh to support, *στείβω* and *στέμβω*; sphal, to deviate *σφάλω* (Lat. *fallō*, Fr. *faillir*, Span. *faltar*, Eng. *fail*, *fall*, *fell*, *falter*, *false*, *fault*.)

Its dialectic interchanges are with δ, θ, τ, πτ, ξ, the aspirate, and ρ: as with δ, Æol. and Dor. *ἴδμεν* for *ἴσμεν*; with θ, Dor. *ἀγασός* for *ἀγαθός*; with τ, Æol. and Dor. *τυ* for *συ*; with πτ, *πέσσω* Sansk. *pach*, to cook and collateral form *πέπτω*; with ξ, Dor. *τριξός* for *τρισσοσ* and *ξύν* for *σύν*.

T. Its equivalents in Sanskrit are t, th, dh, ch and k.

(t) anti over against, *ἀντί* (Lat. *ante*); pat to fly *πέτομαι*; tan, to extend, *τείνω* for *τένιω*.

(th) asthi, a bone, *ὀστέον* (Lat. *os* for *oss*, for *ost*); sthâ to stand *ἵστημι*, stern *στα*; sthiras, fixed, firm, *στερεός*.

(dh) dhâ, to place, *τίθημι*, stem *θε*.

(ch) cha, and, *κα* and *τε*.

(k) kas, who, *τίς* Lat. *quis*. So, *τέσσαρες* is for *κέσσαρες*, for *κέτFapes*, Sansk. *catvâras*, Lat. *quatuor* (pronounced as if *katuor*); and *πέντε* Æol. *πέμπε* is for *πέγκε*, Sansk. *panchan*, five, Lat. *quinque*.

The following are its dialectic interchanges: θ, σ and π. For θ, compare *αἰθῖς* and Ionic *αἰτῖς*; for σ, *συ*, and Æol. *τυ*. (For a similar change in the modern languages compare Lat. *stratus*, part. of *sterno*, Span. *strada*, Germ. *Strasse*, Eng. *street*; and Germ. *essen* with Lat. *edo*, Gr. *ἐσθίω*, Eng. *eat*.) For π compare *τέσσαρες*, Doric *πέπορες* and *πέντε*, Dor. *πέμπε*. Compare similarly *σπουδή* and Lat. *studium* *zeal*; *τάως*, a

peacock and pavo; and also in Latin itself *hospes* and *hostis*, the primary meaning of both of which is the same, a stranger.

Ῥ. Ῥ corresponds with the Sanskrit a, u, v, sv.

(a) sam, with, σύν; nakhas, a nail, ὄνυξ.

(u) upari, above, ὑπέρ; udan water, ὕδωρ, stem ὕδατ.

(v) dvau, two, δύο; vē and vap to weave, ὑφαίνω; tvam, thou, σύ (Lat. tu); çvan, a dog, κύων. (So cf. Lat. suus, Sansk. svas). As with i and j, so u is but a vowelized form of v, or, which is the same thing, v is but a hard consonantal form of u.

(sv) svapnas, a dream, ὕπνος.

In the Greek dialects υ was interchanged with α, ι, ο, ω, οι. For (α) compare σάρξ and Æol. σύρξ, as also τέσσαρες and Æol. πίσυρες; for (ι) see φευτεύω and poet. φιτύω: for (ο) ὄνομα and ὄνυμα (Æol.); for (ω) χελώνη and Æol. χηλύνη; and for (οι) χρυσός and Æol. χροισός.

Φ. The equivalents of φ in Sanskrit are bh, p, ph, v.

(bh) bhû to be, φύω (Lat. fui and fore); bhid to divide, φείδομαι (reflexive), (cf. German beissen, Eng. bite); bhâ, to shine, φαίνω (cf. φημί and Latin for and facio); bhar and bhri, to bear, φέρω; bhuj, to turn or bend, φεύγω, stem φυγ (Latin fugio).

(p) pâl, to love, φιλέω; prâna breath, spirit, φρήν.

(ph) phullan, a blossom, φύλλον.

(v) svas his, σφός, Lat. suus.

Φ is interchangeable in Greek with π and ϑ: with π, as Æol. σπόγγος for σφόνγγος, and, in the Doric, ἐπιωρκέοιμι occurs for ἐφιορκέοιμι; and with ϑ, as Æol. θήρ, Attic φήρ, as also θλίβω and Æol. φλίβω.

X. The letter χ represents variously the Sanskrit h, kh, g, çr.

(h) hrish, to rejoice χαίρω; hyas, yesterday, χθές; lih to lick, λείχω.

(kh) khol(a)s wavering, χολός; nakhas a nail ὄνυξ, gen. ὄνυχος.

(g) garhan, an enclosure χόρτος (Lat. hortus and cohors; Eng. cohort and court); gaura, χολή bile.

(ζρ) ζrat, credit, χράω to lend (Lat. *credo* = ζrat + dâ Sansk.).

The interchanges of χ in Greek are in the Ionic with κ as δέκομαι for δέχομαι, and so the Sicilian Greeks made χιτών a tunic κιτών; and in the Doric with θ, as θρνιχος, gen. of θρνις a bird for θρνιθος.

Ψ. As ψ represents the combination of any one of the labials with σ, its equivalents are of the same general sort with theirs. In δψ the voice (Sansk. vachs Lat. vox) it represents the Sansk. chs.

Ψ was interchanged in Greek with σπ, as σπάλιον for ψάλιον; with σφ, as by the Dorians and the Syracusan Greeks σφίν was made ψίν; and with σ, as ψιττακός for σιττακός. There are also some correlative forms in ψ and ξ, as ψάω and ξάω.

Ω. This letter is representative of the Sanskrit a, v, y.

(a) âsus, quick, ώκός : ζvan a dog, κύων.

(v) vâra, time, ώρα (Lat. hora, Fr. heure, Germ. jahr and uhr, Eng. hour and year); van to sell, ώνέομαι (Lat. vendo).

(y) yat, ώς (for ώτ).

The Greek interchanges of ω are with α, αυ, ου, ο : with α as Ionic ώνθρωπος for άνθρωπος, Doric πρâτος for πρῶτος; with αυ, θῶμα Ionic for θαῦμα wonder; with ου, ώρανός, heaven, Æolic for οὐρανός; and with ο, ότειλή Æolic for ώτειλή, a wound.

3d. Special Pathological Affections of the Greek.

I. Digammatism.

II. Sibilation.

III. Aspiration.

IV. Reduplication.

V. Nasalization.

These affections of words, while pertaining more or less to the three classical languages in common, have a special relevancy to the Greek in respect to their influence on the forms of the language, or the prominence with which they appear, as special features of it.

I. Digammatism.

The digamina, or double-gamma, F, was originally the

sixth letter of the Grecian alphabet. It corresponded to the Phenician Vau and the Latin F. In some old Peloponnesian inscriptions in the Laconic or Doric dialect, this character, is found representing it. The Laconians, indeed, and especially the Laconian colonists of Heraclea in Southern Italy, and the Cretans, showed much more fondness for retaining the digamma, in either its natural form, or as softened into β , than most of the other Greeks. The name digamma was given by both the Greek and Roman grammarians to this character, because its form was that of two gammas united, one above the other, in one compound symbol. From the great fondness of the Æolians for this letter, it was often called the Æolic digamma. It was used at first by all the Greeks; or, in other words, it was one of the characteristics of the Pelasgic or Pioneer period of Greek development; and, as it is not found in any Attic or Ionic inscriptions, it must have fallen very early into disuse by the Ionian race.

It was probably pronounced very much like our w in its softened form; for Dionysius says, that it sounded like *ou*. Its corresponding vowel is *υ*; and it is often changed into it, as in the diphthongs *au* and *eu*; which at times originate in this way, as well as *ou*, when not formed by lengthening *ο*, to represent a contracted form. Thus *βούς*, *ναῦς* and *πλεύσω*, fut. of *πλέω*, are for *βόFs* (Lat. *bos* for *bovs*, gen. *bovis*) *νάFs* *πλέFσω*.

As the digamma lost its distinct symbol, it underwent several interesting transformations, such as the following:

(1) It was sometimes, when initial, weakened into a mere breathing, as *ἔσπερος* for *Ἔσπερος* (Lat. *vesper* and *Hesperia*), *ἑστία* for *Ἔστία* (Lat. *vesta*) and *ἔννυμι* for *Ἔννυμι* (Lat. *vestio* to clothe).

(2) It was changed by the Laconians, and some others of the Dorian family, into β , γ , or ϕ , as,

βέργον, work, for *Ἐέργον*, later, *ἔργον* (Germ. *werk*, Eng. *work*).

βιδεῖν to see, for *Ἔιδεῖν*, later, *εἶδεῖν* (Lat. *videre*).

βίκατι twenty for *Ἐείκατι*, later, *εἴκοσι* (Sansk. *vinçati*).

γισχύς force }
and *βισχύς* } for *Ἰισχύς*, later, *ἰσχύς* (*ἰς* and Lat. *vis*).

γιτέα a willow, for *Ἰιτέα*, later, *ἰτέα* (Lat. *vitex*).

(3). It was changed in some cases to *o*, as in *Οἶτυλος* and *Βεῖτυλος* for *Φίτυλος*, a Laconian town, also called *Τύλος*.

(4). It was sometimes softened into *υ*, as in *ναῦς* for *νάFς*.

(5). It was completely rejected, as in *ἔαρ* for *φέαρ* Lat. ver; *οἶκος* for *φοῖκος*, Lat. vicus. Cf. *Ἰταλός* and *Ἰταλία* (Italy) for *Φιταλός* etc. Lat. vitulus: so called on account of its fine oxen.

Some words originally beginning with two consonants, the first of which was the digamma, have remaining but a mere weakened form of one of them, as Sansk. svadus, sweet, Gr. ἡδύς for σFηδύς. (Cf. Lat. suavis, where the original sv are both represented; and also Sansk. svapnas, sleep, (Gr. ὕπνος for σFύπνος, Lat. somnus for sopnus for svopnus). Thus, by the comparison of many Sanskrit forms and their Latin equivalents with kindred forms in Greek, which are now aspirated or contracted, or otherwise marked as having once had a fuller form of another sort, we assure ourselves absolutely of the fact, that the archaic form of the Greek was itself also digammated.

It is clear, that in Homer's time many words had the digamma, which afterwards lost it. The concurrence of two vowels in the radical part of a word would make a hiatus,¹ particularly disagreeable to a Greek ear; which both poets and prose writers would seek carefully to avoid. In the case of words that at first had the digamma, such a hiatus did not originally exist, of course, when the preceding word ended in a vowel; and, in the absence of the digamma, accordingly, they are still found occurring together, as when it did exist, as in *πρὸ ἔδεν* for *πρὸ Fἔδεν* (for σFἔδεν). For the same reason, the influence of the lost *F* of a once digammated word is still felt, in making with a preceding consonant the vowel originally followed by them both, although one of them is now wanting, long by position.

The following are some of the most important specimens of Greek words that were beyond doubt once digammated:

¹ The hiatus of two vowels in juxtaposition was far less offensive to the Latin ear, than to the Greek, and less even to the Greek than to the Indian.

(1) Initially.

ἄγνυμι, to break, for *Ῥάγνυμι*.

ἀνδάνω, to please, for *Ῥανδάνω*.

ἄστυ, a city, for *Ῥαστυ* (Sansk. vastu from vas to dwell).

ἔαρ, spring, and ἦρ for *Ῥέαρ* (Persian behâr, Lat. ver).

εἶδω, to see, for *Ῥίδω* (Lat. video, Sansk. vid).

ἔννυμι, to clothe for *Ῥέσνυμι* (Lat. vestio, Sansk. vas).

ἔλλω, to seize, for *Ῥέλλω* (Lat. vello).

ἔργον, work, for *Ῥέργον* (cf. Sansk. vay to bestir one's self).

{ ἔσπερος, evening for *Ῥέσπερος* (Æol. φέσπερε, Lat. vesper
and Hesperia, cf. Sansk. vas to cut off and vasati night).

ἔστία, the hearth, for *Ῥεστία* (Lat. vesta; Sansk. vas, to dwell).

ἴον, the violet, for *Ῥίον* (Lat. viola).

ἴος, poison, for *Ῥίος* (Lat. virus, Sansk. vishas).

ἴς, force, for *Ῥίς* (Lat. vis, pl. vires for vices).

ἰτέα, a willow for *Ῥιτέα* (Sansk. vêtâ a reed Lat. vitex).

οἶκος, a house, for *Ῥοῖκος* (Sansk. vêsas, Lat. vicus).

οἶνος, wine, { for *Ῥοῖνος*, Cretan *βοῖνος* (Lat. vinum; cf.
Sansk. vêna beloved).

ῥήγνυμι, to break for *Ῥρήγνυμι* (Lat. frango, Sansk. bhanj).

ὠνέομαι to buy for *Ῥωνέομαι* (Sansk. van, Lat. vendo).

ἴδιος, own, peculiar { for *Ῥίδιος* (Sansk. vidh, to separate, Lat.
viduus, divido and individuus).

{ ὅς, and 3d pers. pronoun οὗ, οἷ, ἑ for *σῬός*, *σῬοῦ* etc. Cf.
suus and sui, sibi etc. in Latin.

(2) Medially.

{ αἰές, αἰέν and αἰεί, always, for *αἰῬέλ* (Lat. ævum and αἶων,
Sansk. êvas, a moving or going).

βοῦς, an ox, for *βόῬς* (Lat. bos gen. bovis, Fr. boeuf Eng.
beef and beeves).

κλεῖς, a key, for *κλεῬίς*. (Lat. clavis, Fr. cléf).

λαῖός, left, for *λαῖῬός*. (Lat. laevus).

λεῖός, light, for *λεῖῬός*. (Lat. levis, Eng. lift, lever, etc.).

σάος, safe, for *σάῬός*. (Lat. salvus, Eng. safe).

σκαῖός, left, for *σκαῖῬός*. (Lat. scaevus, Germ. schief, Eng.
skew).

νεός, new, for *νεῬός*. (Lat. novus, Sansk. navas).

οῖς, a sheep, for *οῖῬίς*. (Lat. ovis, Sansk. avis).

- { ὠόν, an egg, for ὠFόν (Lat. ovum, Fr. oeuf).
 { Doric ὤβρα,¹ with which compare ὤεα, in Epicharmus).

Between two vowels, therefore, an original digamma often dropped quietly out of sight; leaving not a trace behind it of its former existence. Thus πλέω is for πλεFω (root πλυ, and, when gunated, πλεν) Sansk. plavâmi, I wash; and κλαίω Attic κλάω, to weep, fut. κλαύσομαι, is for κλαFιω, Sansk. çravayâmi. Other words of this sort are πνέω, pure stem πνυ; νέω, stem νυ; ῥέω, stem ῥυ; and θέω stem θυ. The analysis of this class of forms is this: the final υ of the stem was lengthened to ευ, as a mode of strengthening it; but ευ before vowels became, in early Greek, εF, from which finally F dropped away, as everywhere else in the language, because distasteful to the cultivated Greek sense. The different stages, accordingly, through which the stem πλυ went, may be thus represented: πλυ — πλεν — πλεF — πλε.

II. Sibilation.

S is a sui generis sound, which, like the sponge, mediate, as it were, between a vegetable and an animal, or the bat, between birds and quadrupeds, occupies a sort of middle ground between a consonant and a vowel; uniting the characteristics of them both. While various letters, found in some languages, are wanting in others, as the letter v or w, or the French u, like, also, the compound consonants, termed the nasal ng and the guttural ch, not to speak of more still; no language fails to possess the sibilant s. Its two chief sounds are the soft and hard, or its s- and z-sounds. With ch in some languages, as the German, and h in others, as ours, it forms a softened compound-sound, in which it appears in its most agreeable form, at least to modern ears, and which was not known at all to the ancients.

¹ The Æolians and Dorians kept the digamma in the beginning of many words (as Æolic *Fétros* a year, Doric *Fídiος*, own, peculiar), and the Heracleans in Magna Graecia preserved it in many inscriptions, in words, in which it does not occur in any of the other dialects, or exhibit any signs of having occurred; while as strangely they have omitted it in many words, in which it does occur in the other dialects. Ahrens, Vol. II., p. 42.

S often occurred initially in Greek, and was pronounced, in such cases, with its sharp sibilant sound; but it was as little pleasing to the Greek ear as to the French; and on this account, it was so frequently exchanged for the rough breathing in many words, whose original stems possessed it; as in ἔξ (sex) and ἑπτά (septem).

When occurring in the middle of a word, it is manifest that it had a very soft sound, as it so often fell out from weakness, as in βουλευῆ for βουλεύει, for βουλεύεται, and ἐβουλεύου, for ἐβουλεύει, for ἐβουλεύετο, and γένους for γένεος for γένεος.

In Latin, between two vowels, and at the end of words, when it formed a part of their original stem, it passed into r; so weak was its sound, or rather its power of retaining its own permanence; as in Papirius for original Papisius, Valerius for Valesius, honor and arbor for honos and arbos, and generis and foederis, genitives of stems originally ending in s, as genes and foedes. So eram is for esam, imperf. of sum — for esum (i); and corpus is for corpos, for subsequent corpor, as the stem. Compare, also, honor and honestus, robur and robustus, arbor and arbustum.

The term assibilation is used to denote the combination of the sibilant with the various mutes, as in ps, ts, and ks, gz and dz. In Greek, this assibilation is represented by the compound letters ψ and ξ, occurring in all parts of words, as the beginning, middle, and end. With regard to ζ, see previous page.

The graphic symbols ξ and ψ were added by Simonides, in the times of the Persian wars (B. C. 500), to the Greek syllabarium.

The final s, so often found affixed, in the classical languages, at the end of nominal and adjective bases, in the nominative, and called properly the gender-sign, represents the Sanskrit personal pronouns he and she (Sansk. sa, he; sâ, she; tat, it. Cf. ó, ή, το, and Germ. sie, she; and Eng. he and she). This affix is a sign, at once, to the eye, that personality is predicated of the noun receiving it; it carries with itself a vitalizing force. The tendency to the imperso-

nation, in thought, of material objects, is very strong indeed, in not only poetical natures as such, who love to see and to feel the reflection of their own vitality, from every mute form of beauty around them ; but also, especially, in the early, impressible, and imaginative period of a nation's first intellectual life.

III. Aspiration.

The influence of climate on the tendency to aspiration, in any language, is very great, and even, in fact, determinate, it would seem, of the whole taste and tendency of a people in that direction. "Nowhere," says Benary, "is a simple dialectic difference, in the use of aspiration, more significant than in Germany ; so that, he who should go from the highlands of that country in the centre, to the low plains of the north, might mark, quite well, the successive steps of decline, in its use, from his starting-point, until, on arriving at Denmark, all traces of its use would disappear." So, in Italy, the Sabines who lived among the mountains, were specially fond of aspiration ; while the Romans, dwelling on the broad plains of Latium, were averse from ¹ it.

Each of the three cardinal classes of mutes, the gutturals, labials, and linguals, has its own aspirate. The aspirates may be classified as follows :

1. The Guttural Aspirates.

(1) The Greek. The rough breathing ' and χ.

(2) The Latin. H and ch (of Greek origin).

2d. The Labial Aspirates.

(1) Greek, φ, F (obsolete).

(2) Latin, f, ph (of Greek origin).

3d. The Lingual or Dental Aspirates.

(1) Greek, θ, σ.

¹ Says Cicero "aversus a vero." Oration IV., in Catilinam § 9. The very *a* in *aversus* is a *for ab, from*. How empty, therefore, Webster's remark under this word, that "it is absurd to speak of an affection of the mind exerted *from* an object." It is surely the most natural thing in the world, to speak of a state of feeling, as turned away from a given object.

(2) Latin *s* and *th* (of Greek origin).

The genuine aspirates, except *s*, are of course all double sounds, consisting of some mute, as the stable element, and an added breathing; so that they correspond, among consonants, to diphthongs among vowels. The Greek is rich in this class of mixed consonants, as it is also in diphthongal mixtures among vowels; while the Latin is poor in them both; and the Slavic languages are almost wholly destitute of them. The original forms of the aspirates were for the guttural, *gh*; for the labial, *bh*; and for the dental, *dh*. Curtius classifies the Indo-European languages, in five divisions,¹ in respect to the phenomena of their aspirates.

1. The Sanskrit² by itself: exhibiting the original bases, in the aspirates *gh*, *bh* and *dh*, of the whole system of aspiration, in any and all languages; and yet *gh* often settles in Sanskrit, into mere *h*, as *lih* for *ligh*. Gr. *λελχω*, Lat. *lingo*; and *mahat* great, for *maghat*, Gr. *μεγας*, Lat. *magnus*.

2. All those languages, which, by giving up the breathing, remove the difference between the medial aspirates and the medials themselves in given forms; as the Zend, which, while sometimes retaining the aspirates, at other times weakens them to medials, as in *gh*, *bh*, *dh*, weakened to *g*, *b*, *d*.

3. That embracing the Germanic languages, which has, with the same characteristics as those that mark the second class, an additional tendency to a strengthening of the mute element of the aspirates, as of *g* in *gh* into *k*; of *d* in *dh* into *t*; and of *b* in *bh* into *p*.

4. The Greek in all its dialects with its *tenuis* aspirated, instead of the original medial aspirates; in which it is the exact counterpart of the second and third classes.

5. The Italic languages having only the two aspirates, *h* and *f*.

To the above schedule, drawn so well by Curtius, might

¹ Zeitschrift Der Sprachforschung, Vol. II., pp. 328—334.

² The scale of aspirates in Sanskrit, while reducible to the simple elements above stated, is full of varied forms of them, as *gh*, *kh*, *ch*, *chh*, *jh*, as well as *bh*, *ph*, *dh* and *th*, and compound consonantal aspirates as *ksh*, *chch*, *chchh*, *nchh*, *nth*, *ddh*, *dbh*, *mbh*, *dhr*, *sth*, *sch*, *kshm*, *chchh*, *chchhr*, *ddhy*, etc. †

be added, properly, for an absolutely complete view of the aspirates.

6. The Slavic languages, as the end of the scale, and the antipodes in its particulars of the Sanskrit: being nearly wanting in aspirates of any kind.

The stronger the aspiration, the more is the mute itself, which is aspirated, covered up by it; and the weaker the aspiration, the more distinct the sphere and scope of the mute.

The following are some of the more noticeable principles, pertaining to the aspirates:

§ 1. Since the aspirates possess, as a class, a special nature of their own, in common; they are more readily exchanged for each other, in passing from one language or dialect of the same language to another, than are the other mutes.

§ 2. The stronger the aspirate, so much easier the exchange.

1. Aspirates in Greek.

1st. What the aspirates represent, as their originals or equivalents.

The rough breathing in Greek represents

(1) The Sanskrit sibilant, as its equivalent. Instances abound, as

SANSKRIT.	LATIN.	GREEK.
sarp, to creep,	serpo and repo,	ἔρπω.
sad, to sit,	sedeo,	ἕζομαι.
sam, with, together,	cum and simul,	ἅμα.

(2) An obliterated s medial as ἦμαι for ἥσμαι.

(3) ν, or the digamma F. See digammatation. So also, ἐκόντι is for *Fεκοντι* Sansk. vacant and ἔνεκα for *ἐνFεκα* Æol. *ἐννεκα* Ionic *εἶνεκα*.

(4) It sometimes represents both an obliterated sibilant and digamma, as in ἔ for σ*F*έ, ἡδύς for σ*F*αδύς. So compare ἐός, ὅς and σ*F*ός, his, as various equivalent forms to the one Sansk. form svas, Lat. suus. "Ιδιος likewise is claimed by some as for σ*F*ιδιος, from same root, as Sansk. svas, own.

(5) The half-vowel y initial. Thus ὅς, the relative adj.

pronoun, represents the Sansk. yas, who; ἡπαρ, gen. ἡπατος, for ἡπαρτος, Sansk. yakrit, from yakart, Lat. jecur; ὑμεῖς, for ὑμμεῖς, for original ὕσμεῖς, Sansk. yusma; and ἡμερος, tame Sansk. yam to restrain; and ἄζω, for ἄγνω (cf. ἄγιος), Sansk. yaj to worship.

2d. The effects of aspirates on letters immediately preceding them.

(1) A hard mute (π, κ, τ) is changed into the corresponding aspirate φ, χ, θ, by an aspirated vowel succeeding it.

§ 1. In composition, as ἐφῆμερος (= ἐπί + ἡμέρα).

§ 2. At the end of a word, whether the conjunction occurs regularly, or by apocope, as οὐχ οὗτος; ἀφ' ἡμέρας; νύχθ' ὅλην.

(2) The alliteration of two aspirates of the same kind, in successive syllables, displeased the Greek ear; so that one of them may be said to have annulled the other, or rendered it impossible; as, in all reduplicated forms of verbs in -μι, like τίθημι, and likewise reduplicated perfects generally, as πέφληκα.

II. Aspirates in Latin.

There are but two aspirates in Latin, h and f.

1st. The following facts exhibit the function of h, in Latin.

(1) It may represent any one of the following Sanskrit aspirates h, bh, gh: h, as heri for hesi, yesterday (cf. hesternus), Sansk. hyas; bh, as mihi for mibhi, Sansk. mabhyam; and gh, as hospes a guest Sansk. ghas, to eat.

It belongs only to vowels and to them as succeeding it, and is found indeed in the middle of words, only between two vowels, as in nihil and traho; but its possession of its place, or of any phonetic power in it, is so very feeble, that it is readily removed, for the convenience of a contracted form, as in nil for nihil and vemens for vehemens; while for prosodial effect it is treated, when occurring between two vowels, as if it did not exist at all.

(2) Its conversion with s, when in conjunction with it, into x, has analogies of a parallel and illustrative sort in the Sanskrit.

When h is reduplicated in Sanskrit, it becomes some-

times g, as in *hâ* to leave, which becomes *gahâmi*, instead of *hahâmi* (cf. Sansk. *hri* to seize, Gr. *χείρ* and Lat. *gero*) ; and so, in the middle of a word, *hs* becomes *ks*, as in *mêxy-âmi*, for *maihsyami*, fut. of *mih* to urinate (cf. Lat. *traxi* and *vexi* perf.'s of *traho* and *veho*). In both Greek and Latin, *g* is often the equivalent of the Sanskrit *h*, as in *γένυς*, Lat. *gena*, Sansk. *hanus* ; *ἐγών* and *ego* Sansk. *aham* ; and, as in these instances we have for the guttural equivalent the medial mute *γ*, so, in the following instances, we have likewise the smooth mute *κ* representing the Sanskrit *h* : *καρδία*, Lat. *cor(d)*, Sansk. *hard*, *hrid* and *hridaya*, and *necto* Sansk. *nah*.

(3) *H* is not so much a consonant as a breathing. It differs from the sibilant, physiologically, only in being a breathing through the whole open mouth, with the tongue at rest on its base and the teeth apart ; while the sibilant is a breathing through the teeth, in a nearly closed state, with the tongue against the upper teeth. *H* and *s* are therefore both breathings and differ, only in the different positions of the tongue and teeth. The sibilant and aspirate have accordingly an etymological, as well as phonetic, parallelism with each other ; and the sibilant, as has been abundantly shown, fades away readily in the Greek into the aspirate.

(4) *Ch*, although found in Latin, is not properly a Latin combination.

It occurs seldom and is resolvable : (1) sometimes into a specimen of wrong orthography, in imitation by the Latin grammarians of the Greek, who, as the founders of the science of language, as of so many other sciences and arts, gave law to the Romans in all matters of theoretic and formal criticism ; and (2) into the resulting form of a contraction.

Ch occurs in a few proper names as *Bacchus* (*Βάκχος*) and *Gracchus*. The strictly Roman words, in which it is found, are the following four : *pulcher*, misspelled for *pulcer*, the original form, which, like the Gr. *φύλλον*, a leaf, (pl. *foliage*) represents the Sansk. *phullan*, a blossom ; *brachium*, which is but the Latinized Greek word *βραχίον*, Sansk. *bahu* ; *inchoð*, which is contracted, as old manuscripts show,

from *incoho*; and *sepulchrum*, in which the suffix *-chrum* is misspelled for *-crum*, meaning the place or the means of any given act described in the root, as in the words *lavacrum* (*lavo*) and *fulcrum* (*fulcio*). Cicero spells the word, *sepulcrum*, and states directly that the ancients did not aspirate words. *Inchoo* is regarded by some, as a strictly Greek word (*ἐνχώννυμι*, to gather in heaps, i.e. for building). Benary conceives of it, in the light of its original form *incoho*, as contracted, like *traho* in his view for *traveho*, from an original form *incoveho* (*in+con+veho*), to bear together: the loss of the radical syllable *ve* being accounted for by syncope, as in *nôram* for *noveram*. If Benary's analysis be accepted, we shall have but three verbal roots in Latin, in which *h* occurs, as the final letter of the stem — *traho*, *veho*, and *coho*; and these will be still farther reducible to but one ultimate form, *veho* (Sansk. *vah* to bear cf. Gr. *ἵκω*). Leo Meyer¹ however, laughs at such a derivation of *traho* (as *tra-veho*) and derives it, like the Gothic *dragan* (Eng. *draw*) and German *tragen*, from the Sanskrit *drâgh* to stretch out, to lie on the ground, to be weary (cf. Germ. *träge* idle). With this he compares also Sansk. *dîrgha* long, Gr. *δολχος* and Sanks. *darh*, to be long. But Meyer, in his notions of the origin of *traho*, stands, it is believed, by himself.

Since the aspirate combines in Sanskrit with the medial mutes, as well as with the soft, that is, with *d* as well as with *t*; and *b* as well as *p*; and *c* as well as *k*; it was probably weaker than in most of the cognate languages.

2d. The function of *F* in Latin.

(1) *F* is a much more positive, definite, aspirate than *h*. It occurs in combination with *l* and *r*; is capable of being doubled (as in *effero*) and maintains its position between two vowels against any and all tendencies to contraction. It occurs almost entirely in the beginning of words, and seldom in the middle.

(2) It is equivalent, etymologically, to several Sanskrit aspirates, as *dh*, *ch*, *h*, *bh*; and to the unaspirated letters, *m*, *p*, *dv*.

¹ Zeitschrift, etc. Vol. VI., p. 223.

(dh), inferus from infra, Sansk. adharâ(s) lower, comparative form of adhas below. Cf. also the superlative forms in the two languages adhamas and infimus; the Latin form throughout being nasalized. In Afer also Africa and Africus, f is equivalent to the same consonant in the same word, adharâ(s), meaning the lower or inferior place or places.

(ch) fundo (root fud) Sansk. chut to pour forth. Gr. χέω fut. χεύσω: (cf. also Gr. χολή and fel, the gall-bladder).

(h) rufus (cf. ruber) Sansk. rohitâs Gr. ἐρυθρός (with which compare also Sansk. rudhira blood).

(bh), fremo, to murmur Sansk. bhran, Gr. βρέμω; fanum a temple, for fagnum, (like finis for fignis from figo) Sansk. bhaj to honor.

(m) formica, Gr. μύρμηξ. The Greek equivalent Benary regards, as immediately corresponding with the Sanskrit root mush, to steal, which in the Greek form is reduplicated, so as to express the idea more strongly: the -ηξ being in his view a mere denominative suffix, like -ex in Lat. senex gen. senis. Compare in same way frendo to gnaw (pure stem fred, as in supine fresum for fredtum) and Sanskrit mrid (with which also for a double equivalent of same root, cf. Lat. mordeo, like repo and serpo in Latin, compared with Sansk. sarp, to creep, Gr. ἔρπω).

(p), foeteo, Sansk. puy, to be corrupt or fetid, Gr. πύθω, (cf. also Sansk. puyan corrupt matter, Gr. πύον and Lat. pus). Compare similarly fodio to dig and Sansk. budh to find out (that is, physically,) and Gr. βυθός depth, the root being βυθ or βοθ, as in βόθρος a pit (cf. also βάθος and βαθύς).

(dv), fores, Sansk. dvâr, a door, Gr. θύρα. So festus, in the word infestus (the preposition in having only a directive or objective force), compares with the Sansk. word dvish to hate.

The Latin however, it must be remembered, is essentially averse from aspirates. Many are the examples of their rejection in Latin, compared with equivalent forms in Greek and Sanskrit, as

LATIN.	GREEK.	SANSKRIT.
puto,	πυνθάνομαι (pure stem πυνθ),	budh.
patior,	πάσχω, for πᾶθσκω, stem παθ.	bâdh.
crepusculum;	κνέφας,	kshapas.
carrus, a wagon,	—————	char, to move.
domus,	δόμος,	dhâman.
fido,	πείθω (pure stem πιθ.)	bandh.
fugio,	φεύγω (stem φυγ).	bhuj.
sex,	ἑξ,	shash.

IV. Reduplication.

Reduplication, like nasalization, is a mode of strengthening the symbol of a thought, or thing. The use of strengthened forms was an early feature of language, abounding in the Sanskrit and Greek, and of frequent occurrence also in Latin; but occurring less and less in derived languages, as we get farther and farther from their primeval sources. As the Latin generally preserves, with the Sanskrit, more of the same simple strong characteristics, which they thereby both indicate to have belonged to their common mother-tongue, than does the Greek; its departure to a wider degree than the Greek from its original, in this respect, is to be ascribed probably to the direct practical tendencies of the Roman temperament, which did not relish double forms of the same thing, or multiplied modes of reaching the same end.

While human sensibility is instinctively averse from monotony, and the human organism generally recoils from mere iteration of any kind; there is yet manifestly a strong tendency, as appears not only in the first syllabication of infants, but also in the confirmed usage of all nations, to a repetition of the same consonantal sound in the utterance of many words, although the repetition is usually connected with some attending vowel-modification. The reiteration of a given sound intensifies it, as does that of a word or syllable, by not only drawing the hearer's attention to it more strongly; but also by showing that the speaker thinks, from his purposed repetition of it, that it deserves to do so.

Reduplication abounds in Sanskrit and occurs, as in Greek, in the present active of many verbs, and also in the preterite, as a sign of past time ; and even a retriPLICATION of the root sometimes occurs in Sanskrit, as *bhibhībhīd*, from the simple base *bhid* to divide (German *beissen*, Eng. bite, cf. Lat. *findo*, as a strengthened form).

1st Reduplication in Greek.

(1) A reduplication of the stem occurs, as a mode of strengthening it, in the present tense, and those tenses which are derived from it, of some verbs.

Thus *γίγνομαι* (stem *γεν*) is for *γιγένομαι* ; *μίμνω* (stem *μεν*) for *μιμένω*, and *πίπτω* for *πιπέτω*. So *τίθημι*, *δίδωμι* and *ἵστημι* are reduplications of the stems *θε*, *δο*, and *στα*. Other examples are such as *μιμέομαι*, to imitate ; *μερμηρίζω*, to be anxious ; *πορφύρω* (stem *φυρ*, to mix), to gleam, from which comes *πόρφυρα*, purple (referring to the constant play of light upon it) ; in all of which words, their own very repetitiousness of sound is a good image of the repetitiousness of the act, which they denote.

In such reduplicated words, the verb is strengthened in two ways : by the repetition of the stem itself as such, and also by the consequent lengthening of the verb-form as a form.

Some reduplications, in both Greek and Latin, manifest clearly a simple onomato-poetic origin, as mere syllabifications, in human speech, of repetitious sounds previously heard in nature ; as *μορμύρω*, Lat. *murmuro*, to murmur ; *λαλαγέω*, to babble ; *καχλάζω* (stem *χλαζ*), to dash or plash ; so Lat. *susurro* (simple stem *sur* reduplicated), to whisper.

Of the reduplicated verbs in Greek, when not onomato-poetic, or, like *μερμηρίζω*, ideopoetic, it may be said, as of *δίδωμι*, *τίθημι*, etc., that they are among the most common words in the language ; whose emphasis, being somewhat impaired by the constant familiarity of their use, is quite restored by the intensification of their form. Many also, if not most of them, are but copies of similar forms, in earlier languages, as *δίδωμι*, Sansk. *dadâmi*, and *τίθημι*, Sansk. *dadhâmi*.

An exhibition of the attending changes that occur, in some of the common instances of reduplication in Greek, will perhaps be of service. In *δίδωμι* (stem *δο*, Sansk. *da*) the reduplicated vowel *ο* is changed to short *ι*; so as to compensate for the added length of the word, and also so as to throw the reduplicated vowel into the shade, compared with the stem-vowel; while, similarly, in order to make the stem-vowel still more prominent, or to increase its relative, dynamical effect, as containing in itself all the sense of the verb, as such; as well as for the further purpose of preventing the concurrence of three short vowels; the short stem-vowel *ο* is lengthened into *ω*. The same analysis, step by step, will resolve the changes that have occurred in *τίδημι*, stem *δε*, except that, in addition to those made in *δίδωμι*, *θ* is changed, in the reduplicated syllable, into its corresponding smooth mute *τ*, as two initial aspirates cannot succeed each other in two successive syllables. Apply also the same analysis to *ῖημι*, stem *ῑ* (Sansk. *yâ*, to send away), and *βίβημι*, stem *βα* (Sansk. *ga*) as also in *βαίνω* for *βάνω*), in which form the stem is nasalized. The form *ῖστημι* is for the more normal form *σίστημι*, and this for the fuller form still *στίστημι*, stem *στα*; with which compare Lat. *sisto* (for full form *sistami*) reduplicated from stem *sta*, as in *sto*, *stare*, Sansk. *sthâ*. In the reduplicated syllable (*ῖ*) of *ῖστημι*, two special changes have occurred: the dropping out of a radical letter of the stem (*τ*) and the exchange, as in so many other instances in Greek, of the initial sibilant for the aspirate. In *γίγνομαι* (stem *γεν*), for fullest unaltered form *γενεγένομαι*, the final *ν* of the reduplicated syllable has been dropped, and the *ε* of the stem syllable (*γεν*) rejected, as in other reduplicated consonantal stems, as *πίπτω*, *μίμνω*, etc.; instead of being lengthened as in the vowel stems. In *πίπτω* for *πεπτέω* and *μίμνω* for *μευμένω*, there are the same changes as in *γίγνομαι*.

(2) The reduplication occurring in the form of the Greek perfect, consists regularly in doubling the initial consonant of the stem, with the vowel *ε* appended to it; which, unless it be the stem-vowel itself, as in *νέμω*, perf. *νενέμηκα*, is adopted

as a compensative shortening inwardly of the increased volume of the word outwardly, as in *λέλυκα* from *λύω* and *γέγραφα* from *γράφω*. If the reduplicated stem be a vowel-stem, as in the contract verbs, the final vowel of which is always short (on the principle that a vowel before another vowel is short), that short vowel is lengthened, as in *τιμάω*, *τετίμηκα*; *φιλέω*, *πεφίληκα*; *δηλόω*, *δεδήλωκα*. Unlike the augment, which is rejected in all the moods besides the indicative, reduplication is retained in them all. In stems beginning with two consonants or a double consonant, except a mute preceding either *λ*, *μ*, *ν* or *ρ*, the reduplication amounts only to the usual augment *ε* in form, as in *ζώννυμι* perf. *ἔζωκα*. Those beginning also with *ρ* prefix *ε*, and at the same time double the initial *ρ*, as in *ρίπτω*, perf. *ῥρίψα*. Such forms as *ζέζωκα* and *ῥέριψα*, however normal in their type, the Greek ear could not abide. Some few verbs also, instead of the usual syllable of reduplication, prefix *ε* lengthened into *ει*, as in *εἶληφα* perf. of *λαμβάνω*, instead of *λέληφα* (for the explanation of which see previous part of this Article, page 704 Vol. xvi. (1859).

In those few peculiar perfect forms, which change the stem vowel into an *o*-sound in reduplication, as *ἔολπα* perf. of *ἔλπω*, *ἔοργα* perf. of *έργω*, *ἔοικα*, of *εἶκω* and *εἶδα* of *ἔδω*, the facts which at first sight appear to be so anomalous, are yet quite resolvable by analysis. *Ἐλπω*, *ἔργω* and *ἔδω* are each for *Ἡέλπω*, *Ἡέργω* and *Ἡέδω*, respectively; and their proper perfect forms for the second perfect tense, from such digammated originals, would be *ἩέἩελπα*, *ἩέἩηργα* and *ἩέἩηδα*. With the digammas dropped, there would be a hiatus at once caused by two vowels of the same kind in conjunction, which was the most offensive form of hiatus to a Greek ear: a difficulty which could in no way be relieved so well, as by the change of *η* to *ο*; *ε* and *η* being compound vowels formed from *α+ι* (*η* differing from *ε* as having two measures of *α* in its composition, since *ε* is *α+ι*, and *η* is *α+ι+α*); while *ο* is a compound vowel also formed from *α+υ*. The vowel *ο* was as special a favorite with the Greeks, in changed forms and derived forms, as was the

vowel *a* with the Romans. The perfect *ἔοικα* from *εἶκω* to seem (from *εἶκος*, one with itself, likely; Sanskrit *êkas* for *aikas* one; Lat. *aequus*; cf. also *ἵσκω*, to make like, and *ἴσος*, equal), would be, reduplicated without change, *εἴεικα*. But the *ι* of the reduplicated syllable must fall out, by the rule that that must be shortened; and the *ε* of the stem-syllable *ει* is changed readily, as in so many other cases in Greek (as in the perfects of *μένω*, *δέρκομαι*, *λείπω* etc.), to *ο*. In the form *εἶωδα* from *ἔδω* for *ἑἔδω*, we have such changes as the following from *ἑἔδω*, the unchanged normal archaic form: the change of the reduplicated vowel (*ε*), after the dropping of the digammas, into *ει* which, contrary to the usual rule, is the lengthening instead of the shortening of the vowel of reduplication, and which was probably done for the sake of adding strength to a base of so weak a consonantal character — *δ* (much weaker than any of the others enumerated); and the same phonetic instinct, which would suggest or rather demand the lengthening of the reduplicated vowel, would demand, for the preservation of the proper relative vowel-weight of the stem-vowel in the form, the lengthening of that also from *ο* as the new vowel naturally selected for it to *ω*.

The Attic reduplication, so called, differs from the common form of reduplication, in repeating the entire initial syllable, instead of merely the initial consonant with *ε*: the radical syllable also at the same time being emphasized, as such by the lengthening of its vowel, as in *ἀρήρωκα*, perfect of *ἀρῶω*, etc.

2d. Reduplication in Latin.

This verbal affection is not of so wide a scope in Latin, as in Greek or Sanskrit. In Sanskrit, there are three distinct preterite forms: the first, answering in form to the Greek and Latin imperfect; the second, to the Greek perfect; and the third, to the Greek aorist. Yet neither one of these three perfects is generally used, to represent the completeness of an action; and their parallelism with the corresponding tenses named in Latin and Greek, is one of form instead of being one also of sense. The first preterite, like the Greek imperfect in form, is marked by the augment (*a*); the second, like

the Greek perfect, is marked by reduplication ; and the third, like the Greek aorist, is marked by *s* and the augment.

In Latin the perfect and aorist are combined in the same form, commonly denominated the perfect, and discriminated in practice only by the sense of the context. While there are several modes of forming the Latin perfect — as by the use of the auxiliary verb, *-fui*, which is indeed the prevailing mode of forming it (being hardened in the first and fourth conjugations into *-vi* ; and often also in the second, in which it is otherwise softened into *-ui* ; and sometimes even in the third) ; and also by the addition of *s* to the verb-stem, as in the Sanskrit third preterite and Greek aorist, — many instances are found in the different conjugations, except the fourth, of its formation also by the reduplication of the stem.

A few instances occur in Latin of words possessing a reduplicated form, in themselves ; as *sisto*, stem *sta* (cf. *sto*, *stare*) ; *gigno*, stem *gen*, (perf. *genui*) ; both of which verbs are causative in their force: *sisto* meaning to cause to stand, and *gigno* to cause to be, or become (*γίγνομαι*, stem *γεν*). So *bibo* has for its stem *bo* (cf. *πίνω*, stem *πο*, fut. *πόσω*) ; *sero*, for *seso*, (Gr. *σεῖω* and *σεύω*, to hurl about, Sansk. *su* and *sû*), has the stem *se*. *Memini* is a reduplication of the root *men*, to think (Sansk. *man*, as also in Lat. *moneo*. Cf. *reminiscor*, *mens* and *Minerva*, goddess of wisdom ; and also *μνάομαι*, *μένος* and *μήνις*) *Populus* is but *plus* (*πολύς* cf. *πλέος*) reduplicated, to signify a great number. *Jejunus* (cf. *ἰνῶω*, to be empty and *inanis*) seems to be a reduplicated derivative from the same root with *ἰνῶω*.

While in Greek the vowel of the reduplicated syllable is *ε*, it may be in Latin, as in Sanskrit, *o* or *u* ; as in *momordi*, *spopondi* and *tutudi*, perfects of *mordeo*, *spondeo*, and *tundo*.

As the perfect denotes a past act, viewed as complete in present time, there is certainly a theoretic propriety, in expressing its sense by a reduplication ; as the calling up of something already past into the present again, is making it repeat itself: appearing first in its own occurrence as a fact, and secondly appearing again in the announcement of it

anew to those, who did not see it themselves but who learn it from the testimony of another.

Before the light of Sanskrit philology was obtained, the Greek augment (ἐ) was analyzed by the best scholars, like Buttmann, as but a form of reduplication, shortened by the rejection of the initial consonant. But the discovery of the Sanskrit augment (a), as well as that of the reduplicated preterite in Sanskrit, dispelled at once such a theory.

In German, as in some English derivatives also from it, repetitious forms of words occur, which are instances indeed of reduplication, but which occur only in the lower strata of the language, as zigzag, hurly-burly, criss-cross, hurry-scurry, hocus pocus (hoc est corpus), helter skelter (hilariter et celeriter). Such forms have no grammatical or lexical significance of their own.

V. Nasalization.

The one letter most frequently used in all languages, to strengthen the stem of a word, is *n*; which contains in it also, because of its own phonetic strength, the idea of negation in all languages. Even our very words negation (ne+ aio), and deny (de+nego), do but echo it again to us, as it appears in the words no, neither, nor, never, nay, not, none; Latin ne, non (archaic nenu), nullus (ne+ullus), nihil (ne+hilum), neuter (ne+uter), nunquam (ne+unquam); Gr. *νη*, *μη*; French ne and non; and German nicht (not), nie and nimmer (never), nein (no), and niemand (no one). So in Greek the same negative nasal appears in the preposition *ἀνευ*, without, and the abbreviated particles *αυα*, *αν* and the inseparable prefix *νη*-, which is but a strengthened form of *αυα* abridged; and the Latin negative prefix in-; the German preposition ohne without, and the English prefixes of negation in- and un-. In Sanskrit and Zend we find na, not, and in Sanskrit also mât and Persian me (Gr.

μη). N is a stronger nasal than m and is accordingly, as we have shown, the prevailing base of negative words in the different languages. There are properly three nasal liquids m, n, ng, which abound in Latin and Greek, as also in German and English. Examples of the nasal ng in Latin are *ango, inquam, anxius*; in Greek *κλαγγή, ἄγγελος*; and in English, *anger*, with which compare for difference of sound the word *singing*; in the pronunciation of which, the g-sound does not duplicate itself upon the next syllable. The soft sound of ng, in such words as *singing, ringing*, etc., occurs abundantly in German; and, while it is not found in Greek and Latin, it does belong to the Sanskrit.

Ng may be accordingly analyzed, as a guttural nasal, as in English *longer*, Lat. *longus*; and as a palatal or resonant nasal; and this of two kinds: hard, as in English words *swinging* and *hanger*; and soft, as in words *strange* and *mangy*. The English and French *nch*, as in Eng. *haunch* and French *blanche*, forms a dental nasal, as in German the word *manch* does a lingual nasal, where *nch* has a sound peculiar to that language. At the end of words in French, as in *bon, bien, nom*, n and m have a very light sound as palatal nasals.

The class of stems strengthened by nasalization, or by the insertion or addition of n to them, with or without an accompanying vowel, is that of verb-stems. The tenses thus strengthened are in each of the three classical languages, as a general fact, only the present and the derived tenses. In Latin however *jungo* preserves its nasalized stem throughout all its forms; with which compare the simple stem *jug*, as seen in *jugum*, and also both the strengthened and simple stems, as combined in *ζεύγνυμι* fut. *ζεύξω* etc. In Lat. words *tingo, pingo, and stringo*, the nasalized stem prevails throughout the verb, except in the supine stem.

The nasal is added to the stem in two ways, in reference to the place of its connection: (1) At the end of the stem. Specimens of its addition at the end of a vowel-stem are *δύνω, κρίνω, τίνω*, stems *δυ, κρι, τι*; and at the end of a consonantal stem are *δάκνω, κάμνω, τέμνω*, stems *δακ, καμ, ταμ*. As,

in Latin, cerno, sperno, and sterno are cases of metathesis, their simple roots being cre, spre and stra, they are not to be reckoned as verbs having consonantal stems. (2) In the middle of the stem; as, in Latin, in findo, fundo, linquo, pango, pungo, rumpo, vinco.

Roots are nasalized also in different modes and to different degrees, as to the volume and effect of the nasal addition made to their weight:

(1) By the addition of mere *ν* to them, which is the exclusive mode in Latin; as in *τίνω* fut. *τίσω*, *τέμνω* fut. *τεμῶ* for *τεμ(έσ)ω*.

(2) By adding *αν*, as in *δαρδάνω*, *αἰσδάνω*, *αὔξανω*.

When the root-vowel is short, as in the stems *λαβ*, *λαθ*, *λαχ*, *μαθ*, *πνθ*, *φυγ*, a double nasalization occurs: the simple nasal *ν* being inserted before the final consonant as well as the nasal appendage *αν* after it; as in *λαμβάνω*, *λαινδάνω*, *λαγχάνω*, *μανδάνω*, *πνυνδάνομαι*, *φυγγάνω*. Here, as Curtius beautifully suggests, the nasal of the stem syllable is a sort of fainter phonetic reflection of the nasal ending added to it.

(3) By adding *νε*: as in *κυνέω* fut. *κυσω*; *ἰκνέομαι* fut. *ἴξομαι*; *βυνέω*, etc.

(4) By adding *νν*. This class of strengthened verb-forms in Greek should be viewed, in connection with their equivalent forms in Latin: as

GREEK.	SANSKRIT.	LATIN.
<i>ρήγνυμι</i> , for <i>Ερηγνυμι</i> .	bhanj and bhâj.	frango.
<i>ζεύγνυμι</i> (stem <i>ζυγ</i> .)	yu and yuj.	jungo.
<i>πήγνυμι</i> (stem <i>παγ</i> .)	paç,	pango.
{ <i>σκέδαννυμι</i> , (cf. <i>σκιδνημι</i> ,	chid, and khid,	scindo.
{ <i>σχίζω</i> and <i>κεδάζω</i> .)	to divide.	

In this class of verbs, while the nasal is inserted before the guttural in Latin, it is placed in Greek after it and syllabicated with a vowel, that it may be placed there.

All the vowel sounds are capable of receiving, in various modern languages, a nasal quality. In French we have a nasal a-sound, broad, and flat, as in *ange* and *linge*; and a nasal u-sound in both French (*un*) and Portuguese (*um*); as also a nasal o-sound in French (*bon*); and a nasal i-sound in Portuguese (*im*).

Nasalization, on a larger or smaller scale, is one of the inner forces to be found at work in all languages, ancient and modern, and occurring, not only in Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin, but also in the German and English.

B. The Latin.

1st. Benary's classification, in brief, of the fundamental principles of its special phonetic system.

After what has been said, in detail, in different parts of this Essay, on the phonetic elements and laws of the Latin language, it will not be necessary to enlarge the separate features of the general view, here furnished by Benary. The outline is indeed brief but comprehensive, and well worthy of study as a whole. The first half of the first volume published by him (in 1837), which is all that has yet appeared from his pen on the subject, is occupied with the subject of diphthongation; and the remaining half with that of aspiration.

These, then, are the special peculiarities of the phonetic system of the Latin, as grouped by him into one view, and are here thus formally quoted, on account of their value, as a group in one whole.

I. Disinclination to diphthongs.

II. The small range of aspiration.

III. The limited use of consonantal combinations, in initial and medial syllables.

IV. The counterbalancing influence of consonants and vowels.

V. The weakening of final letters, after consonants, as well as after vowels.

2d. The phonetic force of the Latin letters in alphabetic order.

A. This represents the Sanskrit *a*, and the Greek *α*, *ε*, and *η*.

(*α*) Sansk. *sara*, salt; *ἄλς*; *sal*.

(*ε*) *ἔνος* and *ἐνιαυτός*, a year; *annus*.

(*η*) *ἄρπη*, a sickle; *harpa*.¹

¹ The *harp* gets its name from its being sickle-shaped; and it is of the same root with *harpoon* and the *harpies*.

In composition it is changed into the different vowels, e, i, u.

(e), inermis (in+arma); imberbis (in+barba); aspergo (ad+spargo). So even au may be changed to e, as in obedio (ob+audio).

(i) incido (in+cado); insilio (in+salio).

(u) insulsus (in+salsus).

In reduplicated forms it changes also in the tone-syllable, into e and i, as fefelli perf. of fallo, and tetigi and cecidi of tango and cado.

B. It is equivalent to the Sanskrit bh, b, g and p.

(b) bhû, to be, imperf. abhavam; -bam -bo, imperfect and future tense-suffixes, in the Act. voice of Latin verbs. So Sansk. barbara, foolish, barbarus.

(g) gô, gen. gavas, a cow; bos (βούς). G in Sanskrit is however more often represented by g in Latin than by b; while β occurs, as its equivalent, much more frequently in Greek than in Latin.

(p) plu, to move, to flow; bullo, to bubble; Gr. βλύω.

It represents the Greek β, π, φ.

(β) bos; βούς; bulbus; βολβός.

(π) bibo (stem bo, reduplicated); πίνω fut. πόσω (stem πο), to drink. So, buxus, the box-tree and πύξος. Compare in the same way in Latin publicus with its archaic form populicus from populus; and in German Burg, and in Eng. -burgh and burgher and burgess with πύργος.

(φ) Compare the following equivalent forms in the two languages: balaena, a whale, and φάλαινα; orbus, bereft, ὀρφανός, later ὀρφός; ambo, both, ἄμφω (cf. ambi- and ἄμφι); nebula, a cloud, νεφέλη.

Its changes in Latin are the following :

(1) Before the labial aspirate f, b passes sometimes into f, as offero for obfero; sometimes it changes into u, as aufugio for abfugio; and sometimes it is rejected, while its previous existence is recorded in the lengthening of the preceding vowel, as in āverto for ōbverto and āvello for ōbvello.

(2) Before s and t, it is commonly softened into p, as

scripsi perf. of scribo, and nuptus from nubo. In one case however it becomes s before si by assimilation, as jussi for jubsī, perf. of jubeo. In compound words, as obtendo, subtraho, etc., heterogeneous sounds are endured in combination in Latin contrary to the law of homogeneity required in concurrent vowels so universally in Greek and occasionally at least in Latin.

C. Its equivalents in Sanskrit are ç, g, ch, h, k and v.

(ç) çana, hemp; cannabis, *κάνναβις*; çarnis, a horn, cornu (*κέρας*): çarabha, a crab, carabus, *κάραβος*.

(g) gala, the neck; collum.

(ch) char, to go, and châras, a course; curro and cursus: chil, to cover; celo.

(h) hard, hrid and hridaya, the heart; cor(d) (*κῆρ* and *καρδία*): hal, to hollow; coelum, (*κοῖλος*).

(k) karavah, a crow; corvus (*κόραξ*): kar and kri, to make, creo, to create, (cf. cresco).

(v) bhavayâmi (causative form of bhû, to be), I make; facio (for faciami): jiv, to live; vixi (for vicsi) and victum, perf. and supine of vivo.

C is equivalent to κ, γ, χ, π, in Greek.

(κ) caro, flesh, *κρέας*: cygnus, a swan, *κύκνος*.

(γ) conger, an eel, *γόγγρος*: caneo, to glisten, *γανῶω*.

(χ) cedo, to depart, *χάζω*: corium, skin, *χόριον*: scindo, to divide, *σχίζω*: *credo*, to believe, *χράω*.

(π) linquo, to leave *λείπω*: Cf. lupus, a wolf, *λύκος*.

In the Latin itself, c sometimes changes into g; as, contrarily, g sometimes becomes c. See the supines of verbs in -go, as cinctum, junctum, rectum, from cingo, jungo, re-go, for the change of g to c; and for that of c to g, quadringenti, quingenti, etc., and negligo, negotium etc.

So long as the Latin remained pure, c had the hard sound of k even before the vowels e and i; and in later times, as we learn from Quintilian, c was pronounced in such names as Caius and Cnæus, as G. No distinction in fact was made archaically between c and g; and c occupies the same relative position in the Roman alphabet that g does in the

Greek and Phoenician. The graphic symbol *g* was not introduced into the Roman alphabet, until five hundred years and more had passed from the founding of the city. Spurius Cervilius devised it (A. U. C. 523), in order to represent the medial guttural sound, for the soft sound of which *c*, as well as *qu*, both pronounced as *k*, were kept. Prodigium is accordingly for prodicium, from prodico, to tell beforehand; so congruo and ingruo, thought by many to be compounds of *con* and *grus*, in and *grus*, are probably but contracted forms of *concurro* and *incurro*; compare also *dulcis* and *indulgeo*. The fact that several words have double forms interchangeably in *c* and *g*, as *vicesimus* and *vigesimus*, *-centi* and *-genti*, in the various cardinal numbers for hundreds; and the change of *c* to *g*, in some compound words as *negotium* (*nec-otium*), or in derived ones, as *digitus* from root *dic* (cf. *dico* and *disco* Gr. *δεικνυμι*), shows that the sound of *c* wavered at times at least between *k* and *g*.

C, like *g* and like *v* also sometimes, combined with *s* is changed to *x*; while in some perfects in *s* the guttural entirely disappears, as in *tersi* from *tergo* for *tergsi*.

D. The equivalents of *d* are in Sanskrit *d*, *dh*.

(*d*) *dam*, to subdue; *domo* (cf. *dominus* and *domina*; Eng. *dominion*, *domineer*, *domain*, *dame*, *dam*, *damsel*, *Madam*).

(*dh*) *dhâman*, a house; *domus*.

Its Greek correspondents are *δ*, *ζ*, *θ*, *σ*.

(*δ*) *δέκα*, ten; *decem*.

(*ζ*) *ζημία*, damage; *damnum*.

(*θ*) *Θεός*, God, (Æol. *Δεός*, cf. *Zeus*, gen. *Διός*); *Deus*. (Cf. *τίθημι*, stem *θε*, Sansk. *dhâ*, German *thun*, Eng. *do*.)

(*σ*) *μέσος*, middle, *medius*. Cf. also *ρόδον* and *rosa*, a rose.

Its peculiarities in Latin are the following :

(1) Before *c*, *p*, *r*, *t*, it is regularly assimilated to those letters, as in *accedo*, *appello*, *arrideo* and *attendo*. It is also

often assimilated before f, g, l, n, s; as in sella for sedla (for sedela), fossa for fodsa, agger for adger, etc.

(2) Before t, it changes in the middle of words by assimilation into s, as in rastrum for radtrum (from rado), and rostrum for rodtrum (rodo), and est 3d pers. sing. present of edo to eat, for edt. In some words, after the change of the d to s, the t wholly disappears, as in morsum (for mortum) for mordtum, from mordeo; and so pensum (for pensum) for pendtum from pendo; and risum for ridtum.

(3) In nominative forms d drops out before the gender-sign s, as laus for lauds, frons for fronds, pes for peds, vas for vads and lapis for lapids.

(4) D has wholly disappeared from the ablative singular of nouns where it once existed, as the case-characteristic of the ablative in all the different declensions; as in domino for dominod, sermone for sermoned: forms found in archaic inscriptions, which yet have left no trace of their previous existence upon the present state of the language, except in the prosodial fact of the elongation of the final vowel of the ablative, as in a, o, u and e terminal, of the 1st, 2d, 4th and 5th declensions.

(5) D, original in archaic forms, became afterwards sometimes l, as in lingua for diugua (cf. German zunge, Eng. tongue) and lacrima for dacrima (δάκρυμα). So compare levir and δαήρ for δαFήρ, and Ulysses and Ὀδύσσευς. Compare also lignum, wood (for burning) and λυγνός flame-smoke, with Sansk. dah, to burn and δαίω, to kindle.

(6) D followed by u in archaic forms was afterwards represented by b, as in bellum for archaic duellum; bis, archaic dvis (Gr. δῖς for δFῖς); and also bonus for duonus.

(7) Di and J were correlated in some forms in Latin; as Diana and Janus; dies, deus, Jovis and Juno. In the derived languages the Latin di is abundantly thus represented.

E. This letter represents the Sanskrit a, i, y.

(a) ad, to eat; edo.

(i) îr to go; erro, ἔρρω (cf. îra and ἔρα, the earth).

(y) yam, to obtain; emo (cf. νέμω).

It corresponds with ϵ and η in Greek.

(ϵ) *κέντρον*, a point from *κέντειν*, to prick; *centrum* (Eng. centre).

(η) *ἥρως*, a hero : *heros*.

In several words the double forms of the present and preterite roots, apparently occurring, by some inexplicable metathesis, within the bounds of the Latin itself, are wonderfully parallel with similar double forms of the same roots in Sanskrit : as *cerno*, perf. *crevi* (Sansk. *kar* and *kri*) ; *sterno*, perf. *stravi* (Sansk. *star* and *stri*). So compare Sansk. *sarp* and *srip*, to creep and Lat. *serpo* and *repo*.

E is often changed in Latin in compound and derived forms into i, o and u.

(i) *pertinax* (per+tenax) ; *contineo* (con+teneo)

(o) *extorris* (ex+terra) ; *socius* (sequor) ; *sodalis* (sedeo) ; *toga* (tego) ; *vortex* (verto).

(u) In *genus* (Gr. *γένος*, stem *γενες*) the proper stem of the word is *genes* and the present genitive *generis* is for *genesis*. In *pulsus* (part. of *pello*) for *pelsus*, for *peltus*, as likewise in *sepultus* part. of *sepelio*, and also in *avulsus* part. of *avello* and *tugurium*, from *tego*, we see similar specimens of the same change. E also interchanges sometimes with u in double forms, as *dejero* and *dejuero*, *pejero* and *perjuero*.

F. F represents several Sanskrit letters, as already shown under "Aspiration" (p. 839).

Its Greek equivalents are ϑ , χ , β .

(ϑ) *fera*, a wild beast ; $\vartheta\eta\rho$: *ferveo*, to be hot ; $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omega$.

(χ) *fel*, gall ; $\chi\acute{o}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$: *fatisco*, to gape ; $\chi\alpha\tau\acute{\epsilon}\omega$. So compare *frenum*, a bridle, and $\chi\alpha\lambda\iota\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$; and *funis*, a rope and $\sigma\chi\acute{o}\iota\nu\omicron\varsigma$.

(β) *fremo*, to roar ; $\beta\rho\acute{\epsilon}\mu\omega$: *fascino*, to bewitch ; $\beta\alpha\sigma\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\omega$. Cf. also *rufus* and *ruber*, and French siffler with Lat. *sibilare*, as also Lat. *frater* and Eng. brother. It is sometimes hardened in derived forms in Latin into b ; as in the suffixes -ber, -brum and -brium. Thus *saluber* (*salus*+fero) means literally bearing health ; and *candelabrum*, a candlestick, is literally

something *bearing* a candle. Cf. likewise the imperfect and future tense-endings -bam and -bo, with the preterite suffix -ui and -vi (fui) : all from same root as Sansk. bhû, to be.

G. The equivalents of g in Sansk. are g, gh, j, ç, h, y.

(g) gaudeo, to rejoice; garv : garrio, to chatter; grij, or grî : gilvus, yellow; gaura (cf. German gelb, Eng. yellow with gilvus).

(gh) gauea, an eating-house for gasnea; ghas, to eat.

(j) genu, the knee; jânu : gelu, cold; jalas.

(ç) gloria, glory and *inclytus*, renowned; çravas, (cf. Gr. κλέος for κλέFος).

(h) gena, the cheek (γένυς); hanu(s) : so also ego (ἐγώ) and Sansk. aham (for agham) : and nego (=ne+aino), to deny; ah, to say : and anguis, a snake; ahis.

(y) geminus, twin; yamas and yamanas, united, from yam, to unite (Gr. γαμέω)

Its correspondents in Greek are γ, χ, β, κ.

(γ) genu, the knee; γόνυ : gyrus, a circle; γυρός.

(χ) gutta, a drop; χέω fut. χεύσω, adj. χυτός : gero, to bear; χείρ : ango, to squeeze; ἄγχω.

(β) glans, an acorn; βάλανος.

(κ) gubernare, to govern; κυβερνάω.

G becomes c before t, as in lectus and rectus for legtus and regtus. The law of homogeneousness in consonantal combinations prevails in the middle of words, in Latin as in Greek : smooth with smooth; middle with middle; and rough with rough, as scriptus for scribtus, etc. With a succeeding s, g becomes x, as in rexi (reg-si), maximus (mag-simus); or disappears before s, as mulsi (for mulg-si). As an initial letter occurring in combination with other consonants, it is found only with l and r. Before n it has entirely disappeared from the beginning of many words once possessing it, as in navus (Fr. naïve) and nosco and nascor, originally gnavus, gnosco and gnascor; although it reappears again in compound forms, as ignavus (in+gnavus) and agnosco.

H. H represents Sansk. h; as hiems, wintry storm; hi-man (cf. *χείμα*): also veho, to carry; vah. Its equivalents in Greek are the aspirate, as horror and *ὄρρωδέω*; and χ, as hortus and *χόρτος*, veho and *ὀχέω*; hirundo and *χελιδών*. H is but a light breathing, and so light that two vowels enclosing it between them are affected by their juxtaposition, just as if it were wanting: the first being made short by the second, according to the usual rule, that a vowel before another vowel is short.

It changes before t into c; as tractus from traho and vectus from veho. So mactus agrees with Sansk. mah in its root; as do also magnus, magis and major, for magior (cf. *μείζων* for *μέγιων*).

The sign H was used as a sign to represent the aspirate by the Greeks, before being used, as it came to be in the end, as the sign for double ε, or η; and it was accordingly placed, at the outset, after the smooth mutes π, κ, τ, to indicate the aspiration of them, afterwards indicated by the symbols φ, χ, θ. When used as a whole simply to designate the vowel η, it was also divided and one half of the symbol H shortened for convenience into ' was used to denote the rough breathing; while the other half H shortened into the smooth breathing, and turned from the proper cursive direction of the letter, to indicate that its force did not go over upon it, was used to discriminate as such every initial vowel that was not aspirated.

I. and J. I is often the equivalent of the Sanskrit a, and i, and ê.

(a) ignis, fire; agnis: in, into and in; ana: imber, a shower; abhra: *invîtus*, unwilling; vas, to wish.

(i) is, he; i, the demonstrative particle i (cf. also idem the same and Sansk. idam, he, it); eo, ire, to go; i, to go: viginti, twenty; vingati.

(e) vitis, a vine; vêttra, a reed.

J is equivalent to Sansk. y, as jungo, to join; yu and yuj: juvenis, a youth; yuvan.

The Greek correspondent of j is ζ, which was not pro-

nounced, as commonly in this country, as if *ds*, but as *dsh* or *j* or *zh*; and the ancients spoke admiringly of its soft liquid sound.

I in compound and derived forms in Latin is often substituted for other letters, as for *a*, *ae*, *e*, *o* and *u*. It is the substitute of *a* in *incīdo* (*in*+*cado*); *ae*, in *incīdo* (*in*+*cae*-*do*); *e*, in *retineo* (*re*+*teneo*); *o*, in *illico* (*in*+*loco*); *u*, in *consilium* (from *consulo*) and *exsilium* (*exsul*). **I** represents the short vowel-sounds in Greek *α*, *ε*, *ο*. (*α*) *digitus*; *δάκτυλος*: *catinus*, a bowl; *κάτανος*. (*ε*) *piper*, *pepper*, *πέπερι*. (*ο*) *canis* gen. *canis*, a dog; *κύων*, gen. *κυνός*.

J sometimes falls out of the middle of words as in *obex* for *objex* (*objicio*) and *aīs*, 2d pers. present of *aio*, or *ajo*, for *ajis*. **J** is the consonantal counterpart of the vowel *i*, as *v* is also of *u*.

As the Greek *υ* was pronounced like the French *u*, the corresponding vowel of Latin forms, from the same root as Greek forms containing it, takes *i* in its place, to which the short French *u*-sound is very similar. The letter *y* accordingly has received from this fact the alphabetic name *y* Grec, in French.

K. **K** was employed in the earliest period of the Latin, as the equivalent of the Greek *κ*; at which time *c* represented the Greek *γ* in sound as well as in its alphabetic place and its symbolic form (inverted). When subsequently a new symbol for *g* was invented, *c* supplanted *k* in use; and *k* in consequence fell into disuse, except in a few abbreviated forms as *Kal.* for *calendae*, etc.

L. **L** is equivalent to Sanskrit *l*, *n*, *r*, *d*.

(l) *labor*, *labi*, to fall and *labo*, *āre*; *lab* and *lamb*: *libet* and *lubet*, it is pleasing; *lubb*: *ligo*, to bind; *lig*.

(n) *alius*, another; *anyas*.

(r) *lyra* (Gr. *λύρα* prob. at first *λύδρα*; *ru*, to sound forth and *rudrī*, an instrument): *laedo*, to injure; *radh*; *lateo*, to be concealed; *rah*, (cf. Fr. *rossignol* and *lusciniolus*). So the terminations *-alis* and *-aris* are radically the same.

(d) *lignum*, wood (to burn); *dah*, to burn: *levir*, a

brother in law (Gr. *δαήρ* for *δαFήρ*); *dêvri* : mel, honey; *madhu*. So *lingua* was originally *dingua*. Cf. also the double forms in Greek *δάφνη* and *λάφνη*, a laurel, and Lat. *oleo*, to smell and odor; also, Lat. *amylum*, starch and Fr. *amidon*.

As *l* could not remain doubled at the end of a word, it was removed, in the nominative, from the end of the stems *mell*, *honey*, and *fell*, *gall*.

M. *M* has for its Sanskrit equivalent *m*. Cf. *machinor*, to contrive, etc.; Sansk. *mah* (Gr. *μηχανάομαι*, Eng. *make*, Fr. *maçon*, Eng. *mason*).

M interchanges with *n*, as *immanis* and *immitto* for *inmanis* and *in-mitto*. *M* also corresponds as a final letter, in the declension of both verbs and nouns, with *ν*¹ in Greek (Sansk. *m*); since the Greek ear would not tolerate *m*, at the end of words. Before *s*, it is assimilated in one case to *s*; as *pressi*, perf. of *premo*, for *premsi*. Usually when *m* and *s* would occur together in the perfect of verbs, *p* is euphonically inserted between them, as *prœmpsi*, perf. of *promo* (= *pro*+*emo*): and *sumpsi*, perf. of *sumo* (= *sub*+*emo*). Cf. for similar epenthesis of *p* in French, *dompter*, to subdue (Lat. *domitare*), and in English *tempt* (Lat. *tento*).

M interchanges in Latin in some instances with *b* and *v*, as *hibernus* (*hiems*) and *promulgo* for *provulgo*; with which compare also *globus* and *glomus*.

N. The Sansk. equivalents of *n*, are *n*, *sn*, *jn*.

(*n*) *neo*, to spin and *necto*, to connect together; *nah*, to knit: *nasus*, the nose; *nâsa*(*s*).

(*sn*) *no*, to swim, and *nato*; *snâ*: *nix*, *nivis*, *snow*; *snavas* (from verb *snu*, to pour forth).

(*jn*) *nosco* (for *gnosco*), to know; *jnâ*.

N in Latin corresponds sometimes with *τ* in Greek; as *pinus*, a pine, Gr. *πίτυς*: *planus*, broad, Gr. *πλατύς*.

In composition with *l* and *r*, *n* is assimilated to them, as

¹ So in French also, *m* often changes to *n*, as *colonne*, a column (*columna*); *sentier* a path (Lat. *semita*).

colligo for conligo and corruo for conruo. So also ullus is for unlus; for unulus; and corolla for coronla for coronola. Before s, as in trans, n often disappears, as in trado (trans +do), traduco, and traho, and tracto its derivative (supposing traho to be for tra +veho). So in elephas (for elephants) and gigas (gigants), and adamas (adamants), the letters nt have been dropped out before the gender-sign, as always in Greek¹ when the gender-sign is retained. The disappearance of n, in the perfect and supine forms of verbs, which contain it in the present and imperfect tenses, as in fundo, pungo, tango, is not, of course, to be explained, as a matter of euphonic necessity or convenience. Such verbs have their pure stems, which are found, as in Greek, in the preterite tenses, nasalized in the present and imperfect tenses, as likewise in the Greek in both voices.

Other words besides verbs are sometimes thus strengthened in Latin, as ambi (*ἀμφί*) Sansk. abhi; and inferus, sup. infimus; Sansk. adhas, low, comp. adharâs, sup. adhamas.

O. O is equivalent to Sansk. a, â, âu.

(a) os(s), a bone; asthi.

(â) vox, voice; vâch(s).

(âu) octo, eight; ashtâu.

Its correspondents in Greek are o, ω, ε.

(o) nomen, a name; *ὄνομα*. (ω) ago; *ἄγω*. (ε) oliva, the olive, *ἐλαία*, and oleum, oil, *ἐλαιον*.

O is frequently interchanged with u in derived forms: as sermunculus, diminutive of sermo(n); exsul (ex +solum); cultum (sup. of colo); robur, gen. roboris; publicus (for populicus) from populus; vult (for volit) from volo; and also homo and humanus. So, the ancient name of Modena was Mutina.

It sometimes interchanges with e, in the same word, as

¹ When such a combination would occur in nominal bases as *vs*, *vts*, or, *ps*, in Greek, the rule is, if the gender sign is retained, to reject the other letters of the combination as *γίγας* (*γίγαντς*); or, to reject the gender-sign and keep final *ν* or *ρ*, and lengthen the vowel preceding it, by way of compensation, as *ποιμήν* (*ποιμένς*); *ῥήτωρ* (*ῥήτορς*).

vertex and vortex (verto); vester and voster (vos). It is in derivatives sometimes changed to i, as in cognitus (cognosco).

By way of adding more weight to the stem-vowel, other vowels, and especially e, are changed to o, in derived forms, as so often occurs also in Greek: as socius (from sequor); sodalis (sedeo); proculus (precor); solium (sedeo); modus (metior); nodus (necto). These changes occur chiefly, in both Latin and Greek, in the case of nouns¹ derived from verbs.

P. Its Sanskrit equivalents are p, v, b. (p) palus, a marsh; palvala(s): pingo, to paint; pij and pinj. (v) porcus, a pig; varâha(s). (b) puto, to consider; budh: pestis, a plague; bâdhâ.

P, when initial, can be followed only by l and r of all the consonants. Its euphonic insertion between m and s, in perfect and supine forms, has been already described. Its Greek correspondents are π, φ, τ, κ. (π) palma, the hand; παλάμη. (φ) pars, a part, φάρσος, from φάρω, to divide. (τ) pavo, a peacock; ταῶς. (κ) lupus, a wolf; λύκος.

P is interchangeable in Latin with b,² as scripsi perf. of scribo; with v, as opilio and ovilio³, a shepherd from ovis, a sheep; and with t, as hospes and hostis, each having for their primary signification, a stranger.

Q. Q and qu represent Sansk. k, ch, p, ç. (k) quis, who; kas: quatio, to shake; kvath, to agitate. (ch) coquo (for poquo), to cook; pach (cf. πέττω for πέκτω): quæro for quæso, perf. quæsi; chesth, to seek. (p) quinque, five, panchan (πέντε πέγκε): (ç) equus, a horse; açvas.

¹ In German, and correspondingly in English, there are many instances of a change of the stem-vowel of verbs, to indicate distinctions of time.

As, singen, to sing.	Imperf. sang.	Past Part. gesungen.
" stehlen, to steal,	" stahl.	" " gestohlen.
" sprechen, to speak.	" sprach.	" " gesprochen.
" binden, to bind.	" band.	" " gebunden.

² So, Latin apotheca becomes, *vice versa*, French boutique.

³ Cf. Lat. pauper and French pauvre; and also German vater and Lat. pater.

Its correspondents in Greek are π , as *sequor*, to follow ; $\epsilon\pi\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$: and τ , as *quis*, who ; $\tau\iota\varsigma$ (for $\kappa\iota\varsigma$). With reference to the interchangeableness of q , or any other guttural, with p , or any other labial, in Sanskrit or Greek, compare with other examples previously cited, *proximus* (for *propsi-mus*) ; *vixi* (*vivsi*) and *nix* (*nivs*). So *tabeo*, to pine away, corresponds with $\tau\acute{\eta}\kappa\omega$ and French *suivre* with Lat. *sequi*.

Qu is not a diphthong in Latin, as in German and English. It had only, as in French, the simple sound of k . The vowel u was added, simply to make it capable of articulation. In early forms a similar combination of u with g occurred, as *tinguo*, *unguo* and *urgueo*, first forms of *tingo*, *ungo*, and *urgeo*. So in French we find *guérir*, *guider*, etc. ; and in English, *guide*, *guard*, etc.

Q in *qu*, before another u and also before t , becomes c ; as *secutus* for *sequutus* (*sequor*) and *secundus* for *sequundus*. So is it with *relictus* from *relinquo* and *coctus* from *coquo* and *concutio* for *conquatio* and *cujus*, gen. of *quis* (for *quojus*). In one word, *inquilinus* for *incolinus*, a reverse change occurs ; and in *quum* with its double form *cum*, we have two different spellings of the same word with the same pronunciation.

R. Its equivalents are in Sanskrit r , l ; and various consonantal combinations with r , as pr , dr , sr , kr .

(r) *res*, a thing ; *ras* : *rex*, a king ; *râj* : *rodo*, to gnaw ; *rad* : *rhedā*, a carriage, *rathas*.

(l) *rumpo*, to break ; *lup* and *lump*.

(pr) *re-* and *red-* back ; *prati*.

(dr) *racemus*, a cluster of grapes ; *draksha*(s).

(sr) *rivus*, a brook (cf. $\rho\acute{\epsilon}\omega$ for $\sigma\rho\acute{\epsilon}F\omega$) ; *sru*, to pour forth.

(kr) *rideo*, to laugh ; *krîd*.

Before s , r is sometimes rejected, as *lepus* for *lepors* (o being also euphonically changed to u) ; *flos* for *flors*, *mus* for *murs* ; *pulvis* for *pulvers* ; *cinis* for *ciners* ; in which cases s is the gender-sign. So *hausi* perf. of *haurio* is for *haursi* and *haesi* for *haersi*. But in such neuter forms as *jus*, *corpus*, *foedus* etc. the s is to be analyzed as a substi-

tute for r : and radical r is accordingly often changed to s, before nominal and adjective suffixes; as *flosculus* for *florculus* and *corpusculum* for *corporeculum*; *scelestus* for *sceletus* and *rusticus* for *rurticus* : while before t, especially in supines, radical r often becomes s; as *gestum* for *gertum* (*gero*), *questus* for *quertus* (*queror*) and *ustum* (*uro*) for *urtum*.

R is often assimilated before l and s : as *puella*, for *puerla* for *puerula*; *libellus* for *liberlus*; and *pellucidus* for *perlucidus* : as also *gessi* for *gersi* (*gero*) and *ussi* (*uro*) for *ursi*.

It is sometimes inserted into words by epenthesis, as in *sero* perf. *sevi* (Gr. *σελω*, Sansk. *su*, German *saën*) and in the genitive plurals of nouns -*arum*, -*orum*, -*erum* for *aüm*, *oüm*, *eüm*, Gr. *ων* etc. So *brachium* compares with Sansk. *bahu* and *frango* with *bhanj*.

R is often the representative of an original s in Latin : as *ara* for *asa*; *eram* for *esam* *quorum* for *quosum* (Sansk. *kâsâm*) *dirimo* for *disemo*; *diribeo* for *dishibeo*. So compare *nasus* and *naris*. In German and English likewise r and s often interchange : as German *war*, *frieren*, *hase*, *eisen*; Eng. *was*, *freeze*, *hare*, *iron*.

S. S represents Sansk. s, ç, ch, sv, ksh. (s) *scando*, to climb; *skand*. (ç) *saccharum*, sugar; *çarkaga*. (ch) *obscurus* (*σκιά*, *σκοιός* and *σκότος*); *chhâyâ*. (sv) *soror* for *sosor*, a sister; *svasri* and *vasar*. (ksh) *sipo*, to cast away; *kship*.

The correspondents of s in Greek are the aspirate, as *super* and *ὑπερ*; σ, as *studeo* and *σπεύδω*.

In some cases s initial is found in roots wanting it in Greek, as *scalpo* and *γλύφω*, *scruta* and *γρύτη*; and, vice versa, it is not found in some roots where in Greek it does occur, as *fallo* and *σφάλλω*.

S is dropped in the nominative from the end of any stem, where it would otherwise be doubled, as *as* (for *ass*) gen. *assis* and *os* (for *oss*) gen. *ossis*. It is also often dropped in the middle of compound words as *diduco*, *dimico*, *divello* for *disduco* etc.

For the interchange of *s* and *r*, see letter *r*.

S is assimilated before *f*, as *differo* for *disfero*; and it assimilates to itself in many cases, a preceding *b*, *d*, *m*, *r*, *t*, as *jussi* (for *jubsi*), *cessi* (*cedsi*), *pressi* (*premsi*), *gessi* (*gersi*), *confessus* (*confetsus*, for *confettus*).

S sometimes represents in Latin an original *d*, as *esca* and *esculentus* and *est*, he eats, from *edo*, to eat, for *edca* etc. So in Greek *ἐσθίω* and fut. *ἔδομαι* compare; as also Lat. *rosa* and *ῥόδον* and Sansk. *madhyas* and *μέσος*.

T. The Sanskrit equivalents of *t* are *t*, *st*, *sth*, *dh*. (*t*) *tendo*, to extend; *tan*. (*st*) *tono*, to thunder; *stan* (cf. *Στένωρ*, famous for his loud voice). (*sth*) *taurus*, a bull; *sthiras*. (*dh*) *terra*, the ground; *dhara*.

Its Greek correspondents are *τ*; and *Θ*, as *vestis*; *ἐσθής*, etc.

T is assimilated to *s*, as *quassi* perf. of *quatio* for *quatsi* and *missum* for *mitsum* (for *mittum*). *T* is also often suppressed before *s*, as in the nominatives *mors*, *mens*, *dos*, for *morts*, *ments*, *dots* and the perfects *misi*, *sensi* for *mitsi* and *sentsi*. *T* becomes sometimes *d* in derived forms, as *quadra* and *quadraginta* from *quatuor*, and so *mendax*, deceitful from *mentior*, to lie.

In the middle of a word before two vowels the first of which is *i*, *t* was in the later period of the Latin language pronounced with a sibilant sound, as is evident from the double spelling *ci* and *ti* used in such cases, as in *nuntius* and *nuncius*.

U and V. *U* represents Sansk. *u*, *v* or *kv* and *a*. (*u*) *sub*, under (*ὑπό*); *upa*. (*kv*) *ubi*, where, for *cubi*, as in *alicubi* (*alius+cubi*, or *ubi*); *kva*.

U is sometimes hardened into its corresponding consonantal form *v*, as *gavisus*, perf. form of *gaudeo*. Sometimes it is shortened into *e* or *i*, as *bacillus*, dimin. of *baculus* (for *bacululus*); and so *tabella* (for *tabulula*) dimin. of *tabula*; and *familia* formed from *famulus*. Other vowels frequently change in derived forms to *u*, but *u* seldom

changes to them as in *cultum* sup. of *colo*; *insulto* and *exsulto* from *salio*, compounded with *in* and *ex*.

The equivalents of *v* in Sanskrit are *u*, *v*, *b*, *k*. (*u*) *vacca* a cow; *ukshan*, an ox from *vah*, to carry. (*v*) *veneror*, to worship: *van*; *via*, a way; *vah*, to go. (*b*) *valeo*, to be strong; *bala*, force. (*k*) *vermis*, a worm; *krimi*.

Its correspondents in Greek are the digamma *F*, as *vinum* (*οἶνος* for *φοῖνος*); and *β*, as *volo* (*βούλομαι*).

V is properly a labial differing from *f*, only as being somewhat harder. The two sounds compare phonetically, as in English the two sounds of *th*, in *think* and *rather*, or *bath* and *bathe*. After a vowel and before a consonant, especially *t*, it changes often into *u*, as *lautum* for *lavitum* (*lavo*), *nauta* for *navta*; *cautum* for *cavtum*. And so also, vice versa, after a consonant and before a vowel or *t*, it changes into *u*, as *docui* for *docvi* and *solutum* for *solvum*. In some words *v* drops out and the previous vowel is lengthened as *votum* supine of *voceo*, for *vovtum* and *oblitus*, part. of *obliviscor*, for *oblivtus*. In a few cases it is changed, in combination with *s* into a guttural, as *vixi*, *victum* for *vivsi* and *vivtum* from *vivo*; and *nix* (for *nivs*) gen. *nivis*. In forms like *jūvi*, *fōvi*, *mōvi*, *cāvi* etc., there is a contraction of the full original forms, which were *juv-vi* (*juv-* being the verb stem and *-vi* the tense-ending, composed of the tense characteristic *v* and the person-ending *i*), and *fōv-vi*, *mov-vi*, *cav-vi* etc. *V*, when occurring in a syllable which was afterwards contracted, changed to *u*, as *neu* for *neve*, *seu* for *sive*, *nauta* for *navita*.

X. Its Sanskrit equivalent is *ksh* as *axis* (*अक्ष्ण*), an axle-tree; *aksha*: and its Greek correspondents are *ξ* and, in proper names sometimes, *σ* and *σσ*: as *sex*, *six*; *ἔξ*: *Ajax* and *Αἴας*, *Ulixes* and *Ὀδυσσεύς*.

X represents, as a compound consonant, *cs*, *gs*, and sometimes *vs*, *ps* and *ts*.

(*cs*) *vox*: (*gs*) *rex*: (*vs*), *connixi* perf. of *conniveo* for *connivsi* and *fluxi* perf. of *fluo*, for *fluvs*: (*ps*) *proximus*, superlative of *propior*, for *propsimus*: (*ts*) *nixus* for *nit-sus* from *nitor*.

In one word at least the use of *x* seems to be altogether arbitrary ; *senex*, gen. *senis*. The author can think of no euphonic analysis that will explain it.

X in the preposition *ex* changes into *f* by assimilation before *f*, as *effero* etc.

The change of *x* to *ss* or *sc* is noticeable in a few words, as *lassus* (for *laxus*) and *lascivus* (for *laxivus*).

Y. This letter was not introduced until a late period into the Latin alphabet ; and it was then confined to words borrowed from the Greek, in which *υ* had been previously used. As the Greek *υ* was in pronunciation the modern French *u*, its representation by *y* in Latin, in the middle of words, was very natural.

Z was borrowed from the Greek, and used only to denote foreign words.

No one who has not undertaken to compass the whole subject of phonology, for himself, in its many internal elements and external relations ; and to subject its facts and difficulties to a thorough analysis of his own ; and to adjust the results of his manifold investigations in all their separate and combined aspects into a harmonious scientific system, adequate to the wants of so great and so complicated a subject, — can have any just idea of the amount of earnest, varied and repeated thought and research required for its proper development. No one will welcome more gladly than the author, the sound of another's blast, drill or hammer, in these vast and but partially worked mines of scholarly exploration. His own effort has been, to throw a true and strong light on matters hitherto lying out of the field of scholastic vision, in this country ; and to him who shall give them a brighter and fuller illumination, no one shall shout with more gladness : All hail !

ERRATUM. — On page 691 (Vol. XVI.), of previous article, lines 2 and 30, for word *dadâmi*, I place, read *dadhâmi*.

ARTICLE VI.

A JOURNEY TO NEAPOLIS AND PHILIPPI.

BY HORATIO B. HACKETT, D. D., PROFESSOR AT NEWTON.

[*Prefatory Note by the Editors of the Bib. Sac.* — The Book Notices which have been prepared for our present Number, we have chosen to defer, in order that we may publish the following valuable narrative, which, although accessible perhaps in another form, will yet be new to our readers; and which, being peculiarly appropriate, has been specially revised and enlarged, for this Periodical.]

It was the writer's original plan to travel by land through Macedonia from Thessalonica to Neapolis, and thus visit the several places in that country (Philippi, Amphipolis, Apollonia are the others), which Luke has mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles. The principal object, however, was to see Neapolis and Philippi, and so much the more because they lie considerably aside from the ordinary route of travellers, and have seldom been described by persons attracted to them as places of biblical interest. On arriving at Thessalonica, on the 6th of December, 1858, it appeared necessary to modify this plan in part. The lateness of the season presented unforeseen obstacles. The rains had been uncommonly abundant, and had flooded the country. The streams were swollen, and many of the bridges swept away. The Turkish post between Thessalonica and Constantinople had recently been more than a week behind its time. Individuals, whose judgment I was not at liberty to disregard, advised me against this undertaking. Not to fail wholly in my purpose, therefore, I concluded to return to Volo in Thessaly, near the ancient Iolchos, and cross by steamer to Neapolis, on the other side. The passage occupies, usually, twenty-four hours; but a storm overtook us, and the voyage proved to be more than twice as long. We remained ten hours in one position off against Mount Athos, without making the least head-way.

The engine was powerless against the combined force of the winds and waves, and no harbor was within reach which it was deemed prudent to attempt to enter. Towards the close of the second day the storm abated, and the captain took shelter for the night under the lee of Thasos. A run of two hours the next morning brought us into the port of Kavalla, the ancient Neapolis.

Arrival at Kavalla.

Roumelia, which includes the ancient Macedonia, is a Turkish province, and does not excel in all the arts of civilized life. It was a pleasant relief, after a brief experience in the best khan (*ξενοδοκείον* or *κατάλυμα*, as the Greeks term it) which the place afforded, to be invited by the English vice-Consul, Frederick Maling, Esq., to make his house my home during my sojourn in that region. It is not enough to say that this gentleman treated me with as much kindness as if I had been one of his own countrymen; for I know of no title with which one stranger can approach another which could have procured for me a heartier welcome, or a more generous hospitality, than I received from him. It becomes me, at the outset, to make this acknowledgment, and to say, further, that I am indebted to his intelligence for hints and information which were invaluable to me in the prosecution of my inquiries.

I arrived at Kavalla in the forenoon of Saturday, December 11. A general survey of the place and the making of arrangements for the expedition to Philippi occupied the remainder of the day. The town is built on a rocky promontory, which juts out from the coast of Roumelia into the Aegean. The harbor, a mile and a half wide at the entrance and half a mile broad, lies on the west side. The more prominent geographical features are the range of hills on the west, known to the ancients as Symbolum, which come down near the shore, and connect transversely the eastern end of Pangaeus in the south, and the opposite end of Haemus, or Rhodope, in the north. Back of Symbolum lies the Plain of Philippi, flanked on the right and left by the other ranges just

named. Mount Athos, the Aghion Oros ("Ἁγιὸν ὄρος") of the present Greeks, is conspicuous in the south-west. The land along the eastern shore is low, and otherwise unmarked by any peculiarity. Samothrace, in the same direction, can be seen when the atmosphere is clear. The island of Thasos bears a little to the southeast, twelve or fifteen miles distant. A post-road passes through Kavalla to Constantinople, eastward, and to Drama and Thessalonica, westward. The further details will be more in place hereafter.

Historical Associations.

I assume here, for the present, that Kavalla is the Neapolis mentioned in Acts 9:14. Here Paul and his associates, Silas, Timothy, and Luke, landed in Europe on their progress to the west as heralds of the gospel. They proceeded from here, over Symbolum, to Philippi, and thence onward to the south of Greece. Paul traversed the same ground again on his second visit to that country, and on his return from Corinth, on his last journey to Jerusalem, came once more to Philippi, and embarked at Neapolis for the opposite shores of Asia. The historian of the party shows a peculiar interest in the Macedonian labors of the apostle. It is observable that Luke, who became his companion at Troas, drops the first person in the narrative at that place, and does not resume it again till he comes to the account of their sailing thence for the last time. It is possible that he himself spent the interval between the apostle's first and second Grecian tour in that city. It is certain that he dwells upon the events there with something like the partiality of a favorite theme. The most graphic chapter in the book, unless we except the account of the voyage to Rome, is unquestionably that which relates to Philippi and the occurrences there. The church which Paul was instrumental in planting in that city was preëminently distinguished for its purity and its efficiency. The name of Philippians has been rendered memorable forever by the loving epistle which the great apostle addressed to them. It is evident from its contents that no one of the primitive churches enjoyed so much of his confi-

dence and affection. The Second Epistle to the Corinthians was written in Macedonia, and in all probability at Philippi. Nor had the sound of Paul's footsteps hardly ceased to be heard here, before Macedonia was honored with the presence of another of the faithful witnesses. Ignatius, bishop of Antioch, passed through this region on his way to Rome, where he was to be thrown to the wild beasts in the amphitheatre. Having crossed from Troas to Neapolis, he proceeded to Philippi, and thence onward, by the Egnatian Way, to Thessalonica and Dyrrachium, where he took ship again and went forward joyfully to meet his fate. Such recollections exalt the interest of a visit to such places, infinitely above the attraction of "all Greek, above all Roman fame." I cannot doubt that I shall have the reader's sympathy in the attempt to bring up afresh this scene of apostolic energy and self-denial and triumph.

Excursion to Philippi.

I took the earliest opportunity to make the proposed excursion to Philippi. Mr. Maling, who had been there several times and was familiar with the ground, was one of the party. A Greek friend, a Macedonian by birth, who had accompanied me from Athens, went with us. On Monday, about ten in the forenoon, we started from Kavalla. The present route must be the ancient one, for it is evidently the shortest route between the two places, and crosses the hills at the only point where a passage could be easily effected. Just out of the gate, on the west of the town, we crossed a stream which came down from the right, and, at the distance of a few rods, emptied into the harbor. On the bank stands a magnificent plane-tree (*πλάτανος*), the unmistakable age of which must cover no small portion of the interval between our own days and the days of the apostles. The present trunk measures thirty-three feet in circumference, and when perfect must have been forty feet or more. It is partially decayed now; and the hollow, as was evident from the blackened sides, has been used as a shelter for the be-

nighted or the houseless.¹ A recent flood had swept away the bridge over the stream, except a single arch, and had borne the fragments into the sea.

Crossing of Symbolum.

For fifteen minutes after this the paved road runs quite near the shore. We passed a Gipsy settlement, within view, on the right. We begin then to ascend, and are climbing the eastern side of Symbolum. Near the commencement of this ascent the track of an older road turned off to the left, towards the sea; but, as I afterwards ascertained, left that direction, and, near the top of the ridge, fell again into the road which we pursued. Another stream was dashing wildly through a ravine on the left, along the side of which the present road is constructed. As we mounted higher the air became colder; and the country people, whom we met on the way to market, had their capotes drawn closely about their heads. A thin soil covers the rocky hills, supporting little more than thorny shrubs, a few wild olives and stunted oaks, and a plentiful crop of ferns and mosses; some of the last exceedingly rich and delicate. Looking back when about one third of the way to the top, Kavalla, with its port, made a fine appearance; and the summit of the promontory on which it stands, seemed directly opposite to us. The more open spots, which looked toward the sea, are thickly strewn with large boulders, thrown into every variety of position, as if just left there by the reflux waves. Symbolum, according to captain Graves, is 1670 feet high; but the road is somewhat lower, as it passes through a gorge with overhanging heights on the right and the left. We reached the watershed in thirty minutes from Kavalla. That town disappeared then, and the prospect was cut off both towards the east and

¹ A distinguished botanist (Prof. Gray, of Harvard College), informs me that a plane-tree of this description cannot be less than five hundred years old. There is another tree of the same species, almost as large, near the principal mosque in the town. It is still vigorous, and bids fair to run the race of other centuries. The plane-tree at Kephissia, on the way to Marathon, which has been so much admired, has a girth of less than thirty feet.

the west. It proved, however, to be a few rods only across the ridge ; and soon another scene opened suddenly upon us. First, the snowy peaks of Pangaeus in the south-west, and those of Haemus in the north and north-west, rose up majestically before us. A few steps further, and the entire Plain of Philippi and its grand amphitheatre of hills, the acropolis and the ruins at its base, were before our eyes, as if a curtain had been drawn aside in a moment by an enchanter's hand. I reserve a more particular description of the view from this point for a subsequent paragraph. The Pieric Valley, which leads down to the coast between Pangaeus and Symbolum, was very distinctly visible. It surprised me to see a collection of water in that part of the Plain almost large enough to be called a lake. The declivity on this side is more abrupt than on the other. The descent to the border of the Plain occupied twenty minutes. The paved road here, from the nature of the ground, must follow the ancient Roman Way ; though, in consequence of having been repaired so often, it may not be easy to distinguish the work of one hand from that of another. The hills jut out somewhat beyond each other ; so that, after reaching the bottom, we advanced, for a time, under the shoulder of a ridge on the left. The mountains which slope down from the north, reminded us strikingly of those of Hymettus. They presented the same puffed-out, swelling forms so characteristic of the Attic scenery.

Plain of Philippi.

The road, after striking into the Plain, was much less perfect than it had been hitherto. The soil is too soft to allow the stones to be laid firmly ; in some places they were gone altogether, and in others submerged beneath the mud and water. Yet the track could be easily traced, and the pavement reappeared every now and then. We passed several flocks of sheep and goats, intermixed, as represented in the parable. The abundant rain had so flooded the fields that the peasants, in some instances, were sowing them a second time. At half past eleven, A. M., we reached a large Turkish cemetery, which contained many monuments, of which the

material was antique. Some of them were marble pillars at the head of the graves, with the end wrought into the turban-shaped figure with which the Turks so often embellish their tombs. Many such pillars were lying on the ground; other more ordinary stones, taken evidently from buildings, were used for the like purpose. Latin letters, and occasionally single words, could be deciphered on the fragments. The great marble quarry in this region is the island of Thasos. The specimens here may have been obtained, originally, from that source, but were the immediate spoils of the fallen Philippi.¹ Nearly off against the cemetery, toward the middle of the Plain, was the Turkish village of Bereketli, which signifies "Plenty."

Ancient Monument.

In fifteen minutes beyond this cemetery we came to a khan, kept by a Greek family, where we stopped a quarter of an hour. Here is a large monumental block of marble, called in Turkish, *Dikili-tash*," "Upright stone," twelve feet high and seven feet square. It rests on a plinth, composed of two pieces of the same kind of marble. It appears to be the base or pedestal of some structure which originally stood upon it. It has a hole on the top, which may have been designed for the reception of a statue. There is an inscription on two sides, in large Latin letters, of which the names "Caius Vibius et Cornelius Quartus" are nearly all that can now be made out. The lower part of the block is mutilated, and the fresh color of the surface showed that pieces had been recently chipped off. We were informed that the Turks have a superstition that the stone, pulverized and taken as a potion, is a valuable specific, and that they seek it for that pur-

¹ I have since read that Belon, a French traveller, who was here in the sixteenth century, observed a vein of marble near Philippi itself. He would account in that way for the abundant use of this stone in the city and the environs. Paul Lukas, another and later French traveller, thought he could distinguish different kinds of marble, and conjectured that the better species was brought from Thasos. He also speaks of a quarry in the hill near which Philippi was built.

pose. The Greek innkeeper told us, also, that the cavity on the top was the crib (*φάτνη*) out of which Alexander's horse Bucephalus, was accustomed to eat his oats.¹

Near this khan is another cemetery, full of fragments of marble columns used as grave-stones. On the opposite side is a cluster of beautiful shade trees; and on the same side, at a greater distance, a mill, to which the water is conveyed through a flume from a sedgy pool in the neighborhood. The stream rushed along its channel with great violence. In the same direction, beyond the mill-race, are seen the ruins of a fortification on a slight eminence, which may have been some outpost of Philippi. The time from this point to the site of the ancient city was twenty minutes. There is no human habitation, in any direction, nearer the site than this caravansary. Beyond here, the indications of approaching an important locality are more and more numerous. Slabs of marble, broken columns, and chaplets, building stones, heaps of rubbish, attest the suburban extent of the town, though no doubt some of these remains have been brought hither from the town itself.

River near Philippi.

Luke states in the Acts (16: 12 sq.), that Paul and his companions, after being a few days at Philippi, "went out of the gate by a river side," and, sitting down there, spoke the word to the Jewish proselytes, who had a place of worship on the banks of the river. The expression implies that the stream flowed near the city; that they had only to pass out of the gate,² and were then shortly at the spot which they would reach. Many of the streams in the East are transient; they are full

¹ This story has at least the interest which arises from its having been repeated on the spot through successive generations. Belon was entertained with the same pleasantries, two hundred and fifty years ago.

² The Common Text has *πόλεως* (and so the English version "city"); but Lachmann and Tischendorf adopt *πόλης*, as do most of the recent commentators. The authorities are A B C D and the principal Versions. The laws of textual criticism require us to accept *πόλης* as the word from the first hand. Yet the remarks in the body of the page are scarcely less in point, if any one chooses to adhere to the other reading.

and swollen during the rainy season, but disappear in summer.¹ Mr. Maling had been there several times in the hot months, but found the water-course always dry. I was not without hope that the lateness of my journey would enable me, as one of its compensations, to see the river or stream (*ποταμός*), in our sense of the expression, which Luke speaks of as being near Philippi, and which travellers have so generally missed. Yet the subject, as we approached the ruins, had passed for a moment from my mind. I was intent on gazing at the memorials of the past heaped up before me; and the lower ground, directly under the line of the ancient walls, was not yet in sight. Suddenly, as we drew nearer, a roaring noise broke upon me; there was no visible cause for it; it seemed almost as if some convulsion of nature was at hand.² A few steps further, and the mystery was cleared up: there, rushing and foaming over its rocky bed, was a wild winter torrent, which had been formed by the recent rains. The proper bed of the stream measured, in width, sixty-six feet. One-half of this space was covered with water, varying from one and a half and two feet to four and five feet. The stones at the bottom were rounded and worn, and showed the action of a still more powerful current at times. Its course was winding as it ran past Philippi; and it is evident that the direction of the walls had been adjusted to that of the stream. It skirts the east or south-east side, and then trends off to the south-west. It forms a moderate cascade just below the ruins, and empties, in all probability, into the marsh or lake which is so conspicuous towards the west end of the Plain. It may be conjectured that, in ancient times, the banks off against the city were walled up, as is seen to be the case, under similar circumstances, elsewhere; so that the water was

¹ As late in the year as the second week in November, I walked dry-shod along the water course of the Ilissos, from a point opposite the Acropolis to its entrance into Phaleron. There was only one place where it was necessary to turn aside, and then in order to avoid a quagmire, and not from any fear of being drowned.

² The noise was not unlike that of the well-known 'Ain el-Fijeh, which bursts forth at the base of one of the mountains of Anti-Lebanon, and which the traveller approaches so suddenly through a dense plantation of fruit-trees.

spread over less space, but formed a deeper channel.¹ We crossed the stream ; and, at the distance of three hundred and fifty feet from its margin, found a break in the line of the dilapidated walls, which showed clearly where the gate had been on that side of the city. Travellers from Neapolis would enter that gate as we did in coming from the same place. Paul and his company must have entered the town here. It may be supposed to have been out of this gate that they passed when they went to preach on the river-side ; for the place on the banks, as remarked already, was near the gate, and situated as Philippi was, no other gate would have brought them so directly to the river as this. It will be seen that this vicinity of the stream and the gate tallies remarkably with the sacred text. It seemed to me, at the moment, to be one of the most beautiful topographical confirmations that I have ever traced out in sacred or classic lands.

The Present Ruins.

We were now within the limits of the ancient Philippi. Deducting the time for delays, we had been a little more than two hours on the way. Our pace had been faster than that of Eastern travelling, as usually performed ; and it may be correct to reckon the distance between Kavalla and Philippi

¹ The stream is no doubt the Gangas, or Gangites (ὁ Γάγγας τινὲς, οἱ δὲ λέγουσι Γαγγίτην), which Appian (*Bell. Civ.*, iv., 106), describes as near Philippi. It is impossible that this river should be the Strymon, which was a day's journey further west. It is surprising that such writers as Neander, De Wette and Meyer should have fallen into that error. Luke omits the name in conformity with a very common usage of those countries. I found, in repeated instances, that the people are accustomed to speak of a stream in their neighborhood merely as the stream or river, and often are unable to tell the stranger whether it has any name or not. I incline to think that we have an intimation here that the critics are right who suppose that Luke staid at Philippi until the Apostle's second arrival here. Being an inquisitive man, as we know from the proem of his Gospel, no doubt he sought out the name of the river on his first arrival, when his curiosity was still fresh ; and had he afterwards remembered the place merely as a traveller, he would have been led quite naturally to insert the name when he wrote his history. But if, on the contrary, he was there so long that his ear became accustomed to the popular expression "the river," "water," "stream," it is then conceivable that when he came to write out his memoranda or recollections he would pass over the name, and speak unconsciously as the old habit dictated.

as ten miles.¹ So many writers speak of a village on the spot, known still under the ancient name, that my first feeling was one of disappointment to find that this is no longer true, if, indeed, it has been true for these many years.² There was no sign of any human abode within the precincts of the ancient city. There is no village nearer than Bereketli, and that must be some miles distant. The old name is applied, no doubt, to the locality among the people, but on traditional grounds, and not because Philippi has any modern representative.

The present scene is one of utter desolation. It reminded me (though on a smaller scale) of the promiscuous heaps of Ascalon. The ruins are spread over an extent of several acres. The course of the wall may be followed very distinctly on the side towards the river. The remains of an amphitheatre are seen on the sides of the overhanging hill, where it looks southward towards Pangaeus. The seats are quite perfect, and rise above one another in tiers, as in the Dionysiac theatre at Athens. On some of the stones are inscriptions: a few in Greek, but mostly in Latin. Philippi became a Roman colony in the age of Augustus, and is so represented (*κολωνία*) in Acts 16:12. The chiselled words which the stones found on the spot have borne down to us from that age, certify the same fact. The most imposing antiquities there, are two lofty gateways, supposed to have belonged to a colossal temple of the emperor Claudius. They stand near each other, *vis-a-vis*; may be forty feet high; contain stones twelve feet long and four feet thick, and are constructed with exquisite taste and elegance. One of them is much shattered, and looks as if nodding to its fall. There is a Greek inscription on one of the displaced stones, which imports that the people (*ὁ δῆμος*) defrayed the expense of some votive offering in

¹ Mr. Maling on one occasion accomplished the journey in an hour.

² Even Meyer, in the last edition of his *Commentar über den Philipper-Brief*, 1858, speaks of the village *Fellibah*, as on the ancient site. Winer (*Realwörterbuch*, ii., p. 249), makes the same representation, and Alford after Winer. Yet Cousinery wrote thirty years ago: "La ville célèbre de Philippi ne renferme aujourd'hui, que des animaux Sauvages; l'oiseau de Minerve s'y régénère au milieu des débris."

honor of one of the citizens. There are several parallel trenches walled up with stone, which are evidently ancient. Fragments of pottery are scattered everywhere. But few pieces of marble are now to be found. On the west side of the city is a mill-race, no longer used, into which are wrought some finely hewn stones, which must have adorned a Greek or Roman edifice.¹

The acropolis, at the base of which the ruins lie, is said to be two thousand feet high. It is the last of the hills where Haemus sinks down into the Plain, and is connected with them by a narrow ridge, of inferior altitude, on the north. It consists of two peaks, which, as seen at a distance, give to it a saddle-shaped appearance. Several walls, at different degrees of elevation, guarded the summit. On the top are the ruins of fortifications, which show the traces of Roman masonry. It reminds one, in its general contour, of Acro-Corinth, though it is not isolated, like that, nor so huge in its proportions. It is difficult of access, and must have been almost impregnable against the ancient modes of assault.

The summer vegetation had nearly all passed away. A solitary rose² still lingered on the sunny side of the hill, where the amphitheatre³ is, and a few pinks hung partially withered on their stalks. Some plots within the area had been sown

¹ Belon, whom I have mentioned already, spent two days at this locality. It is evident, as one reads his description, that the ruins were vastly more extensive and complete then than they are at present. He speaks of a great number of statues; there is not one there now. The superb marble columns, both of the Doric and the Ionic order, which he mentions, all are gone. The remains of the temple are very insignificant, in comparison with those which he saw. He represents the inscriptions as very numerous. I could find but one which was at all complete. Unsparing depredations have been committed there within a few years. A mercantile company, at Thessalonica, which bears an English name, is said to have removed a large quantity of the material to Kavalla, for the erection of a warehouse. The remonstrance of some more liberally minded foreigners put an end to the Vandalism. A Byron's pen is needed again to expose the outrage to the indignation which it deserves.

² The ancient naturalists speak of the rose of Pangaeus as a much admired flower.

³ Travellers describe it variously as a stadium, theatre, amphitheatre. Though much smaller in all respects, it appeared to me to resemble the theatre at Argos, or the Dionysiac theatre at Athens.

with winter grain, which was just beginning to appear. A portion of the ground was converted into a range for cattle. The stubble of the last year's harvest showed that everything was exacted of the soil, which it could be made to yield. On the banks of the Gangas was a cluster of mulberry trees, the branches of which had been cut off for the sustentation of the silk-worm.

On descending into the plain, we had ceased to feel any inconvenience from the cold, and during the greater part of the day found the air to be delightfully mild and balmy. For a short time only, at noon, was the heat oppressive in a slight degree. The striking contrast between such a temperature and the sight and vicinity of mountains glittering with fields of snow and ice, was not unlike that which presents itself to the traveller as he looks towards the Apennines from the Campagna, or towards Lebanon from the valley of the Bukâa.

Reading of the Epistle to the Philippians.

Before leaving the scene, I sat down upon one of the prostrate columns and read the Epistle to the Philippians. The recollections, the place, the circumstances, brought home to me the contents with new vividness and power. I had just traversed the road by which Paul and his associates approached the city. The gateway where they entered was within sight. I could hear the rushing of the stream upon the bank of which Paul declared the name of Jesus and rejoiced over his first converts on a new continent. On my left passed the Egnatian Way, along which Epaphroditus, the bearer of the epistle, hurried with tidings of the apostle from his cell at Rome. The silent Stadium lay before me on the hill-side, of which his illustration reminded the Philippians, as he held up to them his own example for imitation in striving for the *βραβεῖον*, the imperishable crown, which is to reward the Christian victor. Within the space under my eye must have stood the house where the first disciples were gathered for worship and called on the name of Christ. One of the mounds around me may have been the

ruins of the prison which resounded with the praises of Paul and Silas, and which the earthquake shook to its foundations. I thought especially of the moment when the following great words were read and heard here for the first time, and of the myriads since that moment whose souls those words have stirred to their inmost depths, in all generations, and in all parts of the earth: "Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus: who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God: but made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men: and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name above every name; that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of *things* in heaven, and *things* in earth, and *things* under the earth; and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." One could not, under such circumstances, repress a new and yet more ardent prayer that the day of this universal recognition may soon come, and, in the meanwhile, that the spirit of the sublime passage may pass more fully into the lives of those who profess and call themselves Christians.

A Remarkable Tomb.

Though the lengthening shadows (*majoresque . . . altis de montibus umbræ*) admonished us to be gone, one object of interest still remained which claimed attention. About two miles from the ruins (I may err in the precise distance), off to the left from the line of the road to Kavalla, is a marble sarcophagus, which is well worth seeing. It stands on the edge of one of the roads which intersect the Plain. It is a solid block, except the immense lid or roof, twelve feet long outside, eight and a half high, and six feet wide. A great part of one of the sides has been broken away, and a hole laboriously opened at the upper corner of another side. Such mo-

nolythic sarcophagi are found in other parts of Greece.¹ The Greek and Turkish inhabitants have an idea that treasures were concealed in them; and the mutilated state in which they are found is to be ascribed, no doubt, to an attempt to get possession of the coveted riches. The reports of earlier travellers show that such monuments were formerly numerous here; but this is the only one of which I heard as still remaining.

A Night Journey.

The twilight was nearly past when we set forward again. The return to Kavalla was a night journey. The moon shone dimly and a few stars only appeared, owing to a hazy atmosphere. We saw occasionally shepherds gathered around their watch-fires, while their flocks were folded near them in the *mandra* or wicker inclosure constructed for that purpose. We were soon mounting the western acclivity of Symbolum. The stillness was unbroken save by the clatter of the horses' feet on the old pavement. The appearance of Kavalla, as seen through the shades from the brow on the other side, unenlivened except by two or three solitary lights, made on me a sad impression. The clear voice of the muezzin, as he proclaimed the hour of prayer from the mosque, was distinctly audible while we were yet on the mountains. We were not surprised that the gates of the town were closed for the night at so late an hour.² The consul despatched a messenger to the military governor; and, in the mean time, we betook ourselves to a neighboring khan, where we were glad to feel the warmth of a cheerful fire. An unexpected piece of good fortune awaited us here. In digging for the foundations of a house near there, a relic of antiquity had just

¹ Konze (*Reise auf den Inseln des Thrakischen Meeres*, 1860) describes a similar one, which he saw in the Island of Thasos. He also mentions the popular belief alluded to in the page above.

² This incident is liable to occur often in the course of oriental travel. It illustrates the origin of John's image of the heavenly city where all is peaceful and secure; where "there is no night, and the gates are not shut at all by day." All time is day there, and the dangers which night brings are unknown.

been turned up, at a depth of some fifteen feet below the ground, which the master of the establishment had in his possession. It was a marble tablet, quite perfect, on which was sculptured a group of female faces, singularly elegant and expressive. One value of the discovery was, that it served to strengthen the manifold evidence that an ancient people inhabited this spot, who were not strangers to the classic form of culture. The order to open the gate soon arrived, and thus closed a day which had fulfilled one of the most earnest wishes of my life.

Neapolis Identified.

It may be as well, at this stage of the narrative, to pause a moment on the question whether there can be any reasonable doubt, that the present Kavalla occupies the site of Luke's Neapolis. The majority of the earlier and later writers affirm this question; while a few dissent still from that conclusion. Of those who deny the identification in question, the most important representatives are Cousin ry, for many years French consul at Thessalonica, and the author of a valuable book of travels in Macedonia;¹ and Tafel, a German scholar, the author of a very able work on the Egnatian Way.² I propose to mention, briefly, the reasons which support the claim of Kavalla to be regarded as the ancient Neapolis; and, on the other hand, the arguments which are urged in favor of Eski (or Old) Kavalla, a harbor ten or twelve miles further west. To satisfy myself on this point was one of the objects which led me to undertake the journey.

First, the Roman and Greek ruins at Kavalla prove that a port existed there in ancient times. Neapolis, wherever it

¹ *Voyage dans la Macedonie*, Paris, 1831.

² *De Via Militari Romanorum Egnatia, qua Illyricum, Macedonia, et Thracia jungebantur, Dissertatio Geographica*. T bing e, 1842. Mr. Howson (*Life and Letters of Paul*, Vol. I., p. 338), says, inadvertently, that Tafel agrees with Dr. Clarke and Colonel Leake in placing Neapolis at Kavalla. Tafel opposes that view, and contends at length for the other opinion. See his work (*Pars Orientalis*), pp. 14, seq. Forbiger also identifies Neapolis with Eski Kavalla, in his *Handbuch der alten Geographie*, iii., p. 1070, but in Pauly's *Real Encyclop die* (v., p. 487) appears to follow Leake.

was, formed the point of contact between Northern Greece and Asia Minor, at a period of great commercial activity, and would be expected to have left vestiges of its former importance. Kavalla fulfils entirely that presumption. Fuller evidence of this remark (some I have given already) will appear in the sequel. On the contrary, no ruins are found at Eski Kavalla, or Paleopoli, as it is also called, which are unmistakably ancient. No remains of walls, no inscriptions, and no indications of any thoroughfare leading thence to Philippi, are reported to exist there. Cousinéry, it is true, speaks of certain ruins at the place, which he deems worthy of notice; but according to the testimony of others these ruins are altogether inconsiderable, and, what is still more decisive, are modern in their character.¹ Cousinéry himself, in fact, corroborates this testimony, when he says that on the isthmus which binds the peninsula to the main land, *on trouve les ruines de l'ancienne Néapolis ou celles d'un château reconstruit dans le moyen âge.*"² It appears that a mediaeval or Venetian fortress existed there once; but, as I was credibly informed, nothing else has been discovered, which points to an earlier period.

Secondly, the advantages of the position render Kavalla the probable site of Neapolis. It is the first convenient harbor south of the Hellespont, on coming from the east. Thassos serves as a natural landmark. Tafel says, indeed, that Kavalla has no port, or one next to none; but that is incor-

¹ Cousinéry was at the spot a short time only, and was hurried away before he could make the investigations which he had proposed. Colonel Leake did not visit either this Kavalla or the other, and his assertion that there are "the ruins of a Greek city" there (which he supposes, however, to have been Galepsus, and not Neapolis), appears to rest on Cousinéry's statement. But as involving this claim of Eski Kavalla in still greater doubt, it may be added that the situation of Galepsus itself is quite uncertain. Dr. Arnold (note on *Thucyd.* iv., 107), places it near the mouth of the Strymon, and hence much further west than Leake supposes. According to Cousinéry, Galepsus is to be sought at Kavalla. Rawlison (*Herodotus*, iv., p. 103), remarks incidentally, that it lies eastward of the Strymon, between Phagres and Oesyma.

² On p. 119 he says again: "*Les ruines de l'ancienne ville de Néapolis se composent principalement des restes d'un château du moyen âge entièrement abandonné et peu accessible.*"

rect. The fact that the place is now the seat of an active commerce proves the contrary. It lies open somewhat to the south and southwest, but is otherwise well sheltered. There is no danger in going into the harbor. Even a rock which lies off the point of the town has twelve fathoms alongside of it.¹ The bottom affords good anchorage; and, although the bay may not be so large as that at Eski Kavalla, it is amply large enough to accommodate any number of vessels which the course of trade or travel between Asia Minor and Northern Greece would be likely to bring together there at any one time.

Thirdly, the facility of intercourse between this port and Philippi shows that Kavalla and Neapolis must be the same. The distance is ten miles, and hence not greater than Corinth from Cenchreae, and Ostia from Rome. Both places are in sight at once from the top of Symbolum. The distance between Philippi and Eski Kavalla must be nearly twice as great.² Nature itself has opened a passage from the one place to the other. The mountains which guard the Plain of Philippi on the coast-side fall apart just behind Kavalla, and render the construction of a road there entirely easy. No other such defile exists at any other point in this line of formidable hills. It is impossible to view the configuration of the country from the sea, and not feel at once that the only natural place for crossing into the interior from the coast is this break-down in the vicinity of Kavalla.

Fourthly, the notices of the ancient writers lead us to adopt the same view. Thus Dio Cassius says (*Hist. Rom.* xlvii. 35) that Neapolis was opposite to Thasos (κατ' ἀντιπέρας Θάσου), and that is the situation of Kavalla. It would be much less correct, if correct at all, to say, that the other Kavalla was so situated, since no part of the island extends so far to the west.³ Appian says (*Bell. Civ.* iv. 106) that the camp of the

¹ See Purdy's *Sailing Directory for the Mediterranean*, p. 152.

² The inspection of any good map (as, for example, Cousinéry's), will justify this estimate. I have not ascertained that any traveller has gone over the ground between the two places.

³ Pococke, who passed along the coast, describes the position of Thasos in

Republicans, near the Gangas, was nine Roman miles from their triremes at Neapolis¹ (it was considerably further to the other place), and that Thasos was twelve Roman miles from their naval station (so we should understand the text); the latter distance appropriate, again, to Kavalla, but not to the harbor further west.

Finally, the ancient Itineraries support entirely the identification contended for. Both the Antonine and the Jerusalem Itineraries show that the Egnatian Way passed through Philippi. They mention Philippi and Neapolis as next to each other in the order of succession; and since the line of travel which these Itineraries sketch was the one which led from the west to Byzantium, or Constantinople, it is reasonable to suppose that the road, after leaving Philippi, would pursue the most convenient and direct course to the east which the nature of the country allows. If the road, therefore, was constructed on this obvious principle, it would follow the track of the present Turkish road, and the next station, consequently, would be Neapolis, or Kavalla, on the coast, at the termination of the only natural defile across the intervening mountains. The distance, as I have said, is about ten miles. The Jerusalem Itinerary gives the distance between Philippi and Neapolis as ten Roman miles, and the Antonine Itinerary as twelve miles. The difference in the latter case is unimportant, and not greater than in some other instances where the places in the two Itineraries are unquestionably the same. It must be several miles further than this from Philippi to Old Kavalla, and hence the Neapolis of the Itineraries could not be at that point. The theory of Tafel is, that Akontisma or Herkontroma (the same place, without doubt),² which the Itineraries mention next to Neapolis, was at the present Kavalla, and Neapolis at Leuter or Eski Ka-

relation to Kavalla in precisely the same way as Dio Cassius describes that of Neapolis and Thasos. See his *Travels*, Vol. II., p. 148. This agreement, in the mode of expression, as Pococke has no reference at all to the present question, confirms our inference from the language of the Greek historian.

¹ The camp, it is to be borne in mind, was a little further toward the coast than Philippi.

² See Hoffman's *Griechenland und die Griechen*, Band I., p. 125.

valla. This theory, it is true, arranges the places in the order of the Itineraries; but, as Leake objects, there would be a needless detour of near twenty miles, and that, too, through a region much more difficult than the direct way. The more accredited view is that Akontisma was beyond Kavalla, on the way further east.

Antiquities at Kavalla.

The antiquities of Kavalla, as I have intimated already, show conclusively that it must have been the site of a Roman or Greek city. One of the most imposing objects, among the first to attract the voyager's eye at sea, is a massive aqueduct, which brings water into the town from a distance of ten or twelve miles north of Kavalla, along the slopes of Symbolum. It is built on two tiers of arches, a hundred feet long and eighty feet high, and is carried over the narrow valley between the promontory and the main land. The upper part of the work is modern, but the substructions are evidently Roman, as is seen from the composite character of the material, the cement, and the style of the masonry.

Three or four miles from the town, on this water-course, are two other aqueducts, of much smaller dimensions. Just out of the western gate is a well, with a curb-stone indented with marks of the rope in drawing, such as the use of centuries only could produce. Near there are two marble sarcophagi, used as watering troughs, on which are Latin inscriptions, from the age of the emperor Claudius. In the stable of a khan, also outside of the town, are more than a dozen stately columns, two of them of elegant Ionic workmanship, which would be worthy of attention at Athens or Corinth.

A Winter Scene.

On one occasion I followed the course of this aqueduct for several miles. It was a frosty morning, and the Turkish fountain, on the neck between the promontory and the main land, was covered with thick ice. Beyond here the hills curve in-

ward to the left ; the aqueduct runs along the side of them, for the most part on the surface, but occasionally sunk a little below it. Several streamlets descend from above, and pour a part of their contents into the channel. In two instances, within the limits of my walk, the conduit crossed deep ravines, spanned by arches forty paces long. It is impossible that the fountain-head should be on Pangaeus, as some of the books represent ; for instead of going to the south-west, as would be necessary in that case, the aqueduct runs in just the opposite direction, i. e. north-east. The scene was thoroughly a winter scene. Thasos appeared white to the very shore. All the standing collections of water within sight were sheeted with ice. Immense icicles were hanging from the arches of the aqueduct. The thermometer was four degrees only above zero, and, before night, fell to zero. The streets of Kavalla were almost deserted. The people, who are much more sensitive in this respect than those of higher latitudes, cringed before the cold, as if it was piercing them to the quick.

The preceding winter had been one of uncommon severity. Even Symbolum was covered with deep snow. Several inches fell in the town itself. The road between Neapolis and Philippi, and thence onward to Thessalonica, became for a time impassable. Shepherds and travellers were frozen to death, and the flocks were destroyed in a frightful manner. The houses are poorly constructed for such weather, and the suffering of those within door, at such times, cannot be slight.

Paul in Macedonia.

There is no evidence that the apostle Paul ever travelled further north than Macedonia. Some of the hardships which he recounts he suffered from cold and want of raiment (*ἐν ψύχει καὶ γυμνότητι* in 2 Cor. 11 : 27). He may possibly have had some experience of this nature in this precarious climate. To such trials he must have been still more exposed during his travels among the highlands of Asia Minor,

if he was there in winter. It is very possible that his first sojourn in Macedonia, and perhaps a part of his second, fell in that season of the year. The apostle arrived in that country on his second visit early in the summer; for, remaining at Ephesus until Pentecost (as may be inferred from 1 Cor. 16: 8), and tarrying for a short time at Troas (2 Cor. 2: 12, 13), he then proceeded directly to Macedonia. But as he went, at this time, westward as far as Illyricum (Rom. 4: 19), and as he spent but three months at Corinth before his return to Macedonia at the time of the Pentecost (Acts 20: 6), he must have prolonged his stay in northern Greece into or through December. It is certain, at all events, that the rigor of a severe winter here is great enough to occasion no ordinary amount of personal suffering.

Discovery of New Ruins.

On one of the afternoons while I remained at Kavalla, the consul, who had several times applied for the favor without success, sent to the military commander of the town and obtained permission for us to visit the citadel. It is situated on the highest point of the promontory, and commands, in a military point of view, the city, the harbor, and the pass on the west, which was the key between Thrace and Macedonia. Several cannon are planted there, stamped with the winged lion of Venice, and among them a French piece, bearing the date of 1665. An old magazine contains a large stock of spears, arrows, and other antiquated weapons of the Middle Ages. One of the most interesting objects is a subterranean excavation, divided into compartments, like cisterns or baths, and resembling Roman works of that nature. Pieces of marble and a prostrate pillar indicate that a better style of architecture existed there once than the unsightly piles of stone and mortar which have taken its place.

On descending from the citadel we paid a visit to the governor of the city. Knowing the interest of travellers in objects of antiquity, he mentioned to us that excavations were then going on in connection with a house once occupied by

the Venetian governors, which had brought to light some curious ruins. We were not slow to act upon this suggestion. The place to which we were directed was in the upper town, and not far below the fortress. The ancient house was to be rebuilt; and some adjacent walls had been demolished, and the foundations turned up for the purpose of securing a proper basis for the new structure to be reared upon them. It was evident that some splendid edifice of the Graeco-Roman period had stood upon this spot. Many large blocks of marble were lying there, which the workmen had just dug out of the ground. The fragments of building-stones were numerous. Two or three pillars with the Ionic frieze, had been found beneath the rubbish. One such column maintained its upright position, imbedded still to a great depth in the earth. In a neighboring stable was a series of carefully hewn blocks, some of them thirteen feet long, and one and a half and two feet thick, resting to all appearance upon their original foundation; while other ancient stones had been placed upon these by later hands. On several of the stones are inscriptions, mostly in Latin, but one at least in Greek,¹ so mutilated or illegible as to furnish no connected sense, though single words are entirely distinct. There is part of a Roman arch in the wall which separates the upper and the lower town from each other; and on the opposite sides of the gate which leads into the fortress, or upper town, are two ancient columns, some twelve feet high.

Track of an Old Road.

I have mentioned that the present road to Philippi follows a slightly different track from an older one on the eastern side

¹ No traveller, as far as I am aware, speaks of having noticed any Greek inscriptions at Kavalla. Dr. Clarke says expressly, that none had been found up to the time of his visit. But even if Neapolis was founded in the Roman age, Greeks must have constituted a part of the population; and some trace of that fact might be expected to be found among the existing relics. The Greek inscription to which I refer is on the face of a block, wrought, at present, into the wall of a Turkish house near the excavations. It appears to have been what we should call a victualler's sign-board. It mentions the proprietor's name and occupation, and sets forth the variety and excellence of his viands.

side of Symbolum. I went out, one forenoon, for the purpose of ascertaining more exactly the relation of the two roads to each other. The deviation begins near the bottom of the ascent. I left the new road there on the right, and, turning down nearer to the shore, crossed on the hard sand and the stones, the stream which comes down the mountain through a deep and wild ravine. The entire object in changing the course of the road, appears to have been to bring the road from the left side of this ravine to the right, and thus secure a more direct line of travel. Just beyond here, after beginning to ascend, another smaller stream issues from the heights, and supplies a Turkish fountain at the foot of the hill. The country, just here, was wild in the extreme. Not a single tree, properly so called, unless a dwarfish wild olive should be excepted, diversified the landscape. Thorns, shrubs, and moss-covered rocks, were all that met the eye. The harbor as viewed here, in consequence of a slight projection of the shore, appeared like the figure of a heart. Still higher up, a bridle-path struck out to the left, toward Eski Kavalla, or Leufteropoli, or Paleopoli (as it is variously called); but, though I pursued it for a considerable distance, I could find no trace whatever of any ancient road in that direction. The old paved way, instead of inclining longer toward the sea, turned, after a time, to the right, or east; and, though the stones sometimes disappeared almost entirely, could be made out till it became manifest that the old and the new tracks fell into each other at the head of the ravine, near the watershed. This result is one of some importance, as showing that Neapolis could not well have been at Eski Kavalla; for a road, in that case, must have been constructed along the coast to the present Kavalla, which, if it was not Neapolis, must have been, at all events, one of the stations on the route from Philippi to the east.

An Unexpected Sight.

I then went forward a little distance beyond the point of junction between the roads described above. Kavalla disappeared, and Philippi had not yet come into view. It oc-

curred to me whether, by ascending one of the heights which overlooked the road, it might not be possible to see the two places from the same position. I am not aware that any traveller has spoken of this possibility. It seemed more than probable that some intervening peak, on the right hand or the left, would intercept the view, and so disappoint my hope. The experiment was made, and the result was one of the most gratifying incidents of the journey. It was not necessary to go very high up; one of the lower heights afforded the wished-for sight. Kavalla and Philippi could be seen, in their opposite directions, from the same spot. I am sure that a person standing there could interchange signals between the two places with entire ease. I felt, more strongly than before, how natural it was to regard the city and its port as one; to speak of landing at Philippi, though the disembarkation took place at Neapolis; or of sailing from Philippi, though the sea was ten miles distant.¹

The panorama spread out before me, as I looked towards the Plain, was diversified and extensive. The prominent figures were the mountains, which stretch away toward the north and the north-west to an indefinite extent, the Haemus range, and, nearer at hand, in the south-west, Pangaeus, which forms a distinct chain; the former more lofty, and, in the distance, opposing to the eye an unbroken region of snow; and the latter, more sharply defined, and thrusting its snow-capped summits against the clear sky with a most imposing effect. The outlet of the Plain around the foot of Haemus, where Philippi stood, in the direction of the conterminous plain of Serres, was the only very noticeable interruption in the circuit of hills which otherwise inclose the great battle-field.

The marsh, into which flow the waters of the Plain, seemed to extend almost from the site of Philippi to the opening between Pangaeus and Symbolum.² Trees, meadows,

¹ So familiar was this identification to Luke, that he leaves the verb which describes the voyage from Troas to Neapolis (*ἐκδιδρομήσας*), to describe the continuance of the journey from Neapolis to Philippi. See Acts, XVII., 11.

² This lake or marsh is not a perennial one. Appian says (*Bell. Civ. IV.* „106), that it existed at the time of the battle of Philippi, and was not without its influ-

and fields, recently sown, skirted its border. Other collections of water sparkled in the sunlight at different points. The village of Bereketli appeared to be near the centre of the valley. Several hamlets could be distinguished at the base of the opposite mountains, and others on the sides of them. Detached farm-houses were scattered here and there. The contrast between the vegetation and fertility here and on the other side of Symbolum was very marked. The shrubbery was more abundant and fresher, the trees larger, fields were green with winter grain, and farms or plantations were set apart for cultivation at the proper season. The atmosphere being very clear, it was possible to distinguish even the smaller objects. Among the ruins at Philippi, the gates of the temple were visible to the naked eye. The fortifications on the acropolis stood out in bold relief. A glass enabled me to discover the solitary sarcophagus on the edge of the Plain. Turning to the east, the view was an extended one of land and sea. Within the field of vision were Kavalla, its towering promontory, the harbor, Aghion Oros or Athos in the south-west, and Thasos, Samothrace, and a long line of coast in that direction.

Farewell to Philippi.

It was hard to tear myself from the scene, and say the last word of farewell to a place endeared to the hearts of Christians through so many generations. I looked and lingered, was anxious to secure the last conscious view, and yet would avoid it. But the reluctant step must be taken. I raised my eyes once more, and cast them hurriedly over the landscape, and then, turning away, Philippi, with its visible mementoes

ence on the fortunes of the day. It was an interesting circumstance that my visit happened to fall in the precise month of the year (which is known from various data), in which this battle between the Caesareans and the Republicans was fought. Some difficulties I am led to say here, surround still the attempt to reconcile in all respects the present topography with the statements of the Roman and Greek writers, and even to bring the writers themselves into harmony with each other. There is work here still for the critical historian as well as the geographer. The fullest discussion of this subject which I have seen is found under *Philippi*, in Ersch and Gruber's *Encyklopädie*.

of so eventful a history, was lost to my sight forever. Descending from the "specular mount" to the level of the road, in a few moments I reached the brow of Symbolum, on the side towards Kavalla. From this point every step of the way was descending except a short distance along the shore. A few marketers were returning from the town into the country. I endeavored to ascertain the name of the stream (χείμαρρος) which rolled and foamed through the chasm on my right, but without success. A rapid walk of forty-five minutes brought me again to the hospitable abode of the English consul. I found that the road which leads from Kavalla to the top of Symbolum, bears W. N. W., and that from the top to Philippi, N. W. by N.

Statistics of Kavalla.

The foregoing statements embrace the leading results of the journey, in relation to the points on which I was most anxious to inform myself. But it may not be improper, in a miscellaneous Article of this description, to add a few items of a statistical or geographical nature, respecting a region so comparatively unknown to the generality of readers.

Kavalla has a population of five or six thousand, nine-tenths of which are Mussulmans, and the rest Greeks. One third of this number is an augmentation within the last ten years. Fifty or sixty Gipsy families live on the narrow plain between the town and the foot of Symbolum. The town consists of an inner or upper part, inclosed by a crenelated mediaeval wall, and an outer part, or suburb, also surrounded by a wall, but one of more recent construction. Even the outer wall does not include the entire promontory, but leaves the western slope outside, part of which is tilled, and the remainder is naked rock. Dr. Clarke, and others after him, speak of a harbor on the east side of the promontory, as well as on the west. There is no such harbor there, in use, at present. All the shipping is on the west side. So indifferent a roadstead as the one there, hardly deserves to be called a harbor.¹

¹ Purdy's *Sailing Directory for the Mediterranean* makes no account whatever of any eastern harbor.

On the open ground near the aqueduct, wrestling matches, for which the athletes train themselves in due form and anoint their bodies after the manner of the old Greeks, are held, annually, in the spring. The people of the country assemble far and wide to witness the spectacle. Judges preside over the games, and the successful combatant is rendered famous for the rest of life.

A British vice-consulate was established here in 1858. Austrian, French, and Greek consuls have resided here for a long time. The principal articles of trade are tobacco and grain. The exports amount annually to about £360,000 sterling value, and the imports to £60,000. The district of Kavalla is one of the six divisions which make up the Sanjack, or province of Drama; the latter, again, being one of the two minor provinces which compose the pashalic of Salonica. The Sanjack of Drama is about eighty miles in length from east to west, and twenty-five or thirty in breadth. It is mainly separated from the more northern part of Turkey by the range of Mount Rhodope, which runs parallel to the coast line. It commences on the west, near the embouchure of the Strymon, and stretches along the seaboard a hundred miles to the east, including, besides Kavalla, the ports of Keremati and Lagos. The imports of the latter place are double those of Kavalla. The plain of Drama, or Philippi, is well adapted to every kind of cereal produce, and is already under such cultivation that large quantities of grain are shipped thence to other parts of Turkey, and to western Europe. It has been ascertained that cotton of the best quality can be raised there. A beginning has been made, and the prospect is, that, before many years, England (whose government is so attentive to these objects) will receive large supplies of that commodity from the ancient Macedonia. The city of Drama has twenty thousand inhabitants. The entire district is said to have a population of about two hundred thousand, three-fourths of whom are Mussulmans, and the rest Greeks and Gypsies, with a few Jews.

Anecdotes of Mohammed Ali.

The celebrated Mohammed Ali, Pasha of Egypt, was born at Kavalla, in 1769. The outline of this remarkable man's history must be familiar to every one. I learned a few particulars respecting him on the ground, which may not be so generally known. They may be told in few words, and certainly need not weary the reader.

The origin of Mohammed Ali was not so entirely obscure as some have represented. He belonged to one of the best families of Kavalla, but lost his father at an early age. He was reduced, at one time, to such a state of dependence that he served as a porter, or in some such menial capacity, in a warehouse at Thessalonica. The future viceroy, the conqueror of Syria and the Morea, actually began his career as a houseless wanderer, and a mendicant. It is honorable to the Pasha that he retained, through life, a warm attachment to the place of his birth. His countrymen always found him ready to advance their interests, either at home, or in his service abroad.¹

He repaired the aqueduct which supplies the town with water, and put in order again the dilapidated road which leads to Drama on one side, and to Constantinople on the other. He strengthened the walls and fortifications, and would have enlarged the harbor; but the people were afraid of European immigration, and declined the offer. His most munificent act was to build and endow a substantial madresseh, or college, at a cost of three hundred purses — about £15,000 sterling. The edifice is a handsome stone structure, attracting the eye at once by its minarets and porticos, and forming the chief architectural ornament of the place. Three hundred scholars are taught and supported in this in-

¹ He was often importuned to befriend applicants who claimed to be his fellow-townsmen. The figure of a human head and face is to be seen on one of the street walls at Kavalla, which it requires some attention to observe. One of the Pasha's ways of identifying a Kavallian is said to have been, to ask him what was to be seen in a certain place there, and then challenge him to describe the object.

stitution, entirely without expense to themselves. Nor do these appropriations exhaust the resources of the college. The funds are so ample, that doles of bread and rice are given out, daily, to half the inhabitants of Kavalla. Two ship-loads of corn, and other fruits, are brought from Alexandria, every year, for these objects, being derived from an estate in Egypt set apart for the maintenance of the college. The chief branches of study are Arabic, arithmetic, geometry, and a knowledge of the Koran. Pupils are received here from all parts of Turkey. I was allowed to visit this school, and to make free inquiry respecting its condition and internal economy. A collateral descendant of the Pasha is the administrator of this public charity.

Mohammed Ali died in 1848, at the age of seventy-nine. The feelings of the old man yearned for a last sight of the home of his childhood; and, shortly before his death, he paid a final visit to his native place. The house in which he was born is still pointed out to the curious. It is uninhabited, but kept in repair at the expense of friends who honor his memory. The time-worn veteran, on landing, directed his steps at once to the ancestral abode. He had outlived his generation, and saw only the faces of strangers among those who gazed upon him. It would seem that his errand had respect to the past alone. He spent but a few hours on shore; and, having occupied these in religious worship, under the roof which first sheltered him, hastened back to his ship, and the next day departed for Egypt.

Thasos and its Governor.

The island of Thasos, which lies in full view from Kavalla, is an appanage of the Egyptian vice-royalty. It was bestowed by the Sultan on Mohammed Ali, as a reward for his services against the Wahabees, a schismatic Arabian sect, from whom he recovered the holy Mohammedan places. The population, about ten thousand, is entirely Greek. The island is principally covered with pine forests, whence timber is shipped to Egypt for the public works of the government. Olive oil, honey, and wax are exported thence, in large

quantities. Its present governor, an Egyptian, resides at Kavalla, and is a man of uncommon intelligence, and liberally imbued with European ideas. The vice-consul being on familiar terms with his Excellency, it was easy for me to obtain an interview with him. In reply to the question, what were the greatest antiquities which he had found in Thasos, he answered: "The people themselves are the greatest curiosity; for they remain in the same condition in which their ancestors were more than two thousand years ago." There is some truth in this witticism. The inhabitants of the island are thoroughly Grecian; and the ancient manners and traditions linger among them, as in some of the other Greek islands, with remarkable distinctness and purity. Philologists say that the old form of the Greek future, which has been so generally displaced in the current Romaic, may be heard still, from the mouths of the peasants, in these rarely visited retreats of the Hellenic race.

Return to Athens.

In the course of the forenoon, Dec. 22, a steamer was signaled in the south-west, standing round Mount Athos for our port. It proved to be the Turkish steamer from Thessalonica to Constantinople, which, in consequence of the bad weather, had failed to come, as was expected, the previous week. The following day, at 10 o'clock A. M. I embarked for the Dardanelles, reconciled, as well as I could be, to the necessity of retracing, to some extent, familiar ground, and returning to Athens by way of Smyrna and Syra. The last views of the harbor and the coast were interesting and impressive. Pangaeus, with its snowy peaks, loomed up in the distance with a grandeur all its own. It was seen to consist of successive hills which lay back of each other far into the interior. The notch on the left of Kavalla, where the road crosses to the Plain of Philippi, was very striking. There is no other such depression, anywhere within sight, in the eastern line of the mountains which separate that Plain from the coast. The summits there fall apart, and leave an opening which affords the only practicable passage that rational men

could ever think of using as a thoroughfare. It was impossible for me to doubt, with this new evidence of so natural a communication between Philippi and the sea, that Kavalla, and no other place, must be the site of Neapolis, the ancient port of Philippi. As we receded further, the tops of Haemus came into view, glittering with snow-heaps which seemed piled up against the sky. Our track lay under the shores of Thasos. Such names as Lagos, Samothrace, Imbros, Lemnos, Troas, played an important part in the various tongues which were spoken on board. Early the next morning we passed Samothrace. This island was the resting-place, for a night, of the first Christian missionaries who crossed from Asia into Europe. Almost for the first time within two weeks, a cloudless sky hung over us, as we coasted along the fields of Troy. The "many-peaked Ida" displayed, proudly, the "snowy mantle" which she wore of old, when Homer's eye (who was not always blind) was turned thither. We were pursuing the track of Paul's vessel on his last voyage to Syria; and it happened to us, as was true in his case (Acts 20:14), that we stopped a night off against Mitylene. It was a strange sight, to see the hills behind Smyrna covered with snow, in contrast with the summer beauty with which I had seen them arrayed on a previous visit, in the month of June. A furious storm overtook us, on the passage to Syra; and the prudent captain turned back, and rode out the gale in one of the inlets of the Gulf of Smyrna. We were kept here from one midnight to another midnight. On proceeding thence we found ourselves, the next morning, opposite to Chios (ἀντικρὺ Χίου) the modern Scio.¹ No trace of the recent storm appeared in the sea, though threatening clouds deformed, still, the face of the sky. The clustering Cyclades lay around

¹ The reader will perceive that I have in this sentence changed hardly a word of Luke's *κακειῶθεν ἀποπλεύσαντες τῇ ἐπιούσῃ κατηντήσαμεν ἀντικρὺ Χίου* in Acts 20:14. I may be permitted to say that it was a source of constant interest to me on this circumnavigation (*περίπλους*) of the Aegean, as it proved so nearly to be, to read the maritime portions of Luke's narrative, and observe how many of the incidents of the voyage could be expressed in his language, and how nearly that language coincides with that which a well-educated Greek of the present day would employ in speaking of the same things.

us as we approached Delos. Syra, the central point of the steam-navigation of that part of the Mediterranean, had become almost twice as large, in the interval since 1852. We remained there a few hours, and then started on the last stage of the voyage. Amid thick darkness and torrents of rain, and through a labyrinth of islands on the right hand and left, the steamer plowed her way safely ; and, after a run of ten hours, cast anchor in the Piræus. Just a month had passed since I had embarked thence on this expedition to the apostolic places. It was a great transition to find myself once more amid the bustle and refinement of Athens, as compared with the desolate and semi-barbarous provinces which I had visited during my absence.

Attraction to the East.

After leaving Kavalla I found, in my portfolio, the following lines, which had been placed there by an intelligent lady in the family of Mr. Maling. For me they form, of course, a pleasing remembrancer of the journey and the friends it enabled me to make ; but I venture to insert them here, in the hope that their interest will be found to consist not wholly in the peculiar circumstances which brought them into my possession. The language and sentiment will be seen to be the more fitting if I add that they refer, in part, to a previous journey of the writer, which had embraced Egypt and the Holy Land.

What secret current of man's nature turns
Unto the golden *East*, with ceaseless flow ?
Still where the sunbeam at its fountain burns,
The pilgrim spirit would adore and glow :
Rapt in high thought, tho' weary, faint, and slow,
Still doth the traveller thro' the deserts wind,
Led by those old Chaldean stars, which know
Where passed the shepherd-fathers of mankind.
Is it some quenchless instinct, which, from far,
Still points to where our *alienated home*
Lay in bright peace ! O Thou true Eastern Star !
Saviour ! atoning Lord ! where'er we roam,
Draw, still, our hearts to Thee ; else, else, how vain
Their hope—the fair, lost birthright to regain !

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